procedural grounds.
The trial court also held that CGN
CORDILLERA GLOBAL NETWORK V. SEC RAMON
PAJE
G.R. No. 215988
FACTS:
On September 2001, DENR issued an
Environmental Compliance Certificate to SM
Investments Corporation for its SM Pines Resort Project.
The construction of SM City Baguio, located within the
Sm Pines Resort complex, was completed in November
2003. A few years later, SM City Baguio expanded its
mall on Luneta Hill to increase parking and commercial
space.
SMIC submitted an Environmental Compliance
Report to the Environmental Management Bureau as
part of its application to amend its Environmental
Compliance Certificate. The Bureau requested
additional information on the inventory of affected tress
to be included in the Report, SMIC complied. DENR
granted the Corporation’s request for the amendment of
its Environmental Compliance Certificate. DENR granted
a permit to cut and earth-ball the Trees that would be
affected by the Expansion Project. However, the permit’s
issuance was subject to several conditions, including the
public consultations and procurement of an
environmental compliance certificate. The City Planning
and Development Office of Baguio City granted
locational clearance for the project.
On Feb 27 2012, Cordillera Global Network filed
a complaint against SMIC, Secretary Paje, et al. It
Prayed among others, that a temporary environmental
protection order be issued to enjoin SMIC from cutting
the trees. On March 2012, Regional Executive Director
Baguilat gave the go-signal to cut the trees and on April
9, 2012, SMIC began to cut.
Pending resolution of the protection order, CGN
filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of the Temporary
Environmental Protection Order, the trial court grated the
Motion effective for 72 hours. CGN filed a Motion to
extend the effectivity of the protection order to cover the
pendency of the case. CGN then filed a petition to cite
SM Investments Corporation in contempt for violating the
protection order. On April 13, 2012, Judy Lyn Adajar et.
al filed a new Complaint against SM Supermalls. The
two petitions were consolidated.
CGN and Adajar et al. both alleged that the
cutting of the tress would severely damage the
environment and health of Baguio City residents. They
also assailed the regularity of the permits issued,
claiming that the Expansion Project violated zoning and
environmental laws. RTC dismissed the consolidated
cases, it held that CGN and Adajar, et al. possessed the
necessary personality to file the environmental cases
under the principle of transcendental importance.
However, their cases did not fall under any of the
exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Thus, the cases were dismissible on
and Adajar et al failed to substantiate their claims of
irregularities in the cutting and building permits.
GCN and Adajar, et al filed their respective
appeals before the CA, which was denied, upholding the
findings of the RTC, holding that there was no patent
illegality. Despite not being parties to the applications for
the compliance certificates, they still should have come
to the appropriate administrative tribunals to resolve
questions of fact.
CGN filed a petition for Review on Certiorari with
prayer for TRO and writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners insist that private respondents needed to
obtain a separate environmental compliance certificate
for the tree-cutting and earth-balling of the 182 trees
since the project was not a mere expansion, as private
respondents claimed, but a totally new project.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition should be dismissed
for raising questions of fact, which are not allowed in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;
No
RULING: It is well-established that a review of appeals
filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion”. The Rules of Court requires
that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under Rule 45, as factual questions are not the
proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. However, these
rules do admit of 10 exceptions, as listed in Medina v.
Mayor Asistio:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents
(10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
is contradicted by the evidence on record
In this case, the petitioners claim that the
issuance of a zoning clearance was tainted with
irregularity. Furthermore, they stress that the
respondents were not authorized to cut the trees as they
failed to obtain a separate environmental compliance
Upon careful review, this Court finds that this case falls
under the exceptions in Medina,  particularly: "(4) [w]hen
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts"; and "(8) [w]hen the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based[.]"
HA DATU TAWAHIG V. PROSECUTOR LAPINID
G.R. 221139
FACTS: Lorraine Fe P. Igot filed a Complaint before the
Cebu City Prosecutor charging Sumatra with rape.
Prosecutor Lapinid found probable cause to charge
Sumatra with rape and recommending the corresponding
filling of information, the case was subsequently filed.
Judge Singco directed the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against Sumatra. Following his arrest, Sumatra
filed a motion to Quash, citing as bases Sec 15 and
Sec65 of the indignenous Peoples’ Rights Act,
predicated on the ground that RTC had no jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, he asserts that the
present controversy is purely a dispute involving
indigenous people over customary laws. Judge Singco
denied the Motion, she reasoned that the IPRA does not
apply such case as it does not involve claims over
ancestral domain or to the right of indigenous
communities.
Sumatra filed this Petition for Mandamus, noting
that Igot had already brought her accusations against
him before the concerned Counsel of Elders and a Tribal
Court was subsequently formed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of Mandamus must be
issued to compel respondents to ”uphold and respect”
the Tribal Court Resolution
RULING: No; For a writ of mandamus to be issued in
such a situation, there must be a concurrence between:
(1) a clear, duly established legal right pertaining to
petitioner; and (2) a correlative, ministerial duty imposed
by law upon respondent, which that respondent
unlawfully neglects.
The capacity to prosecute and punish crimes is
an attribute of the State's police power. It inheres in "the
sovereign power instinctively charged by the common
will of the members of society to look after, guard and
defend the interests of the community, the individual and
social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the
guaranty of the exercise of his rights."
The basic precepts underlying crimes and
criminal actions make it improper for the State to yield
"disputes" involving criminal offenses to indigenous
peoples' customary laws and practices.
Viewed through the lens of the requisites for
issuing a writ of mandamus, there is no right or duty to
even speak of here. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act does it state that courts of law are to abandon
jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of
mechanisms applying customary laws.
HEIRS OF RENATO P. DRAGON V. THE MANILA
BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. 205068
FACTS: From 1976 to 1982, Dragon obtained several
loans from Manila Banking which were evidenced by 4
promissory notes. Manila Banking was placed under
receivership by BSP, the bank sent several demand
letters requiring Dragon to pay his outstanding loans. In
a Statement of Account attached to the final letter,
Manila Banking computed the amount Dragon owed as
P44,038,995.00, consisting of the principal amount of
P6,945,642.00, plus accrued interest, penalties, and
attorney's fees. Dragon failed to pay his outstanding
obligation.
On January 7, 1999, Manila Banking filed before
the RTC a Complaint for collection of sum of money.
Dragon claimed that he had already partially paid his
debts to Manila Banking, and that his loans with the bank
had been extinguished by novation. Dragon further
claimed that Manila Banking’s cause of action had
prescribed, since it failed to demand payment within 20
years from their due date. The RTC issued a decision in
favour of Manila Banking, it noted that Dragon’s
defenses of prescription and novation were neither
pleaded in his answer nor raised in a motion to dismiss.
RTC also found that that obligations had not yet
prescribed, and the obligation were not novated.
Nonetheless, RTC held Dragon to pay P6,945.642.00,
representing his principal obligation, plus the interest and
penalty charges, as stipulated in the Promissory Notes,
and not P48,028,268.98, per the Statement of Account
submitted by Manila Banking. Both parties filed for
Motion for Reconsideration, RTC denied both Motions.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC, finding that the
Statement of Account was not substantiated.
The Heirs of Dragon filed their Petition for
Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of CA.
Petitioners argue that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to award Manila Banking's claims due to
insufficient payment of docket fees. Respondent further
claims that it paid the correct amount of docket fees for
the Complaint based on the principal amount of
P6,945,642.00. It argues that it was impossible to
compute the interests, penalties, and attorney's fees it
should claim because the date of actual payment by
Dragon was uncertain at the time of the filing of the
Complaint.
ISSUE/s:
 Whether or not the Petition for Review on
Certiorari raises questions of fact not cognizable
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;
 Whether or not the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the Complaint of respondent
The Manila Banking Corporation in view of the
insufficient payment of docket fees. no
RULING:
1. No, the existence of novation and prescription of
an action is a question of fact not cognizable
under a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
To determine if there was novation, the facts on
record must be examined to show if the
elements are present. Here, the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals did not err in
finding that there was no novation of the
Promissory Notes. Novation must be clear and
unequivocal, and is never presumed. It is the
burden of the party asserting that novation has
taken place to prove that all the elements exist.
Likewise, the question of prescription of an
action is a factual matter.
2. No, This Court has consistently held that a party
may be estopped from questioning the lack of
jurisdiction due to insufficient payment of filing or
docket fees, if the objection is not timely raised.
The records show that Dragon raised
the defense of prematurity, and no other, in his
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated
January 31, 2000.78 Dragon later actively
participated in the proceedings of the case,
including trial on the merits. Respondent's
insufficient payment of docket fees was raised
for the first time before the trial court in Dragon's
Reply (To: Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration) and Supplemental
Opposition (To: Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Reconsideration), filed on February 26, 2008,
following the September 26, 2007 Decision. The
jurisdictional objection had been available to
petitioners long before then, but they failed to
timely raise it.
Nonetheless, the circumstances of this
case warrant an examination of the rules and
principles on payment of docket fees. it must be
emphasized that payment of filing fees in full at
the time the initiatory pleading or application is
filed is still the general rule. Exceptions that
grant liberality for insufficient payment are strictly
construed against the filing party. Moreover, the
filing party must show that there was no intention
to defraud the government of the appropriate
filing fees due it.
When respondent filed its Complaint in
1999, the applicable rule on the basis of the
assessment of docket fees was the Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 11-94, dated
June 28, 1994, amending Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, the basis for the assessment of
the filing fees for respondent's Complaint should
not have been only the principal amounts due on
the loans, but also the accrued interests,
penalties, and attorney's fees. These amounts
should have all been specified in both the
Complaint's body and prayer.
Respondent alleges that it could not
determine with certainty the accrued interests,
penalties, and attorney's fees petitioners are
liable for, pointing to the uncertainty of the date
when these additional claims would be awarded
by the Regional Trial Court. However, the
demand letters sent to Dragon prior to the filing
of respondent's Complaint already contained
respondent's computation of the accrued
interests, penalties, and attorney's fees
corresponding to the Promissory Notes.
Clearly, respondent is perfectly capable
of estimating the accrued interests, penalties,
and charges it demanded as of the date it filed
its Complaint. But despite respondent's demand
letters containing computations of accrued
interests, penalties, and attorney's fees, none of
these computations were mentioned in the
Complaint, either in its body or prayer. Hence, a
liberal application of the rules on payment of
filing fees is unwarranted.
SIMEON LAPI y MAHIPUS, Petitioner  vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 210731
FACTS:
In an Information dated April 20, 2006, Lapi, Allen
Sacare (Sacare), and Kenneth Lim (Lim) were charged
with violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No.
9165. On arraignment, Lapi, Sacare, and Lim pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. At pre-trial, Sacare and
Lim changed their pleas to guilty, and were sentenced to
rehabilitation for six (6) months at a government-
recognized center. 
According to the prosecution, operatives of the Bacolod
City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group
conducted a stake-out operation in Purok Sigay,
Barangay 2, Bacolod City. During the operation, Police
Officer 2 Ronald Villeran (P02 Villeran) heard noises
from one (1) of the houses. He "peeped through its
window"8 and saw Lapi, Sacare, and Lim "having a pot
session."
Having been arrested and their paraphernalia seized, the
men were then brought to the City Anti-Illegal Drug
Special Operation Task Group Office, where a police
blotter was filed. They were later brought to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to undergo
drug tests. They also tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
Regional Trial Court found the accused Simeon Lapi
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of  Violation of Section
15, Article II of R.A. 9165.
Lapi appealed to the Court of Appeals, but was denied.
He then filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lapi may still question the
validity of his arrest even after arraignment
RULING: No.
SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112
Petitioner asserts that while he failed to question the
validity of his arrest before entering his plea, his
warrantless arrest was illegal from the start. Hence, any
evidence obtained cannot be used against him. He
argues that P02 Villeran committed "a malevolent
intrusion of privacy"28 when he peeped through the
window; had he not done so, he would not see what the
people in the house did.
The Court has consistently ruled that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. We have
also ruled that an accused may be estopped from
assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for
the quashing of the information against him before his
arraignment. A
nd since the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused,
any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed
cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of
the trial court. We have also held in a number of cases
that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such
arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of
the accused.
POLO PLANTATION AGRARIAN REFORM
MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE
(POPARMUCO), Petitioner  vs. RODOLFO INSON,
Respondent
G.R. No. 189162
FACTS:
Sometime in 2003, a 394.9020-hectare portion of the
landholding3 owned by Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc.
(Polo Coconut) in Polo, Tanjay, Negros Oriental was
placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program,
On December 11, 2003, the Department of Agrarian
Reform received from the Land Bank of the Philippines a
Memorandum of Valuation, indicating the amount of
P85,491,784.60 as just compensation for 393.1327
hectares6 of Polo Coconut property. A Notice of Land
Valuation and Acquisition was then sent to Polo
Coconut. On January 16, 2004, a Certificate of Deposit
was issued to Polo Coconut for the said amount.
After Polo Coconut failed to reply to the Notice of Land
Valuation and Acquisition, the Department of Agrarian
Reform conducted summary administrative proceedings
to determine just compensation. It affirmed the valuation
offered by Land Bank of the Philippines in the amount of
P85,491,784.60.
Polo Coconut's title was canceled in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines.  A collective Certificate of
Land Ownership Award, with CLOA No. 00114438, was
issued. It was registered on January 30, 2004, under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-802, 10 in favor of
POPARMUCO members whom the Department of
Agrarian Reform identified as agrarian reform
beneficiaries.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Negros Oriental,
Stephen Leonidas, sent Espina a letter dated July 16,
2004, informing him of the Department of Agrarian
Reform's intention to proceed with the relocation survey
of the property. Polo Coconut moved for the suspension
of the survey, but Regional
Adjudicator Arrieta denied the Motion for lack of
jurisdiction.

Polo Coconut filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari questioning the propriety of subjecting its
property to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. It contended that the City of Tanjay had
already reclassified the area into a mixed residential,
commercial, and industrial land. It also assailed the
eligibility of the identified agrarian reform beneficiaries
POPARMUCO filed before the Supreme Court a Petition
for Contempt. Petitioner prayed that a restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction be issued, directing
respondent to cease: (1) from enforcing the Cease and
Desist Order in light of the Petition; and (2) from
reviewing the beneficiaries, as this Court had decided
with finality on the issue. It further prayed that this Court
hold respondent guilty of contempt of court

Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Polo Coconut. It found
that the Polo Coconut property was no longer an
agricultural land when the Department of Agrarian
Reform placed it under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. It also held that the beneficiaries were
not qualified beneficiaries.
In its September 3, 2008 Decision, this Court
in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Polo Coconut
Plantation Company, Inc.17 reversed the Court of
Appeals Decision.18 It confirmed the acts of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, through the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer, and declared the issuance of
TCT No. T-802 and CLOA No. 00114438 as valid. also
ruled that Polo Coconut did not exhaust its administrative
remedies when it directly filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals instead of first filing a protest
or opposition before the Department Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of July 7 2009 a
cease and desist order and correctness of March 12
Order may be discussed in a Petition for Contempt
RULING: NO.
The validity of the July 7, 2009 Cease and Desist Order
and the correctness of the March 12, 2010 Order will not
be discussed in this Petition for Contempt. They should
instead be tackled in a more appropriate mode and
forum. Petitioner had appealed the Order partially
granting the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion and the July
14, 2010 Order82 denying their Motion for
Reconsideration. In an April 3, 2013 Order, 83 the
Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit.

On June 30, 2009, 164 alleged regular farmworkers of

Polo Coconut (Alcantara, et al.) filed a Petition for
Inclusion as qualified beneficiaries in TCT No. T-
802/CLOA No. 00114438 and Exclusion of those named
as beneficiaries therein. They contend that the
Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders were not
qualified beneficiaries under Section 22 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

On July 1, 2009, Alcantara, et al. also filed a Petition for

Immediate Issuance of a Cease and Desist Order and/or
Injunction.27 They averred that the Certificate of Land
Ownership Award holders had attempted to occupy the
property

even without authority from the Department of Agrarian

Reform.

Regional Director Inson issued a cease and desist order.

POPARMUCO members, who are Certificate of Land

Ownership Award holders, filed a Motion to Quash the
Cease and Desist Order with Motion for
Reconsideration.34 They alleged that they were not given
prior notice of the filing of the Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion,35and that the Cease and Desist
Order defied this Court's September 3, 2008
Decision.36 Further, they were indeed qualified under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law as their families
were landless farmworkers.