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    73 views187 pages

    Leo Strauss - Locke Seminar 1958

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    Sir Toby Belch
    Leo Strauss - Locke Seminar 1958

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    doin locke ‘hp Trexttses of Govermact ml Resaye on the Law of Natura reer, AS T-ly20) danuary 6, 1956 ot us begin ot the beginnings Why do vo study muh 2 book as Locke's Trestises of Govermamt? What would you say? After all, do we not have msi nore urgent thinge to do? There ie not a word in if abawt our present etustion, I don't have to labor that points Why do wo read thie kind Gf things We mist not take thet for granted. What would you say? (ano: I supposcthe historian wuld say as a tool for the understanding of English constitutional history, But beyond this I would think At would be of value to ce the develomment of the majern theory of natural right and the consent of the governed.) But is there not a more obvious reason, a reason which every high school esior, at least, wuld know? (ines In connection with Jefferson and the Declaration af Independence.) That's it. In other words, to say nothing of other fanous documents, the Declaration of Independence is besed on Locke, Since ve have to mention this document nyway, what 18 the precise reletion of Locke md the Declaration of Independance? (amet Jefferson took sone of his ideas on natural right and the right of ‘the Poople to choose their oy government fram Locke. The Declera~ tion of Independence ie a natural right docunant to the best of my Imowledge, and 2 good deal of its arginent 18 taken from locke.) How can you prove that? (mst One can see dt in the text of the Declaration, when Jefferson first usesthe statement life, liberty and property, later changed to the PUrsuit of happiness, he was using Locke's formation.) But St is even nore specific. There are sone sentences which ere literally ‘taken over from Locke. For example, the phrase “not for transient causes” amd 00 one But there 4s no doubt that the Declaration af Independence was based on this thought. But you said that Jefferson changed a part of Locks. (inst Ye, originally I believe thst he had intended to say Nall men are endowed by their crestor with certain insliensble rights, and among ‘these are life, liberty and property, I believe he changed this to the pursuit of happiness because there was sone objection or comon bias against the aristocratic notion of property.) T an alnost certain that you are wrongs I a almost certain thet there vas never any question of property,” If ny manory does not deceive ney the formula goes beck to Heltaendte {Masorliet(South Cerclina) formla vhere life, 2iberty and the pursuit of happiness (not property) was indicated. But at any rat the most covioue difference betwem the Declaration of Independance and Locke January 6, 1958 - 2 de that the key third right, natural right, in locke ie property and in the Declaration of Independence ie not property but the pursuit of happiness ‘That 48, of course, a very great change. Whether it cm be explained in the ‘way in which you explain it--that Jefferson was opposed to a property-oriented natural right doctrine or note-is a very difficult question, There could be given «nore technical or theoretical reason. The view that there is no natural right to property is based on the preniee thet there is no property 1 to the establisiment of civil society. That view can be held on entirely ‘theoretical groumds, and thes 4t can be eid that on these grounde there cannot be a natural right to property. That view, and again I have to rely on my nenory on this point, was held by Lord AMM , who Jefferem used. This was hela by people other than this Scottish jurist, but it sees that he was one of the more important people holding ite On the other hmd, whet wae Jeffersons chief preoccupation in thie early period, in his activities in Virginia and so on? Wam't be particularly can- cenred with religious freedan? Could not religious freedom be subsumed wider the right to the pursuit of happiness? Because the right to the pursuit of happiness does not specify thet this happiness mst be earthly happiness: This could be of value, although we cannot go into this questicn now. ab sny rate, there 1 obviously an important comection, but aleo an inportant difference, between the Declaration af Independence ad Locke. But let us to back to the question fron which we started. We raised the question wiy wo should study as Locke, ani the snswer given would be something like thist Lock ‘of Goverment, exercised e Very great influence both on Aneriom and ‘thought, opinion and action, But we mist consider the horizon in which this whole problen arises. We presuppose that it is reasonable to be concerned with an anlyeis, say, of Anericm society. Now an essential part of every society Se the ideas vhich permeate the society and give it ite characters In order to understand these ideas, it is necessary in sme cases to go back to the classical proponents of those ddeas—in our case, Lockes. So the Frenise of the whole enterprise, and the perspective of it, is the cbviois necessity of heving a proper anilyeis of our soctety» het nakes sense; at loast 1t is sufficiently comoneeneical not to question that. But can we leave it at that? Cm ve Leave 4t et cuch m approach? We want to wderstend Anerioan society—one of the fundanental documents of An-rica is the Declaration of Independence—in order to understand the Declaration of Independence it 18 necessary to have read Locke's Treaties of Goverment. Is thie sufficient? Mast we not also pursue, from this see starting point, ioe. Anerican society an ‘the ideas giving it its character as well as the origin of these ideas Apr"take another direction from this sane startitg point? Assuming we have understood this idea of right te life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (or property}, whet question arises?--2 question which is as important as the purely historical question, to say the leasto (inst The validity.) The validity. In other vords 4t is not enough to know that ideas "x", "y" and 0 on play a role in a given society, It is also imortant to know the quality of these ideas. Are they trus, or valid, or mtrus? So let us now look at the January 6, 1958 = 3 problen fron this point of view. Jn a way this is much more simple ad mre Recessery approach. We eock the political truth, ani this has, in iteclf, nothing to do with any bocks, But = very practical consideration enters—the eiffsculty of kmowing thet truth, Therefore, we have the need for competent assistance, the naed for the wrks of the great thinkers, who can be presumed to be more valuable than most, perhaps all, of us. So if we approach Locke fron this point of vie, we expect in locke to find soe help toward the political truth—perhaps the truth itself or st least a very imortent error. To understand an important error is, of course, a great help tovard under= standing the truth, Here we make another presupposition wiich i worth a certain emsideretion, We assune here that locke is talking about the same ‘things, fundamentally, with which we are concerned—that Locke's problen 4: fundémentally the sane problen as our problet, But we do not yet know whether Locke's anover ie acceptable to us. We have, or imly, this notion—~that there As a fundamental political problea, and this fundamental political protlen permite of a variety of ansvers which have theoretically the sme status oz ‘the problem. If the problem is, 20 to speak, eternal or at least coovel with man, then the alternative mavore will have this sane status, Let us speak of ‘a tingless problen ani tineless alternstives. oes this make sense?=-that ‘there could be such problens shich sre raised at all tines, 4f not always vith the sane degree of clarity. So the ansvers to these problens could in Principle hive been given at any tins, Let us look for sone examples; otherwise the question will not became sufficiently clear. Have you ever heard of such a viey? In reading @ can- ferporary thinker or writer (perhape not all thinkers acre writers ged all writers thinkers) ve are rexinded of something, a thought, which if very old. Wo ony that this is the sme positio, the sae sever, to the eae quecticn. Have you ever come across such phimomena? We are speaking of very elenntery ‘things here; (inet One inde continual erhante on the eleuntery urges, eating, and #9 a, That would be clear proof that such a thing axists, but siill esting is not ag such a theoretical problem. Let us look at a theoretical problem, You aze perfectly right dn what you say, of course, because thinking 4e as mush a part of man’s mature constitution as the need for food. (inst As one example, Karl Popper's whole book, The Open Society, is based on tis mubject.) I think I have never read that book, so you will have to tell. about it, net hing (ings It 4s a book trying to show how various thinkers fron Plato through Hegel spacer the question of the poneihtlity of denocratin society én ry) In other words, 4t vas the sane problen~is denocracy good or bad? And it was anoyered either with yes or no, 90 to say, at all tines. Alright. But a more commen exansle wuld be, for instance, when people speak of Machiavelli they are (we all ere for that matter) reminded of certein doctrines or theses we find in Pleto~Thrasynachus, for examples (Book I - af the ic) We may ‘also be reminded of the Athenian arbassador to/Melosin Thucydides” Histories: January 6, 1958 - In other words, a kind of comlete disregard of moral considerations in poli- ‘tice wich ie believed to be characteristic of Machlavelli we find eqid ly in these cient mens Or to take an exanple a bit closer to us, let me read to you a passage from Aristotle's Politics (Book III, 1280 e-b) But the end of the state 1s not mere life; it isp rather, @ good quality of life, es » It ts not the end of the state to provide an alliance for mutud defence against al injury, or to pase exchange md promote economic inter- course. » » eLin states witch have this charecten/ neither of ‘the parties concams itself to ensure a proper quality of character anong the nenbers of the other; neither of then socks to qusure that all who are included in the scope of the treaties shall be free fran injustice and from any form of vice; ani neither of then goes bayond the ain of preven= ting its om menbere fron comiitting injustice against the nmbere of the other. But it 4s the carding issue of goodneee or badness in the life of the polis witch always engages the attention of any state that concerns iteslf to sesure a systen of good lave well obeyed The conclusion which clearly follos 4s that any polie which is truly 90 called, and is not merely one in name, mst devote tteclt to the end of encouraging goodness. Others se, a political association sinks into a mere alliene, which only differs 4n space fron other forms of alliance where the nenbers Live at a distance fran one another. Otherwise, too, Lar Decomes a nore covenant « co instead of being, as it should be, a rule of Life such as will make the menbers of fa poli good and juste In other words, Aristotle here contrasts two opposite interpretations of political interpretation af essocietion: the ane which secs ite function 4n making the menbers virtuous (to use the old feshioned expression); the other view 4a that the fimction of civil sockety, or political soci dy, consists ia melding posotble poscosble exchange and preventing overyuling which wuld endanger thet peaceable exchmge, such as fraud and foree ane dimer id thout baing concerned about the cheraster of ite mabere beyond ‘this pointe Now swh a view of civil society as Aristotle here sketches, mé rejects, has occured very frequently in modem times, And one can perhaps say that it Wg(eutd-tn-poedoninentiy-nodemn times, certainly in men Like Hobbes, locke and quite a fev others, So we have here a fundanen= tal understanding of the state vnich was the sane, say in the 19th and 20th century, as it was long ago> So it does make sense to spedk of tincless problens ani of tineless anavere to these problenss But this is not sufficient, Tine does play a role. If the view I sketched first wore simply correct, the soquance of the great political thinkers would be purely accidentel. But as we find out. when studying the sequence cf these thinkers, or what we call the history of political ‘thought, then we ses there is a certain order in the sequence. Ie this general statenert intelligible?—that the soquence of these thinkers 1s not nerely accidental (although accident does play a role) but that the sequence Bipetkas e certain ordere’ Por ceanpley 21's tan rates ¢ stetenave thet tim @octrine of Marx could not possibly have precede the doctrine of Hegel, but sanuary 6, 1958 = 5 15. that it makes senea thet Marxéeb doctrine followed that of Hegel, I think this has somo truth in it. There are other eanples of the sane Kind. Now if we bring wp the most important examples of such differences, of such{tenporal @ifferences—tenporal and st the ome tine memingful difference, between the grest political thinkers,{the example would be the difference between modern Thought and premodern thought. Jn other wards, in site of the fact that there were sich doctrines reninding of Mechiavelld in classical tines end doctrines raxinding of locke ad Hobbes in classical times, there is a posal dility that $f all these maJern thinkers have sonething very important in common which distinguishes then from all pre-nodem thinkers, and these two distinctions cross each othe. . » Is this general possibility clear?—other~ Wise it 4s no use that I go ahs Is thie intelligitie? Let ne try to present it graphdeally, Let us assume that this is the sane problem, the sane funda- mental problem, and there 1s this and this fundanental alternative~a Machiavellim type of doctrine, a Lockesn type of doctrine, and an Aristo- tlelim type of doctrine. And we find these types af doctrines, 0 to speak, at all tines. But there is m aiditimal possitility-thet these kinds of types are crucially affected by a distinction which cuts across, a distinction Detween pre-nodern and modem thought, eo that all modem thinkers, in spite of the great opposition anong then, heve sonething very important 4n comon, ani that all pre-nodern or ancient thinkers, in epite of all the di sggrements among then, have something very important in comon. Does this possibility make ecnso? I leave 4t open what this element in common is, tut that there 1s sme thing very importent 1g clears Let us present it as follove. let us assme Ht the vine Le correct tet Thrarmanhna, n the flret book of the Republi, had something in comon with Machiavelli, and that ee Sophist cal in Aristotle's tine had soncthing very important in comon with locke. There could still be thie possit Mty--that Machiavelli end Locke have something in Connon which distinguishes then from Thrasyacliis and these other represente= ‘tives of earlier thought. Ie there soncthing to this hypothesie? We have to consider that I will try to present this in a véry simple fom, This would nesd, of course, very long footnotes, but I believe it will reach at a certain point an Amediste intelligibility, ‘Let us raise thts question: How did the most influential pre-modem thinker view philosopty, and how 4s philosophy viewsd today! I will justify that ad also specify it. The most influgstial thinker of premodern times can be said to have been Aristotles And & will not go into any question of a desper understanding of philosophy; I will Lint myself to the nost external end buremcratic aspects — the divicton of philosophy Anto disciplines. Now, how did Aristotle divide philosophy? Ho divided Thon be ecivided each inte thresnatheart lop, piysieny end netepayaion (wich ‘hen vided on coat 3» physics, and netephyeies could also be called theology). Physics means all natural science. Now what were the mbdivisions ydthin the practical’—sthics, economics and politics, Then Aristotle said there is a seventh part, which 16 not « part proper but a dnd of prelude to the whole, and that he, or his pupils called, logic. This was the division of piilosoply. Wow what would be the division of philosophy today! It te soncthing very simple, sething you could find out by looking at a few ennomcennts of a few different miversities. January 6, 1958 = 6 str: Wr (ims: Logic would be « part of patdosonty (Or course, there would be a Philosphy of the various so-called disciplines, exge religion ind @ on.) Religion ip not e Glecipline in tteclf, at Least how you mem it here. ‘Today I believe we can immediately add epistenology, although that it fre- quently taken together ith logic. (Ans: There is also « philosopty of history in the theoretical) Certainly, Bverything which cones to your head, provided it 1s borne out by ‘amy annomcenents. (inst Philosophy of art.) I believe they ales call this aesthetics. But how can your forget ethics. ‘tnd what else? (ans: Poetics.) But that de no Longer treated in this way. Do you know where poetics occurs 4m the traditional order the Aristotlelian order? As a part of logio—one form of proving things. {But nov let us cons to consider uhat are the differ exces. Wo don't have £0 go into every point, but the ealient things are very helpful, But first one footnote. This division which I gave here ie the Arietotlelin division; 4 vas not accepted by all philosophic schools, I ‘take 1 only because it facilitates this contrast. Well, what about mathe- natics, physics, or econorice, for that matter; are they regarded as parts of philosophy taiay? Where do they cone in? (inet They usually cone in under natural sciences Mathenatics would have ‘a ort of distinction of ite own, although 4t would not cone under Philosophy.) ‘This 4s the only pofint I am interested in, Now vould economies. (Ques: It would avpear to be something of an inversion in thet Aristotle agpropristed science to philosophy, shereas at present philosophy As mubordinate to scence, ‘Those who consider thie at Present Promgpone that the basls of any philoecphy 4e the aclentifie Rathod ee 6 onething to do wth what I en driving at» (Ques: Could you say thet epietenclogy, in a way, devours those other things?) That Ae not quite fatz, because there are people vio are concerned with sesthe- tics and would absolutely refusd'that.. But the simple point. and the first ‘thing we have to observe is this, In our present day thought we make @ die- tinction between philosophy and eciencs, @ distinction which te absent fron Aristotle. Aristotle doam't cive us « division of philosophy only, but he gives us a division of movledge as such, This implios, and this is crucial, that certain parts of philosophy, of philosophy in the old snes, are now outside of philosophy completely, eoge mathenatics, physics and economics. January 6, 1958 - 7 Political science perhaps els belongs there. Clearly in this case. But the most imortant example of thove three 1s physics, witch mems here naturel science as a vhole, Now vhst does that mean?--because,to mention in passing, thet methenatics is in a way something outside of philosophy was always granted practically. People spoke of philosophers and matheuticies already in Platots tine. They are tw different things. The interesting probles ip physics, or natural science, Wiy? (Quest Didn't this cuslis between philosophy and science cone forth as fa result of the discoveries of the isth and 17th centuries 4n natural sciences) r it bit ‘This has sonething 60 do with it, but we mst state{ou-peobier nore prect sely. 4 (ims: This ie a little bit of an oversinmplification, but natural science ‘today would be considered as the highest fom of Imowledge, in fact in a way the only legitimate form.) 7 ‘In a way, yes, but that 4s all a consequence of one point which I will try i to state: Up to the energence af malem eclence in the 17th cextwy, physios was always & philosophical discipline proper, By which I mean you could not r be @ physicist without belonging to a specifie philosophic school, There was af Aristotelian physics, there was x Platonic physics, there was st Bpicures physics, # Stoic physics, and eo ns There was no philosophically: neutral natural gclence. This te the most atriking feature of modem ‘thought as distinguished from pr the establishment of cally neutral sciences, ‘of thelr philosophic new 2 @o much oo thet they Deraie, ority for philosophy. That applic specially, of course, to the natural sciences, but we find parallels to that in the social sciences aswell, Now the mort interesting thing in pocial science is economics. For Ariatotle econonice 1e aa much a part of phtloscphy a ethics, Whereas today econonica has the sane cognitive statis as ely of the natural. aciencee, at lenst to the extent to witch it is a science. So this : is then the firet crucial difference-the establigtment af philosophically meuiral, sciences which confrond philosophy with the clain to be authoritative = for philosophy. How this happens you ell know from your high school. That ‘this new phyatcs, which began with Galileo and culminated in Newton, proved ] to be aiporiar to any available altematives, md it proved to be possible u to establish the characteristic theues af thie physics against any cout or (Sar ‘This hal never hi pened before. All future developments in Fane woe we physics, including the more modern develoments, is nly derivative frou this crucial develoment of the 17th century. 7 Philosophy has been deprived of @ considerable mumber of disciplines | which formerly vere regarded ap phtlosophis. But hoy does the rump of philo- : Look? Waat te charac What 46, SEE Rotlen bE phiiocophy Ci Slaregerd one aetashyelee) ad afattoget shod fron Aristotle’ (hat 42 the oomon formla you can apply to all of thet, to all these disciplines, exg. logic, epistenclogy, philosophy of history, art, religion and 2 on: NC January 6, 1958 ~ 8 (ans: Indistinct) Wo. That is exactly the point, but that 4s a very important point you mention. The distinciion between theoretical and practical has been sbolished, and me ‘Gould say, although Chet te 6 Bit aibtle, that all these GLeciplines are neither simply theoretical nor simply practical. The distinctim does no longer apply to it properly,er—cheepiys But what is it as fer as the subject matter of all these disciplines 1s concerned. There is something very obvious, (ans: They are independent of ane another.) ‘That is trus to some extent, but I was thinking more about the subject matter. What do they ell have in couman? May I suggest a simple word. They all deal with man, lima thought, hima science, humm interests, huwn arte, hum Feligions (for that 4e, of course, the difference betwee philosophy of religion and theology; theology deals sith and philosophy of religion Geals with man, xdth man’s concen wth god). Now an older forma for what Teall mm vas the conscloumoss or the humm mind. If you think ef sme of the most famous modern book titles, e.g: Locke's Essays Conceming Hwan Understanding, Berkeley's Principles of man Knowledge, time's Trectioe of Hina Nature, Kent's Gritique of Pure foamon, Hegel's Phenomenology of the Kind, and s9 on, the mind, the bunm mind, the conecioumess is the thane of ‘nodern philosophy to a much higher degree then it was in former times. In fomer tines, for example, if you said metaphysica it meant sonething—per- haps you coulé say god, perhaps the whole comic order/adéiferent was the ‘theme of the older kind of philosophy. The whole comic order is now the thene of atural science and no longer of philosophy. Philosophy has to do rath suftHlainectiy, insofar as hmnan Inovledge of the comic onder, science of 4t, Hunan activity 49 otill in a way the theme of philosophy. Now I vould ike to add another point to indicate thet there 4s really onethings You can say I am trying to prove sonething trivial, but one mst sometinos bother to make a bit clearer to one's self what te general ly ainit- ted in order not to becone mistaken, dangerously mistaken. Now if one looks deck at this great divide which fale generally speaiing in the 17th century and the mos: fencus nme » » » But who is generally regarded as the fomder of mojern piilosophy, at least in the textbook version? (inst Descartes.) Yoo. It ise perfectly intelligible and defensible thesis, Now let us lock for one mmsnt st Descartes, because in Descartes we can perhaps seo hov these things hmg together. Prior to Descartes, and the starting point for Descartes was this.--lere we have these many philosophic books, a trenendous tradition going back to early antiquity. And vhat has cone out of that? Whet is the Value of that tradition? Descartes! answer-- ZERO! Because there ia not a single point which is moatested. There is only one glimer of Light, one available discipline which 4g really healthy end good, and that is mathenatics. Brerything is contested, everything is doubtful, and the simple proof? of this is the fact that the whole philosophic tradition 1s split inte two branches. One were called the dognatics, and the other were called the skeptics. If philosophy had ever becone truly a science, there could not be skepticisn. The very existence of skepticien ani the very January 6, 1958 - 9 survival and persistence of skepticim proves thet, phtlomphy has not yet Fosched the statue of sciences Descartes wante to change that radically, and he proceeds, generally speaking, in this way. He says the skeptice are right. ‘he skeptics are right, up to a point. We mst start fron the Sow exirene for of skortictem—dowt of everything Ar se Hetatabbens, overyuning mist be doubted. And then, by thie very ect of the mst recical doubt, we sili discover a certainty witch 49 beyond all possible doubt. ‘Ind starting fran thst absolute certainty we can then construct an sbeclutely safe md foclproct scence. And what was that certainty which will resiet aay possible cout. (anst The conscioumess that I exist.) st us eay—my coscioumess. I will not go into the details of Descartes formilation hereo{ The ego and its ideas—that is the only absolute baste. ‘nd here we see thst the ego, the conscioumess, in a certain enlargenent we may say the himan mind, becones the prinary and eventually the énly content of philosophy. But let us also omeider the other aspects. Descartes wants to arrive and believed to have arrived at a genuine science, @ perfect science, 2 domstic eience. Dommatic means here nly a science which can teach... There is a dognatic teaching, but this dognatic teaching is distin- guished fron all earlier cognatic teachings by the fact that 4t 1s based on the most extrene skepticiom. So if we say dogmatio based on skepticien, we can say that is the formula for vhst constitutes madem philosophy, at leagt in this claesie or herote stage of the 17th century. And dan't believe thet this ie merely eonsthing of the past. If you talk today to the nore rasical types of social scientists, you find out within avery short tine that they still have this Cartesian dognatien based on skepticion, What is charecterte- tie of social ecience in the extrene form?—the rejection of all prinary knowledge, of all novledze preceding stientific mmovledge, You know of certain attempte to prove sone truth sbout man, or about specific groups of Bien, which every child knows. The idesbeing that this cannot be know 4 At has not been established by meme of a strictly scientific procedure Brorything which has not been establiched in this way has the character of folklore. You must have heard this, or perhaps sone other tems witch they may use, The scientific arproach emerges by virtue of a radical break vith our pre-eolentific, ordinary, common mee understanding of thinga. That such a break ie required, that 1s preciecly the Cartesian heritage. ind Just as in Demartes, et least as fer as knowledge of thefuniverse was con- Corned, the true sclesce mist be mathenstical, the sane te still noticeable in present Gay eockal sciences All true knowl edge hes the character of quantitative inodedge, amd what we now independently of it, for exemple most people Like this or that, is a wholly mecientific statenente What we mist dois find out in numerical terms how large a percentege of the population really does have thet preference. What Im driving at is that while Descartes york or the work of the 17th century altogether hes; of course, boenfpupoxcoded by many later developments, it still 16 discemn- able up to the Present day. So 4t makes eone sense, than, to speak of a fundenental difference between nodern thought and premodern thought. Are these points clear, or at least apparently clear. Bo you recognize sme January 6, 1958 ~ 10 ” Phenomena which you Imex independently ofwhat I have sxLde Let me add, then, one more point md I mn willing to repeat the question imodiately. T'vould Like to illustrate this difference now by ecmples taken from political philosopty, because this fundarental change expressed Ateelf in political philosophy in particular. In Descartes and in his ‘followers we see the primey of the ego (the conscioumess) over against the whole order, the comic or divine arder: Nov there is a simple correspendence Eo that in political tnowhe, Descartes wrote a ethical vork called the Passions of the Soul in which, I believe, there is not a single reference Fo duties, But in the most important paragraph of that work there is an emphatic assertion of rights: The theoretical primacy of ° (think) inde dts noral-pilictesy eipranal mts the primes of rigs tinguished from dutd TOW @ general obeervation—that generally ‘speaking, especially in the Middle Ages and in the early modern tines, political thought frequently took on the fom af a teaching regarding naturel lew, 90 that the political teaching was to a certain extent ove identical with the teaching regarding netural lay. And within this teaching regarding natural law wo find this fundanental change taking place in the 7th century: thet whereas the traditional natural lew teaching spoke either exclusively or chiefly of the duties of man, this modem kind of natural law teaoing speaks prinarily or chiefly of the rights of mans Certain rights of nai, or natural righte, were of course implied in the oléer natural law teaching, but they vere mostly left in the state of implication. In the modern way of thinking, which appears most clearly in Hobbes, the prinary moral phenonenon is not duty but right. It has often deen seid that laws and rights ere necessarily correlative. Let. us grant that this 4s true, but there still renaine this crucial practical difference— vhether the emphasis is put upon the cuties or upon the rights. And in this respect we find a very clear distinction between the thinkers of the Middle Ages, especially, and of classical antiquity on the one hand and ‘those of the 17th and 18th century. This can aleo well be underatoad 1f ‘we think of the fimdmantal change in theoretical matters, in general Philosophy, namely the prinacy of the thinking ego as compared with the objective comic or divine order. That was only meant to illustrate the assertion to which I for one have been driven again end again in my studies: thet one mist adnit that a radical change in human orientation has occured in the early modern tines, the 17th or 16th century, and thet thts has effected all later thought up to the present day. And that this new thing, which is difficult to define, which entered during this period, 1s not to be fod in any earlier thought. (Quest How would you fit into your schese those sclentific philosophers and those scientist who don't seen to reget solentific Imovledge 4n ters of certainty at all, but rather in terns of approxinations and of aj ches which are always open? » » . @ philosophy of science Like that of Devas) ‘That Le 2 very uninteresting difference, because these man, let us speak rather of the ecientiste thenselves who are perfectly willing to revise January 6, 1958 ~ 11 every theory, take it for granted thst these theses of science have a higher Gignity than what we say sbout man!’ In other words, while there is an openness the sotence, yet eclece hae an exactness, a peculiar theo- retical dig vty, which 18, of course, in no way questied by the fact that thay are gure there will never be the final solution to the comlo- gical problem ae Newton, for example, regarded it as possible. In other words, in order to see how Little akeptical these people are you have only to consider ancient skepticion, wiich was really skepticien and denied, of courses any comnitive value to mathenatics, to physics, to medicine, or whatever have yous In short, vat you suggest is a refinenent but not 2 fondanental change of ite (quest Insofar as the thought of antiquity ond the Middle Ages enphastzed duty instead of right, would you consider nodern foms of totali- tarlanian as retrogression to antiquity and the Middle Ages?) You have taken a soneuhat narrow view of right. Can you reduce what you understand by totalitarianien to a simple proposition} I wil not qitble with worde, but I would like to see it. (inst That the state takes more thm it gives to the individuals thst ies thet the individual becones less inportant as an end in hinself than as a creature of the state.) What about the state? Can the state do what it wants? (ins: Yes, ite will is a law unto itself.) You mist take wnat I eaid earlier smavbat nore tosadly. tis modern doctrine can be said to branch ovt in two éirestionst the one ie the natural rights Gacteings aay ae you keew it fran Paina ant otherey tut the other ecrecoet Gisele ost cLosly in the nodem doctrine af goverelgnty-the sovereign state or the sovereignty of the government or whatever it may be. Now just as in ‘that liberal version the individual is absolutely sovereim--in the «treme cass@- total octribe tee tah oma that, oot ee UE eee et describe that mre specifically. (quest A side point. Do you feel that insofar as the polis, as you say, could be good or bad is bad or corrupt, is it then related to modern forme of totalitarian at.) It all depends. If you take the view of an amonynous, unscrupulous poli- ‘tician in Greece, well he will be as bad ag an ancnynous, unscrupulous politician now, ‘So the only clear and possible distinction is that between ‘the great teachings. And here, by the very fact that it is a bad polié it Le indicated that it is not something by which you take your orient ‘tion as a reasonable and decent man. It is not oo much the actual distri- ‘bution of virtug and vice throughout history, which 4s very hard to establish tatifoy men dulged of st. Regarding the latter point st te nore possible to mow something, especially as far as the famous writers ‘are concemed. Is there any other point you would like to bring up in connection with this question which T have tried to discuss up to now— which is, why do we read such bocks! (Ques: Indistinct.) That would be a gross exaggeration and wrong, I aly spoke of whet ie characteristically modem, There are, of course, in modern tinos quite a few people, as there are in all tines, who were in fundamental disagreenent with this modern turning awey fron the older. But repeat your statenent. (Quest I only mentioned 4t because Locke 4 such a modern one and I think he stresses such natural or self-evident truths.) Surey just as Descartes does, but what is Locke's whole method? He called At hingelf, or accepted the expression, the way of ideas. Whet does that mean? It has nothing to do with Plato's ideas. Thst means Demartes' Deginning, beginning with what is present in the human mind, These are the re et tao eo ott 7 : (unelee*) I J January 6, 1958 - 13 Jdeas in the Lockean sense—the idea of red, the isea of a chair, or vhat have yous These evidences are all within the conecioumens, wistever that may mean. Locke's whole work is called sn Hesey on Human Mnderstanding and not am essay om the universe or an essay Sr Seo sarang Tike that The connon word for that, which I could have used if I had wanted to, is eub- fectivian, The subject de the great thene—the thinking subjects (Break in tape) (Ques: . » © # comological world view like that of entiquity. I was won- Gering if thie emphasis is only partial, inasmch as the modem Philosophy of solence, eog- logical positivism, philosophical malysis, or whatever you call it, emphasizes the bifurestion of philosophy into whet they call the value theory and the philosophy of science, They are very strictly seperated and in mmy casee the hunan consideration is called nemingless o » ») I imow, That 18 a very extrene form, but 14 finds ite place, Shall T give you a graphic presentation of thet positions) T have cmsidened that, (Ques: 4n other wards 4t 46 an emphasis by avoidance.) Sure. Tt 4s still more extrene in this dirbction than the mre average Posi~ ‘ian, Now let ue then turn to the second elenentary consideration wich one mst state fron tine to tines Granted that such booke Like Locke's Civil Government mist be read and mst be studied, how mst they be studied? Here one distinction I believe 4g of special importance. An answer frequently given is thet we mst study much books "historically". Now what do people mean by thet? That would be a neaninglese sentence if there were not an altemative way of studying it, ‘that 18, mbietorically. (inet Rather them studying then in regard to the school in which several, nen living several centuries apart would be classed, you wuld study then in the historical cireungtances, their relation to the conditions of the time, what shaped the particular aspects of their ork, ami so on.) 1» ‘Tk de the background or the setting. We have to understand these joughte within their historical setting. Well, to take another example ctmer than Locke, in order not to Hrejudge the issue there; if we had to study Machiavelli, for example, we Imow of course that he was a Reneissance ‘thinker, and so we have to understand him against the backgroud of the Renaiseances It 4s avery como views Une questions=ctioy do we low anything of the Renaissance? Ag scientific men ve camot cimply take these jinings for granted. How do we now of thea?’ How do we Inow of the Renat- sence’ (ans: Well, through these stulies by men like Machiavelli who wrote during the Renaissance. « «) T se. In other vords ve now really from Machiavelli and others what Renaie~ Jeruary 6, 1958 = Ub sence could mem, and then we arrive at cert eses, and then An reading Machiavelli, instead of going on re say, “Oh, that's Renais- gence." We refer Machiavellt to snething witch 1s infintely vaguer then Machiavelli's doctrine, which we have in his books, can possibly be. (Quest Granted this would be true especially of classical antiquity. But far the Renaissance, im't there a certain ancunt of things like nunor rolle and other writings that were never to be published in Guantity--histories of families, geneslogies; portreite and #0 os) : sung, bit the qeetion ia, Hor do we kno that ter of amy relertce Brea (inst Well, 4f we were trying to determine some parts about the Renate sance, wouldn't 1t be of inportance to leam that a lot of the bishops were illegitinate children md s0 forth—and the effect ‘this would have on the church and not being attached to a family.) But how do you know that this 49 of greater impartmee to Mschtavellé than the Various qpecies of fishes to be fomd in the Mediterranean? How do you know thet? We can mov it only if Machiavelli hinself 1s concerned ith bishops. And then dn case thst Vachiavellt. says about, the bishops Goom't nake any sense mn the basis of what you knoy of bishops, then, souvd Hot Indeed, you are conpelled to fini out someting about bighopeA But this me 4s the only correct procedure, and not cimply to go out for the Renaissance and expect there all Kings of cluea, which ney either be no clea et all or eloe sholly inpertinent--Like the statis of fishes in the Mediterranean r Sea sbout the year 1500. Jn other words, the procedure is really circular, We know of Renate= sance only by studying such people like Hachiavelli, an} then we use that result or alleged result for gn understanding pf “echiavelli. The only way, Of course, 4s to begin by studying Machiavelli hineelf, There is mother consideration ynich must be cansidered—tne dognatie assumption that every thinker must be understood fron his time. This disregards the possibility that a great man, or a not so grest nm, may have thought against his time. And then his mniqueness, his rebellion against this thought, would be con= Pletely blurred. But the most important, the most simple consideration against the so-called historical understanding is e very simple one, No one wuld expect that a man would write a history of matic 4f he ie not hinself a musical man, If aman ip completely deaf and in adéitin, as Gxstingulshed fran Beethoven, never had sny understanding of music would L become a historian of msic, he would be the laugh of the ten. But in the case of the history of political thought, it seems to be regarded as Possible that you don't have to care a Mt sbout political thoughts you can nevertheless study 4t. To put 4t in a very simple formila, if there 4s not a certain fundmmtel sympathy between the historian and hie subject r matter, nothing good can cone out of thet, If one does not share, exy, Locke's concern with finding the true foundation of civil society, these pages of Locke renain wholly mute ani obscure. This does not mem, of course, that the form in which Locke hinself raised the question 18 necesstrily imedistely intelligible to us. We will see that this is by no mesns the case. But that means aly that we have to seck a bit deeper fron the very beginning, snd to state the fundamental 4: non-prejudicial way that Locke cannot but have agreed with this question, nore general formation of the question. And ‘the way fron this most simple forn of the question to the particular form which Locke uses, I believe I can make this more clear using ‘same examples, But first Let ne state the simple principle, The only possible way of a historical mderstending of Locke's political teaching is the study of locke's Trestises thenselves, Everything we may know or hear shout fis fanily, party allegiance and whit have Jou, ie utterly tninportant and can cone in in a very secondary manner only after we have understood his book, For staple, thet Locke had a certain half-higgish family tradition ie utterly and entirely uninteresting, That his doctrine 18 Whiggish—if we know thet, then we can say, "Oh, he was a bit prepared for that by his dad md granddad," But since we nov other cases in which people had Whiggish ancestry and became Tories afterwards, there is no great value to be attached to this kind of explanations So we study Tooke, but still the word historical, which 4e applied in these matters or in this context, 4s not entirely meaningless. I will try to explain at by raising the question in this form, Wy is some scholarship needed for a proper understanding of such books ike locke's Treatises of Government? In other worts, why thst which is dave in great books Brograns, of which I an perenally very fonds but why 1s this not quite sufficient? In other words, thet we simply elt dom, read, argue, ste: why 1s something else needed and really indispensable, Ani not merely to show off as avery leamed man, but because you think you can't go on without that, Well, let us take a simple exmple. Let us lock at page 122 (4n the edition’ which I recomended), paragraph ht 5 i 4G § # 7 "To ‘understand subordination or stbjection.® Yow you have read that and the sentences are reasnably clear, but shat difficulty arises imediately?—when you read thet? After all, to read 4t as Locke meant it moms to read it as if it were addreseed to you and not merely to contemporaries. You are thinking about political power amd the origin of political power, however you call {ts you are confronted with this very general ansver—that all nen are by nature in a state of nature; that thay are all free and egal, You are not simple encughe ‘That is the reason you can't answer my questions Well, the simple reaction wuld be, he says a mouthful, He doem't prove that in ay ‘way. How do we know that there is a atate of nature? Bven if, why should man be free and equal? How do we know? And, a8 you vill see when you go oa, there is no proof to speck of of t later. So locke makes Semary 6, 1956 = 16 here an assumption vhich ie absolutely mevidart to us, 4f we do not deceive ourselves. Woll, but there 4a no eesuwtion a man ever nade which camot be understoed, which mst not be understood. het te extremely ellipticel--tiie stateent. Tt cannot be sufficiently der wood out of itself, Wet do we doin such a case? In other words, Locke presumposes thet man grant hin thet, but we can't grant him that» Therefore, becstse he Prasuzposse thet $t will be granted to him, he speake extrenely briefly about it, Tt is much too brief te be understoods Wet do you do in cuch a case? Locks presuproses} that was a assuptian, but et sono point or other tht assumption had to be stated in a non-elliy- teal ways (anes One could reed his other writes) Surely, that ie one wey. But may I tell you & seoret? Thet wouldn't helpe ‘So whet do ws doin such e cass? (anes Indistincts) The ordinwry exwression or way of explaining this is thet there waz & ‘tradition on which he built, And we must have sone nowledge of that tradition if ve want to understand Locke. Mow if we go on md reai the next paragraph, "This equality . . . of justice and charity. We got at Least one infornstiont that there wes ons earlier thinker who Locke regarded very highly=ths judicious Hocker. And.the judicious Hooker can perhaps be expected to give ue sone clarification about theso very checure things, although the judicious Hooker, too, is aatd to look upon it as 20 evident in itself and beyond all question that he may not have explained it sufficiently. But still, we have at least a tit of Light. Ist us read Hooker Now thet again 4e not eo terribly éifficult Decause it ie sufficient for all practical purposes to read about SO pages in Hooker* of Bools Polity to get all. the information beodel for Sober Wicrstending GE lattes” het Tw driving et 40 this. Wo grost thinker is really fully selfeexplanstory. There 1s me vary obviougmecon for thatthe terminologies chmge, fer good or bed reaomse And in the moment their te-winology hae becona nore or less obsolete, it is no Longer directly intelligible. And therefore one has to learn or relearn thet temninology, to sais sxtent. But there 1s no secret oF mystery shout it. Because Trcidwesssristacewane can say thie—md T wuld sseert this witha ey qualifiestion, waiting far objection— thet there is no great book which I have ever som in wideh we do nob gst fron the asthor the elgaposts pointing ua whieh other bodke we siould asus 6, 1538 = 27 i in order to uierstand bie more fully, So locke telle us, Hookers Le of some help, wdthout eny question, Whether it ig of mfficient is ematter we shai concider later. But we have in Locke's cess ner indiostion of vhat we mist absolutely read if we want, to under= tend kim, ani thet he gives us in the First Trectioe. The fire Trect- Girected ageinst the then voll Ino: nen Called Sir Robert Filmery 3 wrote a mnber of books the noct fenous of which is the Patriarchs, is e criticion of Sir. Robert Filme, Gince this 1s s0, it is necessary oF st least desiratile to read the Patriarche, which we will do first ‘thing nett tines = & ie oe But I would ke te give you ancther Little example to shor you ‘these simple difficulties end hox they are in principle solvable; Let us tum te paragraph 35, videh is on pega 1B. We have sesn in the paosage which xo read that Locke assutes that there ie such e thing es ‘the state of nature, m assumption wholly baseless in our opinion tedsyo Bub Locke must have thought 4t was necessary te assime thet, Yow let us read paragraph 15: “fo those .. . state of nature, In other words, Locke was fanilier to the view which we hold thet there ware never axy nen in the state of notures , SEMEN not only... whore he ears /onit the quotation’ But I is vey clear." Yoo, now we mst ave vhather he tli make it very clear. But you eso ‘that Locks here also dose soisthing elec. He quotes frat Hooker, md Af you read thie quotation and ere the context in which it occurs, you ‘ELL ece thet the judicious Hooker doem't say a word sbout the state of nature, But Locke indicated thet. He ssid, "I moreover oo o meming going beyond Hooker, “affim thet ell men are naluraly és of) whereas: Hooker at most had ectd that some me: are accidentally ina state of natures Another example of the same type may be found eb the begining of paragraph 13, page 1276 "To thie strange . . . it will be objected /ami eo on/* Here again Locke dreve our attection to something wich the judtetus Hooker or anyone elee did nob do. # strange doctrins here meme as much 22 a novel doctrine, That is the king of thing thet ean be aasined to SEnstbine pores cg int of acates in oiler wordsy bea by ngage ne af the lax of natars: ‘worda, bets ure SEULEDPGEA, Stlaae"agesnet 12s abate oF Reta, "so hebe fours Rimsolf dreve our ebtenticn to an innovation which he made and gives us ane direction in the understanding of viet the peculiarity of hie dect#ine ise Nowe last point, end then I cone back to the beginning, danvery 6, 1950 = 18 locke’ politicel doctrine proper has been laid dow in this work, ‘the Bye Troxtises of Goremuent, witch vero Published aver the victor- fous Fevelution of fe cnly tolerable edition of thet ds thie ms, All other editime reprint the lest edition made while Locke was alive with all the printing errore of the smo. Some things are wholly Tintelligible, For example, the Sveryam's Library edition 48 2 good exarple of this bac prosedure. That ie the best. A critical edition I mderatend 1s nov in preparation, Of course there are ale the Letters on Tolewation, but they deal with the probles of toleration by itecif ‘end not With the political probles as a whole, It is necessary, and that we cannot do here with the shart tims at our dimposdl, to read in Locke'e greatest work, the Es earn Jtunan_Understs » THE PEW pessages: Secltng wish the prOSlee of aot aae Tame Tiss are Veep Fewot they aed Tay indicate ther to you on mother oscasion. Tt 1s aleo necessary ‘to resi his book, fhe Reagonableness of Christianity, which saye a lot host the lev of nature, ‘ut tha oct Dporcart titty now, afver the Giscovery of these useful essays, ie to rend thie book wich hue no title in Locke's manuscript but which the editor calls Locke's Es: the Law of Nature. That is really indispensable after it is aveilable Yo read it. it ie wrong to call it essaye, Those are really depute tiene. The title of each eseay t6 a question, Tney are all in Latin, Dut the editar added om Englioh transiation, oo 4 4s nore appropriate (eccessitle). Tt desis with the question, for exanrle, whebiier there 6 or there exets a naturel loves, 401 of these(passages)have the sons { toms (ind of Lecture) Locke, ve Trectizes of Gevemusst dencary 6 1958 - 1 ee ae (Lecture #2} + + « Tou said ene point which I disn't quite understand because of the fusht what Hobbes acid regerding Soul and hoy it differs from whet Filmer says, (inst Well, as I understand Hobbes quoting scripture, he clained thet God was nonarch over the dove at thic timo . « « (indistinct) « but actually the earthly nonerch insofer as the Jevs could have any ruler ¥ae God hinself, And he tells Samiel, when Sanvel telis hin. . » (indistinct) . that they have not rejected Samuel but thoy have rejected hin, that 4s, God. Therefore, wher Saul cones 2s king, ec I understand it Hobbes believed this ‘to be a separstiony God no lager rules on earth ac an earthly monerch ani hie Kingdon 4s « heavenly kingéaxo) He says that the kingéon of god wes terminated uith the election of Saul. The Kington of Gad dass nat axt et fron Saul until the Second Gonings And whet docs Filner cay? (Ane: Filmer would claim that vhether you consider God as the eartily menerch or Saruel thers 1s e continuity there end a direct Lines My understanding is that Semel, although called « judge, would actually be Like a King becsuso bm ruled tp God's dnstion of Powers snd formally Saul was a king and succeeded Semuel but the tradition of divine right 4e not broken no matter what wort of u ruler the Jove haven) Of course he vill have great difficulties in proving thet Samuel vas a Kings 2 « « (indistinct), . o But thet is aly a mine point, There wes one point where I hed difficulties. . when you stated the position opposed by Filner, you eclled thet doctrine the naturel right doctrine. Ta this Filmer’ description of thet doctrine? (ans: Well, as I understood it he refere to the naturel Mberty and equality. I thought it was the naturel rights ides.) You are a hietorien, and therafore thie question 1s properly addressed +5 you. Ian not aware af the fact, but I may have overlooked it, thst Filner ever epeake of neturcl righte. At my rate he would speak sxtrenely rarely of it. And it is quite interesting thet when we reed it toiay this expression natural righte doctrine conse 0 easily to oar Lipg md not so im Filner, You eee, Filnor wrote very oariy=-1610° smd at thet tins Returel righte dostrines were not 00 fexous under thie nme, Thic can in the letter part of the i7ch century and in the 16th eextury. That would {fist bo en interesting exmple of ow this terminology has chmngad> I fait Fecal) his epesting of netural riahte, although he specke af netural, Yaw and of natural liberty and equality, Bat I don't recell thet he speske ae & matter of courgs of naturcl rights, There may be one or tuo mentiee whieh I don't renaber, but corteinly not in thie wey> Ke Goem't oall 4t, I believe, e usturel rights doctrine, New le ue tum to the mbjeot. We must, of cours, always keep in mind that this writing of Milner together with other writings of Filner which are noi printed in this sr & ipte oo Laslett edition but which have been reprinted, most of then, in/Petriarche and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Tilmer, ofited by Poter-Lhaite (ap?), Black- Ric ‘Go {Tou gee a better edition of the Patriarche md you get in addition sous other writinge of Filmer, for those who are interested. Filner is of inportance to us only because Locke directed his Tresti a of Goverment against his Before we can tum to Filner's om doctrine, we must see what te the character af the thesis widoh he attacked. How does he himself describe ‘that thesis? (page 252) Menkind is naturelly endoved and born with fresdon fran al) subjection, and at Liberty to choose whet fom of goverment it please, and that the pover which any ona men hsth over others was at first bestoved cording to the disretion of ‘the miltitude. You see tere 1e no reference, no explicit reference at ey rate, to natural right, The goverment te freely established by the mltitade, and therefore the mlvStude 42 algo free to withiray the power which i has given to the goverment. ly does Filner emphasize the fact. that thie de a doctrine of school. diinest dumty £ (ins Well, I believe thst Thonss Aquinas hed quite B bit to do wth ‘this Sea. I don't knoy about the later scholastios, but Filner Clained they were concerned to advance papal power over the Pewer of the seculex monarch.) What Ls the relevance of that?—mof thie renark? (inst Well, occasionally in the Middle Ages and even smewhst later there had been disputes betwom the secular and exclesiastical amns of the goverment. sngland at one tines was wider inter- dict at the tine of Henry and Joim for coming inte trouble with ‘the Papacy over certain regulations of the church, If the pops had sore other power he could turn to besides the kinge, the People were probably nore devoted to religim than the average monerbh and thay would generally dbey the pope.) What I neont 48 this» ‘hy does Filner sxphasize this potnte-that, this doctrine, thie wicked doctrine, stena fron school dieinestunwr!4 (inet Well, England had broken off from the church at thet time and any attechnent to the doctrine of the scholastic: In other words, he appeals to the anti-Catholic prejudice. Thet 1a in- portant. ut wheb te locke going to do, if he will take up again as it eens a papilist dostrine. Uo you see thet this crestes sone difficulty for locke? If he attacks Filner,’ he takes the side of the pepelistac How will Locke protect binself? ‘ov can he protect hingelf?--egeinst this severe charge at a tins whe the fight between Catholicien end Frotestantisn was so inportent in inglend. (anes Well; he ofte:, oftes the judicious Hocker, wio was one af the lesd- ing Givines of the Anglican churek-) So loke Je able to play tht gene too. In other wards ho stys an Anglican divine and mot a echool divine ae mentioned here, Nov to waeretend thie J yb" doctrine — but this doctrine es state here, regardless off wa ca: fing the precise @igin, end the theeis attacked by Milner ts clearly underlying ths Declaration of Independence, with certain inportent modi- floatione. For exenple, when you read this. There ig, of course, no statenent here, az you will have seen,,.0r no reference here to the indivi~ dual, That 4e quite interestingin the statement as Filner nakes it. You ses, "Hainkind is naturally endowed «« » discretion of the mltitude." There 18 n6 emphasis on individual, yheress in the Declaratim, of course, ell men ave created equal-widca means oach man is cfeated equél with the others ow That to secure these rights, Goverments are instituted among mei, deriving their juet powers fron the consent of the governad,=-Thst whenever any form of goverment Decones destructive of these ends; it is the Right af the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, » « ‘Tho question which I'm driving st 19 thist Ie this Declarstion of Inde: pendence 2 denccratic docunext? Well, you would have to know what deno- eracy 45, of coures. low vhat Le deucoracy! Well, shall I suggest a ‘very fenous man's statenent, now distredited by the autherities?—~Covern- nent of the people, for the people, by tie people, Goverment for the people was the view of alnoet everyane. ‘That you cen have together vith absolute monarchy or whatever you vant. Government of the people is a nore theotebical thesis, That this government for the people hes its toot, ite original roct, in the peosle; eo that even an absolute monarchy te aPiginally established by the mititude. But you om have goverment ‘of and for the people without heving government by the Peoples For exer Pls, if you have governnent by a hereditary nobility or by @ hereditary and absolute monarch, Tao specific denocretic thesis is then, and Lincoln hit if absolutely on the head by saying governnent of the people, for the peopla and by the people. That is the distinctive differcnce between Secrecy aid the non-dencoratic reine, Now if thet is 20, what 42 the position taken by the Declaration of Independence? I resi this messge to you againt ‘That whenever any form of governnart becomes destructive to these ends, it isthe right of the people to alter or to ebolish St, ee 6 The reference to any Tor: of government momo thet there are many forms of goverment md not only denccreoy, It is perfectly compatible with the position taken by the Decleraticn of Independencs thet the gor eranant may be monarchic or arietocratic, of couse. The wisle argument doom’ make senso Sf the British mnarciy is notin iteclf « Legitinste order. owl Cuherwies ib voule heve beer extreoly simple te say the meve fat thet he Britic’ govermex:, British polity, is monarchie and hes « House of Lords mikoe it iilesitingte, Tho would be the strictest donccratic ergu~ nant, But the Doclareticn of Independence is net denccratic. You cm say it conteine cortein demorctic elencnts but not mores It 4¢ as dex- Cratic and not nore dswcretic than the position attacked by Filner heres That the goverment fc of the people ani for the people, meaning that 1% has originelly bem establishes by the poople, but i is not necessarily goverment by the people. I wae surprised to observe in talking to a Runber of advanced meh, sdvanced in knowledge, that this is not generally adnitteds Tt ses to be obvious. I believe certain people read into the Declaration of Independance othe: opinions which Jeffereon expressed cloochare, The opinions of Jefterem ant even the ctate papore signed by hin are smsthing entirely different fron thigspeper signed by 50 mmy other peopls, where he di not speck a6 Thones Jefferson, The position is the thie, There 1s no question thtt the goverment mst be denceratic, Athe goverment mist origincliy have been established, at first es he save, accoréing to the dietetic of the miltitude, ‘The position is then thet men are criginslly at Mberty to choose whet fons of goverment they pleass. And thot mems thet the mititude may osteblich any form of governnatt 4% pleases. lox te this thesia fusssiet. Filner quothe @ peseage from erdinel Bellarnine (page 253 dott Secular or civil power is instituted by ment it fe"in the people, unless they bestoy 4t on a prince. Thic power ia Amedistely in the vhole miltituie, as in the subject of its for thie power is in the divine ley, but the divine lew hath given thie power to no particular man. If the positin be taken axay, there ie left no reason why enongst the multitude-—who are equel—one rather than another should bear rule over the reste You that is the crustal eetence, Here it 1s indeed dmplied; ell. men are by neture equal. Thet is the meaning of the phrase--"If the positive Lex be teen axay. « «! The positive Lev, of course, establiches Anequelity, inequelity of the governing ae distinguished fron the govemed, the rich as distinguished from ths poor, the nobles as distin- guished fron the comoners, and whichever the differeces may be: All nen are by nature equal, Thet 1s, of course, correctly understood by Filmecs thet this is the chief Sssues All inequality 16 conventions), Positive. And since this ie eo, since ell are equel, no one has by nature the right to rule anyone elecy and therefore &1 right of men to rule other nen mist be derivative from positive lam

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