Uwe Petersen’ WHAT DO. THE ANTINOMIES TEACH US? Elements of a dialectical approach towards the contradictions of comprehension The problem of the set theoretical antinomies has not yet found a satisfactory solution: we still do not know why, in the words of Frege, we have to take into account that there are concepts, which — at least in the common meaning of the word — have no extension®. This paper is an attempt to outline some basic ideas of dialectical interpretation of this allegedly strange and irritating phenomenon of foundational studies. It is well-known that contradictions are a central feature of dialectis; yet there is no generally accepted theory of dialectics which we could go back on, and as a result there is no agreement on what dialectical contra- dictions are all about. I owe a great deal to the ideas of German Idealism, particularly of Kant and Hegel, as briefly sketched in section V; this must be taken into account whenever I use the words “dialectic”, “contra- diction” or the like, as it will help to avoid misunderstandings?. " Lwould like to thank Ms. Sheila Blake for her Sisyphean struggle to counterbalance my poor command of the English language. If she wasn’t entirely succesful, this is simply due to the fact that she didn’t read the last draft. ? G. Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. II, Jena 1903, p. 257: *... wit miissen die Monglichkeit in Betracht zichen, dass cs Begriffe gebe, die — im gewOhnlichen Wortsinne wenigstens — keinen Umfang haben.” * To protect myself from constant frustration, I gave up trying two things: firstly, explaining the aim of mathematical logic to’ Hegelians, and secondly, explaining the ideas of transcedental idealism to analytic philosophers. The reader is requested to be familiar with the basic notions of both.68 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us?, We once again broach the antinomies in the hope that we might obtain a better understanding this time by employing some ideas of Transcen- dental Philosophy — as opposed to Analytic Philosophy. At the same time, this might bring us a little closer to obtaining a precise notion of Hegelian dialectic and Speculative Philosophy. 1 am thus setting out some ideas initiated in [11]. I. The basic question is whether antinomies are more or less a lapse of reasoning and therefore better put aside, or whether they deserve a place in the foundation of knowledge. It is my belief that there must be more to them than just a weird phenomenon somewhere on the outskirts of knowledge. In other words, we are approaching the problem of the anti- nomies under the aspect of a wide notion of reductio ad absurdum: what have we learn from the antinomies, and how do we take advantage of what we have learnt? Are contradictions essential in the process of learning’ ; i.e. if we learn by reductio ad absurdum, are we making a detour, or could this not be learnt directly? Putting it more metaphysically:: is there any- thing in the universe which does not have a deeper meaning, which is simply an error and thus in principle can be deleted? I doubt it. There must be a continuity between the process of learning and its manifestation. Let us keep this in mind as a guide-line. However, it is a well-known result of Gentzen’s calculus of sequents that the cut-rule, and thereby reductio ad absurdum' , can be eliminated in first order logic (Gentzen 1934), in complete arithmetic (Schiitte 1951), and even in simple type theory (Takahashi 1967/Prawitz 1968). This could suggest that reductio ad absurdum is rather worthless, at least with regard to logic and mathematics. Van Benthem [3] takes a different view with regard to inconsistent but non-trivial systems: ‘‘... the loss of reductio ad absurdum does tie our hands to an annoying degree” (p. 344). 4 This is by no means to be interpreted as some kind of psychological process. 5 In a Gentzen-style calculus all forms of reductio ad absurdum can be replaced by an application of the cut rule: ; T sA,A&A7A A&WA> TeaUwe Petersen 69 He gives no reason for this, but we should, in any case, be careful. The tule of reductio ad absurdum has a mutual difficulty together with the principle of tertium non datur: one should abstain from identifying i tuitive logical notions with certain rules or formulas. Apart from confusing different levels of argumentation, such a procedure can even be dangerous if one does not explicitly refer to a given system of logical rules and axioms. The simples reason is that symbols such as ‘“—”, “&”, and others only have a meaning within a system of rules and axioms which determine their usage. However, intuitive notions seem to possess some kind of independence. This was presumably Quine’s idea when referring to deviant logicians: “They think they are talking about negation, ‘—', ‘not’; but surely the notation ceased to be recognizable as negation when they took to regarding some conjunctions of the form ‘p & —p’ as true, and stopped regarding such sentences as. implying all others. Here, evidently, is the deviant logician’s predicament: when he tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject.”° So every attempt to change classical logic is point- less? And just because we cannot deny the doctrine without changing the subject? But what subject is Quine talking about? Negation? Does this mean that the swe idea of negation is represented only by the rules and axioms of classical logic? Who is to believe this? Consequently, non- -Euclidean geometry should sacrifice the notion of the séraighr line. But ‘on what grounds? How can anybody or any theory claim to be in posses- sion of the proper meaning of a word? Where is the holy shrine where the true ideas are hid. 1? But anyway, wouldn't it be suprising if somebody, who, like Quine, is nominalistically inclined, falls back on platonism in order to defend classical logic?” We could retum to the usage of “not” in ordinary language, and thus avoid any suspicion that universals are being ©W.V.O. Quine [15], p. 81. 7 This reminds me of an amusing anecdote by Anderson: “Imagine a man (Quine or Goodman of 1947) who, when asked whether he had ined tos last eh said “Yes, and it was an interesting variant of Alekhine’s Defense. Chess is one of the games I enjoy most,’ But then he suddenly coughs and tums pale, and adds, in a dispiriting tone of voice, ‘But of course I didn’t really play i there aren’t really any abstract entities,... so there is no such thing as chess... so that isn’t what I was doing after all.’” A. R. Anderson, What Do Symbols Symbolize?: Platonism. In; Baumrin, B. (ed.): Philosophy of Science. The Delaware Seminar, vol.1, New York/London 1963, p. 146. ,70 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us?! employed. But to me this is no way out, for it would make “negation” an empirical concept. We would then have to consult public opinion research, ethnolinguistics, and heaven knows what else in order to determine the use of “not”. This is hardly in the spirit of logic; a logician simply deals with what he calls gnruition — whatever this may be. If Quine meant to say that the deviant logician is re-examining intuition — e.g. in respect of negation — then he is perfectly right. But then, where is the predicament? Admitte- dly the classical doctrine has taken us in with antinomies; so intuition has proved false and has to be re-examined. The only question is, where did our intuition fail? No matter how this is answered, according to our point of view we must at least insist that the lesson one has been taught from the antinomies be expressed within the new theory, i.e. we wish to prove within the new theory that Moreover, we want to be able to examine these objects more closely. Apparently, most of the remedies for antinomics are unsatisfactory in this respect. This will be discussed briefly in the next section. But we shall find an even more severe objection to the customary treatment of antinomics when turning to the so-called semantic antinomies. This will induce us to adopt a view of concepts which is fundamental to transcedental idealism and has since been suggested by several represent- atives of the continental tradition of philosophy: concepts are acts. Il, We start with the classical, Fregean, idea of a concept. A concept is something unsaturated, no yet fit to be talked about; if however, we do insist on making statements about concepts, we have to replace them by their extensions. It was hardly doubted that this could be done®. This view is commonly expressed in the following scheme of the axiom of compre- hension® = te Axal[x] © a(t] (CP). (A xa[x]” denotes the extension of the concept a; we usually refer to it as a class.) ® During a lecture in Munich in December 1980, G. Kreisel drew attention to G. Cantor’s review of G. Prege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetik in which Cantor held against Frege that not every predicate determines a whole. 9 We use x,y,z as vound variables, @ as free variable, ¢ as term, vas nominal form, and AB Cas formulas.‘Uwe Petersen mt There is no need to mention how simple CP is. And yet, together with the rules and axioms of classical logic, it leads to triviality. For example, le us consider the classes defined by the following conditions: Ryi=Ax (xe x81) where n€ IN and A4B 0 A>B and AD*1B: 7 4>(A 3B), Any of the R,, yields | along the following lines: 1 Ry, ER M41 cP 2. (Ry ER AFL)>RAER, op 3, R, ER, FL from 1. with ALAtYB_E ABB 4.R,€R, from 1. and 3. with A, A+B EB (mp) 5.1 from 1. and 5. by n-fold application of mp We may look upon this as a reduction ad absurdum. But what, apart form the conviction that the classical doctrine is somehow false, is its result? The answer is virtually a matter of fancy, with everybody favour- ing his own ideology. One possibility is to blame the language for producing meaningless expressions which then produce antinomies. But no matter what a restric- tion of the language looks like (simple or ramified hierarchy of types or any other future inventions), if it is effective and antinomies can be avoided, this results in our being deprived of all means of expressing what we have learnt from the antinomies. This is simply because no more mean- ingless expressions exist which could be blamed for the damage. Thus the exorcism has bestowed “‘unspeakables” upon us. Apart from other well- -known tiresome consequences and intuitive inconsistencies of the theory of types, and no matter how effective it may be from a foundational point of view, this is sufficient to make any such restriction completely un- acceptable in respect of the above. Yet people with a tendency towards intellectual puritanism might still support this view, even at the cost of dogmatism. On the other hand, if somebody has always been suspicious of Frege’s logic of employing impure means to gather such riches as number theory,72 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? ne will tend to agree that the term “A xoi[ x ]” is guilty of hiding some un- warranted existential assumption and thus causing the breakdown. It may he will argue, look as if “A xov[x]” was constructed from “a”, the predi- cate, by a simple logical step. But actually CP conceals an ontological sta- tement. This view can be represent by writing the axiom of comprehension the following way: Vy Axe peoxl) (CP’). Now the antinomies simply mean that this existential assumption is false. It is not always the case that an object y existis which possesses all the objets x with the property o. as elements, The only problem is:in which cases does such an object exist? One answer is to restrict the property a. This can be done by submitting a to a hierarchy of types as Quine proposed in his “New Foundations” !? stratified (has passed the type test) and y does not appear in oi . Then, for , ie. CP’ is an axiom, iff ot is every n& IN, we can prove TWA x (4 yo (xe xFl)) (ie. there is no object comprising exactly those objects which have the property x € x #1), by deriving a contradiction from Vy A x (x© yo ~(x€ x21 )), ie. by a recutio ad absurdum. In other words, there are concepts which have no definite extension. Bu the latter we cannot prove! We have no means at our disposal of talking about concepts which have no definite extension, because concepts are only predicable by their extensions. Hence objects like the R, cannot be represented within the formal theory. There is a more liberal way: to restrict the objects x. We make use of the fact that objects such as the Ry are only troublesome when they are on the left side of €, i.e. if they are elements. In this way we can ward off any evil by preventing non-definite extensions (proper classes) from being elements of other classes: 1 10 cf [14], p.93.Uwe Petersen 73 Vy be(x€ yoVa(xe 2) &alx]), ie. iff for every single x with the property ov there exists an object z which possesses x as an element, then there exists an object » comprising all such x. Now ‘ Vx Wy (xey)- can be established; all the R,, are of this kind: Vy M(xE yo Vz(xEz) & (xe xF1) is an instance of the axiom-schema, yet VyAx(xE€ye(xE x8 ly) is disprovable, hence Vz(eyA x(x yo Vz(xEz) & (xExF1)ez) can be refuted by reductio ad absurdum. We have ascertained that for every concept there is an extension perhaps non-definite, but this will cause no harm — which nevertheless produccs a strange result: it is not possible to arrange any of the proper classes into a class; any class of proper classes is empty. For example, AVC PHAR (XE x1 )) is empty, e.e, the extension of the predicate “identical to Xx (xEx-ly is empty; but this does not mean that there are no objects identical to Ax(x€ x>1)! Putting it a little differently: the class of sets is a proper class and any class of proper classes is treated as a set, the empty set!" I once looked upon this as dialectical, but actually it is merely weird. How- ever, let us consider these &,, from an intuitive point of view! Obviously RE Ra holds ifn < m)?. Yet R,© Rp, cannot be established; no more than R,© .R,> 1. This suggests some difference between Ry and Ry. ** It is necessary to determine by axiom that the empty class is a set, whereas it is demonstrable that the class of sets is a proper class. Ray Eq VEL isan immediate consequence of the axiom of comprehension and the definition of Ry -R, ER, 1, with m>n is an immediate con- sequence thereof by means of > (BA) and modus ponens.74 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? But what kind of difference could there be? Ryy\R, :=AX (XE Ry &— x €ER,) can neither be empty nor caniit be not empty. However, from the point of view of classical logic, the defining conditions of the R,, are all equal: (A2B) + (AB) for every n. This seems to be the vital point: the R, refute (42.B) + (A > B) Does this mean that classical logic is abolished, because there are objects which do not comply with classical logic? Or are the R,, not to be construed as objects? As long as we retain classical logic we cannot cope with all of these objects given to us by comprehension. Which is to blame for this: comprehension or classical logic? Classical logic is supposed to be univer- sal; but a restriction of comprehension leads to an unsatisfactory treat- ment of concepts without well-defined extensions. Is classical logic then not universal? Before we make any decision, let us have a closer look at A x ot [x], the so-called extension of o. We need a better understanding of the function of A; what kind of an object is Xx ou [x]? To answer this, let us turn towards another antinomy. III. There is a class of antinomies which is said to be sharply separated from the antinomies of the preceeding section. These are called semantic antinomies because they deal essentially with semantic notions such as sazisfaction, designation, and truth; thus, they exceed the means of set theoretical syntax’. In [22] Tarski gave an example of a pure, i.e. non-empirical, one, which, for simplicity’s sake, I cite here: “Let S be any sentence beginning with the words “Every sentence”. We correlate with S a new sentence 5 * by sub- jecting S to the following two modifications: we replace in S the first *3 T have not taken into consideration the possil Gédel-numbers. ‘ies which arise when employingUwe Petersen 75 word, “Every”, by “The’’; and we insert after the second word, “senten- ce’’, the whole sentence S enclosed in quotation marks. Let us agree to call the sentence § “(self-japplicable”’ or “‘non-(self-)applicable” dependent on whether the correlated sentecen S * is true or false. Now consider the following sentence: Every sentence is non-applicable. It can easily be shown that the sentence just stated must be both applic- able and non-applicable; hence a contradiction.” (p.80). The situation concerning this antinomy appears to be completely dif- ferent: there is no comprehension involved. So none of our remedies in section II can seemingly be applied. The commonly accepted reaction to semantic antinomies is well-known: we must not refer to a language within this language, i.e. semantically closed languages have to be abandoned. Tarski did not consider this a very severe move: “... this restriction does not affect the needs or interests of science in any essential way.” (ibid. p59). Yet a further examination of the structure of the above antinomy will reveal some irritating inconsistencies. Apart from the usual logical symbols, we need, for a loose symbolizat- ion, quotation marks “‘” and ‘“’* to be applied to sentences, and a pre- dicate of truth “7” to be applied to quoted sentences. The predicate of truth has to satisfy the condition of truth S + T (‘S’). This makes the following definitions possible: 1. (Axa x ])* : #0r[* Axouf x]? ]* 2, Appl[‘S? ]:%T(‘S*") We now consider Ax — Appl [x]: Appl ‘A x > Appl[ x]? ] * TL‘ ->Appl[ Ax — Appi[ x ]"]"] + — Appl |‘ Ax Appl[x]*] * This symbolization is apparently not quite adequate; but to make something perspicuous is another matter.76 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? This is considered as not representable in set theory, because we have no means of quoting a formula. But by using a simple trick we obtain a sort of substitute for the quotation ‘S” of a formula X in set theory: Ax(S&x=x). This immediately results in a substitute for the condition of truth by means of CP and elementary logic: S+S&a=a ea€ d\x(S&x=x), The concept of truth and the possibility of quoting a formula now no longer prevents the above antinomy from being transferred into set theory. We first give the respective definitions: 1. ( Avotl x] )*: eof Ay ( Axafx]&y=y)] 2. Appl Ax (S &x =x) ] sae Ax(S*&x=x) Now Ax ~Appl [ x ] leads to a contradiction along similar lines: Appl[X¥( Ax >Appl[x]J&Y=V)] o wa dz (>Appl[ Ay( Ax Appl [x ]&y =y) ]J&z=2)% w Appl [| hy ( Ax >Appl (x ]&Y=y)]&aq=ae «+ Appl | Ay ( Ax mAppl[x ]&y=y)] This is not yet a fully syntactic formulation '*, but it enables the equiv- alence to stand out better: Quotation of a sentence S‘S’ | Xx(S&x=x) Extension of a concept a hx(S&x=x) Relation of membership Condition of truth $+ T(‘S’)] S#a€ Ax(S&x =x) Axiom of comprehension Predicate of truth T (‘S”) eS 1S =a” denotes a nominal form and hence is not a symbol of the formal language. We achieve a full set theoretical formalization by passing over to an extensional point of view. Then the predicate App! turns into the class Appl: =\xVy(x=hxy (Az (2z€y )&x, =x) &XExX). The negation of the predicate App! is not represented by the complement of the class Appl, butUwe Petersen 7 We are thus confronted with an antinomy which can at the same time be construed as semantic and syntactic by simply replacing “‘S’” by “Nx CS & x =x)” and “T(‘S’)” by “ae Xx (S&x=x)” or vice versa. Yet the reactions towards it are completely different according to the respective interpretation of a few symbols. From a syntactic point of view, the antinomy results from some hidden existential assumption in AY CAx af x]& y=y); but who would ever want to argue that quo- tation depends on some existential assumption? Furthermore, the pre- dicate of truth must be excluded from the object-language, whereas the €-relation cannot be abandoned; S + T (‘S”) is the condition for an ade- quate predicate of truth,whereasS # a © Xx (S&x=x) has tobe re- stricted to certain S; “S” occurs improperly'® in “‘S’” but not in “Ax (S & x=x )”. Yet interpretation cannot make any difference in the matter; there must be something wrong! IV. Things have now reached such an annoying state of confusion that we should be given a chance to start anew. Firstly, why burden oneself any Jonger with “x” in “ Xx (S & x =x J’? We may as well write “XS”; “x” serves no purpose which could not be accomplished by “A” alone According to this “E ) X” is written instead of “a€ Xx(S&x=x Ye Appl: =Ax Vy (x=Axy (Az (zEy)&x, =x1 )&—-(x Ey) ); this is simply because the formula in question must have the form A x (x ©f). One can see easily that nothing can be an element of both, Appl and Appl, ie.A x (x € App! & x Appl). _ Consider, however, $:=A yA.x (x © Appl & y=y).Since S=Ax, Az ( 2 EApph & xX, =X,) holds by definition, we receive Vy (5 =x, Az(z Ey) &, =x,)& 7(s€ y)), ic. s€ Appl, from the assumption “(5 i.e. we have proved 8 GAppl. On the other hand, $= AX, (Az (z €Appl) 1 Jand s Appl yield Vy(s=Axy (A 2(z Ey) &x, =x, &SEy), ie. SE Appl. *6 With regard to the notion of (im)proper, consuit [6], [10], and [14] pp. 139-159.78 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? But how are we to read “AS” and “EAS”? If A is construed as an operator of extension, then, according to Frege, AS is a iruth value. But this leads to a similar difficulty just as Xx @ [x ]does: sometimes no well- defined object, ie. a truth value or a set, can be assigned to the A-term; thus, truth values also depend on existential assumptions? If we follow this line, we have to cope either with those unsatisfactory restrictions demonstrated in section IT or with an increasing number of — non-classical — “truth values”, whithout knowing how to interpret them. To construe Axa x] or AS as some kind of a object is thus inconvenient. Secondly, therefore, we revert to our original version of the axiom of comprehension, TE AxXa[ x ] sof f |’, remaining unsure of the function of A. A is just as unlikely to denote a quotation: the occurrence of “S” in “A a [S]” would not be considered as proper, ie. S§ +S, would not be considered sufficient to replace “S” by “S,” in “A at[S]” (provided that 2 is inter- preted as an operator of quotation and “S” lies within its scope). But this hardly fits in with other common aspects of A. The axiom of extension- ality does not exempt terms within the scope of d from being replaced. One might argue that this is simply because in logic we are not confronted with the phenomenon of referential opacity. But then, if A, still inter- preted as an operator of quotation, does not create referential opacity, why should we view ) as sealing off its scope, i.e. where is the justification of looking upon the occurrences of “‘S” in “Acr{S]” as improper and thus of allowing definitions such as S:=4,8'*. The problem is: A seems to combine aspects of both, an operator of ex- tension as well as an operator of quotation; but these interpretations don’t agree with each other, and none of these interpretations finds enough support on its own. 17 Set theory is thus again viewed as logic, in spite of Quine et al. 18 This definition is commonly used in the form S : =—7( ‘S ’)in order to derive semantic antinomies on the grounds that “S ” does not oceur in ““T(‘S'’)”.The catchword referential opacity has given us as fresh stimulus. In some cases, “that”, when used as a subordinate conjunction, creates contexts in which the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (Leib- niz) is violated. This once induced Quine to construe “that” as a quot- ation'®, ie. occurrences of terms within a “that”-clause are regarded as improper. Quine’s considerations are not relevant to us, because we are apparently not concerned, with referentially opaque contexts. But his association is valuable in another sense. Why don’t we consider the quot- ation as the subordinate conjunction “that”? “9” is true could just as well be written It is true that S. Set theoretically * ‘S’ is true” is substituted by eas. This suggests that A could also be construed as the conjunction “that”. As well as saying tis a member of the class of allot, we can also say For ¢, it is right?° chat it is an ov. Or tis such that it ison". Necessity can be treated similary: N(S) ” ce [ia] p. 142. I would like to avoid the word “true”. This involves a metaphysical probk which has not been touched in the so-called semantic conception of truth 21 Interpretations like these also play a role in the attempts to cope with referential opacity. Cf, W.V.O. Quine, Quantifiers and Propositional ‘Attitudes, The ent of Rilocophy LIN (1956), 177-187, and D. Kaplan, Quantify ing in, Synthese 1980 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? means It is necessary that S. All this looks quite neat and seems to be acceptable in respect of ordinary language”, But does it help us? Well, we might at least have a chance of ridding ourselves of sets, extensions of predicates, universals, and that whole troublesome “ontology”?>. But anyway, we still have to busy our- selves with antinomies**. So what shall we do? Apparently, there is no longer any existential assumption ”* to blame for them, and the distinction between meta- and object-language does not apply to X and €. It seems we can’t escape the antinomies, though this is somehow repugnant to our intuition. The solution must lie with ); granted that \ can ben construed as the subordinate conjunction “that”, what then makes a subordinate conjunction more likely to yield contradictions than an operator of extension? After all: what is a subordinate conjunction all about? What is it that hides behind this grammatical form? As Montague and Kalish mentioned in [10], the Leibniz principle can also be violated by using “whether”, “what”, “where”, “why”, “when”, “how” as subordinate conjunctions. In all these words we are aware of what, of old, has been called cazegories: quality, modality, relation, space and time*®. This brings to mind Kant’s claim that the categories are 22 ; This is worth a more detailed investigation which cannot be carried out here. 23 oi As a metaphysician I feel uncomfortable when using this fine old word in the amputated meaning Quine gave to it; but sometimes it secms impossible to regain classical notion when one sees how fast they are abused by analy tic philos- ophers. 24 Thus platonism seems to be less involved in the problem of antinomies as is usually argued 2s In [16] F. P. Ramsey considered “that"’-clauses as existential Propositions, but this would mean starting off the merry-goround again. There is no general agreement among philosophers on what a category is, and 1 know no investigation which could help us concerning our particular aim. 26Uwe Petersen 81 excellently represented in the forms of judgements”’. Could we possibly convert this into the conjecture that it might be the categories which somehow tum up in the form of subordinate conjunctions? But then, what is a category? In particular, why should categories cause antinomies? Let us take a closer look at Kant’s idea of Transcendental Philosophy and its further development by Hegel’s idea of dialectic and Speculative Philosophy hoping that their ideas concerning the nature and origin of categories might help us further?®. V. By subjecting reason to a fundamental examination Kant tried to find out, why, on the one hand, science a priori — mathematics and pur physics — is possible, but on the other metaphysics is apparently doomed to fail- ure. He began with revolutionizing the common conception of how know- ledge is possible. After: all attempts to establish a Priori knowledge by Starting from the objects failed, he considere it justifiable to try once starting from the subject”®. This is what Kant himself looked upon as a kind of Copernican Revolution and was meant to be confirmed by the further procedure of his Critique of Pure Reason. Absolutely no know- ledge is possible without certain non-empirical constituents originating solely in our mind, and to which he referred as synthetic a priori. Such are the pure forms of intuition, basis of mathematics, the pure concepts of understanding (categories), basis of pure physics, and the pure concepts of reason (transcendental ideas, ideas of reason), basis of metaphysics. 27 ce. [8] A 69/B94: “Wir kinnen aber alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urteile zurlickflihren, so dass “der Verstand Uherhaupt als ein Vermagen 2u urteilen vorgestellt werden Rann, ... Die Funktionen des Verstandes k6nnen also insgesamt gefunden werden, wenn man die Funktionen der Einheit in den Urteilen voll. * standig darstelicn kann.” Kant did not go far in his investigations, she genealogy of his Table of Judgements is particularly poor. CF [7] vel, I p. 128 for Hegel's . criticism of Kant's discovery of the categories. 28 Since this is not intended to be an introduction to the ideas of tanscedental idealism, I shall confine myself to the barest outline. 2° Cf. Kant [8] B XVI.82 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? The characteristics of synthetic a priori are, according to Kant, necessity and universal validity; a priori conditions of knowledge cannot be refuted by experience, because they do not originate from experience but first of all make it possible. But unlike the forms of intuition and categories, the ideas of reason exceed all experience; they are not concepts of objects, “but only of the thoroughgoing unity of such objects”. Moreover, they lead to antinomies™ ; and this is what Kant interpreted as a vindication of his idealistic approach: the ideas of reason lack any empirical significance; we can have no knowledge of things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear. To achieve his goal, Kant gave a foundation of the categories, the so-called Transcedental Deduction of the Categories, which he himself looked upon as the most important part of his work. Central notion of the Transcedental Deduction of the Categories is the transcedental unity of apperception, a kind of consciousness which is the source of a synthesis which cannot be found in reality itself, but is a genuine act of the sponsan- eity of thought. Thus the categories are based on an act. This act is a tran- scendental one, i.e. it is the basis of a priori knowledge. Here, the idea of transcedental idealism exists in its purest form and Hegel acknowledged Kant’s philosophy as true idealism. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason can be understood as a generously layed out reductio ad absurdum with the aim of rejecting the possibility that knowledge exceeds experience. Yet his conception suffers from a fundamental inconsistency which became a dominating point of cri in the work of Hegel: the notion and the role of the thing-in-itself* Hegel criticised Kant for having abandoned his own philosophical prin- ism 3° Kant [8] B 673, cited from [2] p. 269. According to the three ideas of reason there are three kinds of dialectic reasoning: paralogism, antinomy, and ideal. Here we are only concerned with the antinomies. 32 Cf. [7] vol. I p. 33. vol. 35,'vol. IV p. 47, vol. VIII p. 133.‘Uwe Petersen 83 ciples by introducing the notion of things-in-themselves and thus making it impossible to recognize the objective significance of the antinomies. While Kant maintained that ‘the ideas of reason can never be dialectical in themselves’ **, but “become dialectical only through heedlessness and misapprehension” **, Hegel reproached Kant for renouncing reason as not being subject to condition**. If the idea of transcedental idealism is to be conclusive, then there is no room for the thing-in-irself, thus, Hegel com- pletely eliminated it from his considerations and thereby emancipated contradictions from their unimportance. What then is the meaning of contradictions? According to Hegel, they reveal the function of concepts within the realm of knowledge. Concepts are not simply boxes without any content of their own; they are contents to themselves. This is not just an unpleasant secondary effect of concepts as seen by Kant, but the source of the categories: concepts may be more or less true with respect to themselves; concepts reach beyond themselves an thus are rendered suitable as the foundation of the categories. There is no more need for a world of things-in-themselves or any other outer world as an incentive for the mind. The deduction of the categories has become a matter of pure logic. This iswhy Hegel called his Speculative Philosophy, ie., his deduct- ion of the categories, “Wissenschaft der Logik” Hegel never managed more than to give some vague indications and sisky speculations which are nevertheless immensely rich. Yet his argument- ation terrifies anyone who is not familiar with the mentality of German Idealism. Therefore, we will no longer dwell upon a further representation of Hegel’s ideas, but turn to what may have become clear from the 33 Kant [8] B 697, cited from [2] p. 269. 4 Kant [8] B 708, cited from [2] p. 269. 3s cf. . vol. VIII p, 152, and furthermore: “unbedingt ist die Vernunft nur da- durch, dass dieselbe nicht von aussen durch einen ihr fromden Inhalt bestimmt bee sondern vielmehr sich selbst bestimmt und hiermit in ihrem Inhalt bei sich selbst84 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? above. We start with the idea of the synthetic a priori; yet we shall not follow Kant in his considerations of necessity’ and universal validity as characteristic of the synthetic a priori, but rather contradictions. This is an idea which seems present throughout Hegel’s Logic, though Hegel never mentioned this explicitly. Spontaneity of thought reveals itself in contradictions; and contradictions are not limited to special kinds of concepts, as argued by Kant, but are universal ™ ; therefore, spontaneity of thought is also universal. Thus, the idea of transcedental idealism is not confined to intuition or experience, but extendend to (higher order) logic, i.e. discriminating objects and predicates is considered a tran- scendental act. ie. the distinction is not found in reality itself, but is an achievement of the mind. What then happens to the notion of the thing- -in-itself? We find ourselves confronted with the ultimate question: arc there things-in-themselves beyond predication®?. Has the world, as it is in itself, the structure of statements, ie. are there really objects and predicates, or is this only our way of conceiving? Imagination has reached its boundaries. Could it be possible that there are rational beings some- where in the universe, living on a planet in some distant galaxy, who do not gain their knowledge by discerning objects and predicates*?? Ap- parently, we have no means of questioning predication, because, when 36 Tt may well be that to some readers nothing has become clear. I am afraid this can't be helped. The ideas of transcendental idealism are not easy to understand, especially not for those analytically inclined. Fgllesdal’s paper [5] could serve as a stepping stone. Kant uses necessity as a criterion for synthetic a priori, yet later introduces it as a category. How does that fit together? cd ct [7] vol. VIII p. 141: “Die Hauptsache, die zu bemerken ist, ist, dass nicht nur in den vier besondern aus der Kosmologie genommenen Gegenstanden die Antinomie sich befindet, sondern vielmehr in allen Gegenstanden aller Gattungen, in allen Vorstellungen, Begriffen und Ideen.” We may assume, without running into a logical contradiction that there is a shing- -in-itself beyond percevtion; but a thing-in-itself beyond predication? Wouldn’t this be a terrific subject for science fiction? 39‘Uwe Petersen 85 doing so, we are actually predicating yet again. There seems no escape In this sense, predication is objective, and the thing-in-itself is an empty concept: there is no-thing beyond predication*?, This means that we interpret antinomies as an echo of our own con- tribibution to knowledge which became concealed in the course of its own development. We no longer construe concepts, in particular categories, as representable by objects, but as constitutive acts. Grammatically, these acts become subject to predication through the form of subordinate conjunctions such as “that”*?. We are used to treating them as names of objects by replacing, for example. that x equals x by the equality of x and x, and thus hiding their origin“. Once we have interpreted concepts as acts, we need no longer be puzzled by the antinomies. An act may well have consequences which were not originally intended; it may even have consequences which des- troy its own basis“. But how are we to conceive predication as an (tran- ee ere *! Cf, Hegel [7] vol. IV p. 137 *? Le. “that” does not refer to facts but acts. There is a great difference as Fichte stated: “Fs ist... gar nicht so unbedeutend, als es einigen vorkommt, ob die Philosophie von einer Tatsache ausgehe, odex von einer Tathandlung (di. von roiner Tatigkeit, die kein Objekt voraussetzt, sondern es selbst hervorbringt,...)." J. G. Fichte, Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, in’ Lauth, R,/Jacob, H./Gliwitzky, H. (eds.): J. G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1, 4, Stutt. gart-Bad Cannstatt 1970, p. 221 * Cf. G. Frege, for a similar view, although from a different position, Uber Schoen- filles: "Die logischen Paradoxien der Mengenlehre, in: Nachgelassene Schriften ed. by Hermes/Kambartel/Kaulbach, Hamburg, 1969, p. 192: “Die Sprache stem: pelt so einen Begriff zu einem Gegenstande, indem sie seine Bezeichnung nur als Eigennamen in ihr grammatikalisches Bauwerk einzufiigen weiss. Aber damit bogeht sic eigentlich cine Falschung.” In this sense one may say that an act is contradictory to itself. The human race is on the point of giving an example of hitherto unknown global dimensions for ‘this phenomenon of crushing self reference aq86 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? scendental) act? This seems to lie beyond our intuttion in principle. So how can we decide whether the notion of the act is an appropriate tool for describing what make of the (idealized) logic of an inference to its make use of Hegel’s idea of Speculative Philosophy as a decisive factor: if it is possible to gain the categories with the help of antinomical objects, we may say that our view of concepts as acts has been vindicated. In this case, antinomies may indeed be considered as playing an important part in the foundation of knowledge. We turn back again to the formal aspects of antinomies and carry on from there. VI. There is no longer any reason to be afraid of all contradictions from an intuitive point of view*S. If, according to the ideas of mranscendental idealism, concepts cannot be traced back to objects, but are independent acts, one might look upon the antinomies of unrestricted comprehension as a logical equivalent to the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics: they simply point out the role of the (idealized) subject® within the system of knowledge. However, antinomies have a disastrous effect in classical logic: from any provable contradiction A & —4 we may infer, by means of A & —4 > B (ex falso quodlibet) and modus ponens, any formula B. This motivated some logicians to omit A & 4 > B in order to avoid tiviality although contradictions may be provable’”. But ap- parently, such a restriction alone is not sufficient to permit unrestricted — “5 Hysteria contradictionis is a widespread neurosis which should not be considered harmless. 46 Heel calls it the absolure. It may be viewed as analogous to Kants transcendental unity of apperception *7 Cf A. 1. Arruda, A Survey of Paraconsistent Logic, in: Arruda/Chuaqui/da Costa (eds.); Mathematical Logic in Latin America, 1-41.‘Uwe Petersen. 87 comprehension; the crucial point rather is the validity of modus ponens together with the rule of absorprion™® ‘ ASB A>B Moreover, we may restrict the logical calculus in order to permit un- restricted comprehension without touching ex falso quodlibet. This would imply that the contradictions of comprehension did not originally have the form 4 & —4. Besides, Hegel never demanded contradictions of the form A & -A to be admissible. According to him, contradictions only assume the form 4 & 4, because of a logically inadequate treat- ment of the synthetic nature of concepts: it is not taken into account that concepts are not just aids toward gaining knowledge of a independ- ent world, which in principle could be deleted without affecting the world, but which are constitutive. Does this concern logic? As we mentioned at the end of section II, logic is considered universal; logic is not restricted to certain objects and predicates, but is concerned only with the grammatical structure of statements, no matter what their particular objects and predicates are. The R,, of section IT already induce us to question this view. But at that stage we had no idea what kind of objects the R, might be; whether they are objects of discourse at all. If we adopt the vew of transcedental idealism, we can see no reason for rejecting the R, as undesired objects of discourse. So our answer to the question whether classical logic is universal must be no. Classical logic is based on a vital assumption: there is a world of independently existing objects and predicates; a world to which logic makes no contribution of its own. But again: how could this assumption affect logic and finally ———— 48 ce [4] p. 152. ° Watch out! This is a transcendental, not a kind of Berkeleian, idealism.88 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? cause antinomies? The answer was realized as early as 1905 by Poincaré under a certain aspect of conceptualism®®: the antinomies arise because of unstable classifications; some classifications can never be accomplished, because there are objects whose membership depends on that very clas- sification. In this case, according to Poincaré, reasoning makes no sense*’ , because the subject of reasoning is changing. But why should we resign? Not everything changes; this would indeed cause chaos. Only that which is involved with the process of conclusion may change. Let us consider a simple example of inference: A_B Sc A and B are the premises and C is the conclusion. We pass from A and B to C; i.e. A and B are conditional for carrying out the inference, C is the result. Obviously only A and B are involved in the act of inferring, C does not appear until the work is done, So A and B may change when inferring to C. This means that the premises are exhausted; we are not allowed to add the premises of an inference to its conclusion, as may be done in classical logic: A B A&B&C °° Conceptualism does not really represent my view, but has a certain similarity to it. The basic difference lies in the positive appraisal on my part of the role of concepts in the constitution of knowledge. $1 Here it is already possible to recognize the pyejudice which governed most ap- proaches towards antinomies: we shall never be able to avoid their negative effect by means of simples logical restrictions, Seven years after the first type-free logic was proved consistent, Stegmiiller still claimed that this would mean a “scientific catasophy”. Cf.’ W. Stegmiiller, Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der Semantik, Wien 1957, p. 39.Uwe Petersen 89 If one uses Gentzen’s calculus of sequents as a basis, this simply results in the omission of two structural rules, the rules of contraction® . The cal- culus we thereby receive shall be called LD (““‘logistischer dialektischer Kalki”); and LD) if LI) is enlarged by the rules of comprehension. No /ogical rule need be changed in order to deal consistently with unrestricted comprehension®*. This seems worth noting in view of “Quine’s predicament”; we haven’t changed logic in its proper sense. VII. We are now in a position to deal consistently with unrestricted comprehension, and — as a result — we may treat formerly antinomical objects without any fear of triviality. They still yield contradictions of the form A + 74, A + (A >-A), and others, but these contradictions, to which we may refer as dialectical**, no longer lead to inconsistency or even triviality. What have we gained thereby? Firstly, let us recall our minimum criterion for a satisfactory solution of the antinomies: can we assert within the formal system that there are objects which falsify a classically valid formula, e.e. VxVyrna(xey], where at [ A | is a classifically valid formula? Consider for example [A ]:6 (A >A) +-(4 +4) which is classically valid, yet may be refuted in LD): 52 For the calculus of sequents cf. [20] p. 10. 53 This can be proved by eliminating the cut rule in LD). Cf. [11] pp. 122-131. 54 As opposed to kontradiktorischer Widerspruch, ie. contradictions of the form90 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? R,ER, >R,ER, RiER, >RiER, Ri ER, = (Ri ER) (Ri ER) = RER = RE R, > A(R ER) >A(R; € Ri) > Ri ER, a(R; © Ry > 3(R; € Ry)) > CCR © Ri) > Ri E Ri) (Ri € Ri 7 3(Ki E Ri )) >ACCGRi € Ri) Ri E Ri CR E Ry > (Ri E RD) PVV Ys (CAKE YFKE VIF A(KE YH a(HEY))) Secondly, we may now examine these objects more closely, and shed some light on the relation between KR, and R,, ifn #m, (ABB) > (ADB) no longer applies. So there is a difference! But of what kind ? Let us consider R; and Ry as examples! R, \ Ry cannot be empty: every element of R, would be an clement of Rj, in particular: since Ry © Ry holds, R, © R, must hold as well. This would lead to triviality. Is R2 \Ry, then not empty? This in turn is also impossible. Consider any element ¢ of Ax(x © Ry & A(x © Ry)): tC Ry &R4(t CR) means (ret +a(t€ t))& © ¢. There can’t be any difference concerning the extensions of R, and R,. However, R; © R; *7(R, © R,) is provable as we have seen above. On the other hand, 1(R, © Ra +2(R, € Ra)) holds; 2 RE R > ARE RR) =R, ER, > 7(R, ER) >=RERz Ri, ER, - - a(R, ER,) > RL ER, > 7(R E Ry) > = 3(R, © Rp > 7(R, © Ra) This means that there is an intensional difference between R, and Ro, namely Ry © AX(Ry EX +3(Ry Ex)) but (Ry E Ax (Ri Ex>7Ri E4)),Uwe Petersen 91 ie. Vy(Ri € y&7(R E ¥)), although we cannot establish any extensional difference. We thus refuted the axiom of extensionality. It is not that classes exist, which have the same members and yet are different in respect of their properties, but: there are concepts which have no clear attitude towards certain objects; it cannot be decided whether certain objects fall under a concept or not This was presumably Hegel’s idea when referring to certain moments of a concept existing as such®* , which have not yet settled dow**; in modern terminology: there is more to the intension of a concept than to its extension. This finally is what I call dialectics form a Hegelian point of view: the interaction between the extension and the intension of a concept. VIII. We got accustomed to the contradictions of unrestricted com- prehension from an intuitive point and we learnt how to handle them within a formal system. The formerly antinomical objects now simply reveal some kind of independence of intensions in the face of extensions. Intensions of concepts cannot in general be represented by extensions. This was exactly our starting point: some concepts have no well-defined extension. So meta- and object-theory are in fine accordance. Yet we still do not know what part this phenomenon is to play within the found- ation of knowledge. Does it only tell us of general boundaries of know- ledge, or does it have a positive significance? According to the ideas of Hegel, these gaps between intensions and extensions somehow uncover roots of new categories. Can LD, support this view? This indeed is the SS For the notion of “an-sich” cf. C. Taylor [21] pp. 111, 112. 5® Cf, Hegel [7] vol. VIII p. 208: “Seyn und Nichts sollen nur erst unterschieden seyn, d.h. der Unterschied derselben ist nur erst an sich, aber er ist noch nicht gesetzt.”92 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? crucial test tor any theory of Hegelian dialectics: the deduction of the categories”. We cannot give any conclusive answer, but we may at least give some idea. Consider again the R,, of section II! For every pair of natural numbers n, m with n # m we established ¥ (Ry € VK (RyEY))- But can we establish the above formula irrespective of the pair of different natural numbers, ie. for all natural numbers n, m (nm)? Apparently not! However, this can be achieved by introducing new schemata of inference rules which may be construed as generalizations of certain rules of conjunction ® ; nA® Tse ap®smA,A4 ocleft e-right a(XA),PoA @ (AT) +a (AA), a (AA) These rules replace in a certain way the former contraction rules; it thus becames possible to interpret classical logic within LD, . We can now establish Ry EAXA(AR,E x) but 3(R,E Axa(AR,E x)). Thus, we have removed a sort of incompleteness of LD; the questions what kind of incompleteness has been removed and in what way being of special interest. This remains to investigated more closely. Apart from this, one can easily recognize the modal character of «: 37 ae We might just as well say that this is th i i Ps i - Sea y is the crucial point for Hegel’s idea of Spec. 8 “8 These are not the rules of conjunction of Gentéen! Cf. [11] pp. 111 and 133. 5? nA means A,...,A n-times, SED means £Ay..£AQ if PSAs idm and & is nor, or, or & © Cf [11] pp. 112-116.Uwe Petersen 93 a(AA)>A, a(A(A>B)>(a(AA)>a(AB)), Abt a(XA)® Hence a sort of concept of modality® results from our treatment of the antinomies. According to Hegel’s idea of Speculative Philosophy we have to carry on with this procedure and “unfold” the contradictions of modal- ity in the same way we did the contradictions of predication in order to reach the next category. Whether this is possible future investigation will tell TX. We conclude with a short discussion of the formal treatment of reductio ad absurdum in LD and some results thereof. Let us consider the following formulas: (a) (A>+(B&AB))>AA, ()) B>((A+7B)>74), (©) (A>B)>((A>7B)>74), @) (A>(BeB)) 774. (a) — (4) ate all valid in classical logic, but only (a) and (b) are valid in LD%. As a result of the permissibility of modus ponens (mp is a special case of the cut rule!), the respective rules are permissible in LD: A+(B&7B) B A>7B (8) aA nA (A) The antinomies discussed in [9] and [17] do no harm because of our restriction of the sentential calculus. 6 ‘This is not the system T of Hughes and Cresswell, An Introduction to Modal Logie, London 1968, Chapter 2, because we deal with a restricted sentential calculus. © Tf (c) or (d) were valid, this would lead, together with unrestricted comprehension, to triviality.94 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? But for the same reason (i.e. redundancy of the cut rule), this kind of reduction ad absurdum is superfluous ®. Hence, the classical contradic- tion® is of no essential use for logical reasoning within the calculus of sequents. In LDg, (c) can simply be replaced by (2) (A>B)>((4 >7B)> 7 a (4 J). Again the respective rule (c) A>B A>naB aa(A) is permissible in LDg, and also superfluous. However, there is no such simple substitute for (d). But (d) exactly represents the logical form of Cantor's diagonal method as it is used to prove the power set theorem: a class C is so defined that “If a one-to-one correspondence g exists, theng CE C#-(g Ce C)” applies. g CE C+ 1(gC€ C )is considered a contradiction, hence the existence of a one-to-one correspondence is refuted. We, on the other hand, do not consider g CE C#-4gCE€ Ca contradiction, but C as non-definite. Therefore, we have to renounce sransfinite cardinals. 1 don’t feel sorry about this; amongst other things, this relieves us of the intuitive inconsistency which results from the Léwenheim/Skolem theo- rem. Instead, we obtained extensional indiscernibles and through these, in a certain way, a, and we hope to obtain more categories by the same method. Thus, proper classes such as the R, became discernible by in- tensional characteristics. This I consider to be a fine equivalent. Further- ee ®* Te, the set of provable formulas remains the same if we omit these rules, ®© kontradiktorischer Widerspruch, as opposed to dialectical contradiction. °7 G. Cantor has concerned himself with a similar question in a letter to R. Dedekind dated 28.8.1899. In his opinion the consistency of classes as in the above is an axiomUwe Petersen 95 more, incompleteness results according to Gédel’s procedure are questioned, because Cantor’s diagonal method is used; i.e. this kind of reductio ad absurdum is not effective. But this does not mean that we are now able to develop complete theories of arithmetic or set theory. LD) can be shown to be incomplete by simple means: Ax (XE X)JEAX( XE x)F is undecidable in LD, When applying the -rules® to this formula, we always obtain the same formula: Adeft WOEXVE MWEHEX) ysight PACE x) EC AxGEX) MEX) E Me(VE x) > = (KE X) © AXE) Apparently, this is not a result of Cantor’s diagonal method ”. We should be aware of the fact that incompleteness theorems cannot only be achiev- ed by Gédel’s procedure”! Consistency proofs could be a different matter, but I do not want to discuss this here. We should at least be content that semantically closed languages are no problem ™. This was a brief outline of the basic ideas of a transcendental-dialectical interpretation of the antinomies. Our main conjecture was that concepts cannot be traced back to objects, but are independent acts, and thus are constitutive for knowledge. In other words: basis of knowledge are not facts but acts. This indeed is what discriminates Transcendental Philos- ophy fundamentally from Analytic Philosophy, and what causes such trouble in mutual understanding. It is no use trying to make the relevant °* Cf. K. Schiltte, Beweistheorie, Berlin, Géttingen, Heidelberg 1960, p. 228. © cr. [IL] p. 118. 1 consider negation essential for Cantor’s diagonal method. ™ Cf. [19]. Since these proofs are direct, they are supposed to apply to paracon- sistent logics as well. This does not seem to be the case with inconsistent formal systems such as da Fos Co: “Ass If*A” is tme, then everything is true” still causes trouble. Cf. p. 233.96 What Do The Antinomies Teach Us? intuitive notions exact: the subject with which we are concerned is prior to all our reasoning and thus cannot simply be expressed in terms of it. As Frege said: “Es wird nicht immer méglich sein, Alles regelrecht zu definieren, weil es gerade unser Bestreben sein muss, auf das logisch Einfache zuriickzugehen, das als Solches nicht eigentlich definirbar ist. Ich muss mich dann begniigen, durch Winke auf das hinzuweisen, was ich meine.” > REFERENCES [1 ]JAckermann, W.: Der Aufabau einer hdheren Logik, Archiv f. math, Logik u. Grundlagenyorschung 7 (1963), 5-22. [2] Bennett, J.: Kant’s Dialectic, London and New York 1974. [3] Benthem, J. F. A. K. van: What is Dialectical Logic? 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