Isaac vs. A.
L Ammen  principles governing the liability of a common carrier:
FACTS:
May 31, 1951: Cesar Isaac boarded Bus No. 31 from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili,
Camarines Sur and seated himself on the left side resting his left arm on the window
sill but with his left elbow outside the windowBefore reaching his destination, a pick-
up car at full speed and was running outside of its proper lane came from the
opposite direction .The driver of the bus swerved the bus to the very extreme right of
the road until its front and rear wheels have gone over the pile of stones or gravel
situated on the rampart of the road. The bus could not bus farther right and run over a
greater portion of the pile of gravel, the peak of which was about 3 feet high, without
endangering the safety of his passengers. Despite efforts, the rear left side of the bus
was hit by the pick-up car. He was rushed to a hospital in Iriga, Camarines Sur where
he was given blood transfusion to save his life. After 4 days, he was transferred to
another hospital in Tabaco, Albay, where he under went treatment for 3 months Later,
he was moved to the Orthopedic Hospital where he was operated on and stayed for
another 2 months. He incurred expenses of P623.40, excluding medical fees which
were paid by A.L. Ammen Trans. Co. Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint - collision
occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the pick-up car.
ISSUE: W/N if there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier but that the
accident resulting in injuries is due to causes which are inevitable and which could not
have been avoided or anticipated notwithstanding the exercise of that high degree of
care and skill which the carrier is bound to exercise for the safety of his passengers
neither the common carrier nor the driver is liable therefor
HELD: YES.  Appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extra ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756 Ooom.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
 
1. the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation.
There is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all
circumstances of each case
2. a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances
3. a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of
death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence
4. the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel
 where a carrier's employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact
that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be
taken into account, and he is held to the some degree of care that he would
otherwise be required to exercise in the absence of such emergency but must
exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise under
like circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his part to exercise the best
judgment the case renders possible does not establish lack of care and skill on
his part
 Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude
that the driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid
the collision 
 It is true that Isaac's contributory negligence cannot relieve A.L. Ammen of
its liability but will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused
(Article 1762, new Civil Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates
against the position taken by Isaac
TAN CHIONG SIAN,
plaintiff-appellee, vs.
INCHAUSTI AND CO.,
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-6092 March 8, 1912
TOPIC
Fortuitous event/liability of owner and shipper
FACTS:
Three bill of lading were executed. To this end 3 bills of lading were executed (38, 39,
and 76). The steamer Sorsogo arrived at the port of Gubat on 28 November 1908 and
as the lorcha Pilar the other vessel to which the merchandise was to be transshipped
for its transportation to Samar was not yet there. The cargo was unloaded and stored
in the
defendant company’s warehouses at that port. The lorcha Pilar arrived several days
later and the merchandise
owned by Sip and other goods were transported to Catarman, Samar. On 5
December 1908, however, before the Pilar could leave for its destination a heavy and
strong wind caused
the lorcha to wrecked and its cargo including Sip’s package were scattered. Workmen
of Inchausti tried to save
the merchandize but it is already futile so they proceeded to have it sold at public
auction before a notary for the sum of P1,693.67 A complaint was filed against
Inchausti because the same neither carried nor delivered his merchandise to Ong
Bieng Sip, in Catarman, but unjustly and negligently failed to do so, with the result
that the said merchandise was almost totally lost, and thus claimed the value of the
merchandise which was P20,000, legal interest thereon from 25 November 1908, and
the cost of the suit. *include the lower court and appellate decision and ratio if
applicable *include as well the respective contentions/ allegations of the petitioner(s)
and respondent(s)
ISSUE(S)
WON Inchausti is liable for the shipwreck?
HELD
NO. RTC- infavor of the Chinese man SC- The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment appealed from, and absolved Inchausti & Co., without special finding as to
costs; holding that Inchausti is not liable for the loss and damage of the goods
shipped on the lorcha Pilar by the Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, in asmuch as such loss
and damage were the result of a fortuitous event or force majeure, and there was no
negligence or lack of care and diligence on the part of Inchausti or its agents.
RATIO
: NO. . Wreck of lorcha due to fortuitous event; Loss cannot be attributed to Inchausti
or its agents From the moment that it is held that the loss of the said lorcha was due
to force majeure, a fortuitous event, with no conclusive proof of negligence or of the
failure to take the precautions such as diligent and careful persons usually adopt to
avoid the loss of the boat and its cargo, it is neither just nor proper to attribute the loss
or damage of the goods in question to any fault, carelessness, or negligence on the
part of Inchausti and its agents and, especially, the patron of the lorcha Pilar.
Inchausti took all measures for he salvage of goods recoverable after the accident
Herein, subsequent to the wreck, Inchausti’s agent took all the requisite measures for
the salvage
of such of the goods as could be recovered after the accident, which he did with the
knowledge of the shipper, Ong Bieng Sip, and, in effecting their sale, he endeavored
to secure all possible advantage to the Chinese shipper; in all these proceedings, he
acted in obedience to the law
COMMON CARRIERS; Loss OF SHIP AND CARGO;
FORCE MAJEURE.—Loss of a ship and of its cargo, in a
wreck due to accident or force majeure must, as a general
rule, fall upon their respective owners, except in cases
where the wrecking or stranding of the vessel occurred
through malice, carelessness or lack of skill on the part of
the captain and in the remaining cases indicated in article
841 of the Code of Commerce.
EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY – Under 361 of the Code of Commerce transportation
of merchandise is
for account, risk and hazard of the shipper, unless the
contrary has been expressly stipulated. The carrier is
exempt from liability if he prove, as it is incumbent upon
him to do, that the loss or destruction of the merchandise
was due to accident and force majeure and not to fraud,
fault, or negligence on the part of the captain or owners of
the ship.
G. Martini Ltd. vs. Macondray & Co. (GR 13972, 28 July 1919)
Facts:
In September 1916, G. Martini, Ltd. arranged with Macondray & Co. Inc., as agents
of the Eastern and Australian Steamship Company, for the shipment of 219 cases or
packages of chemical products from Manila, Philippine Islands, to Kobe, Japan. On
15 September 1916 (Friday), Martini applied to Macondray for necessary space on
the steamship Eastern, and received a shipping order, which constituted authority for
the ship’s officers to receive the cargo aboard. The mate’s receipt did not come to
Martini’s hand until Monday night, but as Martini was desirous of obtaining the bills of
lading on the Saturday morning preceding in order that he might negotiate them at the
bank, a request was made for the delivery of the bills of lading on that day To
effectuate this, Martini was required to enter into the written obligation, calling itself a
“letter of guarantee.” In conformity with the purpose of this document the bills of
lading were issued, and the negotiable copies were, upon the same day, negotiated
at the bank by the plaintiff for 90% of the invoice value of the goods. The bills of
lading contained on their face, conspicuously stenciled, the words “on deck at
shipper’s risks.” The mate’s receipt, received by the plaintiff two days later also bore
the notation “on deck at shipper’s risk,” written with pencil, and evidently by the officer
who took the cargo on board and signed the receipt. Martini says that upon seeing
the stamped “on deck at shipper’s risks”, he at once called the attention of S. Codina
thereto, the latter being an employee of the house whose duty it was to attend to all
shipments of merchandise and who in fact had entire control of all matters relating to
the shipping of the cargo. Letters by Martini, warning Macondray that it would be held
liable for loss or damage if the goods were stowed on deck, were dispatched by
messenger, and upon receiving it, Macondray called Codina by telephone at about
4.30 p.m. and, referring to the communication just received, told him that Macondray
could not accept the cargo for transportation otherwise than on deck and that if
Martini were dissatisfied, the cargo could be discharged from the ship. The goods
were embarked at Manila on the steamship Eastern and were carried to Kobe on the
deck of that ship, on 16 September 1916. Upon arrival at the port of destination it was
found that the chemicals comprised in the shipment had suffered damage from the
effects of both fresh and salt water. An action was instituted by Martini to recover the
amount of the damage thereby occasioned. In the Court of First Instance judgment
was rendered in favor of Martini for the sum of P34,997.56, with interest from 24
March 1917, and costs of the proceeding. From this judgment, Macondray appealed.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and absolved Macondray
from the complaint; with no express pronouncement will be made as to the costs of
either instance.
ISSUE: owner's consent, transported on the deck of a sea-going vessel
upon a bill of lading exempting the ship's company from
WON Macondray should be held liable? liability for damage, the risk of any damage resulting from
carriage on deck, such as the damage caused by rain or the
HELD: splashing aboard of sea water, must be borne by the owner.

NO.

1. Damage was caused by water

The damage was caused by water, either falling in the form of rain or splashing
aboard by the action of wind and waves.

2. Paragraph 19 of the several bills of lading issued for transportation of the cargo
Paragraph 19 of the several bills of lading issued for transportation of the cargo reads
“(19) Goodssigned for on this bill of lading as carried on deck are entirely at shipper’s
risk, whether carried on deck or under hatches, and the steamer is not liable for any
loss or damage from any cause whatever.“

3. Shipper ordinarily produce mate’s receipt to agents of ship’s company

Ordinarily the shipper is supposed to produce the mate’s receipt to the agents of the
ship’s company, who thereupon issue the bill of lading to the shipper. When,
however, the shipper desires to procure the bill of lading before he obtains the mate’s
receipt, it is customary for him to enter into a written obligation, binding himself,
among other things, to abide by the terms of the mate’s receipt. Herein,

4. Contents of the “Letter of Guarantee”

The “Letter of Guarantee” dated 16 September 1916, is of the tenor “In consideration
of your signing us clean B/L for the undermentioned cargo per above steamer to be
shipped on or under deck at ship’s option, for Kobe without production of the mate’s
receipt, we hereby guarantee to hold you free from any responsibility by your doing
so, and for any expense should the whole or part of the cargo be shut out, or
otherwise, and to hand you said mate’s receipt as soon as it reaches us and to abide
by all clauses and notations on the same.”

5. Martini did nothing to discharge cargo

In order to get the cargo off certain formalities were necessary which could not be
accomplished, as for instance, the return of the mate’s receipt (which had not yet
come to Martini’s hands), the securing of a permit from the customs authorities, and
the securing of an order of discharge from the steamship company. In view of the fact
that Martini did nothing whatever looking towards the discharge of the cargo, not even
so much as to notify Macondray that the cargo must come off, the proof relative to the
practicability of discharge is inconclusive. If Martini had promptly informed Macondray
of their resolve to have the cargo discharged, and the latter had nevertheless
permitted the ship to sail without discharging it, there would have been some ground
for Martini’s contention that its consent had not been given for the goods to be carried
on deck. Needless to say the Court attached no weight to the statement of Codina
that he was unable to get Macondray by telephone in order to communicate directions
for the discharge of the cargo.

SHIPPING; DECK CARGO; DAMAGE RESULTING

FROM ACTION OF ELEMENTS.—Where cargo is, with the