New conception of biolaw1. DefinitionBefore saying what biolaw is, I will justify what it is not.

For
this, I need to delimit it,both bioethics and other branches of traditional law. I carry out the above
inthe next two paragraphs. Then I offer more specific definitions of biolaw,as well as addressing its
need, scope, contributions and its possible constitutionalization.1.1. Why biolaw is not bioethicsA
correct, valid and true definition of biolaw must clearly delimit it frombioethics. In the first place,
biolaw unfolds on a different normative plane from that ofbioethics, since this discipline
essentially pursues deliberative purposes,designing various models of reasoning to make moral
decisions aboutscopes and ethical consequences of clinical and biomedical practices. On the other
hand theBiolaw has not only ends, but also prescriptive effects of legal scopebinding, so that its
normative universe is law and not ethics.Second, biolaw is not part of bioethics. Namely, it does
not represent a kind of sub-branch that must address the legal scope of bioethical problems.It is a
serious mistake to consider (as much of the Mediterranean School does, forexample) that biolaw
has as its object of study bioethics and notbiomedicine, since that arbitrarily distorts the meaning
of this new discipline, andkeeps it a slave to bioethics, confusing and supplanting normative plans
andsubtracting from the biolaw its legally binding nature.Third, assuming a principled model,
biolaw cannotbe based on principles of common morality as bioethics does. The above,it would
assume that there is no difference between bioethics and biolaw. Accept thatdeliberation in
biolaw must be founded on general ethical principles is a mistakemethodological and
epistemological. It is a methodological error because it reduces the scopeprocedural rules of
biolaw in the field of ethics, preventing its extension (unless it ismake an arbitrary leap, as is the
case of the European School) to the jurisdictional context of theright. In this way, biolaw would be
absolutely incapable of generating modelsbinding laws for the legal regulation of biomedical
practices, which isprecisely a shortcoming of all the schools analyzed in this chapter. On the other
hand,biolaw has its own epistemological status that is not assimilated to that of bioethics.Indeed,
biolaw configures an interdisciplinarity different from that of bioethics, witha scope capable of
generating and applying binding rules for the new scenarios of thebiomedicine and biotechnology.
Also, and beyond traditional law, biolawis able to recategorize classical legal institutions and
contribute new elementsfor legal argumentation. Finally, biolaw overcomes the limitations of
thelegal dogmatics that unfolds in isolated and univocal branches of law. For thehimself, is capable
of identifying and developing new legal categories and subjective rights,integrating them to the
totality of a legal system.Fourth, it is an error to affirm that biolaw juridifies bioethics or
thatbioethics moralizes biolaw. Without denying a relationship between both disciplines, which
isstrictly speaking, contingent and not necessary, it is important to define its normative content.
HeBiolaw is not an instrument for the evolution of bioethics. It is different to accept that,In the
historical course of both disciplines, they colonized each other,especially at a discursive level.
European Community jurisprudence was filled with

Page 43

bioethical semantics, and the same thing happened with the rulings in the US courts.
WithoutHowever, this does not, under any circumstances, prove that there is a necessary
relationshipbetween both disciplines and that, therefore, biolaw cannot be justified or understood
withoutbioethics. Can law be understood without ethics? Of course yes. And for that noit is
required to be an ideological positivist, but only to separate both fieldsepistemological.Fifth, due
to its eminently dialogical and deliberative nature, theBioethics offers plenty of room for the
generation of emotivist models ofreasoning, where very subjective aspects of deliberation acquire
quiteleadership. These include the consideration of the values at stake in a casedetermined and
the collision between professional duties and wishes of patients or subjects ofexperimentation.
Those non-emotive models, such as principlism, for example,determine general norms too vast to
accommodate the increasing specificityof biomedical problems. Biolaw does not engender
emotivist normative modelsnor does it work with general norms of common morality. To choose a
modelprincipialist should be an arithmetic calculation design that guarantees the objectivity ofthe
decision beyond particular inclinations, beliefs and preferences. While theBiolaw must seek social
consensus and must not be based on a model of pacttacit social society, from which
biotechnological advances are introduced into society andmarket, assuming an implicit consensus
of the world's inhabitants, should notbe based merely on said consensuses, which can often be
arbitrary,fickle and adjusted to the interests of certain dominant groups in the public sphere.Sixth,
bioethics has a more eclectic normative universe than that of thebiolaw. This phenomenon causes
deliberation in bioethics to be situated,indistinctly, in any of its normative dimensions, namely,
ethical theories,principles of common morality, professional rules and procedures. This is precisely
thebecause most people who apply principlism to deliberate inbioethics do not know exactly how
to apply it, since four dimensions coexist in itregulations that are not always consubstantial, but
are often inhibitedmutually. Biolaw represents a comprehensive and non-fragmented approach to
conflictlegal emerged in the bioscientific field. It does not offer deliberative phases, many times

Page 44

disengaged from each other. The biolaw does not receive or reason about the problemslegal
theories from fossilized legal theories or from existing norms of lawtraditional. Biolaw creates new
normative universes, in tune with the new oneslegal problems arising from bioscientific advances
and enhancements.In this sense, the normative dimensions of bioethics are encapsulated
orintrinsic, which means that the normative scope of its prescriptive plans isdetermined by theory,
principle, norm or procedure. On the other hand theBiolaw has an extrinsic normative content,
since it colonizes other branches of thelaw, recategorizing institutions of traditional law, without
necessarilyin norms pre-established by classical law.1.2. The crisis of the jurisdiction of
biolawWhere does the authority of biolaw come from as a device that engenders regulationof
biomedical practices? Who has the suitability to exercise which we cancall “bio-legal profession”
and thus contribute to the creation and construction of a correctunderstanding of the nature of
the discipline?It is true that biolaw could be defined as a multidiscipline, in thesense that interacts
in a rather essential way with science, ethics and the sameright. Namely, there is a crisis of the
jurisdiction of biolaw, since this can beclaimed, both by scientists, as by lawyers and bioethicists.
This statute of thebiolaw, added to its various interpretations, have diminished its legitimacy in the
spacepublic and also in academia, whose members view with skepticism the value andreach that
the new discipline may have, beyond bioethics and traditional law.This supposed breach of the
jurisdiction of biolaw is mythological. The biolawit is not a multidiscipline, although it has a
multifactorial epistemological dimension. OfIn fact, as we will see later, biolaw has a veryspecific
and its purpose is to regulate it, trading with other conceptual areasdisciplinary, such as ethics and
science, but also, and very especially, optimizingand refreshing other branches of law. This
interaction and influence of biolaw on

Page 45
other legal spaces make it, rather, a transdiscipline, namely, aepistemology that radiates to other
branches of law, optimizing them and expanding their castcategorical and conceptual. Therefore,
this biolaw skill does not meaneclecticism, but ductility.The real cause of this crisis lies in another
event that I will present nowsame. It is a tacit agreement (something like a social pact), but at the
same time,institutionalized, that biomedical science practices need regulation, notonly ethical, but
also legal. While the legally binding regulation ofbiosciences is increasingly profuse in the world, it
is also imprecise, incomplete and,often ineffective. This is precisely due to the true crisis of
jurisdictionof biolaw. This crisis does not respond to its supposed multidisciplinarity or
apparenteclecticism, but rather to widespread ignorance about its nature and
valueepistemological, which has impeded, in a stubborn and systematic way,
itsinstitutionalization, despite the clear evidence of its conceptual development that identifies
it,both bioethics and other branches of traditional law.Indeed, most of the regulation of
biomedical practices in the world hasproliferated piecemeal and with very little conceptual
content. It couldargue that the regulatory systematization of biolaw occurs in the field
ofinternational biolaw, but I have already shown that this is only a cast ofinstruments with legally
binding provisions and recommendations of null value.So, many regulations, provisions, and
jurisprudence emerge as a result of thesocial pressure and the eventual work of legislative or
executive commissions that do not knowreally on the subject and, worse still, they are reluctant to
seek the advice of biojurists whohave deepened in a relevant way in the reception, intellection
and understanding of thetrue legal scope of bioscientific practices.This engenders a logical distrust
of biolaw. The reasons arefundamentally two: i) the public space (and many legislators, legal
operators andofficials) believe that these are issues that concern bioethics and not biolaw,ii) the
controversy generated by the ineffectiveness with which practices have been regulated up to
nowbiomedical activities in the world, which constitutes, ultimately, a criticism and ainterpellation
to the biojurista.

Page 46

The little institutionalization of biolaw and its consequent lack of legitimation,both in academia
and in public space, it is due precisely to mistrust andskepticism that it provokes. This has also
been the responsibility of those who have addresseddiscipline in recent decades, from a
promiscuous relationship with bioethics. Isobsession to understand biolaw from bioethics has also
prevented itsinstitutionalization as an independent field.In the same sense, the marked
naturalistic understanding that has given content todifferent epistemologies, constitutes a barrier
for biolaw to legitimizepublicly as an autonomous branch of law, capable of identifying and
defining something elsethat principles or general deliberative referents for the regulation of
biomedicine.For this reason, the majority of those who are linked to biolaw can only achievea
biased approach to discipline, as they lack the skills andknowledge to reflect, reason and,
eventually, resolve bio-legal conflictslast generation.The apathy and opacity with which the so-
called biolaw specialists understandThis field has represented a hard obstacle for the social and
academic legitimation of thediscipline. In fact, just carry out a little internet search for articles.that
in their title they use the word "biolaw" to realize that the term is usedto attract attention, to refer
to an allegedly legalized bioethics, or topoint to traditional law trying to understand the legal
scope of the newinventive bioscience. Is that biolaw? Of course not.In those articles, which are
many and, which, for obvious reasons, I do not quote here, theAuthors, either by mistake or by
choice (which would be even worse), use with total confidencethe term “biolaw” to refer,
ultimately, to something that this disciplineclearly not.Therefore, the jurisdiction of biolaw must
be exercised by those professionalsthat have, at least, the following characteristics:1. They
understand biolaw as an independent branch of traditional lawwith all that that implies.2. They
understand and apply biolaw without considering it a parasite of bioethics.3. They reason bio-legal
problems beyond common sense or morality

Page 47

prevalent socio-cultural.4. They have relevant knowledge of the scope and nature of the
practicesnext-generation bioscientists.5. They have the ability to deploy logical arguments that
unmaskfallacies.6. They are able to elaborate dense and coherent epistemological arguments.7.
Possess meta-law expertise, namely, they can address issues withinof biolaw and on biolaw.8.
They know theories and deliberative models that can provide plausible criteriato be specified in
more binding value rules.9. They have relevant knowledge of the shortcomings shown, at least, by
theconstitutional law, criminal law, administrative law and civil law,to receive and correctly
understand the legal scope of the techniquesbiomedical.10. They are dedicated to thinking and
addressing biolaw as the main task of their lives.11. They have the ability for precise conceptual
analysis of the meaning, scopeand legal nature of a key issue for biolaw, such as, for example,PGD,
CRISPR, and status of preimplanted embryos, among others.12. They are able to predict and
expose, without prejudice, and with impartiality andrationality, the appropriate or inappropriate
consequences of differentharmful arguments that could fossilize in the social collective.13. Have
the ability, ability and willingness to work and think in environmentsplural and
transdisciplinary.14. They are capable of designing and applying biolaw public policies, with an
impactconceptual, institutional and social.15. They understand biolaw as a biocentric
epistemological field,interspecies, and rid of the erroneous paradigm that naturebiological and
genetic is unchangeable.Therefore, the strength of the bio-legal gaze compared to the traditional
one unfoldsin the ability of biolaw to grant more certainty and legal security to regulation

Page 48

of biomedicine, and in contributing to the categorical expansion of other branches of law.

Ofschematized, but more exhaustive, this ability is reflected as followsway:Traditional
lawBiolawLiteral-Read the phenomenon of legal scope.-Understand its meaning.Hermeneutical-It
interprets the phenomenon of legal scope.-Create new senses.Reagent-Regulates, generally, after
theoccurrence of an event.Proactive-Regulates before the occurrence of
theevent.Intradisciplinary-Operates, generally, encapsulated withinof univocal
branches.Interdisciplinary and Transdisciplinary-It is displayed in tune with other fieldsknowledge
and other branches of law.Univocal-Search and generally admit apossible answer.Mistaken-Looks
for and supports a plausible range ofequally relevant answers.Paradigmatic-It is based, necessarily,
on archetypeslegal-epistemologicalAnomalous-It is not based, necessarily on archetypeslegal-
epistemological 1Conservative-Work with and from categories of lawtraditional
positive.Innovative-Works with bio-legal concepts (thesame of the law, but
expandedcategorically).ReductionistAmplifier1 Namely, biolaw seeks to rethink and, if necessary,
epistemologically expand categories oftraditional law. Examples of that are the concepts of future
person and non-human person, thislast, present in the case of the orangutan Sandra, who was
granted habeas corpus, in a rulingunpublished of Room II of the Criminal Cassation Chamber of
Buenos Aires, recognizing it, effectively, asnon-human person. Therefore, the contribution that the
biolaw perspective represents is very relevant, sinceinvites us to generate debate and discussion
about the statute, not only legal, but also ontological, of manyconcepts of traditional law, which
can result in the optimization of regulation and legislationon biomedical issues, as well as on the
rights of animals and the environment.

Page 49

-It does not identify new legal categories. -Contributes categorically to other branches of thelaw,
identifying new institutionslegal.Explanatory-Does not seek or pretend, necessarily,create
knowledge.Extensive-One of its purposes is to createknowledge.Anthropocentric-It generally
thinks of life as lifehuman.Biocentric-Think about life as a whole. twoNational- Regular search
within the orderlegal.International- Regular search between the orderslegal.Therefore, biolaw is a
new legal epistemology, a new modeldeliberative, a new hermeneutical approach and a new
branch of law. I will try thetruth of this statement in the next paragraph.1.3. Biolaw as an
epistemology, model, approach and branchI have just stated that biolaw represents a new legal
epistemology, a newdeliberative model within law, a new hermeneutical approach to sciencelegal,
and a new branch of law that optimizes the scope and legal density of othertraditional branches of
law. All these dimensions are consubstantial, soSaying "epistemology" is not contradictory with
"approach" or "model", but rather indicates anew legal universe, ductile but not eclectic,
multifactorial but not dispersed. I will justifythis immediately.Biolaw constitutes a new
epistemology because it clearly has2 Consistent with the previous quote, and although it has not
been the subject of this work, it is important to clarify that thebiolaw, in one of its facets, seeks
not only to regulate the lives of human beings among themselves, but also toalso with its natural
and animal environment.

Page 50

recognizable conceptual and institutional dimensions. In this same chapter,discussed at least four
different conceptions of biolaw with their respectiveinstitutional supports, namely, the academic
centers and the doctrinants or theoreticians thatThey have developed these approaches to this
new field of knowledge.It is clear, then, that biolaw has a disciplinary dimensionsystematized that
has evolved since its inception and has opted fordifferent conceptualizations with their respective
institutional references. Saidconceptions of biolaw, beyond their vicinity, present a diverse
theoretical density,different categories, different purposes, different regulatory scopes,
differentfoundation, and unequal hermeneutics, which allows us to affirm that it is aboutdifferent
conceptual approaches to the same event.On the other hand, the biolaw is capable of generating
deliberative plexuses andspecific argumentative to adjust to the specificity of legal
disputesemerging as a result of the application and proliferation of new inventionsbiotechnology.
For this reason, biolaw represents a new deliberative modelwithin the law, since it has the ability
to develop articulations within thefocused nature of biomedical science practices, providing
categories ofmeaning adjusted to the scope of said inventions, which is not necessarilypresent in
traditional law.Being a new deliberative model, biolaw provides variousmeaningful connections for
the bio-legal regulation of genetic practices, for example,which seems to be impossible for
classical legal science. Therefore, biolaw, whenconsolidate itself as a new model of legal
deliberation and argumentation, it is capable ofgenerate criteria and guidelines of conduct,
regulations and policies for the receptionof biomedicine as a whole. In addition, it has the ability
to recategorize otheralready typified models of law and coordinate and articulate them
institutionally. ByThis, being a new deliberative model, biolaw also assumes a status asinstrument
for the evolution of law, intervening and optimizing it.Biolaw is also a new hermeneutical
approach within law thatidentifies new interpretation criteria that are received with greater
certainty and securitylegal legal complications of bioscientific practices. Due to those criteria of

Page 51

interpretation, which are in tune with the unprecedented legal complexity of thenew biosciences,
biolaw is capable of identifying new possibilities of damage thatSuch inventions can cause human
beings and extrahuman nature, generatingnew institutional categories that can regulate these
damages. Of theIn the same way, and as we will see later, biolaw recognizes and defines new
rightsindividual subjective factors related to said damages, as well as newProtected legal assets
that must be specified and cataloged, beyond the genotype.This creation of new legal institutions
or categories is only possible by virtue ofof the new interpretative approach that biolaw
represents, beyond itstraditional conceptions, which never in their history managed to
recategorize the lawtraditional, and rather, they confused biolaw, or with bioethics, or with
lawclassic.Finally, biolaw is not a new right, but rather a new branch of theright that is
distinguished from the other branches, at least, in three elements: i) Its object ofstudy: it is
specific, precise and unique. Namely, no other branch of law has asmain purpose to study,
understand and regulate the latest bioscientific practicesgeneration; ii) Its normative scope: unlike
the traditional branches of law,that seek to generate national regulation, biolaw not only has the
purpose, but alsois capable of engendering regulation transversal to international legal systems,
and iii)Its epistemological range: biolaw, unlike other branches of classical law thatfeed
themselves, it has the ability to extend its categorical reach to otherbranches of law, irradiating
and optimizing them legally.Therefore, from a general perspective, it is possible to define biolaw
asa new branch of law, applied to the biomedical field, which is capable, among other things,to
open new normative plexuses, identify new categories of unlawful damages,endow with
constitutional value new individual subjective rights (bio-rights), andenable the emergence of
greater legal certainty in the regulatory field of thebiomedicine. Therefore, it is clear that biolaw is
not the traditional law applied tonew problems (Valdés 2015).Likewise, and specifically, I define
biolaw not only as a set ofprinciples and norms that are coercively imposed within a legal system

Page 52

closed and abstract. Far beyond that oblique gaze, biolaw represents amodel and a legally binding
approach applied to the specificity of conflictbiomedicine legal system, and indicates principles
and rules, of constitutional rank, that servebase to legislate and regulate biomedical practices, and
sentence and punish abuse andmisuse of them (Valdés 2015).In a synoptic way, it is then possible
to configure a new conception of thebiolaw, whose main characteristics are the following:The
biolaw:i) It is not a parasite of bioethics, since both disciplines have different objects ofstudy and
point out, from the methodological and procedural point of view, residual effectsdifferent (that of
biolaw is eminently normative and binding).ii) It has its own, clear and different scope of
application (that of the law) regardingof that of bioethics (that of ethics), which is applied to moral
controversies whoseResolution does not necessarily indicate legal-normative consequences.iii) It
does not seek to regulate bioethics, but rather biomedicine. Bioethics, then, noconstitutes an
object of study of biolaw.iv) It has epistemological and methodological independence from
bioethics.v) It opens new normative plexuses, through the identification and redefinition oflegal
categories of traditional law.vi) Identify new categories of damages, expanding the listcategory of
different traditional intangible reparation items, such as, for example, theharm to health. An
example of this is the identification and legal configuration of the damagegenetic and inexorable
damage (Valdés 2018).i) Identify and define new individual subjective rights (bio-rights).ii) Identify
new legal assets criminally protected.ix) Identify and define new obligations of citizens and the
State.x) Provides greater certainty and legal security to regulate and legislate on thebiomedical
practices.xi) Identify and define principles and rules of deliberative purpose and
consequencesregulations.xii) It is an independent branch within the law, of a transdisciplinary and

Page 53

intradisciplinary, contributing to reparatory, constitutional, criminal and civil law.xiii) It has a

multilateral and horizontal legal perspective, that is, it influences otherbranches of law, providing
a comprehensive approach to biomedical matters with alegal.xiv) Promotes the integration,
expansion and categorical redefinition of lawtraditional.2. Why we need biolawAll the moral
controversies that hatch under advances in biomedicineand that indicate a bioethical interest,
have a legal and legal scope or, in other words,biolegal or biolegal. Gene editing, neurocognitive
enhancement , eugenics andembryonic dysgenesis, baby design, genetic predetermination
ofphysical traits, and the use of genetic information, are just a few practices enabledfor the
development of biomedical techniques.Furthermore, the social relevance of the consequences
and legal implications of theBiomedical research is indisputable, since this importance finds its
root incomplex multifactorial relationships that involve not only science and bioethics,but also, the
law and culture in general. On the other hand, there is a closeconnection between bio-legal
matters and constitutional law, as well as withhuman rights: How should the autonomy of the
subjects ofexperimentation versus biomedical development? How should obtaining,storage, use
and marketing of genetic samples? What has more valuelegal: human integrity or the progress of
society? What is more important: theright to choose or unconditional protection of life? Is it
legally plausibleuse biomedical techniques for dysgenetic purposes? It seems, then, that theseThe
questions refer to central legal categories that not only point to issuesrelated to biomedical law,
but also to human rights.The preceding diagnosis indicates the need to identify and define a
newbinding legal framework in order to legislate, regulate, sentence and sanction cases

Page 54

legally controversial in the field of biomedicine. This urgency is still donemore evident if we
consider some objective facts that show the ineffectiveness of thetraditional positive law to
address certain unpublished legal problems, taxation ofthe possibilities opened by the
development of biomedicine:i) There are polarized legal positions with respect to these matters,
whichmakes a fruitful dialogue that progresses towards consensus impossible and paralyzes
worklegislative from the deliberative platform of traditional positive law.ii) The current legal
hermeneutics is insufficient to address complex cases,because the interpretation of the facts and
their implications and consequences issubjective (contingent on particular inclinations, beliefs,
values and preferences), and theJudges, many times, declare ignorance about bio-legal matters.iii)
There are loopholes and legal loopholes, since international legislation and regulationregarding
these issues is incomplete or inefficient.iv) The current international legal systems are precarious
in termsbiomedical regulation and, therefore, are inefficient to resolve biolegal conflicts ofbinding
mode.v) There is an evident lack of public policies on biomedicine, due toalso to the absence of
legislation.vi) There is little or no legislation on how to administer the practices not
onlybiomedical, but also those clinical procedures of a complex nature thatinvolve the application
of extraordinary means, and the laws that exist are, in theirmost, anachronistic, outdated and
contradictory.vii) The Biomedical Ethics Principles of Beauchamp and Childress, through thewhich
are usually analyzed and deliberated on these issues, are not legally binding, andincluding them in
legal systems with legal value represents an important error, sincethat produces an impersonation
of normative plans.The seven facts just described reveal, strictly speaking, seven shortcomings of
ourlegal systems to regulate different aspects of biomedical practices.Precisely, in this chapter, I
seek to correct these deficiencies, proposing a newconception of biolaw.

Page 55

3. Contributions of biolaw to legal scienceOne of the most notable contributions of biolaw is the
identification and definition ofnew categories of rights in legal systems. This ability opens up
newnormative universes that are justified not only by the force of their own implications,but for
the following two reasons: i) It is not possible to do without these newcategories of rights if one of
the fundamental bases of constitutions is theobservance and respect of human autonomy and
integrity. The omission of saidcategories would imply a contradiction, not only of constitutional
principles, but alsoalso the disrespect of various international treaties and conventions; ii)
Technologygenetics is of recent emergence in our history, and its scope and consequences are
notthey can be predicted with neither certainty nor scientific evidence. However, the current
capacityhuman to do practically everything through bioscientific experimentation,generates a
capital responsibility in legal terms: lay legal foundationssufficient and necessary, not only to
regulate and legislate on these matters, but alsoidentify new classes of rights that have never
before been identified by lawpositive, not because of an insufficiency of it, but because when the
law thought ofdelimit and define the legal scopes of categories as central as the body byexample,
all possibilities of damages opened by genetic technologythey did not exist yet.Within these new
categories of bio-rights, we should at least consider:The right to genetic integrity : the damages
derived from an alteration of theoriginal or native genetic makeup of an individual, imply a
disintegration ofthe ontological unity of the person, not only with himself, but also with hissocial
and historical environment. Genetic integrity must be considered in relation tocultural and social
identity, since it expresses the narrative coherence of any civilization.The damages to the
relational aspects of the individual are then evident in the light ofthis new category, and they point
out precisely the obligation to respect the right that allperson has to preserve their genetic
integrity.

Page 56

The right to genetic self-determination : Genetic predetermination, that isthe selection and / or
genetic alteration of individuals according to the viability of their designgenetic, restricts one of
the fundamental rights of human beings: theself-determination. Therefore, this right signals the
rejection of determinism thatunderlies non-therapeutic genetic techniques that can alter, diminish
and even nullifythe life project of a person, namely, his capacities to live his life according
topersonal, reasonable and free purposes. Furthermore, the commercialization of the
genomeHuman and genetic information, without consent, also violates this right.The right to
genetic privacy : The use of genetic information describedabove, it points to the emergence of
another category of harm: damage to privacy.The use of genetic information constitutes another
category of damage as it impliesserious alterations to the development of the individual life
project. The right to protectown genetic constitution of the knowledge of others, namely, not to
make public mygenetic information, should be considered as a fundamental right to
reachconstitutional.The right to genetic diversity : The acceptance of genetic improvement
withouttherapeutic purposes would also imply tacitly accepting that there are human beings
offirst and second class, and in turn, would be a source of discrimination and social
segregation,even worse, more explicit, more blatant, and more obvious than the current ones:
eugenicsselective; universalization of aesthetic and epistemological stereotypes;
homogenizationracial; and loss or, at best, undervaluation of genetic diversity, amongothers. This
kind of genetic tyranny would determine the exclusion of minorities from spacepublic, namely, the
exclusion of the weak, the sick, the physically handicapped,of the aesthetically unfortunate, and of
the less intellectually gifted. Respect andobservance of the principle of equality would then not be
guaranteed.Furthermore, genetic manipulation, either through transgenesis, or even
techniquesmore refined, such as neurocognitive enhancement , can generate different categories

Page 57

of citizens and promote and thus promote profound inequities and discrimination, due tothat the
search for perfection necessarily indicates the consecration of a stereotypespecific genetic. From a
utilitarian perspective, genetic improvementit would optimize the genes of an inherently weak and
vulnerable humanity. However,What would be the criteria for deciding who to improve and who
not to? This is a spacecontroversial that must be covered by a new category of biolaw, since,
thusas vulnerable and violated characteristics of the personality by virtue of aharmful event, can
be considered as a deficiency likely to becompensated, the relationship between genetic
vulnerability and damage is also relevant when it comes tovalue fundamental rights.These bio-
rights also indicate the identification of new categories ofdamages in the scope of reparatory law,
which, as we will see later, may haveradical consequences in the legal, political and social. One of
these new itemsIntangible reparations is genetic damage, which can be defined as all
damage,alteration, and modification, without therapeutic purposes, operated by genetic
techniques, capableto affect the biology, autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability of the
individualhuman, by virtue of substantially fracturing his original genetic constitution
withpurposes of predetermining or artificially or tendentiously determining its existence.This
definition makes it possible to understand that everyone also has the right tobe protected from
any bodily and psychological damage or harm eventually causedby non-therapeutic genetic
manipulation.All the aforementioned generates a significant impact in the field ofright to health
and makes visible the urgent need to include new categories ofdamages when determining and
assessing reparatory compensation. The reason thatunderlying the above statement is that it is
not possible to do without these new categoriesif one of the fundamental purposes of reparation
is the observance of the principlesof comprehensive reparation and equality. The omission of
these categories would imply thecontravention of constitutional principles to which all democratic
nationsadhere.In this way, incorporate into the formal constitution, norms and
practicesinternational jurisprudential implies the configuration of the material constitution in

Page 58

relation to those rights. This does not mean an exaggerated categorical dispersion ofconstitutional
norms, but rather the expansion of the catalog of rightsfundamental, in tune with the new
possibilities of damage, opened by the techniquesbiomedical. This expansion should also result in
the adaptation oflower hierarchy to the international standard.I must emphasize here that what I
call bio-rights are not just the result ofdogmatic development that occurred with the object of
biomedical problems addressed by theinternational law in the European Union and the Council of
Europe, but emerge inspecial relationship with the epistemological and methodological deepening
that I haveout, deriving from it, a whole legal framework oriented to the protection of the human
beingconsidered physically and socially. Its origin, then, is inherently linked tofundamental rights,
and demand of the national systems the effort to restructuretraditional legal categories to extend
their protection.I also call bio-rights to individual subjective rights related tothe capacity for self-
determination and self-preservation of genetic identity. The newspossibilities opened by the
development of biomedicine - an area of increasing complexityethical and legal - they are not duly
regulated, and the disputes arisingas a consequence of the development and application of
genetic techniques without therapeutic purposes,they are analyzed and resolved casuistically.
Techniques such as enhancement (improvementgenetic), which implies the possibility of forever
altering and modifying the identitygenetics of humans, to get happier people (alteration of the
processesbrain related to serotonin, or memory manipulation to forgetsad episodes of our
personal history), the search for perfection, manipulatinggenetically the species to obtain only
individuals better physically and mentally endowed(genetic discrimination, genetic determinism),
or genetic experimentation toto be able to delay the aging of the tissues ( Ageless Bodies ), they
do not obey atherapeutic objective and, rather, relate to the technological
imperativecontemporary that indicates that the first purpose of biotechnology is to produce
morebiotechnology, although this "need" is not, so far, neither ethical norlegally justified.In
addition to the historical reasons, the link that unites them to the dialectic of rights

Page 59

fundamentals has to do with their own content, that is, that the different systemslegal systems
recognize the protection of human autonomy and integrity as a dimensionessential of
constitutional democracy.In addition to the above argument, the protection of human beings in
the termsindicated, it has been constituted as a commitment of the States in their consecration
invarious international conventions; This reason leads me to evaluate the conditions underwhich
agreements on fundamental rights at international headquarters are inserted in thenational
regulations, and here the positions are shared. Even though there arearguments for and against
three of its equivalence with the constitutional contentnational, I think that, due to their content,
the fact that they reflectconditions and attributes that demand a solid and extensive protection,
due to the highharmfulness that biomedical practices potentially represent. Besides,
theconstitutionality of these bio-rights is based on the way in which it must be carried outcarry out
their effective protection. In this sense, the way in whichStates will have their resources to
confront these new phenomena and thereforethey immediately become matters of public order.
How do you deal withlegislation with the collision between biomedical advancement and the right
to non-discrimination?How should the State resolve disputes arising from access to benefitsof
genetic improvement? Does a person improved by genetic interventionsshould be considered as a
subject of rights under the same statute as others? AllThese questions require a state
position.Now, these bio-rights present a new way of visualizing the subject ofrights. The rights of
first (civil and political), second (economic, social andcultural) and third generation (rights of
peoples, right to peace,environment, etc.) were not able to extend their scope of protection
againstnew controversies presented by biomedical development. Bio-rights broaden thespectrum
of the protection of the corporeality of the classic subject of rights and the creation ofcategories
that allow fuller protection and eventual repair. This is the3 The arguments against the doctrine of
the constitutional block of rights, among others, are related towith the inconsistency in the
identification of the relationship between material law and its formal source.This criticism
maintains that according to the block, a series of subjective rights could be identified that would
havesuch quality considering its material content and not its formal source, which is an
inconsistencymethodological.

Page 60

question: the passing of time has opened the possibility of substantially damaging thesubject in an
aspect that was previously implausible, namely his genetic makeup and evenextend the
consequences of the damage to the future and the new generations. Before thisproblem, the new
generation of rights raises their due protection through thetools granted by the bioright.4. The
constitutionalization of biolawIn opposition to the traditional epistemologies of the discipline,
which affirm that thebiolaw or is it a juridified bioethics, or part of bioethics, or a normative field
thatreplaces it completely, or, that it is simply the same right as always,addressing, with more or
less difficulties, the problematic plexuses of biomedicine, thebiolaw is a right applied to the
biomedical field, capable, among other things, of openingnew normative plexuses, identify new
categories of unlawful damages, provideconstitutional value new individual subjective rights (bio-
rights), and enable theemergence of greater legal certainty in the regulatory field of
biomedicine.This, in contrast mainly to the more widespread understanding of thebiolaw until
recently, namely, that which conceives it as bioethicsapplied to the legal field. The problems of
this reception of biolaw are evidentsince this understanding indicates that biolaw is a juridified
bioethics, which grantsa statute binding on other general rules prima facie , of a different name,
but the samedefinition that the principles of biomedical ethics identified by Beauchamp and
Childress(2013).However, as clearly defined by Beauchamp and Childress, theprinciples of
biomedical ethics are abstract theoretical guides of common morality, not binding,that, specified,
namely, limited in scope, and enriched in content, canpoint out promising paths for moral
deliberation. However, in the legal field,These general rules can only be used as references to
legalize otherprinciples, more identified and more in tune with a possible legal order.
Suchprinciples are not a mere iteration of bioethical contents, but indicate other norms

Page 61

general, of a different nature than those of common morality, and of a legallybinding.By virtue of
the foregoing, the definition of biolaw that I haveproposed (Valdés 2015; Valdés 2019), has the
ability to reconcile, rationally,polarized positions regarding the conflict inherent in biomedical
issues,what can make possible a fruitful dialogue that advances towards a consensus and does not
paralyze thelegislative work. In the same way, and given the insufficiency of legal
hermeneuticstraditional that is, rather, epistemologically tangential, biolaw provides amore
ductile and less subjective interpretive model, that is, less linked to thecontingency of the case,
but based on principles and impartial rules that objectifyany decision and solution.In addition,
given the precariousness that, from the point of view of regulation,international legal systems
show, biolaw fosters the emergencyspecific regulation for biomedical and genetic developments
that fill gaps andlegal loopholes.From a more specific point of view, biolaw is able to identifynew
possibilities of damages in the application of genetic techniques on thelife, identify new individual
subjective rights (bio-rights and human rightsfourth generation), and recognize new legal rights
under criminal protection, beyondof the genotype, exclusively considered by almost all laws and
regulations.Indeed, an episode of biased genetic manipulation, seeking, for example,introducing
deficiencies into the human embryo (dysgenetic genetic manipulation), candamage not only the
genetic identity of an individual, but also their autonomy andlife project, among others.Therefore,
the contributions that biolaw can make to other branches of law areconsiderable. In this regard, it
is enough to mention just a few:• Redefines the relationship between the State and its associates
based on new possibilitiesof damages that may be caused through the application of
techniquesgenetics about life. (Contribution to administrative law).• Broadens the list of
fundamental rights (bio-rights) linked to the

Page 62

genetic practices, such as the right to genetic privacy, the right togenetic identity, genetic self-
determination, among others. (Contribution to lawconstitutional).• It reinforces the protection of
minors as full subjects of rights,modifying the legal status of its protection, understanding the
manipulationdysgenesis of preimplanted embryos as an attack on rightsfundamental rights of
children who will have to live their lives undermined andadjust their existential projects to
difficulties, impairments and disabilitiesoperated by arbitrary and unilateral will of their parents.
(Contribution to civil law).• Recognizes genetic self-determination, genetic identity, and
integritygenetics as new protected legal assets, as the manipulationNon-therapeutic genetics in
the embryonic state can inhibit the enjoyment of these goodsin the future pointing to inexorable
damage to the person, caused by an actmaleficent - in the case of non-therapeutic genetic
manipulation - or by a failurebiomedical - in the case of genetic manipulation for therapeutic
purposes. (Inputto criminal law).Therefore, the biolaw can establish: i) if the existing legal
frameworks areadequate and plausible to tolerate the rapid advance of biomedical technologies,
and ii)what mode (s) biomedical and biotechnological empowerment impacts the normative
corpus andvalue of a society. Therefore, unlike a classic or traditional look, thebiolaw is capable of
providing the biomedical field with greater certainty and legal security.Now, most of the questions
we ask ourselves in the bio-legal field,such as, for example, is the genetic manipulation of embryos
without ends punishabletherapeutic? o Is the human genome the only protected legal asset linked
to thebiomedical practices ?, are questions that we ask ourselves and answer within thebiolaw.
However, asking, for example, what are the contributions of the bio-right tointernational legal
systems, is a question about biolaw and no longerinside him.This logical distinction is relevant
because it suggests us to understand the phenomenon of lawin perspective and not only ask
ourselves about the legal-normative status of the

Page 63

problems that it addresses, but also because of its nature and ethical and ontological
significance.Asking oneself, then, about the contribution of biolaw to legal systemsinternational is
to interrogate, also, for the sense of discipline and, at the same time,due to its scope and eventual
limitations, which constitutes a good proof ofsufficiency of their disciplinary autonomy with
respect to other branches of law and the sametraditional law, which I understand as all that
doctrinal constellation,jurisprudential and normative prior to the biomedical emergence.Biolaw,
like other disciplines of axiological content, has a doubleconceptual dimension. The first indicates
its endogenous nature, namely, the entire cast ofmeanings that tell us what biolaw is, including its
scopemethodological and epistemological, and referring to an autonomic relational context
thatjustifies based on discerning what biolaw is with respect to itself,regardless of its eventual
extension to other disciplinary plexuses. The second facetimplies the exogenous condition of
biolaw, that is, its projection to other areas of theknowledge, which illustrates their what for ,
namely, what are the contributions ordoctrinal, categorical and hermeneutical performances of
biolaw with respect to otherbranches of law and other disciplines. The foregoing indicates an area
of justificationheteronomic, which cannot be argumentatively satisfied without elucidating the
linkof biolaw with other fields, both science and humanities.This double conceptualization of
biolaw does not occur simultaneously but it doesconsubstantial, since its justification is a
successive process and, at the same time, complementary,because the exogenous nature of the
biolaw cannot be understood or justified without its attributeendogenous.Therefore, biolaw
contributes to international legal systems, notonly epistemological consistency, but also normative
coherence and a modelinterpretive derived from a correct intelligence of biomedicine and its
disturbingpossibilities, as well as the new relationships that are unfolding betweenhuman beings
and life as a whole.

Page 64

5. ConclusionsBiolaw acquires special value in any legal system as a means offact and of certain
law to guarantee an effective mechanism of protection of thosefundamental rights that, in this
context, concern each member of thesociety, and to indicate the State's obligation to protect
those rights, and to promoteits realization and not to its detriment. The above, since my proposal
extendsepistemologically and methodologically the criteria developed by
jurisprudenceconstitutional law and also improves and optimizes the understanding of the
guarantee offunctions of fundamental rights.In addition, the biolaw could indicate for the
constitutional legal orderinternational a new and more complete conception of fundamental rights
thatwould allow states to comply with their international obligations in this areaand it would also
make said rights effective in domestic jurisdictional contexts.Therefore, this conception is very
applicable in the light of constitutional texts.However, the foregoing establishes a very relevant
possibility condition: understandingthat the Constitution is a normative text and not simply a
programmatic text. Thispoint points out the importance of the recognition of bio-rights, since
theseconstitute a platform that places fundamental rights in their deserved range ofassessment,
and indicates for the State the best proof of sufficiency to validate its activityas guarantor of said
rights.In this sense, biolaw is justified and legitimized as a mature discipline andepistemologically
independent, since it is able to identify new categories ofdamages and establish procedural bases
for the constitutionalization of rightsfourth generation humans or bio-rights. In other words, the
contribution of the biolaw toreparatory law (especially in the field of non-contractual liability of
theState), constitutional law and, also, criminal law, is of great relevance.Therefore, the
importance of biolaw does not lie only in its contributionprocedural or doctrinal to the law, but
implies a consequence of much morescope, since biolaw can guarantee the constitutionalization
of new rightsindividual subjective or bio-rights