1
Aratuc vs. Comelec
Same; Administrative law; As the superior
administrative body having control and
supervision over boards of canvassers, the
COMELEC may review the actuations of the
Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by
extending its inquiry beyond the election records
of the voting centers in question.—While
nominally, the procedure of bringing to the
Commission objections to the actuations of
boards of canvassers has been quite loosely
referred to in certain quarters, even by the
Commission and by this Court, such as in the
guidelines of May 23, 1978 quoted earlier in this
opinion, as an appeal, the fact of the matter is
that the authority of the Commission in
reviewing such actuations does not spring from
any appellant jurisdiction conferred
anywhere in the Election Code, but from the
plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted
provisions of Section 168. And in administrative
law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any
supporting citation here, that a superior body or
office having supervision and control over
another may do directly what the latter is
supposed to do or ought to have done.
Consequently, anything said in Lucman vs.
Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387, cited by petitioner, to
the contrary notwithstanding, We cannot fault
respondent Comelec for its having extended its
inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of
Canvassers. On the contrary, it must be stated
that Comelec correctly and commendably
asserted its statutory authority born of its
envisaged constitutional duties vis-a-vis the
preservation of the purity of elections and
electoral processes and procedures in doing what
petitioner claims it should not have done.
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board
Energy Regulatory Board; Due Process;
Executive Order 172; While under E.O. 172, a
hearing is indispensable, the Board is not
precluded from ordering, ex parte, a provisional
increase in the price of petroleum products.—
Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in
questioning the lack of a hearing, have
overlooked the provisions of Section 8 of
Executive Order No. 172, which we quote:
"SECTION 8. Authority to Grant Provisional
Relief.—The Board may, upon the filing of an
application, petition or complaint or at any stage
thereafter and without prior
hearing, on the basis of supporting papers duly
verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief
on motion of a party in the case or on its own
initiative, without prejudice to a final decision
after hearing, should the Board find that the
pleadings, together with such affidavits,
documents and other evidence which may be
submitted in support of the motion, substantially
support the provisional order: Provided, That the
Board shall immediately schedule and conduct a
hearing thereon within thirty (30) days
thereafter, upon publication and notice to all
affected parties. x x x What must be stressed is
that while under Executive Order No. 172, a
hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the
Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional
increase, as it did here, subject to its final
disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it
permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or
(3) to deny the application. Section 3, paragraph
(e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary attachment issued by the
courts, which are given ex parte, and which are
subject to the resolution of the main case.
US vs. Dorr
"We understand, in modern political science, * *
* by the term government, that institution or
aggregate of institutions by which an
independent society makes and carries out those
rules of action which are necessary to enable
men to live in a social state, or which are
imposed upon the people forming that society by
those who possess the power or authority of
prescribing them. Government is the aggregate
of authorities which rule a society.
By ''administration", again, we understand in
modern times, and especially in more or less free
countries, the aggregate of those persons in
whose hands the reins of government are for the
2
time being (the chief ministers or heads of
departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.)
But the writer adds that the terms "government"
and "administration" are not always used in their
strictness, and that "government" is often used
for "administration"
…
"We understand, in modern political science, * *
* by the term government, that institution or
aggregate of institutions by which an
independent society makes and carries out those
rules of action which are necessary to enable
men to live in a social state, or which are
imposed upon the people forming that society by
those who possess the power or authority of
prescribing them. Government is the aggregate
of authorities which rule a society.
By ''administration", again, we understand in
modern times, and especially in more or less free
countries, the aggregate of those persons in
whose hands the reins of government are for the
time being (the chief ministers or heads of
departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.)
But the writer adds that the terms "government"
and "administration" are not always used in their
strictness, and that "government" is often used
for "administration"
Malaga vs. Energy Regulatory Board
Administrative Law; Government
instrumentality, defined; Iloilo State
College of Fisheries is a government
instrumentality; Applicability of P.D. 188.—
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a
government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions,
and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory
Provisions). The same Code describes a
chartered institution thus: Chartered
institution—refers to any agency organized
or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives.
This term includes the state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the
state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that
ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
Government contracts; Public bidding
requirement; Injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects.—It is apparent that the
present controversy did not arise from the
discretionary acts of the administrative body nor
does it involve merely technical matters.
What is involved here is non-compliance with
the procedural rules on bidding which required
strict observance. The purpose of the rules
implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive
bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and
fraud in the award of these contracts to the
detriment of the public. This purpose was
defeated by the irregularities committed by
PBAC. It has been held that the three principles
in public bidding are the offer to the public, an
opportunity for competition and a basis for exact
comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter
which excludes any of these factors destroys the
distinctive character of the system and thwarts
the purpose of its adoption.
Same; Same; Same.—P.D. 1818 was not
intended to shield from judicial scrutiny
irregularities committed by administrative
agencies such as the anomalies above described.
Hence, the challenged restraining order was not
improperly issued by the respondent judge and
the writ of preliminary injunction should not
have been denied. We note from Annex Q of the
private respondent’s memorandum, however,
that the subject project has already been “100%
completed as to the Engineering Standard.”
This fait accompli has made the petition for a
writ of preliminary injunction moot and
academic.
Same; Same; Same; Liabilities of private
respondents.—It has been held in a long line of
cases that a contract granted without the
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competitive bidding required by law is void, and
the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit
from it. It has not been shown that the
irregularities committed by PBAC were induced
by or participated in by any of the contractors.
Hence, liability shall attach only to the private
respondents for the prejudice sustained by the
petitioners as a result of the anomalies described
above.
United Residents of Dominican Hill vs.
Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems
Administrative Law; Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP); Origin.—The COSLAP was created
by virtue of Executive Order No. 561 dated
September 21, 1979. Its forerunner was the
Presidential Action Committee on Land
Problems (PACLAP) founded on July 31, 1970
by virtue of Executive Order No. 251. As
originally conceived, the committee was tasked
“to expedite and coordinate the investigation and
resolution of land disputes, streamline and
shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold
and decisive measures to solve land problems,
and/or recommend other solutions.” It was given
the power to issue subpoenas duces
tecum and ad testificandum and to call upon any
department, office, agency or instrumentality of
the government, including government owned or
controlled corporations and local government
units, for assistance in the performance of its
functions. At the time, the PACLAP did not
exercise quasi-judicial functions.
Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 speaks of
any resolution, order or decision of the COSLAP
as having the “force and effect of a regular
administrative resolution, order or decision.”
The qualification places an unmistakable
emphasis on the administrative character of the
COSLAPs determinations, amplified by the
statement that such resolutions, orders or
decisions “shall be binding upon the parties
therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction
over the same.” An agency is defined by statute
as “any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or
a distinct unit therein.” A department, on the
other hand, “refers to an executive department
created by law.” Whereas, a bureau is
understood to refer “to any, principal
subdivision of any department.” In turn, an
office “refers, within the framework of
governmental organization, to any major
functional unit of a department or bureau
including regional offices. It may also refer to
any position held or occupied by individual
persons, whose functions are defined by law or
regulation.” An instrumentality is deemed to
refer “to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations.” Applying the principle in
statutory construction of ejusdem generis, i.e.,
“where general words follow an enumeration or
persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to
be construed in their widest extent, but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned,” section 3(2) of Executive Order 561
patently indicates that the COSLAPs
dispositions are binding
on administrative or executive agencies. The
history of the COSLAP itself bolsters this view.
Prior enactments enumerated its member
agencies among which it was to exercise a
coordinating function.
The COSLAP discharges quasi-judicial
functions: “Quasi-judicial function” is a term
which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of
public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their
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official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature.”
Same; Same; Separation of
Powers; Administrative agencies are not
considered courts—they are neither part of the
judicial system nor are they deemed judicial
tribunals; The doctrine of separation of powers
observed in our system of government reposes
the three (3) great powers into its three (3)
branches—the legislative, the executive, and the
judiciary—each department being co-equal and
coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere, and,
accordingly, the executive department may not,
by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its
own agencies, upon the judiciary.—It does not
depart from its basic nature as an administrative
agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial
functions. Still, administrative agencies are not
considered courts; they are neither part of the
judicial system nor are they deemed judicial
tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers
observed in our system of government reposes
the three (3) great powers into its three (3)
branches—the legislative, the executive, and the
judiciary—each department being co-equal and
coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere.
Accordingly, the executive department may not,
by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of
its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed,
under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, it is empowered “to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”
Beja vs. CA
Administrative
Law; Suspension; Preventive suspension
distinct from the administrative penalty of
removal from office such as one mentioned in
Sec. 8 (d) of P.D. No. 857.—Imposed during the
pendency of an administrative investigation,
preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It
is merely a measure of precaution so that the
employee who is charged may be separated, for
obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged
misfeasance while the same is being
investigated. Thus preventive suspension is
distinct from the administrative penalty of
removal from office such as the one mentioned
in Sec. 8 (d) of P.D. No. 857. While the former
may be imposed on a respondent during the
investigation of the charges against him, the
latter is the penalty which may only be meted
upon him at the termination of the investigation
or the final disposition of the case.
Same; Same; The PPA general manager is
the disciplining authority who may by himself
and without the approval of the PPA Board of
Directors subject a respondent in an
administrative case to preventive suspension.—
The PPA general manager is the disciplining
authority who may, by himself and without the
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject
a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers
are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No.
857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No.
807 granting heads of agencies the “jurisdiction
to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary actions against officers and
employees” in the PPA.
Same; Same; Preventive suspension may
be lifted even if the disciplining authority has
not finally decided the administrative case
provided the ninety-day period from the
effectivity of the preventive suspension has been
exhausted.—Parenthetically, the period of
preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted
even if the disciplining authority has not finally
decided the administrative case provided the
ninety-day period from the effectivity of the
preventive suspension has been exhausted. The
employee concerned may then be reinstated.
However, the said ninety-day period may be
interrupted. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also
mandates that any fault, negligence or petition of
a suspended employee may not be considered in
the computation of the said period. Thus, when a
suspended employee obtains from a court of
justice a restraining order or a preliminary
injunction inhibiting proceedings in an
administrative case, the lifespan of such court
order should be excluded in the reckoning of the
permissible period of the preventive suspension.
Same; Same; By vesting the power to
remove erring employees on the General
Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board
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of Directors, the law impliedly grants said
officials the power to investigate its personnel
below the rank of Assistant Manager who may
be charged with an administrative offense.—
Although the foregoing section does not
expressly provide for a mechanism for an
administrative investigation of personnel, by
vesting the power to remove erring employees
on the General Manager, with the approval of
the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly
grants said officials the power to investigate its
personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager
who may be charged with an administrative
offense. During such investigation,
the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may
subject the employee concerned to preventive
suspension. The investigation should be
conducted in accordance with the procedure set
out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807.
Holy Spirit Homeowners Assoc vs.
Secretary Defensor
Administrative Law; Administrative agencies
possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers
and quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers.—Administrative agencies
possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers
and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power
is the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegability and separability of powers.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative
agencies applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not
when the assailed act pertained to its rule-
making or quasi-legislative power.—In
questioning the validity or constitutionality of a
rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not
when the assailed act pertained to its rule-
making or quasi-legislative power.
LBP vs. CA
The conclusive effect of administrative
construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set
aside by the judicial department if there is an
error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be
stressed that the function of promulgating rules
and regulations may be legitimately exercised
only for the purpose of carrying the provisions
of the law into effect. The power of
administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect.
Corollary to this is that administrative
regulations cannot extend the law and amend a
legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law. And in case there
is a discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former
that prevails.
CIR vs. CA
Taxation; Tax Amnesty; Administrative
Law; Administrative issuances must not
override but must remain consistent and in
harmony with the law they seek to apply and
implement.
Manila Jockey vs. CA and Phil Racing
Commission
Consequently, every statute should be construed
in such a way that will harmonize it with
existing laws. This principle is expressed in the
legal maxim “interpretare et concordare leges
legibus est optimus interpretandi,” that is, to
interpret and to do it in such a way as to
harmonize laws with laws is the best method of
interpretation.
Public Schools District vs. de Jesus
The power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules in the implementation of a
statute is necessarily limited to what is provided
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for in the legislative enactment; The
implementing rules and regulations of a law
cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as
the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested
in the legislature.
Echegeray vs. DOJ
The reason for delegation of authority to
administrative agencies is the increasing
complexity of the task of government requiring
expertise as well as the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention
The choice of the delegate who shall
cobble the rules and regulations that will
implement a law is part of lawmaking and
hence, this power to choose is the sole
prerogative of Congress.
Rule-making power of a public
administrative body is a delegated power, which
it may not use either to abridge the authority
given it by the Congress or the Constitution or
to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended
De Jesus vs. COA
DBM Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10
(DBM-CCC No. 10) implementing R.A. 6758 by
discontinuing without qualification all
allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of
basic salary, being in the nature of an
administrative circular the purpose of which is
to enforce or implement an existing law, must go
through the requisite publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines in order for it to become
effective and enforceable
At the very least, before DBM-CCC No.
10 may be permitted to substantially reduce
their income, the government officials and
employees concerned should be apprised and
alerted by the publication of subject circular in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines to the end
that they be given amplest opportunity to voice
out whatever opposition they may have, and to
ventilate their stance on the matter.
CIR vs. CA
It should be understandable that when an
administrative rule is merely interpretative
in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance for it gives no
real consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed. When, upon
the other hand, the administrative rule goes
beyond merely providing for the means that
can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially
adds to or increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord
at least to those directly affected a chance to
be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed,
before that new issuance is given the force
and effect of law.
it legislated under its quasi-
legislative authority. The due observance of
the requirements of notice, of hearing, and
of publication should not have been then
ignored.
Ang Tibay vs. CIR
he fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does
not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.
There are cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this
character. The first of these rights is the right to
a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision.
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Not only must there be some evidence to support
a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must
be substantial. The decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial
Relations should, in all controvercial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it.
Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
Then too, there is the “substantial evidence” rule
in administrative proceedings which merely
requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in
the quantum of evidence, as well as the
procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in
criminal and administrative proceedings, the
findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other.
In administrative proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; Administrative due process cannot be
fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense.
He therefore cannot validly claim that
his right to due process was violated. We need
only to reiterate that a party who chooses not to
avail of the opportunity to answer the charges
cannot complain of a denial of due process.
CSC vs. CA
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari may
only be availed of when any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. It is gathered that Luzviminda had up to
February 20, 2002 to file a petition for review
before the appellate court. On April 22, 2002,
she filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Certiorari which the appellate court
granted, and she eventually filed her Petition for
Certiorari. A special civil action for certiorari is,
however, a limited form of review which cannot
be used as a substitute for lost or lapsed remedy
of appeal. The avail ability to Luzviminda of the
remedy of a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court foreclosed her right to resort
to certiorari.
PBC vs. CIR
It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-
circulars are considered administrative rulings
(in the sense of more specific and less general
interpretations of tax laws) which are issued
from time to time by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the
interpretation placed upon a statute by the
executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is
entitled to great respect by the courts.
Nevertheless, such interpretation is not
conclusive and will be ignored if judicially
found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not
countenance administrative issuances that
override, instead of remaining consistent and in
harmony with, the law they seek to apply and
implement.
A memorandum circular of a bureau
head could not operate to vest a taxpayer with a
shield against judicial action, for there are no
vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong
construction of the law by the administrative
officials and such wrong interpretation could
not place the Government in estoppel to correct
or overrule the same; The non-retroactivity of
rulings by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is not applicable where the nullity of a
Revenue Memorandum Circular was declared
by courts and not by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
Fortrich vs. Corona
8
An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
which error is reviewable only by an appeal,
while an error of jurisdiction is one where the
act complained of was issued by the court,
officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, and which error is
correctable only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.
The act of the Office of the President in
re-opening the case and substantially modifying
its earlier decision which had already become
final and executory, was in gross disregard of
the rules and basic legal precept that accord
finality to administrative determinations.
The orderly administration of justice
requires that the judgments/resolutions of a
court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point
of finality set by the law, rules and regulations;
A resolution which substantially modifies a
decision after it has attained finality, is utterly
void.
Ysmael vs. Exec Sec
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction
that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies have upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These
decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the
rights of the affected parties as though the same
had been rendered by a court of general
jurisdiction. The rule of resjudicata thus forbids
the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive
jurisdiction.
Thus, while the administration grapples
with the complex and multifarious problems
caused by unbridled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long
line of cases establish the basic rule that the
courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies
More so where, as in the present case,
the interests of a private logging company are
pitted against that of the public at large on the
pressing public policy issue of forest
conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide
latitude of discretion possessed by the
government in determining the appropriate
actions to be taken to preserve and manage
natural resources, and the proper parties who
should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these
resources.
The Court will not hesitate to step in
and wield its authority when invoked if an
appropriate case is brought showing a clear
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
DENR officials and related bureaus with respect
to the implementation of the public policy
concerning the conservation of natural
resources.
People vs. Drugmaker’s Lab
Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers only if there
exists a law which delegates these powers to
them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated
must be within the confines of the granting
statute and must involve no discretion as to what
the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix
the details in the execution or enforcement of the
policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform
with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as
an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of
legislative power.
An administrative regulation may be
classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative
rule, or a contingent rule. Legislative rules are
in the nature of subordinate legislation and
designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. They usually
implement existing law, imposing general, extra-
statutory obligations pursuant to authority
properly delegated by Congress and effect a
change in existing law or policy which affects
individual rights and obligations.
Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to
interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory
regulations under which the administrative body
operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to
construe the statute being administered and
purport to do no more than interpret the statute.
9
Simply, they try to say what the statute means
and refer to no single person or party in
particular but concern all those belonging to the
same class which may be covered by the said
rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued
by an administrative authority based on the
existence of certain facts or things upon which
the enforcement of the law depends.
When an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it
gives no real consequence more than what the
law itself has already prescribed.
Executive Secretary vs. South Wing
Police power is inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of society. It is
lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue
of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may
also be exercised by the President and
administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking
bodies on all municipal levels, including the
barangay. Such delegation confers upon the
President quasilegislative power which may be
defined as the authority delegated by the law-
making body to the administrative body to adopt
rules and regulations intended to carry out the
provisions of the law and implement legislative
policy. To be valid, an administrative issuance,
such as an executive order, must comply with
the following requisites: (1) Its promulgation
must be authorized by the legislature; (2) It must
be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure; (3) It must be within the
scope of the authority given by the legislature;
and (4) It must be reasonable. Contrary to the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals, EO 156
actually satisfied the first requisite of a valid
administrative order. It has both constitutional
and statutory bases.
Anent the second requisite, that is, that
the order must be issued or promulgated in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is
necessary that the nature of the administrative
issuance is properly determined. As in the
enactment of laws, the general rule is that, the
promulgation of administrative issuances
requires previous notice and hearing, the only
exception being where the legislature itself
requires it and mandates that the regulation shall
be based on certain facts as determined at an
appropriate investigation. This exception
pertains to the issuance of legislative rules as
distinguished from interpretative rules which
give no real consequence more than what the
law itself has already prescribed; and are
designed merely to provide guidelines to the law
which the administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing. A legislative rule, on the other hand,
is in the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted
to implement a primary legislation.
Taking our bearings from the
foregoing discussions, we hold that the
importation ban runs afoul the third
requisite for a valid administrative order. To be
valid, an administrative issuance must not
be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the
authority conferred. It must not supplant or
modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and
other existing laws, for such is the sole function
of the legislature which the other branches of the
government cannot usurp.
When the application of an
administrative issuance modifies existing laws
or exceeds the intended scope, the issuance
becomes void, not only for being ultra vires but
also for being unreasonable
It is an axiom in administrative law that
administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of
rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and
regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to
bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for
which they were authorized to be issued, then
they must be held to be invalid.
Lokin vs Comelec
The legislative power of the Government is
vested exclusively in the Legislature in
accordance with the doctrine of separation of
powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot
surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for
doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the
power to make laws cannot be delegated by the
Legislature to any other authority, a power that
10
is not legislative in character may be delegated.
Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can
delegate to executive officers and administrative
boards the authority to adopt and promulgate
IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the
Legislature must declare the policy of the law
and fix the legal principles that are to control in
given cases. The Legislature should set a
definite or primary standard to guide those
empowered to execute the law. For as long as
the policy is laid down and a proper standard is
established by statute, there can be no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
when the Legislature leaves to selected
instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate
rules within the prescribed limits, although there
is conferred upon the executive officer or
administrative board a large measure of
discretion. There is a distinction between the
delegation of power to make a law and the
conferment of an authority or a discretion to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for
the power to make laws necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be.
The authority to make IRRs in order to
carry out an express legislative purpose, or to
effect the operation and enforcement of a law is
not a power exclusively legislative in character,
but is rather administrative in nature. The rules
and regulations adopted and promulgated must
not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing
statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may
be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of a law. The power
of administrative agencies is confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect.
Corollary to this is that administrative regulation
cannot extend the law and amend a legislative
enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of
the law is controlling and cannot be amended by
a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Indeed, administrative or
executive acts shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. To
be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must
comply with the following requisites to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the
Legislature; 2. It must be within the scope of the
authority given by the Legislature; 3. It must be
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure; and 4. It must be reasonable.
Abella vs. CSC
A permanent appointment in the career service is
issued to a person who has met the requirements
of the position to which the appointment is made
in accordance with the provisions of law, the
rules and the standards promulgated pursuant
thereto. It implies the civil service eligibility of
the appointee. Thus, while the appointing
authority has the discretion to choose whom to
appoint, the choice is subject to the caveat that
the appointee possesses the required
qualifications.
The Constitution mandates that, as “the
central personnel agency of the government,”
the CSC should “establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote the moale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the Civil
Service.” It further requires that appointments in
the civil service be made only through merit and
fitness to be determined by competitive
examination. Civil Service laws have expressly
empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules
and regulations to carry out its mandate.
The classification of positions in career service
was a quasi-legislative, not a quasi-judicial,
issuance. This distinction determines whether
prior notice and hearing are necessary. In
exercising its quasi-judicial function, an
administrative body adjudicates the rights of
persons before it, in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law. The
determination of facts and the applicable law, as
basis for official action and the exercise of
judicial discretion, are essential for the
performance of this function. On these
considerations, it is elementary that due process
requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must
be observed. These requirements include prior
notice and hearing. On the other hand, quasi-
legislative power is exercised by administrative
agencies through the promulgation of rules and
regulations within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of
certain powers flowing from the separation of
the great branches of the government. Prior
notice to and hearing of every affected party, as
elements of due process, are not required since
there is no determination of past events or facts
11
that have to be established or ascertained. As a
general rule, prior notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of rules or regulations
promulgated to govern future conduct.
Smart vs. NTC
Administrative agencies possess quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegability and separability of powers.
he rules and regulations that administrative
agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law. They must conform to and be
consistent with the provisions of the enabling
statute in order for such rule or regulation to be
valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to
what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may
not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute
it is administering or he rules and regulations
that administrative agencies promulgate, which
are the product of a delegated legislative power
to create new and additional legal provisions that
have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law. They must conform
to and be consistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute in order for such rule or
regulation to be valid. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what
rules and regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to
what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may
not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute
it is administering or which created it, or which
are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and
an administrative order, the former must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-
legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power. This is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative
duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-
judicial functions, the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from
them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only
where the administrative agency exercises its
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function
In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by an administrative agency, a party need not
exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court.
GMA vs. COMELEC
12
It is a basic postulate of due process,
specifically in relation to its substantive
component, that any governmental rule or
regulation must be reasonable in its operations
and its impositions. Any restrictions, as well as
sanctions, must be reasonably related to the
purpose or objective of the government in a
manner that would not work unnecessary and
unjustifiable burdens on the citizenry.
CSC vs. Almojuela
The Civil Service Commission has standing as a
real party in interest and can appeal the Court
of Appeals’ decisions modifying or reversing the
Civil Service Commission’s rulings, when the
Court of Appeals action would have an adverse
impact on the integrity of the civil service.
A formal or trial-type of hearing is not
indispensable in administrative proceedings,
and a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of
due process.
It is well-settled that a formal or trial-
type of hearing is not indispensable in
administrative proceedings, and a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side
suffices to meet the requirements of due
process.  witness stand without his consent.
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (URACCS); Under Section
52 (A)(2) and (3), Rule IV of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, both gross misconduct and gross
neglect of duty are grave offenses punishable by
dismissal from the service for the first offense.
Mendoza vs. COA
Legislation on the compensation and position
classification of government employees reflects
the policy of the State to provide “equal pay for
substantially equal work” in government and “to
base differences in pay upon substantive
differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions.” At
present, Republic Act No. 6758 or the
“Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989” governs the compensation and position
classification system in government. The
Compensation and Position Classification
System established under Republic Act No.
6758 applies to “all positions, appointive or
elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing
or hereafter created in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
and government financial institutions.”
The term “government” in Republic Act
No. 6758 “refers to the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the
Constitutional Commissions and shall include
all, but shall not be limited to, departments,
bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts,
tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations,
center, institutes, state colleges and universities,
local government units, and the armed forces.”
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners
In an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, x x
x the x x x Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause,
compel the person proceeded against to take the
he reason is that, the right against self-
incrimination, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime
should not go unpunished and that the truth must
be revealed, such desirable objectives should not
be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded
the human personality.
Dumarpa vs. Dimaporo
Nor may the Acting Governor be faulted for
consulting the lawyers of the province as to the
effects of a judgment on the authority and
actuations of municipal or provincial officials, or
the fiscals for advising him on such matters. The
law implicitly authorizes the former to seek such
advice and expressly imposes upon the latter the
duty to give it on request. Section 1682, first
paragraph, of the Revised Administrative Code
provides: “SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal
13
adviser of province and provincial subdivisions.
—The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser
of the provincial government and its officers,
including district health officers, and of the
mayor and council of the various municipalities
and municipal districts of the province. As such
he shall, when so requested, submit his opinion
in writing upon any legal question submitted to
him by any such officer or body pertinent to the
duties thereof.” Thus, all that the respondent
fiscals did was perform a duty specifically
enjoined by law, for the failure or refusal to do
which they could appropriately have been called
to account. It may be that the opinion they
submitted was erroneous, though this is by no
means certain and is not here fully inquired into,
there being no need to do so. As already
observed, it cannot, on the ground of error alone
and absent any indication in the record that it
was prompted by a deliberate intent to affront
the Commission or ignore or belittle its
judgments and orders, be considered
contumacious.
Araneta vs. Gatmaitan
An Action against Government officials
sued in their official capacity, is essentially one
against the Government, and to require these
officials to file a bond would be indirectly a
requirement against the Government, for as
regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if
any, the real party in interest would be the
Republic of the Philippines  to res judicata in the other case.
For the protection of fry or fish eggs and
small and immature fishes, Congress intended
with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to
prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device
like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete
the supply of sea food, and to that end
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to provide by regulations
such restrictions as he deemed necessary in
order to preserve the aquatic resources of the
land. In so far as the protection of fish fry or fish
eggs is concerned the Fisheries Act is complete
in itself leaving only to the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources the
promulgation of rules and regulations to carry
into effect the legislative intent. Consequently,
when the President, in response to the clamor of
the people and authorities of Camarines Sur
issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely
prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all
waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he
,did nothing but show an anxious regard for the
welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal
province and dispose of issues of general
concern (Section 63, Revised Administrative
Code) which were in consonance and strict
conformity with the law. The exercise of such
authority did not, therefore, constitute an undue
delegation of the powers of Congress.
Encinas vs. Agustin
This Court enumerated the requisites of
forum-shopping as follows: Forum-shopping
exists when the elements of litis pendentiaare
present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another. Litis
pendentiarequires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as those representing the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with
respect to the two preceding particulars in the
two cases, such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount
In order that res judicata may bar the
institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment
must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment
on the merits; and (d) there must be between the
first and the second actions (i) identity of
parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii)
identity of cause of action.
ffidavit of Desistance; The subsequent
desistance by respondents does not free
petitioner from liability, as the purpose of an
administrative proceeding is to protect the
14
public service based on the time-honored
principle that a public office is a public trust.
Union Bank vs. CA
Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies; Basic is the rule that before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it
is a precondition that he should have availed of
all the means of administrative processes
afforded him.
The underlying principle of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on
the presumption that the administrative agency,
if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the
matter, will decide the same correctly.
Bernardo vs. Abalos
Petitioners did not exhaust all the
remedies available to them at the
COMELEC level. Specifically, they did not
seek a reconsideration of the assailed
COMELEC En Banc Resolution as required
by Section 1, Rule 13 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, thus:
“Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed.—
The following pleadings are not allowed:
xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en
banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except
in election offense cases;
Lopez vs. City of Manila
As a general rule, where the law
provides for the remedies against the action of
an administrative board, body, or officer, relief
to courts can be sought only after exhausting all
remedies provided. The reason rests upon the
presumption that the administrative body, if
given the chance to correct its mistake or error,
may amend its decision on a given matter and
decide it properly. Therefore, where a remedy is
available within the administrative machinery,
this should be resorted to before resort can be
made to the courts, not only to give the
administrative agency the opportunity to decide
the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to courts. This
rule, however, admits certain exceptions.
Courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulations of
activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies; The
determination of whether a tax is excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory is essentially a
question of fact.
We have carefully scrutinized the record
of this case and we found no cogent reason to
depart from the findings made by the trial court
on this point. As correctly found by the trial
court, the petition does not fall under any of the
exceptions to excuse compliance with the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit:
“One of the reasons for the doctrine of
exhaustion is the separation of powers which
enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of
non-interference with matters coming primarily
within the competence of other department. x x
x There are however a number of instances when
the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial
action validly resorted to immediately. Among
these exceptional cases are: (1) when the
question raised is purely legal, (2) when the
administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the
act complained of is patently
illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; (5) when the claim involved is
small; (6) when irreparable damage will be
suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public
interest is involved; (9) when the subject of
controversy is private land; and (10) in quo-
warranto proceeding (citation omitted).
Universal Robina vs. Laguna Lake
Development
he doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our
15
judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that
courts must allow administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of
their respective competence. The rationale for
this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser
expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy
away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.
Smart vs. NTC
Administrative agencies possess quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate, which are
the product of a delegated legislative power to
create new and additional legal provisions that
have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency.
Quasi-Judicial Power; The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
power when it performs in a judicial manner an
act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature.
Exception; In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by an administrative agency, a party need not
exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only
where the administrative agency exercises its
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function.
Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec
During elections, the Supreme Court
(SC) has the power and the duty to correct any
grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with
unconstitutionality on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
Sovereignty resides in the
people.Political speech is a direct exercise of
the sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies yields in order to
protect this fundamental right.
UST vs. Sanchez
The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies requires that where a
remedy before an administrative agency is
provided, the administrative agency concerned
must be given the opportunity to decide a matter
within its jurisdiction before an action is brought
before the courts. Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is a ground for
dismissal of the action.
The rule on primary jurisdiction applies
only where the administrative agency exercises
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus,
an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is
the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. 
Cristobal vs. CA
Questions relating to non-compliance
with the requisites for conversion of subdivision
lots are properly cognizable by the National
Housing Authority (NHA), now the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), pursuant
to Sec. 22 of PD 957 and not by the regular
courts. Under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is
vested upon an administrative body, no resort to
the courts may be made before such
administrative body shall have acted upon the
matter.
CBS vs. NTC
Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.
Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction; Courts cannot and will not resolve
a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative
16
tribunal, especially where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
PHILROCK VS. CIAC
The Supreme Court will not
countenance the effort of any party to subvert or
defeat the objective of voluntary arbitration for
its own private motives.
Voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of
their functions, act in quasi-judicial capacity,
such that their decisions are within the scope of
judicial review.
Zabat vs. CA
Courts cannot enjoin an agency from
performing an act within its prerogative, except
when in the exercise of its authority it gravely
abused or exceeded its jurisdiction.
Administrative decisions on matters within the
executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on
proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or
error of law. Absent these badges of executive
excesses, no injunction may be granted.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;
Before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, it is a precondition that he should first
avail of all the means afforded by administrative
processes.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA
Non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, proper; General rule that decisions of
the POEA should first be appealed to the
NLRC; Case at bar comes under one of the
exceptions, as the questions raised are questions
of law; Absence of objection by private
respondent to petitioner’s direct resort to the
Supreme Court.
Delegation of power; Legislative
discretion as to the substantive contents of the
law cannot be delegated; What can be delegated
is the discretion to determine how the law may
be enforced.
Accepted tests to determine whether or
not there is valid delegation of legislative
power.
Principle of non-delegation of powers is
applicable to all the 3 major powers of the
government, but is especially important in the
case of the legislative power.
Reasons for delegation of legislative
powers are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies; Delegated power to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute is called power of subordinate
legislation.
Administrative bodies implement the
broad policies by promulgating their
supplemental regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code.
Administrative agencies vested with two
basic powers, quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial; Power of administrative agencies to
promulgate implementing rules and regulations
and interprets and applies them, not violative of
due process as long as the cardinal rights in the
Ang Tibay vs. CIR case are observed.
KBPMBPM vs. Dominguez
As to failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, the rule is well-settled that this
requirement does not apply where the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts,
as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied
approval of the latter, unless actually
disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified
political agency ensures speedy access to the
courts when most needed. There was no need
then to appeal the decision to the office of the
President; recourse to the courts could be had
immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies also
yields to other exceptions, such as when the
question involved is purely legal, as in the
instant case, or where the questioned act is
patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is
the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter
shown, is correct.
An administrative officer has only such
powers as are expressly granted to him and
17
those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
— non-judicial remedies could have been available
Vda de Tan vs. Veterans
The respondent Commission is in
estoppel to invoke the rule on the exhaustion of
administrative remedies, considering that in its
resolution, it declared that the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice were "advisory in nature,
which may either be accepted or ignored by the
office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved
party has the court for recourse", thereby leading
the petitioner to conclude that only a final
judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by
the Commission.
Castro vs. Sec of DEPED
The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies calls for resort first to
the appropriate administrative authorities in the
resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to
the courts of justice for review. It is settled that
non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of
a cause of action, which is one of the grounds
allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal
of the complaint.
the doctrine is not absolute. There are
instances when it may be dispensed with and
judicial action may be validly resorted to
immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1)
When the question raised is purely legal;
2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;
3)when the act complained of is patently
illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; 5) when the claim involved is
small; 6) when irreparable damage will be
suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public
interest is involved; and 9) in quo
warrantoproceedings.
Truly, a petition for mandamus is
premature if there are administrative remedies
available to petitioner. But where the case
involves only legal questions, the litigant need
not exhaust all administrative remedies before
such judicial relief can be sought. In Cortes v.
Bartolome, a case involving a petition for
mandamus, we ruled that “while it may be that
to respondent in that he could have appealed to
the then Secretary of Local Government and
Community Development and thereafter to the
Civil Service Commission, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies need not
be adhered to when the question is purely legal.”
This is because issues of law cannot be resolved
with finality by the administrative officer.
Appeal to the administrative officer would only
be an exercise in futility.
Cabada vs. Alunan III
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990
specifically provides that if a RAB fails to
decide an appeal within the reglementary period
of sixty days, the appealed decision becomes
final and executory without, however, prejudice
to the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to
the Secretary of the DILG. The said provision is,
however, silent as regards the availability of an
appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB
within the reglementary period.
his gap in Section 45 cannot be
construed to prohibit appeals from decisions of
the RAB rendered within the reglementary
period, for while the epigraph of the section is
worded Finality of Disciplinary Action, there is
nothing therein that explicitly bars any further
appeal. Complementary laws on discipline of
government officials and employees must then
be inquired into considering that in conformity
with the mandate of the Constitution that the
PNP must be national in scope and civilian in
character, it is now a part, as a bureau, of the
reorganized DILG. As such, it falls within the
definition of the civil service in Section 2(1),
Article IX-B of the Constitution.
The Civil Service Law referred to in
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle
A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Chapter 6
thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where
the decision rendered by a bureau or office is
appealable to the Commission, the same may
initially be appealed to the department and
finally to the Commission.
Republic vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
18
Failure to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
affect the jurisdiction of the Court.
The length of time the PCGG allowed to
drift away and its decision to file its motion to
dismiss only at the homestretch of the trial
hardly qualify as “proper time.” This factual
scenario largely differs from the “Ocampo” case
relied upon by the PCGG. In that case and the
case of “Community Investment & Finance
Corp. v. Garcia” cited therein, the motions to
dismiss involved were filed just after the filing
of the answer, and not at some belated time
nearing the end of the trial. The parties in those
cases have not presented any testimonial or
documentary evidence yet, as the trial proper has
not commenced, and neither does it appear that
the movants concerned took close to seven (7)
years before filing their respective motions to
dismiss. The PCGG therefore cannot seek refuge
in the “Ocampo” case to justify the marked
delay in filing its motion to dismiss. Such tarried
maneuver made the PCGG guilty of estoppel by
laches—the definition and effect of which this
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Regalado,
had the occasion to visit anew in the relatively
recent case of “Olizon v. C.A.” “Laches has
been defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence could
nor should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.”
The leniency extended by the Rules and
by jurisprudence in allowing a motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action filed after the
answer or at any stage of the proceedings
cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the
onset of laches.
NFA vs. CA
The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not a hard and fast
rule. It is subject to some limitations and
exceptions. In this case, private respondents’
contracts were terminated in the midst of
bidding preparations and their replacements
hired barely five days after their termination. In
fact, respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder,
submitted all requirements and was preparing
for the public bidding only to find out that
contracts had already been awarded by
negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board
or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of
Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 was not a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law. The urgency of the situation
compelled private respondents to go to court to
stop the implementation of these negotiated
security contracts.
Petitioners’ manifest reluctance to hold
a public bidding and award a contract to the
winning bidder smacks of favoritism and
partiality toward the security agencies to whom
it awarded the negotiated contracts and cannot
be countenanced. A competitive public bidding
aims to protect the public interest by giving the
public the best possible advantages thru open
competition. It is a mechanism that enables the
government agency to avoid or preclude
anomalies in the execution of public contracts.
DAR vs. Apex
The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a relative one and is
flexible depending on the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial
settings of a case.
On the first assigned error, this Court
has consistently held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
relative one and is flexible depending on the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Among others,
it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention; and (b) the administrative
action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
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