Frivaldo vs.

COMELEC
FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon
on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo.

In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United
States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated
February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask
that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing
on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the
respondents.

ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition
are merely secondary to this basic question.

HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution
that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all
times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a
candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified
voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.
The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all
public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and
the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.
The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply
filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine
citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not
yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act
or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because
the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has
been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was
discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly
thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people
of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that
the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and
possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if
repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the
renewal of his loyalty and love.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where
she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949.  She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban.  Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban.  She went to Manila
during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives.  In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter.  When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter.  In 1965,
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila.  She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections.  Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency.  The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven
months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.  She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.  The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1.  A minor follows domicile of her parents.  Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 

2.  Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose.  In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed
to continue.  

3.  A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil
Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.  When Imelda married late President Marcos in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.  
 4.  Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a
new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly
indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.  To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested.  She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to
run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Teves vs. COMELEC

Facts:
·         Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros
Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.
·         Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.
·         Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office.
·         The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of
House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.
·         Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14 May
2007 congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR moot and academic.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.

Held:
·         Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general.
·         The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public
officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such
interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
·         Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is
when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited
from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
·         In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or
financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of
1991.
o   The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia,
Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question.
o   Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he
would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they
remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be
presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
o   Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the
LGC of 1991.
·         However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved
moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be
considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but
whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
·         The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason
that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the
foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral
turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.
·         Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law
or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of
the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.
·         Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioner’s conviction does not
involve moral turpitude.
·         The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees fit.

·         In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it
may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and
horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no
authority to review, much less reverse.
Grego vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct. Subsequently,
he ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local
elections. He won and assumed office. After his term, Basco sought re-election. Again, he won. However,
he found himself facing lawsuits filed by his opponents who wanted to dislodge him from his position.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had
been “removed from office as a result of an administrative case” pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7160. For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office was
again contested. In 1995, petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The
COMELEC conducted a hearing and ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the
Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco
immediately took his oath of office. COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC ,, hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for
disqualification.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in dismissing the
petition for disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do not agree with its conclusions and
reasons in the assailed resolution.

The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure must not override, but instead remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to
apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant
nor to modify, the law. The law itself cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. An administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress.

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the
basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may,” it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular
for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.

Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.

Mercado v. Manzano
FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.  It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship.  That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.  The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts.  The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic.  No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings.  In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national.  A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.