1. HASEGAWA VS.

KITAMURA
G.R. NO. 149177, NOVEMBER 23, 2007

FACTS:
Nippon, a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management
support in the infrastructure projects, entered into a year period Independent
Contractor’s Contract (ICA) with Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in
the Philippines.

Kitamaru was assigned and worked as the project manager of the Southern
Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion,
DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon of which Kitamaru was named as
the project manager in the contract for Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI)
Project.
However, Nippon’s general manager, Hasegawa, informed Kitamaru that the
company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would
be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project,
just in time for the ICA's expiry.
Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City.
Nippon filed a MTD contending that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and
executed by and between Japanese nationals, invoking lex loci celebrationis & lex
contractus, the RTC has, therefore, no jurisdiction.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and the rulings of the latter was upheld by
the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for
specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by
foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
contractus, the "state of the most significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens.

RULING:
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are
 Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state while choice of
law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power, however, to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum
law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the “minimum
contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the
other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a
judgment.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is
brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the
latter in disposing it: (1) dismiss the case, either for lack of jurisdiction or refusal to
assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the
internal law of the forum; (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or
apply the law of some other State or States.
The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the
Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the
court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements,
even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

2. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS. REBESENCIO

G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015

FACTS:
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia), a foreign corporation based in the
Philippines, hired and recruited the respondent as flight attendants.
Respondents were separated from service and contended that the termination of
their employment was illegal as the grounds was solely because they were pregnant.
Accordingly, they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone
through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves, which was initially
approved but subsequently disapproved. Saudia anchored its disapproval based on the
Unified Contract stating that the employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes
pregnant is rendered void.
The respondents, however, emphasized that the Unified Contract took effect on
September 23, 2006, well after they had filed and had their maternity leaves approved.,
 Subsequently, the respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers
for illegal dismissal and other claims. Saudia, on the other hand, assailed the jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter. It claimed that all the determining points of contact referred to
foreign b law and insisted that the Complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground
of forum non conveniens. It also added that respondents had no cause of action as they
resigned voluntarily.
The LA dismissed respondent’s complaint, however, upon appeal this was
reversed by NLRC on the grounds that there were no special circumstances that
warranted its abstention from exercising jurisdiction and that there was nothing on
record to support Saudia's claim that respondents resigned voluntarily.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
YES. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “a court, in conflicts of law
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most ‘convenient’ or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.”
As the present dispute relates to the illegal termination of respondents’
employment, this case is immutably a matter of public interest and public policy.
Consistent with clear pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws
properly find application in and govern this case. Moreover, as this premise for Saudia’s
insistence on the application forum non conveniens has been shattered, it follows that
Philippine tribunals may properly assume jurisdiction over the present controversy.
Even if we were to assume, for the sake of discussion, that it is the laws of Saudi
Arabia which should apply, it does not follow that Philippine tribunals should refrain from
exercising jurisdiction.
In Puyat, as well as in Bank of America NT&SA v. Court of Appeals, it is not so
much the mere applicability of foreign law which calls into operation forum non
conveniens. Rather, what justifies a court’s desistance from exercising jurisdiction is
“the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law” or the inability of a “Philippine Court . . . to
make an intelligent decision as to the law.” Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the
extent that it is proper and practicable”, Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law
selected by the parties. In fact, in this case, respondents themselves have made
averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia.
The immense public policy considerations attendant to this case behoove
Philippine tribunals to not shy away from their duty to rule on the case.
3. AZNAR VS. GARCIA 7 SCRA 95
G.R. NO. L-16749, JANUARY 31, 1963

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California and domiciled in the
Philippines, left a will executed in the Philippines in which he bequeathed Php 3,600.00
to Maria Helen Christensen ("Helen") and the remainder of his estate to his daughter,
Maria Lucy Christensen Daney.
Helen asserts that her claim must be increased in view of the successional rights
of illegitimate children under Phil. Law, being an an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased Edward in an earlier case.
Contrarily, the counsel of Maria insists that Art. 16 (2) provides that the
NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON applies in intestate and testamentary successions
and since Edward C. is a citizen of CA, its law should be applied.
The laws of California allows the testator to dispose of his estate in any manner
he pleases. However, California law also provides that the personal property of a
person is governed by the laws of his domicile.
Subsequently, the executor, Adolfo C. Aznar, drew a project of partition in
conformity with the will. Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law on succession governs in the distribution of
the decedent’s property.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the Philippine law on succession governs.
The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply
to any general American Law, because there is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. It can
therefore refer to no other than the private law of the state of which the decedent was a
citizen. In the case at bar, the State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its
citizens, an internal law for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its
citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions.
The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946 Civil Code, refers back the case,
when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines
in the case at bar. The court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to
California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because
the case will then be tossed back and forth between the two states. If the question has
to be decided, the Philippine court must apply its own law as the Philippines was the
domicile of the decedent, as directed in the conflict of law rule of the state of the
decedent, California, and especially because the internal law of California provides no
legitime for natural children, while the Philippine law Articles 887(4) and 894, Civil Code
of the Philippines makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.
As the domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child of the latter’s legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
d
4. BELLIS VS BELLIS
G.R. NO. L-23678, JUNE 6, 1967

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis is a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States of which
by his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate children; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children; and finally,
he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his
estate, viz: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; P40,000.00 each to his 3
illegitimate children; and (c) the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his
first and second wives.
Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A July 8, 1958, thus
his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on September 15, 1958.
People's Bank and Trust Company, being the executor of the will, did as the will
directed. However, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, filed their respective
oppositions on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children.
The CFI of Manila as the probate ruled based on Art. 16 of the Civil Code,
whereby, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic
validity of the will.

RULING:
YES. Order of the probate court is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country and is domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent was
a citizen of Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that, even
assuming that Texas has a conflicts rule providing that the domiciliary law should
govern successional rights, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but it would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which calls for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties
involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of Texas, it would be presumed to
be the same as our local conflicts rule.
Where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there are no
forced heirs, the system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to the
succession to the decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the decedent's will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law.

5. CADALIN. ET. AL. VS. POEA ADMINISTRATOR

G.R. NO. 104776, DECEMBER 5,1994

FACTS:
Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Int’l Builders Co. (AIBC), a
domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root
Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas.
Plaintiff instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising from the
unexpired portion of their employment contract which was prematurely terminated.
Under the Bahrain Law, where some of the complainants were deployed, the
prescriptive period for claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year, in
contrast with the explicit provision in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants is 3 years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bahrain Law on prescription of action based on the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription shall be the governing law.

RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld that the Philippine law on prescription shall be the
governing law.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites
for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the
action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that
it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization
given such a law.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing statute.” Said
statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign
statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the
laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the
local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this
kind. Said Section provides: “If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of
action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex
proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976. The courtsb of the forum will not enforce any foreign
claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period
of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene
the public policy on the protection to labor.
This is in consonance with Sec. 10 and Sec. 18 of the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies, and emphasized in Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights
of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.
6. DACASIN VS. DACASIN
G.R. NO. 168785, FEBRUARY 5, 2010

FACTS:
On April 1994, Petitioner Herald Dacasin, American, and respondent Sharon Del
Mundo Dacasin, Filipino, got married here in the Philippines and begot a baby girl
named Stephanie.
Subsequently, the respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois Court a
divorce decree against petitioner in June of 1999. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved
the marriage and awarded to the respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
contract (agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie.
Two years thereafter, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City asserting that respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack
of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.
The trial court sustained respondent’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner sought reconsideration, however, the same was denied.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s
suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held, YES, the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain
petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit
in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus, jurisdiction-wise,
petitioner went to the right court.
Yet, trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit thinking that the Illinois
court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction is unfounded. Petitioner’s suit seeks the
enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce
Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois
court’s so-called "retained jurisdiction."
 However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of
petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s
custody.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the
ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within
coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings – the best interest of the
child. As the question of custody is already before the trial court and the child’s parents,
by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the
interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice  to allow the parties to take advantage of
the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving
Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court render judgment.  This disposition is
consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be
invoked to serve the child’s best interest.

7. WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 342 SCRA 213
G.R. NO. 119602 OCTOBER 6, 2000

FACTS:
The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private
respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the
completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, an official pilot
of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate
the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River.
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San
Roque Channel. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch
officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. The master
(captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the
channel.
The Philippine Roxas ran around in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the
ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel
owned by herein petitioner Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out
of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer
Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the
form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00plus
attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.
 The trial court affirmed and rendered its decision in favor of Wildvalley Shipping
Co ., Ltd. However, on appeal it was reversed by the appellate court. Petitioner filed MR
contending that respondent court of appeals seriously erred in disregarding Venezuelan
law despite the fact that the same has been substantially proved in the trial court without
any objection from private respondent, and whose objection was interposed belatedly
on appeal. However, the MR was denied.
Hence, this review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar.

RULING:
No. It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten
law. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is “unwritten,” the oral testimony of
expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent
evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.
For a copy of a foreign public document to” be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by
his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service
officer, and with the seal of his office.

The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the
giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written
law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign
statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute.
 A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite
the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of Venezuela. We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a
foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading
and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as
our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.

8. EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 145587; OCTOBER 26, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of OFWs.
ESI is another recruitment agency which collaborated with EDI to process the
documentation and deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI to
work for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter for curricula
vitae of qualified applicants for the position of “Computer Specialist.” In a facsimile
transmission dated November 29, 1993, OAB informed EDI that, from the
applicants’ curricula vitae submitted to it for evaluation, it selected Gran for the position
of “Computer Specialist.” The faxed letter also stated that if Gran agrees to the terms
and conditions of employment contained in it, one of which was a monthly salary of SR
(Saudi Riyal) 2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for Gran’s immediate dispatch.
After accepting OAB’s offer of employment, Gran signed an employment contract
that granted him a monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two years. Gran was
then deployed to Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on February 7, 1994.
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his monthly salary—
his employment contract stated USD 850.00; while his POEA Information Sheet
indicated USD 600.00 only. However, through the assistance of the EDI office in
Riyadh, OAB agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a month.
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was
terminated through OAB’s July 9, 1994 letter.
On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00
representing his final pay, and on the same day, he executed a Declaration releasing
OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise, towards him.
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July 21, 1994,
against ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western Guaranty
Corporation with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City, which was docketed
as POEA ADJ (L) 94-06-2194 for underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Saudi Laws or the Philippine labor laws will apply in the
determination of the issues.

RULING:
The Philippine laws will apply.
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the
OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by the
employment contract. A contract freely entered into is considered law between the
parties; and hence, should be respected, so long as the stipulations established
clauses, terms and conditions are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states
that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract. Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws
should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.
However, in international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as
a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot
take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the
matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or
processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus,
we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.

9.WILLAMETTE IRON AND STEEL WORKS VS. MUZZAL

G.R. No. 42538. May 21, 1935

FACTS:
The Defendant has a liability to ptr for obligations contracted by a california
corporation of which he is a stockholder at the time the said debt was contracted.
Pursuant to sec 322 of the civil code of california: SEC. 322. Each stockholder of a
corporation is individually and personally liable for such proportion of all its debts and
liabilities contracted or incurred during the time he was a stockholder as the amount of
stock or shares owned by him bears to the whole of the subscribed capital stock or
shares of the corporation. Any creditor of the corporation may institute joint or several
actions against any of its stockholders, for the proportion of his claim payable by each,
and in such action the court must (1) ascertain the proportion of the claim or debt for
which each defendant is liable, and (2) a several judgment must be rendered against
each, in conformity therewith. If any stockholder pays his proportion of any debt due
from the corporation, incurred while he was such stockholder, he is relieved from any
further personal liability for such debt, and if an action has been brought against him
upon such debt, it must be dismissed, as to him, upon his paying the costs, or such
proportion thereof as may be properly chargeable against him. The liability of each
stockholder is determined by the amount of stock or shares owned by him at the time
the debt or liability was incurred; and such liability is not released by any subsequent
transfer of stock.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law of California must be enforced.

RULING:
Yes. That the defendant, a former resident of the State of California, now residing
in the Philippine Islands, is liable for obligations contracted by a California corporation of
which he was a stockholder at the time said obligations were contracted with the
plaintiff-appellee in this case.
The herein def endant is chargeable with notice of the law of California as to the
liability of stockholders for debts of a corporation proportionate to their stock holdings, in
view of the fact that he was one of the incorporators of the MeyerMuzzal Company in
the year 1924 and was still a stockholder in that company in the year 1928. The
defendant cannot now escape liability by alleging that the California law is unjust and
different from and inconsistent with the Philippine Corporation Law.
The testimony of an attorney-at-Iaw of San Francisco, California, under oath,
who quotes verbatim a section of the California Civil Code and states that said section
was in force at the time the obligations of defendant to plaintiff were incurred is sufficient
to establish the fact that the section in question was the law of the State of California on
the dates referred to. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure
will convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other
competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law.
 10. HONGKONG SHANGAI BANKING CORPORATION v. SHERMAN
G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989

FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes
arising under this guarantee

RULING:
Wala ko kabasa sa facts pa. mao dili ko sure kung kinsa decision gi reverse ug
kung yes or no ba cya. HAHAHA. PLS Nalang ko Mano. Salamat

While it is true that “the transaction took place in Singaporean setting” and that
the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of
due process dictates that the stipulation that “this guarantee and all rights, obligations
and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be
enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree
that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this
guarantee” be liberally construed.
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State
does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it,
whether the proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the
jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in
Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove,
that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or
expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action
here just to harass private respondents.