G.R. No.
L-30821 December 14, 1988 temporary restraining order of January 31, 1969, on the latter
VIDAL BERNARDO and JESUS SILVERIO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division) and TROPICAL
HOMES, INC., respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari which has been
pending for seventeen years now. As per its resolution dated 1
September 1986 (p.144, Rollo), this Court ordered the parties
to manifest "whether or not they are still interested in
prosecuting this case, or supervening events have transpired
which render the case moot and academic or otherwise
substantially affect the same." Counsel for petitioners has
expressed that he has never seen nor has communicated with
his clients "for ten (10) years or more" and is therefore without
knowledge of their interest in pursuing this case (Manifestation
with Explanation, p. 152, Rollo). On the other hand, both
respondent Tropical Homes, Inc. (TROPICAL, for short) and its
counsel could not be found at their addresses of record.
Nevertheless, under the circumstances We cannot as yet
consider this case as moot and academic. We therefore will
resolve the same.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On January 29, 1969, the respondents tenants, Vidal Bernardo
and Jesus Silverio, filed a verified complaint with the Court of
Agrarian Relations, Sixth Regional District, Branch III, Pasig,
Rizal, CAR Case No. 442-Rizal '69, against Mercedes Tomas
and the petitioner, Tropical Homes, Inc., alleging that they are
the agricultural lessees of Mercedes Tomas of a 2-hectare rice
landholding; that on January 16 and 17, 1969, petitioner
herein, in conspiracy with its co-defendant Mercedes Tomas,
who had apparently sold the landholding aforementioned to the
petitioner to be converted for residential purposes, without any
written notice to the plaintiffs in said case, now private
respondents herein, nor any verbal report to them and without
their permission and against their will and consent, forcibly
bulldozed a small portion, of their landholding and destroyed
the earth embankments (pilapiles) existing thereon; and that
despite their protest to refrain from said acts, Tropical Homes,
Inc. and its henchmen continued the bulldozing of the
landholding of the private respondents. The plaintiffs in the
abovementioned case prayed in their verified complaint for the
issuance ex parte  of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the defendants therein from continuing with the bulldozing of
their landholding.
Pursuant to the verified complaint and motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction, the respondent Judge, pending the
hearing of said motion, issued on January 31, 1969, an order
temporarily restraining and enjoining Mercedes Tomas and the
Tropical Homes, Inc., their agents, representatives and/or their
hired contractors to cease and desist from bulldozing or
causing the performance of any kind of work over the
landholding that would have the effect of dispossessing the
plaintiffs therein.
The defendants abovementioned were given five (5) days from
receipt of notice of said order within which to file their reply or
objection to the motion for issuance of the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction and said motion was set for hearing on
February 6, 1969, at 9:30 A.M. The defendants in said case
were summoned on January 30, 1969, and were notified of the
date.
On February 3, 1969, petitioner Tropical Homes, Inc. filed
an ex parte motion to lift the temporary restraining order,
including its opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.
On February 6, 1969, Tropical Homes, Inc. filed an ex
parte motion to stay the proceedings and asked that the
hearing of the motion for preliminary injunction set for February
4, 1969, be held in abeyance pending action by this Court on
this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, filed by the
petitioner on February 5, 1969, to nullify the restraining order of
January 31, 1969.
The respondent Judge by order of February 7, 1969, held in
abeyance the hearing of the motion for preliminary injunction
until this Court shall have decided the instant petition, and on
February 8, he issued an order denying the motion to lift the
temporary restraining order of January 31, 1969.
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court on
February 17, 1969, enjoining and restraining the respondents
from enforcing the order of January 31, 1969, upon the filing of
a bond in the sum of P1,000.00. (pp. 67-70, Rollo)
Ruling in favor of TROPICAL, respondent Court of Appeals
(CA for brevity) construed the restraining order issued by the
Agrarian Court dated 31 January 1969 as "practically a writ of
preliminary injunction" (p. 76, Rollo) and therefore irregularly
issued as no prior hearing was conducted and that no bond
was posted as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 of
the New Rules of Court. The CA also applied Section 14 of the
Code of Agrarian Reform (R.A. 3844) as invoked by
TROPICAL and interpreted Section 36(l) of the same Code, the
basis of petitioners' claim of right, thus,
... ejectment proceedings should take precedence only in
cases where the owner himself or a member of his immediate
family undertakes the conversion in good faith of the
agricultural landholding into a residential subdivision. In such
case the provisions of Section 36(l) requiring final court order
for ejectment of the lessee would be applicable. (p. 75, Rollo)
prompting the petitioners to file this petition for review.
Culling from the respective briefs of the parties, this Court is
now tasked to determine the validity of the restraining order in
question and the proper application of Sections 14 and 36(l) of
R.A. 3844.
It is to be noted that the first matter in issue is procedural in
nature. And in the disposition of this issue, the basic legal truth
in Remedial Law that laws of procedure may be retroactively
applied provided no substantial rights are impaired is of
principal importance. The pertinent legal provision under
consideration is section 5 of Rule 58 of the New Rules of
Court. It is worthy to note that in 1982, several years after the
questioned temporary injunction was issued by the Court of
Agrarian Relations (CAR, for short) Judge Pastor Reyes, the
defunct Batasang Pambansa enacted B.P. Blg. 224 which
substantially amended said Section 5 of Rule 58 to read as
follows:
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
issuance of restraining order.—No preliminary injunction shall
be granted without notice to the defendant. If it shall appear
from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified complaint
that great or irrepairable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to whom
the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue
a restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty
days from date of its issuance. Within the said twenty-day
period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the
defendant, requiring him to show cause, at a specified time and
place, why the injunction should not be granted, and determine
within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction
shall be granted and shall accordingly issue the corresponding
order. In the event that the application for preliminary injunction
is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically
vacated.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair, affect or
modify in any way any rights-ranted, by, or rules pertaining to
injunctions contained in, existing agrarian, labor or social
legislation. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying now the above law to the case at bar, it is clear that
the Court, in this case the CAR, can issue a restraining order
which is to last for only twenty (20) days and which is clearly
distinct from the writ of injunction applied for. This restraining
order may be issued by the judge despite the absence of a
prior hearing as long as it could be shown by affidavits or in the
verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would be
suffered by the applicant. There being no substantial rights
affected, We rule that the temporary injunction of 31 January
1969 is not equivalent to the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for by petitioners in their verified complaint, thus, no
bond nor prior hearing is necessary since its purpose is merely
to maintain the status quo (B.F. Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-30690,
November 19, 1982).
It is clear from the law that the issuance of the restraining order
is left to the sound discretion of the judge whenever he deems
that grave or irreparable injury on the part of the applicant
commands it. We do hot doubt the CAR Judge's discretion. He
was correct in his observation (Motion for Reconsideration, p.
80, Rollo) that "security of tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of
their and their families (sic) only means of livelihood." Such
dispossession, therefore, in the context of this case, is indeed
a grave injury which social justice seeks to vindicate.
Unfortunately, however, considering that this case had been
pending for a long time now, We leave it to the proper Court
presently having jurisdiction over this case, subject to the
parties' intention to pursue or not this litigation, to determine
the possibility of enforcing the lower court's restraining order in
the light of the physical changes which might have ensued.
Coming now to the matter involving sections 14 and 36 (1) of
R.A. 3844, We disagree with the respondent Court's ruling that:
We hold that ejectment proceedings should take precedence
only in cases where the owner himself or a member of his
immediate family undertakes the conversion in good faith of the
agricultural landholding into a residential subdivision. In such
case the provisions of Section 36 (1) requiring final court order
for ejectment of the lessee would be applicable. (p. 75, Rollo)
As correctly pointed out by Judge Reyes of the CAR,
The purchaser of the landholding is subrogated to the rights
and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor
(Sec. 10, Rep. Act No. 3844), hence, the agricultural leasehold
relationship continues between the agricultural lessee and the
purchaser automatically by operation of law and the latter, as
agricultural lessor, is bound to respect the agricultural lessee's
possession and cultivation of the land. (Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 79, Rollo).
This being the case, TROPICAL is bound to respect the
possession of the petitioners as leasehold tenants over the
land in question pursuant to the latters' right to security of
tenure as enshrined in Sections 9, 10 and 36 of R.A-3844. To
hold otherwise would render nugatory one of the primary
reasons for the enactment of said law.
Respondent TROPICAL, in an attempt to justify its
dispossessory acts against petitioners, invoke the provisions of
Section 14 * of R.A. 3844 (p. 28, Rollo). However, this Court
does not find the pertinence of such provision in the case at
bar. The repealed section 14 stated:
Sec. 14. Right of Pre-emption and Redemption not Applicable
to Land to be Converted into Residential, Industrial and Similar
Purposes.—The right of preemption and redemption granted
under Sections eleven and twelve of this Chapter cannot be
exercised over landholding suitably located which the owner
bought or holds for conversion into residential, commercial,
industrial or other similar non-agricultural purposes Provided,
however, That the conversion be in good faith and is
substantially carried out within one year from the date of sale.
Should the owner fail to comply with the above condition, the
agricultural lessee shall have the right to repurchase under
reasonable terms and conditions said landholding from said
owner within one year after the aforementioned period for
conversion has expired: Provided, however, That the tenure of
one year shall cease to run from the time the agricultural
lessee petitions the [Land Authority] to acquire the land under
the provisions of paragraph 11 of Section fifty one.
Clearly, this defunct section establishes the right of the tenant-
lessee to pre-empt the sale of his landholding or redeem the
same if its sale had already been consummated. However, a
reading of the petitioner's complaint filed with the CAR (pp. 20-
24, Rollo) does not reveal any desire on their part to exercise
this right; what they express, however, is their eagerness to
work on their landholdings as tenants-lessees. They invoke,
therefore, their right to security of tenure. And pursuant to
section 36 of R.A. 3844, the agricultural lessee cannot be
dispossessed of his landholding except by a Court order that is
final and executory. Hence, in conjunction with section 10 of
R.A. 3844, the mandatory requirement of Section 36 may
never be overlooked by respondents. Nor may they invoke the
provisions of the repealed section 14, even if it were still
applicable today.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is
granted and the appealed decision of the Fourth Division of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated 15 July 1969 is hereby
reversed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is further
instructed that the records of CAR Case No. 442-Rizal '69, filed
with the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Sixth Regional
District, Branch III, be remanded to the proper court now
having jurisdiction for trial on the merits, conditioned on the
interest of the parties to pursue this case.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
 
G.R. No. L-20700             February 27, 1969
FIDEL TEODORO, petitioner,
vs.
FELIX MACARAEG and COURT OF AGRARIAN
RELATIONS, Second Regional District, Sala II, respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
Before us for review, upon a petition for certiorari, are the
decision of the respondent Court of Agrarian Relations of
September 7, 1962 in CAR case 558-Gba. 68 (Nueva Ecija),
ordering the herein petitioner Fidel Teodoro to reinstate the
herein private respondent Felix Macaraeg (the petitioner in the
agrarian court) to his "former landhoding ... and to keep him as
the true and lawful tenant in accordance with law," and the
resolution of the same court of November 27, 1962
condemning Teodoro to pay or deliver to Macaraeg as
damages "82 cavans of palay or its equivalent value in the
amount of P820.00 computed at the rate of P10.00 per cavan,
plus interest at 10% until fully paid."
We turn to the factual milieu.
On June 7, 1961 Macaraeg filed a petition with the Court of
Agrarian Relations (Second Regional District, sala II, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija) praying, inter alia, that (1) an interlocutory order
be issued to restrain Teodoro and Jose Niegos (the
respondents below), from ejecting him from his landholding
pending resolution of his petition; and (2) after due trial, he be
maintained as the lawful tenant in the disputed landholding.
Macaraeg alleged that he is a leasehold tenant of Teodoro
cultivating a farmholding situated in the municipality of
Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, of an area of four (4) hectares devoted
to rice culture, and that he has worked said land "as a tenant
for the last seven years"; that on March 2, 1961 he received a
letter from Teodoro and his wife advising him that the aforesaid
landholding will be given to another tenant, on the pretext that
he (Macaraeg) "is contracting be a tenant of another in said
landholding"; that forthwith, Teodoro placed a new tenant, Jose
Niegos, in the disputed land; that subsequently, Niegos
repeatedly forbade him from working on said riceland; that in
order to avoid trouble, he refrained from forcibly entering the
landholding, but with the advent of the planting season, it
became imperative that the agrarian court order his
reinstatement and restrain Teodoro and Niegos from
committing further acts of dispossession.
In his answer with counterclaim dated June 19, 1961, Teodoro
categorically denied that Macaraeg was his tenant, claiming
that "ever since he became the owner of around 39 hectares of
riceland in Kalisitan, Talugtug, N. Ecija, he had always leased
all of it under civil lease and he had never given any portion of
it under tenancy." He further alleged that after the expiration of
his lease contract with Macaraeg in January, 1961, his wife
twice notified Macaraeg to renew his contract for the then
incoming agricultural year 1961-62, but the latter "verbally told
Mrs. Teodoro that he was no longer interested to work on the
land and he was giving it up as he had left the place already."
Teodoro also claims that it was only after Macaraeg had
abandoned the farmland that he decided to lease it to Niegos.
On his part, Niegos seasonably answered, disclaming any
knowledge that Macaraeg is the tenant of Teodoro, and
averring that he entered the landholding in good faith clothed
with the proper authority from the other respondent (Teodoro)
and with the consent and confirmity of the petitioner
(Macaraeg) who allowed him to work on the same"; and that
Macaraeg "has no more interests in the cultivation of the
landholding as could be gleaned from his actuations, like the
failure to clean the land during the months of March and April,
and his failure to prepare his seed bed in the month of May
which is the period for broadcasting seedling in the
community".
On February 6, 1962, when the hearing of the present
controversy was nearing completion in the respondent agrarian
court but before the case was submitted for decision,
Macaraeg filed a "supplemental petition", claiming damages as
a a result of his dispossession. Said petition was given due
course by the court commissioner and the requisite hearing
was set for March 9, 1962. Both Teodoro and Niegos
interposed their respective answers, identically asserting that
the same was filed out of time and that the failure of Macaraeg
to claim earlier his alleged damages amounted to a fatal
neglect which could no longer be cured at that very late stage
of the proceedings. Nonetheless, hearing on the said petition
was disclosed that as "a result of his (Macaraeg's) ejectment,
he became destitute" since he had no "income except from
those derived from transplanting and reaping wherein he
earned the amount of P30.00". It was further proved that "for
the aqricultural year 1961-62, Jose Niegos realized a gross
harvest of 110 cavans out of which he paid his rental to Fidel
Teodoro in the amount of 42 cavans and 23 kilos."
On September 7, 1962 the decision under review was
rendered, with the following dispositive portion:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner Felix
Macaraeg and against respondents Fidel Teodoro and Jose
Niegos in the tenor and disposition hereinbelow provided, to
wit:
1. Jose Niegos is hereby ordered to vacate the landholding in
question with an approximate area of four (4) hectares,
situated at Barrio Kalisitan, Talugtug Nueva Ecija, in favor of
herein petitioner and to refrain from molesting or in any manner
disturbing his peaceful possession and cultivation thereof,
subject to the condition that said respondent shall have
harvested and threshed his crop which he planted for the
current agricultural year;
2. Conformably with the preceding paragraph, Fidel Teodoro is
hereby ordered to reinstate said petitioner to his former
landholding aforestated and to keep him as the true and lawful
tenant in accordance with law;
3. Declaring Exhibit A as a leasehold tenancy contract between
the parties for the agricultural year 1960-61 as the term is
understood under our tenancy law; as a consequence hereof,
Exhibit 4-Teodoro and Exhibit 5-Niegos, i.e. contract of lease
between Fidel Teodoro and Jose Niegos is hereby declared
void and of no legal effect; and
4. Dismissing petitioner's claim for damages as embodied in
his supplemental petition.
Teodoro and Niegos filed separate motions for reconsideration
which were denied by the respondent agrarian court in its
resolution of November 27, 1962. However, in the same
resolution, the court a quo reconsidered, upon motion of
Macaraeg, its ruling denying the latter's prayer for damages,
thus:
With respect to petitioner's claim for damages as embodied in
his supplemental petition, wherein evidence was adduced in
support thereof, we believe that its admission is in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines,
same not being for the purpose of delaying the proceedings.
And, the fact that the Court of Agrarian Relations shall not be
bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence but "shall act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case", we believe that the evidence to support the claim for
damages received during the hearings before the court
commissioner is meritorious (Secs. 10 and 11 RA 1267, as
amended). Hence, petitioner is entitled to recover damages
claimed by him from his landholder in the amount of 85 cavans
of palay which is equal to the two years rental of his
landholding less his earnings during the same period in the
amount of P30.00 only or is equivalent to 3 cavans of palay. In
fine, Fidel Teodoro is liable to pay to petitioner the amount of
82 cavans of palay or its cash value of P820.00, computed at
P10.00 per cavan plus interest at 10% until fully paid.
After Teodoro's motion to reconsider the foregoing resolution
was denied, he interposed on January 5, 1963 the present
petition, imputing to the court the following errors:
1. In holding that Macaraeg became a tenant of Teodoro by
virtue of the "Contract of Lease" which they executed in April,
1960;
2. Assuming that the foregoing contract was in effect a
leasehold tenancy agreement making Macaraeg a tenant of
Teodoro in not finding the former guilty of abandonment, an act
which terminated their tenancy relation; and
3. In condemning Teodoro to pay damages to Macaraeg for the
alleged dispossession, despite the fact that the claim for
damages embodied in the abovementioned "Supplemental
Petition" below were about to be terminated.
The pertinent provisions of the disputed "Contract of Lease"
between Teodoro and Macaraeg read as follows:
That the LESSOR is the registered owner of a certain parcel of
land situated at Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, containing an area of
THIRTY NINE (39) HECTARES, more or less;
That for and in consideration of the rental of Nine (9) cavans of
palay per hectare for one agricultural year, the LESSOR
hereby lets and leases and the LESSEE hereby accepts an
undivided portion 4 ½ Hectares  of the abovementioned
property under the following terms and conditions:
1. That this contract of lease shall only be for the agricultural
year 1960-61;
2. That the LESSEE shall give a guaranty to answer for the
payment of the lease consideration of this contract;
3. That the rental of 38.7 cavans of palay per hectare shall be
paid unto the LESSOR not later than January, 1961;
4. That the corresponding rental must be brought to the
Poblacion of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, to be deposited to any
bonded Warehouse at the expense of the LESSEE and in the
name of the LESSOR;
5. That the rental must be of the same variety as that produced
by the LESSEE;
6. That the LESSOR shall pay for the real property taxes
corresponding to the property leased;
7. That violation of any of the terms of this contract shall be
sufficient ground to terminate the same with damages against
the guilty party;
8. That the property leased shall be used or utilized for
agricultural enterprise only;
9. That in case of default on the part of the LESSEE to pay the
lease consideration when the same becomes due and payable
and the collection for the same reaches the court, the LESSEE
hereby binds himself to pay the cost of the suit including
reasonable attorney's fees. (Emphasis supplied)
I. Teodoro contends that the language and tenor of the
aforesaid contract clearly manifest the intention of the parties
to enter into an ordinary civil lease contract, not a leasehold
tenancy agreement as alleged by Macaraeg and sustained by
the agrarian court. To start with, Teodoro stresses, the parties
denominated the said covenant as a "Contract of Lease",
which assigned title discloses their mutual intention to execute
an ordinary lease contract, for, otherwise, if they had intended
to create a leasehold tenancy relation, they could have
accordingly captioned their agreement "with the word tenancy
or some other word of similar import". Moreover, Teodoro
points out that "in the contract of lease in question it is
significant to note that the words landlord and tenant were
conspicuous by their complete absence".
The foregoing stance assumed by Teodoro is patently
untenable, in the face of the principal features and stipulations
of the contract in controversy and the pertinent provisions of
existing law on leasehold tenancy. It bears emphasis that the
title, label or rubric given to a contract cannot be used to
camouflage the real import of an agreement as evinced by its
main provisions. Moreover, it is basic that a contract is what
the law defines it to be, and not what it is called by the
contracting parties. 1
As correctly expressed by the respondent court, "viewed from
the four corners of Exhibit A, we have no doubt that the
leasehold tenancy contract entered into between petitioner
(Macaraeg) and Fidel Teodoro is a pure and simple leasehold
tenancy contract as the term is understood under our tenancy
laws." This observation of the agrarian court finds anchor in the
pertinent provision of the Agricultural Tenancy Act. Thus,
section 4 of Rep. Act 1199, as amended by Rep. Act 2263,
provides that
Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either
personally or with the aid of labor available from members of
his immediate farm household, undertaken to cultivate a piece
of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person
together with members of his immediate farm household,
belonging to a legally possessed by another in consideration of
a fixed amount in money or in produced or in both.
Furthermore, section 42 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act defines
a landlord-lessor as
Any person, natural or judicial, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land, who lets,
leases or rents to another said property for purposes of
agricultural production and for a price certain of ascertainable
either in amount of money or produced;
while a tenant-lessee is defined as
any person who, with the consent of the former (landlord-
lessor), tills, cultivates or operates said land, susceptible of
cultivation by one individual, personally or with the aid of labor
available from among his own immediate farm household.
Gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the following could be
synthesized as the principal elements of a lease-hold tenancy
contract or relation:
1. The object of the contract or the relationship is
an agricultural land which is leased or rented for the purpose of
agricultural production;
2. The size of the landholding must be such that it
is susceptible of personal cultivation by a single person with
assistance from the members of his immediate farm
household;
3. The tenant-lessee must actually and personally till, cultivate
or operate said land, solely or with the aid of labor from his
immediate farm household; and
4. The landlord-lessor, who is either the lawful owner or the
legal possessor of the land, leases the same to the tenant-
lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in a amount of
money or produce.
Reverting to the controverted "Contract of Lease", we are of
the consensus that it indubitably contains the forgoing essential
elements of a leasehold tenancy agreement.
The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land
devoted to agricultural production. More specifically, the parties
stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or utilized for
agricultural enterprise only". (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the farmland must be
used for rice production as could be inferred from the
stipulation that "the rental of nine (9) cavans of palay per
hectare for one agricultural year ... must be of the same variety
(of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE". (Emphasis
supplied)
The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single
person as it is of an area of only four and A half (4-½) hectares.
This Court has held 2 that even a bigger area may be cultivated
personally by the tenant, singly or with the help of the members
of his immediate farm household.
From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same
variety as that  produced by the LESSEE", it can reasonably be
inferred that the intention of the parties was that Macaraeg
personally work the land, which he did as found by the
Agrarian Court, thus: "In the instant
case,  petitioner  (Macaraeg) cultivated the
landholding belonging to said respondent (Teodoro) for the
agricultural year 1960-61 in consideration of a fixed annual
rental." (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, there is no evidence
that Macaraeg did not personally cultivate the land in dispute.
Neither did Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg
availed of outside assistance in the cultivation of the said
riceland.
Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding
and he delivered the possession thereof to Macaraeg in
consideration of a rental certain to be paid in produce.
Evidently, there was a valid leasehold tenancy agreement.
Moreover, the provision that the rental be accounted in terms
of produce — 9 cavans per hectare — is an unmistakable
earmark, considering the other stipulations, that the parties did
actually enter into a leasehold tenancy relation.
Teodoro further argues, however, that the aforesaid "Contract
of Lease" cannot possibly be construed as establishing a
leasehold tenancy relation because the parties themselves
ignored and repudiated the very essence of tenancy — security
of tenure — when they stipulated that "this agreement shall
only be for the agricultural year 1960-61".
This argument is unacceptable. The mere fact that the parties
fixed and limited the duration of their lease contract to only one
agricultural year, does not remove the relationship which they
created from the purview of leasehold tenancy, considering the
general import of their agreement which irreversibly leads to
and clearly justifies tenancy coverage. It is fundamental that
the tenant-lessee's security of tenure subsists notwithstanding
the termination of the contract which initially established the
tenancy relation. In the language of the law, the "expiration of
the period of the contract  as fixed by the parties ... does not of
itself extinguish the relationship". 3 This is a "practical
consequence of the distinction between the tenancy contract
which is fixed by the parties, and the tenancy relationship
which is maintained and governed by law". 4 Furthermore,
section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides that
Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the
period of future surrender of the land, in all cases where land
devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system
of tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his holdings
by the landholder except for any of the causes hereinafter
enumerated and only after the same has been proved before
and the dispossession is authorized bye the court." (Emphasis
supplied)
The abovecited provision does not permit the parties to
stipulate at what future time the tenant shall leave or surrender
the land. Thus, this Court has held  5 that an agreement
whereby the tenant was required to return to the landlord his
landholding after one crop year cannot justify the tenant's
dispossession after the said period because such agreement is
expressly proscribed by law.
Still vehemently contending that he never intended to enter into
any tenancy relation with Macaraeg, Teodoro finally argues
that construing the abovementioned "Contract of Lease" as a
leasehold tenancy agreement would amount to a judicial
negation of his freedom to contract.
Needless to stress, this Court frowns upon and rejects any
attempt to nullify the legitimate exercise of the right to contract.
We agree with Teodoro that as a landholder he has full liberty
to enter into a civil lease contract covering his property. What
we want to indelibly impress, however, is that once a
landowner enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to
be devoted to agricultural production and said landholding is
susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with
help of labor coming from his immediate farm household, then
such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement,
and perforce comes under the direct coverage of the tenancy
laws. Otherwise, it would be easy to subvert, under the guise of
the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting
the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the
unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the landed
gentry.
II. We now come to the second assignment of error. Teodoro
posits that granting the establishment of a leasehold tenancy
relation between him and Macaraeg by virtue of the aforesaid
"Contract of Lease", the agrarian court nevertheless erred in
not finding Macaraeg guilty of abandonment, an act which
terminates the tenancy relation and justifies the ejectment of
the tenant. In support of his thesis, Teodoro points out that
Macaraeg committed a positive act of abandonment when he
offered to vacate his leasehold in favor of a certain Luciano
Claus, and only after "he could not have his own way of placing
Luciano Claus as his successor" did he try to "recover the land
holding". Assuming the veracity of the foregoing allegation, a
tenant's offer or intention to surrender his hold on the condition
that the person named by him should be accepted as his
successor, does not of itself constitute abandonment of his
farmland.
"The word 'abandon', in its ordinary sense, means to forsake
entirely; to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace
this word to the root idea of 'putting under a ban'. The
emphasis is on the finality and the publicity with which some
thing or body is thus put in the control of another, and hence
the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never again to
resume or claim one's rights or interests." 6 In other words, the
act of abandonment constitutes actual, absolute and
irrevocable desertion of one's right or property. In the case at
bar, Macaraeg merely intended to vacate his leasehold
possession on the condition that a certain Claus be taken as
his successor. Hence, his act did not constitute desertion of his
leasehold as it was a mere intended surrender of the same.
And as correctly espoused by the counsel for the respondent
court, it is "only through the actual surrender of the land that
tenancy relation terminates; no amount of intention to
surrender severs the relationship". Furthermore, the said act of
Macaraeg was not an absolute renunciation of his leasehold
possession, as it was in fact clearly conditional.
However, Teodoro also claims, with characteristic certitude that
Macaraeg did actually abandon work on the land in dispute and
that even the decision under review contains a finding to this
effect. We find no statement in the agrarian court's decision
sustaining Teodoro's view. On the contrary, we perceive truth
in the respondent court's counsel's manifestation that
The only times that the tenant herein did not work the land
were (1) during the time it was undergoing its regular dry
season fallow, and, ... (2) after he was prohibited from plowing
the land by a certain Niegos, an agent of petitioner. Failure to
cultivate during the dry season fallow definitely does not
amount to abandonment (Cf. De la Cruz vs. Asociacion
Zangera Casilan et al., 83 Phil. 214). Likewise, failure to
cultivate the land by reason of the forcible prohibition to do so
by a third party cannot also amount to abandonment, for
abandonment presupposes free will.
Anent the charge of abandonment, it is also pertinent to note
that four days after Macaraeg received a letter from Teodoro
and his wife advising him that the landholding in question will
be given to another tenant, he lost no time in inquiring from the
Tenancy Mediation Commission at Cabanatuan City about his
rights as a leasehold tenant. It would appear therefore that
Macaraeg's immediate reaction to his landlord's design to
dispossess him negates the act of abandonment imputed to
him.
Moreover, Teodoro's pretension that Macaraeg had
abandoned the disputed landholding was squarely rejected by
the agrarian court, thus:
In the instant case, while petitioner had intentions to surrender
his landholding to respondent after the harvest for the
agricultural (year) 1960-61 which led the latter to advise the
former not to give his landholding to Luciano Claus, yet that
surrender did not materialize because said petitioner had
apparently changed his mind. For as early as March 6, 1961,
petitioner went to the Office of the Tenancy Mediation
Commission, Cabanatuan City for consultation. As a matter of
fact, said Commission wrote a letter to Fidel Teodoro and his
wife advising them to enjoin their overseer, Benito Ismael, from
ejecting petitioner.
During the intervening period, Fidel Teodoro and his wife
entered into another lease contract of tenancy with Jose
Niegos. For this reason, Mariano Niegos, son of Jose Niegos,
prevented petitioner from plowing his landholding when he
found him in the premises on June 1, 1961. However,
notwithstading this incident, Fidel Teodoro opened the door for
negotiations. In fact, as late as June 23, 1961, when petitioner
went to the house of Fidel Teodoro in Manila, a conference
was set for that purpose at the house of Benito Ismael
in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija which did not take place because of the
absence of petitioner. Under these circumstances, it appears to
our mind that while negotiations for settlement were still
pending, yet  petitioner has not, in truth and in fact,
surrendered his landholding. (Emphasis supplied)
We are not at liberty to reverse the foregoing finding of fact in
the absence of any proof that it is unfounded or was arbitrarily
arrived at or that the Court had failed to consider important
evidence to the contrary. 7 This Court has consistently ruled
that the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations will
not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial evidence
to support them. 8 In the case at bar, the finding of fact by the
by the respondent court anent the issue of abandonment rests
on substantial evidence.
III. Toward the end of the proceedings in the respondent court,
Macaraeg interposed a pleading which he denominated
"supplemental petition", wherein he asked for damages as a
result of his dispossession. The said "supplemental petition"
was given due course by the hearing commissioner and
Macaraeg was allowed to present evidence in support thereof.
On the basis of the evidence thus adduced, the respondent
court awarded damages to Macaraeg as decreed in its
abovementioned resolution of November 27, 1962.
Teodoro maintains that the respondent court erred in admitting
the said "supplemental pleading" on the basis of section 2,
Rule 17 (now section 3 of Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of
Court) which exclusively pertains to amendment of pleadings,
and has nothing to do with the interposition of supplemental
pleadings which is separately governed by section 5 of Rule 17
(now section 5 of Rule 10). Teodoro avers, moreover, that
since Macaraeg filed his claim for damages only when the
hearing below was about to end, his inaction must be
considered as a waiver of such claim or that he should be
considered guilty of fatal negligence.
In resolving this last assignment of error, attentions must be
centered on the liberal policy which frees the Court of Agrarian
Relations from the fetters of formalistic procedure. As aptly
observed in one case,9
Social justice would be a meaningless term if in a situation like
the present, an element of rigidity would be affixed to
procedure precepts and made to cover the matter. Flexibility
should not be ruled out. Precisely, what is sought to be
accomplished, by such a fundamental principle expressly so
declared by the Constitution (Art. II, sec. 5) is the effectiveness
of the community's effort to assist the economically
underprivileged. For under existing conditions, without such
succor and support, they might not, unaided, be able to secure
justice for themselves....
Moreover, there is equally the obligation on the part of the
State to afford protection to labor. The responsibility is
incumbent then, not only on the legislative and executive
branches but also on the judiciary, to translate this pledge into
a living reality. The present case is an appropriate occasion for
the discharge of such a trust. To preclude relief under the
circumstances herein disclosed would be to fail to submit to the
dictates of a plain constitutional duty. That we should not allow
to happen.
Since the abovementioned "supplemental pleading" was filed
without intent to delay the proceedings, the agrarian court
exercised sound discretion in giving it due course in order that
"the real matter in dispute and all matters in the action in
dispute between the parties may, as far as possible, be
completely determined in a single proceeding". Moreover
Teodoro has no reason to complain, for he was accorded every
opportunity to controvert Macaraeg's claim for damages, but
apparently he did not, as in fact he does not here traverse the
substantiality of the award.lawphi1.nêt
Significantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not restricted to
the specific relief claimed or demanding made by the parties to
the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter
or determination which may be deemed necessary and
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further disputes, provided said matter for
determination has been established by competent evidence
during the hearing". 10 In words, the respondent court could
have determined Macaraeg's claim for damages even without
his "supplemental petition", provided there was proof to
substantiate such claim (and such requisite evidence was not
wanting). Hence if the agrarian court could, have awarded
damages in favor of Macaraeg even in the absence of a
specific prayer; then there is no conceivable reason to bar the
respondent court from granting the same with the interposition
of the aforesaid "supplemental petition" which explicitly and
unmistakeably prays for damages resulting from Macaraeg's
dispossession.
We hasten to modify however, the award of damages in so far
as it deducts from the total amount recoverable by Macaraeg
the sum of P30 or its equivalent of 3 cavans of palay,
representing his earnings during the period of his unlawful
ejectment. This part of the award contravenes section 27(1) of
the Agricultural Tenancy Act which makes the erring landlord
"liable to the tenant for damages to the extent of the
landholder's participation in the harvest in addition to the
tenant's right under Section twenty-two of this Act". And section
22(1) provides that the "tenant shall be free to work elsewhere
whenever the nature of his farm obligations warrants his
temporary absence from his holdings". Consequently,
Macaraeg's measly earning of P30 during the period of his
dispossession should not be deducted from the total amount of
damages due to him. Interpreting the abovecited section 27(1)
in relation to section 22(1), this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes held that
The earnings of the tenants during the period of unlawful
ejectment are not now deductible from the award of damages.
In the case of Potenciano vs. Estefani L-7690, promulgated on
27 July 1955, this Court, on grounds of equity, ruled to deduct
such income but said case was decided under the prior law,
Act 4054. The above-quoted Section 27(1) of Republic Act No.
1199, as amended, which is the one applicable to the present
case, not only provides for a quantum of damages to the
tenant, based on the landlord's share in the harvest, but adds
thereto his right under section 22, which states:
(1) the tenant shall be free to work elsewhere whenever the
nature of his farm obligations warrants his temporary absence
from his holdings.
This right, although already granted under section 20 of Act
4054, was not then a right additional to the recovery of
damages consequent to unlawful dismissal, but under Republic
Act 1199, as amended, it is to be added to the damages
recoverable.11
ACCORDINGLY, the decision and resolution under review are
hereby affirmed, with the sole modification that the earnings of
the herein respondent during the period of his dispossession
shall not be deducted from the award of damages. Cost
against the petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. 126425 August 12, 1998
POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA
NISNISAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PACITA MANCERA, WENCESLAO
MANCERA and SILVESTRE POLANCOS, respondentsP.
MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court assails the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39416 affirming en toto the
decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 21) of Bansalan,
Davao del Sur, in Civil Case No. XXI-5 (86), which dismissed
petitioners' complaint for reinstatement of tenancy holding filed
against private respondents spouses Pacita Mancera and
Wenceslao Mancera.
The facts as culled from the record are as follows:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a
parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 2510, Cad 275 located
at Dolo, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with an area of 4,9774
hectares, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (P-11676)-
2151. Petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan, son of Gavino Nisnisan,
has been cultivating one hectare of the aforesaid land since
1961.
On April 1, 1976, Gavino Nisnisan and petitioner Policarpio
Nisnisan entered into a leasehold tenancy contract 3 which
stipulates a sharing arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest, the
bigger share being given to the latter.
On December 28, 1978, Gavino Nisnisan sold two hectares of
their land, including the land tenanted by petitioners-spouses
Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan, to private respondents-
spouses Wenceslao Mancera and Pacita H. Mancera.
As a result of the sale, petitioners-spouses were ousted from
their landholding. Hence, on November 24, 1982, petitioners-
spouses instituted an action 4 for reinstatement of tenancy
holding against private respondent spouses Wenceslao and
Pacita Mancera before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR)
in Davao City. The case was later transferred to the Regional
Trial Court when the CAR was abolished. The said complaint
was dismissed without prejudice on December 16, 1985.
Sometime in 1983, Gavino Nisnisan demanded from the
Mancera spouses to repurchase the said land but the latter
refused. Hence, on November 3, 1986, spouses Gavino and
Florencia Nisnisan, together with the petitioners-spouses
Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan, filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court for: (a) repurchase of the subject land
under the Public Land Act, (b) declaration of nullity of the
instrument of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15954,
(c) reinstatement of tenancy holding and (d) damages. 5 The
complaint alleged among others,
x x x           x x x          x x x
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
1. Plaintiffs herein are agricultural tenants-lessees under the
Provisions of PD No. 27 on a portion of one (1) hectare of that
parcel of land sold by plaintiffs to the defendants by virtue of
the conveyance dated March 31, 1982; said tenanted portion is
devoted and cultivated by tenants plaintiffs to lowland rice
culture as shown by an accomplished OTAC FORM No. 56-B
with the land owner prior to the aforementioned sale;
2. That, despite the verbal agreement between defendants
vendee and plaintiffs tenants for plaintiffs herein to continue
and cultivate their tenancy holdings in pursuant to PD No. 27
availing security of tenancy tenure on any land sold if devoted
to rice and corn culture, defendants ejected the plaintiffs
without court order, and therefore plaintiffs were deprived of
their only livelihood;
3. That, in disregard of and to subvert PD No. 27, defendants
induced plaintiff Policarpio Nisnisan to sign a prepared affidavit
which he did not know nor understood the correct import
purporting that he has surrendered his tenancy holdings; that
the execution of said affidavit was without the knowledge,
consent, and participation of his tenant spouse, Erlinda
Nisnisan;
4. That, despite that plaintiffs and defendants agreed that in
case of sale or transfer of ownership of the tenanted portion
the security of tenure of the plaintiffs follows the land as
established under PD. No. 27, but that after the sale, the
defendants persisted in ejecting the plaintiffs from said tenancy
holdings; that despite plaintiffs availing of the provisions of PD
No. 1508, no settlement and/or conciliation was reached in the
Office of the Lupon Tagapayapa, as a result in case No. 70 a
certification to file action has been issued;
5. That, plaintiffs have been deprived of their income from said
land holdings as tenant thereof under PD No. 27; defendants
therefore are liable for damages:
Traversing the allegation in the complaint with regard to the
prayer for reinstatement of tenancy holding of petitioners
Nisnisan spouses, which is the sole subject matter in this
petition, the private respondents Mancera spouses countered
that the Nisnisan spouses have no cause of action, the latter
having voluntarily surrendered their landholding. 6
On June 25, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint ruling that the petitioners-spouses'
allegation of tenancy is repudiated by the affidavit executed by
Gavino Nisnisan to the effect that the subject land is not
tenanted. The trial court ratiocinated in this wise:
As to the claim of reinstatement by Policarpio Nisnisan, it
appears from the affidavit (Exhibit X for the Court) of Gavino
Nisnisan which was executed and filed with the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur, and recorded as Entry No.
117718, per memorandum of encumbrances of Original
Certificate of Title No. (P-11676)-2151 (Exhibit A/5-C) that the
said land is not tenanted. This claim therefore by no less than
plaintiff Gavino Nisnisan, has totally shattered the claim of
tenancy of Policarpio Nisnisan. A fortiori therefore the claim for
reinstatement has to fail. 7
The above-quoted ruling of the trial court was affirmed by the
respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision dated November
20, 1995 which substantially adopted the trial court's findings,
thus:
The Memorandum of Encumbrances of appellant Gavino's
OCT No. (P-11676)-2151 (Exhibits A to A-3) contain two
entries of affidavit of non-tenancy. The first is Entry No. 72086
for Affidavit of Non-Tenancy under Justice Circular No. 31. The
second Entry No. 117718 for Affidavit of Non-Tenancy
executed by Gavino Nisnisan, vendor. Also appellants-spouses
Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan executed a Joint Affidavit dated
January 28, 1985 wherein they averred the following:
9. That it is not true that our son and his wife were our tenants
in the said land as they did not give any share to us nor did we
ask for it and any semblance of tenancy they did have was only
a ploy that did enable them to borrow under the Masagana 99
programs of the government which they did ultimately failed to
pay but which we paid as parents if only to save our son from
being prosecuted and jailed for estafa. 8
Aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioners-
spouses now come to this Court on the sole issue of: "Whether
or not petitioners Spouses Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan
voluntarily surrendered their tenancy holding."
We find merit in the petition.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners-spouses
are not tenants of the subject land holding is erroneous. While
there are annotations in Gavino Nisnisan's certificate of title
(Entry No. 72086 for Affidavit of Non-Tenancy under Justice
Circular No. 31 and Entry No. 117718 for Affidavit of Non-
Tenancy executed by Gavino Nisnisan) that the subject land is
not tenanted, said annotations are not conclusive proof of the
real relationship between Gavino Nisnisan and petitioner
Policarpio Nisnisan and are not binding upon the court. As we
have ruled in Cuaño vs. Court of Appeals, 9
We believe and so hold that such annotation cannot be
regarded as conclusive upon the courts of justice as to the
legal nature and incidents of the relationship between the
landowner(s) in this case and private respondents. Firstly, the
annotation serves basically as notice to all persons of the
existence of the Certification issued by Mr. Eugenio Bernardo,
but neither adds to the validity or correctness of that
certification nor converts a defective and invalid instrument into
a valid one as between the parties. Secondly, the certification
issued by Mr. Eugenio Bernardo of the MAR (Ministry of
Agrarian Reform) is very much like the certifications issued by
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and other officials of the
Ministry and later the Department of Agrarian Reform
concerning the existence of tenancy relationships in respect of
agricultural lands from which persons, who claim to be tenants,
are sought to be ejected. It is well-settled that the findings of or
certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or
his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties are merely preliminary or provisional and
not binding upon the courts. (Emphasis Ours)
Moreover, petitioners-spouses have sufficiently shown that
they are the tenants of the spouses Gavino and Florencia
Nisnisan as evidenced by a document entitled "Panagsabutan
Sa Abang Sa Yuta" (Exhibit "D"), executed by Gavino Nisnisan
and Policarpio Nisnisan on April 1, 1976, acknowledged before
the Municipal Trial Court Judge Mariano C. Tupas of Bansalan,
Davao del Sur, and registered before the Municipal Treasurer's
Office, portions of which read:
x x x           x x x          x x x
2 Nga ang yuta nga giasoy sa itaas pagatamnan sa NAGA-
ABANG SA YUTA ug humay . . . sa panahon sa ting-ulan ug
humay . . . sa panahon sa ting-init sulod sa termino niining
kasabutan, ubos sa mga kondisyones nga mao;
x x x           x x x          x x x
4. Nga ang naasoy nga yuta pagaabangan ug . . . 15 ka bakid
nga . . . humay sa tag 50 kilos kada bakid para sa panuig, ug
15 ka bakid nga . . . humay sa tag 50 kilos kada bakid para sa
pangulilang . . .;
5. Nga ang abang para sa tuig tingtanum adto ibayad sa
NAGAPAABANG o sa iyang piniyalan sa sulod sa 3 ka adlaw
sukad sa petsa sa ting-ani . . . ihatud sa balay sa nagpa-abang
o kon kagustuhan sa NAGAPAABANG SA YUTA, mahimo
iyang kuha-on ang abang sa petsa sa tinggiok . . . .
6. Nga kon pananglitan, ang maong tanum madaut nga balor
ug 75% tungod sa mga hinungdan nga dill tinuyo (fortuituos
event or force majeure) ang NAGA-ABANG SA YUTA DILI
mapugos sa pagbayad sa gikasabutan abang alang nianang
tuiga, apan kinahangalan pagbayaran niya kanang maong
abang pinaagi sa data-data sa sukad sa 50% (kuarta o humay
sa kada ting-ani mag sugod sa sunod nga ting tanum hangtud
nga maimpas ang bayranan;
x x x           x x x          x x x
The above-quoted document evidences the leasehold tenancy
relationship between Gavino Nisnisan and petitioner Policarpio
Nisnisan. It clearly shows that the subject land is agricultural;
that petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan is obligated to cultivate the
same by planting rice thereon; and, that there is sharing of the
harvests between the said parties. It is clear that essential
elements of tenancy relationship 10 are present in this case,
namely:
1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant
2. the subject matter is agricultural land
3. there is consent SO ORDERED.

4. the purpose is agricultural production Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

5. there is personal cultivation by the tenants

6. there is sharing of harvests between parties

Significantly, this documentary evidence of leasehold tenancy

relationship was never rebutted by the private respondents-
spouses. Furthermore, this leasehold tenancy contract cannot
be defeated by the aforementioned affidavit of non-tenancy
executed by Gavino Nisnisan, which is obviously self-serving.

Private respondents likewise impliedly admitted in their answer

to the complaint that petitioners-spouses are tenants when
they alleged that petitioners-spouses have voluntarily
surrendered the subject landholding. 11 This brings us to the
issue of whether or not petitioners-spouses have indeed
voluntarily surrendered the subject landholding. Upon perusal
of the record of the case, we find private respondents'
contention baseless. Other than their bare allegations, private
respondents failed to present any evidence to show that
petitioners-spouses surrendered their landholding voluntarily
after the private respondents purchased the subject property.
Moreover, the filing of the complaint for reinstatement of
leasehold tenancy by petitioners-spouses against private
respondents before the CAR militates against the private
respondents' claim that petitioners-spouses voluntarily
surrendered their landholding to them.

Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, 12 voluntary

surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold
tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved
by competent evidence. The tenant's intention to surrender the
landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by
mere implication. 13

Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-

spouses are agricultural lessees and are therefore entitled to
security of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act
3844:

Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by

Expiration of Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation
under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of
the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or
transfers the legal possession of the landholdings, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural
lessor. (Emphasis Ours)

Thus, the agricultural leasehold relation cannot be extinguished

by the mere expiration of the term or period in an agricultural
leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. He can only be ejected for
cause 14, which, however, is absent in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated

November 20, 1995 is hereby MODIFIED in that, petitioners-
spouses Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan are declared tenants
and AFFIRMED in all other respects.