Art.
 Ar t. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability . 

Jurisprudence:  

1. PEOPLE
PEOPLE V ESMEDIA

CRIM
CRIM REV Art
Articl
icl e 12, Jur
Jurisp
isp rudence
ru dence  

Case title: THE UNITED STATES vs . G.R. No. L-5749 

PONCIANO ESMEDIA and MENA
ESMEDIA Date: October 21, 1910 

DOCTRINE: Any person
person who, in defending
defending his father
father again
against
st an unlawful
unlawful atta
attack,
ck, while he still honest
honestly
ly
believes him to be in great danger, causes the death of the attacking party, is exempt from criminal
responsibility. (Art. 8, par. 5, Penal Code.)

FACTS:

- This is an appeal
appeal from a sentence rendered by the Court of First Instance o off the Province of
 Antique,
 Antiqu e, condemning Ponciano Esmedia and Mena Esmedia of  reclusion
  reclusion temporal, to jointly
and severally pay to the heirs of Santiago Abando the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs of

- the cause,
Ciriaco for thehiscrime
Abando,
Abando, wife, of
anddouble
their homicide
their son, . , lived in the jurisd
Santiago
Santiago, jurisdiction
iction of the mun
municipality
icipality of
of
Sibalom, in the barrio of Bongbongan, Province of Antique. Gregorio Esmedia, father of these
two accused, son-in-law of Ciriaco Abando and brother-in-law of Santiago Abando , lived
in the same barrio. These two families lived very near to each other and owned adjoining rice
lands. Before this trouble occurred   there had been a dispute between these two families
relative to the ownership of the rice land then occupied by Ciriaco Abando. About 2 o'clock on
the afternoon of the June 24, 1909, Ciriaco Abando instructed his son, Santiago, to go to a
certain place in his rice field to let out the water in order that they could plant rice in the said
field. In compliance with these instructions of his father, Santiago proceeded to the place
designated, and while at work doing what he had been ordered by his father to do, Gregorio
Esmedia appeared on the scene and started a quarrel with Santiago. Soon thereafter Gregorio
drew a dagger and stabbed Santiago in the back. Santiago fell to the ground, but arose
immediately and attacked Gregorio with his bolo, inflicting several wounds on the said Gregorio
in consequence
accused of which
and Ciriaco Abandohe appeared
fell to the in
ground. Before this
that immediate trouble finally terminated the two
vicinity.
-  ACCUSED:  These two accused contend that they were working in their rice field nearby, and
on seeing Ciriaco Abando and Santiago Abando attacking their father, Gregorio, they started to
the place to render their father assistance, Ponciano starting first; that when Ponciano got near
the place of the trouble he was met by Ciriaco and Santiago who attacked him with bolos and
clubs and that he, Ponciano, in self-defense,
self -defense, knocked them both down, and after they had fallen
the other accused, Mena Esmedia, arrived. Ponciano further contends that he did not use a
bolo in this fight, but used a club only.
- PROSECUTION: The prosecution in the court below contended that when these two accused
saw the fight between their father and Santiago they rushed to the place and proceeded to kill,
as they thought, Santiago, and on seeing Ciriaco approaching they met him and killed him
outright.
- As a result of this fight Ciriaco was left dead on the scene, Gregorio received fatal wounds from
which he died within about four hours, and Santiago also received fatal wounds from which he
died five days later.

1
 

- Ciriaco Abando   received two wounds on the top of his head caused by some cutting
instrument, and also sustained a fracture of the skull, apparently caused by means of a blow.
He also had a wound on the head, another on the neck below the left war, the left eye was
bruised and he also had a wound on the palm of the right hand.
- Santiago Abando  received in all seven wounds, one cross-wise of the head, back of the left
ear; another on top of the head, just above the first wound; a third wound on the left part of the
neck, all of these three wounds having been caused by a cutting instrument; a fourth wound,
also caused by some sharp instrument on the top of the head; a fifth wound which was in the
nature of a contusion, appeared on the frontal region of the head; a sixth wound in the back;
and a seventh wound on the left hand which had apparently been caused by some cutting
instrument.
- The body of Gregorio Esmedia  showed four wounds; a wound or bruise on the front of the
head; another wound, caused by a cutting instrument, running across the head, apparently
caused by a blow with some blunt instrument, on the breast; and another wound apparently
caused by a cutting instrument, and also a bruise on the left arm.
- The accused, Ponciano Esmedia, received one wound on the head, but it was not of a serious
nature; the other accused, Mena Esmedia, escaped uninjured.
uninjured.
- The prosecution presented  An Andr
dr ea L
Lact
act oson
os on , 60 years of age, wife of the deceased Ciriaco,
and Julian Alagos , a young boy about 16 years of age, a grandson of Ciriaco. These two
witnesses saw the fight and gave a detailed account of the same. While it is true that these two
witnesses contradicted themselves to some extent on cross-examination, they having testified
on direct examination that Ciriaco never did reach the scene of the fight but was killed by the
two accused while on his way
w ay there, whereas on cross-examination they testified that Ciriaco
was there and when the accused arrived, yet it is clear that they intended to say that when the
two accused arrived Ciriaco was in that vicinity but they did not mean to say that he was at the
very side of his son.
- The theory of the defense that Ponciano was attacked by Ciriaco and Santiago is untenable, as
the nature and character
character of the w
wound
oundss on the bodies of these two persons show clearly that at
least some of them were inflicted by bolos, and Ponciano must have used a bolo in the fight,
though he contends that he only made use of a club. The bolo wounds on the heads of Gregorio
and Santiago were of such a serious nature
natur e that it would have been imposs
impossible
ible for them to have
gone any distance after having been wounded. So they could c ould not have rushed toward Ponciano
and attacked him after having received these wounds. Santiago was stabbed in the back by
Gregorio, but this wound of itself was not necessarily fatal.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the accused Ponciano and Mena Esmedia are guilty of double murder.

HELD:

•   YES.
•   The two accused arrived
arriv ed on the scene about the time the fight between Santiago and Gregorio
was terminating, and on seeing their father, Gregorio, lying in the mud and water, fatally
wounded and dying, and honestly believing that Santiago, who was standing at the time, would
inflict other wounds upon their father, they, in his defense, immediat
immediately
ely killed Santiago. Ciriaco
was near the scene at this time and on seeing him the two accused, under this great
g reat excitement,
proceeded to attack him, and as a direct result of the blows inflicted by them he fell to the
ground, dying immediately. Ciriaco was an o ld m an, a about
bout 80 ye
years
ars of age, aand
nd u sed a cane
to assist him in w alk
alking
ing about .

2
 

• Penal Code, the two accus ed a

  Under the provisions of No. 5, Article 8 of the Penal are
re e
exempt
xempt fr om
criminal responsibility  for having caused the death of Santiago Abando, inasmuch as it has
been shown that they inflicted these wounds upon him in defense of their father who was fatally
wounded at the time. They honestly believed, and had good grounds upon which to found their
belief, that Santiago would continue his attack upon their father.
•  They are, however, guilty of having caused the death of the old man, Ciriaco Abando .
When they attacked and killed him the other trouble had terminated
term inated and they were not in danger
of bodily harm from him.
•  In the commission of of this crime
crim e of homicide,
homicide, we must take into consideration No. 20 of article
article
10 of the Penal Code which provides, as an aggravating circumstance , that "when the act is
committed with insult or in disregard for the respect which may be due the aggrieved party on
account of his rank, age , . . ." inasmuch as the deceased, Ciriaco, was a man 80 years of age
and did not arrive on the scene until after the trouble between the two accused and Santiago
had terminated.
• accused killed this old man, Ciriaco, while laboring under grea
  As we have said, these two accused greatt
excitement and in the heat of passion , and it might be insisted that under these
circumstances they shoul d be giv en the benefit of No. 7 of articl e 9 of th e P Pena
enall Code , as
an extenuating circumstance. This provision should be applied to reduce the penalty in cases
where the provocation which caused the heated passion was made by the injured party. In the
case at bar the provocation was made by Santiago and not Ciriaco, as Ciriaco arrived after the
fight had terminated and there was then no provocation running
running from
f rom the old man
man,, Ciriaco, to
these accused. He was entirely unarmed and made no demonstration and said no word prior to
the assault upon him by the two accused. So the state of mind into which these two accused
were thrown by the provocation induced by Santiago can not modify the extent of their
punishment for killing the old man. In other words, before this provision can be applied as an
extenuating circumstance it is necessary, as we have said, that the person injured should have
executed the act producing   arrebato y obcecacion. It can not be applied when an assault is
made upon a person who had taken no part in the quarrel and had not in any manner provoked
the accused.
•  In view of the fact that these two accused are ignorant   the aggravating circumstance is
compensated by the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code which we applied in this case.
•  The sentence appealed from is, therefore, affirmed ; provided, however, that these two accused,
Ponciano Esmedia and Mena Esmedia, be condemned to fourteen years eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal, and to the accessory penalties; and, provided f urther, tha thatt they be
declared exempt
exempt fro m crimi nal responsibi lity for causing the dea death
th of Santiago Abando ,
which exemption relieves them from paying any indemnity to the heirs of the said Santiago
 Abando..
 Abando

2. PEOPLE
PEOPLE v BINDOY

CRIM REV Ar
Artiticl
clee 12 

Case title: People of the Philippines vs. G.R. No. L - 34665

Donato
Donato Bi ndoy  
Date: Augu st 28, 193
1931
1

DOCTRINE: Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense.
 Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code, the legal provision pertine
pertinent
nt to acciden
accident,
t, contemplates a situation
where a person is in fact in the act of
of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence
dilig ence and prudence,
but in the process produces harm or injury to someon
s omeone e or to something
something not iin
n the least in the mind of the
actor an accidental result flowing
fl owing out of a legal act. Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the
sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of
3
 

humanly foreseeable consequences. In short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the
wrong done

FACTS:

-  In the afternoon of
of May 6, 1930 a disturbance arose
arose in a tuba wine shop in the barrio market of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the tuba
drinkers. The accused Bindoy offered
off ered some wine to Tibay, who happened to be the wife of Pacas.
Bindoy threatened to injure Tibay if she did not accept the offer. Pacas stepped in to defend his
wife and attempted to take away the bolo that Bindoy was carrying. Emigdio Omamdam
(deceased herein), heard of the disturbance since he lived near the market. Omamdam went to
see what was happening. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself
from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with
such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio
Emi gdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind
Bindoy.

-  There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and O Omamdam,

mamdam, on the contrary, it
appears they were nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with each other.
Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only
defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him, and his
conduct
conduct w
was
as perfectly lawful.

-  An Information
Inform ation for Homicide was filed against Bindoy.

-  A witness for the

the defense states that he heard Omamdam say, say, at
at his death bed, "Please look
after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was an
accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap."

-  There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio
Emigdio Omamdam's death,
but the defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.

-  The CFI of Occidental Misamis convicted him for Homicide.

Homic ide. He appeals the judgment
judgm ent to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:

-  Is the Exempting
Exempti ng circumstance under Article 8, No. 8 of th the
e Old Pena
Penall Code applicable in this
case? (I can’t find a copy of the Old Penal Code,
Code, I think the equivalent N o. 4, since
equivalent is Article 12 No.
he was exercising a lawful act in trying to retain possession
possession of his bolo)
HELD:

•  Yes. The accused is entitled to acquittal under Art. 8, No. 8 of the Penal Code.

•  The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his
bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is no evidence to show
that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with
Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had
wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a
felony or a misdemeanor
misdemeanor incurs criminal
crim inal liability, although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.

4
 

•  Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only
defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him, and his
conduct
conduct was
w as perfectly lawful.

•  We have searche
searched d the re
record
cord in vain for the motive of this kind
kind,, which, had it e
existed,
xisted, would have
greatly facilitated the solution of this case.

3. PEOPLE
PEOPLE V AL DEMITA

People of t he Philippi nes vs. Re

People Renato
nato Al demita y Malihan
G.R. No. L-55033-34,
L-55033-34, Nov . 13, 1986
Narvasa, J.:

Doctrine:

It is settled principle that in cases such as this, the period to which an inquiry into the mental state
of the accused should be directed is that transpiring
transpir ing immediately before and/or at the very moment
of the act or acts under prosecution.

Facts:

(The judgment of the former Circuit Criminal Court of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC
CCC-VI-2253
-VI-2253
and CCC-VI-2254 finding Renato Aldemita y Malihan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
and frustrated murder is before this Court on automatic review in view of the death penalty meted
out)

The deceased victim, Erlinda Viardo, was at the time of her slaying managing partner of the
accounting firm of Carlos Valdez and Company. Angelita Yambao was her secretary and
appellant Aldemita was a liaison officer.

In the afternoon of March 5, 1976, Viardo arrived at her office in the company's premises at 1130
Perez Street in Paco, Manila, at about half past two o'clock. She conferred in her room with
Yambao for some time and then the latter stepped out briefly to get some files. Upon Yambao's
return to Viardo's room and while she and Viardo were engaged in discussion, Aldemita entered
the room, locking the door behind him. He was carrying an object wrapped in a newspaper, which

turned out to be
and wounding a jungle
her bolo,
in the left andand
hand withon
which, without
the head. Hefurther ado, he
then turned hisattacked Yambao, hitting
deadly ministrations on
Viardo and started hacking her with the bolo, at which point Yambao saw and seized the chance
to flee. She opened the door and ran to a room in the second floor of the building where she
locked herself in.

Maria Trinidad Ochoa Francisco, another secretary assigned to Viardo, had seen Aldemita enter
the room carrying an object about two feet long wrapped in a newspaper. She had then heard the
shouts of Yambao and Viardo and ran to a guard for help.

Ricarte Corpus, Viardo's driver, had seen people scampering out of the offices and promptly hid
himself to Viardo's room. From a distance of about four paces away from the room, he saw
 Aldemita through the open door hacking
hacking away at Viardo
Viardo.. He entered
entered the ro
room
om and ttried
ried to pac
pacify
ify
 Aldemita, but the latter
latter turned on
on him and tried to strike him, missing him,
him, however. Corpus tthen
hen
ran to call
arrived, theya policeman
and Corpusbut wastotold
tried openthat
thesomeone had already
door of Viardo's done
room, but that.
foundWhen policeAldemita
it locked. officers

5
 

opened the door only when he was convinced by the police that he would not be harmed; then
he walked out of the room and gave himself up.

 Aldemita, having been

been handcuffed
handcuffed and
and led tto
o a sofa,
sofa, began talking about th
the
e inciden
incident,
t, telling one
of the policemen that he had long planned the killing and had purchased the bolo with which he
had done it three days before. At police headquarters, however, he said he had bought the bolo
three weeks previously. No written statement was taken from him because he wanted to wait ffor or
his lawyer before giving one, and when the latter arrived, he advised Aldemita against doing so.

Post-mortem examination of the body of Viardo disclosed that she had sustained fourteen (14)
incised wounds and eleven (11) stab wounds.
 Aldemita was charged with murder and frustrated murder
m urder within three days after tthe
he incident,
 Aldemita was brought to trial only some two years later. In the
the interim, he was confined and placed
under observation in the National Mental Hospital having been committed to said institution by
order of the Trial Court issued on March 11, 1976 on motion of his counsel.

 An initial
initial report on his
his mental
mental or psych
psychiatric
iatric condition attested that said appellan
appellant:
t:

“... (i)s found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by
withdrawal symptoms, behavioral oddities, dulling of the affect and mental inaccessibly.”  

 Appellant's defense of
 Appellant's of insanity is anchored on those rereports;
ports; the professio
professional
nal opinions given o
on
n
the stand by Dr. Carlos Vicente and Dr. Arturo Nerit of the National Mental Hospital, who had him
under observation during confinement in that institution, that he was already mentally sick at the
time he committed the acts charged; the testimony of Ms. NoliNoliee Uy, a social worker in the National
Mental Hospital, who declared that she had conducted an anamnesis (social case history) of the
appellant and found that he had an only sister who had been confined in the same institution for
psychosis for 23 years, and that six of his maternal cousins and a maternal grandmother had
histories of mental illness; and the testimony of appellant's wife, Lucrecia, about his disturbed and
confused state in late February, 1976 brought about by the meddling of relatives in family affairs
having to do with the partition of their father's property.

Ruling of t he T
Trial
rial Court:

Conviction. The Trial Court adjudged the appellant sane at the time he committed the acts
charged, and the record discloses no good or sufficient reason to disturb that finding.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was insane within the purview of Art. 12 of the RPC so as to
exempt
exempt him from crim inal lia
liability?
bility?

Ruling:

No. In considering the plea of insanity

i nsanity as a defense in a prosecutio
prosecution
n for crim
crime,
e, the starting premise
is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind or otherwise stated, the law presumes
all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously.
Insanity being the exception, rather than the rule.

 Another basic premise is that the inquiry into tthe

 Another he mental condition of an accused who pleads
insanity as an exempting circumstance must relate to the time preceding, or coetaneous with, the
6
 

commission of the offense with which he is charged. The evidence (of mental condition), it has
been held, " ... must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment
of its execution."

 As to what
what constitut
constitutes
es insanity in law, this Court h
has
as consistently
consistently hewed to the o
old,
ld, but still valid,
parameters established in rulings of the Supreme Court of Spain;

in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that
there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the
accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he
acts without the least discernment; that there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was
held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should
absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality
of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence
that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior
to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition.

The appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption that he
committed the acts for which he was prosecuted and convicted freely, knowingly and intelligently.
His evidence fails to confute the following clear and positive indicia that immediately before and
during the commission of said acts, as well as afterwards, said appellant was in full possession
of his mental faculties:

1) after lunch on March 5, 1976 and until about half an hour before the incident, the
appellantt had played two or three
appellan t hree games of chess with Lorenzo Javier, a fellow employee;
2) a few minutes before he barged into Viardo's room and attacked his victims, he was
seen checking the company log book for his assignment, which fact demonstrates that he
was clearly aware of and at least normally diligent in attending to his duties;
3) he craftily wrapped his weapon in a newspaper to avoid arousing suspicion of his
murderous intent;
4) he took care to lock the door of Viardo's room before starting his attack, the natural and
it must be presumed the intended consequence of which was to trap his victims;
5) after violently rebuffing the efforts of Ricarte Corpus, Viardo's driver, to pacify him and
make him desist from further attacking Viardo, he locked the door again;
6) in quietly coming out of the room and submitting to arrest after he was assured that he
would not be harmed, he showed that he had not lost the power of discernment or
reasoning
reason ing as well as self-possession in a crisis situation
situation;;
7) when investigated, he declined to give any statement without the presence of his
lawyer, thus evincing knowledge and awareness of his constitutional rights.

These are not the acts or reactions of a madman. They bespeak an intelligently functioning mind,
purposive and calculated thinking, even craft and guile.

That during his confinement in the National Mental Hospital the appellant may have been found
certifiably schizophrenic does not detract from the persuasive character of the evidence of
normality implicit in his conduct and actions immediately before, during and after the attack on
Viardo and Yambao. As already pointed out, it is settled principle that in cases such as this, the

period to which
transpiring an inquiry
immediately into
before the at
and/or mental state
the very of theofaccused
moment the act orshould be directed
acts under is that
prosecution.

7
 

WHEREFORE, modified only to increase the civil indemnity in the murder case to P30,000.00
and to reduce the penalty imposed therein from death to reclusion perpetua, the judgment under
review, being otherwise free from error, is affirmed in all other respects, with costs de oficio. 

SO ORDERED.

4. PEOPLE
PEOPLE V UL
ULEP
EP

People v. Ulep
Facts:   The evidence shows that at around two o' clock in the morning of 22 December 1995
Buenaventura Wapili was having a high fever and was heard talking insensibly to himself in his
room.His brother-in-law, Dario Leydan, convinced him to come out of his room and talk to him,
but Wapili told Leydan that he could not really understand himself. After a while, Wapili went back
to his room and turned off the lights. Moments later, the lights went on again and Leydan heard a
furniture . [3] Unable to pacify Wapili,
disturbance inside the room, as if Wapili was smashing the furniture.
Leydan called Pastor Bonid of the Alliance Church of Kidapawan to help him "pray over" Wapili,
but they could not enter the latter's room as he became wild and violent. Suddenly, Wapili bolted
out of his room naked and chased Leydan. Thereafter, Leydan with the aid of two (2) of his
neighbors
neighbo rs attempted to tie Wapili
W apili with a rope but was unsuccessful as Wapili wasw as much bigger in
[4]
built and stronger than anyone of them.
them .  Wapili, who appeared to have completely gone crazy,
kept on running without any particular direction.
Thus, Leydan went to the house of policewoman Norma Plando, a neighbor, and asked for
assistance. As Wapili passed by the house of Plando, he banged Plando's vehicle parked
outside. Using a hand-held radio, Plando then contacted SPO1 Ernesto Ulep, SPO1 Edilberto
Espadera and SPO2 Crispin Pillo, all members of the PNP assigned to secure the premises of
Kidapawan.[5] 
the nearby Roman Catholic Church of Kidapawan.
 At around
around four
four o'clock
o'clock in the morning of tthe
he same
same day
day,, SPO1 Ulep together
together with S
SPO1
PO1 Espad
Espadera
era
and SPO2 Pillo arrived at the scene on board an  Anfra police service jeep. The three (3) police
officers, all armed with M-16 rifles, alighted from the jeep when they saw the naked Wapili
approaching them. The kind of weapon Wapili was armed with is disputed. The police claimed
that he was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili's relatives and neighbors said he
had no bolo, but only a rattan stool.
SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons or they would
shoot him. But Wapili retorted "pusila!" ("fire!") and continued advancing towards the police
officers.
officer s. When Wapili was only about two (2) to three (3) m meters
eters away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot
the victim with his M-16
M -16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim
v ictim slumped to the
ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head and literally blew his
out.[6]  
brains out.
The post mortem  examination of the body conducted by Dr. Roberto A. Omandac, Municipal
Health Officer of Kidapawan, showed that Wapili sustained five (5) gunshot wounds; CAUSE OF
DEATH - multiple gunshot wounds.
Dr. Omandac concluded that the shots were fired at close range, perhaps within twenty-four (24)
inches, judging from the powder burns found around some of the wounds in the body of the
victim,,[8] and that the wound in the head, which caused the victim's instantaneous death, was
victim
position." [9] 
inflicted while "the victim was in a lying position."
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Military filed an Information for murder against SPO1
Ulep. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment, and insisted during the trial
that he acted in self-defense. However, on 28 October 1997, the trial court rendered judgment
8
 

convicting the accused of murder and sentencing him to death. The means employed by the
accused to prevent or repel the alleged aggression is not reasonable because the victim,
Buenaventura Wapili, was already on the ground, therefore, there was no necessity for the
accused to pump another
another shot on the back portion of the victim's head. Clearly the gravity of the
wounds sustained by the victim belies the pretension of the accused that he acted in self-
defense. It indicates his determined effort to kill the victim. It is established that accused (sic) was
already in the ground that would no longer imperil
imp eril the accused's life. The most logical option open
to the accused was to inflict on the victim such injury that would prevent the victim from further
harming him. The court is not persuaded by the accused's version because if it is true that the
victim attacked him and his life was endangered - yet his two (2) companions SPO1 Espadera
and SPO2 Pillo did not do anything to help him but just witness the incident - which is unbelievable
unbeli evable
and unnatural behavior of police officers.
Ruling:  Preliminarily, having admitted the killing of Wapili, accused-appellant assumed the
burden of proving legal justification therefor. He must establish clearly and convincingly how he
acted in fulfillment of his official duty and/or in complete self-defense, as claimed by him;
otherwise,
otherwis e, he must suffer all the consequences of his m malefaction.
alefaction. He has to rely on the
quantitative
quant itative and qualitative strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the pr
prosecut
osecution;
ion;
for even if it were weak it could not be disbelieved after he had admitted the killing.
Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of The Revised
Penal Code  may be successfully invoked, the accused must prove the presence of two (2)
requisites, namely, that he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or an office, and that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence
of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The second requisite
is lacking in the instant case.
 Accused-appellantt and the other police officers involved originally set out to perform a legal
 Accused-appellan
duty: to render police assistance, and restore peace and order at Mundog Subdivision where the
victim was
w as then running amuck.
am uck. There were two tw o (2) stages of the incident at Mundog
Subdivision. During the first stage, the victim threatened the safety of the police officers by
menacingly advancing towards them, notwithstanding accused-appellant's previous warning shot
and verbal admonition to the victim to lay down his weapon or he would be shot. As a police
officer, it is to be expected that accused-appellant would stand his ground. Up to that point, his
decision to respond with a barrage of gunfire to halt the victim's further advance was justified
under the circumstances. After all, a police officer is not required to afford the victim the
opportunity to fight back. Neither is he expected - when hard pressed and in the heat of such an
encounter
encou nter at close quarters - tto
o pause for a long moment and reflect coolly at his peril, or to wait
after each blow to determine the effects thereof.
However, while accused-appellant
accused-appellant is to be commended
commended for promptly respondin
responding
g to the call of duty
when he stopped the victim from his potentially violent conduct and aggressive behavior, he
cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty during the second stage of the incident - when he
fatally shot the victim in the head, perhaps in his desire to take no chances, even after the latter
slumped to the ground due to multiple gunshot wounds sustained while charging at the police
officers.
officer s. Sound discretion
discr etion and restraint
r estraint dictated that
th at accused-app
acc used-appellant,
ellant, a veteran
[11]
policeman,, should have ceased firing at the victim the moment he saw the latter fall to the
policeman
ground. The victim at that point no longer posed a threat and was already incapable of mounting
an aggression
aggressi on against the police
p olice offofficers.
icers. Shooting him ini n the head was w as obviously
obvi ously
unnecessary. As succinctly observed by the trial court -

Once he saw the victim he fired a warning shot then shot the victim hitting him on the different
parts of the body causing him to fall to the ground and in that position the accused shot the
victim again hitting the back portion of the victim's head causing the brain to scatter on the
ground x x x x the victim, Buenaventura Wapili, was already on the ground. Therefore, there

9
 

was no necessity for the accused to pump another shot on the back portion of the victim's head.
It cannot therefore be said that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a necessary
consequence of accused-appellant's due performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right
or office. Likewise, the evidence at hand does not favor his claim of self-defense. The elements
in order for self-defense to be appreciated are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the person
injured or killed by the accused; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and, (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself . [12] 

The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the
person defending himself .[13] In the present case, the records show that the victim was lying in a
prone position on the ground - bleeding from the bullet wounds he sustained, and possibly
unconscious - when accused-appellant shot him in the head. The aggression that was initially
begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant attacked him. From that moment,
there was no longer any danger to his life.

This Court disagrees with the conclusion of the court a quo that the killing of W apili by accused-
appellantt was attende
appellan attended
d by treachery
treachery,, thus qualifying the offense to murder. WWee discern nothing
from the evidence that the assault was so sudden and unexpected and that accused-appellant
deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to insure the killing of Wapili, without the victim
having the opportunity to defend himself.
On the contrary, the victim could not have been taken by surprise as he was given more than
sufficient warning by accused-appellant before he was shot, i.e., accused-appellant fired a
warning shot in the air, and specifically ordered him to lower his weapons or he would be shot. The
killing of Wapili was not sought on purpose. Accused-appellant went to the scene in pursuance of
his official duty as a police officer after having been summoned for assistance. The situation that
the victim, at the time accused-appellant shot him in the head, was prostrate on the ground is of
no moment when considering the presence of treachery. The decision to kill was made in an
instant and the victim's helpless position was merely incidental to his having been previously shot
by accused-appellant in the performance of his official duty.
Indeed, to hold him criminally liable for murder and sentence him to death under the
circumstances would certainly have the effect of demoralizing other police officers who may be
called upon to discharge official functions under similar or identical conditions. We would then
have a dispirited police force who may be half-hearted, if not totally unwilling, to perform their
assigned duties for fear that they would suffer the same fate as that of accused-appellant.
This brings us to the imposition of the proper penalty.
We find in favor of accused-appellant the incomplete justifying
justif ying circumstance
circums tance of fulfillment of a duty
or lawful exercise of a right. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be
deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or
lacking."
Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance, which, not only cannot
be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than
law.[15] Undoubtedly, the instant case would have fallen under Art. 11, par. 5
that prescribed by law.
of The Revised Penal Code had the two (2) conditions therefor concurred which, to reiterate: first,
that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office;
and second, that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. But here, only the first
condition was fulfilled.
f ulfilled. Hence, Art. 69 is applicable,
appl icable, although its "that
"t hat the majority of such
conditions
into accountbeunder
present," is immaterial
Art. 11, since
par. 5. Article 69 there are only
is obviously two (2)
in favor of conditions
the accusedthat
as may be taken
it provides for
a penalty lower than that prescribed by law when the crime committed
commi tted is not wholly justifi
justifiable.
able. The
10
 

intention of the legislature, obviously, is to mitigate the penalty by reason of the diminution of
either freedom of action, intelligence, or intent, or of the lesser perversity of the offender . [16] 
We likewise credit in favor of accused-appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The police blotter of Kidapawan Municipal Police Station shows that immediately after
killing Wapili, accused-appellant reported to the police headquarters and voluntarily surrendered
himself

The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under
circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The
[18]
law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill.
kill.  It may
be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a
situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be
stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties
must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits.

I. IMBECILETY/INSANITY  

1. PEOPLE v FORMIGONES

People vs. Formigo nes

People
G.R. No. L-3246, Nov.
Nov . 29, 1950
Montemayor, J.:

Doctrine:

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.

Facts:

(This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the
appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The follow
following
ing facts are not disputed.)

In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo

Abelardo Formigones
Form igones was living on his farm in
Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his
five children. From there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones,
in the barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of
palay.

On December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the
house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from
the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung
and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia
toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed
foll owed by her husband
husband Abelardo who, taking
her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay
down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts
11
 

for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the
stabbing of her mother by her father.

Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement wherein he

admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement
he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his
brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he
noticed that his had become indifferent to him.

During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused
pleaded guilty. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea
of not guilty, but did not testify.
testif y. His counsel presented the testim
testimony
ony of two guards of the provincial
 jail where Abelardo was confined to the effecteffect that his
his conduct th
there
ere was rath
rather
er strange a
and
nd that
he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark
naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent
to his surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the
prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even
alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened, he
suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his
liberty.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is an imbecile, therefore, exempt from criminal liability under Art. 12
of the RPC?

Ruling:

No. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it
was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and
that he could distinguish right from wrong.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken
into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment;   that there be a complete absence of the power
to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held
that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does
not exclude imputability.

12
 

 As to the strange beha

behaviour
viour of the accused during his confine
confinement,
ment, assuming that it was not
feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or
to a morbid
m orbid mental
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.

 After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile.
 According
 Accordin g to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anythinanything
g or
conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He
regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even
maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work.

 And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent
extent of kill
killing
ing
his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was
vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.

2. PEOP
PEOPLE
LE v AMBAL

CRIM REV Ar
Artiticl
clee 12 

2. PEOPLE v. AMB
AMBAL
AL G.R. No. L-52688

Date: Octob er 17, 198

1980
0

DOCTRINE: Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented, a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition.

PARTIES
PARTIES:: HON
HONORAT
ORATOO AMBAL (accused)
FELICULA
FELICULA VIC
VICENT
ENTEE AMB AL (deceased)
SETTING:
SETTING: BA
BARRIO
RRIO BA
BALB
LB AGON, MAMB
MAMBAJAJAO,
AO, CAMIGUIN
CHARGE: PARRICIDE
FACTS:

In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering plants near the

house of Honorato
and medical Ambal,
assistance.   Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She asked for drinking water
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in an improvised
hammock and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival.
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, after entrusting his child to a neighbor, went to the house of the
barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he had killed his wife Feling. After making that
oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman, also
confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated
confiscated Ambal's long bolo the tip of which was broken. Ambal was bespatt
bespattered
ered with
blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.

The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which were
exacerbated by the fact that he sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and chose to spend the
night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children.

13
 

The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy medicine
for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated altercation. Felicula told her
husband that it would be better if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark
infuriated Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife.
 Ambal was charged with parricide where he
he pleaded
pleaded not guilty.
guilty. His defense
defense was insanity.
The CFI directed the municipal health officer, Doctor Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate
who had undergone a six-month training in psychiatry in the National Mental Hospital, to
examine Ambal and to submit within one month a report on the latter's mental condition.
Doctor Balbas
B albas found
f ound that Ambal was a "passive-aggressiv
"p assive-aggressive,
e, em
emotionally
otionally unstable,
u nstable, explosive or
inadequate personality." He testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days after the killing)
to November 3, 1977, when he
he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any mental defect
and was normal.
 Asked directly
directly whether Ambal suffere
suffered
d from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied
replied:: "Before
the commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal, but during the
commission of the crime, that is what we call 'Psychosis' due to short fru stration tolera
tolerance
nce ."
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna, a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month observation of mental
cases and who in the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred cases of mental
disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a minor psycho -ne
-neurosis,
urosis,
a disturbance of the functional nervous system which is not insanity . The doctor concluded
that Ambal was not in sane. Ambal was normal but n ervous. He had no mental diso rder.

 Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten months after the
incident. He said that at the time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he was
allegedly not in full possession of his normal mental
m ental faculties. He pretended not to know that was charged
with the capital offense of having killed his wife.

But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death. During his
confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked
in the town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in the market.
He said that his wife quarreled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he rode on a tricycle when
he surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident he got wet while
plowing He feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had chills. That
was the commencement of his last illness.
From Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident, CFI concluded that he was not insane and that he
acted like a normal human being. CFI convicted him of PARRICIDE. 

ISSUE:

WON Ambal is exempted from crimina

criminall liability by reason o
off Insanity

HELD:

NO. The Court agrees with CFI.

14
 

In the instant case, the

t he alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient
s ufficient eviden
evidence.
ce. The
presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and
freedom
freedo m of will
w ill when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any disease or defect.
The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law -enforcing au
authorities
thorities is
incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he wa
incontestable wass going to be
punished for it .
 Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance
circumstance of voluntary surrende
surrenderr to the autho
authorities.
rities.
 Article 246 of the
t he Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with
w ith reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser
penalty should because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of aggravating
circumstances.
Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or
mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity.

 Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from crimina

criminall liability an imbecile or an insane person
unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain,
or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic,
and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective
faculties,
faculties, or by im
impaired
paired or disordered volition."
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary". The law
always presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed
unconsciously.
When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he performed the criminal
act charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of madness or of mental derangement, or that he
was generally considered to be insane — his habitual condition being, on the contrary, healthy — the
legal presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the burden is upon the defendant to
overcome this presumption.
Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to
or during the perpetration
perpetration of the crime, it will
wi ll be presumed that he was in a normal condition.
 A defendant
defendant in a criminal case, w who
ho interposes
interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of
establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code, he must be deprived completely a reason or discernment and freedom of the will at
the time of committing the crime .
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempt ing circumstance, there must be comp lete depriv ation
exempting
of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least
discernment .
There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a
frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a
quarrel or fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always,

15
 

acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular
meaning of the word 'crazy' is not synonymous with the legal terms 'insane.'
Justic e Ca
Cardozo
rdozo  in his article, "What Medicine Can Do for The Law",  traces briefly the origin of the
rule regarding insanity as a defense. He says:
In the early stages of our law, way back in medieval times, insanity was never a defense for crime. The
insane killer, like the man who killed in self-defense, might seek a pardon from the king, and would often
get one. He had no defense at law. Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within narrow limits. This
was what was become known as the wild-beast stage of the defense . Then the limits of the defense
were expanded, but still slowly and narrowly. The killer was excused
excused if t he disease of the min d was
such that he was incapable of appreciating the difference between right and wrong . At first this
meant, not the right and wrong of particular case, but right and wrong generally or in the abstract, the
difference, as it was sometimes said, between good and evil. Later, the rule was modified in favor of the
prisoner so that capacity to distinguish between right and wrong generally would not charge with
responsibility if there was no capacity to understand the difference in relation to the particular act, the
subject of the crime.
The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in 1843 by the answer made by the House of
Lords to questions
questions submitted by judges in the famous
fam ous case of Mc-Naghten, who was tried for the murder
m urder
of one Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert Peel.

In the Mc-Naghten case, the following rule was laid down: "To establish a defense on the ground of
insanity, it mu st be clea
clearly
rly pro ved that at time of committi ng the act, the party accused was under
such a defect of reason
reason fro m dis ease
ease of the mind, as not to know t he na
nature
ture and quali ty of the act
he was doin g , or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
was doing wh at wa
wass wrong. "
In the Mc-Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten
M'N aghten shot Edward Drummond on January 20, 1843.
Drummond died as a consequence of the gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was the private
secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime minister. M'Naghten shot Drummoned, thinking he was Sir Robert.
Mc-Naghten labored under the insane delusion that he was being hounded by his enemies and that the
prime minister was one of them. Medical evidence tended to prove that Mc-Naghten was affected by
morbid delusions which carried him beyond the power of his own control, leaving him unable to distinguish
right and wrong, and that he was incapable of controlling his conduct in connection with the delusion. The
 jury found
found him no
nott guilty by reason o
off insanity.
 As stated
stated in another
another case,
case, the "t
"test
est of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is asse
asserted,
rted, is the
capacity
capacity of the accuse
accused d to distinguish b etwe
etween
en right and w rong  at the time and with respect to the
act which is the subject of the inquiry."
 Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test   which means that "assuming defendant's
 Another
knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of
disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him
to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The commission of the crime is
excused even if the accused knew what he was doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental
disease he lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit the act.
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called wrong t est
est , supplemented by the irresistible impulse
tes t, does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a person alleged
mental incapacity."
incapacity." "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the pr
produc
oductt of a mental
disease or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of criminal responsibility for his
16
 

unlawful act is a condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a mental defect having
such effect on criminal responsibility is a condition not considered capable of improvement of
deterioration, and either congenital, or the of injury or of a physical or mental disease.”  

The general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to be the capacity to understand the nature
and consequences of the act charged and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong as
to such act , and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test .
The rule in the Mc-Naghten
Mc -Naghten case exists along with the "irresistible
"ir resistible impulse" test or some other formula
permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the ground that, although he knew the act was wrong, he was
unable
unable to refrain from committing it.
Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham   or 'Product' rule, also permits inability to
distinguish between right and wrong to be considered, even though it refuses limit
lim it the inquiry to that topic,
it wou ld appea
appearr that insanity whi ch meets this test is a defense in all Anglo -American jurisd icti ons  
and that the only controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the right-and-wrong test is
not met, but in which a defense on grounds of insanity should nevertheless be recognized.

3. People
People vs . Puno
Puno

G.R. No.
No. L
L-33211
-33211 Jun
Junee 29, 198
1981
1
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appe llee, vs. ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO,
plaintiff-appellee,
 Accused whose de
death
ath senten
sentence
ce is und
under
er review.

 AQUINO, J.:

DOCTRINE: 

Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime.

Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intellige

intelligence
nce in com mitting the ac
act,
t,
that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts with out th e leleast
ast discernm ent beca
becauseuse
there is complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of
dom of the will. Me
freedom
free Mere
re a
abnor
bnor mality of th e mental faculties will not excl ude imput ability."  

FACTS:

This is a murder  case
 case where the accused interposed as a defense the exe
exempting
mpting circumstance
of insanity .

There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno,
28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow.
The house was located in the area known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal

On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: "Mangkukulam ka
mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several
times on the head with a hammer until she was dead.

17
 

The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom with the old woman,
and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno's eyes were
reddish. His look was baleful and menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.

 After the
the killing,
killing, Pun
Puno
o went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria
Hilaria had taken refuge, and, a
according
ccording to
Hilaria, he made the following confession and threat: "Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag
ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa
matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong
tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko. "

 After the
the killing, Puno
Puno fled to his parents'
parents' house at Barrio Tuga
Tugatog,
tog, Malabon
Malabon and then wen
wentt to the
house of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan,
reaching that place in the evening. How he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded,
is not shown in the record.

Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon police of the
killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed
already dead, Her head was bloody. Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down
the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer.

 A medico-legal
medico-legal officer of
of the National
National Bureau
Bureau of Investigation
Investigation conducte
conducted
d an aut
autopsy.
opsy. He certified
that the victim had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused
by a hard instrument, On opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and generalized
hemorrhage. The cause of death was intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage.

Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought him to the National
Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970. He was charged with murder
in the municipal court. He waived
w aived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
investigation.

On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal.
 Alleged in the information
i nformation as aggravating
aggravating circumstances
circumstances were evident premedita
premeditation,
tion, abuse of
superiority and disregard of sex.

Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after the killing,
pretended that he did not remember having killed Aling Kikay- He believes that there are persons
who are "mangkukulam," "mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by
those persons, his feet might
mig ht shrink or his hands might sw
swan.
an. Puno believes that a person harmed
by a "mambabarang" might have a headache or a swelling nose and ears and can be cured only
by a quack doctor ( herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to kill the "mangkukulam" and
"mambabarang".

Puno is the third child in a family of tw

twelve
elve children.
children. He is married with two children. He finished
third year high school. His father is a welder. Among his friends are drivers.

Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the murder, Puno's eyes were
reddish. He complained of a headache. The following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told
Zenaida that a bumble bee was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida
did not see any bee.

Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother. He wanted to use
that cord in
that cord. tyingtied
Puno histhe
dog. Hetoasked
dog a treefor
by another roperope
looping the when Zenaida
through admonished
its mouth himitsnot
and over to use
head. He
repeatedly boxed the dog.
18
 

 Aida Gabriel,
Gabriel, Zenaida's
Zenaida's elder
elder sister, saw Puno
Puno while h
he
e was boxing
boxing that d
dog.
og. Aida o
observed
bserved that
that
Puno's eyes were bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious expression.

Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno came to their house
in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in that place. He was
cuddling a puppy that he called "Diablo". He called for Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat.
Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the puppy.

Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song. When Teotimo asked
him to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimo'
Teotimo's
s father.
When told that Teotimo's father had been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked
at Teotimo.

While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a moaning sound until
he fell asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next morning by the noise caused by persons wading
in the flood. Ernesto thought they were his fellow cursillistas.

The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that Puno was
insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with
discernment.

Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial
Hospital, to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times between September 8, 1966 and
July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was an out-patient who could very well live with society,
although he was afflicted with "schizophrenic reaction"; that Puno knew what he was
doing and that he had psychosis, a slight d estruction
estruction of the ego.  Puno admitted to Doctor
Maravilia that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his financial
problem. Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July 4, 1970 was already cured.

Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno was first brought to
that hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents complained that he laughed alone and
exhibited certain eccentricities
eccentrici ties such as kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles
observed that while Puno
Puno was suffering from " schizophre
schizophrenic
nic reaction", his sympto ms were
"not socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to his environment . He
agreed with Doctor Maravilla's testimony.

Doctor CarlosofVicente,
examination Puno, hea gathered
medical dspecialist
gathere that Puno of acted
the National Mental Hospital,
with discernm ent whentestified that itted
he comm from the
his
killing and that Puno could distinguish between right and wrong . Doctor Vicente also
concluded that Puno was not suffering from any delusion and that he was not mentally
deficient; otherwi se, he would not have rea reached
ched thir d yea
yearr high sch ool.  

On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense, Doctors Vicente,
Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental Hospital submitted the following report
on Puno:
Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient
Service of the National Mental Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which he
recovered ; in 1964 a relapse of the same mental illness when he improved
and in 1966
1966 when his illn ess remained unimpr oved.  
His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro
Compound
anymoup
back anymo retoforJuly, 197
1970.
0. He On
medication. was relieve
relieved
Septemberd of8, s1970,
ymptaccording
oms and to
didinformation,
not com e
he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not given.
19
 

MENTAL CONDITION

..
.... Presently,
Presently, he is qu iet and as usual m anage
anageable.
able. H
He
e is fairly c lean in person
and without undue display of emotion. He talks to co-pa co-patients
tients but become
becomess
evasive when talking with the doctor and other personnel of the ward. He
know s he is accused of mur der but refuses to ela elaborate
borate on it.  

xxx xxx xxx

REMARKS

In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously w as suffering

suffering
from a mental illn ess calle
called
d schi zophrenia, is presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms.  
The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several
isolated accounts in his life do not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic
process. It may be found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a
markedly,
marke dly, reta
retarded
rded individual of which he is not.  

However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like
schizophrenia may retain some residual symptom s impairing t heir judgment
schizophrenia
but not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the offense
committed.  
committed.

The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court and the order of the
trial court dated November 16, 1970 for the mental examination of Puno in the National Mental
Hospital to determine whether he could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed
the killing.

TRIAL COURT RULING:

Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col was wrong and that he would be
puni shed for i t, a
ass show n by t he threats which h e made to Hilaria de la C
Cruz
ruz and Lina Pajes,
Pajes,
the old w oman's companions who witnesse witnessedd his dasta
dastardly
rdly dee
deed.
d.

The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had gone berserk, he
would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he

really disposed of her because he thought that she was a witch.

Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed the conduct and
behavior of the accused inside the court, most especially when he was presented on the witness
stand" and he was convinced "that the accused is sane
sa ne and has full grasp of what was
w as happening"
in his environment.

The trial court con victed Puno of m urder, sentence

sentencedd hi m to dea
death
th and ord ere
ered
d hi m to pay
the heirs of th e victim an indemn ity of t wenty-two th ousand pesos (Crimin al C
Case
ase No. 5509
09).
).

ISSUE: Whether or not accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime.

RULING:
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point
must
(U.S. refer to the time
vs. Guevara, preceding
27 Phil. the act under
547). Insanity shouldprosecution
be proven or to
prov en by theand
clear verypositiv
moment
positive of its execution
e evidence (People
vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).
20
 

The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he had
chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8, 1970,
when he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person
of discernment and freedom
freedom of will.

Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).

Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intellige

intelligence
nce in com mitting the ac
act,
t,
that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he a
acts
cts w itho ut the least discernment because
there is complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of
dom of the will. Me
freedom
free Mere
re abnormality of the mental fac
faculties
ulties will not exclude imput ability.
ability.""

 After evaluating counsel de oficio's  contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated and the
circumstances surrounding the killing, we are
are le
led
d to t he conclusio n that Puno was not legally
insane when he killed the hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the
psychi atrists reveal that on that tragic occasion h e was not compl ete
etely
ly deprived of reason
and freedom
freedom o f will.  

In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder. The
qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority.  In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who was
armed with a hammer, took advantage of his superior natural strength over that of the unarmed
septuagenarian female victim who was unable to offer any resistance and who could do nothing
but exclaim " Diyos ko ".

Thus, it was held that " an atta

attack
ck made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which
sex and
and the weapon used in the act a aff
ff orded hi m, a
and
nd fro m which t he woman was unable
to defend herself"  (People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil.
612; U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).

Evident premeditation ( premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated because the

evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime,
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a
suffi cient interval of tim e be
between
tween the dete
determin
rmin ation and the exe
executio
cutio n of th e crime to allow
him to r eflect upon t he consequences of his act
58 SCRA 241, 247).  (People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July 31, 1974,

Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old age sho uld
Dwelling
be appreciated
appreciated as generic aggravating cir cumst ance
ances.
s. D
Disregard
isregard of sex is not aggravating
because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately
deliberately int ended to offend or i nsul t the
sex of the victim or showed manifest
manifest disrespect to her womanhood  (People vs. Mangsant,
65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2,
L-2 3511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404, People vs, Jaula,
90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).

However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating

circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as contended by counsel de
oficio , the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) which
diminished his will-power without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts.  
(See
87 People
Phil. 658.)vs. Francisco,
Francisc o, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs.
vs . Formigones,

21
 

It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed (Arts. 64[41 and
248, Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua
The indemnity imposed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio. 

SO ORDERED.

P.S.
READ THE SEPARATE OPINIONS..   
SEPARA TE OPINIONS

4. PEOPLE VS. TABUGOCA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRESENCIO TABUGOCA, accused-

appellant

G.R. No. 125334 Januar y 28, 1998

Doctrine: In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be
complete depreciation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted
without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not preclude
imputability.

FACTS: Two informations were simultaneously filed on January 20, 1995 in the RTC-Branch 18
of Ilagan, Isabela. Accused-appellant
Accused-app ellant was accused of raping his daughters in two separate
incidents. The information in Criminal Case No. 2386 charges him as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of March, 1992 in the municipality of Naguilian, province of
Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and
with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own daughter JACQUELINE A.
TABUGOCA, a girl of 14 years old (sic), against the latter's will and consent.

The information in Criminal Case No. 2387 alleges:

That on or Philippines
of Isabela, about the 9th day
and of December,
within 1994,ofinthis
the jurisdiction theHonorable
municipality of Naguilian,
Court, province,
the said accused
accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and
with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own daughter JINKY A. TABUGOCA,
a girl of 12 years old (sic), against the latter's will and con
consent.
sent.

He pleaded not guilty. The commission of the two felonies was found by the lower court to have
been attended by the aggravating circumstances of relationship and intoxication.

In Criminal Case No. 2386, accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
Perpetua and directed to indemnity Jacqueline Tabugoca in the sum of P50,000.00. In Criminal
Case No. 2387, wherein the crime charged was committed after the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 7659 on December 31, 1993, he was condemned to suffer the capital punishment of death
and ordered to indemnify Jinky Tabugoca in the sum of P50,000.00.

22
 

The trial court arrived at the conclusion that, beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant had
committed the crimes charged on the bases of the testimonies of the victims, as corroborated by
the medical reports, and the testimony of the physician who examined them.

Jacqueline testified that she and her three younger sisters, Janet, Jinky and Jewel, lived under
the sole care of their father after their mother died on August 28, 1991. While she and her sisters
were sleeping in their house at Barangay Roxas, Naguilian, Isabela at around 10 o'clock in the
evening of March 28, 1992, she was roused by her father who asked her to scratch his back. It
turned out, however, that accused-appellant had other intentions that night aside from relief from
his itchy discomfort.

While Jacqueline was thus scratching her father's back, he told her to stay and wait for a while.
Without any intimation, accused-appellant then removed her shorts and underwear and made her
lie down beside him. Jacqueline could only cry at this point. As soon as she was completely
disrobed, accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. With his manhood Accused-
appellant warned her not to tell anyone of his dastardly act if she would not want to be harmed
(makaala ka kaniak). Complainant was so petrified
with fear that she did not even dare ask her father why he was sexually molesting her. Jacqueline
was twelve years and three months old at the time of the incident, she having been born on
December 27, 1979. Jacqueline harbored ill-feelings against her father, and she reportedly
became the object of gossip by her classmates in school. However, she did not tell anyone about
her ordeal at the hands of her own father until she learned that the same misfortune had befallen
her sister, Jinky.

In Criminal Case No. 2387, complainant Jinky declared in the court below that her father tried to
rape her in the early morning of December 9, 1994. While she was cleaning some articles in their
house, accused-appellant approached her and then took off his clothes. He then ordered Jinky to
lie down and he removed her shorts and panty. Thereafter, he inserted his penis into her vagina.
Jinky cried and complained to her father that she was in pain. Accused-appellant explained that
it is ordinary to feel pain because it was her first time to experience coitus. After a while, he did
not persist anymore in his sexual pursuit. Appellant lay down beside Jinky and told her that they
will continue the following day. At dawn of December 10, 1994, accused-appellant made another
attempt to carnally molest Jinky. This time, however, Jinky resisted, thereby causing appellant to
 just lie down
down and leave her
her alone. Jinky was only
only 12 yyears
ears and nine mon
months
ths old at the ttime
ime of the
incident, she having been born on March 5,1982.

While Jacqueline and Jinky were watching television at their grandmother's house nearby, Jinky
confided to her grandmother about the sexual abuses of her father against her. Upon hearing the
revelations of her sister, Jacqueline also disclosed to her grandmother her own experience with
her father two years before. The victims'
victim s' grandmother, Perlita Alejandro, forthwith brought her
granddaughters to the police authorities and then to the Municipal Health Officer of Naguilian for
physical examination.

In Criminal Case No. 2386, the findings were as follows:

LEGAL FINDINGS:

1. PE findings: essentially normal except for the anxiety that the victim exhibited

2. Internal Examination : multiple healed lacerations/scars at 3, 5, 6 and 9 o'clock positions of the

hymen. : introitus admits two fingers with ease. . . no other findings noted . . .
RECOMMENDATIONS:
23
 

Impression : The above findings suggest that the victim was forcibly abused and the incident, the
first one happened long ago based on the healed scars of the hymen.

While in Criminal Case No. 2387, the medico-legal found that:

LEGAL FINDINGS:

1. The vulva is edematous although the hymen is intact. . . . no other findings noted . . . .

RECOMMENDATIONS:
The above findings suggest that full penetration was not successful although attempts
were done based on the swelling vulva of the victim.

Dr. Fontanares explained that the lacerations found on Jacqueline's hymen were the result of
sexual intercourse which happened approximately on the date alleged. She added that, aside
from the swelling of Jinky's labia, she also found out that they were tender and reddish.

Jacqueline executed a criminal complaint for rape against accused-appellant, while Jinky charged
accused-appellant with frustrated rape in her own criminal complaint.

 Accused-appellantt raised the defense of his ha

 Accused-appellan having
ving been completely unaware of what ttranspired
ranspired
on March 28, 1992 and on December 9, 1994 as he was very drunk on those occasions.
 According
 Accordin g to him, he does not know if he had sexually
s exually assaulted his daughter, Jacqueline. He
only came to know of the complaint of Jacqueline against him after the policemen who arrested
him on December 10, 1994 told him thereof. On the same day, Jacqueline allegedly informed him
that he was drunk on March 28, 1992, but he claimed that he could not recall if indeed he drank
liquor that day.

With regard to the complaint of Jinky, accused-appellant similarly declared in the lower court that
he drank liquor in their house on December 9, 1994, Again, he claimed that he could not recollect
the ensuing events after he had finished drinking. He was allegedly merely in formed by the
arresting policemen on December 10, 1994 that Jinky was accusing him of attempted rape.

 Accused-appellantt claimed that

 Accused-appellan that he learned
learned to drink liquor after
after his wife died
died on Au
August
gust 28, 1991.
1991.
Prior to his wife's death, he was not used to drinking alcoholic beverages. He later resorted to
alcohol whenever
while. He he would
also opined remember his
that Jacqueline anddeceased
Jinky mustwife,
havebutfiled
he allegedly drank only
their respective once in in
complaints a
order to get back at him for castigating or whipping them whenever they committed mistakes.

 Accused-appellant's
 Accused-appellan t's pretext that he could not remember the events of March 28, 1992 and
December 4, 1994. He claimed exemption from criminal liability on the ground of insanity brought
about by intoxication, invoking therefor some dicta in American jurisprudence.

ISSUES: Whether or not the accused-appellant can claim exemption from criminal liability on the
ground of insanity brought about by intoxication.

HELD: NO.

The law presumes every man

m an to be sane. A person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has necessarily the consequent burden of proving it. Further, in order
that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance,
circumstance, there must be complete depreciation
24
 

of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least
discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not preclude imputability. Accused-
appellant has utterly failed to overthrow the presumption of sanity. The defense did not present
any expert witness, any psychiatric evaluation report, or any psychological findings or evidence
regarding his mental condition at the time of the commission of the offenses. Accused-appellant's
charade of amnesia is evidently a desperate gambit for exculpation. Yet, amnesia, in and of itself,
is no defense to a criminal
crim inal charge unle
unless
ss it is
i s shown by competent proof that the accused did not
know the nature and quality of his action and that it was wrong. Failure
Fail ure to remember is in itself no
proof of the mental condition of the accused when the crime was performed.

He also posits that he cannot be prosecuted for rape in Criminal Case No. 2386 because the
criminal complaint of Jinky only accuses him of frustrated rape. With such a charge, he argues
that the trial court's jurisdiction to punish him is limited only to said offense and cannot cover
consummated rape. This is a meritless argument. When it is said that the filing of the complaint
by the offended party in cases of rape is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that
starts the prosecutory
prosecutory proceeding, but it is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court
to try the case. The penalty for the rape in Criminal Case No. 2387 is properly within the
 jurisdiction of the regional trial court,
court, then B
Branch
ranch 18
18 of th
the
e Re
Regional
gional Trial
Trial Court
Court of Ilagan,
Ilagan, Isabela
may hear and try the offense charged in the information and impose the punishment for it.

 Accused-appellantt insists that the failure of Jacqueline to immediat

 Accused-appellan imm ediately
ely report the crime
cr ime renders
doubtful of her accusation. The failure of complainant Jacqueline to immediately report the
incident to the authorities does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the charge in
Criminal
committedCase
by a No. 2386.
father It ishisa daughter
against settled decisional rule isthat
due to threats delay in reporting a rape case
justified.

 Accused-appellantt next asserts in his brief that Jacqueline filed her complaint in Criminal
 Accused-appellan Cr iminal Case
No. 2386 only out of sympathy with, and by way of revenge for what her father had done to, her
younger sister. It is highly inconceivable that they would claim having been raped just because
their father spanks them whenever they commit mistakes. serious criminal charge just to get even
with her father and to empathize with her sister. The sisters would not contrive stories of
defloration and charge their own father with rape unless these stories are true.

 Accused-appellantt also faults

 Accused-appellan faults th
the
e trial ccourt
ourt for not
not duly appreciating
appreciating the testimony of Jinky to the
effect that he only attempted to rape her and then desisted after she felt some pain. In relation to
this, appellant maintains that there was no rape in Criminal Case No. 2387 because of the
absence of lacerations on Jinky's vagina as found after medico legal examination.

It is axiomatic in criminal
crimi nal law that in order to sustain a conviction for rape, full penetration of the
female genital organ is not required. It is enough that there is proof of the entrance of the male
organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into
the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices to warrant
conviction for rape. The rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is
not indispensable to a conviction for rape. Thus, a finding that the victim's hymen is intact and
has no sign of laceration does not negate a finding that rape was committed. Jinky, being young
and unschooled in the ways of the law, may have entertained the notion that complete penile
penetration is necessary when she declared that her father only attempted to rape her. She was,
of course, not in any position to legally distinguish consummated from attempted rape.

Furthermor e, Accused-appellant contends in his memorandum that the prosecution failed to prove
Furthermore,
the employment of force and intimidation against complainants in both criminal cases. Corollary
to his reliance on the absence of force or intimidation, he asseverates in his brief that the absence
of resistance from Jinky suffices to hold that the sexual intercourse was voluntary. There is no
25
 

doubt that the appellant had carnal knowledge of his two daughters. In incestuous rape, it is not
necessary that actual force and intimidation be employed. It is sufficient that the accused
exercised a pervasive influence and control over the victim. Even if there was no violence
employed in the sexual congress, the moral influence of appellant over the complainant suffices
to constitute it into the crime of rape.

Two forms of intimidation under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code were recognized
in Matrim
Matrimonio,
onio, that is (1) threats and (2) overpowering
overp owering moral infl
influence.
uence. Accused-app
Accused-appellant
ellant
exercised such moral influence over herein complainants. Being the victims' father, accused-
appellant had that moral ascendancy and influence over his daughters which, in itself, was
sufficient to intimidate and force them to submit to his desires.

For rape to exist it is not necessary that the intimidation

intimidati on employed be so great or of such character
as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is therefore
enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the
accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter, as when she is threatened
with death if she reports the incident. Intimidation would also explain why there are no traces of
struggle which would indicate
indicate that the victim fought off her attacker.
attacker. If Jinky had consented to the
sexual intercourse, she would have kept it to herself and not denounce it immediately as rape.
Jinky's crying during the sexual act, and her evasion of her father's advances the following day,
belie his pretense that she voluntarily participated in the intercourse. There is no showing
whatsoever
morals. that complainant Jinky is a sexually perverted woman or one of extremely loose

Republic Act No. 7659 has added seven more attendant circumstances which, in effect also
create other variants of "qualified" rape punishable with the single indivisible penalty of death. In
line with the immediately preceding observation, the presence of ordinary mitigating or
aggravating circumstances would be of no moment since the death penalty shall be imposed
regardless of the number of any of them. The only possible basis for a reduction of such penalty
under the rules for graduating penalties under the Code is the presence of a aprivileged
privileged mitigating
circumstance.
circum stance. it used to be the
the accepted doctrine that in crimes against chastity, such as
as rape,
55
relationship was always aggravating.
aggravating.  However, among the "qualifying" circumstances
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 is the situation when the victim is under eighteen years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Obviously, in such a factual milieu, relationship having been used as an element in that "qualified"
form of rape, the same circumstance
circum stance cannot be used again to a aggravate
ggravate the penalty to be imp
imposed
osed
on the offender.

In the case at bar, therefore, relationship cannot be applied as an aggravating circumstance.

However, we are persuaded to affirm the attendance of intoxication as an aggravating
circumstance on the additional finding that it was habitual on the part of accused-appellant.
Indeed, he admitted in his memorandum 57that he took liquor to forget the memory of his wife ever
since she died on August 28, 1991. Such admission, together with the declarations of his
daughters and his own testimony in court that he was also inebriated on the two occasions when
he separately raped the victims, reasonably yields the inference that accused-appellant was a
habitual drunkard.

Yet, even on the remote assumption ex gratia argument that intoxication can be considered as a
mitigating circumstance in his favor, its presence would not affect the two penalties imposed by
the court below. Being indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death must be applied by the

26
 

courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed. The rule, however, is slightly different with respect to the civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 2386 and 2387 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-
appellant Cresencio Tabugoca is further ordered
order ed (1) in Criminal Case No. 2386, to pay Jacqueline
Tabugoca the additional amounts of P25,000.00 as moral
m oral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (2) in Criminal Case No. 2387, to pay Jinky Tabugoca the further amount of
P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

Two Members of the Court voted to impose on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

5. PEOPLE
PEOPLE v DIAZ

People v Diaz
G.R. No. 130210. December 8, 1999

DOCTRINE: Pedophilia being dissimilar to insanity. Defendant in a criminal case who

interposes the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing that fact

Facts:
-  3 December 1996 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening Francis Bart Fulache and his 10-
year old brother Felbart went to Pier 3 to defecate.
-  They were with 30-year old Ralph Velez Diaz, a friend Francis Bart knew
knew from the
hantakan, a gaming place near their store.
-  Francis then invited
invi ted his brother Felbart to go with them to Pier 4 but the latter was not
inclined so he went home
-  Francis did not return home that evening.
evening . But Felbart was not alarmed as his brother
was used to going around and doing anything he wanted to without telling him nor
asking permission from their parents.
-  However when Francis still failed to show up in the afternoon of the next day their
parents got worried and started searching for him.
-  Meanwhile, at noontime of the same day, SPO2 Ramon Villar received a report that a
body of a boy between 10 to 12 years of age was found dead at the Bulacao Bridge.
-  The body was in a sickening state of nudity and physical abuse.
-  The face was covered with a big stone in an apparent attempt to hide the body.
-  After the routine taking of photographs the body was brought to the Cosmopoli
Cosmopolitan tan
Funeral Homes for a post-mortem examination.
-  autopsy conducted by the PNP Medico-Legal
Medico- Legal Officer,
Offic er, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, revealed that
the cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage, extensive, with skull fracture, traumatic.
-  There were, quite notably, multiple
multip le lacerations in his rectum.
rectum .
-  With respect to the injuries
injuri es in the boys
boys rectal area, Dr. Cerna o opined
pined that a blunt
instrument like a male organ in full erection could have caused them.
-  He claimed that in an attempt to avoid any violation of his rectum the boy could have
suffered more pain considering his soft and tender skin and the violation would
necessarily result in hemorrhage which could cause instantaneous death
-  4 December 1996
1996 while the Fulache family
fami ly continued their search for Francis Bart
-  Degamo coucouple
ple claimed the body of the young
young victim in the belief that it was their
missing son Joseph Johnson Degamo.
-  After 2 days however, their missing son came home so the Degamos returned the body
to the funeral parlor.
-  What was good news for the Degamos was bad news for the the Fulaches
Fulaches..
-  The body now back in the funeral home turned out to be their Francis Bart. Bart .

27
 

-  Bartolome Fulache, father of the Fulache boys,

boys, identified
identif ied the corpse after hearing over
the radio that the cadaver of a boy remained unclaimed at the Cosmopolitan Funeral
Homes.
-  9 December 1996 at around 1:00 oclock in the morning a person acting suspiciously
suspici ously but
unknown to the Fulache spouses went to the wake.
-  There he created a spectacle of himself by reciting poems for Francis Bart Bart and singing
the theme song from the movie The Lion King, and giving emphasis to the word
surrender.
-  Bartolome Fulache reported to the authorities the unusual behavior of of their "uninvited
guest."
-  The police immediately went to the Fulache residence to observe the person. They
invited him to their headquarters for further observation and questioning. He went with
them voluntarily. He was identified later as herein accused-appellant Ralph Velez Diaz
-  The extra-judicial confession made by the where accused-app
accused-appellant
ellant revealed his sexual
perversity by narrating in detail how he perpetrated the ghastly crime against Francis
Bart, was however declared inadmissible by the trial court on the ground that Atty.
 Abellanosa
 Abellan osa who assisted aaccused-appella
ccused-appellantnt du
during
ring the custodial
custodial in
investigation
vestigation was not
an independent counsel of the accused as required under the Constitution.
-  The following
followi ng day, between 11:00
11:00 oclock in the morning andand 12:00 noon, a reenactment
was made at the scene of the crime.
-  There accused-appellant
accused-appell ant demonstrated, with Felbart as victim,
victim , sexually abused Francis
Bart and later killed him.
-  The reenactment was published in the 11 December 1996 issue of the Sun Star Daily,

but because
court, only an unauthenticated
it was likewise photocopy
declared inadmissible of the newspaper
in evidence. was
But the trial presented
court in
nevertheless
took judicial notice thereof.
-  Ralph Velez Diaz alias "Jimboy"
"Jim boy" was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City with mur der in relatio n to RA 7610
7610.
-  ARTICLE 12 FACTS: On his part, accused-appellant sought to establish the defense of
insanity by presenting Dr. Wilson Tibayan, a government physician connected with the
National Center for Mental Health.
-  The doctor’s testimony however did not help accused-appellants case because although
he admitted having initially categorized accused-appellant as insane, the doctor
eventually diagnosed accused-appellant to be afflicted with pedophilia, a mental
disorder NOT synonymous with insanity.
-  He explained that pedophilia is a sexual disorder wherein the subject has strong,
recurrent and uncontrollable sexual and physical fantasies about children which he tries

- 
to
Hefulfill, especially
claimed, when
however,
however, there
that are no
despite his people
afflictionaround.
affli ction the subject could distinguish right from
wrong. In fact, he maintained that pedophilia could be committed without necessarily
killing the victim although injuries might be inflicted on the victim in an effort to repel any
resistance.
-  Also worthy of of note was Dr. Tibayans
Tibayans testimony that accused-app
accused-appellant
ellant had disclosed to
him that his pedophilic acts were done in revenge as he himself as a child was also a
victim of sexual abuse.
-  Finally, Dr. Tibayan declared that accused-appellants
accused-app ellants affli
affliction
ction had a very low prognosis
thus making him very dangerous to society.
-  11 April 1997
1997 the court a quo found accused-appellant
accused- appellant Ralph Velez Diaz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder in relation to sexual abuse (sodomy) of a child, attended by
treachery. He was sentenced to death
-  trial court was convinced that notwithstanding the exclusion of the extrajudicial
confession of accused-appellant and the absence of any eyewitness to the crime, there
were enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to support his conviction, to wit:

28
 

(a) the testimony of 10-year old Felbart that he saw his brother last alive in the
company of accused-appellant;
(b) the physical evidence of sexual abuse through sodomy committed against the
victim;
(c) the exculpatory plea of insanity which only tended to negate liability but was
an admission of guilt;
(d) the reenactment of the crime by accused-appellant the details of which could
not have been known to anybody but himself; and
(e) the fact that accused-appellant voluntarily confessed to the crime without any
evidence of coercion, duress or intimidation exerted upon him.

ISSUE:
-  Accused-appellant submits
subm its that the trial court erred in
o  (a) finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubtdoubt of murder, and
o  (b) imposing upon him the supreme penalty
penalty of death.
-  It is the contention of accused-appellant
accused-appell ant that if he is guilty his guilt would only be for
homicide and not murder as the qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation are absent.

HELD:
•  The contention is untenable.
•  We agree with the trial court that the crime
crim e committed by accused-app ellant was murder
accused-appellant
even
even in the abse
absence
nce of the qualifyin g cir cumst ance of evident premeditation
because the
qualified treachery
crime toand
and abus e of superior st rength w ere present  - either of which
murder. w hich
•  There is treachery
treacher y or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.
•  In the
the instant
instant case
case,, treache
treachery
ry characterized
characterized the killing of 1
11-year
1-year o
old
ld Francis Bart. Well-
settled is the doctrine that the killing of childr en who by rea reason
son of their tende
tenderr
years cannot b e e
years expected
xpected to put u p a defe
defense
nse is con sidered attended with
treachery even if the manner of attack is not precisely  shown.
•  Thus, the killi ng of Francis Bart must b e dee
deemed
med ipso facto qu alified by treachery  
by reason of his inherent defenselessness  
•  there is a clear case of abuse of superior strength  given the blatant inequality of
strength, but this c annot be appreciated even as a generic aggravating circumstance
being necessa
necessarily eachery  
rily abso rbed in tr eachery
•  Anent the second assigned error, we agree with accused-appellant th at he should not
be meted the supreme penalty of dea death
th .
•  A careful scrutiny of the records shows th at the IInform
nform ation charge
charged d him only with
murder qualified  by treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation.
•  It failed to mention sexuall abuse or sodom y on the victim .
mention t he commission of sexua
•  The Informatio n designated the crim e a ass murd er in relation to RA 761 76100, but as a
rule, what controls is not the designa
designation
tion of the offense but its description in the
complaint or information .
•  The real nature
nature of the crimi nal charge  cannot be determined
determined from the ca caption
ption or
preamble of the information or from t he mere reference to a pa particu
rticu lar provi sion  of
law alleged to have been violated because they are conclusio ns of law .
•  On the contrary, it is determined
determ ined by the actual recital of facts in the complaint o orr
information.

29
 

•  The technic al na
name
me given by the fiscal appea
appearing
ring in the title of the inform ation
does not determine the character of the crime but the facts alleged
alleged in the bod y  of
the information.
•  Thus, eve
even
n if there is positi ve proof of sexual abuse  accused-appellant cannot be
convicted therefor as it was not so alleged
alleged in the inform ation .
•  EXTRA ISSUE ni ni SOLICITOR-GENERAL:
SOLICITOR-GENER AL: that the trial court did not apply the provis
provisions
ions
of RA 7610 in imposing the death penalty but merely made reference to them as sexual
abuse, which was established to have been committed by accused-appellant. He
contends that the sodomy could b e considered as a an
n aggrava
aggravating
ting c ircumstance for
adding ignominy to the crime
 as the sexual
done to the victim thus unduly increasing abuse certainly augmented the wrong
his pain.
•  Supreme Court does not agree.
•  Ignominy is a circumstance
circum stance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and
obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.
•  Thus, for ignominy to be appreciated
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the instant case,
it must be shown that the sexual assault on Francis Bart was done by accused-appellant
to put the former to shame before killing him.
•  This is clearly not the case here for accused-appellants intention was shown to be the
commission of sexual abuse on the victim as an act of revenge for his similar experience
as a child. Surely, the killing was done to eliminate the only witness to his crime.
•  We should no t be misunderstood for our failure to hold accused-appe
accused-appellant
llant
responsible
res ponsible for com mitting sexua
sexuall abuse on his victim  despite strong evidence in
support thereof.
•
  We have no choice as our hands are tied by the failure of the public pro secutor to
file the appropriate information  for accused-appellants sexual assault on the victim.

 ARTICLE 12 12 ISSUE:
ISSUE: The defense, invoking the doctr ine of parens patriae, also appea
defense, invoking appealsls to
this Court f or the psychiatric examina
examination
tion and eva
evaluation
luation of accused-appellant if indeed he
is found to have committed the crime charged. The defense emphasizes the fact that accused-
appellant was institutionalized twice within a considerable period in the National Center for
Mental Health; consequently, there is no certainty that he was sane when he committed the
crime imputed to him.

•  We cannot grant the request. When accused-appellant

accused- appellant was committed
commit ted to the National
Center for Mental Health, he was not diagnosed as insane but w as suffering fro m
pedophilia.
•  Thus, there is no dou bt in our m ind that he was SAN SANE E during his two-yea
two-yearr
confinement  in the center, pedophilia being dissimil ar to insa nity .
insanity
•  A defendant in a crimin al casecase who int erposes the defense of mental incapacity
has the burd en of esta
establi
bli shing t hat fact , i.e., he was insane at the very moment when
the crime was committed.
• clearr and po sitive evidence. In the instant case, the defense of
  He must prove it by clea
insanity as an exemptin
exemptin g circum stance was not established  and did not overcome
the legal presumption that a person's acts are of his own free will and intelligence.
•  The settled rule is that the onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insa insanity
nity as a
defense, and the defense failed to discharge this burden. Thus, the conviction of
accused-appellant no doubt is in order.
•  Accused-appellant Ralph Velez Diaz is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt doubt of murder
and sente
sentenced
nced to reclusion perpetua instead death  
instead of death

6. PEOPLE v MADARANG

30
 

CRIM REV Ar
Artiticl
clee 14 
Case title: People of th e Phili
Case Phili ppin es v. G.R. No. 132319
Fernando Madarang  
Date: May 12, 200
2000
0
DOCTRINES:

•  In the Philippi
Philippines,
nes, the courts have established a more stringent criteri
criterion
on for insanity to be
exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a
total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.
•  Establishing the insanity of an accused requires
requi res opinion testimony which may be given by a
witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to
conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or
by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the
accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the
offense with which he is charged.
• 

FACTS:

CHARGE:
Fernando Madarang is charged with PARRICIDE for killing his spouse, Lilia Madarang, on
September 3, 1993 at Poblacion, Infante, Pangasinan.

FACTS:
The accused Fernando Madaraing was a seaman for 16 years, spending the early part of his career
in the United States, and the last 9 years of said career in Germany. He would retire and return to
his family and start a hardware store. Unfortunately, his business venture would fail, and coupled
with habitual cockfighting would lead to his bankruptcy. By this time, his wife, Lilia was already
heavily pregnant with their 8th child. Due to their financial circumstances, Fernando and his family
were forced to move in with
w ith his mother-in law, Avelina Mirador.

On the fateful night of the killing, husband and wife were having a squabble, with the former
accusing his wife of infidelity. The accused then stabbed his wife around the sternum area, with an
upwards trajectory, and then on her right arm, causing her death.

Fernando was brought to Court, where he was unresp onsive to the Court’s question. He was
ordered transferred to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for examination. Initial findings
by Dr. Wilson Tibayan found that the accused was suffering from insanity or psychosis classified as
schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by
impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor
self-care, insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions. The
patient may be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may
become destructive orhave a propensity to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent. A
schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals during which he may be able to distinguish right
from wrong. Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness may have begun even prior to his
admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was already suffering from schizophrenia
prior to his commission of the crime.
31
 

 After 2 years
years of confinement
confinement his mental
mental conditio
condition
n was found
found to ha
have
ve improved e enough
nough for him to
stand trial. He raised the defense of insanity: that he had no recollection at all of the incident, and
that he had not known the fate of his wife had it not been for his mother-in-law who showed pictures
of her in a casket; that his behavior at the time of the stabbing particularly the lack on remorse of his
part, was indicative of the schizophrenia; that he had no motive to kill Lilia since she was scheduled
to give birth to their 8th child 3 days before, and that only something as overpowering as jealousy
would trigger him to commit such a heinous crime; and finally he relied on the testimony of Dr.
Tibayan.

RTC DECISION:
Conviction of Parricide. Reclucion Perpetua

 ARGUMENT:
That he was suffering insanity at the time of the commission.

ISSUE/S:
-  Whether or not Madarang had sufficiently
suffi ciently proven his insanity.

HELD:

NO. In the as
exempting Philippines, the courts
it is required have
that there established
must a moredeprivation
be a complete stringent criterion for insanity
of intelligence to be
in committing
the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.

Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a
witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to
conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by
a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the
accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the
offense with which he is charged.

The court found that records were bereft of any indication that the accused was suffering from
insanity during or immediate
immediatelyly before the commission from the crime. Accused was only
diagnosed with schizophrenia after  he
 he was admitted to the NCMH. His claim, as corroborated by
Dr. Tibayan’s testimony, that the loss of his fortune could have caused his insanity, was refuted by
 Avenlina’s
 Avenlina’s testimony that he had
had not manifested
manifested any irregular
irregular behavior
behavior prior to the
the incident.
incident. The
court found that the argument was purely speculative and unsupported by evidence on record.
Neither was jealousy a sufficient reason to kill his spouse. This being the case, with the admission
being made but the defense not having sufficiently proven, judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

BAKA ITANONG ITO:

•  In Anglo-American
Anglo-Am erican jurisprudence,
jurispr udence, the traditional
traditio nal test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states
that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time
of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a cognitive
measure of insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the nature and quality of the
32
 

act, and that the act was wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated
whether the word "wrong" referred to moral or legal wrong
•  the "irresistible
"irresi stible impulse" test which means that "assuming
"assumi ng defendant's knowledge of the nature
and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind,
defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent
himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that
what he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness
kept him from controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule
rests on the assumption that there are mental illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even
while there is cognition or knowledge of what is right and wrong
•  Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect."  Critics of
this test argued that it gave too much protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a
dicult position of proving accused's sanity beyond reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a
psychiatrist that accused's act was the result of a mental disease leaves the judge with no
choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes completely dependent on the
testimonies of experts.
•  Then came the the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in
its Model Penal Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghtenand irresistible impulse tests. The
new rule stated that a person is not responsible for his criminal act if, as a result of the mental
disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
•  the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style statutory formulation.
formul ation. It
enacted
applicabletheinComprehensive Crime
all federal courts. Control
The test Act which
is similar made t h as
to M'Naghten e appreciation testcognitive
it relies on the the law test.
The accused is not required to prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test
shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the
defense of diminished capacity and provided for commitment of accused found to be insane.

7. PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO

PEOPLE VS JESUS DOMINGO

DOCTRINE he law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law
presumes that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done
unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was insane
committed .[24] 
immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing
the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the
offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and
perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An

33
 

insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or
acts.[25] 
her acts.

FACTS:

This is a consolidation of 6 information cases against domingo.

The facts are as follows:

Complainant Raquel Indon testified that between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. of 29 March 2000,
she and her minor children Melissa, Michelle, Marvin and Jeffer were sleeping inside their
house in Caingin, San Rafael, Bulacan, when she was awakened by the sound of appellant
kicking their door open. Raquel narrated that she immediately recognized the accused, since
the kitchen light illuminated his face.
f ace.

 Armed with a screwdriver and and a kitchen knife, appellan

appellantt cut the cord
cord of the mosquito ne
nett and
repeatedly stabbed her, using the six-inch screwdriver, and hit her right arm three times.She
screamed and was heard by her sister-in-law, whose house was contiguous to theirs.When her
sister-in-law asked her for the identity of the assailant, she immediately identified herein
appellant as Doser, a name by which he is known in the community.Appellant was angered by
her reply and said, Anon
 Anong g Doser? and thereafter pulled a kitchen knife from his right side and
stabbed her on the stomach. When she tried to escape from the room, four-year-old Marvin
rushed towards her. She then grabbed him and ran towards the gate. However, before reaching
the gate, she fell down and appellant stabbed her right leg. The appellant then proceeded to
stab Marvin, hitting
hitting the latter twice on the arm and tw
twice
ice on his left chest. Marvin died on 3 April
2000 as a result of these injuries. After stabbing Marvin, appellant returned back to the house,
towards Raquels two daughters Michelle and Melissa.

When Raquel pleaded that the appellant spare her daughters lives, he retorted: Ngayon pa,
nagawa ko na. Melissa died because of the stab wounds that the appellant inflicted on her;

while Michelle, who was able to hide under the papag merely sustained serious physical
injuries.

The appellant also attacked two-year-old Jeffer by striking him on the head with the
screwdriver, but the latter managed to run to the house of Raquels sister-in-law. Raquel got up
and ran for help, but the appellant followed her. Their neighbor, Ronaldo Galvez, came to their
rescue and tried to subdue the appellant. Raquel, thereafter, lost consciousness. She also
relayed that she was later informed that a struggle ensued between appellant and
Galvez. Appellant inflicted wounds on Galvezs upper left chest and arms, after which Galvez

34
 

was able to hit appellant with a piece of wood, which rendered the latter unconscious. Raquel,
hospital .[5]  
Melissa, Marvin, Jeffer, Galvez and the appellant were taken to the hospital.

In his defense, appellant testified that prior to the incident, he was in good terms with the Indon
family and that he had no record of mental illness. However on 20 March 2000, he went to East
 Avenue Medical Center
Center for a medical check-up,
check-up, and h he
e was ad
advised
vised to have an operation
operation.. He
suffered from sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell
him to kill. He averred that when he regained his memory, one week had already passed since
the incidents, and he was already detained. He only came to know of the incidents from his
sister and his children who visited him. On cross-examination he admitted that when he
regained his memory, he did not even ask the police officers why he was incarcerated.

Dr. Regienald Afroilan, a witness for the defense, also testified that appellant was first
brought to the National Center for Mental
M ental Health
He alth (Center) in
i n August 2004 for a psychiatric
psychi atric
evaluation, psychological examination and final testing to determine if he could stand trial. Dr.
 Afroilan stated that based on his evaluatio
evaluation,
n, appellant
appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental
disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech
and behavior, poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. He could not find out when the
appellantt started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of Schizophren
appellan Schizophrenia
ia which were m
manifeste
anifested
d
by the patient indicated that he suffered from the illness six months before the Center examined
the appellant. On cross-examination,
cross-exam ination, he clarified that the evaluation finding that a
appellant
ppellant suffered
from Schizophrenia covered the period when the appellant submitted himself to examination . [14] 

In a Decision dated 13 November 2006, the RTC decreed that the appellant was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-00 and No. 1497-M-00, frustrated
homicide in Criminal Cases No. 1499-M-00 and No. 1500-M-00, and attempted homicide in
Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-00 and No. 1501-M-00.

DEFENSE OF INSANITY UNMERITORIOUS.

RTC declared that there was no treachery proven nor any qualifying aggravating circumstance
in the said cases.

35
 

In a Decision dated
dat ed 30 April 2008, the appellate court
c ourt adjudged that Raquel IIndons
ndons
testimony was credible, and that the inconsistency pointed out by appellantwhether or not Raquel
was standing up or lying down when appellant stabbed her legsreferred to minor
details. Moreover, insanity exempts the accused only when the finding of mental disorder refers
to appellants state of mind immediately before or at the very moment of the commission of the
crime. This was not the case when appellant was first medically examined more than four years
after the commission of the crimes. Appellants response to Raquel Indons pleas also proved that
children . [18] 
his faculties of reasoning were unimpaired at the time of the attack against Raquels children.

The Court of Appeals nevertheless modified the RTCs Decision dated 13 November 2006
and declared that the qualifying circumstance of treachery, which was alleged in the six
Informations along with evident pre-meditation, was adequately proven by the
prosecution. Raquel Indon, Michelle Indon, Melissa Indon, Marvin Indon, and Jeffer Indon were
merely sleeping inside their bedroom and had not even given the slightest provocation when
appellant attacked them without warning. Furthermore, the killing of Marvin Indon and Melissa
Indon, both minors who could not be expected to defend themselves against an adult, was

considered treacherous, and would sustain a conviction for murder. The penalties imposed were
adjusted accordingly. Appellants conviction for frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-
2000 was affirmed, since prosecution failed to prove appellants treachery or evident premeditation
in his assault against Rolando Galvez, who came to the scene of the crime to subdue the
appellant.[19] 
appellant.

The Court of Appeals modified and found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in
Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000 and No. 1497-M-2000, attempted murder in Criminal Cases
No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000, frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000,
and frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000.

In the petition before the Supreme Court, appellant also asserts that he was insane or
completely deprived of intelligence during the commission of the alleged crimes, and therefore
should be exempted from criminal liability in accordance with Article 12, Chapter 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.

 Appellant offers his

 Appellant his uncorrobo
uncorroborated
rated te
testimony
stimony as
as the on
only
ly proof tha
thatt he was insane at the time
he committed the crime. He testified that nine days before he committed the crime, he suffered

from
him tolack
kill of
badappetite,
people.sleeplessness,
He claims that and anxiety.
he does In addition,anything
not remember he allegedly heard voices
that happened on ordering
29

36
 

March 2000, when the crimes were committed, and that he was already detained when he
became conscious of his surroundings.

ISSUE: IS JESUS EXEMPTED FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY?

HELD : NO.

Even assuming that appellants testimony is credible, his sleeplessness, lack of appetite,
nervousness and his hearing imaginary voices, while
whil e suggestive of an abnormal mental condition,
cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere
abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The popular conception of the word
crazy is used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of ordinary. Testimony that a person
acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does not
absolution . [26] 
conclusively prove that he is legally insane and will not grant him or her absolution.

Raquel Indons narration of the events presents evidence that is more revealing of
appellants mental state at the time the crime was committed. Appellants reply to her pleas that
her daughters lives be spared, Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na,  was a positive sign that he was aware
of what he was doing, and that his reasoning faculties were unimpaired.

The trial court found the testimony

testim ony of Raquel Indon more credible than that of the accused,
and its findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial courts
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court. This Court does not generally disturb the findings of fact of the trial court
because it is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while testifying on the stand. Unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked certain
facts and circumstances
circumstances that might alter the result of the case, the findings of fact made
m ade by the
Court .[27] 
trial court will be respected and even accorded finality by this Court.

It is also remarkable that appellants testimony is not supported by his familys or intimate
friends accounts of his purported insanity. Appellant testified that he had been suffering from
symptoms of insanity nine days before the incident. Insanity may be shown by the surrounding
circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the allegedly deranged
persons general conduct and appearance, his conduct consistent with his previous character and
bargains. [28] It is difficult to believe
habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains.
that appellants behavior, conduct and appearance, which would denote mental disturbance,
escaped the notice of his family and friends.

37
 

 Appellantt draws attent

 Appellan attention
ion to the results of the medical examina
examination
tion conducte
conducted
d by Dr.
Regienald Afroilan in 2004, showing that he was suffering from Schizophrenia. It should be noted
however that the examination was taken four years after the crimes were committed, and that Dr.
 Afroilan admitted that his findings did not include the mental state of petition
petitioner
er four years
before.The alleged insanity of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the
very moment the felony is committed, not at any time thereafter. Medical findings of mental
disorder,
disorder, referring to a period after the time
tim e the crime was committed
committed,, will not exempt him from
criminal liability. [29] 

8. PEOPLE VS. ISLA

Facts:

This is an appeal from decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC, finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and Frustrated Murder.

Evidence for the Prosecution

 According
 According to AAA’s account, she was inside her rented house together with her two (2) children,
AAA’s account,
aged 1 ½ years old and 9 months old, respectively. She then noticed that accused Edwin Isla
(Isla) was standing by the door of her kitchen. He asked her what time her landlady would be
arriving and she answered that she had no idea.

 After fifteen
fifteen (15)
(15) minutes, she was sta
startled
rtled when he suddenly
suddenly poked a knife o
onn her n
neck
eck and
pulled her inside the bedroom. By this time, she noticed that she had already closed the window
and the door of the living room. She pleaded and begged for mercy but to no avail. She was
warned not to shout or resist otherwise she would be stabbed.

Inside the bedroom, she was made to lie down on the floor because there was no bed. Isla
placed himself on top of her and then he removed her upper clothing. He raised her bra,
exposing her breasts and then kissed them. Eventually, he made her spread her legs and had
carnal knowledge with her. While he was committing the dastardly act, she noticed a knife
pointed at her. She also informed the trial court that during the whole ordeal, her children were
present and witnessed everything.

When Isla stood up after raping her, she noticed that the knife he was holding was already
bloodstained. At this point, she found out that she was stabbed with the knife. She tried to take
hold of the knife while shouting for help. In response, Isla struck her the second time, this time,
under her lower left breast. She also sustained a wound on her palm while trying to disarm him.
Then the knife fell to the floor. It was at this moment that she was able to get hold of it and she

38
 

threw it outside through a broken window in the room. Thereafter, Isla scampered out of the
house through the backdoor.

In a little while, a neighbor came knocking at the d oor and was able to see AAA’s condition. She
was taken to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) for medical attention and was confined
there for five (5) days.

 At the hospital,

hospital, Dr. Freyra co
conducted
nducted an examina
examination
tion on AAA.. Based
Based on her findin
findings,
gs, AAA
sustained eleven (11) body injuries, two (2) of which were stab wounds, six (6) incised wounds
and two (2) contusions. The stab wounds required medical attendance of not less than 30 days.
 An examination
examination of
of AAA’s sexual organ
organ showed congestions abrasion in the labia minora
congestions and abrasion
and yielded negative result on the presence of spermatozoa.

 AAA’s attending
attending physician,
physician, Dr. Perez,
Perez, on the other hand,
hand, testified that she had
had multiple stab
wounds on the left side of the chest. Her chest x-ray result disclosed an accumulation of blood
in the thorax which required him to conduct a procedure to drain the blood. He concluded that

the stab wounds were severe and fatal which could have led to AAA’s death had it not been for
the timely medical attendance.

Evidence for the Defense

Edwin Isla was presented together with two (2) psychiatric doctors who examined him. Isla
never denied that he raped AAA. Invoking the defense of insanity, he testified that before the
incident, he and AAA had an illicit relationship for about two months until they broke up. He had
to use a knife to be able to have sexual intercourse with her. It was the first time that he and
 AAA had sex. After
After raping h
her,
er, he admitted
admitted stabbing
stabbing AAA
AAA twice, first on
on he
herr left breast and the
then
n
on her lower right breast “for reason he cannot understand.” He also punched her several times

when she attempted to grab the knife from him.

 As to Isla’s
Isla’s claim of insanity
insanity,, Dr. Juan Villacorta and
and Dr. Mary Gomez of the
the National
National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH) were presented as qualified expert witnesses.

Dr. Villacorta testified that Isla was suffering from a major depressive disorder
disorder with ps ychotic
ychotic
features; that he manifested psychosis on account of his hallucinations, poor impulse control,
poor judgment, and low frustration tolerance; and that he exhibited such behavioral pattern
immediately prior to being jailed. Dr. Villacorta, however, could not say with definite certainty
whether or not Isla was suffering from such mental disorder on July 21, 1997 as there was no
examination conducted on Isla on the said date.

39
 

To corroborate Dr. Villacorta’s findings, Dr. Gomez was presented. After a t horough interview
and psychiatric testing on Isla, she likewise observed that Isla was suffering from a major
depressive disorder which impaired his mental faculties. She opined that such finding could not
be conclusive because of lack of information from other informants during that time.

RTC convicted Isla of the crimes of rape and frustrated murder. It did not give credence to his
defense of insanity because it noted that Isla committed the crimes charged during a lucid
interval. There was no indication that he was deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of
will when he committed all the acts attendin
attendingg the commission of the crime.

Isla interposed an appeal with the CA. CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision
which found Isla to have acted with discernment when he committed the crimes.

Issue: Whether appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense.

Held: No. At the outset, this Court notes that there is no more question as to whether or not AAA
was raped by Isla. The latter never denied this fact which can be gleaned from his direct
testimony.

 Article 12
12 of the Revised Penal Cod
Codee (RPC) provides
provides for one
one of the circumstance
circumstancess which will
exempt one from criminal liability which is when
w hen the perpetra
perpetrator
tor of the act was an imbecile or
insane, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. This circumstance, however, is not
easily available to an accused as a successful defense. Insanity is the exception rather than the
rule in the human condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every
human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of
proving it with clear and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An
accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not
guilty because of insanity. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must, however, relate
to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with
which he is charged.

In the case at bench, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The respective
testimonies of Dr. Villacorta and Dr. Gomez of the NCMH, as qualified expert witnesses, failed
to support its claim of insanity. As observed by the CA, the mental examination on Isla taken
four to six years after the incident happened in July 1997, in effect, showed that it could not be
concluded with certainty that he was suffering from such psychosis immediately before or
simultaneous to the commission of the crimes.
40
 

This Court also agrees with the observation of the RTC as affirmed by the CA that Isla acted
with discernment as can be deduced from his acts before, during and after the commission of
the crimes with which he was charged. The RTC wrote: The overt acts committed by the
accused are attributed to a criminal mind, not a lunatic. There is no indication whatsoever that
he was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he stood for a
while by the door of complainant’s house, then entered it, toyed with a disconnected telephone
set, and cunningly poked a knife at complainant’s neck and dragged her inside the room where
he raped her. The fact that he first discreetly closed the door and the window before he
approached and poked a knife at complainant, then, as he laid on top of her, ordered her to
undress, kissed her breast, separated apart her legs with his own legs, and satisfied his lust, all
the while holding a knife with his right hand poked at co mplainant’s body, are calculated means
to ensure consummation of his lewd design. These are by no means the workings of an
imbecile, but by one engulfed by lust.

If Isla had become insane after the commission of the crime, such fact does not alter the
situation and the Court’s ruling is the same. His defense still fails considering that he was not
insane during the commission of the acts charged.

With respect to the stabbings, it appears that Isla committed two acts. The first was while he
was ravishing AAA. The Court considers this and the rape as one continuous act, the stabbing
being necessary, as far as he was concerned, for the successful perpetration of the crime.
When he testified, Isla claimed that he had to use the knife so he could have sexual intercourse
with her. The second stabbing took place after consummation of the rape act. This second
stabbing is a separate and distinct offense as it was not a necessary means to commit the rape.
It was intended to do away with her life. Thus, it has been written, “Where a girl was raped and
then strangled to death, the crimes are the separate crimes of rape and homicide, not complex.”  

The Court, however, finds itself unable to agree that the second crime committed was frustrated
murder. In the information, it was alleged that the stabbing was committed with treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. There is, however, nothing in the records
of the case that would show the presence of the said qualifying circumstances. For said
reasons, the crime charged should have been frustrated homicide only.

II & III. AGE OF CRIMINAL IRRESPONSIBILITY

IRRESPONSIBILITY

Republic Act No. 9344 

2. PEOPLE VS. DOQUEÑA

CRIM REV Ar
Artiticl
clee 12,
12, AGE
 AGE OF CRIMINAL IRRESPONSIBILIT
IRRESPONSIBILITYY 

41
 

Case title:
tit le: THE P
PEOPLE
EOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 46539
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEÑA, defendant-appellant. Date: Septem
September
ber 2
27,
7, 1939

DOCTRINE: The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the diff erence betwee
between n rig ht and wron g, and such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into considera
consideration
tion all the facts a
and
nd circumstances
afforded by the records in each case, the very appea
appearance,
rance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behaviour
behaviour of sa
said
id minor , not only before aand
nd during the commission of the
act, but also after and even during the trial

FACTS:

•  The accused-appellant,
accused-appell ant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide
homici de in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with a knife.
•  The court, after trying the case, held that the accused acted
acted wit h discernment in committing
the act
act imp uted to him  and, proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code,
Training School as amended
for Boys by Commonwealth
to remain therein Act No.
until he reaches the 99,
ageordered him to be sent to the
of majority.
•  From this order the accused interposed an appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that he
had acted with discernment and in not having dismissal the case.
•  On the
the date of the crime, the appellant
appellant was exactly
exactly thirteen years, n
nine
ine mont
months
hs and five day
days
s old.

THE INCIDENT:

•  Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now decea deceased
sed Juan Ragojos
and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan.
•  The herein
herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened
interv ened and, catching the ball, tossed it at
Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him
around the yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape.
•  Said accused then turned against the deceased assumingassumi ng a threatening attitude, for which the
reason said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately to the place
where Epifanio Rarang
Rarang was in order to continue playing with him.
•  The accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan Ragojos, who was
taller and more robust than he, looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack the now
deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he approached a cousin of his named Romualdo
Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife.
•  Once in possession of the knife,
knife, Valentin Doqueña approached
approache d Juan Ragojos and challenged the
latter to give him another blow with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want
to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the accused.
•  Juan Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused,
accused, continued playing and, while he was thus
unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the
chest with the knife which he carried.

42
 

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the accused acted with discernment.

HELD:

  YES. The proven facts, as

•
as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the
appeal taken from said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to determine
discernment
discern ment by the means resorted to by tthehe attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his
brief.
  He claims that
• that to de
determine
termine whether
whether or not
not a minor acted
acted with discernment,
discernment, we must tatake
ke into
consideration not only the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the
minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he might have had
at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of
reasoning he could have had at that moment.
  It is clear
• clear that the attorney
attorney for the defen
defensese mistakes the discernment referred to in article 112,
2,
subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which,
as a mitigating circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of
said Code.
  The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of
• of a minor
under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand th e difference between right and wro ng, a and
nd su ch capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circum stances afforded by the record s in each
each case, the very appea
appearance,
rance, the vevery
ry attitude,
the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and during the
comm ission of the act, but also after and e
even
ven durin g the trial  (U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155).
This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.

3. PEOPLE VS. NIETO

People vs Gloria Nieto

Facts

On September 21, 1956 an information for homicide was filed against Gloria Nieto alleging that

That on or about the 7th day of May, 1956, in the Municipality of Peñaranda, Province of Nueva
Ecija, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused Gloria Nieto, with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and
feloniously push one Lolita Padilla, a child eight and one half (8-1/2) years of age, into a deep
place of the Peñaranda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died
right then and there.

Contrary to the provisions of Article 249 of the Revised Penal

Code.

Upon arraignment, the accused, who was assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty,
but the trial judge nevertheless acquitted her of the crime charged on the grounds that she was
43
 

a minor "over nine and under fifteen years old" and the information failed to allege that she
acted with discernment.

The prosecution thereafter filed another information for the same offense, the said information
stating that the accused Gloria Nieto was "a child between 9 and 15 years old" and alleging in
express terms that she acted with discernment. But the defense filed a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy, and the court, now presided by another judge, granted the motion.
The prosecution appealed;

Supreme Court
We find the appeal to be without merit.

The pivotal question is whether the accused could on her unqualified plea of guilty to the first
information, be rightly held answerable for the offense therein charged. Undoubtedly, she could.
For the said information avers facts constituting the said offense with nothing therein to indicate
that she, as the perpetrator thereof, was exempt from criminal liability because of her age, and
her plea of guilty to the information is an unqualified admission of all its material averments.
 And, indeed,
indeed, even
even under
under the view taken
taken by the trial judge
judge who acquitted her that because sheshe
was between the ages of 9 and 15 — although that fact does not appear in the information to
which she pleaded guilty — an allegation that she acted with discernment must be required, that
requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information that she, the
accused Gloria Nieto, with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously
push one Lolita Padilla, a child eight and one half (8-1/2) years of age, into a deep place of the
Peñaranda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then
and there. ... As the learned trial judge, Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, who quashed the second
information, says in his order:

The allegations in the information that the accused "with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, criminally and .feloniously push one Lolita Padilla ... into a
deep place in Peñaranda River and that as a consequence thereof, Lolita Padilla
got drowned and died right then and there", and her plea of guilty thereto,
preclude the existence of any one of the justifying or exempting circumstances
enumerated in Article 11 and 12 of the Revised Penal Code including Paragraph
3 of Article 12. The said allegation can only mean that the accused, who is over 9
but below 15 years of age, was not justified in killing the victim nor was she
exempted from any criminal responsibility therefor. Otherwise, the term 'criminal
and feloniously would have no meaning at all. To require the addition of the
ritualistic phrase 'that she acted with discernment' would be superfluous. Under a
different view, substances would sacrificed to the tyranny of form.

... To insist on the necessary of including the phrase 'she acted with discernment
in the information for the purpose of conveying said in order to make the
information sufficient, is to confess a bankcruptcy is language or vocabulary and
to deny that the same Idea can be expressed in other terms. One need not a
dabbler in philology or semantics to be able to appreciate the import or
connotation
conno tation or significance of the phrase "with intent
i ntent to kill ... wilfully,
w ilfully, criminally
and feloniously" made more emphatic by "contrary to the provisions of Article
249." The contrary view nullifies the existence or value or utility of synonymous in
the communication of Ideas.'"

The defense filed a motion to quash this second Information on grounds of double jeopardy, and
the trial court already presided by another Judge, Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, now Justice of this
44
 

Court, granted the motion. The prosecution appealed to this Court from said order. In its
Decision, the Court dismissed the appeal and sustained the order of then Judge Makasiar,
deploring that as a result of a mistaken view taken by the trial judge who acquitted the accused
Gloria Nieto despite her plea of guilty there was a miscarriage of justice which cannot be righted
and which leaves the Court no choice bat to affirm the dismissal of the second Information for
reasons of double jeopardy.

4. GUEVARRA VS. ALMODOVAR

CRIM RE
CRIM REV V Articl e 12,
12, Intent disti ngui shed from discernm ent
Case title:
titl e: PEOP
PEOPLE
LE vs. AL
 ALMODOVAR
MODOVAR   G.R. No. 75256

Date: Janu
January
ary 2
26,
6, 1989

DOCT
DOCTRI
RINE
NE:: Intent and d iscernm ent are two different co ncepts . Intent  means: a determination to
do certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such
intent. Discernment  means: the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong

While they (intent and discernment) are products of mental processes w/in a person; intent refers
refers to
the desired of one’s act (active) while discernme
discernmentnt refe
refers
rs to the moral signif icance that a person
ascribes to an act (passive)  

FACTS:

•  On October 29, 1984, the Petitioner who was then 11 years

years old was playing with best friend
Teodoro Almine Jr. and three other children in their backyard. The children were target-shooting
bottle caps placed 15 to 20 meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour.
•  In the course of
of game, Teodoro
Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his
unfortunate death.
•  The examining fiscal after
after investigation exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the
unfortunate appeared to be an accident.
•  Victim’s parents appealed to Ministry of Justice, who ordered fiscal to file a case against
petitioner for Homicide through reckless imprudence.
•  On October 25, 1985, the petitioner moved to quash the said information on on the follow
following
ing
grounds:

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense

b) Information contains averments which if true would constitute a legal excuse or justification

c) That the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of defendant

45
 

  His primary argument was that

• that the term discernment connotes intent under the exempting
circumstance found under Article 12, Section 3 of the RPC. If this was true, then no minor
between the age of 9 to 15 may be convicted of quasi offense under Article 265 which is
criminal negligen
negligence.
ce.
  On April 4, 1986, the said motion was denied
• denied with respect to the first and th
third
ird grounds relied
upon decision on and part was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.

ISSUE/S:
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE

HELD:

  Intent and
• and discernment
discernm ent are two different concepts. Intent means: a determination to do certain
things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent.
Discernment means: the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.
  The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the
•

morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no c rime can exist, and because …
the infant 3 (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability.
  In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three
• three (3) elements are indispensable,
namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such
felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a
minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a
negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern
the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of
age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A
reading of the said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase “Any person. . .”
without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
 
• Minors 9yrs to 15yrs
15yrs are presumed to be without criminal
crimi nal capacity; but this presumption may be
rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of
the act, that is, that (they) acted w/ discernment
 
• Discernment
Discernm ent is embraced w/in the concept of intelligence w/c is oneone of
of the elements of a
culpable felony, thus it is important that a minor 9yrs to below 15 yrs of age to have acted w/
discernment to show that he acted w/ intelligence thus being liable for the offense under Art 365
of the R.PC
 
• Minors 9yrs to 15yrs
15yrs are presumed to be without criminal capacity; but this presump
presumption
tion may be
rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of
the act, that is, that (they) acted w/ discernment.
 
• Because of this, Guevarra was not exempted.

5. PEOPLE VS. ARPON

People
People vs. He
Henry
nry Arpon

G.R. No.
No. 183563 | Decem
December
ber 14, 2011

Leonardo  – De Castr

Castro,
o, J.

46
 

FACTS:

*This
*This is a long and co mpl icated case
case.. Sorry*

Henry Arpon, appellant herein, was charged with eight (8) counts of rape in separate informations

 AAA was raped by her uncle,

uncle, he
herein
rein appella
appellant
nt Henry
Henry Arpon, once in 1995 when she was 8 yea
years
rs
old and seven more times in 1999 when she was 12 years old.

The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges against the accused-
appellant. AAA testified that she was born on November 1, 1987. In one afternoon when she was
only eight years old, she stated that the accused-
accused-appellant
appellant raped her inside their house. She
S he could
not remember, though, the exact month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant stripped
off her shorts, panties and shirt and went on top of her. He had his clothes on and only pulled
down his zipper. He then pulled out his organ,org an, put it in her vagina
v agina and did the pumpi
pumping
ng
motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated her vagina. When he pulled
out his organ, she did not see any blood. She did so only when she urinated.

 AAA also testified that the accused-appellant

accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five times on
different nights. The accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of
 AAA, in the house of AAAs neighbor. AAA further related that the accused-appe
accused-appellant
llant raped her
again twice in August 1999 at nighttime. AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the rapes
because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint
when he proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD.

The prosecution also presented as evidence the medico-legal report which contained the results
of the medical examination conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel Capngcol and Dr. Melissa Adel
Gagala which findings stated old, healed incomplete lacerations of the introitus.

For the defense: Appellant testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in
1995, he was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked in
Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy and he stayed there up to 1996. He stated that he was
working in Tacloban City when the alleged rapes happened in the municipality of XXX. When he
would go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house of a certain Fred Antoni. He did not
go to the house of AAA as the latters parents were his enemies. He said that he had a quarrel
with AAAs parents because he did not work
w ork with them in the ricefields. He further recounted that
in July
Jul y 1999, he was also living
li ving in Tacloban City and worked there as a dishwasher
dishw asher at a
restaurant. He worked there from 1998 up to September 1999. The accused-appellant likewise
stated that in August 1999, he was still working at the same restaurant in Tacloban City. While
working there, he did not go home to XXX as he was busy with work. He denied that he would
have drinking sprees with AAAs stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.

On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of AAA was his sister and
they were close to each other. He said that his parents were still alive in 1995 up to October 1999
and the latter then resided at Calaasan, Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated that his parents house
was about two kilometers away from the house of AAA.While he was working at the restaurant
in Tacloban City, he would visit his parents once every month, mainly on Sundays.

RTC’s Ruling: Found appellant guilty of one count of statutory rape and seven counts of rape.

47
 

CA’s Ruling: Affirmed RTC’s decision  

RTC’s decision

ISSUES:

Whether or not appellant is entitled to the exempting circumstance of minority

RULING:
Yes, but only as to the first charge of rape committed against AAA.

It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law
requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the
exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the
appellant's presumption of innocence. Thus, including the first incident of rape, the testimony of
 AAA was only able to establish three instances when the accused-appe
accused-appellant
llant had carnal
knowledge of her.

Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a
child in conflict with the law viz:

SEC. 7. Determination of Age. The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy
the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict
with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years of age or older. The
age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of
other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In
case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

Furthermore, in Sierra v. People, we clarified that, in the past, the Court deemed sufficient the
Furthermore,
testimonial evidence regarding the minority and age of the accused provided the following
conditions concur, namely: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth
certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove the date of birth of the
accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of
the accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of the
prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing
show ing that the accused's and/or his relatives'
.
testimonies are untrue  

In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on February 23, 1982 and
that he was only 13 years old when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995. Other
than his testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date of his birth. However, the
records of this case show neither any objection to the said testimony on the part of the

prosecution,
 Appeals shounor
should any
ld ha
have contrary ted
evidence
ve appreciated
apprecia tthe to dispute the
he accused-appe
accused-appellants same.
llants mino Thus,
minority
rity the RTCing
in ascertain and
ascertaining thethe Court of
appropriate
penalty.
48
 

 Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic
 Although Republic Act No. 9344 took effect
on May 20, 2006, the said law is still applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:

SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences .
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the
time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this
 Act. They shall be ent
entitled
itled to appropriate
appropriate dispositions
dispositions provided
provided und
under
er this Act and
their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released
if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.

Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
explicit in providing that:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility . A child fif teen (15 (15)) yea
years
rs
of age or und er  at at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervent
i ntervention
ion prog
program
ram
pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.

 A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age  shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
li ability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with
this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing
laws. (Emphases ours.)

 As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age limit of criminal
irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,  i.e., from under

nine years of age and above nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without discernment)
- to fifteen years old or under and above fifteen but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in
determining exemption
exemption from criminal liability.

 Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information

 Accordingly, information in Criminal
Crim inal Case No. 2000-01-
46 was allegedly
allegedl y committed
commi tted in 1995, the testimony
testim ony of the accused-appellant
accused -appellant sufficiently
suf ficiently
established that he was only 13 years old at that time. In view of the failure of the prosecution to
prove the exact date and year of the first incident of rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995
or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt therein should be resolved in favor of the accused,
it being more beneficial to the latter. The Court, thus, exempts the accused-appellant
accused-appell ant from criminal
liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.

49
 

For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the accused-
appellant was already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-
appellant acted with discernment. In Madali v. People, the Court had the occasion to reiterate that
discernment is that mental capacity
capacit y of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful
act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In this case, the fact that the
accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA,
which we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell
anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant because
the latter told her that he would kill her mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant had to
threaten AAA in an effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that what
he did was wrong and that he was aware of the consequences thereof.

IV. ACCIDENT

1. U.S. VS. TANEDO

THE UNITED
UN ITED STA
STATES
TES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs. 
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant. 
G.R. No. L-5418, February 12, 1910  
MORELAND, J.: 

DOCTRINE : If life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act
executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.  

FACTS: 
-Tanedo  was a landowner. On the morning of the January 26th 1909, he, with Bernardino
Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or
dam on his land. Tanedo took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild
chickens
chicken s after he had set his laborers at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and
then went a short distance away across a stream to see how the alteration which he had made in
the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice field on the other side of the stream. He
carried his shotgun with him across the stream. 

str eam he met the Feliciano Sanchez (deceased), who, with his mothe
-On the other side of the stream m otherr
and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting season.
 Accused Tanedo  asked the uncle of deceased Sanchez  where he could find a good place in
which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of
fever. Deceased Sanchez, a young man about 20 years of age, was working at something under
a manga tree a short distance from the shack. Although accused Tanedo directed his question to
the uncle inside of the shack, deceased Sanchez answered the question and pointed out in a
general way a portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack.  

-And after deceased Sanchez pointed out that place to accused Tanedo, that place where the
wild chickens were to be found, accused Tanedo proceeded to hunt. So when accused Tanedo  
arrived at that place, he saw a wild chickens and he shot him. And after he shot that chicken
accused Tanedo heard a human cry. He picked up the chicken and went near the place where
he heard the noise, and after he saw that he had wounded a man, he went back toward the

50
 

malecon, where his companions were working, running back, and when he arrived there, he left
his shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where his companions were working; and he called
Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the occurrence, and to him, accused Tanedo told of that
occurence because he was his friend and besides that he was a relative of the deceased
Sanchez, and when Tagampa heard of this he and accused Tanedo  went together to see the
dead body. 

- The body was concealed in the cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon,
where his fellow laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide the body.

The rest of
accused. Hethe laborersit saw
delivered the
to the witness
wife of theYumul takewho
accused, the testified
chicken that
which had
she been killed
received by the
the chicken
from Yumul and that it had been killed by a gunshot wound.  

- That evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body finally. They took
it from the cogon grass where it lay concealed and carried it about 1700 or 1800 meters from the
place where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth
and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped
the accused dispose of the body because he was afraid of him, although he admits that the
accused in no way threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial
denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the trial,
however, he confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story
substantially as above. 
CHARGE: Murder  
CFI OF TARLAC: Homicide 
ISSUE: Whether accused Tanedo homic ide for allegedly killing the deceased Sanchez.  
Tanedo is guilty of homicide

HELD: 
NO. The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by
misfortune
misfor tune or accident
accident while in the performance
perform ance of a lawful
lawf ul act executed with due care and without
intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs.
Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State,
2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752;
State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)  

In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither
is there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident
occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his
concealment and denial.  
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):  

Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove
such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a d enial of intentional
killing, and the burden is upon the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a
consideration of all the evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing
killi ng was accidental or intentional, the jury
should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing
kill ing is relied upon, the prisoner
pr isoner admits the killing
kill ing but
denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and
it is clearly error to instruct the jury that the defendant must show show that it was an accident by a
preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to
be erroneous. 
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction. 
51
 

The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his discharge
from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.  

2. U.S. VS. TAYONGTONG

CRIM
CRIM REV Art
Articl
icl e

Case title: G.R. No. L-6897

THE US vs. POLICARPIO TAYONGTON

TAYONGTONG
G Date: February 15, 19
1912
12

DOCTRINE:

a criminal action for homicide by imprudencia temeraria, that contributory negligence on the part of the
person killed is no defense, provided the driver of automobile himself was negligent and that negligence
was the proximate cause of the death, nevertheless, that doctrine does not in any way inveigh against
the proposition which we here assert that, where death is due to the negligence of the decedent himself
and not to the negligence of the driver of the automobile, the latter cannot be held for homicide.

FACTS:

-  The defendant in this

this case was convicted of the crime of homici
homicide
de by negligence (homicidio por
imprudencia temeraria). He appealed, basing his whole case here upon the proposition that the
evidence does not warrant the conviction.
-  It appears that on the 19th day of January, 1911, one Severino Resume was engaged in
painting telephones poles located along the highway between Jaro and Iloilo. On that day he
was killed by being run over by an automobile driven by the defendant. The highway at the point
where Severino met his death was straight, of considerable width, and in good condition. The
telephone pole upon which Severino was at work at the time of the accident was outside of the
beaten portion of the highway and located about 2 feet into the grass at the side. Between it and
the edge of the road was a pathway used by people traveling on foot. The machine which
caused the death of the deceased is a large passengers, and having upon each side and
extending about 2 feet out beyond the wheels a rack or other contrivance for the carrying of
parcels, baggage, and freight. It is used solely for the purpose of carrying passengers back and
forth between Iloilo and Jaro. The accident happened at about 10 o' clock in the morning.
-  The accused testified,
testifi ed, and produced several
several witnesses to support his testimony, that at the time
of the accident he was driving the machine, which was loaded to its fullest capacity with
passengers and baggage, at about 10 to 15 miles an hour;
-  that he was driving in or near
near the center of the
the road and pas to either side; that the machine was
under full control and was going steadily and smoothly without deviating to the right or to the
left; that on approaching the place where the witness Pablo Tayson stood he saw him turn his
back toward the road and place his cap over his face in such a way as to cover his nose, mouth
and eyes, evidently to protect them from the cloud of dust which was rolling from behind the
machine over toward the side of the road on which he was;
-  that the deceased, as the machine approached, probably seeing the cloud of dust which it was
raising and which would inevitably drift in his direction, and observing his companion, Pablo
Tayson, under the necessity of protecting himself from the dust in the manner described, just
before the machine reached a point opposite him, started to cross the road to the other side,
evidently to escape the dust;

52
 

-  that he misjudged
misj udged the distance and started too late; that in attempting to cross he placed himsel
himselff
squarely in front of the machine;
-  that his movement was so sudden and unexpected and, when he reached the road, he was so
close to the machine that it was impossible to stop it in time to avert the catastrophe; that he did
everything that was possible to be done to avoid the accident;
-  that he put on both brakes as hard as possible and turned the machine as much as could be
done under the circumstances;
-  that in proof thereof he shows that only the front wheel of the machine passed over the body of
the deceased, it having been turned by him sufficiently so that the mind wheel missed him, and

- 
that the
The machine
accused wased,stopped
testified,
testifi avidence
very fewinfeet
and his evidence
e this beyond the
regard is point where thethat
uncontradicted, accident
he wasoccurred.
thoroughly
qualified as a driver, having served his apprenticeship on this very road and this very machine
before being employed.

ISSUE/S:

-  w/n the accused is liable for homicide.

homici de.

HELD:

•  We are satisfied that the evidence is not sufficient

suffi cient to convict. On the contrary, we believe that,
under all of the facts and circumstances of the case, the fair preponderance of the evidence
indicates that the deceased met his death in substantially the manner described by the accused.
•  the testimony of this witness is unreasonable. It is improbable that a machine as large as the
one in question, going at the rate of speed described by Pablo Tayson, could zigzag from one
side of the highway to the other in the manner described by the witness. It is still more
improbable that this machine could have dodged from the right-hand side of the road to the left
and, in some unknown manner, picked the deceased out from behind the telephone pole,
dragged him into the highway and there run over him. It is not clear how an automobile can run
over a man when it is admitted that he is on the opposite side of a telephone post from the
machine which ruins him down, with only a portion of his body extending beyond it.
•  It is undisputed evidence of the case that that portion of the machine which struck the deceased
first was the mudguard over the left wheel. This fact alone shows the impossibility of the
machine having hit the deceased while standing at the post, as it is admitted that no part of the
automobile collided with the post. If the deceased had been at the post, as described by
Tayson, the guard could not possibly have struck him without the extended portions described
having struck the post itself.
•  Although we have held in a recent case (U. S. vs. Reyes, 10 10 Off. Gaz.,
Gaz., 1045), a criminal action
for homicide by imprudencia temeraria, that contributory negligence on the part of the person
killed is no defense, provided the driver of automobile himself was negligent and that negligence
was the proximate cause of the death, nevertheless, that doctrine does not in any way inveigh
against the proposition which we here assert that, where death is due to the negligence of the
decedent himself and not to the negligence of the driver of the automobile, the latter cannot be
held for homicide. In this case the death of the deceased was due entirely to his own
negligence. There is not sufficient reliable proof in the record to establish negligence on the part
of the accused. There being no negligence, he is not responsible, no matter what the result of
the accident may have been.

3. PEOPLE VS. AYAYA

CRIM
CRIM REV Art
Articl
icl e 12 par. 4 
53
 

Case title: People v Praxedes Ayaya   G.R. No. 29396

Date: November
Novemb er 9, 1928
DOCTRINE:
 A marr
m arrii ed w om an w
who
ho,, to fr ee her son
so n fro
f ro m t he iimm
mm in ent dan
danger
ger of bei
beingng ststrr ang
angled
led by th e do
door
or
which her husband was attempting
attempting to shut, thrust her umbr ella in the opening of said door and
 jabbed
 jab bed her hu sb
sband
and wi th th e po
poin
intt t her
hereof
eof , th
ther
ereby
eby cau
causising
ng an iinj
nj ur y t o h
his
is l eft eye, wwhi
hi ch i s
suppo sed to have beebeenn the cause of his death, is not cri minall y liable, pursuant to articl e 8 of
the Penal
Penal Code, because the a act
ct perform ed by her does not in volv e a any
ny cri mi nal liabilit y.
FACTS:
-  Accused, Praxedes Ayaya was charged with the crime crim e of parricide for the death of her h
husband,
usband,
Benito de la Cruz
-  At about 1 am of Jan. 16, 1928, Jose Fajardo, Chief of police of Pagbilao, Tayabas, was
informed by a policeman that one Benito de la Cruz was drunk, wounded, and vomiting in his
house in said municipa
m unicipality.
lity.
-  When Fajardo went to the place, he found Benito lying in bed with a wound on his left eyelid and
unconscious.
-  When ththe
e accused
accused was questioned as to the cause of thethe wound, she replied that it was due to
the fact that she herself jabbed her husband with an umbrella.
-   As to why she jabbed
jabbed her
her husband,
husband, it was stated
stated in the defendant’s
defendant’s sworn statement
statement and
corroborated by their son that: as mother and son were trying to enter their house, the deceased
who was inside prevented it; that then the door gave way somewhat and her son Emilio
succeeded in putting his head in between the opening of the door and the wall and in order to
prevent it from crushing him, she pushed it; that Benito then poked his head in the opening of
the door and when she saw him she jabbed him with the umbrella with a downward motion to
prevent the door from crushing her son’s head; that she does not know where she jabbed him
although she thinks it was in the body. She further stated that she did not know how the wound
in her husband’s forehead was caused.  
-  Benito was brought to a hospital where he died four days
days later.
-  The cause of death was said to be cerebral hemorrhage produced by the wound he had
received in the forehead
Trial Court
Court : Convicted  defendant with the crime of parricide

ISSUE/S:
-  Whether or not accused is guilty of parricide
parrici de

HELD:
•  NO
•  In view of the fact that there is no eyewitness of the act herein prosecuted, with the exception of
the defendant and her son Emilio de la Cruz, we are compelled to accept the declaration of the
defendant that she jabbed her husband with her umbrella in order to prevent the door from
closing and crushing her son's head which was inserted between said door and the wall of the
house. Said defendant, explaining what took place, says in part: "When the door was ajar my
son went in, and then my husband pushed it and as I saw that he was about to crush my son's
head, I jabbed my husband with the point of the umbrella downwards to prevent him from
crushing my son's head." We find nothing improbable in this statement and if we add to this the
absence of any reasonable motive to prompt said defendant to injure her husband, we are
compelled to conclude that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door in question, she
did so to free her son from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or being strangled;
and if she thus caused her husband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without any fault or

intention
accordanceto cause it. This
with article 8, being
No. 8,so, we believe
of the that she
Penal Code, incurred
because, no criminal
it being liability
a licit act in her son
to free
from the grave danger threatening him, and the fact of having touched the left eye of her

54
 

husband, who was behind the door, with the end of her umbrella, does not make her criminally
liable.
N.B.: Super old case kaya art.8 no. 8 pa nakacite

4. PEOPLE VS. FALLORINA

CRIM REV Ar
Artiticl
clee 12 

Case title: People vs. Fallorin a  

Case 424 SCRA 655
Date: March 4, 2004

DOCT
DOCTRI
RINE
NE:: To cl aim self-defense, the means emplo yed must not be evidently excessive. 

FACTS:

-  11 year old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. nicknamed “Hataw” and his playmate Whilcon "Buddha"
Rodriguez played with his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road in
Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro.
-  Meanwhile Ricardo and his three friends were playing basketball below. Afterwards, Ricardo saw
appellant riding his motorcycle from the main road across the basketball. He called Hataw and
Budhha to go down from the roof knowing that the appellant abhorred children playing on the roof
of
OngtheOng
carinderia andplaying
before for berated
in them for it. Then he recalled that the appellant scolded his friend
the roof
-  Upon seeing the two in the roof, appellant remarked "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo
magsibaba d'yan!" After hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon immediately jumped down
from the roof. Vincent, meanwhile, was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite, Whe he
stood up to go down the roof, appellant shot him with a .45 caliber pistol and he was hit in his left
paretial area.
-  Upon a ballistic examination, it was concluded that the bullet labelled “FAP” was fired from .45
Thompson Auto Ordnance pistol of the appellant.
-  In his defense, appellant argues
argues that he was responding to a request for police assistance when
he lost his balance and revolver fell to the ground and suddenly went off. Upon learning that
someone was hit, he immediately checked the area and upon seeing Vincent, arranged for him
to be transported to the hospital
-  The RTC convicted the appellant of Murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by of public
position.

ISSUE/S:

-  Can appellant claim the defense of causing an

an injury
injur y by mere accident under Art 12 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code?
HELD:

•  NO, The elements of this exempting

exempti ng circumstance are
(1) a person is performing a lawful act;
(2) with due care;
(3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and
(4) without any fault or intention of causing it.
ingly, an accident is a fortuitive circumstance, event or happening; an event
 Accordingly,
 Accord
happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human
55
 

agency, an event which under the circumstance is unusual or unexpected by the person
to whom it happe
happens
ns . Negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to observe, for the protection
of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand without which such other person suffers injury.  Ac  Acci
cid
d ent and
negligence are intrinsically contradictory .
In the case at bar, appellant failed to prove his defense:
1. In hhis
is counter-affidavit
counter-affi davit he appended pictures showing the hole on the roof of the carinder
carinderia
ia
to prove that he shot the victim accidentally. Yet when the investigating prosecutor
propounded clarificatory questions on him regarding the pictures, he refused to answer.
Thus, casting
2. There doubt toshowing
is no evidence his allegations.
that the gun hit a hard object when it fell to the ground, what
part of the gun hit the ground and the position of the gun when it fell from the appellant's
waist.
3. He testified that he h has
as a safety lock on. That even if the trigger is pulled hard, the gun will
not go off. In fact, when the counsel of the accused was holding the gun in a cocked
position and the safety lock put in place, the gun accidentally dropped on the cemented
floor of the courtroom and the gun did not fire and neither was the safety lock moved to its
unlock position to cause the hammer of the gun to move forward. The safety lock of the
gun remained in the same position as it was when it dropped on the floor.
Clearly, it is unlikely that the shootin
shootingg of the victim was merely accidental as appellant claims.

5. PEOPLE V LATOSA

CRIM
CRIM REV Art
Articl
icl e 12, Acc
Accid
ident
ent  

Case title: PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. G.R. No. 186128 

PHILIPPINES vs . SUSAN LATOSA y
CHICO  Date: June 23, 2010 

DOCTRI
DOCTRINE:
NE: E
Essent
ssential
ial r equis
equisites
ites  for the exempting circumstance
circumstance of acciden
accident,
t, to w
wit:
it:

1. She was performing

perform ing a lawful act;

2. With due care;

3. She caused the injury

injur y to her husband by mere accident;

4. Without
Wi thout fault or
or intention of
of causing it.

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 23, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192
which affirmed the April 12, 2006 Decision of the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 159, convicting appellant
Susan
Susa n Latosa y Chico of parrici de.

PROSECUTION:

56
 

On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, appellant and her husband Major
Felixb
Felixb erto Latosa, S
Sr.
r. (Felixberto) together with 2 of their children, Sassymae Latosa (Sassymae) and
Michaell Latosa (Michael), were at their house in Fort Bonifacio. Felixberto
Michae Felixberto,, Sr. was then asleep when
Sassymae sawsaw appellant take Felixberto Sr.'s gun from the cabinet and leave. She S he asked her mother
where she was going and if she could come along, but appellant refused.

Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae to buy ice cream at the commissary. Appellant
gave her money and asked
asked her to leave. After Sassymae left, appellant instructed Michael to follow his
sister, but he refused as he was hungry. Appellant insisted and further told Michael not to make any
noise as his father was sleeping. Nevertheless, appellant went back inside the house and turned up
the volume of the television
televis ion and the radio to full. Shortly after that, she came out again and gave
Michael some money to buy food at the grocery.

Instead of buying food, Michael bought ice candy and returned to the barracks located at the back of
their house. Michael thereupon saw his friend Mac-Mac Nisperos who told him that he saw appellant
running away from their house. Michael did not pay any attention to his friend's comment. Moments
later, a certain Sgt. Ramos arrived
arriv ed and asked if something had happened in their house. Mich
Michael
ael replied

in
thethe
leftnegative then
portion of hisentered
head andtheir house.
a gun At left
at his thathand.
point, he saw his father lying on the bed with a hole in

Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos about what happened. Sgt. Ramos told
him that appellant
appellant had reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall office.
offi ce. Then, Sassymae
arrived and saw her father with a bullet wound on his head and a gun near his left hand.

Felixberto Latosa, Jr., one of the legitimate sons of appellant and the victim, also testified that
sometime in December 2001, their father told him and his siblings over dinner about a threat
t hreat to their
lives by a certain Efren Sta. Inez.

DEFENSE: 

 Appellant, testifying
 Appellant, testifying on heherr own behalf,
behalf, claimed that when
when Felixberto,
Felixberto, Sr. woke up, he ask
asked
ed he
herr to get
his service pistol from
fr om the cabinet ad
adjacent
jacent to their bed. As she was handing the pistol to him it suddenly
fired, hitting
hitting Felixberto, Sr. who was
w as still lying down. Shocked, she ran quickly to Felixberto, Sr.'s office
and asked for help.
help. She also claimed that when Felixberto,
Felixb erto, Sr. asked her for his
his gun, she was on her
way out of the house to follow her children who left for the market on an errand she had earlier given
Sassymae. She claimed that she wanted to drive for them because it was hot. She ran after them but
after a few minutes, when she realized that she did not have with her the keys to their jeep, she went
back to their house. Felixberto, Sr. then asked again for his gun, and it was then that it fired as she was
handing it to him.

57
 

 Appellant further
 Appellant further described herself as a good mother and a good provider for ttheir
heir six (6) ch
children
ildren whom
she raised by herself while Felixberto, Sr. was in Mindanao. She claimed that they testified against her
because they were manipulated by her her brother-in-law,
brother-i n-law, Francisco Latosa.
Latosa. She denied that Sassymae
saw her holding a gun when she asked her to buy ice cream, alleging that Michael and Sassymae saw
her holding the gun only when she placed it inside the cabinet before they proceeded to the hospital.

 Appellant also denied her children's testimony that she was having an affair with a certain Col. Efren
 Appellant
Sta. Inez (Sta. Inez), a policeman. She claimed that she first met Sta. Inez when her youngest brother
was killed on June 6, 2001 by unidentified men. Sta. Inez was the one who assisted her. She was alone
at that time since her husband informed her that he could not leave his post in Mindanao for he had to
rush some papers. She admitted that Sta. Inez went to the precinct when he learned of the
shooting incident . She also denied that she was terminated from her job at the PhilipPhilippine
pine Public
Safety College due to immorality for having said affair. She claimed that she was terminated because
she had incurred numerous absences from her work.

RTC: The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing her husband Felixberto, Sr.

The RTC held that the claim of accidental shooting   was inconsistent with the evidence
considering the location
location of the gunshot w ound , which was at the left temple of Felixberto, Sr., and
the fact that the gun was found near Felixberto, Sr.'s
Sr.'s left hand despite his being r ight -handed. The
trial court found that appellant
appellant planned the killing by asking her 2 children to leave the house and, after
the shooting, placing the gun near the victim's left hand to suggest that the death was suicide. But
appellant overlooked the fact that Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed. The trial court noted that despite
the grueling cross-examination of the defense counsel, the Latosa children never wavered in their
testimonies about what they knew regarding the circumstances
circums tances surrounding the shooting incident. They
were consistent on material points. The RTC found it inconceivable that the children would testify

against
condemn their
an own mother
injustice ortoconcoct
done a story of parricide unless they were impelled by their passion to
their father.

CA:  CA upheld the decision of the RTC. The CA held that since appellant admitted having killed her
husband albeit allegedly by accident, she has the burden of proving the presence of the exempting
circumstance
circumstanc e of accident to relieve herself of criminal responsibility.
responsibility. She must rely on the strength of
her own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after the appellant has admitted the killing.

The CA, however, found appellant's version of accidental shooting not credible. Citing the case
of  People v. Reyes
Reyes,,  the CA held that appellant's claim of accidental shooting was negated by the
following facts: (1) a revolver is not prone to accidental firing as pressure on the trigger is necessary to

58
 

make the gun fire, cocked or uncocked; and (2) when handing a gun to a person, the barrel or muzzle
is never pointed to that person. In this case, appellant held the gun in one (1) hand and extended it
towards her husband who was still lying in bed. Assuming that appellant was not aware of the basic
firearm safety rule that the firearm's muzzle is never pointed to a person, she failed to explain why the
gun would accidentally fire, when it should not have fired unless there was pressure on the trigger. The
location of Fe
Felixberto,
lixberto, Sr.'s wound also sho wed that the shooting w as not accide
accidental
ntal . Appellant
did not dispute that Felixberto, Sr. was lying down during the shooting and that after the incident, the
gun was found near his left hand.

NOTICE
NOTICE OF APPEAL
APPEAL::  

 Appellant argues that the circumstantial

 Appellant circumstantial evidence
evidence presen
presented
ted by the prosecution was insufficien
insufficientt to prove
that she intentionally killed her husband. She insists that
t hat the gun fir
fired
ed accidentally
accidentally w
while
hile she was giv
giving
ing
it to Felixberto, Sr. Since she had no experience in handling firearms, she was not able to foresee that
it would fire accidentally and hit her husband. After her husband was hit, she immediately rushed to his
office and asked for assistance.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the exempting circumstance of accident was established by appellant.

HELD:

NO. The basis of appellant's defense of accidental shooting is Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code,
Code, as amended, which provides:

 ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —  The following are
exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful lawful act with due
due care, causes an injury by
mere accident
accident w
withou
ithoutt fault or intention of causing it.

Thus, it was incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the following
essential
essential requi sites  for the exempting circumstance
circumstance of accident, to wit:

1. She was performing

perform ing a lawful act;

2. With due care;

3. She caused the injury

injur y to her husband by mere accident;

4. Without
Wi thout fault or
or intention of
of causing it.

59
 

By no stretch of imagination could the pointing of the gun towards her husband's head and pulling the
trigger be considered as performing a lawful act with due care. As correctly found by the CA, which
we quote in full:

 Appellant's version that

 Appellant's that she "accide
"accidentally
ntally shot" he
herr husband is not credible. A
Appellant'
ppellant'ss
manner of carrying the caliber .45 pistol negates her claim of "due care" in the
performance of an act. The location of the wound sustained by the victim shows that the
shooting was not merely accidental. The victim was lying down and the fact that the gun

was
human found near
nature hisa left
that hand
newly was not military
awakened directlyman
disputed
wouldbysuddenly
her. Weask
findhis
it contrary to
wife for his
firearm, and even patiently wait for her return to the house, when the said firearm was
 just inside the cabinet which, according to appellant
appellant,, was just about two meters away
from his bed.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bench, appellant held the gun in one hand and extended it towards her
husband who was still lying in bed. Assuming arguendo that appellant has never learned
how to fire a gun and was merely handing the firearm over to the deceased, the muzzle
is never pointed to a person, a basic firearms
f irearms safety rule which appellant is deemed to
have already known since she admitted, during trial, that she sometimes handed over
the gun to her husband. Assuming further that she was not aware of this basic rule, it
needed explaining why the gun would accidentally fire, when it should not, unless there
was pressure on the trigger.

There is no merit in appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove by circumstantial
evidence her motive in killing her husband. Intent to kill and no t mot ive is the e
essential
ssential eleme
element
nt of
the offense on which her convictio n rests . Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons
may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after
the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.

In the instant case, the following circumstantia

circumstantiall evidence consi dered by the RTC and affirmed by
the CA  satisfactorily established appellant's intent to kill her husband and sustaine
sustained
d her conv iction
for the crime, to wit:

The prosecution established the following circumstantial evidence:

1) Susan Latosa, the accused, asked her twins  to do errands for her. She first asked
Sassymae to go to Commissary to buy ice cream, thereafter, she asked Michael to follow
his sister at the Commissary which accordin
according witnesses was not the
g to the prosecution witnesses
usual thing the accused
accused wou ld do ;
2) Thereafter, it was only the accused and the victim who were left alone in the house;
3) After the witness Michael, son of the accused and the victim left and proceeded at the
barracks located at the back of their house, Susan Latosa was seen running away from
the house by Michael's friend named Macmac;
60
 

4) Immediately thereafter, Michael Latosa went inside the room of their barracks and saw his
father with sort of a hole in the head, blood on the nose and had a gun in his left hand;
5) The cause of death of the victim Felixberto
F elixberto Latosa was intracranial hemorrhage
hemorr hage due
due to
gunshot wound of the head (per Medico-legal Report);
6) Susan Latosa's paraffin test yielded positive result for the presence of gunpowder
gunpowder nitrate
in her right hand;
7) The point of entry of the gunshot
gunshot wound found on the victim was located at the left tempor
temporal
al
region as evidenced by Medico Legal Report;
8) The victim was a right-
right-handed
handed and the gun was found on the latter's left hand;
9) inamin.
Sassymae Latosa
Sana testified
testifi ed
pinahawak mothat
kayshe heard
Major Col.
iyong Sta.
baril Inez
saka motell her mother,
pinutok." ; and . . . "bakit mo
10) The children testified that they were informed by the victim regarding the threat of Sta.
Inez to the whole family who allegedly has an amorous relationship with their mother.
Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum that accused was w as terminated
ter minated from her
teaching job by reason of immorality.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Susan Latosa y Chico is DISMISSED. The April 23, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192 is hereby  AFFIRMED wit
w it h MODIFICATION. The
amount of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00.

6. TALAMPAS VS. PEOPLE

CRIM REV Ar
Artiticl
clee 12 

Case title: Virgilio Talampas y Matic vs. G.R. No. 180219

People
People of the Philip pin es 
Date: November 23, 2011

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:

-  Prosecution witness Jose Sevillo

Sevill o who witnessed the incident testified
testifi ed as follows:
follow s: that he was with
Eduardo Matic and Ernesto Matic in the front of his house in Zona Siete, Wawa, Malaban, Binan,
Laguna, repairing his tricycle. The accused was on a bicycle, stopped 3 meters away from him,
walked a few steps, brought out a revolver, firing it against Eduardo, Eduardo then took refuge
behind Ernesto. Accused Talampas then shot the revolver again 3 times and Ernesto was hit at
the right portion of his back causing him to fall face down. Another shot hit Eduardo and he fell to
the ground face-up (patihaya).

-  Famil
Familyy of Ernesto Matic testified to his
his earnings as a Tricycle driver (P100/day),
(P100/day), and a band player
(P100/night) to loss of earning as actual damages.

-  Information for Homicide was filed against Talampas in Binan, RTC.

-  On his part, He insisted that his

his enemy had been Eduardo Matic (Eduardo), n not
ot victim Ernesto
Matic (Ernesto); that Eduardo, who was then with Ernesto at the time of the incident, had had hit
him with a monkey wrench, but he had parried the blow; that he and Eduardo had then grappled
for the monkey wrench; that while they had grappled, he had notice that Eduardo had held a
61
 

revolver; that he had thus struggled with Eduardo for control of the revolver, which had
accidentally fired and hit Ernesto during their struggling with each other; that the revolver had
again fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh; that he had then seized the revolver and shot Eduardo in
the head; and that he had then fled the scene when people had started swarming around.

-  RTC gagave
ve credence
credence to prosecution witness anandd convicted T Talampas
alampas ooff Homicide. Petition for
Review with CA, appealing issue of self-defense and accident. CA affirmed the conviction based
on the RTCs factual and legal conclusions, and ruled that Talam
Talampas,
pas, having invoked self-
self-defense,
defense,
had in effect
elements
element admitted killing
s of self-defense Ernestoclear
by credible, andand
hadconvincing
thereby assumed
evidence,,the
evidence but burden of proving
had miserably failedthe
to
discharge his burden.

- 
ISSUE/S:

-  Is self-defense applicable in this case?

-  Is accident under Art. 12 No. 4 applicable in this case?
-  Does lack of intention to wound Ernesto absolve him (aberratio Ictus)?
HELD:

•  (Self-defense) Not applicable.

applicabl e. In the nature of self-defense,
self -defense, the protagonists should be the
accused and the victim. The established circumstances indicated that such did not happen here,
for it was Talampas who had initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not
been at any time a target of Talampas attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene
of the attack. In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression
against Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim
(Ernesto), thereby rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.

•  (Accident) Talampas could

could not relieve himself of criminal
crimi nal liabilit
liabilityy by invoking accident as a
defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code, the legal provision pertinent to accident,
contemplates
contemplat es a situation where a person is in fact
f act in the act of doing something legal, exercising
due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to
something not in the least in the mind of the actor an accidental result flowing out of a legal act.
Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes
about through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences. In short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.

•  The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked his revolver
at Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At
that point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of his back
and caused Ernesto to fall face down to the ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape,
causing Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas acts were by no means lawful, being a
criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.

•  (Aberratio Ictus) And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas assault was Eduardo, not
Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the
natural and direct consequence of Talampas felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas
poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither
exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de
la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
62
 

caused). Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

•  SC judgment, Indeterminate
Indetermi nate sentence of 10 yrs. prision mayor to 14 yrs. 8mos. Reclusion
temporal. Deleted the unnecessary increment of 1 day in RTC judgment (10yrs. 1 day  – 14yrs.
8mos.) since it will cause disturbance
disturbance in the computation made by jail authoritie
authorities.
s.

V. IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
1. US
US v CAB
CABALL
ALLEROS
EROS
United States
States vs . Apolo nio Ca
Caballeros,
balleros, et. al.
G.R. No. 1352, Mar. 29, 1905
Mapa, J.:

DISCLAIMER: GUYS, ITO

ITO NA YUNG BUONG FULL TEXT
TEXT.. GANITO KAIK
KAIKLI
LI YUNG CASE!

The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of
seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or
murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O.
France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as
principals or as accomplices, they
they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims iin
n order to
conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although
he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he
was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant
affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by
the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans
were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but the
he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the
shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the
band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their
t heir guns they forced him to
bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible
force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the
acts which are charged against him.
 As regards the other defend
defendant,
ant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in
any way in the execution of the crime
crim e with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof
to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate,
expressly declare
declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses,
corpses,
nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his
supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the
Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be
considered
conside red as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one
of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily . It appears besides, from the
statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of
 Apolonio
 Apolon io Caballeros was made through the promise made to him him an
and
d to the o other
ther defenda
defendants
nts that
nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and
voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a
trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).

63
 

The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which
seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into
consideration in his judgment,
ju dgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render
the defendants criminally liable according to law.

By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from,
we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances.

2. U.S. VS. ELICANAL

Facts: he appellant in this case is one of several persons arrested and convicted of murder. He
was sentenced to death and this case comes to this court not only en consulta but by appeal
also.

The accused was a member of the crew of the lorcha Cataluña cruising in the waters of the
Philippine Islands off Iloilo under the captaincy of Juan Nomo. The first mate was Guillermo
Guiloresa. The accused is about 22 years of age, without education or instruction and
somewhat weak physically. The lorcha left the mouth of the Iloilo river early in the morning of
the 11th of December, 1914. She had scarcely cleared the river when Guillermo, the chief mate,
suddenly and without having mentioned the subject to the accused before, said to him that he
was going to kill the captain because he was very angry with him, and asked him to assist him.
The accused took this statement as a joke as, according to him, the chief mate was a great
 joker; and
and particularly
particularly as he was smiling at tthe
he time h
he
e made the
the state
statement;
ment; and n
naturally
aturally paid
no more attention to it. Neither he nor the other members of the crew held any resentment
against the captain and he had no idea at that time that he would take part in any acts directed
against him. The following morning while the crew were engaged in their daily occupation,
Guillermo, finding the captain in his cabin, assaulted him, attempting to seize and hold his
hands and, at the same time, calling to the crew to come forward and help him. The crew,
drawn by the cries, hastened to the spot where Guillermo was engaged in a hand to hand fight
with the captain. At the request of Guillermo the crew, with the exception of the accused, seized
the captain and tied him with the rope. After he had been rendered helpless Guillermo struck
him in the back of the neck with an iron bar an then, delivering the weapon to the accused,
ordered him to come forward and assist in disposing of the captain. The accused thereupon
seized the bar and, while the captain was still struggling struck him a blow on the head which
caused his death. The sole defense of the accused is that, in killing the captain, he was acting
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury induced by the threat of
Guillermo, the chief mate, and that he was so absolutely overwhelmed thereby that, in striking
the blow which killed the captain, he acted without volition of his own and was reduced to a
mere instrument in the hands of the chief mate.

The learned trial court refused to accept this defense holding that the chief mate did not
exercise such influence over the accused as amounted to an uncontrollable fear or that
deprived him of his volition. We are satisfied from the evidence that the finding of the trial court
was correct. It was held by the supreme court of Spain in a decision of the 5th of November,
1880, that "a threat, in order to induce insuperable fear, must promise such grave results, and
such results must be so imminent, that the common run of men would succumb. The crime
threatened must be greater than, or at least equal to, that which we are compelled to commit."
In a decision of the same court of April 14, 1871, it was said that "inducement must precede the
act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without it the act would
not have been performed." That is substantially the principle which is at the bottom of
subdivision 9 of article 8 of the Penal Code. That article defines the different circumstances
under which a person will be exempt from criminal liability. Subdivision 9 thereof covers "any
person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force." The foundation of these
decisions and the basis of the defense in this case is subdivision 10, which exempts from
64
 

liability "any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury."

 As we have
have already intimated, before a force can be conside
considered
red to be a
ann irresistible one, it
must produce such an effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to
a mere instrument and, as such, incapable of committing a crime. It must be such that, in spite
of the resistance of the person on whom it operates, it compels his members to act and his mind
to obey. He must act not only without will but against will. Such a force can never consist
anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it must be a force which acts upon him
from the outside and by means of a third person. In order that one may take advantage of
subdivision 10 of article 8 and allege with success that he acted under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, it must appear that the threat which caused the
uncontrollable fear related to a crime of such gravity and so imminent that it might safely be said
that the ordinary run of men would have been governed by it. And the evil threatened must be
greater than, or at least equal to, that which he is compelled to cause. The legislature by this
enactment did not intend to say that any fear would exempt one from performing his legal duty.
It was intended simply to exempt from criminal responsibility when the threat promised an evil
as grave, at the very least, as that which the one threatened was asked to produce. Viada in his
commentaries
commenta ries on this subdivision of article 8 of the Penal Code gives this illustration:

Certain evil-minded persons seize me and threaten me with death If I do not set fire to a
neighbor's house; if I perform the act under such threat, as grave as it is imminent, I would fall
within the exemption from criminal responsibility provided for in this number; but if the same
persons threatened to lay waste my forest if I do not kill my father my act would not come within
the exemption for the reason that the evil with which I was threatened was much less than that
of killing my father.

The evidence fails to establish that the threat directed to the accused by the chief mate, if any,
was of such a character as to deprive him of all volition and to make him a mere instrument
without will of his own but one moved exclusively by him who threatened. Nor does the threat
appear to have been such, or to have been made under such circumstances, that the accused
could reasonably have expected that he would suffer material injury if he refused to comply. In
other words, the fear was not insuperable. Indeed, it is doubtful if any threat at all in the true
sense was made; certainly none of such serious nature as would justify an illegal act on the part
of the accused. This discussion disposes of the first error assigned by counsel for the appellant.
The second relates to the finding of the trial court that the crime committed was murder instead
of homicide; and counsel for appellant urge, under this assignment, that the evidence does not
sustain the finding of any qualifying circumstance which would raise the crime from the grade of
homicide to that of murder. It is quite true, as counsel argue, that qualifying circumstances must
be as clearly proved and established as the crime itself; and, unless the evidence in this case
shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed with one or more of the
qualifying circumstances required by the Penal Code to constitute murder, it must be
denominated homicide and not murder.

We agree with counsel that the evidence does not establish the existence of premeditation as a
qualifying circumstance. In the case of United States vs. Bañagale (24 Phil. Rep., 69), the court
said with respect to the facts which must be proved to establish premeditation:

The record does not show whether Banagale, upon extending the invitation to Domingo Posada
through Mariano Ilao, did so for the purpose of killing the former, inasmuch as there is no proof
that he hadacts
performed resolved uponhis
revealing doing so, through
criminal purpose,deliberation,
some days meditation, andprior
or even hours reflection, and out his
to carrying
criminal determination to kill the unfortunate Posada. Article 10, circumstance 7, of the Penal

65
 

Code establishes the requisite that the criminal should have acted, in the perpetration of the
crime, with deliberate premeditation or that he should have prepared for its commission by
outward acts such as denote in the agent a persistent criminal purpose and a meditated
resolution to consummate the deed.

In the case at bar it does not appear that there was ever any consideration of the question of
killing the captain of the launch by the members of the crew, in which this accused took part.
The matter, so far as the evidence goes, was never mentioned except on the day before the
crime was committed and then in such a way as not to show any fixed purpose or determination
even on the part of the chief mate and much less on that of the accused. The fact that he, with
the rest of the crew, answered the call of the chief mate while he was engaged in his endeavor
to make way with the captain is not sufficient by itself, or in connection with the conversation of
the day before, to establish that sustained reflection and continued persistence which are the
special features of the qualifying circumstance of premeditation. It does not appear that the
accused had even thought of taking any part in the death of the captain up to the very moment
when the iron bar with which he dealt the fatal blow was handed him by the chief mate. Under
such circumstances it is error to find the existence of premeditation as a qualifying
circumstance.

We cannot agree with counsel from the appellant that the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
or alevosia, has not been proved. It appears undisputed that, at the time the accused struck the
deceased with the iron bar and thereby caused his death, the latter was bound hand and foot
and was helpless and defenseless. While it is quite true that there was no treachery at the
beginning of the struggle terminating in the death of the captain, that is, the initial attack was
open and fair, the struggle being man to man between the chief mate and the captain, both
unarmed, this does not necessarily dispose of the question of treachery. This court has held
repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the death of the deceased is
free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found present if, at the time the fatal blow
is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself. While the writer of this opinion
holds the view that, where there is not treachery in the attack which results in the death of the
deceased, there can be no treachery which will qualify the crime as murder notwithstanding the
fact that, at the time the fatal blow was struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless,
but, the court having held so frequently the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well
established. Counsel for the appellant, however, maintain that the doctrine of the court in this
regard was modified in the case of United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime (19 Phil. Rep., 164). In
that case the deceased was walking with the two accused in single file in a narrow street, the
deceased being between the other two.

When they were about ninety yards from any house and while in an obscure place on the
railroad track, at about eight o'clock at night, the deceased was knocked down, and while down
was struck two or three blows in the face and rendered practically unconscious. While in this
unconscious condition, but still groaning, the two defendants, one taking him by the head and
the other by the feet, carried him across the embankment, which was alongside the railroad
track, and threw him into a small pond of water, face downward. The defendants then returned
to their house. The deceased remained in that position until the following day when his body
was found there by the policemen, Hartpence and Solis, who conducted the body to the morgue
where it was later identified as that of Simeon Flores by Valentin Franco, a friend and neighbor
of the deceased.

Issue: Whether the act of throwing the deceased into the water while he was still alive but in a
perfectly helpless and defenseless condition constituted alevosia, and made the crime murder
instead of homicide

66
 

Ruling: It will be noted that the attack was not treacherously made, that is, begun with
treachery. This the court held; and, therefore, if that element is to be found at all in the case it
must be found from the fact that the deceased was thrown into the water and drowned while he
was unconscious and in a helpless and defenseless condition. Discussing that question the
court said:

But assuming that the deceased would have recovered from the effects of the four wounds, if he
had not been thrown into the water, yet we still think that the proofs fail to show that there was
present treachery, as the knocking down of the deceased, striking him while on the ground, and
throwing him into the water were all done in so short a time and one movement followed the
other in such rapid succession. constitute one and the same attack. In order that treachery may
be considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise the classification of the crime, or as an
aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it must be shown that the treacherous acts
were present at and preceded the commencement of the attack which caused the injury
complained of. After the commencement of such an attack and before its termination an
accused person may have employed means or methods which were of a treacherous character,
and yet such means or methods would not constitute the circumstance of alevosia. One
continuous attack, such as the one which resulted in the death of the deceased Flores, cannot
be broken up into two or more parts and made to constitute separate, distinct, and independent
attacks so that treachery may be injected therein and considered as a qualifying or aggravating
circumstance.

For these reasons we are of the opinion that the crime was committed with treachery and that it
was properly denominated murder instead of homicide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The third error assigned charged that the court erred in refusing to apply article 11 of the Penal
Code in favor of the accused. We do not agree with this contention. The personal qualities and
characteristics of the accused are matters particularly cognizable by the trial court; and the
application of this section is peculiarly within the discretion of that court.

3. PEOPLE
PEOPLE v SARIP
People vs. Sarip, et al
G.R. No. L-31481-83, Feb. 28, 1979
Perr Curi am:
Pe

Doctrine:

Raop did not prove that he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force or under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. His pretension that he was threatened with
a gun by his friends, Ernesto, is not credible because he himself Raop was armed with a rifle.

Facts:

[The Court of First Instance of Bukidnon in its decision of August 22, 1969 convicted Ernesto
Sarip and Manuel Raop (Raup) of robbery with triple homicide and sentenced each of them to
death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Ciriaco Mision, Pamposa Mision and Amparo
Mision in the sum of P30,000 (Criminal Case No. 1591). They did not appeal from that decision.
Their deaths sentences are now under mandatory review (Sec. 9, Rule 122, Rule of Court)].

Ernesto
Madpan),stated that Datu
convinced Damiano
him and Raop Madpan,
to rob andthe barrio a
liquidate captain
certainoffamily
Malipayon (brother(referring
in Malipayon of Dumatoto,

67
 

but not naming, the Mision family) and that Damiano gave him two American rifles and a paltik to
accomplish that diabolical mission.

Upon arriving at the place to be robbed, Makadatar Madpan and Dumato Madpan took the
chickens and carabao under the house while he and Raop stood guard at the stairs and that
Makadatar and Dumato assaulted the occupants of the house and Dumato took their personal
belongings. That version does not dovetail in all details with the story told by the prosecution
witnesses. But the derisive fact is that Ernesto in his confession admitted that he participated in
the robbery and that he was a co-conspirator of Raop and Makadatar.

The Prosecution’s evidence shows that in the evening of Saturday, April 30, 1966, Ernesto Sarip,
Manuel Raop, Condalla Sarip (Ernesto's first cousin) and Makadatar Tayao Mabpan (Madpan)
were in the vicinity of the house of the spouses Cirlaco Mision and Pamposa Mision located at
Barrio Malipayon, Pangantucan, Bukidnon. Ernesto Sarip, Makadatar and Raop had firearms.
They made known their presence by means of gunshots.

Ernesto Sarip and Makadatar, who was wearing a turban went under the house and took the
chickens which they gave to Raop and Condalla Sarip. The cackling of the chickens awakened
Diosdado Mision, 12, son of Ciriaco, and Loreto Palanog, 26, a farm helper, who were upstairs.
Through the bamboo slats of the floor, they pepped and saw what the intruders were doing under
the house.

The intruders wanted to get also the carabao which was inside the coral under the house.
Makadatar asked Ciriaco in a loud voice to open the corral but the latter kept silent. Makadatar,
who was armed with a gun and a bolo, and Ernesto Sarip destroyed the corral, took the carabao
and gave it to Raop and Condalla who brought it to the plowed field nearby.
Makadatar and Ernesto Sarip (tall and short, respectively) returned to the house and asked
Ciriaco to give them rice and money but the latter replied that he did not have any. Angered by
Ciriaco's refusal to comply with their demand, Makadatar and Ernesto fired several shots directed
at the inmates of the house. Ciriaco, who was lying on the floor, was not hit but his wife, Pamposa,
and daughter, Amparo, were wounded.

Makadatar went up the stairs, cut the string which tied the door, pushed the shutter, and, on
seeing Ciriaco lying on the floor face down, hacked him to death. Ernesto Sarip, armed with a
rifle, followed Makadatar and went up the house. Makadatar and Ernesto- Sarip took clothes and
a sewing machine. The carabao was later released by the robbers.

 After the intruders had left, two inmates of the house were found dead. Ciriaco, 37, suffered an
incised wound, eleven
eleven by three inches, across his back, tw
twoo stab wounds also in the back and a
lacerated wound on the chin. His wife, Pamposa, 35, sustained an entrance gunshot wound in
the right infra-clavicular region. The bullet penetrated her right lung and exited on her back.
 Amparo Mision, a daugh
daughter
ter of the said spouses ((who
who was older than Diosdado), sustained a
mortal wound in the back and died in the hospital.

On the other hand, defendant Raop, 25, in his sworn statement taken on June 6, 1966 by a
Constabulary corporal and in his testimony, admitted his participation the robbery but he averred
that he acted under dures exercised by his friend, Ernesto Sarip.

Raop testified that at six o'clock in the morning of April 30, 1966
1966,, his ffriend,
riend, Ernesto Sarip, went
to his house at Barrio Kalilangan and requested him to accompany Ernesto to the house of the
latter's Aunt located at Barrio Lampanosan. At first Raop refuse but when Sarip allegedly
threatened him by pointing his rifle at Raop, Raop consented to go with him. Ernesto gave him a
homemade gun called "paliuntod". They arrived at Lampanosan at four o'clock in the afternoon.
Ernesto then told him that they were going to Barrio Mayon. On the way, they met Condalla Sarip.
68
 

They proceeded to Mision's house. Ernesto asked Mision to open the door of his house. Mision
refused. Ernesto asked him to come down. Mision
Misio n likewise refused because he was scared. Upon
Ernesto's order, Makadatar took Mision's chickens and carabao under the house.

Ernesto allegedly reproached Raop for doing nothing. So, Raop got hold of the carabao, took it
to the place near the banana plants, and stayed there with Condalla. Raop allegedly advised
Ernesto and Makadatar not to kill any person inside Mision's house. Ernesto did not heed Raop's
advice. After Ernesto and Makadatar entered the house, Raop and Condalla, who carried the
chickens,
fired insideleft the place.
Mision's Raop
house. let loose
Later, theand
Ernesto carabao. In theovertook
Makadatar distance,Raop
they and
heard gunshots
Condalla. being
Ernesto
allegedly warned Raop that he would be killed if he squealed to the authorities.

Issue:

Whetherr or not Manuel Raop is exculpated from criminal liability?

Whethe

Ruling:

No. With respect to Raop, it is clear that his version of the robbery with homicide does not
exculpate him at all. His counsel de oficio
ofi cio argues that Raop acted agains
againstt his welt That contention
is belied by Raop's admission that he and Ernesto are close friends. The two were residents of
Barrio Kalilangan. Raop did not prove that he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force
or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. His pretension that he
was threatened with a gun by his friends, Ernesto, is not credible because he himself Raop was
armed with a rifle.

4. PEOPLE
PEOPLE v LORENO

CRIM REV Ar
Artiticl
clee 12 

4. PEOPLE v. LORENO and MARANTAL G.R. No. No. L-54414

L -54414

Date: July 9, 1984

DOCTRINE: COMPULSION OF AN IRRESISTABLE FORCE; DEGREE OF FORCE REQUIRED.  — A
person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse or
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will
but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and
of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death of serious bodily harm if the act is
not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave
no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.

PARTIES::
PARTIES EUSTAQU
EUSTAQUIO
IO LORENO (accu sed)
JIMMY MARANTAL (accus ed)
ELIAS MONGE and family (victims)
SETTING:
SETTING: MAGSAYSAY, LIBMA
LIBMANAN,
NAN, CAMARINES SUR
CHARGE:
CHAR GE: ROBBERY with
wi th DOU
DOUBLE
BLE RAPE
69
 

FACTS:

In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house with his family. He
and his two young daughters, namely: Monica, single, then 14 years old, and Cristina, married, then 22
years old, were preparing to attend the dance to be held in the barrio proper that evening. They were
then waiting for Elias’ wife, Beata, was still changing the diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon, four -month
old daughter of Cristina. The other occupants present in the house that evening were his sons, Mario,
then 11 years old, and Nilo, then 13 years old, and their farm helper, Francisco Fabie.

 At about 7:40 p.m., while

w hile he was at the balcony, Francisco Fabie saw at first four men with fflashlight
lashlightss
approaching. When they came near, he heard one of them call Elias saying that there was a letter from
the chief (hepe). Fabie informed Elias about it. Two of the visitors, one wearing red clothes and the other
in dark sweater, came up the house. When Elias wentw ent out to the balcony the man in dark sweater handed
to him the letter. Because it was dark to read it, Elias invited the man in dark sweater to come inside the
sala. The other man in red clothes posted himself near the post of the balcony.

When he and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter,
Monica to fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias and Monica read the following:
" Kami mga NP
NPA"
A" , which caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear, informing her just
what she came to know about their visitors. Cristina attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo
but she was held back by the man in dark sweater who then announced to all those inside not to
make any scandal. When Elias turned to look at him, the man in dark sweater poked his gun at
him, and ordered all those inside to lie on the floor.

In the meantime, the man in red clothes asked Fabie for a glass of water, and the latter asked
Mario to get the glass of water, but Mario did not obey and instead went to the sala. Hence, Fabie
himself went inside the house to fetch the glass of water. But, as he went inside the sala, the man
in red clothes followed him. As Fabie reached the door to the sala, the man in red clothes poked
his gun on Fabie's back and pointed a sharp instrument on his neck and then he was pushed to
go inside the sala. Once inside the sala, which was lighted, Fabie saw and recognized the man
in red clothes to be Eustaquio Loreno . Also Elias Monge and his two daughters, Monica and
Cristina, saw and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the sala as one of the companions
of the man in dark sweater. All the occupants of the house were ordered by the man in dark
sweater and Loreno to remain lying flat on their stomachs on the floor.
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to tie al
Thereafter, alll their victims on the floor. Loreno
tied them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's hammock (duyan) and got the ropes
with which he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying th
thee victim's hands together behind their backs.
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to go downstairs and drive the barking dog
away. Loreno held Fabie and brought him downstairs to drive the barking dog away.
On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno happened to focus on
the person of Jimmy Marantal. FaFabie
bie imm ediate
ediately
ly r ecognized Jimm y Mara
Marantal
ntal as on e of the
visitors who rema
remained
ined on the ground as lookouts . Jimmy Marantal beamed his flashlight on
the face of Fabie, and seeing the latter, he kicked him (Fabie) on the right side of his rib which
caused him to fall on the ground. Marantal kicked Fabie who managed to roll on his side and was
hit on his left thigh. After a while, Loreno lifted Fabie’s body from the ground, and brought him
back upstairs.

70
 

 After Loreno
Loreno and Fabie returned
returned to the sala, the man in dark
dark sweater got hold
hold of Monica Monge
and dragged her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to resist but she was then still
tied. Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal the whereabouts of her piggy bank savings.
She said there was none. He ransacked the room but found none. The man in dark sweater then
seized Monica and forcibly removed her pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her parents for
help. He boxed and slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was able to remove her panty and then
made her lie on the floor near the bed. After undressing himself, he forcibly went on top of her.
She kept on struggling and shouting for help, but he succeeded in inserting his organ into her
vagina. She felt pain. He proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She could not do
anything to stop him from consummating his lust as she was still tied. When he was through with
her, she noticed blood in her private part.
Below in the sala, Monica Monge's parents and others heard her shouts for help and the struggle
she put up inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help, Loreno menacingly pointed his gun at
them, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live. Then Loreno brought Beata Monge first to the
maste’rs room and then to the teacher's room. During these two occasions, he forced Beata
Monge to open the aparador and the trunk respectively, with her keys, and he got their contents,
which he brought to the sala, holding on to Beata Monge who remained tied. All the things he got
from the two rooms were poured on the floor of the sala.
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along Monica Monge whose
hair was dishevelled and was crying, and he made her join the others on the floor of the sala. He
reached for a can of pineapple juice from
fr om the aparador in the sala and drank its contents. Not long
l ong
thereafter, he turned his attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged her to the room which was
then rented by school teacher
teacher Miss Olitoquit (who was then in Naga City).
Inside the room, the man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs on her but she resisted and
struggled although her hands were still tied
ti ed behind her back. He boxed her, hitting her on her rig
right
ht
eye which caused her to lose consciousness. He then proceeded to satisfy his lust on her. When
she regained consciousness, the man in dark sweater returned her shorts. She then realized that
he had succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the teacher's room, a third
man entered the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their victims on the floor with a mat. Loreno
found instead a piece of lawanit with which they covered their victims. The third man proceeded
to the kitchen, and when he returned to the sala, he was bringing along some rice. Then, a fourth
man entered the sala and he asked from Elias Monge for a cigarette. Elias Monge stood up and
told him to get it from his pocket as he was still tied. Reacting to Monge's reply, the fourth man
boxed him, hitting him on his breast and solar plexus which caused him to fall on the floor. Then
Loreno asked Elias Monge to accompany
accomp any him to the house of a nearby neighbor. On reaching the
balcony, Elias Monge protested and refused to accompany Loreno who then held hel d Elias Monge by
the neck, pointing his gun at him. Beata Monge protested, telling her husband not to go along.
Loreno desisted from his plan
pl an to go to the nearby neighbor's house. Elias Monge did not recogniz
recognize
e
the identities of both the third and fourth men.

Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina

Cri stina Monge was earlier br
brought
ought by the man in dark
sweater, and he found her still lying on the floor. Loreno
Lor eno embraced her trying to kiss her and touch
her private parts. One of the malefactors on the ground called those upstairs to hurry because a
man was approaching. Loreno then released Cristina Monge and told her to return to the sala to

71
 

breastfeed her daughter who was continuously crying. Thereafter, the malefactors went down
from the house one by one, bringing along all the things they robbed from their victims. The man
in dark sweater returned to the sala and touched the thighs of Cristina Monge, who was already
wearing her shorts, and he told them not to tell anybody what happened to them, otherwise he
will kill them. And then all the malefactors left the place.
Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was on the ground near the fence of the
house calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall. Elias Monge replied from upstairs that
he was not feeling well, and Agapito left. Elias Monge was able to untie himself, and then he also
untied the others. Fabie then revealed to him that earlier when he had gone down with Loreno,
he (Fabie) saw and recognized Jimmy Marantal
Marantal as among those left on the ground as lookout for
the group that had just robbed them. Cristina and Monica Monge also told their father that they
were abused by the man in dark sweater when they were brought inside the rooms. For the rest
of the night, they remained on guard and could hardly sleep.
Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following personal
properties: jewelry valued at P1,000.00, two mosquito nets, P70.00; three blankets, P200.00; one
caldero of rice, P30.00; one reversible jacket, P40.00; three chickens, P30.00; one camera,
P400.00; one beach towel, P35.00; cash in the amount of P6,500.00; and several others, all in
the total of P10,305.00, more or less.
Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter's daughter married a member of
the youth organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was its president. Elias Monge had already
known Loreno whose occupation was catching wild pigs, and the latter used to place booby traps
in his (Monge's) place to catch pigs, during which occasions Loreno usually slept in his house.
Monica Monge and Cristina Monge also had already known Loreno because his daughter married
a neighbor near their house. Monica often saw Loreno traverse the playground of the Magsaysay
Elementary School where he was studying. Fabie had also known Jimmy Marantal because the
latter often attended dances held by the barrio youth organization, and he (Marantal) even married
marr ied
one of its members. He had engaged Marantal in conversations many times.
Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that they were
wer e sexually abused that fateful evening,
Elias Monge forced himself to report the following day, Sunday the robbery-rape incident at the
PC detachment in Sipocot, but there was no one to talk there. So he proceeded to the PC
headquarters at Camp Tara, bringing along the ropes and rattan which were used by the
malefactors in tying him and his family during the robbery-rape incident. He was given a written
recommendation from the PC to the hospital with instructions to have himself and his daughter
Monica be physically examined. Cristina Monge was informed that there was no need for her to
submit for physical examination because
because she was already married.
Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd PC Company,
stationed at Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10, 1978 the robbery-rape incident.
He was informed by Barangay Captain Elias Monge that his house was robbed and his two
daughters were raped by the robbers in the evening of January 7, 1978 in their house and that he
(Monge) was able to identify
identif y two of the robbers, mentioning their names as Eustaquio Loreno and
Jimmy Marantal of Barrio Calabnigan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. After Sgt. del Socorro and his
team made an ocular inspection of the place on that same day, they proceeded to barrio
Calabnigan where they picked up Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal and bro brought
ught them to the
PC camp. At the PC camp on January 17, 1978, the two suspects were duly identified upon

72
 

confrontation as two of the robbers by the above-mentioned barrio captain, his daughters Monica
and Cristina Monge, and their helper Fabie. During the investigation, the two suspects refused to
give their written statements. Thus, Sgt. del Socorro was able to secure the written statements of
Elias Monge, Francisco Fabie, Monica Monge, and Cristina Monge about the robbery-rape
incident. Upon being identified both said suspects told their victims if they could just talk and settle
the matter, but Elias Monge replied that what they did that evening was an oppression (kaapihan)
against him and his family. The two suspects retorted that it was up to him.
Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga City,
examined Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray examination's result was negative. But
the doctor found him to have sustained an external injury which he classified as "resolving
hematoma, right cestal region", a close wound, already spread out but in the process of healing,
located on the right side of the middle portion of the thorax. He gave Elias Monge a prescription
for anti-infection to stop the bleeding as there was still slight bleeding and to subside the swelling.
 Afterwards he gave
gave the correspond
corresponding
ing medical
medical certificate to Elias Mo
Monge.
nge.
Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital, examined Monica
Monge on January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any fresh wound on her body, but examining
her hymen, she found fresh and incomplete lacerations of said hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock
locations and, inserting her index finger inside her patient's sex orifice, it easily admitted her
forefinger. She had the patient's vagina smeared for spermatozoa but none was found after
laboratory examination. The doctor observed that the lacerations did not reach the base of the
hymen but the edges of the lacerated portions were still reddish and slightly swollen. The doctor
opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the forcible penetration of a male's penis
into the patient's vagina. The doctor further explained that the laceration of the hymen heals after
five days. She also explained that male spermatozoa stay inside the female vagina at the most
for 72 hours. She stated that, admitting there was orgasm during the forcible sexual intercourse,
any sperm must have already disappeared when she examined Monica Monge on January 10,
1978 which was already beyond 72 hours since she was raped in the evening of January 7, 1978.
Loreno and Marantal were charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Rape.
CFI found Loreno guilty as charged, while Marantal was guilty only of Robbery.
 Ap pelll ant s Eu
 Appel Eust
staqu
aquio
io Lo ren o an d J im my Maran
Marantal
tal cl aim ed th at tthey
hey act
acted
ed u
und
nd er tthe
he
compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impul se of uncontrollable fear fear of equa
equall or
greaterr inju ry . They admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7,
greate
1978, but they were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed
to be members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did
not obey, appellants and their families would be killed.
ISSUE:

WON Loreno and Marantal are exempt from criminal liability by reason of having acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force or impulse of an uncontrollable fear

HELD:

NO. We, find their contention untenable.

 A person who acts under the compulsion
compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts unde
underr the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with

73
 

freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will
but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and
of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehen
apprehension
sion of death or serious bodily harm if the act is
not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave
no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
 A perusal of the appellants’ r obbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint brief,
appellants’ statement of the robbery
showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and rape against
Elias Monge and his family. Further established were facts inconsistent
inconsistent with appellant's claim of havi
having
ng
acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, to wit:
1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in dark
sweater went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno pointed the gun to the
victims which enabled the malefactors to ransack the house.
2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony, Loreno positioned
himself next to the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater delivered the letter to Elias
Monge. Loreno admitted that, without prior instructions, he immediately positioned himself near
the post of the balcony, an act which showed his voluntary participation in the criminal acts.
3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the hammock.
Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan which he got from inside the
house.
4. When Monica Monge was struggling
struggl ing and shouting for
f or help from inside the room where she was
earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's immediate reaction was to point his gun to
the victims who were then lying on the floor, telling
telling them not to rise if they wanted to live.
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the
master's room and the teacher's room where he made her open the trunk and the " aparador " with her
keys and got the contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted
alone,, withou
alone w ithoutt the threat and assistance
assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man
m an in dark sweater
consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on
the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss and touch her private parts.
When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fabie went downstairs to drive the barking dog away, the
flashlight of Loreno happened to be focused on the face of Jimmy Marantal who in turn beamed his
flashlight on the approaching
approaching Fabie. Upon seeing Fabie,
F abie, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former
f ormer twice causing
him (Fabie) to fall to the ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fabie was due to the fact that Fabie had
recognized him and the blows which he gave to Fabie who was still tied at the moment was to serve as
a warning to Fabie not to report his presence and participation in the robbery-rape incident to the
authorities.
Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house
house below, must have heard the shouts of Monica
Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two
companions who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his
companions effective means and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was
no showing that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the
crimes.

74
 

 All
 Al l th ese dem on st
strat
rated
ed th e vo lu nt ary par tici
ti cipat
pat io n and th e cons
co nspi
pi rac
racyy of th e app ell
ellant
ant s.   The
foregoing acts, though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed
their community of interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which
constituted conspiracy without
wi thout the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself.
its elf. Conspiracy may be inferred
and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and concert
of action and community of interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to establish the
existence of conspiracy, and the degree of actual participation
participati on by each of the conspirators is
immaterial. Conspiracy having been established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent
extent and character of their participatio n because in contemp lation of l aw, the
act of one is th e a
act
ct of all.
The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was committed on January 7, 1978 by more than three
persons, all armed, in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances of band,
nighttime and dwelling and is, under  P.D. 767,
767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by death.
But, for lack of the required number
num ber of votes, the accused should suff
suffer
er the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

UNCONTROLL
VI. UNCONTROLLAB
ABE
E FEAR  
1. U.S. VS. EXALTACION

G.R. No. 1481 Febr uaryy 17, 1904 

Februar
THE UNITED STATES vs. LIBERATO EXALTACION, ET AL.

TORRES, J.:  

DOCTRINE:  The defendants were captured by brigands, who compelled them, by threats of
death, to take and subscribe an oath to support the Katipunan Society, an organization created
for the purpose of subverting the Government by force. That the duress under which the
defendants acted
acted relieves them from crim inal liability.

FACTS:
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that province an
information charging Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of
rebellion , in that they, subsequently to the 4th day of
of November,
November , 1901, will
willfully
fully and illegally bound
themselves to take part in a rebellion against the Government of the United States in these
Islands, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the purpose of which was to overthrow the
said Government by force of arms, this against the statute in the case made and provided.

In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of Bulacan, testified under
oath that:

-  the two defendants were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the police some days
before having captured a number of documents in the encampment of one Contreras, as
so-called general of bandits, situated at a place called Langca, of the town of Meycauayan,
among which documents appeared the papers now on pages 2 and 3 of the record, signed
by the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized the said documents when they
were exhibited to them;

-  that the said defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the said
documents under compulsion;  

75
 

-  that the purpose of the Katipunan Society was to obtain the independence of the
Philippines;

-  that this statement was made in the house

house of the parish priest of Meycauayan in the
presence of Exequiel Casas and Fernando Nieto. The latter, upon their examination as
witnesses, testified to the same facts, stating that the defendants told Governor Tecson
that they had signed the said documents under fear of death at the hands of the thieves
by whom they had been captured.

The witness Casas, the municipal president of Meycauayan, testified that he held office as such
in place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnapped in the month of October,
1902.

The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July 17, 1902, were
written in Tagalog, and contain an oath taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of
the subscribers to carry out the superior orders of the Katipunan, and never disobey them until
their death in the defense of the mother country. The two accused, under oath, testified to
having signed the said documents and alleged that they did so under compulsion and
force while they were held as captives by the thieves ; that the defendant Tanchinco was
captured in the fields one day when he was going to work on his farm by three armed men,
unknown to him, who asked him if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his
replying in the negative they compelled him in view of his denial to sign a document, now on page
3 of the record.

The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was captured at a
place called Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and that on the day following his
release, having been unable to pay the $300 which was demanded of him , he reported to
the president, Tomas Testa.

The defendant Liberato Exaltacion under oath testified that

-  he was captured near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed as policemen
and armed
armed with gu ns or r evolve
evolvers;
rs;  

-  that these men bound him and took him into t he forest a
and
nd there compelle
compelled
d him by
threats of death
death to sig n the documents no w on page 2 of the record;  

-  that thereupon they allowed him to go upon promise

promi se to return.

This defendant (Exaltacion) testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the
road in the hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as they were released
they presented themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the presence of witnesses, and
subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the fact
that they had been captured.

ISSUE: Whethe
 W hetherr or not the defendant
defendant are guilty of the crime charged
charged..

RULING: NO.

The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon — 
of whom the last two were present when Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the president
of Meycauayan, and reported to him what had happened to him — all testified to the same fact
and corroborated the statements of the accused with respect to their capture and their subsequent
subs equent
report to President Testa and to the witness Morales.

76
 

The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above referred to,
signed by the accused, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the
imposition upon them of the penapenalty
lty inflicted by the judgm ent of the court below. 
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by brigands
who belonged to the Contreras band, and that they signed the said documents under
compulsion and while in captivity, re relieve
lieve the
them
m f rom all crimin al liability from th e crime of
rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct of the defendants in presenting
themselves first to th e local president of Meycaua
Meycauayan yan and subsequently to Li eut. Bon if acio
Morales, of the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the
bandits is  This
innocence. corroborative
conclusion of their
is not testimony,
overcome by theand is discrepancy
trifling the best demonstration of their
between the testimony of
the witness Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the fact the Exaltacion was unable to
determine the date when he was captured or that on which he appeared before President Testa.

The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292 not having been
established at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment below
must be reversed and the defendants acquitted with the costs de oficio. The judge below will be
informed of this decision and a copy of the judgment entered herein will be furnished him for his
information and guidance. So ordered.

2. PEOPLE VS. ROGADO

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee, vs.TEODULO ROGADO, ET

 AL .,  defendants-appellants.
 AL.,

G.R. No. L-13025 Decemb

December
er 29, 1959

Doctrine: Where an accused, who was ordered by his superiors to kill a person, had not
only the means with which to protect himself from any retaliation on the part of his
superiors if th ey should threate
threatenn to punish him if he disobeye
disobeyed d their ord er, but also the
opportunit y to esca
escape
pe with the intended victim to avoid the ire of superiors, yet
yet did not do
so, but instead carried out the order, it cannot be said that he acted on the matter
involuntarily or under the influence of un controllable fea
fear.
r.

FACTS: On September 25, 1956, Teodulo Togado, aliasCommander Sulit, Isaac

Orenia,
Pedro alias  Commander
Commande
Merin, r Lawin,
alias Abling, Domingo
Francisco Golfo, alias
Racoma,  Eser, Cresencio
aliasManeng, Arsenal,alias
Pio Mercurio,  Sako,
alias Abling,
Francisco Racoma, alias Rolando, Nemesio Arsolac
Arsolacia,
ia, alias  Noli, and Conrado
Devesa, alias Donato, were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Laguna for
killing of one Salvador Areza. They all pleaded not guilty.

Francisco Racoma and Conrado Devesa were excluded from the information upon motion of the
fiscal to be utilized as government witnesses. Later, upon motion also of the fiscal, the charge
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence with respect to accused Nemesio Arsolacia,
Arsolacia, Maximo
Cerebo and Pedro Merin. Then counsel for the remaining accused filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the killing of the deceased was accomplished by them in furtherance of the huk
movement, but the motion was denied. The trial court found the accused Rogado, Orenia, Golfeo
and Arsenal guilty as principals of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the supreme
penalty of death, while it found Pio Mercurio guilty merely as accomplice. Pio Mercurio having
failed
againsttothe
file accused
his brief,Rogado,
this caseOrenia,
is before this and
Golfeo Court only for
Arsenal the review
which of upon
imposes the decision
them therendered
penalty
of death.

77
 

The facts are as follows:

On July 12, 1956, Salvador Areza, a farmer residing in Lilio, Laguna, left his house carrying with
him a bolo on lots scabbard to gather firewood in his farm in barrio Bubukal. When he failed to
return home that day, his wife Lydia Nudal went out to search for him. She was accompanied by
some armed men, the mayor, and a sanitary health officer, and after a brief search, they found
the decapitated body of her husband in an uninhabited place in Bubukal about half kilometer
kil ometer away
from the road. The gruesome find revealed
rev ealed that Areza's head was totally severed from his body
with his hands tied together. The health officer, Dr. Dominador L. Gomez, found the body to be in
state of decomposition, which led him to conclude that the deceased must have died three to five
days prior to his discovery. Areza's bolo and his scabbard were also found near his body.

It appears that on July 12, 1956, Teodulo Rogado, aliasCommander Sulit, Isaac
Orenia, alias Commander
Commander Lawin, Domingo Golfeo, alias  Eser Cresencio Arsenal, alias Sako,
Pedro Merin, alias Nestor, Maximo Cerebo, alias Maneng, Pio Mercurio, alias Abling, Nemesio
 Arsolacia,, alias Noli, Francisco Racoma, alias Rolando, and Conrado
 Arsolacia C onrado Devesa, alias Donato,
were on their way from barrio Sta. Lucia, Nagcarlan, to the municipality of Lilio, Laguna. They lost
their way, and as they were looking for someone from whom they should get information as to
their whereabouts they met Salvador Areza whom Racoma and Deveza approached. Upon their
inquiry, Areza informed them that they were in barrio Bubukal, municipality of Lilio; that there was
an army camp stationed nearby; and that the soldiers occasionally go on patrol to the barrios.

The information was reported to commander Sulit (Rogado) who in turn ordered that Areza be
brought to him. After talking with him, Rogado asked Areza to lead the way for them, but Areza
refused saying that he had much work to do, and besides he had a carabao with him. after a brief
talk with Orenia, alias Commander Lawin, rogado told Racoma that they were taking along Areza
and that if he should refuse, he should be tied, which instruction Racoma relayed to his two
companions, Merin and arsenal, telling them to be prepared in case Areza would give them a
fight. Thereupon, Racoma approached Areza and asked if he could barrow from him his bolo.
 Areza obliged.
obliged. When Areza refused to go with them, Pio Mercurio dragged
dragged him a
along,
long, and
and as he
refused, Golfeo struck him with the butt of his gun.

 After walking a short distance, Mercurio tied Areza's hands behind him. Areza protested telling
Mercurio that he had not done anything wrong, whereupon Golfeo gave him a fist blow on his
stomach. After walking some distance, a command to stop was heard and so they stopped.
Racoma then approached Rogado and told him that they should release Areza at night but rogado

told him
was thatassaulted
being Areza should be killed
by Orenia andand whenAt
Golfeo. Racoma returnedRacoma
this moment, to the group
heardheRogado
found that Areza
saying, in
the vernacular, "Kill him now so we can proceed." Areza was then taken to a secluded place quite
far from the road, which was thick forest about 20 or 30 meters away from the group, and there
Golfeo ordered Areza to lie down. With Areza's bolo and ignoring
ignori ng the plea for mercy of their vic
victt im,
Golfeo gave him a blow on the neck as he lay face down and with his hands still tied behind. With
the same bolo, Arsenal also gave the victim another blow on the neck which completely severed
the head from the body.

On September 20, 1956, Pedro Merin, a member of the group who surrendered to the authorities,
made a sworn statement before the Justice of the Peace of Nagcarlan, Laguna, stating therein
that Salvador Areza was killed
kill ed by Ezer
Ezer and Sako upon order of Commander Sulit. Dom
Domingo
ingo Golfeo
also made a sworn statement before the justice of the Peace of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting his
participation in the killing of Areza upon order of Commander Sulit. On September 21, 1956,
Cresencio Arsenal
admitting that he wasalso
one made
of thosea who
written
killedstatement before
Areza. Both Domithe
ngo Mayor
Domingo of Sta.
Golfeo and Cruz, Arsenal,
Cresencio Laguna,
while admitting their participation in the killing of the deceased, claimed in exculpation that they

78
 

acted under the pressure of an irresistible force in that they merely obeyed the order of their
Commander, Rogado alias  Commander Sulit, who would have killed them if they disobeyed his
order. The other appellants merely contended that the killing was done in furtherance of the huk
rebellion.

ISSUES: Whether or not the accused would be exempted from criminal liability.

HELD: NO.

The evidence is clear that it was Domingo Golfeo first struck Areza with the butt of his gun hitting
him on the side of his body, then gave him a fist blow on his stomach, and after he had been
taken to a secluded place, it was he who ordered Areza to lie down in the fashion adopted by the
Kempetai during the gloomy days of Japanese occupation and in that position gave him a blow
on the back of the neck which almost severed his head from the body. His participation in the
killing of Areza cannot therefore be doubted. His only defense is that he did so in obedience to
the order of his commander, and because he acted under the influence of uncontrollable fear, he
should be exempt from criminal responsibility.

Obedience to an order of a superior will wi ll only justify an act which otherwi

otherwise
se would be criminal when
the order is for a lawful purpose, but also because the circumstances under which Golfeo
participated
participate d in the torture and liquidation
liqui dation of Areza cannot in any way justify his claim that he acted
under an uncontrollable fear of being punished by his superiors if he disobeyed their order. In the
first place, at the time of the killing, Golfeo was armed with automatic carbine such that he could
have protected himself from any retaliation on the part of his superiors if they should threaten to
punish him if he disobeyed their order to kill Areza. In the second place, the evidence shows that
 Areza was brought to a secluded place quite far from that where his superiors were at the time
and in such a predicament, he and companion Arsenal could have escaped with Areza to void
the ire of their superiors. The fact that he carried out their order although his superiors were at
some distance from him and that without pity and compunction he struck his victim in a Kempetai
fashion show that he acted on the matter not involuntarily or under the pressure of fear of force.

With regard to Cresencio Arsenal. It appears that he was one of those ordered by Rogado to kill
 Areza and in obedience
obedience to such order he had a direct participation in the killing. It was he and
Golfeo who brought
brought Areza to a secluded place and once there he helped Golfeo in killing him with
the same bolo which was taken from the victim himself. After Golfeo had given the first blow on
the back of the neck of Areza as he lay face down on the ground, Arsenal took the bolo himself
and gaveno
therefore thedoubt
fatal that
blowArsenal
which directly
completely severedwith
cooperated the Golfeo
head ofin Areza from
carrying out his
the body. There
concerted is
plan
of killing Areza because of the hostile attitude he adopted in denying them the help they
demanded
demand ed from him.

The other defense of appellants refers to their theory that they killed
ki lled Areza not for personal motive
motiv e
but in furtherance of the huk rebellion and so, if any liability they have, it is only for rebellion and
for murder as they are charged. And having already been prosecuted and convicted of the crime
of rebellion in Criminal
Crim inal Case No. SP-137 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, their prosecution
in the instant case would constitute double jeopardy.

There is no complex crime of rebellion with murder because the latter offense is absorbed by the
former, however, a distinction was made in the case of People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90, 53,
Off. Gaz., No. 1, p. 68, where we held that if he killing is inspired by personal motive such killing
is not absorbed by the rebellion but may be the subject of separate prosecution. In the second
place, we find that the acts with which appellants now charged do not appear included in the
information for rebellion in Criminal Case No. SP-137, for in the case they were merely accused
79
 

of having risen and taken up arms against the Philippine constabulary, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, police forces and other military detachments of the government, without specifying
the particular acts committed against private persons or civilians which may be said to have been
undertaken in furtherance of the huk rebellion. It is not, therefore, correct to say, as appellants
now claim, that the act in question is already included or absorbed in the rebellion charge filed
against them
them in said criminal case.

On the other hand, the pretense that the killing of Areza by appellants was done in furtherance of
the huk rebellion is preposterous considering the fact that Areza was a mere farmer who had no
connection whatsoever with any law-enforcement agency of the government
 According to the testimony of the prosecution witness, Francisco
 According Francisco Racoma, Salvado
Salvadorr Areza was
maltreated, tied and killed because the latter refused to lead and guide the group of Rogado to
the road when he was asked by the latter to do so, Rogado's men were lost in the mountains of
Lilio and they needed somebody to help them find the way out of the place. They came upon
 Areza working
working in his farm. Rogado a asked
sked him to lead the way and AreAreza
za refused sayin
sayingg that he
had much work to do and he could not leave his carabao. Angered and irked by such stubborn
refusal, Rogado after conferring with his co-defendant Orenia gave the order to take Areza along
and to kill him. The killing of Areza was done solely to satisfy the anger of the leader, rogado, who
being used to the blind obedience of his men could not tolerate the refusal of Areza to carry out
his wishes and desires. The rebellious movement of the group had nothing to gain by Atienza's
death. On the contrary, Rogado and his group needed Areza alive in order that they could utilize
him as their guide while they were in the mountains of Lilio.

 An attempt was made by appellan

appellants
ts to show that Areza was
w as killed becau
because
se he threatene
threatened d to
inform the Army of their presence in the neighborhood where he met them. Such attempt,
however, is ridiculous, for Areza, being then alone and confronted with a group of armed men,
could not have hurled such a threat without catering immediate death. As the trial court aptly
observed:: "This Court cannot believe that Areza would have been such a fool to tell that band of
observed
armed Huks that he would give them away to the Army. It is reasonable to presume that any sane
person would have seen the danger of making such statement under the circumstances, for that
would have been sure death."

The trial court found that the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery,
aggravated by abuse of superior strength and the fact that it happened in an uninhabited place,
for which reason it imposed upon appellants to supreme penalty of death.

3. PEOPLE VS. FERNANDO

People
Pe ople v Fernando
G.R. No. L-24781 May 29, 1970

Facts:

-  The victim,
victim , Bienvenido Laxamana, was married to Remedios L. Laxamana.
-  Before his death,
death, Laxamana was a member of the Central A Azucareras
zucareras de Tarlac
Planters' Association of that province.
-  When his brother-in-law,
brother-in- law, the
the late Sinforoso
Sinforoso Lomboy, was the Municipal Mayor of
Bamban sometime in 1950, he became a member of the civilian guards or the Civilian
Commando
Commando Unit (CCU) in that town Bamban, Tarlac with
w ith the rank of captain.

80
 

-  Accused, Carlos Fernando alias 'Bob,' Mario Salonga alias 'Manding,' receivedrec eived
instruction from one of their commanders, Francisco Ronquillo alias Commander Manly,'
to liquidate Laxamana.
-  Salonga and Fernando were members of the Hukbalahap Organization
Organizatio n
-  The motive
motiv e was that
that the Laxamana, while an officer of the civi
civilian
lian guards, had ordered
the killing of a relative of Commander "Manly" and the beating up of the father of
Salonga.
-  Fernando and Salonga went to Bamban from Angeles City by walking walkin g all along between
sugar cane field. After the killing of Laxamana, they also decamped together the same
route.
-  That evening of March 30, 1961, Mrs. Laxamana
Laxamana came
cam e from the Catholic church of
Bamban with her elder daughter, Bernadette. While on her way home and when the
distance from her house was about thirty meters, she heard the firing of shots. She took
cover in one stores; and after the firing had ceased, she went out and hurriedly
proceeded to her home. In front of the store of Honoria Atienza she saw her husband
sprawled on the ground full of blood.
-  accused was CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF OF MURDER before the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac
-  attack the Laxamana with pistols caliber 45, thereby inflicting
inflicti ng upon the said Bienvenido
Laxamana, mortal wounds on different parts of his body which directly caused his
instantaneous death.
-  The trial court rejected the accused's testimony
testim ony at
at the trial that he did not fire any shot at
the victim but merely stood guard outside the store, and that his role, after Salonga had
ceased firing at the victim was to fire three shots in the air as a signal for them to depart
depart
-  At any rate, the trial court further held, there was no doubt as to the existence of
conspiracy between the accused and Salonga,
-  trial cou
court
rt likewise
likewi se rejected the accused's contention that he should be punished only for
the crime of rebellion as the murder was in pursuance of the Huks rebellion movement,
since the motive for the killing of the victim was personal, to avenge the alleged killing of
a relative of Commander Manly and the alleged maltreatment of the father of Salonga,
supposedly ordered by the victim.
-  Trial court convicted accused of MURDER

ISSUE:
-  ARTICLE 12 ISSUE: his participation
particip ation in the murder was in furtherance o off the Huk
movement and that he should have been held by virtue of his Huk membership to have
acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
-  Double Jeopardy ISSUE: trial court's denial
denial of his motion to dismis
dismiss s the case filed on
November 4, 1963, after the prosecution had rested its case, on the ground of double
 jeopardy,, on the ground of his previous
 jeopardy previous conviction on Augu
Augustst 31, 1
1961
961 by the Pa Pampanga
mpanga
Court in another case of the crime of simple rebellion, on his entering of plea of guilty
HELD:
•   The record is bereft of any evidence that the murder was committed as a necessary
means
mea ns to commit rebe
rebellion
llion or in furt hera
herance
nce thereof . The victim had no established
connection with the government at the time.
•   in People vs. Paz besides, "(T)hat the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a
matter of mitigation or defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and
satisfactorily."
• appellant himself revealed in his unrepudiated written confessions  that the killing
  appellant

was inspiredManly
Commander by p ersona
ersonal
and thel mo of avenging the
tivesmaltreatment
alleged alleged killing
of Salonga's of as
father, a relative
orderedofby the

81
 

victim Laxamana, and cannot be deemed

deemed absorbed b y the rebellion  and should be
separately
sepa rately pr osecuted .
•  Appellant's contention that Commander Manly's personal motive did not apply to
hi m  and that he merely obeyed as " a mere 'sold ier' of t he HM
HMB
B  is of no avail  either
in the face of his awareness of an acquiescence to the personal motivation and the void
of any evidence that the murder was necessary to the rebellion or in furtherance thereof.

SPECIFIC ARTICLE 12 ISSUE:

-  Accused next asks the Court to "take judicial notice of the fact that the Hukbalahap or
HMB organization deal with its members who disobey or refuse to carry out its orders in
the most severe manner.
-  A member who disobeys or refuses to carry out its order may be liquidated  or given
another form of severe punishment. " On this tenuous premise, he claims that by virtue of
his Huk membership, his participation in the murder of the victim should have been
deemed to be an act under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury as to exempt, him from
criminal liability 

HELD:
  Justice Moreland long set the norm
• norm for the application
applicatio n of these exempting
circumstances: "...before a force can
can be consid ered to be a an
n irresist ibl e one , it must
produce, such an effect
effect upon the indivi dual that, in spite of all resistance, it
incapable of comm ittin g a crime .
reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such, incapable
•  It must be such that, in spite of th e resistance  of the person on whom it operates, it
compels his members to act act and his mind to obey .
•  He must act not only without will but against
against his will . Such a force can never consist
in anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it must be a force which act
upon him from the outside and by means of a third person.
•  In order that one may take advantage of subdivision
subdiv ision 10 of a
article
rticle 8 and allege with
success that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury, it mu st appea
appearr th at the threa
threatt that whi ch caused the uncont rollabl e feafearr
related to a crime of such gr avity and so immi nent that it mu st safe
related safely
ly be said that
the ordinary ru n of men woul d have bee
beenn governed by it.  And the evil threatened
must be greater than, or at least equal to, that which he is compelled to cause."

•  Accused dismally
dismall y failed to show that he acted
acted "not only w ithout will but against will."
will ." On

the
28, contrary, he testified
1950 "because it is athat
goodheorganization."
joined the Hukbalahap organization since, December
•  The record is devoid even of any claim of the accused that any threats were made upon
him or that he acted under uncontrollable fear. He was not under any physical or
moral compulsion wh en a according
ccording to his own version a att the trial , he freely stood
on guard out side the store while his com panion Salonga we wentnt ins ide and shot the
victim . At his preliminary examination before Judge Tiglao, he further testified that his
role as guard was to fight off any persons who might come to the aid of the victim
Laxamana
•  The last principal error assigned by accused that the trial court should have dismissed
dismis sed
the present case
case by virtue of hi s previous convict ion for rebe
rebellion
llion on August 31,
1961
1961 is wi thou t merit.  
•  The accused,
accused, even before his apprehension in the encounter with the PC troops on June
12, 1961, already faced the criminal charge of rebellion in an information filed on
October 17, 1960 against him and several others before the Pampanga Court of First
Instance.

82
 

  The murder of Laxamana for which the accused stands charged in the present case was
•

committed on March 30, 1961. The criminal complaint therefor was filed with the
municipal court of Bamban, Tarlac on July 19, 1961 and after the records were
forwarded on September 14, 1962 to the trial court, the murder information was filed on
November 29, 1962.
  The
• There
re clearly can be no dou ble jeopardy , because the murd er of Laxama
Laxamanana on
March 30, 196
19611 could not have be
been
en possibly inc luded as one of the specific
count s in the inform ation for rebellion f iled against the a
accus
ccus ed on O
October
ctober 17,
1960, as the mur der had not yet bee
beenn com mitted then .
  Furthermore, the acts constituting
•
constituti ng the crime
crim e of rebellion were committed in the province
of Pampanga where the accused was charged therefor, while the murder of Laxamana
for which the accused is charged in the present case was committed in the province of
Tarlac — over which the Pampanga court had no jurisdiction.
  Finally, as the murder here had been shown to have been committed
• comm itted furtherance of the
rebellion but for personal vengeance, it could not be deemed absorbed by the crime of
rebellion but had to be separately charged and punished.
  AFFIRMED TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT.
•

4. PEOPLE VS. PALENCIA

CRIM REV Ar
Artiticl
clee 14 

Case
Case title: People of th e Phili
Phili ppin es v. G.R. No. L-38957
Romulo Palencia, et. al. 
Date: Apr. 30, 1976
DOCTRINES:
  Duress, as a valid defense, should be based on real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's own
•

life. It should not be inspired by speculative, fanciful or remote fear. A threat of future injury is
not enough. It must be clearly shown that the compulsion must be of such character as to leave
no opportunity for the accused to escape.
FACTS:

CHARGE:
The accused are charged with the MURDER of Alfredo Corigal on Feb. 19, 1972 in Camalig, Albay.

FACTS:

 At around
around 2PM on Feb. 19, 1972,
1972, Alfredo
Alfredo Corigal was fatally stabbed 1
13
3 times, th
the
e stab wou
wounds
nds
having been caused by weapons as testified by the medico-legal ranging from a hacking weapon
such as a bolo to smaller knives. The wounds were concentrated around the nape, the back, and
the deltoid area.

Based on the eyewitness testimony of Rodolfo Corigal, cousin of the victim, who witnessed the
hacking and stabbing from 15 meters away, Romulo Palencia , Nestor Nolleda, Paterno Noga, and
Nestor Nolloda. Upon seeing Palencia and Nolleda commence attacking Alfredo, he immediately
ran to one Rosito, the landlord of their boarding house, but arrived only to find Alfredo having
recently expired.

Through Pat. Jose Flores, the accused were arrested. After they were identified from a police line-
up and giving their testimonies, Judge Salvadora examined them as to the truthfulness of their
written statements and whether they understood the same- having been written in English, but

83
 

affirmed by Judge Salvadora in the local Bicol dialect. Later, however each one came up with an
alibi and a narration that they were forced to confess to the killing, and that their confessions were
extracted by means of violence.

Before the trial court, appellants Paliza and Noga claimed that they only acted under duress from
Palencia, who after hacking Corigal, turned to them and threatened them of the same fate if they
did not attack Alfredo.

RTC DECISION:
Conviction of Murder. Reclucion Perpetua
 ARGUMENT:
That the crime was committed under duress.

ISSUE/S:
-  Whether o
orr not the appellants Paliza and Noga could be considered to have acted under duress.
duress.

HELD:
NO. Duress, as a valid defense, should be based on real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's own
life. It should not be inspired by speculative, fanciful or remote fear. A threat of future injury is not
enough. It must be clearly shown that the compulsion must be of such character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused to escape. In the case at bar, appellants Paliza and Noga had every
opportunity to run away if they had wanted to or to resist any possible aggression on their persons by
appellant Palencia, considering that the said two appellants were also armed. It is more likely that, out
of a sense of companionship or camaraderie, they joined in the attack after Palencia and Nolloda had
hacked the victim several times. Conspiracy has not been proven, since there is no showing that the
attack was agreed upon beforehand. The wounds inflicted by appellants Jose Paliza and Paterno Noga
could not have caused the death of the victim, much less materially contributed to his death. They were
not serious injuries. At most, appellants Paliza and Noga should be held liable as accomplices for
having cooperated in the execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which were not indispensable.

5. PEOPLE VS. ABANES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. 

ROBERTO ABANES
ABA NES and MELECIO BENITEZ 

Doctrine :

Before a force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce such an effect upon
the individual that, inspite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such,
incapable of committing a crime. It must be such that, inspite of the resistance of the person on
whom it operates, it compels his members to act and his mind to obey.
 84

Fear in order to be a valid defense, should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for
one's life or limb

Facts:

The incident in question took place in Bo. Banawang, San Roque, Agoo, La Union, on October
9, 1967. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, appellant Roberto Abanes and victim
Eustaquio Colobong, a half- wit, were in the yard of one Rolly Laroza. Melecio Benitez was also
present, talking with Laroza. Moments later, Abanes and Colobong were seen walking together
towards the north direction of Bo. Banawang, San Roque, followed by Benitez. That was the last
time Eustaquio Colobong was seen alive.

The evidence of record establishes that on the day in question Abanes, Benitez and the
deceased were on their way to the house of the barrio captain because the deceased had told
the two of them that there were raw shrimps to be eaten thereat. Benitez was in an ugly mood,
considering that before they left the yard of Laroza, he (Benitez) uttered the following words: "If
somebody will make trouble in San Roque, I willwi ll kill him."
him ." While the three were thus walking
along the dike with the deceased leading the way, Benitez told Abanes to ask the deceased if
indeed there were raw shrimps to be eaten at the house of the barrio captain, and if the
deceased was just fooling them to stab him. Without much ado, Abanes suddenly stabbed from
behind the unarmed and unsuspecting Colobong who had not given any provocation
whatsoever for the attack. Immediately thereafter, Benitez grabbed the weapon from Abanes
and himself stabbed the victim three times without giving the latter a chance to evade the attack
or make any defense whatsoever. These stab wounds were the direct and immediate cause of
the victim's death.

 An hour
hour later, his
his body was found
found near
near the bridge of San Roque under
under a bamboo
bamboo tree.
tree. As
1
shown in the autopsy report 
report   of Dr. Fidel Verceles, the deceased sustained five stab wounds
from which he died.

When Abanes testified in his own behalf, he denied having signed a written confession. He stated
that on the date and time in question, while he was walking along the dike towards the house of
the barrio captain with Eustaquio Colobong ahead of him and Melecio Benitez behind him, he
was enticed by the latter to stab the victim if the latter was just fooling them in stating that there
were raw shrimps to be eaten in the house of the barrio captain. Abanes claimed that Benitez
threatened to kill him if he (Abanes) would not stab the victim; and that out of fear of Benitez
 85

whom he knew to be a tough guy and quite capable of killing him, he was forced to follow the
order.

In this appeal, Roberto Abanes insists on his plea that he stabbed the deceased under the
compulsion of an irresistible force and/or an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury;
and, furthermore, that if found guilty, he should be entitled to, as mitigating, the alternative
circumstance of degree of instruction and education for the reason that he studied only up to
Grade One. 
One. 

Issue : Is abanes entitled to the exempting circumstance of acting under the compulsion of an
irresistible force or uncontro
uncontrollable
llable ffear?
ear?

there is nothing in the record to sustain this allegati

Held: no. there allegation.
on. While Abanes claims that Benitez
was armed with a brass knuckle,
k nuckle, there is no showing that he ever tried to use it against Abanes
nor did he ever lift a finger to exact the latter's cooperatio
cooperation n in the execution of the crime. Before a
force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce such an effect upon the
individual that, inspite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such,
incapable of committing a crime. It must be such that, inspite of the resistance of the person on
whom it operates, it compels his members to act and his mind to obey. obey.  4 Neither can we conside
considerr
the claim of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury in favor of Abanes. A mere threat of
a future injury is not enough. Fear in order to be a valid defense, should be based on a real,
imminent or reasonable fear for one's lifeli fe or limb. In this case, the fear, if any, harbored by Abanes
was imaginary and speculative. This is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
Furthermore, when Benitez allegedly gave the order to stab the deceased, Abanes was armed
and yet he did not offer any resistance. Neither did he warn the intended victim of the impending
peril. And finally, the act of Abanes in not fleeing but instead of waiting for Benitez while the latter
was stabbing the victim belies his claim of fear of Benitez.

Likewise, lack of instruction or education can not be appreciated in favor of Roberto Abanes as a
mitigating circumstance. The criteria in determining lack of education is not illiteracy alone, but
intelligence. 5 The record discloses that far from his claim that he suffers
rather lack of sufficient intelligence. 
from lack of education, appellant possesses an intelligence worthy of an educated man. In fact,
the trial court observed that he talked as if he were a doctor.  6 

6. PEOPLE VS. BORJA

BORJA  

Facts: The Anderson Fil-American Guerrillas (AFAG) held a general meeting at the bahay-
pulungan of the religious sect known as Watawat Ng Lahi at Barrio Buragwis, Legaspi City. One
of the accused, Pedro Borja, presided over the meeting, which was attended by more than a
hundred members.

When the meeting ended, Borja called an exclusive conference among selected officers and
members, including the other accused Rufino Pavia, Inocencio Demen, Pedro Fustigo, Felipe
Benavides, Dominador de los Santos, Alejo Balimbing, and Tito Oljina. At the secret meeting,
Balimbing proposed to Borja that they conduct a raid the following morning at the Hacienda San
Miguel, located at San Miguel Island, across the bay from Tabaco, Albay.
 86

When they woke up the next day, the eight men left by bus for Tabaco, via Legaspi City. They
were armed as follows: Borja had two pistols tucked in a shoulder holster; Pavia had a .45
caliber pistol; Balimbing had a hunting knife with a scabbard; and Fustigo had a pistol.

Upon Borja's instruction, Balimbing hired a motorboat operated by Mariano Burac. They crossed
the bay, and the group disembarked at the hacienda. They agreed to pose as members of the
Philippine Constabulary, ostensibly on a mission to inspect the firearms of the hacienda.

Gancayco shook hands with Borja and Pavia. Informed of the group's alleged mission,
Gancayco and Isorena presented the license to Borja, who remarked that the license listed only
five firearms, as against reports received at the headquarters in Albay that there were ten
firearms in the hacienda. Borja then ordered Isorena to produce the firearms for inspection;

The group had now succeeded in obtaining possession of four of the five firearms, and they
were not able to get the one remaining firearm only because it was with a hacienda employee
guarding cattle some kilometers away.

During this time, Balimbing was investigating Lanon inside the bodega. Lanon was surrounded
by Balimbing with a hunting knife, Pavia with a .45 caliber pistol, and Benavides with a grease-
gun. In the course of his interrogation, Balimbing told Lanon that they were going to kill
Gancayco, Isorena, Lanon and one Pablo Balimbing, chief herder of the hacienda, because
these employees were boothlickers to the Gancaycos.

Borja then called Balimbing and, referring to Gancayco and Isorena, ordered him to "fix them
up" since it was already getting on towards noon. Borja herded the other men of the hacienda
inside the bodega, where they were guarded by Benavides who was armed with a grease-gun,
and Fustigo, with a pistol.

Now the men surrounded Gancayco in front of the office. Balimbing accused Gancayco of killing
Balimbing's cousin, and demanded that Gancayco produce the .45 caliber pistol which he
claimed was used to perpetrate the death. Gancayco explained that it was not he but Solon
Demetrio who accidentally shot Balimbing's cousin, and that Gancayco had no such pistol.

Gancayco had insisted that he had no .45 caliber pistol. At this fateful moment, Pavia suddenly
 jerked his
his right hand
hand upward and
and fired point-blank with his .45 caliber
caliber pistol a
att Gancay
Gancayco.
co. Hit,
Gancayco stooped to holed the pit of his stomach and cried, "Aray ko po." Instinctively, he
stepped backward and was turning around when Demen, fired at him with a grease-gun. He ran
away in a crouching position towards the citrus plantation, while Demen, continued firing at him.
Then Demen, aimed rapid fire at Isorena, who fell flat on the balcony floor. Demen's line of fire
accidentaly caught de los Santos in the forehead.

 At the outburst

outburst of
of gunfire, Borja rushed
rushed out of
of the bod
bodega.
ega. He saw Gancayco
Gancayco runn
running
ing toward
towardss
the citrus plantation and he shouted: "Habulin! Habulin!" The men carrying their firearms gave
chase;

While the pursuers tracked their prey, Lanon left the bodega by the back door and went to
Gancayco's house. Mrs. Gancayco told him to close all the windows and take the children
downstairs, and he complied. Then he left the house and looked for Gancayco whom he found
in the abaca plantation, climbing a small hill towards another cluster of houses at the hilltop.
Lanon found Gancayco bleeding profusely in the breast.

Gancayco, his wife, and children, Isorena, and some other personnel of the hacienda, were able
to rendezvous at the seashore. They got into a waiting motorboat and sped away towards
 87

Tabaco, for en route, Gancayco died in the arms of his wife. His body was brought to Manila,
where it was examined and autopsied by the National Bureau of Investigation. Although
seriously wounded, Isorena survived. Dr. Casiano Flaviano, a resident Physician at the National
Orthopedic Hospital who treated Isorena testified that the latter would have died from his injuries
had he not received immediate medical attention.

While events unfolded on Tabaco Bay, the group of eight men reached the seashore and
chanced upon a motorboat but discovered that the motorboat did not have enough gasoline,
they looked for another and dragooned Bienvenido Taller into transporting them. Taller
observed that the eight men were excited and apprehensive. Balimbing told him, with some
braggadocio that they had just killed Gancayco and Isorena. The men alighted at the lighthouse
at Malinao and immediately afterwards, Taller reported to the police authorities of the town.

The eight men reached the poblacion of Malinao. Borja instructed Pavia and Demen, to make
their separate way towards Barrio Buragwis. Before he left with Demen, Pavia left his .45 pistol
with Balimbing. The remainder of the group boarded a passenger bus going to Tiwi.

 As the bus stoppe

stoppedd nea
nearr the market at Tiwi another
another car overtoo
overtookk it and policemen from Tabaco
Tabaco,,
headed by Chief of Police Ceferino Firaza, alighted and surrounded the bus. Firaza in a loud
voice called for the surrender of all those in the bus responsible for the killing at the Hacienda
San Miguel. He was suddenly fired upon by Borja and then by Balimbing. The fusillade hit him
on the right cheek, and he ordered his men to return fire. The encounter resulted in the death of
Balimbing and Oljina the capture of Benavides and de los Santos; and the escape of Borja and
Fustigo.

Subsequently, the rest of the band fell one by one into the hands of the law. Pavia, Demen,
Fustigo, were arrested, and Borja, the last one to fall, was captured on February 27, 1959 after
a nationwide manhunt.

The trial court found that conspiracy was "conclusively established" and that "the guilt of all the
accused has been established by proof above the shadow of doubt." It found that the killing of
Gancayco constitutes murder, while the shooting of Isorena constitutes frustrated murder. The
trial court held that either evident premeditation or treachery qualifies the crimes to murder and
frustrated murder; since the law requires only one qualifying circumstance, the other should be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.

The trial court found five aggravating circumstances against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides,
and de los Santos, to wit: (1) the crimes of murder and frustrated murder were committed by a
band, or with the aid of armed men; (2) means were employed to weaken the defense, wherein
is included taking advantage of superior strength; (3) craft, fraud and/or disguise were
employed; (4) there was promise of backpay in the commission of the crimes; and (5) there was
treachery or evident premeditation, depending upon whatever is used to qualify the crimes to
murder and frustrated murder.

The five accused contended that there were three mitigating circumstances in their favor: lack of
instruction;; fear of Pedro Borja; and lack of motive.
instruction m otive.

Issue: Whether the mitigating circumstances can be credited in favor of the five accused.

Held: No. We find no merit in this contention. The argument of lack of instruction is based on the
allegation that the five accused did not finish primary education. But the defense adduced no
 88

proof to establish the existence of this circumstance, leaving in full force the holding that
extenuating circumstances must be proven positively and cannot be based on mere deduction
or inference. If by "lack of instruction" the defense refers to illiteracy, it is not sufficient to
constitute
constitu te a m
mitigating
itigating circumstance,
circumstance, for there m
must
ust also be lack of intelligence.

The second mitigating circumstance advanced by the five accused is "awe and fear of Pedro
Borja." But the element of fear is not one of those enumerated as a mitigating circumstance
under the Revised Penal Code, Article 13. If the defense refers to the element of "uncontrollable
fear or duress" which is an exempting circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, Article 12,
the argument is still invalid, for it has been held that the element of duress should be based on
real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's life or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful, or
remote fear. We find no evidence to support the claim that Borja threatened any or all of the
other accused.

The third alleged mitigating circumstance is lack of motive. We are hard put to discuss this
contention because the Revised Penal Code, Article 13 does not include "lack of motive" as one
of the mitigating circumstances. Finally, the defense argues that "the undiplomatic attitude of
Gancayco and Isorena, bordering on provocation" should be considered as another mitigating
circumstance. This contention is not borne out by the evidence; on the contrary, it appears that
instead of being "undiplomatic", Gancayco was pacific, and he counselled Isorena that "the best
thing for us to do is to talk to them peacefully and follow them, whatever they want." (T.s.n. p.
1466). This leaves as the only remaining assertion of the five accused the claim that "the
alleged premeditated conspiracy to kill Gancayco was not clearly revealed in the records of the
case."

We find that the trial court correctly considered that either treachery or evident premeditation
qualifies the crime to murder, and hence the other alternative circumstance should be
considered as aggravating. We reject the contention of the five accused; for while it is true that
the aggravating circumstance of promise or reward was not alleged in the information,
nevertheless, it was proven during the trial, and therefore can be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance, though not a qualifying circumstance.

In the Brief for the defendant-appellant Pedro Borja, the defense contended that since a
separate trial was held for Borja, the trial court erred in rendering a single decision on which the
findings of facts respecting Borja, based on evidence adduced during his separate trial, are not
distinctively set forth, thereby prejudicially impairing Borja's substantial rights. We find no such
impairment of the rights of the accused. The evidence shows that the prosecution established
the same facts in the two separate trials. Isorena and Lanon testified as eyewitnesses to the
incident of December 19, 1958; de los Santos testified as an eyewitness not only to the same
incident, but also to events before and after the shooting, showing conspiracy among the
accused. Other persons testified in both trials to supply corroborating evidence.

Borja further contended that assuming his criminal liability, the trial court erred in appreciating
the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation; and the generic
aggravating circumstances of band or aid of armed men; use of means to weaken the defense;
craft, fraud, and/or disguise. This contention for the first part flies in the face of the evidence.
Treachery
by enemieswas
withpresent because
firearms, Gancayco
including was killed Thus,
two grease-guns. while he was unarmed,
Gancayco and surrounded
was deprived of any
means of defense while his enemies were exposed to no risk arising from the defense which the
 89

offended party might have made. True, Borja was inside the bodega when the shooting took
place; but his physical absence does not exonerate him, for it was he who ordered the
execution. Moreover, where there is conspiracy, treachery is considered against all the
offenders. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was sufficiently proved, for
prior to the shooting on December 19, 1958, the accused met in two secret conferences and
discussed the raid on the hacienda in order to avenge themselves by exacting redress from
Gancayco for allegedly killing Balimbing's cousin and bulldozing the camote plantations of
Balimbing's relatives.

However, Borja's contention for the second part is well taken. The defense argues that the
circumstance of band and aid of armed men, cannot be taken separately from the circumstance
of use of means to weaken the defense, and advantage of superior strength. It was correctly
pointed out that all these circumstances are absorbed in treachery and may not be considered
independently. It was also correctly pointed out that treachery absorbs the circumstance of craft,
fraud and disguise. Nonetheless, this leaves the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, which applies to all the accused; and the aggravating circumstance of promise of
backpay, which applies to all the accused, except Borja.

7. PEOPLE VS. PETENIA

CRIM REV Ar
Artiticl
clee 12, UNCONTROLLABE FEAR 

Case title:
tit le: THE P
PEOPLE
EOPLE OF THE L-51256 
G.R. No. L-51256 
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
plaintiff-appellee,, vs. EDITO
PETENIA y RODA, CARLO CASTAÑEDA y Date: Augu st 12, 198
1986
6 
SANTIAGO, defendants-appellants.

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:

•  Edito Petenia,
Petenia, Carlo Castaneda and Romeo Lugon were employees of the victim, victim , Bonifacia
Eustaquio Guanlao, in her factory located at No. 52, 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City.
•  Petenia and Lugon were factory helpers while Castaneda was the famil familyy driver.
•  A day or two prio
priorr to the incident in que
question,
stion, particularly
particularly on April 30
30,, 1978, Petenia,
Petenia, Castaneda
Castaneda
and Lugon planned among themselves to kill Mrs, Guanlao and rob her of valuables.
•  At about
about 9:00
9:00 o'clock in the morning of of May 1, 1978,
1978, while Mrs. GuaGuanlao
nlao was inside her bag
factory, Petenia approached the victim and covered the victim's mouth with his hand.'
•  As she struggled, she was hit with an adobe stone from behind
behind by Lugon. As the victim staggered
from the blow, Petenia delivered fistic blows on her. While the victim was lying mortally wounded
on the ground, Lugon hit her again on the head with the same adobe stone while Petenia got
another adobe stone and also hit the victim's head which caused her instantaneous death.
•  Simultaneously, Castaneda entered the victim's
victim 's house and cut the telephone wire. Thereafter, he
entered the victim's bedroom and took her handbag containing cash, jewelry and other valuables.
 90

  After killing the

• the victim,
victim , Lugon and Petenia carried the corpse to a corner of the factory and cocovered
vered
it with used bags to prevent detection.
  They then drove the Ford Fiera of
• of the victim as their get-away
get- away vehicle with Castaneda on the
wheels, abandoning it later at Tejeron Street, Makati Metro Manila.
  From there, the three proceeded to Pasay
• Pasay City where
wher e they
they boarded a JB Bus bound for Sorsogon.
They went later to Samar, from there to Tacloban Leyte and then to Barrio Tawagan, Oras,
Eastern Samar where they divided the loot.
  Later Petenia went to hide in Barrio Villa Alvarez, Balud, Masbate, while Castaneda
• Casta neda went 'to Barrio
Buenavista, Bacon, Sorsogon.
  Both Edito Petenia and
• and Carlo Castaneda assail
assail the decision
decision against them and
and submit
submi t that
that the
lower court erred (1) in not rejecting their
their extrajudicial confes
confessions
sions (Exhs. "E ", "G ", "G
"G-1
-1 ", " H ");
(2) in finding that the crime was committed in conspiracy; and (3) in not acquitting them of the
crime charged despite the presence of the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the existence of uncontrollable fear was proved.

HELD:

NO.

ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFE

CONFESSIO
SSION:
N:

The fundamental rule is that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved.

We have scrutinized the records and We have found no evidence whatsoever to justify the claim that the
extrajudicial confessions of the accused were extracted by force. There was no attempt to discredit the
same during the trial; neither did appellants challenge their admissibility on grounds that they were
extracted out of violence, torture or intimidation. Moreover, both appellants affirmed on the witness stand
the truth and voluntariness of their confessions.

ON CONSPIRACY:

With respect to the claim that the lower court erred in finding that the crime was committed in conspiracy,
suffice it to say that the circumstances under which the crime was committed show a single
si ngle purpose and
in unison with each act of the accused to the attainment of said purpose, clearly showing a concerted
intention to achieve a common goal. Edito Petenia in both his extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "E") and
testimony in court admitted his presence in the planning to kill the Victim He also admitted that he
delivered fistic blows on her while Romeo Lugon hit her with an adobe stone.

 Also in his cconfess

onfession,
ion, Petenia
Petenia declared that Castaneda participated
participated in the planning of the crime, the
truth of which he subsequently affirmed on the witness stand.
 91

 Appellants' extrajud
 Appellants' extrajudicial
icial confessio
confessions
ns and testimonies
testimonies categorica
categorically
lly pointing to each other'
other's
s actual
participation in the conspiracy and in the execution of the crime are accessible in evidence and worthy of
full credit.

ON THE PRESENC
PRESENCE
E OF IMP
IMPULSE
ULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLA
UNCONTROLLABL
BL E FEAR:

We come now to the last error imputed

im puted to the trial court, namely, that the appellan
appellants
ts committed the crime
crim e
"under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury." This defense does not deserve
serious consideration.

For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (a)
existence
existence of an uncontrollable
uncontrollable fear; (b) the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury
is greater than or at least equal to that committed.

Petenia categorically testified that Lugon did not have a knife at the time the crime was committed. He
declared that he delivered fistic blows on the victim because of his fear that Lugon and Castaneda might
hit him with hollow blocks. This is his testimony:

COURT:

 As a matter of fact it was Carlo Castaneda

Castaneda who testified who pointed to you a sharp p ointed
instrument that is why you did not participate in bumping the head of the victim?

 A. It is not true that the

there
re is a knife,
knife, your Hon
Honor.
or.

Q. How was you threatened by Carlo Castaneda?

 A. Tinakot
Tinakot po nila ako at baka bagsa
bagsakan
kan ng h
hollow
ollow blocks, yyour
our Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

It is not true that Carlo Castaneda was being threatened by a knife or sharp pointed instrument by
Romy?

 A. No,
No, your Honor.
Honor.

Q. As a matter of fact, they are very close friends with each other after this incident?

 A. Yes,
Yes, Your Honor.
Honor. (pp. 6-61,
6-61, tsn., June 22, 1
1978)
978)

Likewise, the claim of Castaneda that he cut the telephone connection at the victim's residence and
ransacked her bedroom because Lugon and Petenia "poked" a knife at him is incredible. If it was true
that he was threatened with a knife, Castaneda could have easily escaped from his companions when
 92

he was already at the house of the victim as he was by then no longer within their view. In fact this was
the first of a series of opportunities
opportunities for him to run away from them and to report
r eport the crime to the authoritie
authorities.
s.

The decision of the court a quo is in accord with the law and facts of the case. Independently of the
extrajudicial confessions involved (with their constitutional infirmities) it is clear from the admissions in
open court, from the circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused and the discovery of part of the
loot (including valuables) in their possession, that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

 Accordingly, the a
 Accordingly, appropriate
ppropriate penalty
penalty is death but in view of th
the
e lack of necessary
necessary votes tto
o impose it, We
are constrained to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

8. PEOPLE VS. ANTICAMARA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. A LBERTO ANTIC

ANTICAMARA
AMARA y CABILLO and
FERNANDO
FERNANDO CALAGUAS
CAL AGUAS FERNANDEZ
FERNANDEZ a.k.a. LANDO CAL AGUAS , appellants.||| 
CALAGUAS

For Murder (Criminal Case No. 4498-R)

That on or about the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San
Bartolome, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the
 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused accused,, being then
armed with a hand gun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior
strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take Sulpacio
 Abad, driver of
of th
the
e Estrellas,
Estrellas, hog tied (sic) him, brought (sic) to a secluded place
place,,
shoot and bury in a shallow grave, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the victim.

Contrary to Article 248,  Code.. 

248, Revised Penal Code

For Kidnapping/Serious
Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention (Criminal Case No. 4481-R)
4481- R)

That on oratabout
morning, the 7thCompound,
the Estrella day of MayBrgy.
2002,Carmen
more orEast,
less 3:00 o'clock in
Municipality of the early
Rosales,
Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, who are private persons, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with firearms, did then and there willfully,
AAA,   2 both employees of
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Sulpacio Abad and AAA, 
the Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty, all against their will for a
period of twenty-seven (27) days.

That in the course of the kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and buried in
Brgy. Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan and AAA was raped for several times by
her abductors.

Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised

the Revised Penal Code,
Code, in relation to
to  RA 7659.
7659. 

 As summarized in the People's brief, the facts as established

established by the evidence of the
prosecution are as follows: SIcEHC 
SIcEHC 
 93

 About 3 o'clock
o'clock in the early morning of May 7, 2002, hou
househelper
sehelper AAA and driver
 Abad Sulpacio were sleeping
sleeping in their employers' house located in Barangay
Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan. Their employers, Conrado Estrella and his
wife, were out of the house at that time (TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 4-7).
Momentarily, AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard voices saying, "We will
kill her, kill her now" and another voice saying, "Not yet!" Hiding under her
blanket, AAA later heard someone saying, "We only need money, we only need
money." Thereafter, she heard someone talking in Ilocano which she could not
understand. Then she heard somebody say, "Cebuana yan, Cebuana yan,
kararating lang galing Cebu."  AAA heard the persons conversing which she
estimated about four to five meters away (TSN, ibid., pp. 11-12).

Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later
identified as accused Dick Tañedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Tañedo, a certain Fred and
appellants Alberto Anticamara alias "Al Camara," and Fernando Fernandez alias
"Lando Calaguas." One of the intruders approached
appr oached her and told her not to move
(TSN, ibid., p. 8).

Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to
run but to her surprise, someone wearing a bonnet was watching her. Someone,
whom she later recognized as Dick Tañedo, tapped her shoulder. AAA asked
Tañedo, "Why Kuya?" Tañedo replied, "Somebody will die." After a brief
commotion, appellant alias "Lando Calaguas" asked the group saying, "What
shall we do now?" They then decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led
her outside the house. Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and
blindfolded, seated inside a vehicle (TSN, April 26, 2004, pp. 6-10).

The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers.
 AAA saw Cita Tañedo there. The group brought Abad outside the t he vehicle and
led him away (TSN, December 2, 2002, pp. 13-18; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp.
5-8).

Later, alias "Fred" returned telling the group, "Make the decision now, Abad has
already four
four bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl." When
W hen Cita Tañedo
made a motion of cutting her neck, appellant alias "Lando Calaguas" and "Fred"
boarded the vehicle taking along with them AAA. They later proceeded towards
San
houseMiguel
whereTarlac, where
they kept AAALando Calaguas
from May resided.
7 to May They(TSN,
9, 2002 stayed in Lando's
December 4,
2002, pp. 18-22; TSN, February 17, 2003, pp. 7-9).

On May 9, 2002, appellant Lando Calaguas told AAA that Fred and Bert Tañedo
would kill her. Lando then brought AAA to a hotel in Tarlac, telling AAA that he
would leave her there as soon as Fred and Bert Tañedo leave the place.
However, once inside the hotel room, appellant Lando Calaguas sexually
molested AAA. Lando told AAA to follow what he wanted, threatening her that
he would turn her over to Fred and Bert Tañedo. After Lando raped AAA, he
brought her back to his house. Later, Fred, Bert Tañedo and Lando Calaguas
transferred AAA to Riles, Tarlac (TSN, ibid., pp. 9-13). SacTAC
SacTAC  

 AAA was brought

brought to the residence
residence of Fred's
Fred's niece, a certain Minda, where Fred
kept AAA as his wife. At nighttime, Fred would repeatedly ravish AAA,
threatening her that he would give her back to appellant Lando Calaguas who,
 94

 AAA knew, killed Abad Sulpacio.

Sulpacio. She was afraid L
Lando
ando might also kill her (TS
(TSN,
N,
ibid., pp. 14-16).

On May 22, 2002, Fred brought AAA to Carnaga (should be Kananga), Leyte,
together with his wife Marsha and their children. AAA stayed in the house of
Marsha's brother Sito, where she was made as a house helper (TSN, ibid., p.
17).

On June 4, 2002, AAA escaped from the house of Sito. She proceeded to Isabel,
Leyte and sought the help of her friend Susana Ilagan. After hearing AAA's plight,
Susana called AAA's brother in
i n Cebu, who later fetched AAA in Isabel, Leyt
Leytee and
brought her to Mandaue City. When they arrived in Mandaue City, they
immediately reported the incident to the police authorities. On June 23, 2002,
 AAA executed
executed a Sworn Sta
Statement
tement

On August 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch
53, rendered its Decision, 
Decision, 4 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:

 A. Accused
Accused Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charge
charged
d for
insufficiency of evidence;

B. Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto

 Anticamara
 Antica mara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
as principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the the  Revised Penal Code.
Code.  Considering the presence of
aggravating
aggravatin g circumstance of pre-meditation
pre-meditation,, with no mitigating circumstance to
offset the same, the penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two (2)
accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto
 Anticamara
 Antica mara (Al CaCamara).
mara).

II. Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention:

 A) Accused
Accused Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence;

B) Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto

 Anticamara
 Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
as principal, of the crime of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention of the victim
 AAA as charged,
charged, defined and penalized
penalized under Article 267
267 of the Revised
the  Revised Penal
Code,, as amended by 
Code by  R.A. 7659
7659.. Considering that the victim AAA was raped
during her detention, the maximum penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon
the two accused, Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto
 Anticamara
 Anticamara (Al CaCamara).
mara).

 As to the rrest

est of the accused who are still at-large, let this case be sset
et to the
archives until they are apprehended.
SO ORDERED. 
ORDERED. 5 
 95

COURT OF APPEALS

The CA rendered a Decision dated December 15, 2006, affirming the decision of the
RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 4498-R and 4481-R. However,
How ever, in view of the abolition of the death
penalty pursuant to 
to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346,
9346, which was approved on June 24, 2006, the
appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
On January 9, 2007, Lando, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), appealed the
Decision of the CA to the Supreme Court.

SUPREME COURT

The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of
Sulpacio in the early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish
with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.   9  Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more
experience.
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the
combination of all circumstances
circums tances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
reas onable doubt.
10  A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
10  circumstantial evidenc
evidence
e can be sustained when tthe he
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. 
perpetrator.  11
11  STHAaD 
STHAaD 
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed
and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for
the death of Sulpacio. The Court quotes with approval the lower court's enumeration of those
circumstantial
circumstant ial evidence:
evidence:

The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:

1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim
 Abad Sulpacio were sleeping
sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay
Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to rob the place;

2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and
Dick Tañedo, and heard the latter uttering "somebody will die";

3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she
saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied;

4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Tañedo, Lando Calaguas,
Marvin Lim, Roberto Tañedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred;

5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio
Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;

6.
theThe last time
vehicle tim
byeLando,
that she saw Marvin
Fred, Abad Sulpacio was when
and Al upon he was
reaching Sitiodragged
Rosalia.out
Atfrom
that
time Dick Tañedo stayed with her in the vehicle;
 96

7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic):
"Make a decision now. Abad has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one
left is for this girl."  12  
girl." 12

In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred
utter   "Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan." (Our agreement is that
whoever comes our way should be eliminated) . Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde
testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming
his companions
companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones w ho took AAA and Sulpacio
from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the
authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body,
prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on
various parts of the body of the victim
vic tim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim's
vi ctim's
death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found
wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also
found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the
prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the
house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he
was repeatedly shot and buried.
Conspiracy  
Under Article 8 of the 
the   Revised Penal Code
Code,, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred
from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when
taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of
conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. 13  13  To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take
part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks
which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to
achieve
achie ve their common crimi
criminal
nal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation
particip ation of each of
of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 
principals.  14 
14 cEDIAa 
cEDIAa 
In the present case, prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing
field in Carmen, Pangasinan and discussed
discussed their plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with
the agreement that whoever comes their way will be eliminated.  15   Appellant
eliminated.  15 Appellant Al served as a
lookout by posting himself across the house of the Estrellas with the task of reporting any
movements
movemen ts outside. Fred then climbed the old unserviceable
unserviceable gate of the Estr ella compound
and then opened the small door and the rest of the group entered the house of the Estrellas
opening.  16 
through that opening.  16  After
After almost an hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle
with AAA and Sulpacio. AAA and Sulpacio were brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. Brg y. San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan. In that place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA was brought to another
place and deprived of her liberty. These circumstances establish a community of criminal
design between the malefactors in committing the crime. Clearly, the group conspired to rob
the house of the Estrellas and kill any person who comes their way. The killing of Sulpacio
was part of their conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming himself with a gun constitutes direct
evidence of a deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.

 Appellantt Al attempts to evade

 Appellan evade criminal liability by alleging
alleging that he was ononly
ly forced to
participate in the commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened to be
killed. Al's defense fails to impress us. Under Article 12 17 17   of the
the   Revised Penal Code,
Code ,  a
 97

person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force,
or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person
does not act with freedom. 18 
18  To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must
establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. 
committed.   19 
19 
For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent
and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
enough. 20 
serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.  20 

There from
under duress
under is nothing in the records
his co-accused whileto substantiate
participatin
participating appellant
g in the cri
crime Al's would
me that insistence that
suffice to he was
exempt
him from incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout
and directed to station himself across the house of the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m.
to 1:00 a.m.  21  of the following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the landing field.
a.m. 21
Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to
a real, imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across the house of the
Estrellas for almost six (6) hours, 22 22   and thereafter returned to the landing field where the
group was waiting for his report. Subsequently, the group proceeded to the Estrellas' house.
When the group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his
companions. Later, when the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in going
to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and
 AAA.  23
 AAA. 23  Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished to, but he never
did. Neither did he request for assistance from the authorities or any person passing by the
house
hou setoofperform
effort the
t he Estrella
Estrellas
s during
an overt act the period he was
to dissociate stationed
or detach there.
himself Clearly,
from Al did not to
the conspiracy make any
commit
the felony and prevent the commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal
liability.  24
liability. 24  Therefore, it is obvious that he willingly agreed to be a part of the conspiracy.

PREVEN
VII. PREVENTED
TED BY SOME LAWFUL
L AWFUL OR INSUPERABL
INSUPERABLEE CAUSE

1. U.S. VS. VICENTILLO

CRIM REV Ar
Artiticl
clee 12, INSUP
INSUPERABL
ERABL E OR L AWFUL CAUSE 

Case tit le: US vs. VICENT

 VICENTILLO
ILLO G.R. No. L-6082

Date: March 18, 1

1911
911

DOCTRINE: This is a felony by omission. The failure of a policeman to deliver the prisoner lawfully
arrested to the judicial authorities within the prescribed period because it was not possible to do so with
practicable dispatch as the prisoner was arrested in a distant place would constitute a non-performance
of duty to an insuperable cause.  

FACTS:

•  The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crim
crimee of
of "illegal and
arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay
 98

a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs
of the trial.
•  Three days were expended in the detention,
detention, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the
time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality,
and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was
necessary to take a long journey by boat.
•  The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded
forwar ded
first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial
on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written complaint, which was intrusted to the
policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the
prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof
we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local conditions,
changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of
record, made the journey by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and
sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.

ISSUE:

Failing to perform an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause

HELD:

•   It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to
see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his
trial, but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused
the arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance
of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises.
•   The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial
triv ial nature
nature of the offense for which the arrest was
made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community
where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the
absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all
the evidence on this point that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful
violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and
send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to
convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were supreme, even in the
absence
absen ce of the local m
municipal
unicipal judicial officers.
•   We are of opinion that under all the circumstances
circum stances of this case there can be no doubt of the
lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make
arrest of the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention.
•   As we understand
understand the evidence, the alleged offense with which the compl
complaining
aining witness in this
case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must
be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without
warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472)
•   The judgment
judgm ent of the lower court convicting
convicti ng and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and
he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances
de oficio. So ordered.

2. PEOPLE VS. BANDIAN

People
People vs. Josefina Bandi an
 99

G.R. No. 45186 | Septemb er 30, 1936

Diaz, J.

FACTS:

Josefina Bandian, appellant herein, was charged with the crime of infanticide.

 At about
about 7 am
am January 31, 193
1936,
6, Valentin
Valentin Aguilar,
Aguilar, the appellant
appellant's
's neigh
neighbor,
bor, saw th
the
e appe
appellant
llant go
to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature
because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later,
he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and
back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid
and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her
house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house,
what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be
alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who
lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage
which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw
the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few
moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the
appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which had just been shown to her was
hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.

Upon being notified of the incident at 2pm in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno,
president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house
and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly
under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question
declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she
threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man,
Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but
of another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his
conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when
he went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.

The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose
testimony was not corroborated
corroborated but, on the contra
c ontrary,
ry, was
w as contrad
contradicted
icted by the v ery witnesse
witnessess for
the prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the
lower court furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General,
however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be guilty
only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the
abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.

No evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the
wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals,
the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of infanticide?
 100

RULING:
NO. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or
consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even
in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits
them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be
conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.

The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way
or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had
no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, whi ch
was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her
married life with Kirol — she considers him her husband as he considers her his wife — began a
year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed
from the beginning, affirming such belief
belief when he testified at tthe
he trial, that the child carried by
b y the
appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the
birth of the child. The appellant,
appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy
pregnancy to Kirol.

If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano
Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's
house after the appellant had left the place, staggering,
stagg ering, without strength to remain
rem ain on her feet and
very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her house and to lie
in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and
conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the appellant denied having made any admission
to said physician and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This
illness and her extreme
extrem e debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage
which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being
then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the
inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis
Kirol —  a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day —  is uneducated and could
supplant with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach her,
undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not
occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered
lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal
Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it
abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.

The
to her,acttoperformed
respond tobycall
theofappellant in the morning inthe
natur e, notwithstanding
nature, question,
fact thatby going
she had into
fev
feverthe
er forthicket,
a long according
time, was
perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same
place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because
it all happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).

Instigation and Entrapment

1. U.S. VS. PHELPS

 101

THE UNITED
UN ITED STA
STATES
TES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs. 
JAMES O. PHELPS (alias PHILIPS), defendant-appellant. 
G.R. No. L-5728, 11, 1910  
L- 5728, August 11,
TRENT, J. 

DOCTRINE : When an employee of the Government, as in this case, and according to his own
testimony, encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such
conduct is most reprehensible.  

FACTS: 

PROSECUTION’S VERSION 

- Homer G. Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, testified that the first time he
ever saw the accused Phelps was in the international Saloon in Jolo in the month of April, 1909;
that at the time, while two or three men were sitting together in the said salon, he heard the
accused Phelps  say that he on some occasions like to smoke opium; that a few hours after
leaving the saloon he asked the accused if he smoked opium, and the accused answered "yes,"
that he smoked sometimes; that he knew then that it was his duty to watch the accused, that he
then asked the accused what opportunities he had for smoking opium, and the accused replied,
"good opportunities;" he then said to the accused, "I wish to smoke opium."  

- On the invitation of the accused Phelps he looked him up that night and was told that he (the
accused) was not able to prepare a room for smoking, as the Chinamen were afraid, and asked
the witness to see him the following night; that he saw him the following night, and accused again
said that he could not find a suitable place; that they made another agreement to meet and at that
time they went together to a certain house in the barrio of Tulay, where a certain Chinaman (this
Chinaman was charged in criminal case No. 292 in said court) had prepared the opium and pipe
for smoking; that the accused gave the Chinaman P2, and he (the witness) gave him P1 in
payment for the preparation of the pipe which was prepared for smoking he took the pipe and the
pan containing the opium and went directly to the justice of the peace and swore out a warrant
for the arrest of the accused and the said Chinaman.  

DEFENSE’S VERSION  

- The defendant, J. O. Phelps, a man 30 years of age, testified that Smith, who was then going
under the name of Lockwood, came to his house one night in Jolo and said that he was
accustomed to smoking opium and asked him (the accused) if he knew of any Chinaman in the
town who could assist him in obtaining opium to smoke; that he answered Smith that he did not;
that Smith then asked him if the Chinaman (the one charged in criminal case No. 292), who was
the accused's servant, could look for someone to furnish him (Smith) with a pipe until he became
acquainted in town; 

- That on the following night the witness Smith came again to his house, and after being there
about twenty (20) minutes became very nervous, saying that it was necessary for him to have
some opium; that he told him (Smith) to go to the hospital, and received the reply that he (Smith)
was working for the quartermaster and was looking for a position as clerk, and that they probably
would not give him this position if they learned that he was an opium smoker that he again asked
to have the Chinaman assist him, and he (the accused) believing that he (Smith) was acting in

good
Smithfaith
 wentand washouse
to the really of
sick,
the told the Chinaman
Chinaman in Tulay,towhere
do so;the
that by agreement
Chinaman andthe
prepared thepipe
witness
and
gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving the Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left, without the
accused noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the accused) was arrested about forty
 102

minutes later, and that he called for the doctor to examine him about one and half hours after he
left the Chinaman's house.  

- The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on every material point, stating that
he, after repeated demands made by Smith, did prepare some opium in a pipe and give it to
Smith. 

- The chief of police of Jolo , a sergeant in the United States Cavalry, who arrested the accused
and the Chinaman, testified that when he made these arrests the Chinaman and the accused did
not have an opportunity to talk together before they went to the justice of the peace where the
preliminary investigation was held.  

- Doctor De Kraft , of the United States Army, was called by the accused himself and made an
examination of the accused about an hour and a half or two hours after he left the Chinaman's
house. The doctor testified that the accused was strong, robust man, and a man presenting no
appearance of an opium smoker. On being asked by the court whether or not he could state
positively if the accused had used any opium on that day, the witness answered, "I as sure that
he did not use any opium on that day."  

CHARGE: Violation of Act No. 1761 

CFI OF JOLO, MORO PROVINCE: Guilty as charged  

ISSUE: Whether accused Phelps, who allegedly smoked opium based on the sole testimony of
Smith, should be held liable for violating Act No. 1761.  

ACT NO. 1761 - AN ACT GRADUALLY

GRADU ALLY T
TO
O RESTRICT
RESTRI CT AND REGULATE THE SALE AND
USE OF OPIUM PENDING THE ULTIMA
ULTIMATE
TE PROHIBITION
PROHIBITION OF THE IMPORT
IMPORTATION
ATION OF
OPIUM INTO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS IN WHWHAATEVER FORM EXCEPT FOR
MEDICINAL PURPOSES AS PROVIDED BY THE ACT OF CONGRESS APPROVED MARCH
THIRD, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIVE, AND PROHIBITING ANY PERSON FROM
HAVING
HAV ING THE
THE POSSESSION OF OPIUM, COCAINE, OR ALPHA OR BETA
BETA EUCAINE IN ANY
OF THEIR SEVERAL FORMS, OR ANY DERIVATIVE
DERIVATIVE OR PREPARATION
PREPARATION OF ANY OF SUCH
DRUGS OR SUBSTANCES,
SUBSTANCES, EXCEPT FOR MEDICINAL PURPOSES, AND TO REPEAL
 ACT NUMBERED FOURTEEN
FOURTEEN HUNDRED
HUNDRED AND
AND SIXTY-ONE,
SIXTY-ONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 
OTHER PURPOSES

HELD: NO. The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold or had in his possession
any opium, neither does it contend that he had in his possession any of the prohibited
paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only charged with having smoked opium this one
time in the house of the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony
of the witness Smith, who was an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in
that capacity in Jolo.  

xxx If he had, by these means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession
either opium or any of the prohibited paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable,
since the mere possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the
law within itself. 

xxx But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these
things. According to the statements made by the witness Smith, he not only suggested the

commission of this
and would pay crime,
his part but expense
of the he (Smith) also states
necessary forthat he desired toofcommit
the commission the same
the prohibited offense
act.  
 103

Such conduct on the part of a man who is employed by the Government for the purpose of taking
such steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the offense and which would tend to
the elevation and improvement of the defendant,
defendant, as a would-be criminal, rather than further his
debasement, should be rebuked rather than encouraged by the courts; and when such acts as
those committed by the witness Smith are placed beside the positive testimony of the defendant,
corroborated by the Chinaman and the doctor, the testimony of such witness sinks into
insignificance and certainly does not deserve credit. When an employee of the Government, as
in this case, and according to his own testimony, encourages or induces persons to commit a
crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible.
r eprehensible. We desire to be understood
that we base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness Smith and the incredibility of his
testimony on his own acts according to his own testimony.  

We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is not guilty of this crime . The
 judgment of the lower
lower court is reversed and the appellant
appellant acquitted,
acquitted, with costs oficio.  
costs de oficio.

2. PEOPLE VS. LUA CHUA AND UY SE TIENG

TIENG

CRIM
CRIM REV Art
Articl
icl e

Case title: G.R. No. G.R. No. 34917

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Date: September 7, 193

1931
1
vs
vs.. LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG

DOCTRINE:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons
into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to
prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission.
Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and
the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will
not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of
the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no defense
to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such
agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny
is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of
liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases
holding the contrary.

FACTS:
 104

-  The d defendants
efendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal appeal from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu convicting them of the illegal importation of opium, and sentencing them each
to four years' imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the proportional costs.
-  About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his his
correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium.
-  About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customscustom s secret servic
service
e of Cebu, Juan Samson,
had returned from a vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of customs for the
Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and the latter, after a short conversation, asked
him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the secret service told him he had spent
P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a drawer in his table, the amount of P300, in
paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will arrive shortly,
and you will soon be able to recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money,
left, and put it into the safe in his office to be kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer
of Cebu. A week later, Natividad called Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred
to consisted of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and that the owner would go to Samson's
house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house and told him he had
come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The said accused informed Samson
that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had agreed to pay Natividad
P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October
awaiting a ship that would go direct to Cebu.
-  At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one one Nam Tai loaded on the
steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera Filipina — a shipping company in Cebu had had
built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About the same date
Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already been put on board the steamship
Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson would receive P2,000, Natividad
P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in the
customhouse.
-  Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews
interv iews with Samson. Towards the end of November,
Natividad informed the latter that the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on account of
certain engine trouble, and remained there until December 7th. In view of this, the shipper
several times attempted to unload the shipment, but he was told each time by the captain, who
needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and the 30 cases remained on
board.
-  The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. Whil While
e he was
examining the manifests, Samson detailed one of his men to watch the ship. After conferring

with to
and Natividad, theSe
require Uy latter instructed
Tieng him to
to pay over thedo everything
P6,000. On thepossible
morningto have the cargo
of November unloaded,
16, 1929,
Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had the papers ready to withdraw the cases
marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it would be better for Uy Se
Tieng to go to his house to have a talk with him.
-  Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's
Samson's house that night and was told that he must pay o over
ver the P6,000
before taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading
and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we see whether we can take the money to you
tomorrow." The following day Samson informed Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary, of all
that had taken place, and the said colonel instructed the provicial commander, Captain
Buenconsejo, to discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and
Samson agreed to meet at the latter's house that same night.
-  That afternoon Samson
Samson went to the office of thethe provincial
prov incial fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal,
and asked for a stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy Se Tieng
that night in the
stenographer presence
available, of Captain
Samson Buenconsejo.
got one Jumapao,As the law
of the fiscalfirm
didofnot have a good
Rodriguez & Zacarias, on
the recommendation of the court stenographer. On the evening of December 17, 1929, as
agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer went to Samson's
 105

house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which hung from the
window overlooking the entrance to the house on the ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy
Se Tieng arrived, Samson asked him if he had brought the money. He replied that he had not,
saying that the owner of the opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold him
to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to Samson's house.
-  After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng
Tieng a back door
door entrance into the garden, he asked him where the
opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the cases numbered 11 to 18, and that
there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that night accompanied by his
codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man from
Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy were also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when
he was going to get the opium, and the latter answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of
that.
-  On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered, no, but promi promised
sed to deliver
deliver it
when the opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation, which was taken
down in shorthand, Samson took the accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow,
why didn't you tell me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered:
"Impossible, sir; you were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson
how he had come to bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday
when the collector called me aside and said there was good business, because opium brought a
good price, and he needed money." All this conversation was overheard by Captain
Buenconsejo. It was then agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock
next morning.
-  At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se
Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who
had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers,
which consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and B-1), and in invoice written in Chinese
characters, and relating to the articles described in Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng
and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and
Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him.
-  In the pocket ofof a coat hanging on
on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five
letters written in Chinese characters relating to the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain
Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary headquarters, and then went
to the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11 to 18,
they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of the opium
confiscated amounted to P50,000.
-  In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu and asked

him to tell itthe

"Captain, truth as to ask
is useless whome
wasany
thequestions,
owner of the
for Iopium.
am notLua Chutoanswered
going answer toas follows:
them. The only
thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to
bring it in here without the knowledge of those — " pointing towards the customhouse.
-  The ddefense
efense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan o off P200 from Uy
Se Tieng, he induced him to order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to
P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make a good deal of
money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that
there would be no danger, because he and the collector of customs would protect him;
-  that Uy Se TiengTieng went to see Natividad,
Nativ idad, who told him hehe had no objection, if Samson a agreed;
greed;
that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after
he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the name of Natividad, and
demanded the payment of P6,000;
-  that Uy SeSe Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent cancellicancelling
ng the order, but the latter
answered that theit;opium
to let him unload had already
that when been
the opium loaded
arrived, and theinsisted
Samson captainupon
of thethe
Kolambugan
payment ofrefused
the
P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of
December 14th, and proposed that he participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept
 106

Uy Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the opium had passed the
customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of December 17th, because
Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu
personally promised to pay him that amount.

ISSUE/S:

-  w/n the appellants are liable for illegal importion

importi on of opium

HELD:

•  But the defendants' principal

princip al defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the
opium in question. Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction
of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out. A public official who induces a
person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps necessary to seize the
instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having obtained the profit he had in
mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug,
but that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug,
leaving only its introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and
he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure the
seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.
•  As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-
defendants-appellants
appellants
to import the opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding
with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad — who had promised them that he would
remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the customhouse was
concerned — not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the
better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.
There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the
Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an
innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to
catch a criminal.
•  Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that that the chief of the customs secret
service pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the
customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its
importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction
conviction of the latter.

3. PEOPLE VS. YUTUC

CRIM RE
CRIM REV V Articl e 12 (e
(entr
ntr apment v insti gation)  
Case
Ca se title: People v Estanislao Yutuc G.R. No. 82590
Ponente: Bid in, J.  Date: July
Jul y 26, 1990
DOCTRINE:
In entrapment,
entrapment, the crime had alrea
already
dy been comm itted, while in inst igation, it was not and co uld
not have been
been com mitted were it not for th e insti gation of th e pea
peace
ce officer.
FACTS:
 Accused was cha
charged
rged with violat
violation
ion of
of Sec. 4, Art. II, of RA
RA 6425
6425 (The Dan
Dangerous
gerous Drugs
Drugs Act of
1972)
 107

The accused was arrested by 2 Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Soldiers on Dec. 2, 1986 at Brgy.
Tinajero, Bacolor, Pampanga, allegedly for selling dried marijuana leaves in the amount of P50 to one
of them, Sgt. Juanito de la Cruz. Accused was 17 at the time of the arrest.
 Although
 Although arrested
arrested on Dec.
Dec. 2, 1986
1986 it was n
not
ot until January
January 9, 1
1987
987 or more than one month after
his arrest that the information was filed. This was right after the accused’s mother filed a petition for
habeas corpus, the filing of the information rendered the petition for habeas corpus moot and
academic.
Upon arraignment accused pleaded NOT guilty.
Sgt. Juanito de la Cruz testified that at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1986, a
Buy Bust Operation team was organized by Operation Officer Capt. Honorio Tomas in view of an
informant's (identity undisclosed) report of an on-going drug trafficking in Barrio Tinajero, Bacolor,
Pampanga. Sgt. Juanito de la Cruz, member of the Philippine Army, Narcotics Command, was to act as
poseur-buyer and was given marked money in the total sum of P50.00 consisting of two (2) P20.00 and
one (1) P10.00 bills. Upon arrival at the scene of the incident at 3:00 o'clock p.m., the civilian informer
introduced De la Cruz to the accused as a friend of said informer. De la Cruz offered to buy P50.00
worth of marijuana from the accused. Accused went to a corner at the back of a house and came back
bringing with him the marijuana dried leaves contained in one (1) plastic bag measuring one-half foot in
length and four (4) inches in width and which approximately weighed eighteen (18) grams. The accused
gave De la Cruz the marijuana and the latter in turn proffered the P50.00 marked bills. De la Cruz
wiped his face with a handkerchief as a pre-arranged signal to his companions to arrest the accused,
which they did. Accused's companion who was with him all the time was able to scamper and ran away
but accused himself was brought to the Police Station at Bacolor, Pampanga where the arresting team
had him blottered and searched. They found the marked money in accused's possession. The
apprehending officers brought the accused to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where they took
accused's fingerprints and prepared a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report.
Sgt. Eufronio Sapad, Jr. who apprehended the accused corroborated Sgt. de la Cruz's statements
to the effect that he saw the accused deliver the marijuana and De la Cruz gave the P50.00 marked
bills. At Camp Olivas, the accused underwent custodial investigation without having been informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be informed of such rights and was made to
sign a Receipt of Property Confiscated/Seized (Exhibits "A" to "A-3") consisting of the 18 grams
marijuana dried leaves and the P50.00 marked bills, a Waiver of Detention under Art. 125, RPC.
On the other hand, the defense presented the accused Estanislao Yutuc as its lone witness, who
estified that he is 18 years of age having been born on May 7, 1969, single, is a helper of his mother
and a resident of Tinajero, Bacolor, Pampanga since birth. On that fateful day of December 2, 1986 at
about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at the road near their house at Tinajero, Bacolor,
Pampanga about to pay P230.00 for the rice which his mother purchased at the store located near their
house. The money given to him by his mother to pay the rice consisted of two (2) P50.00 bills; five (5)
P20.00 bills; and three P10.00 bills. Prior to the intended payment, a person approached him and
inquired about a person whose name he forgot. He denied any knowledge of said person. Another
person arrived and they exchanged signals to each other. Then PC soldiers came. The first person who
inquired ran away and the soldiers handcuffed him. C2C Oscar Imperial manacled him. He asked
Imperial the reason for shackling him but the officer refused to say anything. His aunt came, held him in
the arms and asked the PC soldiers why they put handcuffs on the accused and brought him with them.
The PC soldiers did not answer her questions but simply drew their guns. He felt frightened and his
aunt released him from her hold. He was made to board a car and sat in the middle of two (2) persons.
The PC soldiers were in civilian clothes and inside the car, he was beaten and boxed several times all
over his body by said soldiers. He was brought to the Municipal Building of Bacolor, Pampanga and
was subjected to interrogation concerning the sale of marijuana and his personal circumstances. He
denied having anything to do with a marijuana. Later, he was brought to Camp Olivas but while they
were on the way, apprehending officers Villaruz, Sapad, Imperial, De la Cruz and Baking hit him and
boxed himagain
away and several
hetimes.
deniedWhile being maltreated,
knowledge theyThey
of said person. asked him the
boxed himname of thesuch
for giving person who ran
response. At the
NARCOM Office, Camp Olivas, Imperial, De la Cruz and Sapad kicked him and he was thrown by the
impact of the assault. He was made to sign Exhibits "A", "B" and "D" under threats to kill him if he would
 108

not sign them. Because he could not read the documents presented to him, he asked the soldiers to
read the documents to him, and they replied that he was just a "nobody" to make such a request.
Fearful of his life, he gave in and involuntarily signed said papers without having been informed of the
contents thereof and without the assistance of counsel in violation of his constitutional rights.
The trial cour t conv icted the a accused
ccused of the crim e charged  hence the instant appeal

ISSUE/S:
-  Whether or not the accused was guilty of violation of RA 6425

HELD:
•  NO. The court gave credence to the testimony
testim ony of the accused.
•  A meticulous scrutiny of the records discloses that the testim
testimonies
onies of the prosecution witnesses
are not only fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions but the actions of the police officers
in question indisputably show a callous disregard of the Constitution and of the law which would
amount to a mockery of justice to impress on their actions the presumption of regularity and on
their testimonies with honesty and good faith.

•  Undeniably, the prosecution witnesses Sgts. De la Cruz and Sapad, committed a criminalcrimi nal act, a
plain violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, if not plain arbitrary detention (Article
124 of the same Code). In fact, Sgt. Sapad admitted in open court that he was aware that the
detention of the accused was in violation of the Revised Penal Code.
•  The documents were signed by the accused during custodial investigation
investigati on without the
assistance of counsel. He was not informed of his constitutional right to silence and obviously
under threats of violence and intimidation upon his person. He might have been informed of his
right to counsel but not that he may be provided with one if he cannot afford the services of
counsel. More than that, if it can be assumed that he waived said right, the waiver was not in
writing and not in the presence of counsel. In any event, this Court ruled that the written
instruments are declaration against interest and tacit admission of the crime charged, since
mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. These documentary
evidence is in the same category as extra-judicial confessions outlawed by the Constitution.
•  There is, therefore, no question that the admissions
admissi ons of the accused were taken without strict
observance of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution which provides in no uncertain terms
that "Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."

  convict
The evidence as to whether
him beyond or not
reasonable not Yutuc
doubt. Butparticipated
particip ated he
assuming in the
did sale of marijuana
sell, there remainsisthe
notissue
enough
of to
whether he was induced to sell or was merely entrapped into looking for marijuana to sell.
  Sgt. Juanito
• Juanito de la Cruz narrated that he approached the accused who was with one Arnel
Garcia and told him "iiscore ako ng marijuana," meaning, he will buy marijuana. The accused
then allegedly went inside a street at the back of a house and came back bringing along with
him the marijuana for which he (Sgt. de la Cruz) paid the marked P50.00 (Hearing, September
16, 1987, TSN, pp. 32 to 41).
  On the other hand, Sgt. Sapad on cross examination admitted that because of the verbal report
•

of the informant, he already had a pre-conceived notion, a prejudgment that there really was
illegal sale of drugs in Tinajero and that accused was selling marijuana. He admitted further that
he and his companion practically induced the suspect into the commission of the offense. He
testified as follows:
"Question: Without you having been a buyer or your companion having been a buyer, you would agree
with me that
 Answer: Yes,there
Yes, sir. would not have been a charge against the accused, is that correct?
Question: In other words, you induced practically the suspect into commission of an offense, is that
 correct? Answer: Yes, sir.
109

Question: Mr. Witness, you have been in investigation for so long. I am asking you a very important
question, which may redound to the future of this poor boy: — you do not know the difference between
the instigation and entrapment, as an investigator, is that correct?
 Answer: No, sir.
Question: As a matter of fact, that was not even a subject of your seminar or any other training before
you undergo raiding like this?
 Answer: I do no know that, sir.
Question: In short, you instigated the commission of the crime?
 Answer: Yes,
Yes, sir."

•  It is quite clear that Sgt. de la Cruz suggested the commission of the crim
crime
e by o
offeri
ffering
ng th
the
e
accused P50 for the purchase of the prohibited drug which was not even in the possession of
the accused. Otherwise stated, Sgt. de la Cruz instigated the accused to look for marijuana
which he (Sgt. de la Cruz) would buy or pay for P50. When an employee of the government, as
in this case, encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such
conduct is most reprehensible (U.S. vs. Phelps, 16 Phil. 440, as cited in People v. Lapatha
[supra]). Clea
Clearly,
rly, there was insti gation in the case a
att bar and the defendant is entitled to
acquittal.

•  In any
any event therefore, the issue as to wh ether or not th e te
testim
stim onies of the pros ecution
witn esse
essess could b e be
believed,
lieved, is imm ate
aterial
rial as a
against
gainst the fact that instig ation transpi red
in th e case at bar and not entrapment, in w hich case the a accused
ccused wo uld h ave to be
acquitted.

NB: Entrapment v Instigation:

"In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law
breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and himself becomes a
co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction, while in instigation, the defendant
would have to be acquitted."

In another case, this Court ruled further that entrapment must be distinguished from inducement or
instigation wherein the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is lured
into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. In entrapment, the crime had
already been committed,
for the instigation while officer.
of the peace in instigation,
  it was not and could not have been committed were it not