AT THE ORIGIN OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY. THE IMPACT OF SUAREZ METAPHYSICS IN KONIGSBERG Marco Sgarbi Separata de ANALES VALENTINOS Afio XXXVI 2010 Num. 71 VALENCIA 2010AT THE ORIGIN OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY, ‘THE IMPACT OF SUAREZ'S METAPHYSICS IN KONIGSBERG Por Marco Sgarbi* Abstract: The present paper aims to demonstrate how Suérez's in- fluence was decisive in Kénigsberg both in the logical and ontological fields for the formation of two new sciences: gnostology and noology The article is divided into four parts, After the status quaestionis, the second part deals with metaphysics in Kénigsberg before 1600, which was the year of publication of Francisco Sudrez's Disputationes Meta- physicae in Mainz. The third patt contextualizes l'effet Sudrez and more in general the changes in the metaphysical stadies in Kénigsberg during the seventeenth century investigating particularly Sudrez’s influence in Kénigsberg as regards the nature of metaphysics, The fourth part charac- terizes the original Sudrez's interpretation in Kénigsberg Scholasticism in order to reconstruct the origin of the connection between logic and on- tology during the years 1618 and 1644. A number of studies have been dedicated to the dissemination of Francisco Suérez's philosophy in Germany and in the Protestant areas, but few of them have dealt with its impact on Kdnigsberg's university. In spite of the great influence that Suarez may have had on such important author as Immanuel Kant,' there are no investigations on Kénigsberg his- torical cultural background in which the Sudrezean philosopby spread. * Universidad de Verona (Ttalia) ' Sec SEIGFRIED, Hans, “Kant's Thesis About Being Anticipated by Suarez?", Proceedings Of the Third International Kant Congress, Lewis White Beck (ed.), Kluwer, Dordrecht 1970, $10- 520; HONNEFELDER, Ludger, Seientia transcendens. Die formate Bestimmung der Seiendhett wid Realitat in der Motaphysik cles Mitiefalters und der Neuzeit (Dun Scotus, Suarez, Wolff, Kani, Peir- ce), Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1990; LOMBARDO, Mario G., “Intenzionalita ¢ finzione. Semantica degli enti di ragione secondo Fr, Sudrez ¢ 1. Kant”, Fenomenofogia e societt 18 (1995) 17-57, HONNEFELDER, Ludger, “Metaphysics as 8 Discipline: From the "Transcedental Philosophy of the ANALES VALTNOS TE 2010) 145-159,146 M. SGARBI In his monumental Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland, although Peter Peterson deals with meta- physics in Kénigsberg, he does not recognize any heritage of Suarez? Karl Eschweiler in bis seminal Die Philosophie der spanischen Spat- scholastik auf den deutschen Universitéten des 17. Jahrhunderts does not mention any philosopher of Kénigsberg Aristotelian tradition.’ Ernst Lewalter in Spanisch-Jesuitische und Deutsch-Lutherische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts has been the first to investigate the origin of meta~ physics in Kénigsberg concerning the dissemination of Jesuitic me- taphysies, without, however, finding particular Sudrezean influences? In his fundamental book Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahr- hunderts, Max Wundt analyzes accurately the reception of Sudrez's me- taphysics in German universities, but never in Kénigsberg’ Neither Ulrich Gottfried Leinsle in his Reformversuche protestantischer Meta- physik im Zeitalter des Rationalismus recognizes the impact of Suarez on KGnigsberg's metaphysics. In Sudrez et le systéme de la métaphysique Jean-Francois Courtine has been the first to establish a real correlation between Suarez and Kénigsberg's metaphysicians in reconstructing the Ancients" to Kant's Notion of Treascedental Philosophy”, The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics amd Modal Theory 1400-1760, Russell Friedman atnd Lauge Nielsen (ed.), Kiuwer, Dordrecht 2003, 53-74, ToMMASI, Francesco V., Philosophia ttanseendentalis. La questione an tepredicativa ¢ Fanalogia wra la Scolastica ¢ Kant,Otschki, Firenze 2009; ESPOSITO, Costantino, The Hidden Influence of Suéres on Kant's transcenental conception of being, essence and existence, (it preparation), * Petersen deals particularly with metaphysies in Abraham Calov and Christian Dreier. See PETERSEN, Peter, Geschichte der avistotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland Meiner, Leiprig 1921, 284f,, 319 J Bscuwener, Karl, “Die Philosophie der spanischen Spitschalastik auf den deutschen Universivdten des 17. Jabrhunderts”. Gesammelie Aujsaize zur Kulturgeschickte Spaniens, Aschen~ dorff, Minster 1928, 253-283. * Lewalter focuses his attention on Christian Dreier. See Lewatter, Ernst, Spamisoh- esuitische und Deutsch-Lusherische Metaphysike des 17. Jahrhunderts. Bin Beitrag zur Geschichie der Iberisch-Deutschen Kulturbezichungen und zur Vorgeschiehte des Deutschen Ideatismus, Wis- senschattliche Buchgeseilschaft, Darmstadt 1967, 45. Christian Dreier, professor at the faculty of theslogy, was the Jast important metaphysician of the time. His Sapientia sive philosaphia prima ex Aristotele et opiimis antiquis Graecis praesertim commentatoribus methodo scieniifica conseripta, which aimed to restore the original Aristotelian metaphysics from the Scholastic corruptions, unfor- tunately dealt scarcely with Suétez. ‘The Sapientia is a collection of twenty dissertations which deat with the fundamental topics of Aristotle's Metapiysica in an historical perspective, particularly to the problem of fivality, of the prime mover, of the 200d, of substance, and of being. See DRETER, Christian, Sapientia sive phitosophia prima, Reusner, Konigsberg 1644, *WuNDT, Max, Die deutsche Schulmeraphysik des 17, Jahrhunderts, Mohe, Vabingen 1939, 133-139, 227-260. © LEIsLe, Ulrich Gottfried, Reformersuche protestantischer Metaphysik im Zeitalter des Rationalisinas, Maro, Augsburg 1988, 127-138.AT THE ORIGIN OF THE CONNECTION... 147 influence of Jesuitic metaphysics in the classification of metaphysical sciences in Abraham Calov and Christian Dreier.” Neither does the re- cent erudite article Die Schulphilosophie in den lutherischen Territorien of Walter Sparn, although it deals widely with metaphysics in Konigs- betg, shows the impact of Suarezean philosophy.* I The history of metaphysics in Kénigsberg closely parallels the teaching of metaphysics in the German universities. Joseph S. Freedman has recognized a tendency, befween 1530 and the 1590, to subordinate or to remove the discipiine of metaphysics in the curricula of some impor- tant Protestant universities, as for example Basel, Frankfurt am Oder, Leipzig, Rostock, Ttibingen, and Wittenberg.’ This tendency was charac- terized by: 1) a condition of diffuse uncertainty by the continuous doc- trinal and theological mutations of the various reformist movements; 2) the identification of metaphysics with theology, with the consequent teaching in the theological faculties; 3) the dissemination of Philipp Melanchthon's works. Since its foundation in 1544 Kénigsberg university was cha- racterized by Philipp Melanchthon's philosophy. The great success of Philippistic philosophy was due to the strict relationship between Mel- anchthon and the first dean Georg Sabinus: he was Melanchthon's son- in-law. Melanchthon, to whom Martin Luther gave the task of reforming the university-curriculum in Protestant Germany, like many humanists, did not pay attention to metaphysics, especially to Aristotelian and Scho- lastic metaphysics, which was often in contradiction to Lutheran theo- logy. Melanchthon “completely neglected the systematic role played by * Courrive, Jcan-Frangois, Sucirez et fe systéme cle la métaphysique, PUP, Paris 1990, 413- 414, 446-447, 457, 498. ¥sparn, Walter, “Bie Schulphilosophie in den futherischen Territotien", Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts Band 4, Das Heitige Rémtische Reich Deutscher Nation, Nord- und Ost Europa, H. Holzhey and W. Schmidt Biggemann (ed.), Schwabe, Basel 2001, 571-877. FREEDMAN, Joseph S., “Philosophy Instruction within the Institutional Framework of Centra! European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Ena", History of Universities 5 (1985) 120, 124-126; FREEDMAN, Joseph S., “Aristotie and the Content of Philosophy Instruction at Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Bra (1500-1650), Proceedings of the American Philosophical Soctety 137 (1993) 216148, M.SGARBI metaphysics arguing that: (a) logic (dialectic) can replace metaphysics with regard to assessing principles; (b) metaphysics is useless with re- gard to the concept of God and it is also pernicious and (c) the main ad- vantage of metaphysics is to be seen in grammar’.'° However, Walter Sparn has shown that “Melanchthon's exhortation ad res ipsas implies a comprehensive metaphysical project aimed at retranslating the Aristo- telian realist metaphysics in a system of ideal relations held together by mental procedures”.’’ This attempt to reduce metaphysical contents to logic is traceable back to one of the motivation of Sudrez's rapid and large dissemination in Protestant Germany. He was considered an expo- nent of an essentialistic metaphysics, which began with Duns Scotus's assimilation of Avicenna and which will culminate in Christian Wolff's mentalistic metaphysics. In Kénigsberg, unti] the end of the sixteenth century, dialectics was commonly taught instead of metaphysics. Metaphysical works such as Daniel Cramer's Isagoge in metaphysicum Aristotelis (1594) and Niko- laus Taurellus's Synopsis Avistotelis metaphysices (1596) did not exercise a strong influence at the Albertina as in the other Protestant universities. Rudolph Géckel's Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum primam philosophiam, quae dici consuevit metaphysica (1598) had a different fortune; in fact it had a large dissemination, but only beginning from the second decades of the seventeenth century, Everything changed in Kénigsberg after what Jean-Francois Courtine has defined as “I'effet Suarez”. “L'effet Suarez” is complex cultural moment of the German philosophical culture of the first two decades of the seventeenth century. It is characterized not only by the publication in 1600 in Mainz of the Disputationes Metaphysicae, but also by the production of Protestant metaphysical works of Sudrezian origin as those of Hennig Arnisaeus, Jakob Martini, Christoph Schei- bler, and Clemens Timpler, and from a general reevaluation of Jesuitic metaphysics. During this period the most important metaphysicians in K6- nigsberg were Georg Crusius and Abraham Calov. Crusius was the first to iavestigate Suarez's metaphysics in his Disputationum metaphysi- 1 Pozzo, Riccardo, “Logic end Metaphysics in German Philosophy from Melanchthon 1 Hegel”, Approaches to Metaphysics, W. Sweet (ed.), Kluswer, Dordrecht 2004, 62 "18, See particularly SPARN, Walter, Wiederkehr der Metaphysik, Caiwer, Stuttgart 1976, 109.AT THE ORIGIN OF THE CONNECTION... 149 earum, which were published 1618." Crusius’s main sources, besides Suarez, were Rudolph Géckel, Cornelius Martini, and Clemens Timpler, However, the most important and influential metaphysical work was Calov's Metaphysica divina, which was published in Rostock in 1636 and made Kénigsberg one of the most important metaphysical cen- tre of Germany for its large dissemination in all Protestant areas, It The impact of Sudrez's Disputationes metaphysicae is evident in the metaphysical works that were published in Konigsberg during the first half of the seventeeath century especially considering the definition, the subject, and the goal of metaphysics Definition. At the very beginning of the first dispute, Suarez deals with the varia metaphysicae nomina.’ Suarez provides seven definitions of metaphysics. Metaphysics as sapientia is the science of the first causes of all beings, Metaplrysics is said analogously also pru- dentia, because as in the practical acts is required the maximum pru- dence in the speculative thought is required wisdom. Par exellence metaphysics is philosophia or prima philosophia. As far it concerns the knowledge of God and of divine substances, metaphysics is also de- fined as naturalis theologia, The word “metaphysics” comes from the Greek ancient interpreters of Aristotle, From the Greek Tév peta tH votké, metaphysics deals with the substances that follow natural sub- stances or from substances that abstract from matter. {n this last sense metaphysics is defined post-physics. Jt is not post for dignity, i.e. for the ordo rerum, but for the order of knowledge. In fact for dignity, metaphysics is said prima or domina science, because it confirm the principles of the other sciences. '2-Phe volume is a collection of ten disputes on the nature of metaphysics, on the being and on his principles and affection, on the good, on the cause, on the infinite and finite, and on Go CaUSLS, Georg, Disputationem metaphyiscarum, Pabrici, Konigsberg 1618, 1. De philosophia in genere, 2. De constitutione metaphysices: 3. De ente; 4. De entis principis et im specie de actu et po- entia nec non essencia, 5. De affectionibus entis ax genere el specie de existentia, 6. De und secundar centis afjectione, 7. De veritate et bonitate entis affectionibus unitis respectivis; 8, De causa et cau sao necessario et comtingenti affectionibus disiunctts ens immediate sequentibus; 9. De finito ef 1 finito, pecjecto et imperfecto reliquique; 10. De Deo et intelligentiis, 3 suAnez, Francisco, Dispufationes Motaphysicae, Olms, Hildesheim 1965, 1-2.150 M, SGARBI The exposition on the various names of metaphysics had an im- mediate influence on the metaphysical works of Kénigsberg."* Crusius's Disputationum metaphysicorum deals with the names of metaphysics in the second dispute, which is entitled De constitutione metaphysices." According to Crusius metaphysics deals with post or ultra physical sub- slances, not according to dignity or to ordo rerum, but according to the order of acquaintance and invention. In a different sense metaphysics is the science of supreme substances. It can be named sapientia when it deals with the first cause of substances. It is also called prudentia but only analogously to wisdom. It is prima philosophia when it deals with the first and general principles and attributes of substances, while it is defined theologia naturalis if it has as its subject God and the divine substances. Finally metaphysics is properly, according to Aristotle's definition, the science of being qua being. Abraham Calov dedicates the entire introduction of his Meta- physica divina to the Nomenclatura metaphysicae.'* Metaphysics comes from the Greek Tv were te voix, which was the name given by An- dronicus Rohdius and confirmed by Plutarch and Damacenus. The origin of the term “metaphysics” would be therefore bibliographical according to Calov. The term, however, was well chosen because it denotes also the science of the substances “that are after” according (o the knowledge. It is definable as post-physics, not for dignity or for nature, but according to knowledge, invention, and teaching. Calov mentions, as Suarez does, the passage of Plato's Cratylus according to which the sages are usual to assign names to everything only after the consideration of their nature and dignity. Metaphysics is also said hyperphysica, ransnaturalis and irascendentalis as regards its object, which would transcend the mere physical objects. Metaphysics is also named theology when it deals with God and divine substances. In analogous sense it is prudence in the prac- tical field as it is wisdom in the theoretical field. Metaphysics deals with common axioms, general terms of the first and evident principles. It is the queen among all the other sciences because it confirms and estab- lishes the principles of all other sciences. Calov adds also that metaphy- sics is the most adapted science for teaching because it deals with the 1A nomenclature of metaphysics was a common widespread literary topos of metaphysi- cal treatises since Thomas Aquinas's Proemuum to the commentary to Aristotle's Metuphysics; but Regiomontan Scholastics referred particularly to Swarez’s exposition. SS CRUsIUS, Georg, Dispuiationum Metaphysicarum secuada De constitutione meta phystces, 2. 16 CaLoy, Abraham, Metaphysica divina, Rostock, Hallervord 1640, 4, 5,7, 12-14, 16.AT THE ORIGIN OF THE CONNECTION, isl first causes of all beings, taking back Suarez's definition: “illa scientia aptior est ad docendum, quae magis in causarum cognitione versatur; ii enim docent, qui causam cujusque rei afferunt”.” Subject. Suarez's first dispute is mainly devoted to the investiga- tion of the objectwm of metaphysics and to the exposition and to the con- futation of the various opinions on it. The first opinion asserts that the adequate subject of metaphysics is the being considered in its maximum abstraction, ie., ail real beings and al] beings of reason. The second opinion supports that the proper subject is the real being, excluding all the beings of reason but including the accidental beings. The third opinion affirms that the subject is the Supreme Being, i-e., God, while the fourth one that the subject is all im- material substances. The filth opinion asserts that the subject is the being according to the ten categories, thesis that was defended by Domenicus de Flandria. The sixth opinion, the one supported by Buridan, states that the subject is the substance qua substance.’ ‘The subject of metaphysics according to Suarez is the being qua real being, and its attributes.'" Jt en- compasses God, immaicrial substances, material substance, and the real accident, but it excludes beings of reason and the mere accidents. Suarez's exposition is summarized by Crusius in the chapter of the second dispute that is dedicated to Quodnam proprium et adaequatum Subjectum Metaphysicis? Crusius's first opinion asserts that God is the proper subject of metaphysics and it corresponds to Suarez’s third opinion. The second opinion affirms that the immaterial substances are the subject of metaphysics matching with Suarez’s fourth opinion. The third opinion support that the subject of metaphysics is the being in general, which comprises being of reasons and accidental beings. It corresponds to Suarez's first opinion, but it also discusses the possibility of Sudrez's sec- ond opinion. The fourth opinion is the one that was supported by Brudian and it matches with Sudrez's sixth opinion, while the fifth opinion of Domenicus de Flandria coincides exactly with Suarez's fifth opinion, Cru- sisus’s sixth opinion corresponds to Sudrez's notion of metaphysics.* The subject of metaphysics for Crusius is the “Ens qua Ens est”! 1? SuAREZ, Francisco, Disputationes Metaphysicae, 1.5.34, 47 yp, 112-21, 2.9. 1975, L126, 11 % CRrusius, Georg, Dispitationim Metaphysicarum secunda, De constitutione met physices, 89. 2b, 3.152 M.SGARBI In the prelude to Metaphysica divina, in the chapter dedicated to the subject of metaphysics, Calov follows Suarez adding further specifi- cations, which shows the influences of Benet Perera and Rudolph Gockel. Calov affirms, against Alexander of Hales's opinion, that the sub- ject of metaphysics is not the ens nominale. Metaphysics does not deal with particular or accidental being because it deals with the being i7 ab- stracto. Metaphysics considers the beings in general and not in general all beings, It deals with being qua being and not with all the beings. Subject of metaphysics is neither the intelligible being. Calov de- nies the opinion according 1 which immaterial substances can be the proper subject of metaphysics. This opinion corresponds to the Suarez's fourth opinion. Calov states that it is wrong also to support that the sub- ject of metaphysics is the substance or the being according to the ten categories, taking back Suarez's fifth and sixth confutations.” Metaphysics, according to Calov, is “sapientia Entis qua Entis”?? adding that “Scientia de Ente Metaphysica appellatur communiter 4 re- nim ordine, dvtodoyia rectius ab objecto proprio”. In Calov appears for the first time in Kénigsberg the term “dvtodoyic’” in Greek, which probably comes from Gockel, Goal. Kénigsberg metaphysicians share with Sudrez also the goal of metaphysics: “finem hujus scientiae esse veritatis contermplationem propter seipsam”.** Suarez adds also that the proper goal is to show the nature, the properties, and the causes of the being, and of its parts, as far as they abstracts from matter according to the being.’ Metaphysics enlightens the understanding because it abstracts from the senses and from imagination, and it investigates divine substances, common and general principles and cause of being, which are not the subjects of other sciences.” Metaphysics is also helpful to acquire a perfect knowledge in other sciences, because it considers the being in an absolute way and not according to a particular point of view.” Crusius agrees with Sudrez 2 CaLoy, Abraham, Metaphysica divina, 27-31. 8 4b. 17, Ib 4, ® SuARpa, Francisco, Disputationes Metaphysicae, 14.2, 26. 28 1b, 1.4.3,26. 7 tb, 14.4, 26. py 345,27 IbAT THE ORIGIN OF THE CONNECTION, 153 stating that “finis metaphysices est veritatis contemplatio propter se ip- sam”. Metaphysics is the most perfect science because it considers the causes of beings and it is the most helpful to improve the knowledge of other sciences.>! In Sudrez's wake, Calov defines the goal of metaphysics s “mente nostra cognitionem rerum abstractissimarum perficere, et dis- ciplinas inferiores dirigere in facuitatibus denique summis usum suum exervere” 3? In conclusion of this preliminary investigation on the nature of metaphysics in Kénigsberg, it is possible to say that Courtine was right in noting that “est remarquable le témoignage d'A. Calov, c'est que cet auteur fait référence aussie bien a la doctrine de Pérérius qui réservait le nom de Metaphysica une science spéciale (la théologie), qu’a la distinc- tion mise en honneur par les premiers commentateurs grecs d'Aristote entre !a métaphysique comme post-physigue, sclon Yordo rerum, qui est ici l'ordre noétique (mpd¢ Audc), et la méta-physique come sans- physique ou trans-naturelle, come disait Glocenius, selon la priorité ab- solue de son objet. Calov méle ici les deux perspective, de sorte que, pour lui, come déja pour Pérérius, Fvtodoyia demure bel et bien prima philosophia, sans étre pour autant méta-physique, au sens de trans- physique”. lt is noteworthy, however, that, for KGnigsberg's metaphysi- cians, the systematic unity of metaphysical sciences is provided only by Suarez. The impact of Pereira is merely extrinsic; most of the time he was mentioned critically." Géckel, whose influence is without doubt 5 CRusIus, Georg, Disputationm Metaphysicarum secunda, De constitutione metaphysi- ces, A Mp ™ Catov, Abraham, Metaphysica divina, 27. 8 CourTINE, Jean-Franzais, Sudrez et le systéme de la métaphysique, 414. + Konigsberg Aristotelians deal with the division of metaphysics in metaphysica generatis and in meraphysicas spectaiis, which does not occur in Suarez, but which was already sketched by Pereisa, See VOLLRATH, Est, “Die Gliedering, dor Metaphysik in eine Metaphysica generalis und eine Meraphysica specialis”, Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forscinung 16 (1962) 258-284. Crusius asserts a twofold way to investigate the subject of metaphysics: 1) according to the common and ‘general principles and affections of being, and 2) according to the different kinds of beings. Accord ing to this two approaches meraphysica generalis deals with being qua being and with its principles and affections, white metaphysica specialis deals with partecular beings such as immaterial sub- stances and God, See CRUSIUS, Georg, Disputationum Metaphystcarum secunda, De constitutione metaphysices, 5. 1 is important to remark that the term “ontology” does not occur in Crusius to de. fine the science of being qua being. It is possible to exclude the influence of Scheibler, who would have been the first to introduce the dist metaphysica generalis-metaphysica specialis in the ‘Schulmetaphysik, because he is never mentioned in the metaphysicat treatise of KGnigsberg. In addi~ tion Scheibler’s Opus metaphysicum was published in Giessen only in 1617, one year before Cru- sius's work, while it is clear that the division was already strongly consolidated at the university of154 M. SGARBI stronger, is also criticized, and this is easily traceable back to the conflict between pure Lutheranism and Calvinism in Knigsberg. The impact of Suarez in KGnigsberg was important not only in the metaphysical field but also for a general reconsideration of the relatiou- ships between logic and ontology. Iv The fundamental problem of Suarez, which was re-formulated by Regiomontans, is about the relationship between metaphysies and the habit of principles Suarez writes that the intelligibility of the principles of a science rests always on the habit of principles and it is a posteriori and known by means of senses because of the imperfection of human mind.* The habit of principles is not a science in itself, as it is not also the habit of meta- physics. According to the sixth book of Ethica Nicomachea, the habit of principles is the faelligentia, while the habit of metaphysics is sapien- tia.’ Wisdom precedes all the intellectual virtues, and thus also the habit of principles for its nobility and excellence, but not for comprehensibility and certainty.** The habit of principles in fact provides a better intelligi- bility of the first principles, more than the other habits. Kanigsberg, See COURTINE, Jean-Frangais, Sudrez et le systime de fa muétaphysique, 416-417, PO220, Riccardo, “Logic and Metaphysics in German Philosophy from Melanchihon to Hegel”, 63-64 Calov also divides metaphysics into a general an « special part according to the different considera. tions of its subject. Caloy corfuies also the other different divisions of metaphysical sciences foilo- ‘wing Suarez's argwmmentations oF metaphysics as subalterning discipline. According t Caloy the following systemativation of metaphysies are wrong: 1) metaphysics considered as the only science that collect under itself all other disciplines: 2) metaphysies as only the science of being qua being: 3) metaphysics as the science of being opposed to not-being, 4) meiaphysics divided into the science of abstract being according to indifferentia and science of abstract being according to essence, 5) metaphysics divided into science of the division of being, of intelligibles and of opposites; 6) metaphysies divided into the science of substances, of transcedentsls and of categories. Me physica generalis according, to Calov deals with the being “ia abstractissima retione et omnimoda indifferentia”, according the ordo rerum, she general and contmon attributes, and the princypia es- send. {cis algo said universal, common, and syacririca, Metaphysica specialis considers the being in 1 cifferent abstraction; in fact its subject is particutar essences. Tt is also said discretiva, particulars, and propria, See CALOV, Abraham, Metaphysiea divina, 58-65. 35 SuAREZ, Francisco, Disputationes Metaphysicue, 1.2.10, 15. 96 th, LAS, 29. 9B, ANS, 14.18.29, 3031 %8 16, L5.31-2, 46.AT'THE ORIGIN OF THE CONNECTION, 155 Suérez explains that the difference between the habit of principles and that of metaphysics rests on the difference between intuitive and dis- cursive knowledge. The habit of principles knows for itself the principles without any argumentation,” while the task of metaphysics is to demons- trate them discursively.” It is evident therefore that metaphysics deals with first principles differently from the habit of principles. Metaphysics does not deal with principles qua principles, but rather in so far they are conclusions. The habit of principles, on the other hand, deals formally with principles as immediate truths and it knows them without any de- monstraticn. In conclusion, according to Suarez, metaphysics provides a new perspective on the first principles of science.*! Suarez also asserts that the task of metaphysics is also to make clear and to give reasons for the simpie terms, of which the first princi- ples consist“ The clarification of the simple terms is possible through apprehension, which is based on sensible experience. In fact all know- ledge begins with experience and only through experience the simple terms and principles are explainable. In conclusion, according to Suarez, every science depends pre- liminarily on the habit of principles, which is ground on experience, as Aristotle writes in Analytica Posteriora 1.19.4 Unfortunately Sudrez does not provide further information about the connection between the habit of principles and metaphysics." If every science depends straightforwardly on the habit of princi- ples, cereris paribus, according to Kénigsberg Scholastics, metaphysics should also depend on it. It is necessary therefore to study the habit of principles prior to metaphysics itself, The discipline, which studies the habit of principles, is propaedeutic to metaphysics and it has to show the validity of the former as a science. The debate on the relationship be- tween the habit of principles and metaphysics led Kénigsberg Scho! tics (o reassess the connection between logic and ontology. oy 6, IAAT, 30. Ny, fh, 14.20, 3 © {b, Apprehension for Suirez is not the only way to give reason Lor principles; there is also. ‘the demoustration by corfutation, See SUAREZ, Francisco, Dispedationes Metaphwsicae, 14.21, 32. Jp, 15.47, 51. 4S The forty-fourth dispute deals with the classification of habits but does not with their role in the various disciplines. See Dove, John P., “Suarez on the Unity of Scientific Habit”, American Catholical Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991) 311-334. 32136 M.SGARBI Crusius traces back to Suarez the origin of the problem. Crusius states that no science has stronger affinity with metaphysics than logic. They converge because: }) both are general sciences; 2) each organizes under itself all the other disciplines; 3) the material subject is for both the being.’ Considering this kinship between fogic and metaphysies, it is questionable, Crusius remarks, if they converge also in transmitling the instruments to achieve epistemic knowledge. The answer is nonetheless negative because: 1) the science and the modus sciendi require two dif- ferent disciplines; 2) the instruments of the modus sciendi are intentional, while metaphysics does not deal with intentional substances, but with real substances; 3) the instruments of mocus sciendi are taught through other disciplines.’ In addition, metaphysics as wisdom is an autonomous science and for this reason it is possible to argue that its offices are not those of 1) assigning to each discipline its subject; and 2) confirming and organizing the principles of particular disciplines.** Only Sudrez, accor- ding to Crusius, solved these problems of the connection between logic and metaphysics. Sudrez was the first to understand the difference be- tween to be served and to be helpful to other sciences. On one hand metaphysics is conceived just as means, on the other hand as a “superior cause” that determines the other disciptines. Metaphysics should serve all the other disciplines just in this latter sense,” but to do that, it is nec- essary to determine its extent and boundaries, i.e., the habit of principles. Abraham Calov was the first to elaborate an organic system of metaphysical sciences introducing disciplines in order to investigate the habit of the principles. The sciences of the habit of the principles, fo- lowing Suarez, have as subject not only the principles themselves, but also the simple terms, which are known by experience. These two scien- ces are the gnostologia and the noologia.” The former investigates the simple terms and the first operation of the mind; the latter investigates the first principles and the second operation of the mind. The impact of Suarez in Kénigsberg consists in giving the impulse to the origin of these two new sciences. © Crusius, Georg, Dipuiatiomm Metaphysicarun secunda, De consitutione meta phrysices, 1. 7 Ib. “i, * tb, °° The science on habitus primorum principiarum as discipline was probably founded by Georg Guike in the wake of Zabarella's work. On Gutke see WUNDT, Max, Die deutsche Sehulmete ploysik des 17. Jahrhunderts, 242-254; SpaRX, Walter, “Die Schulphilosophie in den Intherisches ‘Teritorien”, 582-585AT THE ORIGIN OF THE CONNECTION. 157 Gnostology is “habitus mentis principalis, contemplans cognosci- bile, qua tale”. Gnostology deals with the mind as habit in its way to improve knowledge according to its natural powers. The object of know- ledge is the cognoscibile, i.c., “quod intellectui nostro ad cognoscendam objicitur’.’ Cognoseibile differs from intelligible, which is “omne quod est’. Also the not-being can be intelligible, but it is not cognoscibile. Caloy takes out of gnostology, hence of metaphysics, beings of reason, and mere accidents, as Suarez does. Calov adds also that knowledge “ex- tra natura in naturalibus est temerario”, because “naturam esse funda- doentum repraesentativam omni scibilis”.* First knowables are “res extra mentem singulares” and object of sensation. Sensation, experience after experience, becomes more accu- rate until universals are grasped directly. At this point abstraction plays a crucial role as in Suarez. In Suarez abstraction consists in the possibility of a thing to exist actually without matter. Abstraction is not specific of immaterial substances, but also of the beings of reason, of substances, and of accidental beings. However, to know the causes of being, abstrac~ tion requires a particular abstractive precision that makes possible the formation of the universal.*° According to Calov, abstraction “est functio intellectus qua mens nostra rem a te praecisam liberat a conditionibus individuantibus ve] imperfectionibus accidentalibus”.” Calov specifies that “abstractio non est formaliter denudatio rei a materia nec a singu- laribus simpliciter, sed est inquisitio formalis rationis in latissimo, lato et adequato conceptu ad gignendam ideam et universalem concepttum”.* Calov, tike Sudrez, distinguishes the formal concept from the objective concept, In Suarez the formal concept is the act in itself (or the verb) through which the intellect conceives a thing or a common reason. It is a “concept” because it is formed by the mind, and formal because: 1) it is the last form of the mind; 2) it represents to the mind the object of knowledge. The objective concept, instead, is what is known by means of the formal concept. In Calov the concept “est species ab intellectu formata, rapraesentativa scibilis in mente, ut in se est cognoscendi”. Ca- S'CALOW, Abraham, Melaphysiea dlivina, 1. “16,8. 1b. 6 54 1b, 10, "1b, 19, 86 SuAREz, Francisco, Dispurationes Meraphy'sicae, 1.1.16. 7 * Cavov, Abraham, Metaphysica diving, 15-16, 3 7b, 18. S° SUAREZ, Francisco, Disputationes Metaphysicae. I1.3.1, 64-65.158 M.SGARBI lov expounds that “conceptus discribitur formalis, qui est principium ap- prehensivum conceptus objectivi. Alias verbum mentis, species intelligi- bilis, intentio, notio, formalitas idea, noema etc. salutatur’ In fact “imago de re apprehensa formata est conceptus formalis, ipsa vero res intellectui objecta de qua talis forma concipitur in intellectu, appellatur conceptus objectivus”.' Formal concept “est signum objectivi concep- tus’. Only through concepts, it is possible, according to Calov, to achieve truth.° Knowledge of concepts is possible, however, only by means of a “qualitas in mente firmiter radicata ad ejusdem perfectionem, circa objectioni cognitionem’, i.c., by an intellectual habit. Gnostologia therefore deals with the simple apprehension of con- cepts, i.e, the simple terms of metaphysical knowledge: “Gnostologia versatur circa scibile praecise gua tole et in abstractione [...] Ad haec Gnostologia perficit primam mentis operationem, concernes simplicem rerum apprehensionem [...] termini semplices ad primam mentis opera- tionem pertinentes”.® Noologia, instead, deals with the composite terms, i-e., principles. Noologia is “habitus mentis principalis affinitatem rerum contemplans quatenus ex eadem prima cognoscendi principia fluunt”. The first prin- ciples of knowledge are not a simple noema, but a conjunction of more concepts.*’ The conjunction of concepts is the second operation of mind. ‘The prima principia cognoscendi complexa are “axiomata comunissima et per se notissima, et quibus omnis cognitio, quae per naturam haberi potest, dependet”. The first and most important principle is the principle of non- contradiction: “impossibile est, idem simul esse, ct non esse”.” From this principle comes “impossibile est idem simul esse, et cum aliis confusum esse”, which asserts the identity of a thing according to its essential properties. © CaLov, Abraham, Metaphysica divina, 20, *, © 16, 21 16,21. OF fb, 29, ®5 CaLov, Abraham, Seripta philosophica, Wilden, Litbeck 1651, 40-42. $5 1B, 38, 1b, 40. Ib, ae 7, 68AT TIE ORIGIN OP THE CONNECTION... 159 In conclusion, it is possible to say that from Sudrez's distinctions between habit of principles and metaphysics, and between simple terms and principles, Regiomontan Scholastics, and in particular Calov, founded two new propaedeutic sciences to metaphysics: gnostologia and noologia. They solve the problem of the connection between logic and metaphysics." Mariano Campo was right in assorting that the innovation of gnostologicians, and in particular of Caloy, “consists in the attempt of an investigation de rerum et intellectus proportione, in pointing the dy- namism of knowledge, (maybe in the wake of the golden strand of Scho- lastic transcendentals); in the attempt to find the condition that make possible the unity in the objectivity of judgments; in placing the problem of the origin of first principles of knowledge and of metaphysics”.” If Suarez was the real inspiration for the distinction between habit of principles and metaphysics, Kénigsberg Scholastics turned their atten- tion to the instrumental logic of Jacopo Zabarella to solve the problems.” If Suarez posed the problem, Zabarella offered a possible solution. The combination of Sudrez and Zabarella was not an isolated attempt in the Schulmetaphysik of the seventeenth century; in fact, important phitoso- phers such as Christoph Scheibler and Comelius Martini also elaborated it.* The combination of Sudrez's metaphysical doctrines with the ones of Zabarella led, from the beginning of the second half of the seventeenth century, to the shift of the ontology from metaphysics to logic, which will culminate with Kant's inclusion of ontology in the transcendental analytics.”° 7 Catv, Abraham, Metaphysica dvina, 7, 11 2 CAMPO, Mariano, Cristiano Wolff e il razionalismo precritico, Vita ¢ Pensiero, Milano 1939, 1, 145-146, On the influence of Jacopo Zabarella in Kénigsbetg see SGARBI, Marco, “Aristotle, Kant, and the Rise of Facultative Logic”, Aristoile and the Arisiotelian Tradition, E. De Bellis (¢d.), Rubhettino, Soveria Mannelli 2008, 405-416. 4 Pozzo, Riccardo, Logic and Metaphysics in German Philosophy from Melanchthon io Hegel, 63, On Scheibler is certain the influence of both Suésez and Zabarella, Less probable it is the sanfluence on Cometius Martini, who developed his metaphysical theories before Suarez. The sources of Martini were Giovanni Crisostome Javelli, Tomaso da Vie, and Zabarella, On the influence of Suitez on Martini see Dr ViuEscHAUWER, Hermann J., “Un paralelo protestante 4 la obra de Suérez", Revista de Filosofia 8 (1949) 365-400. Against the influence of Suéraz on Martini see WuNDT, Max, Die davische Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts, $9-60, 98-9, 102-103; Ds Vona, Piero, Studi sulla scolastica della controriforma. Liesistenza e la sua distinztone metafivica datlessenca, La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1969, 71-75. 7S pozzo, Riccardo, “Aristotelismus und Ekiektizismus in Kenigsberg (1648-1740)", Die Universitat Konigsberg in der fritien Newzett, H. Marti and M. Komorvski (ed.), Boblau, Weimar 2008, 172-185.