Director of Lands vs IAC

FACTS: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which
ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring
481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe. The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). The land subject of the Land Registration
proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962,
from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
minorities. The constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took
place on October 29, 1962. The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except
as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that,
the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973
Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its
Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the
Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme 

ISSUE: Whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in
favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in
effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public
domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.(YES)

RULING: The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it
must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously
does not apply. Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually
confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of
Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution
that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land
to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The
only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings
were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands
of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or
invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights. In the instant case, it is
incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to
purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or
controversy. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this
appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme
thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land.
Albano v Reyes

FACTS: On April 20, 1987, the PPA Board adopted its Resolution No. 850 directing PPA
management to prepare the Invitation to Bid and all relevant bidding documents and technical
requirements necessary for the public bidding of the development, management and operation of the
MICT at the Port of Manila. Seven (7) consortia of companies actually submitted bids, which bids
were opened on July 17, 1987 at the PPA Head Office. After evaluation of the several bids, the
Bidding Committee recommended the award of the contract to develop, manage and operate the
MICT to respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) as having offered the
best Technical and Financial Proposal. Accordingly, respondent Secretary declared the
ICTSI consortium as the winning bidder. Before the corresponding MICT contract could be signed,
two successive cases were filed against the respondents which assailed the legality or regularity of
the MICT bidding. Petitioner, Rodolfo A. Albano filed the present petition as citizen and taxpayer and
as a member of the House of Representatives, assailing the award of the MICT contract to the ICTSI
by the PPA. The petitioner claims that since the MICT is a public utility, it needs a legislative
franchise before it can legally operate as a public utility, pursuant to Article 12, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MICT is a public utility and would require a legislative franchise to
operate (NO)

RULING: Even if the MICP be considered a public utility,   or a public service   on the theory that it is
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a "wharf' or a "dock"   as contemplated under the Public Service Act, its operation would not
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necessarily call for a franchise from the Legislative Branch. Franchises issued by Congress are not
required before each and every public utility may operate. Thus, the law has granted certain
administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize the operation of certain public
utilities. That the Constitution provides in Art. XII, Sec. 11 that the issuance of a franchise, certificate
or other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by Congress does not necessarily, imply, as petitioner posits that only Congress
has the power to grant such authorization. Our statute books are replete with laws granting specified
agencies in the Executive Branch the power to issue such authorization for certain classes of public
utilities. E.O. No. 30 has tasked the PPA with the operation and management of the MICP, in
accordance with P.D. 857 and other applicable laws and regulations. However, P.D. 857 itself
authorizes the PPA to perform the service by itself, by contracting it out, or through other means.
Reading E.O. No. 30 and P.D. No. 857 together, the inescapable conclusion is that the lawmaker
has empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the operation and management of the MICP or to
authorize its operation and management by another by contract or other means, at its option. The
latter power having been delegated to the PPA, a franchise from Congress to authorize an entity
other than the PPA to operate and manage the MICP becomes unnecessary. The contract between
the PPA and ICTSI, coupled with the President's written approval, constitute the necessary
authorization for ICTSI's operation and management of the MICP. The award of the MICT contract
approved by no less than the President of the Philippines herself enjoys the legal presumption of
validity and regularity of official action. In the case at bar, there is no evidence which clearly shows
the constitutional infirmity of the questioned act of government.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines Inc. v Comelec

FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP)
is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as
citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio
and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by
Congress. Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without
due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during
the period of election. The court have decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA
Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner
operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of
§92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free air time to
the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner claims
that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection
with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even
more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioner's allegation that it will suffer losses
again because it is required to provide free air time is sufficient to give it standing to question the
validity of §92. Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause  and the
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eminent domain provision  of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television
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broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary
source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and that to
require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize a taking which is not "a de
minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property."

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 92 of B.P. Blg 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent
domain provision of the Constitution (NO)

RULING: All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to assign.  A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to
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amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or
right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires." Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment
of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought,
such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11
of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better
measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of
candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of
the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount." Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the
requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are
responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally
be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free
expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates
in an election. In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do
not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images.
They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege,
the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of
some form of public service.

Espina v Zamora Jr.

FACTS: On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762,
also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 also
allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines,
to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens. Petitioners who are all
members of Congress assailed the constitutionality of RA 8762.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional (NO)

RULING: The provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state
policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause
of action in the courts. The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods, and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not
prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair. 10 The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a
balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and
services. Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint
on the foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that
the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos
continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has
permitted the entry of foreign investors. Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire
into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has
said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not
convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail
trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to support its
thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. First,
aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second,
only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of
Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign
retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores
through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door
selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities. In sum, petitioners
have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local small
and medium enterprises since its implementation about a decade ago.

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