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    Kitcher82 Chap2believing PDF

    Uploaded by

    Leonardo Garay

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 13
    2 Believing Where We Cannot Prove Opening moves Simple distinctions come all to easly. Frequently we open the way for later puslement by restricting the options we take tobe available So, for example, in contrasting scence and religion, we often operate ‘with a simple pair of categories, On one side there is scence, pool and certiny; on the othe, religion, conjecture, and faith “The opening lines of Tennyson's In Memoriam offer an eloquent statement ofthe contrast ‘Strong Son of God, immortal love, Whom we, that have not seen Thy face, By faith, and faith alone, embrace, Believing where we cannot prove, A prindpal heme of Tennyson's reat poem isis stroggle to manta {Bh inthe ace of what senna to be power acetic wince, Tennyson lad read » popular work by Robert Chambers, Vege the Mural Hy of Geton, aod be was grey toed by the account ofthe course off on cath hat the bok conan enero ‘evel an eying to bleve where canoe prove aa bated ty the though thatthe proof may be agin him Like Tennyson, conternporry Creations accept the tational contraxe between idence and regen. it where Tennjon agonied, thoy aac, While they ar les eloquent they are sorely confident cf ther own token. They open thei onaught on evetonary theory by denying tha ta science In Te Doubled Wat Brin, Henry Mos chtacees evolutionary thary as alesning that Tange amounts of time are required fr evaluation to prodice “new inl” Ava raul, we dhoud noe expec to sce mic “new Kindo” emerging. Mortis comments, "Creationists intr insist that this belief isnot scientific evidence but only a statement of fith- The evolutionist seems 10 be saying, OF couse, we cannot really pov evolution, since this requires ages of time, and so, therefore, you should accee it a8 a proved fact of science! Creations regard this as an odd type of logic, which would be emtirely amacceptable in any other Reld of scence” (Morris 1974b, 161 David Watson makes a similar point in Comparing Darwin with Gallo: “So here is the diference between Darwin and Gallo: Galle seca demonstrable fat against afew words ‘of Bible poetry which the Church at that time had understood in an ‘obviously naive way: Darwin set an unprovable thor against eleven chapters of straightforward history which cannot be reinterpreted in ‘any satisfactory way” (Watson 1976, 46, "he idea that evlution is conjecture fait, or “palosophy” pervades (Creationist writings (Mortis 1974a, -8; Morris 1974b, 22,1725 Wysong 1976, 43-45; Gish 1978, 11-13, 26, 186; Wilder Smith 1981, 7-8) t 5 absolutely crucial to ther case for equal time for “scientific” Cre- Ationise. This pley has suceeded in winning importa adherents to the Creationist cause. AS he prepared to delend Arkansas law 590, Attomey General Steven Clik echoed the Creationist judgement “Evolution,” he said, “is just theory.” Salar words have been beard in Congress. Wiliams Dannemeyer, a congressman from California, ‘troduced bill co imi andng to the Smithsonian with the following ‘words “If the cheory of evolutn is just chat—a theory—and if that ‘theory canbe regarded asa religion -.. then it occurs to this Mesnber that other Members might prefer it noc to be given exclave of tp billing in our Nation's most famous museum but equal biling or perhaps no billing tall” In thei atempt t show that evolution is not sence, Creations receive help from the leas likely sources. Great sintss sometimes claim that certain facts about the past evolution of organisms ate “demonstrated” or “indubiable” (Simpson 1958, 70, 871; also Maye 1976, 9) But Creationists als can (and do) quote scientists who char- acterize evolution a “dogina” and contend that there sno conclusive proof of evolutionary theory (Matthews 1971, xi; Bich and Ehrlich 1969, $40; quoted in Gish 1979, 15-16; salar pasages are quoted in Moris 19F4a, 6-8, and in Wysong 1976, 44, Evolution is not pare of science because, at evolutionary biologists themselves concede fence demands proof, and, as other biologists point out, proof of ‘evolution s ne forthcoming. ‘The rest ofthe Creationist argument flows easly, We educate our children in evolutionary theory asific were a proven fact. We subscribe lca, in our schoo system, o one fith—an atheistic materialistic faith jgnoring rival belie. Amtrligious educators deform the minds of children, warping them to accept as gospel a doctrine that has no ‘more scienfc support than the tue Gospel. Te very least that should bbe done isto allow for both alternatives tobe presented, We should reject the Creationists’ gambit. Eminent scientists not withstanding, science isnot a body of demonsurated truths. Viewally all of science isan exercise in believing where we cannot prove. Yet, Scien conclusions are not embraced by faith alone, Tennyson's Aichotomy was too simple Incomes cence Sometimes we seem to have conclusive reasons for acepting a state- rent as trv. tis hard to doube that 2 + 2 = 4.1 unlike Lord else's eal mathematician, we do not find it obvious that dem Ve at least the elementary pats of mathematics appear to command out Agreement. The direct evidence of our senses seems equally compeling W-see the pen with which Tam writing, holding ic rely in my uundlouded view, how can doubt that it exist? The talented mathe- ‘matician who bas proved a theorem and the keen-eyed witness of an episode Furnish ovr ideals of certainty in knowledge. What they tll uk can be engraved in stone, for there is no cause for worry that it will need to be modified Yet, in another mood, one that scems “deeper” or more “phil sophical,” skeptical doubts begin to creep in. Ie there really anything ‘of which we ae 0 certain that later evidence could not give us reason to change our minds? Even when we think about mathematical proof, can we not imagine that ne discoveries may cat doubt on the eogeney ‘of our reasoning? (The history of mathematics reveals chat sometimes ‘what seems forall the world like a proof may havea fle conckaon,) Ts it not posible thatthe most careful observer may have missed something? Or that the witness brought preconceptions to the obser: ‘ation that sbi biased what was reported? Are we not ass alile? Tam milly sympathetic tothe skeptic’ wore. Compete certainty J best seen as an ideal toward which we sive and that is rarely if ever, attained, Conclusive evidence aways eludes us. Yet even if we ‘ignore skeptical complaint and imagine that we are sometimes lucky ‘nauigh to have conclusive reasons for accepting a claim as rue, we should not include scientific reasoning among ou paradigms of proof Fail i the hallmark of science “This point should not be so surprising. The trouble is that we fie~ _quenly forget it in discussing contemporary science. When we turn to the history of scence, however, our fllbiy stares us in the Face ‘The history of the natural sciences is strewn with the corpses of in ‘sicately organized theories, each of which ha in its day, considerable evidence in is favor. When we look at the confident defenders of those theories we should see anticipation of ouseves. The eightenth ‘century scientists who believed that heat isa “subtle hid," the atomic theorists who maintained that water molecules are compounded out fof ane atom of hydrogen and one of oxygen, the biochemists wo ientified protein as the genetic material, and the geologists who ‘houghe that continents cannot move were neither unintelgent nor informed, Given the evidence available to them, they were eminently reasonable in drawing ther conclasons History proved them wrong. Ie did not show that they were unjustified. ‘Why is science falible? Scientific investigation amas to dicloye the ‘general principles that govern the workings of the universe, These Principles are not intended merely to summarize what some slect, groups of humans have witnessed. Natural science i not ast natural Fistor. iis vastly more ambitious. Science offers us laws that are supposed to old universally, and it advances claims about things that are beyond our power to observe. The nuclear physicist who set down the law governing a particular type of radiactive decay i a. tempting toate a truth that holds throughout the entire cosmos and leo to deseribe the behavior of thing tht we cannot even see. Yet, ‘of necessity, the physicists ultimate evidence i highly retrcted. Like the rest of us, scientists are confined to a relatively small region of space and time and equipped with limited and imperfect senses. iow it science posible talP Hove are we able to have any com- fidence about th distant reyions ofthe cosmos and the invisible realm that lies behind the surfaces of ordinary thinge? The answer fy comn- plicated. Natural science fllows intricate and ingenious procedures far fathoming the secrets of the universe. Scientists devise ways of obtaining expedilly revealing evidence. They single oxt some ofthe things we are able to see as crucial us tothe way that nature works ‘These cuce are used to answer questions that cannot he addressed by direct observation, Scenic theories, even thote tha are most respected and most succssfil rest on idiect arguments from the ‘observational evidence. New discoveries can always call those argu Aig Whar We Cot Pre ‘ments into question, showing scimtsts thatthe observed data should bbe tnderstod in a diferent way, tha they have misread their evidence But scientist often forget the falibiity of their enterprise. This is not jastabsentnindednes or wishful thinking. During the heyday of ‘scent theory, 3 mich evidence may suppoe the theory, 0 many ‘observational cues may seem to atest to its truth, thatthe idea that it could be overthrown appear ldicrous In addition, the theory may provide ways of identying quicly whats inaccessible to our unaided fens. Hecron microscopes and cloud chambers are obvious examples of those extensions of our percepeal system that theories can inspire. “Trained biochemist wil talk quite natralyofseing large molecules, and itis easy to overtook the fact that they are presupposing a masive body of theory in deserbing what they "se." If that theory were to bbeamended,evenin sub ways, then the descripions ofthe “observed characterise” of large molecules might have to be given up. Nor should we pride ourselves thatthe enormous successes of contemporary science secre ut against fare amendments. No theory inthe history (of sence enjoyed a more spectacular career than. Newton's mechanics. Yet Newton's ideas had to give way to Einstein's "When practicing scents are reminded of these straightforward points, chy frequendy adopt what the philosopher George Berkeley falled a “orl skeptic.” From the dea of science ascertain and infallible, they jump toa cynical description of their endeavors, Science ie sometimes held tobe a game payed wih arbivary rules, aniratonal acceptance of dogma, an enterprise based ultimately on faith, Once ‘we have appreciated the faliiity of natural scence and recognized its sources, we ean move beyond the simple opposition of proof and faith. Between these extremes lies the vat fill of cases in which we believe something on the basis of good—even excellent—but inconchasve evidence. If we want eo emphasize the fact that what scents believe today ray have to be revised inthe light of observations made tomorrow, then we can describe all ovr science as “theory.” But the description should not confuse us. To concede tat evolutionary biology isa theory ie not to suppose that there ate alternatives to it that are equally worthy of place in our curicalm. All dheories are revisable, but not all theories are equal ven though our present evidence does not pros that eveitionary biology —or quantum physics, or plat econ, ‘or any other theory is tre, evolutionary bolts wil maintain that the present evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of their theory and ‘overwhelmingly against its supposed rivals. Their enthusiastic asserons that evolution ia proven fact can be charably understood as cans lng Whe Cant Pet 35 that the (admitedly inconclusive) evidence we have for evoltionary theory ib as good as we ever obtain for any theary in any field of ‘Hence the Creationist try for a quick Fools! Mate can easily be avoided. Creationists attempt to draw a line between evolutionary biology and the res of scence by remarking that large-scale evolution cannot be observed This tactic fais. Large-scale evolution i no more inaccessible to observation thin nvlear reactions oF the moleclar comp-siion of water. For the Creationists to succeed in divorcing ‘valutionary biology fom the rest of scence, they need argue that trolationary theory is less well supported by the evidence than are theories i, for example, physics and chemistry. Iwill come as no _sepise to learn that they try todo this To assess the merits ofthe Jnguments we needa deeper understanding of the log of nconclasve {jsficatin, We shall begin with a simple and popular idea! Sdentiic theories earn our acceptance by making successful predictions, Predictive sees Imagine that somebody puts forward a new theory about the origins of hay fever. The theory makes a number of starting predictions ‘oncering connections that we would not have thought worth i ‘egating, For example, ills ws that people who develop bay fever invariably secrete a particular substance in certain fatty tissues and that anyone who eats rhubarb as a child never develops hay fever “The theory predicts things that inially appear fantastic. Suppose that swe check up on these predictions and find that they are bor font by clinical tests. Would we not begin to believe--and believe ‘easonably —thae the theory was af let om the righ tack? “This example ilstrates& pattern of reasoning that is familiar in| the history of cence. Theories win support by producing claims about ‘what can be abserved, aims that would not have seemed plausible prior to the advancement ofthe theory, but that ae in fact found to be true when we make the appropriate observations. A cass real) cxample is Pascal’ confirmation of Torceli’s hypothesis that we lve atthe botiom of an ocean of air that presses down upon us. Pasa reasoned that if Toricel's hypothesis were tru, then air preseure Should decrease a higher aitudes (because at higher altudes we are closer to the “surface” ofthe atmosphere, so thatthe length ofthe ‘column of ar that presses down is shorterh Accordingly, he sen his Drother-in-aw to the top of 4 mountain to make some barometric ‘measurements, Pascal's clever working out of the observational pre= 36 olny Wee We Cnt Pee Aictions of Torticell’s theory led to dramatic predictive scces for the theory. “The ea of predictive sucess has encouraged a popular picture of science. (We shall see later that this pirure, while popular, i not teribly accurate) Philosophers sometimes regard a theory a5 a col lection of claims oF statements. Some of these statements offer gen- ctalizations about the Features of particaar,reeonlite things (genes, toms, gravitational force, quasars, and the lie) These statements are tused to infer statements whose truth oF faity can be decided by ‘observation, (This appears to be just what Pascal did) Staterens belonging to thi second group are called the cbeuatonal consequences ofthe theory. Theories are supported when we find that their ob servational consequences (hoe that we have checked) are rue. The Credentials ofa theory are damaged if we discover that some ofits ‘observational consequences are false. ‘We can make the idea more precise by being clearer about the inferences involved. Those who talk of infering observational pre

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