D.D.

BASU

Article 19

 Pg 2099: Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India 1: it was held that when the Constitution
makers enacted Part III, they inscribed in the Constitution certain basic rights which
inhere in every human being and which are essential for the unfolding and
development of his full personality. These rights represented the basic values of a
civilized society and the Constitution makers declared that they shall be given a place
of pride in the Constitution and elevated to the status of fundamental rights.
 Pg 2100: had there been no restraints, the rights and freedom may tend to become the
synonymous of anarchy and disorder.
 Pg 2100: Individual liberty will be subordinated to the social interests.
 Pg 2100: it is right that is fundamental and not the limitation2(petitioner)
 Pg 2100: The fundamental rights themselves have no fixed content and the attempt of
the Court should be to expand and reach the ambit
 Pg 2101: The article was thus intended to protect these rights against State action
other than in the legitimate exercise of its power to regulate private rights in the
public interest.
 Pg 2102: Freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy, as an emanation
from them which one can characterize as a Fundamental Right, it cannot be said the
said right is absolute.
 Pg 2103: Political, Social and Economic changes occurring in the country may entail
the recognition of new rights and the law in its eternal youth grows to meet social
demands.
 Pg 2103: the chapter dealing with Fundamental Rights is contained in Part III of the
Constitution. The purpose of this part is to safeguard the basic human rights from the
vicissitudes of political controversy and to place them beyond the reach of political
parties who, by virtue of their majority, may come to form the Government at the
Centre or in the State. It was further held that primacy of the interest of the nation

1
(1978) 1 SCC 248.
2
Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1951 SC 270.
 and the security of the State will have to be read into the Universal Declaration as
also in every article dealing with Fundamental Rights.
 Pg 2103: it was held that Fundamental Rights in India may have to be read along
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and if need by its domestic
jurisprudence. Chairman, Railway Board vs Chandrima Das, AIR 2000 SC 988.
 Pg 2104: In sum. Art. 14, 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive. In Maneka Gandhi v.
UOI, it was held that Arts. 14, 19 and 21 are not to be interpreted in water-tight
compartments and consequently a law depriving a person of personal liberty and
prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Art. 21 has to stand
the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Art. 19 and is also
to be listed with references to Art. 14. It was held that principles of reasonableness
pervades all these articles.
 Pg 2108: those great and basic rights which are recognised and guaranteed as the
natural rights inherent in the status of a citizen of a free country.
 Pg 2108: Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala: It was contended that the
constitution contain 12 features and one such basic feature is “the guarantee of basic
human right elaborated in Part III of the Constitution. But in the decision, some
learned judges held “the dignity of the individual secured by various freedom and
basic rights in Part III” is an essential feature. Two other judges held “the essential
features of the individual freedom secured to the citizens” is a basic features.
 Pg 2110: Part III, basic structure doctrine, Ninth Schedule, any article violating basic
structure with Article 21 read in the ambit of 14 and 19 cannot be included in Ninth
Schedule. Ninth Schedule contains acts that violate your fundamental right but are
still applicable and cannot be questioned in the court of law.
 Pg 2118: Since the disappearance of the fetish of laissez faire and the emergence of
the Welfare State, it is generally acknowledged that the individual can have no
absolute or unfettered right in any manner and that the welfare of the individual, as a
member of collective society, lies in a happy compromise between his rights as an
individual and the interests of the society to which he belongs.
 Pg 2120: there cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty, for that
would lead to anarchy and disorder. (Respondent)
 Pg 2120: The exercise of the right under Art. 19(1)(a) will come to an end when such
exercise threatens to infringe the fundamental right of another. (Respondent)
 Pg 2120: Liberty is itself gift of the law and may by the law be forfeited or abridged.
(Respondent)
 Pg 2121: According to the maxim, “sic utere tuo ut alicinium now laedes”, which
being universal application, it must, of course, be within the range of legislature
action to define the mode and manner in which everyone may so use his own as not
to injure others.
 Pg 2122: it is the rights which are fundamental, not the limitations and it is the duty
of the Supreme Court and all Courts in the land to guard and defend those rights,
zealously.
 Pg 2122: Restraints are permissible only to the extent they have a nexus with the
approved object. (Petitioner)
 Pg 2122: A legislature cannot restrict these freedoms beyond the requirement of Art.
19(2) to 19(6).
 Pg 2122: But while considering the validity of restriction, the Courts will have to
take note of the ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’. It was held that the
Constitution aims at bringing about a synthesis between ‘Fundamental Rights and
Directive Principles of State Policy’ by giving to the former a place of pride and to
the latter a place of permanence.
 Pg 2123: In determining the constitutional validity of any statutory provision, the
fundamental duties as envisaged in Part IV-A must also be taken into consideration.
The same principle was reiterated in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, wherein it was
held that so far as the Courts are concerned when there is no apparent inconsistency
between the Directive Principle of State Policy contained in Part IV and the
Fundamental Rights mentioned in Part III, which in fact supplement each other, there
is no difficulty in putting a harmonious construction which advances the object of the
Constitution.
 Pg 2123: the interest of a citizen or section of community, however important, is
secondary to the interest of the country or community as a whole.
 Pg 2123: a restriction placed on any Fundamental Rights, aimed at securing directive
principles will be held “reasonable” and hence intra vires subject to two limitations:
(1) that it does not run in clear conflict with the Fundamental Rights and (2) that it
has been enacted within the legislative competence of the enacting legislature.
  Pg 2123: It follows that the limitations enumerated in Art. 19 were intended to be
exhaustive3 and are to be strictly construed4.
 Pg 2124: the Court cannot enlarge the relevant limitation clause to admit other
grounds on any theory of ‘Police Power’. Read Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras,
herein which ‘public order’ as a ground of restriction was added. Important lines,
D.D.Basu Pg 2124: the State would have been powerless to restrict or punish the use
of the freedom of expression even though it caused or tended to cause a breach of
public peace and tranquillity. (Respondent)
 Pg 2124: H.M. Seervai: the rights represent the claims of the individual, the
limitation protect the claims of other individuals and the claim of the society or the
state; to say that the rights are fundamental and the limitations are not is to destroy
the balance Art. 19 was designed to achieve. To say this is not to be little
fundamental rights, but only to say that the rights are not absolute and can be enjoyed
only in an orderly society. (Respondent)
 Pg 2125: Once the violation of rights under Art. 19(1) is prima facie established, the
burden is on the State to establish that the law comes within the provisions of Art.
19(2) to 19(6).
 Pg 2125: The reason why the State cannot travel beyond the contents of Cls. (2) – (6)
in curbing a fundamental right guaranteed by Cl. (1), is that Cl. (1) guarantees an
‘absolute and unconditional right’, ‘subject only to reasonable restriction that may be
imposed by the Legislature in the public interest under the relevant limitation in Cls.
(2) – (6).
 Pg 2125: the grounds specified in Cls. (2) – (6) being exhaustive, they should be
strictly construed.
 Pg 2125: the law which imposes the restriction must be otherwise valid. A restriction
which is not authorised by a valid law cannot be saved by any other clauses.5
 Pg: 2127: it is the business of the Court to see that in restricting the abuses of the
exercise of a fundamental right in the collective interests, the Legislature does not go
to the length of abridging the right itself.
 Pg 2127: De Jonge v. Oregon, “the fundamental rights of freedom of speech, of the
press and of assembly, guaranteed by the Constitution may be abused by using
3
Sakal Papers v. UOI, AIR 1962 SC 305.
4
Kovacs v. Cooper (1949) 336 US 77.
5
Yasin v Town Area Committee, (1952) SCR 572
 speech or press or assembly in order to incite violence or crime. The people through
their legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse. But the ‘legislative
intervention’ can find constitutional justification only by dealing with the abuse. The
rights themselves cannot be curtailed....”
 Pg 2128: the Supreme Court has been constituted as a protector and guarantor of the
Fundamental Rights. It was held that Fundamental Rights are intended not only to
protect individual rights, but they are based on public policy. Liberty of the
individual and the protection of the Fundamental Rights are the very essence of the
democratic way of life adopted by the Constitution and it is the privilege and duty of
the Court to uphold those rights.
 Pg 2133: the Courts will examine the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed,
the nature and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied, the duration and whether
they are proportionate to the needs of such restriction. (Respondent) (Petitioner)
 Pg 2133: the restriction must not be arbitrary or excessive and must strike a proper
balance between the freedom and need for social control. The Court will test the
reasonableness, if necessary, not only be considering surrounding circumstances, but
also contemporaneous legislation passed as part of single scheme.
 Pg 2133: Implementation of the directive principles contained in Part IV is within the
expression in the interest of general public.
 Pg 2133: Under our Constitution, the word ‘reasonable’ in Cls.(2) to (6) of Art. 19
enables the Court to determine not only whether the impugned restrictive law is, in
fact, in the interests of public order, morality, or security of the State (or any other
ground of restriction permitted by the relevant restrictive clause of Art. 19), but also
whether the restriction sought to be imposed by the legislation is reasonable, having
regard to the objective test, viz, whether the restriction has a reasonable relation to
the authorised purpose or is an arbitrary abridgement of the freedom guaranteed by
the Article under the cloak of any of the exceptions. In short, under Cls. (2) to
(6), the reasonableness is to be applied as to the necessity for the ‘restriction’, the
means adopted for securing that end, as well as the procedure to be followed.
 Pg 2133: when a law is impugned as, having imposed a restriction upon a
fundamental right, what the Court has to examine is the substance of the legislation,
without being beguiled by the mere appearance of the legislation. While considering
the scope of ‘restriction’, the first question to be considered is the sweep of the
 fundamental right guaranteed by the relevant Clauses (a) to (g) of Clause (1). If the
right canvassed falls within the sweep and expanse of any of the sub-clauses, then the
next question to be considered is whether the impugned law imposes a reasonable
restriction falling within the scope of clause of Art. 19 (2) to (6).
 Pg 2134: the legislature cannot disobey the constitutional prohibitions by employing
an indirect method. The legislative power being, subject to the fundamental rights,
the Legislature cannot indirectly take away or abridge the fundamental rights which it
cannot do directly.6
 Pg 2134: A punishment cannot be restriction.7
 Pg 2135: the possible or remote effects of a legislation upon any particular
fundamental right cannot be said to constitute a restriction upon the right.
 Pg 2136: Under the ‘principle of proportionality’ the Court will see that the
‘Legislature’ and the ‘administrative authority’ maintain a proper balance between
the adverse affects which the legislation or the administration order may have on the
rights liberties or interests of the persons keeping in mind the people which they were
intended to serve.
 Pg 2136: where the effect of the law is to curtail or restrain the exercise of a
fundamental law, it must be regarded as a ‘restriction’ within the purview of Cls. (2)
– (6), even though it may not be restrictive in its terms.
 Pg 2136: Conditions of a valid restriction:
I. It must be imposed by law
II. Such law must be made by the ‘State’
III. Such law must be valid
IV. The restriction must be proximately related to any of the grounds specified in
the limitation Cls. (2) – (6), which may be relevant to the fundamental right in
question.
V. The restriction imposed by the law must be ‘reasonable’ except in cases
coming under sub-Cls. (i)-(ii) of Cl. (6).
 Pg 2137: the control or restriction must be imposed only by a ‘legislative act’ and not
by any executive instruction.

6
Kerala Education Bill, in re, AIR 1958 SC 956.
7
Raghubir Singh v. Courts of Wards, Ajmer,, AIR 1953 SC 373.
  Pg 2137: from the language of Clauses (2) to (6), it is clear that the restriction referred
to these clauses can be imposed only by law including intra vires sub-ordinate
legislation.
 Pg 2137: The Legislature, however, is not required to make a law solely for the
purpose of imposing the restriction. A restriction may be imposed by a general law, if
the other conditions are satisfied.
 Pg 2138: the restrictions referred to in Cls. (2) to (6) of Art. 19 may be imposed by
any of the authorities that come within the comprehensive definition of “the State”, in
Art. 12, who are competent to make a ‘law’ as defined in Art. 13 (3) (a).8
 Pg 2138: A restriction which is not authorised by a valid law cannot be saved by any
of these clauses.9
 Pg 2139: the State cannot directly make a law which directly restricts one freedom
even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. (Petitioner)
 Pg 2139: similarly, a regulatory measure does not became arbitrary or unreasonable,
merely because it could not achieve the purpose.10
 Pg 2139: When the freedom of speech gets intertwined with business it undergoes a
fundamental change and its exercise has to be balanced against the social interests.
 Pg 2140: If a ‘must carry’ provision furthers informed decision-making which is the
essence of the right to speech and expression, it will not amount to violation of
fundamental rights. If, however, such a provision compels a person to carry out
propaganda or project of partisan or distorted point of view, contrary to his wish, it
may be restraint on his fundamental right.11
 Pg 2140: it cannot be claimed by a citizen that his right t exercise one of the freedoms
‘should be unfettered by any restriction which the State would otherwise be entitled to
impose in respect of another freedom.
 Pg 2140: not only should the restriction, in order to be valid, relate to any of the
grounds mentioned in the relevant limitation clause, but the relationship between the
impugned legislation and any of the relevant specified grounds must be rational or
proximate.12

8
Vrajlal v State of MP, AIR 1970 SC 129.
9
Yasin v Town Area Committee, (1952) SCR 572.
10
DCM v UOI, (1983) 4 SCC 166.
11
UOI v Mohan Pictures Association, AIR 1999 SC 2334
12
Sodhi Shamsher v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 276
  Pg 2141: the limitation imposed in the interests of public order to be a reasonable
restriction, should be one which has a proximate connection or nexus with public
order, but one far fetched hypothetical or problematical or too remote.13 (Petitioner)
 Pg 2141: freedom of speech and expression is the ‘life blood of democracy’, but the
freedom is subject to certain qualifications including prohibition on scandalising the
Court, the purpose of the prohibition being to protect the administration of justice.
 Pg 2141: The State is objected to maintain communal harmony and public order. The
State is entitled to curb freedom of speech and expression, which in the opinion of the
State is likely to trigger communal antagonism and hatred. This also follows from the
expression in the interests of which occurs in each of the limitation Clauses (2) - (6).
(Respondent)
 Pg 2142: But once the connection between the restrictive legislation and the
permissible ground is rational, the Legislature has the discretion as to the expediency
of the stage at which the restriction is to be applied. Thus, it is permissible to provide
against threatened or apprehended injury as distinguished from an actual enquiry.14
 Pg 2143: The words ‘in the interests’ of imply that the restriction imposed under any
of the limitation clauses in Art. 19, in order to be valid, must be proximately related to
a ground specified in the relevant limitation clause, that very expression enables the
Legislature to restrict the exercise of the fundamental rights as soon as a threat of
injury to the social interest protected by the relevant ground or a proximate tendency
thereof is manifest.15 (Respondent)
 Pg 2144: “the commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be
depressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the
community interest is endangered. (Petitioner)
 Pg 2144: When the authorities are prima facie satisfied that a person’s speech is likely
to disturb communal harmony, (based on his previous speeches in other places), he
can be successfully prevented from entering the area where the public meeting is
being held, by passing a prohibitory order.
 Pg 2144: The administration has a duty to prevent such a meeting to find out who the
speakers and participants are, taking into account their past record and antecedents.

13
Superitendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633
14
Virendra v State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896
15
Virendra v State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896
  Pg 2144: Once the connection between the restrictive legislation and the permissible
ground is rational, the legislature has the discretion as to the expediency of the stage
at which the restriction is to be applied. Thus, it is not prevented from providing,
against threatened or apprehended injury as distinguished from an actual injury.16
 Pg 2145: ‘Public Order’ is not the same thing as ‘public safety’ and hence no
restriction can be placed on the right to freedom of speech and expression in the
ground of ‘public safety’ is endangered. (Petitioner)
 Pg 2145: Once it is held that the enumeration of the grounds of restriction in the
limitation Clauses (2)-(6) of Art. 19 is exhaustive, it will follow that no restriction can
be imposed upon a fundamental right, upon a ground not enumerated in the relevant
clause of Art. 19.
 Read Sharma v. Sri Krishna AIR 1959 SC 395, Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker
Lok Sabha JT (2007) 2 SC 1. For special cases on parliament and 19 (1) (a).
 Pg 2148: That if a person is arrested by the Legislature for its contempt for having
said anything in breach of its privileges, such person can contend before the Court
that the Rule which authorises the arrest is itself unconstitutional because of
contravention of Art. 19 (1) (a).
 Pg 2149: The very existence of a legal right requires that the rights of all persons who
possess such right should be equally maintained: it follows, therefore, that nobody can
be allowed to exercise his legal right as to prejudice the exercise of a similar right
belonging to another individual. This inherent limitation of a legal right extends to
fundamental right as well.
 Pg 2149: UN Declarations of Human Rights (1948)- Art. 29 (2).
 Pg 2149: People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India 17: “International law
today is not confined to regulating the relation between the States. Scope continues to
extend.
 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 19 (3) (a).
 European Convention on Human Rights.
 Pg 2150: A.K. Gopalan18: “Having specified the rights, each of them is considered
separately from the point of view of a similar right in other citizen, and also after
taking into consideration the principle that individual liberty must give way to the
16
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
17
(1997) 1 SCC 301.
18
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
 extent it is necessary, when the good or safety of the people generally is concerned.
The specified right of a free citizens are controlled by what the framers of the
Constitution thought was necessary restriction in the interest of the rest of the citizens.
The Constitution is Art. 19, and also in other Articles in Part III, then attempt to strike
a balance between an individual liberty and general interest of the society.
 Pg 2151: Ram Singh v. State of Delhi19, H.M. Seervai “the rights represent the claim
of the individuals, the limitation protect the claims of other individuals and the
limitations are not to destroy the balance which Art. 19 was designed to give. To say
this, is not to belittle fundamental rights but only to say that the rights are not absolute
and can be enjoyed only in an orderly society.
 Pg 2151: The principle which underlines the structure of the rights guaranteed under
Art. 19 of the Constitution is the principle of balancing of the need for individual
liberty with the need for social control in order that the freedom guaranteed to the
individual subserve the larger national interest.20
 Jefferson propounded: “no man had a natural right to commit aggression on the equal
rights of another”.
 Pg 2152: One cannot exercise his freedom of speech to injure the reputation of
another.21 (Respondent)
 Pg 2153: The Fundamental Right of one person cannot be curtailed merely on the
ground that there is no other way to prevent a violation of the law by another person. 22
A Fundamental Right of an individual is, within the constitutional limitations,
inviolate and available against the entire community.
 Pg 2154: The contents of the freedoms guaranteed under Cls. (a), (b),... do not include
the right to exercise them in the properties belonging to others.23
 Pg 2154: one has a right to speech, other have a right to listen or decline to listen.
 Art. 19 (1) (a) cannot be pressed into service for defeating the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Art. 21.24 (Respondent)
 Pg 2154: Enjoyment of one’s right must be consistent with the enjoyment of rights
also by others. Where in a free play of social forces is not possible to bring about a

19
AIR 1951 SC 270.
20
Harakh Chand Ratan Chand Banthia v. UOI, (1969) 2 SCC 166.
21
Near v. Minnesota, (1931) 283 US 697.
22
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, (1926) 270 US 230.
23
Ry. Bd. v. Naranajn, AIR 1969 SC 966.
24
Noise Pollution, In re, (2005) 5 SCC 733.
 voluntary harmony, the State has to slip in to set right the imbalance between
competing interests. One fundamental right of a person may have to co-exist in
harmony with the exercise of another fundamental right by others and also with
reasonable and valid exercise of power by the State in the light of Directive Principles
of State Policy and in the interests of social welfare as a whole.25
 Pg 2155: But where a restriction is not justified under Cls. (2)-(6), it cannot be upheld
as reasonable merely because it confers a right it benefit upon the public or any
section thereof.26
 Pg 2155: Freedom of expression is a preferred right which is very zealously guarded
by the Supreme Court.27
 Pg 2155: Constitutional Law-I written by former Chief Justice of Delhi High Court
V.S. Deshpande: The first grade would consist of the right to equality guaranteed by
Art. 14 and the first three freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19 (1). The primacy given to
the first three freedoms in Art. 19 (1) is shown by the strictly limited nature if the
restrictions which can be imposed. The right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by
Art. 21 had a somewhat precarious protection because it depended on the “procedure
established by law”.28
 Pg 2156: A fourfold justification of the validity of ‘preferred freedoms’ or ‘double
standards’ as applied to the fundamental right under our Constitution may be
attempted.
1. The Constitution itself places the right to liberty and equality as combined to
produce social and economic justice at the forefront in the preamble. The
liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship only is chosen for this
place of pride. The other liberties are not mentioned in the Preamble. The
intention of the Constitution-makers was to regard justice combining these
liberties and equality as the keystone of the Constitution.
2. The distinction is based on the difference in the language in which these rights
are defined in Part III of the Constitution.

25
(1975) 1 SCC 11.
26
Bennen Coleman v. UOI, AIR 1973 SC 106.
27
Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v Lokvidayan Sanghatana, (1988) 3 SCC 410.
28
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras.
 3. Activism of the judiciary in performing their function of judicial review is
more appropriate in protecting these liberties and equality because they are not
vested rights.
4. The questions of economic policy and regulation of business require study of
statistics and data which are possessed by the Government, but not by the
Courts with the result that the intervention of the Courts in protecting business
rights would have to be comparatively reduced.
 Pg 2157: The State cannot:
1. Make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing better
enjoyment of another freedom29 (Petitioner)
2. Restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction upon
another freedom.30
 Pg 2157: The word “reasonable” implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the
choice of a course which reason directs.31
 Pg 2157: Though the Court starts with the assumption that the Legislature is the best
judge of what is good for its community by whose suffrage it comes into existence, 32
the ultimate responsibility of determining the reasonableness of the restriction, from
the point of view of the interests of the general public, rests with the Court.33
 Pg 2158: Preamble and Statement of Objects and Reasons are taken into consideration
by the Court in judging the reasonableness of the restriction imposed on the
fundamental rights of the individuals.
 Pg 2158: The general principles summarised by the Court to determine the
constitutionality of a statutory provision challenged on ground of unreasonableness
are:
1. The restriction sought to be imposed on the Fundamental Rights guaranteed
under Art. 19 of the Constitution must not be arbitrary as of excessive nature,
so as to go beyond the requirement of the felt need of the society and object
sought to be achieved. (Petitioner)
2. There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection
between the restriction imposed and the object sought to be achieved.
29
Sakal Papers v. UOI, AIR 1962 SC 305.
30
Bennett Coleman v. UOI, AIR 1973 SC 106.
31
Janath Mosque v. Vakhon Joseph, AIR 1955 TC 227 (FB).
32
Pathumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771.
33
Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731.
 3. No abstract or fixed principle can be laid down which may have universal
application in all cases. Such consideration on the question of reasonableness,
therefore, is expected to vary from case to case.
4. In interpreting Constitutional provisions, Courts should be clear about the felt
need of the society and complex issues facing the people which the
Legislature intends to solve through effective legislation.
5. In appreciating such problems and the felt needs of the society the judicial
approach must necessarily be dynamic, pragmatic and elastic.
6. It is imperative that for consideration of reasonableness of restriction imposed
by a statute, the Court should examine whether the social control as envisaged
in Art. 19 is being effectuated by the restriction imposed on the Fundamental
Rights.
7. Although Art. 19 guarantees all the seven freedoms to citizens, such
guarantee does not confer any absolute or unconditional rights but is subject
to reasonable restriction which the Legislature may impose in public interest.
It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether such restriction meant to project
social welfare satisfying the need of prevailing social values.
8. The reasonableness has got to be tested both from the procedural and
substantive aspects. It should not be bound by the processional perniciousness
or jurisprudence of remedies.
9. Restriction imposed on the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Art. 19 of
the Constitution must not be arbitrary, unbridled, uncanalised and excessive
and also not unreasonably discriminating. In hypothese, therefore, a
restriction to be reasonable must also be consistent with Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
10. In judging the reasonableness of the restriction imposed by clause (6) of Art.
19, the Court has to bear in mind the Directive Principle of State Policy.
11. Ordinarily, any restriction so imposed which has the effect of promoting or
effectuating a directive principle can be presumed to be a reasonable
restriction in public interest.34
 Pg 2160: Right to information which is facet of the right to speech and expression,
though a fundamental right is also subject to reasonable restriction.
34
(1995) 1 SCC 501.
  Pg 2160: Every right, legal or moral, carries with it a corresponding obligation.
 Reasonable of restriction is to be judged today and in the circumstances now existing
and not the future possibilities.35
 Pg 2160: One of the important tests to find out whether a restriction is reasonable or
not is to see whether the aggrieved party has a right of representation against the
restriction imposed or proposed to be imposed.
 Pg 2162: the test to be applied is not whether a judge personally considers particular
restrictions unreasonable, but whether a reasonable man would necessarily consider
them unreasonable.36
 Pg 2162: It connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in the enjoyment of a
right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature 37 beyond what is required in the
interests of the public. (Petitioner)
 Pg 2163: It is the effect of a law which constitutes the test of its reasonableness; its
object, whether good or bad, is immaterial for this purpose.38 (Petitioner)
 Pg 2163: What was reasonable at the time of enactment of a law may cease to be so
with the change of time and circumstances.39
 Pg 2163: Even if a provision is not unconstitutional on the day on which it was
enacted or the Constitution came into force, by reason of facts emerging out
thereafter, the same may be rendered unconstitutional.40 (Petitioner)
 Pg 2164: In adjudging the validity of a restriction, the Courts have necessarily to
approach it from the point of view of furthering the social interest which it is the
purpose of the legislation to promote, and the situation which presented itself to the
legislature when the impugned law was enacted. For the same reason, corresponding
laws of other countries, made under different conditions, cannot be referred to for the
purpose of determining the reasonableness of our laws.41
 Pg 2165: Mere possibility of the powers conferred being abused is no ground for
pronouncing it invalid.42 (Petitioner)

35
Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. v UOI, AIR 1959 SC 1124
36
H.M. Seervai, Vol 4, Edn 4, pg 705.
37
P.P. Enterpirses v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 1016.
38
Laxmi v. State of UP, AIR 1981 SC 873
39
Motor General Traders v. State of AP, AIR 1984 SC 121.
40
John Vallanathan v. UOI, AIR 2003 SC 2902.
41
Hamdard Dawakhana v. UOI, AIR 1960 SC 554.
42
(2001) 4 SCC 139.
  Pg 2165: The possibility of misuse of freedom is also not a ground for imposing
restriction.
 Pg 2166: general provision, when proving constitutionality onus of proof on the
challenger against the Statute.
In cases where prima facie it can be established that Art. 19 and 21 have been
violated, burden lies on the State to establish constitutionality.43
 Pg 2172: The reason why “the expression ‘due process’ has never been defined, is
that it embodies a concept of fairness which has to be decided with reference to the
facts and circumstances of each case and also according to the ‘mores’ for the time
being in force in a society to which the concept has to be applied.44
 Pg 2172: “Due Process” as conveniently understood, means procedural regularity of
fairness. It focuses on the means of the government deprive people of things-whether
life, liberty or property-and calls to mind assurances that policy will be implemented
in ways that are not irregular, arbitrary or unreasonable.
 Pg 2173: ‘Due process’ has both a procedural and a substantive meaning. The
meaning originally attributed to the phrase was procedural, namely, a fair and
established procedure, subject to which only the deprivation of life, liberty or property
could be effected by the State. Substantive content to the clause and assumed the
power to review legislation, not on the ground that the procedure prescribed by the
State was unfair, but that the legislation itself was an arbitrary or improper
interference with the freedom of life, liberty or property.
 Pg 2175: Procedural due process, speaking shortly, requires that a person must be
given an, opportunity of being heard in his defence.45
 Pg 2175: No person can be deprived of his right of property or ‘liberty’, without being
afforded an opportunity to be heard in his defence, which opportunity must be
adequate, fair and reasonable.
 Pg 2176: What Due Process requires, however, is an observance of the fundamental
principles outlined above and not a hearing before a Court in every case, or any
particular form of proceeding.
 Pg 2176: Substantive due process, on the other hand, means not only the proper
procedure should be followed, but the law itself must be reasonable.
43
Deena v. UOI, AIR 1983 SC 1155.
44
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461
45
Holden v. Hardy, (1898) 169 US 366.
  Pg 2179: The means selected for the protection or achievement of the social interest
must bear a rational and substantive relation to the object to be attained.
 Pg 2181: Massey, “Contemporary substantive process proceeds on two tracks. Courts
first determine whether a claimed right is a fundamental liberty. If so, a law infringing
upon the right will be subjected to strict scrutiny; otherwise the law is subject only to
minimal scrutiny. Under the strict scrutiny the law is presumed void. The government
must prove that the infringement in necessary to achieve a compelling governmental
objective.”
 Pg 2182: In the expression ‘reasonable restriction’ in cls.(2)-(6) of Art. 19, the
adjective ‘reasonable’ is predicted to the ‘restrictions’ that are imposed by the law and
not of the law itself. The issue to be decided by the Court is whether the restrictions
imposed by the impugned legislation on the exercise of the right are reasonable (both
from the substantive and procedural points of view).46
 Pg 2183: The question whether the provisions of the Act provide reasonable
safeguards against the abuse of the power given to the executive authority to
administer the law is not relevant for the true interpretation of the clause.47
 Pg 2183: It also follows that the Court is not concerned with the necessity of the
impugned legislation or the wisdom of the policy underlying it, but only whether the
restriction is in excess of the requirement and whether it is imposed on an arbitrary
manner.48
 Pg 2183: Reasonableness is an expression used to convey basically the natural law
ideal of ‘justice between man and man’. The concept of ‘reasonable man’ is also an
application of the principles of natural justice to the standard of behaviour expected of
the citizen. The functional and conceptional implications of the term ‘reasonableness’
is that it is essentially another word used for public policy.
 Pg 2183: the test of reasonableness is nothing substantially different from ‘social
engineering’, ‘balancing of interests’, or any other formulas which modern
sociological theories suggest as an answer to the problem of the judicial function.
 Pg 2184: Fundamental Rights have to be read along with the chapter in directive
principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Duties in Art. 51-A.49

46
Khare N.B. (Dr.) v. State of Delhi, 1950 SCR 519.
47
Arunachala v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 300.
48
Chintamanrao v. State of MP, (1950) SCR 519.
49
Javeed v. State of Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 3057.
  Pg 2184: The reasonableness of a restriction has to be determined in an objective
manner and from the standpoint of the interests of the general public and not from the
point of view of the persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed or upon abstract
considerations.50
 Pg 2185: In examining the reasonableness of a statutory provision whether it is
violative of the Fundamental Right guaranteed under Art. 19, one has to keep in mind:
1. The Directive Principles of State Policy
2. Restriction should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond
the requirement of the interest of the general public.
3. In order to judge the reasonableness of the restrictions, no abstract or general
pattern or a fixed principle can be laid down so as to be of universal
application and the same will vary from case to case, as also with regard to the
changing conditions, values of human life, social philosophy of the
Constitution, prevailing conditions and the surrounding circumstances.
4. A just balance has to be struck between the restriction imposed and social
control envisaged under Art.19.
5. Prevailing social values as also social needs which are intended to be satisfied
by the restrictions.
6. There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection
between the restriction imposed upon and the object sought to be achieved. If
there is a direct nexus between restriction and the object of the Act, then there
is a strong presumption of constitutionality of the Act will arise.51
 Pg 2187: The reasonableness of a restriction depends upon values of life in a society,
the circumstances obtaining at a particular point of the time when the restriction is
imposed, the degree and the urgency of the evil sought to be controlled.52
 Pg 2197: In determining procedural reasonableness, the Legislature is concerned with
the procedure or manner of imposing or enforcing the restrictions and to find whether
it is fair and just or arbitrary.53
 Pg 2197: the method of imposing a restriction and the procedure provided for putting
it into operation constitute its procedural aspect. Even though a restriction may be

50
Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731.
51
MRF Ltd. v. Inspector, Kerala Govt, (1998) 8 SCC 227
52
State of UP v. Kaushailiya, AIR 1964 SC 416.
53
Maneka v. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597.
 reasonable in substance, the Court has to see whether the method of imposing it is
also reasonable.54
 Pg 2197: Procedural reasonableness for natural justice flows from Art. 19. So the
principle of natural justice is an element in considering the reasonableness of a
restriction where Art. 19 is applicable.
 Pg 2200: in India, the requirement of the rational relationship between the restriction
and the ground of restriction which is authorised by the relevant limitation clause of
Art. 19 follows not only from general principles but also from specific words in these
clauses, namely, ‘in the interests of’.55
 Pg 2200: Under Art. 19 (2), a restriction can be imposed ‘in the interest of public
order’. For the expression ‘in the interests of’ gives a greater by way to the legislature
by to curtail freedom of speech and expression, for a law penalising the activities
having a tendency to cause and ‘not’ actually causing public disorder, may be valid as
being in the interests of public order.
 Pg 2201: In Ram Manohar Lohia’s case, it was held that the connection between the
Act prohibiting or penalising and the public order should be “intimate”. The nexus
should be proximate – not far fetched, problematical or too remote in the chain of the
relation with public order.
 Pg 2201: it can also curb tendencies to cause the mischief aimed at.
 Pg 2205: Once the substantive relationship between the object of the legislation and
the means adopted exists, the question of the choice of the best means to achieve that
object is one for the Legislature, not the Court unless the restriction is ‘excessive’.
 Pg 2207: In order to be reasonable, a restriction must not be greater than the mischief
to be prevented.
 Pg 2210: In the sphere of Art. 19, this doctrine means that when a law is challenged as
imposing unreasonable restriction upon the exercise of a fundamental right, what the
Court has to determine is what is the direct or proximate effect of the impugned law.
It would be unconstitutional it its direct consequences violate a fundamental right
guaranteed by Art. 19, but not so, if the infringement in only incidental or is due to a
remote consequence of the operation of the law.56

54
Virendra v. State of Punjab, (1958) SCR 308.
55
AIR 1960 SC 633
56
Express Newspapers v. UOI, (1959) SCR 12
  Pg 2222: Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent
reason – (1) it may fail to provide that kind of notice that will enable ordinary people
to understand what conduct it prohibits, (2) it may authorize and even encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The test is whether a law identifies
prohibited conduct with reasonable clarity to a person of normal intelligence.57
 Pg 2225: The test of vagueness is whether the words used in the impugned law are
understandable by the ‘average man’.58
 Pg 2239: a restriction upon a fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 is not
procedurally reasonable if it seeks or empowers an authority to restrict a fundamental
right without complying with the rules of natural justice.59
 Pg 2240: But in cases where the freedom of speech is likely to affect communal
harmony and the speech is likely to trigger communal antagonism and hatred, the
person can be prevented from making to speech and from entering the place under
s.144 of the CRPC. For the said purpose, the authorities can take into consideration
the track record of such happenings in other places involving such participants.60
 Pg 2272: In Chintamanrao v. State of MP, it was observed that “reasonable
restriction” which the State can impose on the fundamental rights should not be
arbitrary or of an excessive nature “beyond what is required” in the interest of the
public. The word “reasonable” implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the
choice of a course which reason dictated. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively
invaded the right could not be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless
it struck a proper balance between the rights guaranteed and control permissible under
Art. 19(2) to (6).61
 Pg 2273: It is settled law when a discretionary power is given the same has to be
exercised in a judicial manner after recording of reasons.62
 Pg 2274: It is now firmly settled when discretionary power is given to the government
or quasi-governmental authorities, it must be hedged policy, standards, procedural
safeguards or guidelines failing which the exercise of discretion is likely to be
invalidated by Courts.63
57
City of Chicago v. Morale, 527 US 41 (1999).
58
Abbas v. UOI, AIR 1971 SC 481.
59
Nawabkhan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1471.
60
State of Karnataka v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, AIR 2004 SC 2081.
61
Om Kumar v. UOI, (2001) 2 SCC 386.
62
State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 437.
63
R.R. Verma v. UOI, AIR 1980 SC 800.
  Pg 2274: where a discretion is to be exercised on “subjective satisfaction” the same
could be exercised and must be based on existing material.
 Pg 2275: “Discretion” means sound discretion guided by law.64
 Pg 2276: The discretionary jurisdiction is to be exercised keeping in view the purpose
for which it is conferred, the object sought to be achieved and the reason for giving
such wide discretion and must be exercised within the four corners of the statute.65
 Pg 2277: If the statute does not provide adequate safeguards for the protection of
innocent citizens or does not require the administrative authority to be satisfied as to
the existence of the conditions precedent laid down in the statute before making his
order, or to comply with the minimal requirements of natural justice, the law must be
struck down as invalid.66
 Pg 2284: In order to justify a discretion prohibiting a particular expression of opinion,
it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
view point.67 (Petitioner)
 Pg 2355: ‘In the interest of’ authorises the Legislature to restrict an act or utterance
which not only produces the mischief aimed at, e.g, breach of public order or Security
of the State, but also those which have a tendency to cause that effect, but which may
not actually lead to a breach of public order.68
 Pg 2356: Reasonableness of a restriction is to be determined in an objective manner
and from the standpoint of the interests of general public and not on the standpoint of
the interest of the persons on whom restrictions are imposed.69
 Pg 2357: Restriction imposed on the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19
must not be arbitrary, unbridled, uncanalised and excessive and also not unreasonably
discriminatory.
 Pg 2357: A limitation imposed in the interest of public order to be a reasonable
restriction should be one which had approximate or reasonable connection 70 or nexus

64
Sant Raj v. O.P. Singla, AIR 1985 SC 617.
65
Clariant International Ltd. v. Securities & Exchange Board of India, AIR 2004 SC 4236.
66
State of MP v. Baldeo, AIR 1961 SC 293.
67
Ajay Goswami v. UOI, AIR 2007 SC 493.
68
Ramji Lal v. State of UP, AIR 1957 SC 620.
69
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 SCC 625.
70
Cf. Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 300.
 with public order, but not one farfetched hypothetical or problematical or too remote
in the chain of its relation with the public order71. (Petitioner)
 Pg. 2364: it was held that of the several rights enumerated in clause 1 of Art. 19 the
right at sub clause a is not merely a right to speech and expression but a right to
freedom of speech and expression. The enumeration of other rights is not by reference
to freedom72.
 Pg. 2365: All citizen posses the rights under Art.19(1) the right of one citizen cannot
be curtailed for facilitating the exercise of the fundamental right of another 73.
(Respondent Art. 21 )
 Pg 2366: Nobody has a right to degenerate others right to person or reputation.
Therefore freedom of speech and expression is tolerated as long as it is not malicious
or libellous74. Such utterances are therefore outside the area of ‘constitutionally
protected speech’ and accordingly steps to suppress them are not subject to the clear
and present danger test75.(Respondent Art. 21 )
 Pg 2373: It was held loud and obscene ,the profane, the libellous and the insulting and
fighting words are not essential part of any expression of ideas and are not protected
and safeguarded by the constitution and its punishment as a criminal act would raise
no question under the constitution76. ( DECRIMILIZATION RESPONDENT)
 Pg 2389: Freedom of expression means freedom not only for the thought we cherish
but also for the thought that we hate77.
 Rights co-exists78 for social welfare.
 Pg 2422: It was held therein that local breaches of public order are no grounds to
restrict freedom of speech and expression and anything which disturbs public
tranquillity disturbs public order.79 (Petitioner)
 Pg 2423: The anticipated danger should have a direct and proximate nexus with the
expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public
interest. (Petitioner)

71
Suptd. v. Ram Manohar, AIR 1960 SC 633.
72
Dharam Dutt v. UOI, (2004) 1 SCC 712.
73
Communist Party of India (Marxist) v. Bharat Kumar, AIR 1998 SC 184.
74
DC Saxena v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, (1966) 5 SCC 216.
75
Beauharnis v. Illinois (1952) 343 US 250.s
76
Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 US 296.
77
Naraindas v. State of M.P, (1974) 4 SCC 788.
78
(1975) 1 SCC 11.
79
G. Jairaj v. State of Karnataka, 1998 AIHC 3960 (Kant)
  Pg 2423: The freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of
demonstration and processions or threats of violence. That would amount to negation
of rule of law and a surrender to blackmail and intimidation. It is the duty of the State
to protect the freedom of expression since it is a liberty guaranteed against the State.
The State cannot place its inability to handle the hostile audience problem. 80
(Petitioner)
 PUBLIC ORDER 1986.
 Pg. 2514: Public interest – that the law should provide an effective mean whereby a
man vindicates his reputation against Columny, has nevertheless to be accomadated to
the competing public interest in permitting men to communicate frankly and freely
with one another about matters with respect to which the law recognises81

80
S.Rangarajan v. P.Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
81
Horrocks v. Lowe (1974) 1 All ER 662.