CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS AS AN EXECUTIVE

PREROGATIVE

READINGS
1. GR No 133250 July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND

AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS:

Through subsequent events, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) owned the
Freedom Islands and on April 25, 1995, the latter entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands
through negotiation without public bidding. The JVA required the reclamation of an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding the said islands to complete
the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP.

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denounced the
JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." The Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations conducted a joint investigation and found the following:

(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA
are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified
as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands;

(2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void,
and

(3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos created a Legal Task

Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee
Report No. 560. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the
conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, petitioner filed an

Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-
AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the
case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner also filed a Reiterative Motion for
Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied however in a
Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
 On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended JVA. On May 28,
1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E.
Estrada approved the Amended JVA. Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the
Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory
grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."

ISSUE:

WON the stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI,
reclaimed or still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: YES

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object
or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are
"inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend
and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void
ab initio.

2. G.R No L- 37995 August 31, 1987

BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE

FISHERIES COMMISSION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO
GALLO

FACTS:

On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject
parcels of land from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substituted in
place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of
Title substantially reproducing the allegations in the application of Mercedes Diago.
Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved on August 30, 1965 to be
substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor over a portion of the
land sought to be registered, supervision and control of said portion having been
transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries Commission.

On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration
of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after
excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hall of
Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of 15 meters
width.

ISSUE:
 WON the classification of lands by public domain by the Executive Branch of
the Government into agricultural, forest, or mineral can be changed or re-classified by
the court.

HELD: NO.

As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted
from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable
or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not of the courts. With these rules, there should be
no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive
Branch of the Government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave
error and/or abuse of discretion for the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted
facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by
the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.

3. G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and

AMELIA BISNAR

FACTS:

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed
on July 20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in
fee simple of lots containing an area of 28 hectares and 34 hectares situated in the
Province of Capiz. They alleged that they inherited those parcels of land and they had
been paying the taxes thereon. However, on December 16,1976, the Director of Lands
and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on the
grounds that; 1.) neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess
sufficient title to acquire ownership; 2.) neither the applicants nor their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of the application; and 3.) the properties in question are a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private
appropriation.

On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was

approved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation that should the
Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby apply for the
benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land as owners for more than
fifty (50) years.

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in
the names of the applicants, herein private respondents, and ruled that applicants and
their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership
 for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for
registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos and
other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds.

The CA affirmed the trial court's decision and held that the classification of the
lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof
that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land.

ISSUE:

WON the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141,
as amended.

HELD:

In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, SC ruled:

As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was

lifted from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules,
there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the
Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for
respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is
within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director of
Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to

declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA
499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply
(Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701;
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 151 SCRA 679).

Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
 4. GR No. L-27873 November 29, 1983

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

FACTS:

There is an application of confirmation of imperfect title filed by Borre in CFI-

Capiz over a certain parcel of land. The said registration was opposed by Heirs of
Amunategui, Director of Forestry and other private parties.

For the heirs of Amunategui, the portion of said land must be confirmed and
registered in their name. The Director of Forestry,in opposition, claimed that it should
not be registered in the name of any private persons for the reason that subject land is
a mangrove swamp and considered as public forest.

The CFI adjudicated the registration in favor of registration of private parties,

but the heirs of Amunategui are not included thereon. Heirs of Amunategui and
Director of Forestry filed their appeals to CA which ruled that the subject lot is a
Forest land as far as the history is concerned, and the government in fact (through
Director of Forester and Bureau of Forestry) showed its opposition to treat the same as
agricultural lands.

In the petition for review by Heirs of Amunategui, they contended that the
disputed land has been in possession of private parties for more than 30 years, that is
enough that it be registered in favor of private parties. Moreover, the subject land
should not be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a
"mangrove swamp." No big trees can even be found therein.

ISSUE:

WON the land (Lot No. 885) is public forest land, not capable of registration in
the names of the private applicants.

HELD:

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code
are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much
less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have
been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber's witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as
late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The
opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court's finding that
timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took
the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that
the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District
Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest."

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving
that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is
part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in
his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he
has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years preceding the filing of his application.

The records show that Lot No. 885 never ceased to be classified as forest land of the
public domain.

In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:

“As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interests since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of
the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest."

Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:

"x x x The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership
for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. (Director of
Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."