STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ROLANDO A. SUAREZ LL.B., SAN BEDA COLLEGE Profescor of Constitutional Law, Constitutional Law Review, and Political Law Review Former Professor of different law subjects in several colleges (ce., San Beda College of Law, Adamson University, MLQU, Lycoum, University of Perpetual Help, PUP and University of Manila); Lecturer; Powerhouse Law Review Center; Conter for Global Best Practices; IBP-MCLE; UM Review; Perpetual Help, Las Piias and Bifian, MLQ Pre-woek, Knowledge Providers Law Review Center, Suarez, Zamora, Suarez and Suarez Author: Political Law Reviewer, Constitutional Law Reviewer: Six Months Before the Bar Outline/Reviewer; Three Months Before ‘The Bar Outline Reviewer Principles; Comments and Cases in Constitu- tional Law, Volume 1, First Edition and Second Edition; Principles, Com- ‘ments and Cases in Constitutional Law, Volume II, First Edition and Second Edition; Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation; Comparative Study; Roman Law and Philippine Law, First and Second Edition; Introduction to Law, First, Second, Third and Fourth Editions; Notes and Comments, Proclamation No. 3 and ‘The Provisional Constitution of the Philippines; Agrarian Reform, Cooperatives and Taxation; A Mile to Go for Genuine Land Reform in the Philippines; Statutory Constitution, First and Second Edition; Torts and Damages First and Second Edition; Legal Forms; ‘The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Made Easy Published & Distibutee by REX Book StoreDEDICATION ‘To my wife, Nora, and children, Revelyn, Rhonnel, Reinna Ricci, and Rizza; to my beloved and deceased parents, Marcelo A. Suarez and Elena Arevalo Suarez, my first teachers, who taught me the rudiments of writing and the value of hard work; to my thoughtful and loving aunt, Cornelia Arevalo Vda. De Capul; to my kind and equally thoughtful mother-in-law, Niflea Lautchang Vda. ‘De Manalese, who just passed away: to my deceased brothers and sisters, Buendegardo, Proserfina, Elvira, Manolo, and Rodolfo with whom I have shared the blessings of a modest home and hardwork- ing parents; to all my former teachers who cared to enlighten me with their knowledge; to my town mates and friends who share my thoughts and aspirations for a better society; and above all, to my dear God who is always generous to help me in any of my endeavors, I dedicate this humble work.ACKNOWLEDGMENT T acknowledge the assistance rendered by the thembers of my present staff, Hanna Marie M. Manila, and Augusto C. Lusung, dJr., my former student who found interest to learn how to write a law book and even a non-law book. I thank the proofreaders, including my children, Roland Rhon- nel M. Suarez, a lawyer, and Rhina Rizza M. Suarez, for encoding some commentaries which I write from time to time. also wish to thank the whole Editorial Production Department of Rex Book Store for helping me throughout the entire printing process, Above all, Iam immensely grateful to God for all the blessings, ‘guidance and fortune that I have received and those still to come.PREFACE I wrote the second edition of this book in 2007. Last year, I was reminded by a concerned staff of REX Book Store that I am not able to revise the second edition of Statutory Construction, and I was requested to do so as soon as possible, in response to numerous requests of students and professors. 1 was about to start the revision last year, but I was saddled by my busy schedule in bar review classes until the first week of August 2013. After the end of the bar examinations last year, I was all st to start the revision, but again, and to my dismay, I suffered a stroke last October 2013, and I was advised to take a rest. After my recovery, T started reading new cases and jurispru- dence about the subject. I gathered the important ones and they are now included in this edition. They are the cases in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, ‘Like what have done in all the books I wrote in different sub- jects, I have tried to have a simplified presentation and discussion of the various principles and cases covering the subject matter. I hope that this new edition, like any other book or books T ‘wrote, wil be of valuable help to all students and professors through- out the country. December 18, 2014, Parafiaque City ROLANDO A. SUAREZTABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT Statutory construction, defined Construction distinguished from interpretation ‘The most basic rules to remember. Decisions of the Supreme Court that clarify the rule on the issue of when to apply and interpret the law ‘Three (3) cardinal rules when the wordings of the Constitution are subject to interpretation .. Who interprets the law: Purpose of interpretation and construction... When is it necessary and not necessary to interpret and construct? New Case Cynthia S. Bolos v. Danilo T. Bolos GR. No. 186400, October 20, 2010 Old Case Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the special allowance for judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004 .. Ambiguity defined. The present structure of government, and how this affects interpretation and construction of statutes.. Legislative power.. Case Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997. 10Judicial power, traditional concept of judicial power ‘What is the traditional concept of judicial power?. What is the new definition of judicial power?.. ‘New Case Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippi ‘Truth Commission of 2010 GR. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 Old Case Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation, et al. G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997. ‘The Court or the judicial arm of the government shall be verned by rules. Executive Department. ‘The three (3) principal branches of government.. CHAPTER IL AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION ‘Use intrinsic aids before resorting to extrinsic aids ‘What are the intrinsic aids? New Case ‘Spouses Pascual, et al., Francisco A. Pascual, Margarita Corazon D. Mariano, Edwin D. Mariano and Danny R. Mariano v. Spouses Ballesteros, et al., GR. No, 186269, February 15, 2012... Old Case ‘LandBank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 118745, July 5, 1996 ... New Case South Pacific Sugar Corporation and South East Asia Sugar Mill Corporation v. Court Of Appeals and 13 13 13 “4 18 23 24 29 31Sugar Regulatory Administration GR. No. 180462, February 9, 2011 Old Case Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Herminigildo Pascual, GR. No, 120368, September 5, 1997 ‘Tabao v. Judge Espina, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1348, June 14, 1996 En Bane, Per Curiam. New Case Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v. Hon. Court Of Appeals and Asia United Bank GR. No. 187919, April 25, 201: Old Case People v. Hon. A. Purisima, et al., GR. Nos. L-420050-66, November 20, 1978.. US. v. Hart, et al., 26 Phil. 149. General Milling Corporation v. Torres, G.R. No. 93666, April 22, 1991 Paras v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 19986... Extrinsic Aids. 1 2 3 4. Contemporaneous and practical construction 5. Executive constructioi 6. Legislative construction. 7, Judicial construction.. 8 Construction by the bar and legal commentators Simplifications of the rule regarding the use of extrinsic aids. 32 35 39 43 HRLILRSSS SsCases Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, GR. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 corner Bonifacio v. Judge Dizon, G.R. No. 79416, September 5, 1989. Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 [1959] and Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 [1992] Garcia-Padilla v. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver and General Fidel V. Ramos & Lt. Col. Miguel Coronel GR. No. 61388, April 20, 1983. Attendant circumstances considered, ‘Comments on this part of the decision .. Contemporaneous circumstances and what was actually being experienced by the soldiers in the battlefield... ‘The historical basis of the Prosident’s Power to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus... Reasons and evils sought to be remedied by LOI 1211. Opinions, commentaries of legal luminaries and ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court... Cases Celso Halil and Arthur Halili v. C.A. and Helen ‘Meyers Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 118539, ‘March 12, 1998. Emilio MR. Osmefia and Pablo Garcia v. Comelec, GR. No. 182231, March 31, 1998.. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Flerida Ruth Romero.. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, Cases Joker Arroyo, et al. v. Jose de Venecia, et al., GR. No. 127256, June 26, 1998. Joseph Estrada v. Aniano Desierto, in his capacity as Ombudsman, et al. GR. Nos. 146710-15 March 2. 2001... xi 55, 87 8 ae 2 28 18 eB 87New Case Simon B, Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller and Ferdinand N. Talabong v. ‘Commission On Elections and Wilfredo F, Asilo, GR. No, 184836, December 23, 2009. Old Case Socrates v. COMELEC & Hagedorn, GR. Nos. 155083-84, October 16, 2002... ‘Background of rules and jurisprudence in case of termination of employment...n.- Cases ‘Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, et al. G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989 ‘Ruben Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission and Isetann Department Store, GR. No. 117040, January 27, 2000.. Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004). Presumptions in aids of construction. Presumption of validity «mmm Presumption of constitutionality.. Presumption of good faith... Presumption against injustice. Presumption against inconsistency .. Presumption against absurdity. Presumption against ineffectiveness Presumption against irrepealable 1a Case De Guia v. Guingona, et al., GR. No, 119525, April 18, 1995. Presumption against implied repeals.. Presumption against violation of public pol Presumption of knowledge of existing laws. Presumption of acquiescence to judicial construction. 99 101 108 105, 107 109 110 il ct 112 2 112 113 113 113 44 115 115 115 116Presumption of jurisdiction, Presumption of acting within the scope ue) wuthority.... 116 Presumption against violation of international law...... 116 CHAPTER II LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION Definition of law.. 7 Classification of law. 8 119 121 121 As to nature Penal statutes... 12a 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 Other classifications A statute could either be prospective or retroactive & 121 A statute could either be a repealing act or an amendatory act. 121 A statute could either be or a declaratory statute. 121 Identification of statutes. . 192 122 122 122 122 124 125 xivBody... Proviso. Interpretative clause... 1. Presidential issuances. Background Examples. 2. Ordinances Effectivity of laws. ‘When shall a law take effect? Scope of Tafiada v. Tuvera. Effectivity of presidential issuances Effectivity of ordinance... Who are subject to Philippine laws? CHAPTER IV VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES Validity and constitutionality of statutes... Actual case or controversy. we Proper party. Earliest opportunity Decision of the constitutional question is necessary to determine the case itself... Effect of unconstitutional statute... If totally declared unconstitutional. If partially declared unconstitutional What is the effect of a statute which is declare unconstitutional? What is the extent of judicial power to declare the unconstitutionality of assailed legislative and executive acts? Requisites for declaration of partial unconstitutionality.. CHAPTER V GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES Statutes must be read and construed as a whole.. 125 127 128 128 129 129 130 130 130 180 136 140, 140, 140 140 140 M1 148,New Case Lorenzo T. Tangga-an v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al G.R. No, 180636, March 13, 2013... Old Case ‘Meridian Assurance Corporation v. Dayrit GR. No, L-59154, April 3, 1990., Courts have the duty to reconcile or harmonize the different provisions of the statute including the conflicting provisions thereof. As a rule, the statute of later date prevails... Generalia specialibus non derogant ... A special lew prevails over a general Taw. Exceptions to this rule ‘ : Pari materia rule In interpreting reenacted statutes, the court will follow the construction which such statute received when previously in force. In the ease of adopted statute, the interpretation courts of the State from which itv adopted should bbe considered. In case of confit between & common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter prevails Implied repeals are not legally prestimed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intentions. Case Batangas CATV, Inc. v. The Court of Appeals, et GR. No. 138810, September 29, 2004... CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES Specific Statutes Rules of construction of the following statutes 148 149 152 153 153, 154 154 155 155 156 157 158 169 159 161 161Construction of each statute... Penal Statutes. How are penal statutes interpreted? Remedial Statutes How are remedial statutes construed?.... Substantive Statutes Labor Statutes How are labor laws interpreted?. Tax Statutes... How are tax statutes interpreted?. Mandatory Statutes.. Statutes in derogation of rights.. Statutes granting privileges. ‘Naturalization laws Statutes imposing taxes and custom duties Statute authorizing suits against the government .. Statutes prescribing limitations on the taxing ower of local government units... Statute imposing penalties for non-payment of tax. Election laws Adoption statutes Amnesty proclamations ‘Veteran and pension laws General welfare legislations. Probation law .. Laws on attachment .. Rules of court, Statutes prescribing qualifications for an office... Election laws on qualification and disqualificatio 162 162, 162 162 162 162 163 163 164 164 165 165 168, 168 168 168 168 169 169 169 169 169 169 170 170 170 170 a im cia 7 am im im 172 172 172 172 173 173 173Repeal. 174 ‘The repeal of a statute is either total or partial. 174 Amendatory ai 175 ‘A Statute could either be a reference statute, a ‘supplemental statute, a reenacted statute or an adopted Statute... 176 Reference statute sone 176 Supplemental statutes.. 176 Reenacted statutes. Adopted statutes: CHAPTER VIL LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE Importance of Latin Maxims Latin maxims applicable to statutory construction ‘On the principle that laws should be prospective not retroacti On the principle that when the law is clear, what the courts should do is to apply it, not to interpret it... On the principle that kileth, itis the spit of the law that giveth life .. On the principle that what is not included in those ‘enumerated are deemed excluded. On the principle that special provisions prevail ‘over general provisions .... 178 179 179 wo 180) 181 182 183 New Case Maria Virginia V. Remo v. ‘The Honorable Secretary Of Foreign Affairs G.R. No, 169202, March 5, 2010 On the principle that while the law may be hard, it is the law that will be followed 183 186 New Case ‘Arnold James M. Yeidoro v. People Of The Philippines G.R. No, 192330, November 14, 2012... On the general principle that without intent, there ‘can be no crime. 186(On the principle that ignorance of the law excuses no one but ignorance of fact may be an excuse .. On the principle that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish... Reddendo singula singulis..mm. Cassus omissus pro omisso habbendus est. Noscitur a sociis Ejusdem generic. CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE How are words and phrases in a statute interpreted? . Is the statutory definition conclusive to the courts! Rules that govern the following situations.. When the word used in a statute has a gener ‘When the word used has a technical meanin, Case Macasaet v. Commission On Audit GR. No. 83748, May 12, 1989 When the word used has no meaning in harmony with the legislative intent When the word or phrase is repeatedly used in a statute. Particular words and phrases... New Case Antonio D. Dayao, et al, v. COMELEG, et al., GAR. No. 193643 and Federation of Philippine Industries, Ine. v. COMELEC, et al., GAR. No. 193704, January 29, 2013. 194 194 194 195 195 201Old Case Civil Service Commission v. Saturnino Dela Cruz GR. No. 158737, August 31, 2004 nsnnnnnn ‘The words “SHALL” ‘The word “MAY”. ‘The word “ALL,” “EVERY,” and “ANY”. ‘The words “AND SO FORTH,” and “AND THE LIKE”. Negative terms “CANNOT,” “SHALL NOT; and “NO”, Due process of law. Requirements of due process : Substantive due process... Procedural due process. ‘Two aspects of procedural due process Court's power to construe statutes arises only if the statute is not clear.. a In the process of construing a statute, what are those that the court can do and what are those that the court cannot dO wwmmmmnnernnervnsion ‘What happens if the statute is not capable of interpretation or construction? Can the If the decision of the supreme court in a particular case is not correct, should it be followed by the inferior courts? RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS: Can the contracting parties enter into any kind of agreement and establish such terms and conditions that they may deem proper? Who are bound by the terms of the contract! When is it necessary and not necessary to interpret the terms of the contract?. ee In case of conflict: between the words of the contract and evident intention of the parties, which prevails? How to judge the intention of the parties? 209 209 210 210 210 210 22 212 213 213 215 216 217 217 219 219Rules governing the following: Effect of the use of several term: Effect of stipulations that admit of several meanings... Effect of words which may have different 220 significations 220 Effect of usage or custom of the place.. 220 Effect of obscure words or stipulation in a co 220 Use of general terms ——— 220 Stipulations that admit general meanings... 220 Usage or custom of the plai 220 Obscure words or stipulatio 220 Rule in case of doubt as to the princi the incidental circumstances. 221 Other rules of interpretation New Case Salun-At Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz v. Eloisa Espejo, et al., GR. No. 168387, August 25, 2010. CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Cases Emeteria Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, Inc. GR. No. 189755, July 4, 2012 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. ‘Commission On Audit GAR. No. 183517, June 22, 2010 . Batangas Power Corporation v. Batangas City and National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 152675; and National Power Corporation v. Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, et al., G.R. No, 152771, April 28, 2004... Lucio Morigo v. People of the Philippine GR. No, 145226, February 6, 2004...United Harbor Pilots’ Assn. of the Phils., Ine. v. Assn. of Int'l Shipping Lines, G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002 People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan and Ceferino 8. Paredes, Jr., G.R. No. 101724, Supreme Court ‘Tupas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 89571, February 6, 1991. Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor And Employment Accreditation Committee For ‘Medical Clinics v. Court of Appeals, GAR. 76254, April 25, 1991 Maceda v. Macaraig G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991 Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia, G.R. No. 90776, June 3, 1991 Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69344, April 26, 1991. Basco v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 44007, ‘March 20, 1991... De Villa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991 . People of the Philippines v. Donato, G.R. No, 79269, June 5, 1991 Board of Commissioners v. Judge de la Rosa, G.R. No. 95122; Board of Commissioners v. dJudge Capulong, G.R. No. 95123; Gatchalian v. Board of Commissioners, G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May 31, 1991 Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR. No. 72138, January 22, 1990. 234 239 241 241 241 242 242 242 244 244 245Meridian Assurance Corporation v. Dayr GR. No. 59154, April 3, 1990 245 Songeo, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 50999-51000, March 23, 1990.. 247 Fiestan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81552, May 28, 1990... = 247 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 54470, May 8, 1990... 248 Brent School, Ine., et al. v. Zamora, et al., GR. No. 48494, February 5, 1990 248 Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., GR. No. 54305, February 14, 1990... 249 Liamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989... Jandusay, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. GR. No. 48714, April 18, 1989. Manila Resource Development v. NLRC, GR. No. 80586, May 3, 1989. Regidor v. Chiongbian, G.R. No. 85815, May 19, 1989.. Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 252 GR. No, 84895, May 4, 1989 253 Francisco v. Permskul, G.R. No. 810061, ‘May 12, 1989. 253 Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989 254 SM Agriand General Machineries v. NLRC, GR. No. 748061, January 9, 1989. é 264 Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, GR. No, 84895, May 4, 1989 snr 254 People of the Philippines v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. 45127, May 6, 1989, 255CHAPTER | STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT L. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, DEFINED Statutory construction is the act or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided in the law. IL CONSTRUCTION DISTINGUISHED FROM INTERPRETATION Construction and interpretation have the same purpose and that is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. A distine- tion, however, has been drawn between construction and interpreta- tion. One who interprets makes use of intrinsic aids or those found in the statute itself, while one who constructs makes use of extrinsic aids or those found outside of the written language of the law (Caltex [Philippines], Inc. v. Palomar, L-19650, September 29, 1966) Hence, when the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from the language employed, and when there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction (Allarde v. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227). When the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids (People v. Amigo, 67 SCAD 28). When the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language (Security Bank and Trust Co. v. RTC of Manila, 75 SCAD 519).2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IIL. IN A NUTSHELL THEREFORE, THE MOST BASIC RULES TO REMEMBER ARE AS FOLLOWS: ‘Apply the Law Construct the Law When the law When there is When the intent speaks in clear and | ambiguity inthe | of the logislature categorical language | language of the cannot be statute, ascertain | ascertained by legislative intent by making use of intrinsic aids, or those found in the law itself. merely making use of intrinsic aids, the ‘court should resort to oxtrinsic aids, or those found outside the language of the Jaw. IV. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT CLARIFY THE RULE ON THE ISSUE OF WHEN TO APPLY AND INTERPRET THE LAW ‘The decision of the Supreme Court.on the issue of when to apply and interpret the law has not changed. 1. In Songeo, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Courtsaid: “When thelaw speaks inclearand categorical language, there is no room for interpretation ‘or construction. There is only room for application. A plain and unambiguous statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and tends only to obscurity.” (G.R. Nos. 50999-5100, March 23, 1990) 2. In Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, September 30, 1986, ‘Second Division, Feria, JL, the Supreme Court made the same ruling, but explained further when an interpretation ‘can be resorted to, thus: “Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to it express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would either be impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.” (248 SCRA 590) 3. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative intent to theCHAPTER 3 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT contrary, for any interpretation (Domingo v. Commission. on Audit, 297 SCRA 163). 4. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but ‘only for application (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199). 5. Statutory Construction applied in connection with RA No. 9227. — It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple application, not inter- pretation or circumvention. With respect to the manner ‘of computation of the retirement benefits in light of the Special Allowance granted under RA No. $227, Section 5 thereof, could not be any clearer. (Re: Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the special allowance for judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits, AM. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004; Callejo; Sr., oJ.) V. THREE (3) CARDINAL RULES WHEN THE, WORDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION FIRST: VERBA LEGIS, which means that whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary ‘meaning except where technical terms are employed. SECOND: RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA, which means that in case of ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. ‘THIRD: UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, which means that the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, but if the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. (Francisco v. HRET, G-R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003) VI. WHO INTERPRETS THE LAW? Anyone can interpret the law. Lawyers, policemen, arbiters, administrative boards and agencies, government aa well as private executives are involved from time to time in the interpretation of lawa. Their interpretation, however, is not necessarily conclusive nor can they bind the courts. Hence, in many occasions, the decisions of‘ STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION regulatory boards and administrative agencies have been elevated and appealed to the Supreme Court in cases where there is abuse of discretion and authority or when there is a violation of due process or denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of the law (MantradeFMMC Division Employee and Workers Union v. Bacungan, G.R. No. L-48437, September 30, 1986, Second Division, Feria, J). ‘The judiciary has the delicate task of ascertaining the sign- iffcance of a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural or a municipal ordinance. It discharges a role no crucial than the roles played by the two other departments in maintaining the rules of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. Logically and rightly, it does so with finality through the highest judicial organ, the ‘Supreme Court. What it says is definite and authoritative, binding con those who occupy the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy (Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70443, September 15, 1986, Second Division, Gutierez, Jr. J.). ‘VII. PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION Interpretation and construction have the same purpose and that is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. ‘VIIL WHEN IS IT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET AND CONSTRUCT? It is necessary to interpret or construct when any of the follow- ing reasons exists: 1. When the language of the statute is ambiguous, doubtful, or obscure, when taken in relation to a set of facts; 2. When reasonable minds disagree as to the meaning of the language used in the statute. IX. WHEN IS IT NOT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET AND CONSTRUCT? It is not necessary to interpret or construct when the law speaks in clear and categorical language. The duty of the court, in such a case, fs to APPLY THE LAW, NOT TO INTERPRET IT (Go Ka Toc & Sons v. Rice & Corn Board, G.R. No. 1-23607, May 23,CHAPTER STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT 1967; People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967; Luzon Security Co. v. De Garcia, G.R. No. L-25659, October 31, 1969). New Case: CYNTHIA S. BOLOS v. DANILO T. BOLOS G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010 FACTS: Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by Danilo and he timely filed the Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for his failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, The RTC issued the order declaring its decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 secking to annul the orders of the RTC and prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children. ‘The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and explained that a motion for recon- sideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between the parties was solemnized before the Family Code took effect. Cynthia sought reconsideration by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration fof the Honorable Court's Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and the motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied,6 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” is applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. HELD: ‘The Court finds the petition devoid of merit. ‘The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2008, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope — This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. ‘The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. ‘The categorical language of AM. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. Acardinal rule in statutory construction is that when, the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal ‘meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. ‘This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the index of intention.” Furthermore, there is ‘the maxim vorba logis non est recedondum, or “from the ‘words of a statute there should be no departure.”CHAPTER I 1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT Old Case: Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the special allowance for judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits, AM, No, RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004; Callejo, Sr., J. Facts: Judge Tito G. Gustilo, then Presiding Judge of the RTC of Hilo City, Branch 23 requested that the second tranche of the Special Allowance granted to judges under RA No. 9227 be included in the computation of his retirement benefits. He claimed that pursuant to OCA Circular No. 48-2004 dated March 3, 2004, the first tranche of the Special Allowance equivalent to 25% was implemented starting on November 11, 2008. The next 25% (second tranche) will be implemented on November 11, 2004. In this connection, Judge Gustilo appealed to the Chief Justice that, in the computation of his retirement benefits, the second tranche of the Special Allowance be included since his retirement was only one (1) month and twelve (12) days before its implementation on November 11, 2004. ‘The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the request be granted, citing Judge Gustilo’s service record in the judiciary, which started on January 18, 1983, including his exemplary record of disposing cases at an average of 2.25 cases each month. Judge Gustilo’s letter and the OCA’s memorandum were referred to the Court's Chief Attorney, who recommended the denial of the request for not being in accord with RA No. 9227 and the Guidelines promulgated by the Court. Held: (1) It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention. — With respect to the manner of computation of the retirement benefits in light of the Special Allowance granted under RA No. 9227, Section 5 thereof, quoted anew below, could not be any clearer: Section 5. Inclusion in the Computation of Retire- ment Benefits. — For purposes of retirement, only the allowances actually received and tranche or tranches of the special allowance already implemented and received pursuant to this Act by the justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of jus- tices of the Court of Appeals and judgos of the Regional8 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ‘Trial Court as authorized under existing laws shall, at the date of their retirement, be included in the computa- tion of their respective retirement benefits. A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of retirement, only the allowances “actually received" and the tranche or tranches “already received and implemented,” upon the date of retirement, shall be included in the computation of the retirement benefits. Otherwise put, before the Special Allowance could be considered in the computation of retirement benefits, it should have been “actually received” and the tranche or tranches thereof should have been “already implemented and received” at the date of retirement. (2) Accrued; Meaning of. — ‘The Guidelines promulgated by this Court pursuant to RA No. 9227 is even more definite as it used the term “accrued” in this wise: “only the special allowance actually received and that which has accrued at the time of retirement shall bbe included.” As correctly reasoned by the Chief Attorney: Notably, the phrase “has accrued at the time of retirement” is used in the Guidelines instead of “the tranche or tranches of the special allowance already implemented and received” which is used in Section 5 of RA No. 9227. Nevertheless, the same meaning is con- veyed. The word “accrue” means “to come into existence as an en- forceable claim: vest as a right” or “to come by way of increase or addition: arise as a growth or result” or “to be periodically accumu- lated in the process of time whether as an increase or a decrease, Hence, a Special Allowance that has not yet come into existence as an enforceable claim or has not yet vested on the recipient judge as ‘a matter of right cannot be considered in the computation of retire- ment benefits, Indeed, “accrue” in its past tense is “in sense of due and de- ‘mandable; vested.” In the case of Judge Gustilo, on the date of his retirement, the second tranche of the Special Allowance has not ac- crued as yet; hence, it cannot be said that the same is due and de- mandable or that it has vested insofar as he is concerned. (8) Interpretation of retirement laws generally favors the retiree, except when the law is clear and unambiguous. — The Chief Attorney, likewise, correctly posits that the strict application of Section 5 of RA No. 9227 is called for by the fact that, under Section 3 thereof, the source for the Special Allowance is the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) established under PD No. 1949, which basically comes from the docket fees paid by litigants:CHAPTER ° ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT «As such, the JDF as a fund source is not constant or fixed in amount, as its amount depends on the amount collected by the courts and the amount of increase in docket fees that the Court would impose. The fact of the JDF becoming insufficient has been foreseen by the Court and is reflected in the second paragraph of 4.1 of the Guidelines quoted above. It is worth noting that until now, the first tranche of the Special Allowance has been, received only for the months of November 11, 2003 until February 2004. The delay in receipt thereof may continue if courts nationwide do not timely transmit the reports of collections to the OCA, as the JDF should be disbursed only ifthe reports of collections and the deposits under the ADF account for the Special Allowance tally in accordance with accounting and auditing rules. application of the law.” (underlining and emphasis supplied) X. AMBIGUITY DEFINED Ambiguity is doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, indistinct- “ness or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written in- (StHMERE (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 105) It has been held, however, that ambiguity does not only arise from the meaning of the particular words but also from the general scope and meaning of the statute when all its provisions are examined. There is also an ambiguity when a literal interpretation of the words would lead to unreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences, or where a statute is in conflict with the Constitution, or where the statute would defeat the policy of the legislation. (Tarlac Development Corporation v. CA, 1-41012, September 80, 1976) XI. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT, AND HOW THIS AFFECTS INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES ‘The present government is a presidential form with the executive power being vested in the President of the Philippines,10 ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION the legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, and the judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. This structure upholds the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. ‘Thereis, however, a more precise and specific meaning attached to each of the said powers. XII. LEGISLATIVE POWER It is the authority of Congress to make laws and to alter or repeal them. There are two kinds of legislative powers namely: 1. Original Legislative Power—This is a power belonging to the sovereign people and this is supreme. 2. Derivative Legislative Power — This is delegated by the sovereign people to the legislative bodies and it is subordinate to the original power of the people. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 164WAS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER AND RULED THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 164 ISSUED BY PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO WAS NULL AND VOID MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997 FACTS: On February 17, 1978, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manil Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters. Only after resettling these squatters ‘would the municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal government center on the subject land.CHAPTER un STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the ‘Municipality of San Juan started to develop its government center by constructing the INP Building, which now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters, and the site to house the two salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon are the Central Post Office Building and the Municipal High School Annex Building. ‘On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquinoissued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716. On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Associa- tion, Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with the Regional ‘Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining or- der against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either remov- ing or demolishing the houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164, (On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in question is being utilized by the ‘Municipality of San Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No. 164 is absent. ‘The appeal before the CA was dismissed in a decision dated July 17, 1991. This decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered on April 8, 1992. Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, pri- vate respondents hired a private surveyor to make consolidation- subdivision plans of the land in question, submitting the same to respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their application for a grant under Proc- lamation No. 164. ‘Toprevent DENK from issuing any granttoprivaterespondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association. ‘The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the parcels of2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION land covered by Proclamation No. 164. The CA reversed the said decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Is Proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power? More specifically, is Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation? HELD: Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation —ProclamationNo. 1716wasissuedby the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976, Being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be mended by an equally valid act of legislation, Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid actof legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution on February 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under Article Il, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution. Then came the ratification of the draft constitution, to be known later as the 1987 Constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued ‘on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely vested in Congress. The Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID — ‘There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid (Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 [1970)). However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive branch. For thle] Court to allow such disregard of the most basic of all constitutional principles by reason of the doctrine of presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back to its sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus, also, itis in the discharge of this task that we take this exception from the Court’s usual practice of not entertaining constitutional questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.CHAPTER I 13 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT XIII. JUDICIAL POWER TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER What is the traditional concept of judicial power? (Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, by Jose Agaton R. Sibal, citing Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756). What is the new definition of Judicial power? ‘The traditional concept of judicial power, as above-mentioned, including now the duty of the courts of justic stitutes the totality of the judicial power ‘which is now vested by our Constitution “in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” This is what is known and referred to as the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The significance of the additional sentence “and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amount- Ing to lack or excess of jurtsdiction on the part of any branch or Instrumentallty of the government”? (Last paragraph Section 1, Article Vill, 1987 Constitution) ‘This sentence has, in effect, expanded the power, authority, and jurisdiction of our courts of justice, particularly the Supreme Court, to determine whether any branch or instrumentality of our government has committed “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” In fact, this power, authority and jurisdiction goes beyond the mere legality of a questioned act, or ‘transaction, whether it is committed, or entered into by the highest official of the land, or of any official or branch of our government. ‘The question of whether the said abuse of discretion is grave or not is ultimately determined, not by the officials whose acts are in question, but by our courts, particularly by the Supreme Court, and it is in this sense that the new provision grants unto the Supreme Court “an expanded jurisdiction and authority” to look into what it considers as a proper subject of its final disposition. In so doing, the“ STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ‘Supreme Court, as the final arbiter, enjoys a wide latitude of power and discretion using, as it may, its honest evaluation of facts, laws, jurisprudence and any and all materials, books and points of refer- ence which may be valuable to support its analysis and conclusion. ‘The wisdom and propriety, for instance, which may be invoked by the executive department, may not be considered so by the scrutinizing minds of the justices. In the end, the Supreme Court ‘may find itself intervening in matters which should better be left to the wisdom of the leaders of the nation who are directly responsible to the sovereign electorate. In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, et al. (G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997), the Supreme Court ruled that the sale of 51% of the shares of GSIS in Manila Hotel Corporation, pursuant to the privatization program of the government, cannot contravene the Filipino First Policy. In this case, the petitioner invoked Article XTI, Section 10(2) of the 1987 Constitution and submits that Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument that reflects the vibrance of Philippine heritage and culture. Since Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony and part of the national economy, petitioner should be preferred after it: has matched the offer of Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT WAS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE ‘TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 and REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT. ‘SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010CHAPTER 1 6 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled “Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.” ‘The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the leg- islative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Consti- tution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funde therefor. ‘The second case, GR. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. ‘The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because itis viola- tive of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the “previous administration” as its sole object makes the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) an “ad- venture in partisan hostility.” ‘The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, “Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap.” The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. ‘To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aqui- no found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous ad- ministration, ‘Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010. ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION HELD: Although the purpose of the PTC falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Onder No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article IIT (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 read: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. ‘The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the “previous administration” as its sole object makes the PTC an “adventure in partisan hostility.” Thus, in order tobe accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimi- nation offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been ‘embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more spe- cific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government, Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed par- takes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilitiesimposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the ‘express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities. ‘The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state ac- tions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all theCHAPTER I 7 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT departments of the government including the political and execu- tive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are: WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedi- cated solely to investigating and finding out the truth con- cerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during. the previous administration, and which will recom- ‘mend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all; Section 1. Creation of a Commission. — There is hereby ereated the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION,” which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such seale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ‘ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-prineipals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, ifany, during the previous administration; and thereafter reeommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor. Section 2. Powers and Functions. — The Commis sion, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Adminis- trative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thor- ough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, ac- complices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter8 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. (Emphases supplied) In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo ad ministration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past ad- ministrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differ- entiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Executive Order No. 1 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT MADE REFERENCE TO THE FILIPINO FIRST POLICY (THE POLICY OBSERVED AND MADE POPULAR BY PAST PRESIDENT CARLOS P. GARCIA), TO THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MANILA HOTEL, AND TO THE LATIN MAXIM OF UBI JUS 1B REMEDIUM MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., GR. No, 122156, February 3, 1997 FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, the shares of GSIS, owner of 61% of the shares of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), was sold by GSIS through public bidding. Manila Prince Hotel and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, participated in the bidding, and both of them offered to buy 51% of MHC shares. Renong Berhad offered a higher bid. MHC senta check to match the bid ofthe foreign firm. To prevent the consummation of the bid of Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, Petitioner's arguments are as follows: 1. Petitioner invokes Article XII, Section 10(2) of the Consti- tution and submits that Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument that reflects the vibrance of Philippine heritage and culture. 2. Manila Hotel has become a national patrimony.CHAPTER 19 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT 3. Since Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony and part of the national economy, petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the offer of the Malaysian firm. Respondents argued that Article XII, Section 10(2) is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing pro- vision and requires implementing legislation. Respondents added that even if the provision is self-executing, the hotel does not fall under the term “national patrimony.” ISSUE: Does MHC fall under the term “national patrimony”? Is Section 10(2) of Article XII self-executing? HELD: Section 10, second paragraph, Article XII of the 1987 Cons- titution, is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws ‘or rules for its enforcement. From its very words, the provision does not require any legislation to put in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concession covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances, an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; con- sequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take ‘their bearings. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Inits plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various ‘significant events, which have shaped Philippine history. It was» STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION called the Cultural Center of 1930's. It was the site of the festivitie during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed ‘as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government, it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the ‘traditional Philippine hospitality. ‘The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by the Filipinos. ‘This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid, it is not yet the winning bidder. ‘The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the required approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos, the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Reluctantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee, respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties. (Emphasis supplied) ‘The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so it must be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and ‘welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial. nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.CHAPTER a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. Inthe light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation, et al., what particularly is the effect of the Supreme Court's “expanded jurisdiction and authority?” ‘The power, authority and discretion to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction ‘was committed goes beyond the mere legality of a questioned act, or ‘transaction, whether it is committed, or entered into by the highest official of the land, or any official or branch of our government, ‘The wisdom and propriety, which may be invoked by the executive department, may not be considered so by the scrutinizing minds of the justices. Example: The privatization of business asset for ‘purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, in pursuance of and to implement alleged economic policy, did not meet the approval of the Supreme Court which took the position that this argument should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary objective, should not be pursued at the expense of national will and dignity. Respondents argued that Article XII, Section 10(2) is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and that it requires an implementing legislation. Respondents also argued that even if the said provision is self- executing, the hotel does not fall under the term “national patrimony.” In sum, the privatization of business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, in pursuance of and to implement alleged economic policy, did not meet the approval of the Supreme Court which took the position that this argument should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. Giving emphasis to what it considers to be more deserving of preference, the Supreme Court added that there is nothing soSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. XIV. IN THE EXERCISE OF THE SAID POWER AND AUTHORITY HOWEVER, THE COURT OR THE JUDICIAL ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE FOLLOWING RULES ‘When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to interpret it; (Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326, 33 SCRA 105; Quijano v. DBP, 35 SCRA 220, L-26419, October 16, 1970) Itis the duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or favor. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail; (Article 10, New Civil Code) When construction or interpretation is necessary, the court should interpret the law according to the meaning the legislature intended to give it; If there are two possible interpretations of a law, that which will achieve the ends desired by Congress should bbe adopted; Laws of pleading, practice and procedure are liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive de- termination of every action and proceeding; A judge cannot decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (Article 9, New Civil Code) In other words, he must decide the case assigned to him whether or not he knows what law shall be applied. In case of silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws, a judge may still be guided by the following: . Customs which are not contrary to law, public order ‘or public policy; Court decisions, foreign or local, in similar cases; Legal opinions of qualified writers and professors; General principles of justice and equity; and Rules of statutory construction. eae seCHAPTER 1 2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT In criminal cases, however, it is an established rule that there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE. If there is no law therefore which punishes an act ‘complained of, the judge must dismiss the case (Suarez, Introduction to Law, p. 4). XV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Article VII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows: “The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” Who shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices? ‘The President of the Republic of the Philippines shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices (Section 17, Article VI) and shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines. Under and by virtue of all the powers vested in him by the Constitution, the President is regarded as the most powerful and the most influential person in the country subject to no other restraint than to comply with the law and the Constitution. What does this mean? ‘This means that he is the “Chief Executive.” More specifically, he is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines and the heads of the different executive departments who are popularly known and called as Cabinet Members, are, in effect, merely his advisers, hence, they are subject to his control and supervision. Are the powers of the President limited only to those that are ‘expressly enumerated in the Constitution? No. The President has (ESi@GRINBOWEE to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President as steward of the people (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989)). What is the so-called residual power of the President? In the said case (Marcos v. Manglapus ibid.), the Supreme Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, said that! (see Hyman, the“ STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION American President, where the author advanced the view that an allowance of diseretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President). Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, on the other hand, made this explanation: “Failing in legal arguments for the allowance of the Mareoses’ return, appeal is being made to sympathy, compassion and even Filipino tradition. The political and economic gains we have achieved during the past three years are, however, too valuable and precious to gamble away on purely compassionate considerations. Neither could public peace, order, and safety be sacrificed for an individual's wish to die in his own country. Verily, in the balancing of interests, the scales tlt in favor of presidential prerogative, which we do not find to have been gravely abused or arbitrarily exercised, to ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.” ‘What is the executive power of the President? It is the power to enforce and administer the laws. (Sec- tion 1 and 17, Article VI) The President shall ensure that laws are faithfully executed (Section 17, Article VI). Is he still required to determine the validity of a law? No, this being a question that should be properly resolved by the judicial department of goverament. Hence, the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity. Until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, it is not unlawful for the President to perform his duty of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed. XVI. THE THREE PRINCIPAL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT HELP ONE ANOTHER IN THE ENFORCEMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS Each Department is Given Certain Powers by which each may Restrain the others from Exceeding their Constitutional Authority. Hence, A System of Checks and Balances Provides an Equilibrium ‘of Governmental Powers. ‘The following are actual examples: FIRST: THE LAWS EMANATE FROM THE LEGISLATURE ‘The legislature enacts laws but these laws have to be presented to the executive department for its approval. The latter may veto ordisapprove the acts of the legislative if in its judgment they are not in conformity with the Constitution or if they will cause hardship to the people. Here, the judicial arm of the government has no role to play yet. It is only called upon to interfere and to exercise its authority ‘when an action is brought to it for decision, and only upon reaching this stage when the courts should apply, among others, these basic rules, to wit: 1. When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to interpret it. 2. In applying the law, the court should discover the real intent and the purpose of the legislature. If that intent and purpose can be discovered within the law, it is the duty of the court to carry out that intention. If that intent and purpose cannot be found within the law, the court should resort to extrinsic aids. 3. When all other rules of statutory construction fail, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended, right and justice to prevail. When conflicting claims are brought to the court for determina- tion, itis authorized to determine the validity of the said logislative measures or executive acts. SECOND: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MAY MODIFY OR SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT ‘The executive department, through the pardoning power, may also modify or set aside the judgment of the courts. ‘The executive department is not in any way interpreting or constructing the law in its favor. It is a plain exercise of pardoning power, which is expressly granted by the Constitution to the Presi- dent, THIRD: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY AMEND OR REVOKE THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT i when in its judgment the interpretation given to a law by the courts is not in harmony with the general policy of the State. It may do this by enacting a new law or by amending the old law, THEREBY6 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ATTAINING AN INTERPRETATION THAT WILL WIPE OUT ‘THE DECISIONS OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT. In this example, the legislature is not interpreting or construct- ing the law but attains the interpretation it desires by enacting a new law or by amending the old law.CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1 USE INTRINSIC AIDS BEFORE RESORTING ‘TO EXTRINSIC AIDS In determining the intention of the legislature, the courts may ‘use any of the following: 1. _ INTRINSIC AIDS — Elements found in the law itself 2. EXTRINSIC AIDS — Facts or matters not found in the law 3. PRESUMPTIONS — Based on logic or established provision of law ‘The established practice is to resort first to intrinsic aids before resolving to extrinsic aids and before indulging in presumptions. Il, WHAT ARE THE INTRINSIC AIDS? Intrinsic aids are any of the following: Title, preamble, words, phrases and sentences; context; punctuation; headings and marginal notes; legislative definition and interpretation clauses. 1. TITLE. —That which expresses the subject matter of the Jaw. It can help in the construction of statutes but itis not controlling and not entitled to much weight. 2, PREAMBLE. — That part of the statute following the title and preceding the enacting clause which states the reasons or the objectives of the enactment. It cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute. 3. WORDS, PHRASES AND SENTENCES, CONTEXT. — The intention of the legislature must primarily be aSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION determined from the language of the statute and such Ianguage consists of the words, phrases and sentences used therein. The meaning of the law should, however, be taken from the general consideration of the act as a whole and not from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences used. PUNCTUATION. — It is an aid of low degree in inter- preting the language of a statute and can never control, against the intelligible meaning of the written word. How- ever, if the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning that is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legis- lative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words thus punctu- ated. HEADINGS AND MARGINAL NOTES. — If the meaning of the statute is clear or if the textof the statute is clear, they will prevail as against the headings, especially if the headings have been prepared by compilers and not, by the legislature. LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION AND INTERPRETA- TION. — If the legislature has defined the words used fn the statute and has declared the construction to be placed thereon, such definition or construction should be followed by the courts. The rules are as follows: (@) If a law provides that in case of doubt it should be construed or interpreted in a certain manner, the courts should follow such instruction; (b) In case of conflict between the interpretation clauses: and the legislative meaning, as revealed by the statute considered in its totality, the latter shall prevail; (© A term is used throughout the statute in the same sense in which it is first defined; (@ Legislative definition of similar terms in other statute may be resorted to except where a particular Jaw expressly declares that its definition therein is, Vimited in application to the statutes in which they appear.CHAPTER IL 9 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE LAW SPEAKS IN CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE AND THERE IS ‘THEREFORE NO REASON FOR INTERPRETATION OR CONSTRUCTION, BUT ONLY FOR APPLICATION New Case: SPOUSES PASCUAL, et al., FRANCISCO A. PASCUAL, MARGARITA CORAZON D. MARIANO, EDWIN D. "MARIANO and DANNY R. MARIANO SPOUSES BALLESTEROS, et al., G.R. No, 186269, February 15, 2012 PONENTE: JUSTICE REYES FACTS: ‘The case involves a parcel of land situated in Laoag City which is co-owned by the spouses Albino and Margarita Mariano, the spouses Melecio and Victoria Melehor, and Angela Melchor. Upon the death of the Spouses Melchor, their share was in- herited by their daughter Lorenza. Subsequently, Lorenza and her husband Antonio Ballesteros acquired the share of Angela. In 2000, Margarita, then already widowed, together with her children, sold their share to Spouses Pascual and Francisco. The old TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in their names together with Angela and Spouses Melchor. Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for legal redemp- tion, claiming that they did not receive any written notice of the said sale and argued that they are entitled to redeem the portion sold as co-owners of the same. RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that they failed to sea- sonably exercise their right of redemption within the 30-day period pursuant to Article 1623 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the lack of a written notice since they had actual notice of the said sale. CA granted the appeal of the respondents. ‘The petitioners sought for reconsideration, but it was denied,0 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ISSUE: Whether the respondents could no longer exercise their right of redemption having failed to exercise the same within 30 days from actual knowledge of the said sale. HELD: Respondents can still exercise their right of redemption. ‘The Supreme Court held that no reversible error on the part of the CA in ruling that the 80-day period given to the respondents within which to exercise their right of redemption has not commenced in view of the absence of a written notice. Despite the respondents’ actual knowledge of the sale to the respondents, a written notice is still mandatory and indispensable for purposes of the commencement of the 30-day period within which to exercise the rright of redemption. Article 1623 of the Civil Code succinctly provides that: Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or re- demption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompa- nied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. ‘The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining ‘owners. ‘The indispensability of the “written notice requirement” for purposes of the exercise of the right of redemption was explained in Barcellano v. Baas, thus: ‘The written notice of sale is mandatory. The Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status. xxx ‘Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear andCHAPTER a AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. ‘There is only room for application. Where the language ofa statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. xxx (Citations omitted) Old Case: LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118745, July 5, 1996 “When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible.” FACTS: Petitioners Departinent of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank of The Philippines (LBP), filed their respective motions for reconsideration contending mainly that, contrary to the Court's conclusion, the opening of trust accounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of R.A. No. 6657. Moreover, it is argued that there is no legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting landowners pending the determination of the final valuation of their properties. ‘The Supreme Court denied their motions for reconsideration. HELD: The Court rejects the said contention. Sec. 16(e) of RA No. 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in “cash” or in “LBP bonds,” to wit: Section 16(e) Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands —32 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION mx Kor “Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding, payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the Iandowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank des- ignated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philip- pines. xxx" ‘The said provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include the opening of “trust accounts” within the coverage of the term “deposit.” When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of RA No. 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible, As [the Court] hals) previously declared, the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting diserepaney between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE COURT APPLIED THE LAW ACCORDING TO ITS PLAIN AND OBVIOUS MEANING New Case: SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORPORATION and SOUTH EAST ASIA SUGAR MILL CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION G.R. No. 180462, February 9, 2011 FACTS: In 1999, the government projected a short metric tons of sugar due to the effects of El Niflo and La NifiaCHAPTER IT 33 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION phenomena. To fill the expected shortage and to ensure stable sugar prices, then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 87, Series of 1999, facilitating sugar importation by the private sector. Section 2 of Executive Order No. 87 created a Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction (Committee) to determine procedures for sugar importation as well as for collection and remittance of conversion fee. Under Section 3, sugar conversion is by auction and is subject to conversion fee to be remitted by Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) to the Bureau of Treasury. ‘The Committee issued the Bidding Rules providing guidelines for sugar importation. Under the rules, the importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within three working days from receipt of notice of the bid award and the 75% balance upon arrival of the imported sugar. ‘The rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the importation or if the imported sugar fails to arrive on or before the set arrival date, 25% of the conversion fee is forfeited in favor of the SRA, to wit: G. Forfeiture of Conversion Fee G.1 In ease of failure of the importer to make the importation or for the imported sugar to arrive in the Philippines on or before the Arrival Date, the 25% of Conversion Fee Bid already paid shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA and the imported sugar shall not be classified as “B” (domestic sugar) unless, upon application with the SRA and without objection of the Committee, the SRA allows such conversion after payment by the importer of 100% of the Conversion Fee applicable to the shipment. (Emphasis supplied) ‘The Sugar Mill submitted the winning bid for 10,000 metric tons while Pacific Sugar submitted the winning bid for 20,000 metric tons, for a combined total volume of 30,000 metric tons of sugar. Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the conversion fees. ‘As it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar delivered only 10% of their sugar import allocation, or a total of only 3,000 metricmu STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION tons of sugar. They requested the SRA to cancel the remaining 27,000 metric tons blaming sharp decline in sugar prices. They ‘sought immediate reimbursement of the corresponding 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P38,637,000.00. ‘The SRA informed the sugar corporations that the conversion feo would be forfeited pursuant to paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules and notified them that the authority to reconsider their request for reimbursement was vested with the Committee. ‘The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract ‘and damages in the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the SRA to pay plaintiffs the amount of 138,637,000 as reimbureement of 25% of the conversion fee they had paid and held that paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules contemplated delay in the arrival of imported sugar, not cancellation of sugar importation. It concluded that the forfeiture provision did not apply to the sugar corporations which merely cancelled the sugar importation. Aggrieved, the SRA filed in the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to set aside the RTC’s Orders as well as the Writ of Execution and the Amended Writ of Execution, The CA ruled to annul and set-aside all the orders of the RTC and remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. Dissatisfied, the sugar corporations filed in this Court a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of P38,637,000.00 in conversion fee. HELD: ‘The RTC gravely erred inorderingthe SRA toreturn the forfeited conversion fee to the sugar corporations. Its strained interpretation of paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules contemplates cases of delay in the arrival of imported sugar but not cases of cancellation of sugar importation defies logic and the express provision of paragraph G.1, If delay in the arrival of imported sugar is subject to forfeiture of 25% of the conversion fee, with more reason is outright failure to import sugar, by cancelling the sugar importation altogether, subject to forfeiture of the 25% of the conversion fee. Plainly and expressly, paragraph G.1 identifies two situations which would bring about the forfeiture of 25% of the conversionCHAPTER II 5 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION fee: (1) when the importer fails to make the importation or (2) when the imported sugar fails to arrive in the Philippines on or before the set arrival date. It is wrong for the RTC to interpret the forfeiture provision in a way departing from its plain and express language ‘Where the language of a rule is clear, itis the duty of the court to enforce it according to the plain meaning of the word. There is no ‘occasion to resort to other means of interpretation, Old Case: CECILLEVILLE REALTY AND SERVICE, CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997 FRANCISCO, J. ‘The Supreme Court applied the law, RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263, according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its express terms. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the word, only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house thereon. It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. This Court should not deviate therefrom. FACTS: In 1976, Sotero Pascual became a tenant of Jose A. Resurrec- cion, the President of petitioner Cecilleville Realty and Service Cor- poration, in the latter's land at Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. When Sotero died, his wife Ana Pascual, succeeded him in tenancy by op- eration of law. As such tenant she had a home lot and a house on the landholding. She was assisted in the cultivation of the land by her son, private respondent Hermigildo Pascual, who also occupies a portion of the landholding distinct from that occupied by his mother. Petitioner Cecilleville sought to eject Hermigildo from the portion occupied by his house but the latter, insisting that he i ‘entitled to occupancy since he ie helping his mother in the cultivation of the land, refused to vacate, Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit36 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION against Hermigildo before MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Finding no tenancy relationship between petitioner and Hermigildo, the MTC ordered the latter to vacate the land and pay attorney's fees and the sum of P500.00 monthly from the filing of the complaint. On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC and ordered that the case be remanded to the DARAB for further adjudication. ‘The court was of the opinion that Ana Pascual was entitled to the help of her son in the cultivation, consequently, her son cannot be simply ejected without cireumventing the law. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC’s decision on the basis of Section 5, RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263, governing the relations of landlords and tenants, which provides that a tenant ‘entitled to the aid and assistance of the immediate members of hi family and other persons who, though not tenants themselves, are afforded the protection of the law and the security of tenure accorded the tenant. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that Hermigildo’s having a house on the landholding is but an incident of the tenancy. In this petition for review on certiorari Cecilleville contends that the appellate court erred in not finding that while private respondent is entitled to work on the agricultural land of petitioner in his capacity as member of the family of tenant Ana Pascual, nonetheless he cannot occupy a substantial portion thereof and utilize the same for residential purposes. HELD: ‘As clearly provided by Section 22, paragraph 8, RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No, 2263, only a tenant is granted the right toa home lot and the right to construct and maintain a house thereon. Private respondent is not entitled to a home lot. As the Court sees it, the issue lies on the interpretation of Sec. 22, paragraph 3, of RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No, 2263. This section provides in full as follow: “Section 22x x x (8) The tenant shall have the rright to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an area of not more than 8 per cent of the area of his landholding provided that it does not exceed one thousand square meters and that it shall be located at a convenient and suitable place within the land of the landholder to be designated by the latter where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and engage in minor industries, the(CHAPTER It a1 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively. ‘The tenant's dwelling shall not be removed from the lot already assigned to him by the landholder, except as, provided in Section 26 unless there is a severance of the tenancy relationship between them as provided under Section 9, or unless the tenant is ejected for cause, and only after the expiration of forty-five (45) days following such severance of relationship or dismissal for cause.” ‘The law is unambiguous and clear. Consequently, it must be applied according to ita plain and obvious meaning, according to its express terms. Verba legis non est receden- dum, or from the word, only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house thereon. And here, private respondent does not dis- pute that he is a mere member of Ana Pascual’s immediate farm household. Under the law, therefore, we find private re- spondent not entitled to a home lot. Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining the same within the very small landholding of petitioner. Torule otherwise is to make a mockery of the purpose of the tenan- cy relations between a bona fide tenant and the landholder as envisioned by the very law, ie., RA No. 1199, as amended, upon which private respondent relies, to wit: Section 2. Purpose. — It is the purpose of this Act to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants upon the principles of social justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landholders: to issue the equitable division of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural production, to bolster their economic position and to encourage thei participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities. (Emphasis supplied) ‘Thus, if the Court were to follow private respondent's argu- ‘ment and allow all the members of the tenant's immediate farm houschold to construct and maintain their houses and to be entitled to not more than one thousand (1,000) square meters each of home lot, as what private respondent wanted th{e] Court to dole-out, then farms will be virtually converted into rows, if not colonies, of houses. How then can there be “equitable division of the produce and38 ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION income derived from the land” and “more efficient agricul- tural production” if the land's productivity and use for growing crops is lessened or, more appropriately, obliterated by its uncer- emonious conversion into residential uso? It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. ‘Th{e] Court should not deviate therefrom. ‘The landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. Further, it is undisputed that Ana Pascual, the tenant and private respondent's mother, has an existing home lot and a house on the subject property in which private respondent may take refuge while attending to his work. private respondent chose joner’s permission, a concrete house of his own thereby saving him the trouble of paying appropriate rents. If the courts were to abide by the respondent court’s inordinate pronouncement that private respondent is entitled to maintain his own house then we will be condoning the deprivation of a landholder’s property without even a fraction of compensation. It taxes the credulity of the Court, therefore, to insist that private respondent's having a house of his own on the property is merely incidental to the “tenancy” and to afford him the convenience of attending to the cultivation of the land for, in the first place, he is not the tenant as he himself admits. Besides, the “incidental” use of his own house can very well be provided by the existing house of his mother, who with her “old and infirm” condition, surely needs the attention and care of her children, one of whom is herein private respondent. Be it emphasized that like the tenant the landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law, as one of the purposes of the “Act” is “to afford adequate protection to the rights of BOTH tenants and landholders.” Tho policy of social justice, the Court reiterates, is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply becauseCHAPTER IL 29 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION it is committed by the underprivileged. “Compassion for the poor,” as [the Court] said in Galay, et al. v. CA, et al., is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.” EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT REJECTED RESPONDENT'S PLEA THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR ANOTHER INTERPRETATION. INSTEAD, ‘THECOURTFIRMLY RULED THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE MISERABLY FAILED TO EXHIBIT THE OBJECTIVITY REQUIRED OF MEMBERS OF THE BENCH WHICH IS NECESSARY, EVEN INDISPENSABLE, TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE COURT. TABAO v. JUDGE ESPINA AM. No. RTJ-96-1348, 14 June 1996 EN BANC, PER CURIAM The respondent Judge should be sanctioned for digressing from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after both the prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases; that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can determine whether or not to grant bail; and that the ruling in Simon did not alter, much less set aside the State’s right to ‘@ hearing to oppose bail and neither did it cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case. FACTS: First Assistant City Prosecutor for Tacloban City, Leo C. ‘Tabao, accused Judge Pedro 8. Espina of: (a) Gross Irregularity, (b) Abuse of Authority, and (¢) Bias in favor of the accused. In another sworn complaint, Regional State Prosecutor Fran- cisco Q. Aurillo, Jr. manifested that he had earlier assailed before the CA an order issued by respondent granting bail to the accused without giving the prosecution a chance to present evidence to op- pose the grant of bail. The Court of Appeals annulled respondent's orders, granting bail to the accused and denying the prosecution's ‘motion for reconsideration of the order that granted bail. Respon- dent failed to comment on this aspect of the complaint against him,0 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ‘The records show that respondent Judge had set the promulga- tion of judgment in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 entitled “People of the Phils. v. Salvador Padernal,” a case for violation of RA No. 6425 for drug pushing and had promulgated his decision thereon despite the defense’s manifestation for time to allow it to submit other docu- mentary evidence, make its formal offer of exhibits, and to rest its case, Judgment was promulgated and the prosecution was not given a chance to adduce rebuttal evidence. Respondent filed his comments on the separate complaints, arguing that he proceeded to decide thecase without thedocumentary evidence of the defense because they were not submitted on time; that the evidence to be submitted, consisting of business licenses ‘and permits, was immaterial to the innocence or guilt of the accused; that official duty is presumed to have been regularly performed unless the contrary is shown; that his grant of bail to the accused is now allowed in view of the ruling in People v. Simon (G.R. No. 98028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555), HELD: ‘The Office of the Court Administrator held that respondent's acts constituted an exercise of judicial prerogative. ‘The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Judge should be sanctioned for digressing from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after both the prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases; that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can determine whether or not to grant bail; and that the ruling in Simon did not alter, much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose dail and neither did it cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case. ‘The Supreme Court dismissed respondent from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. ‘The Court has repeatedly stressed the ruling in People v. Dacudao (170 SCRA 489), that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong on the issue of whether or not to grant bail to an accused charged with a heinous crime where the imposableCHAPTER IL a AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Hence, a denial of the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to which it is entitled equally as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Section 6, Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a plea for bail. The hearing for bail though summary in nature is necessary to afford both the prosecution and the defense an opportunity to prove their respective contentions on the matter of bail for the accused. ‘The Court has never hesitated to impose sanctions on judges who had granted bail to an accused charged with a heinous crime punishable with death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without the required hearing. In Santos v. Ofilada (245 SCRA 56), the Court expressing almost exasperation over repeated violations by judges in this regard stated that “it is indeed lamentable that despite the series of its pronouncements on the same administrative office, th{e] Court still has to contend with the same problem all over ‘again and to impose once more the same sanction. Itis gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaints thoroughly and substantially. Respondent cannot rely on the ruling in People v. Simon (234 SCRA 555), since the issue in the present. complaints is his hhaving granted bail to an accused charged with an offense then punishable with life imprisonment; without giving the prosecution the opportunity to show that evidence of guilt is strong and that as consequence, the accused is not entitled to bail. Under the Rules of Court, a hearing for bail is mandatory to afford the State its right to ‘oppose the granting of bail. The ruling in Simon did not alter much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose bail. Neither did the ruling in Simon cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case. On the issue regarding the manner of promulgating the decision in a criminal case, respondent. judge digressed from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after the prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases. In the subject criminal case, the defense has rested their respective cases. In the subject criminal case, the defense hhad yet to rest its case when respondent rendered the judgment of acquittal. It is not difficult to imagine the grave injustice which2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION would have resulted had respondent judge convicted the accused before the defense had rested its ease. Of course, respondent judge ‘acquitted the accused. But the questions now are: why the deliberate hhaste to acquit the accused, the same accused to whom bail had been granted by respondent judge without hearing the prosecution's evidence? And why was the prosecution denied the right to present rebuttal evidence when it manifested its intention to present rebuttal evidence when informed of the promulgation of judgment? Judges should be reminded that in each step in the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor topportunity to present his defense; so, with the prosecution as to its evidence. Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be yielded by one who has an unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness. Respondent judge's conduct in the disposition of the criminal case subject of the present complaints leaves much to be desired. He miserably failed to exhibit the objectivity required of members of the bench that is necessary, even indispensable, to maintain the public's trust and confidence in the courts. In sum, respondent judge should be penalized for gross ignorance of the law in granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. 98-04-197, where the imposable penalty was life imprisonment, without hearing. He should also be accordingly sanctioned for having promulgated the decision in the same criminal case before the defense had rested and without according the prosecution an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. NOTE: In the above-cited case, the Supreme Court made reference to and answered the respondent's contention and citation of the 1946 case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons (76 Phil. 756) to support his theory that where the prosecution recommends bail, itis to be understood as being equivalent to an admission that evidence of guilt is not strong or a non opposition or a virtual agreement to the bail application which in effect does away with the need for a bail hearing. Unfortunately, nowhere in said case may such conclusion be inferred. Besides, in Ocampo v. Bernabe (77 Phil. 55), the Court said: [The Court] ha[s] held in HerrasCHAPTER IL “ AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION Teehanhee v. Director of Prisons that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. The general rule therefore is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charged are before their conviction entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge isa capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. RESPONDENT, THUS, CANNOT PLEAD THAT THERE RESOLUTION. (Underscoring and Emphasis Supplied) EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT MADE REFERENCE TO THE PREAMBLE AND TO THE WHEREAS CLAUSES TO DISCOVER THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE New Case: RAFAEL H. GALVEZ and KATHERINE L. GUY v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ASIA UNITED BANK G.R. No, 187919 ASIA UNITED BANK v. GILBERT G. GUY, PHILIP LEUNG, KATHERINE L. GUY, RAFAEL H. GALVEZ and EUGENIO H. GALVEZ, JR. G.R. No. 187979 GILBERT G. GUY, PHILIP LEUNG and EUGENIO H. GALVEZ, JR. v. ASIA UNITED BANK G.R. No. 188030 April 25, 2012 Inthis case, the Court holds that AUB, being a commercial bank, is not beyond the coverage of PD No. 1689. The Court asserts that a bank is a corporation whose fund comes from“4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION the general public and PD No. 1689 does not distinguish the nature of the corporation. It requires, rather, that the funds of such corporation should come from the general public. This was highlighted by the third “whereas clause” of the quoted law which states that the same also applies to other “corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public.” FACTS: In 1999, Radio Marine Network (Smartnet) Inc. (RMSD) claim- ing to do business under the name Smartnet Philippines and/or ‘Smartnet Philippines, Inc. (SPI), applied for an Omnibus Credit Line for various credit facilities with Asia United Bank (AUB). To induce AUB to extend the Omnibus Credit Line, RMSI, through i directors and officers, presented its Articles of Incorporation with its 400-peso million capitalization and its congressional telecom fran- chise, Satisfied with the credit worthiness of RMSI, AUB granted P250 million Omnibus Credit Line, under the name of Smartnet Philippines, RMSI‘s Division. Later, it was increased to 452 million after a third-party real estate mortgage by an affiliate of Guy Group of Companies, in favor of Smartnet Philippines, was offered to the bank. Simultaneous to the increase, RMSI submitted a proof of authority to open the Omnibus Credit Line and peso and dollar accounts in the name of Smartnet Philippines, Inc., which Gilbert Guy, et al., represented as a division of RMSI, as evidenced by the letterhead used in its formal correspondences with the bank and the financial audit made by SGV & Co, Attached to this authority was the Amended Articles of Incorporation of RMSI, doing business under the name of Smartnet Philippines, and the Secretary's Certificate of SPI authorizing its directors, Gilbert Guy and Philip Leung to transact with AUB. Prior to this major transaction, however, and, unknown to AUB, Gilbert Guy, et al. formed a subsidiary corporation, the SPI with a paid-up capital of only P62,500.00, Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnot Philippines AUB granted it, among others, an Irrevocable Letter of Credit in the total ‘sum of $29,300.00 in favor of Rohde & Schwarz Support Centre Asia td. Ltd., which is the subject of these consolidated petitions. To cover this liability Gilbert Guy executed Promissory Note (PN) in behalf of SPI in favor of AUB. This PN was renewed twice, once, in the name of SPI, and last, in the name of Smartnet Philippines, bolstering(CHAPTER It 6 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION AUB's belief that RMST's directors and officers consistently treated this letter of credit, among others, as obligations of RMSI. When RMSI's obligations remained unpaid, AUB sent demand letters. RMSI denied liability contending that the transaction was incurred solely by SPI, a corporation which belongs to the Guy Group of Companies, which has a separate and distinct personality from RMSI. It further claimed that while Smartnet Philippines is an RMSI division, SPI, is a subsidiary of RMSI, and hence, is a separate entity. Agerieved, AUB filed a case of syndicated estafa under Article 815(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689 against the interlocking directors of RMSI and SPI, namely, Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr., before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. Accordingly, an Information was filed against Gilbert Guy, et al,, with the RTC of Pasig City. ‘Both parties filed their respective Petitions for Review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) assailing the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. ‘The DOJ reversed the City Prosecutor's Resolution and ordered the dismissal of the estafa charges against Gilbert Guy, et al. for insufficiency of evidence. The AUB's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. AUB then assailed the DOJ Resolution before the CA. The CA partially granted AUB's petition. Hence, these consolidated petitions. ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause to prosecute Gilbert Guy, et al,, for the crime of syndicated estafa under PD No. 1689. HELD: Anent the issue as to whether or not Gilbert Guy, et al., should be charged for syndicated estafa in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689, which states that: Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit ‘estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be“6 ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or ‘more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, ‘and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/ ass0- ciations from the general public. ‘The Court holds that the afore-quoted law applies to the case at bar, Gilbert Guy et al. want the Court to believe that AUB, being a commercial bank, is beyond the coverage of PD No. 1689. The Court holds, however, that a bank is a corporation whose fund comes from the general public. PD No. 1689 does not distinguish the nature of the corporation. It requires, rather, that the funds of such corporation should come from the general public. This is bolstered by the third “whereas clause” of the quoted law which states that the same also applies to other “eorporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public.” This is precisely the very same scheme that PD No. 1689 contemplates to “be checked or at least be minimized by imposing capital punishment involving funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public” because “this erodes the confidence of the public in the banking and cooperative system, contravenes public interest and constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability of the nation.” Old Cases: PEOPLE v. HON. A. PURISIMA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-420050-66, November 20, 1978 In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the intent and spirit of Presidential Decree No. 9 can be found in the preamble or “whereas” clauses, which enumerate the facts, or events that justify the promulgation of the decrees and the stiff sanctions ‘stated therein. FACTS: Information for violation of PD No. 9 was ordered quashed by Judge Purisima. The latter reasoned out that the information failed to allege an essential element of the offense; thus: That the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed or bluntCHAPTER II “a AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. On appeal, the Solicitor General raised the argument that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversion activities and that the preamble of the statute or that expressed in the “whereas” clauses is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute. It was also argued that the explanatory note merely explains the reasons for issuing the decree and this cannot prevail over the text itself. HELD: ‘The Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor General. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of PD No. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanction stated therein. USS. v. HART, et al., 26 PHIL. 149 In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that construction should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation found in the printed act. Argument based upon punctuation is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give the act the effect intended by the legislature. FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged with vagrancy under Section 1 of RA No. 519. This section enumerates certain classes of persons who are to be considered as vagrants such as those “found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support.” Accused-appellants were prosecuted and convicted for“loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses” the first part of Section 1. The second part, it will be noticed is worded as follows: “or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support.”“8 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ‘shown by the evidence, that accused-appellants had visible means of support. ‘The Attorney General argued that “without visible means of support” as used in the second part, does not apply to “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses,” but only to tramping or straying through the country.” It was contended that if “without visible means of support” is intended for the first part, either the comma after gambling houses would have been omitted, or else the comma after country would have been inserted. HELD: When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will give it effect. The construction should be based upon something more substantial that the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give to the Act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary. ‘The accused-appellants were acquitted. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION v. TORRES G.R. No. 93666, April 22, 1991 Private Parties cannot Constitutionally con- tract away the Applicable Provision of Law. FACTS: An alien employment permit was issued by DOLE to Earl ‘Timothy Cone, as sports consultant and coach of General Milling Corporation. The change of admission of status of said Earl Timothy Cone was approved to a pre-arranged employee. Months later, CMC requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full pledged coach. ‘The request was granted.CHAPTER TL 0 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION ‘The Secretary of labor cancelled Cone's permit because General Milling Corporation failed to submit evidence that there is no person in the Philippines that is competent and willing to do the services that could be rendered by Cone, and likewise, there is no proof that Cone’s employment will redound to national interest. ISSUE: Was there a grave abuse of discretion in revoking the alien ‘employment permit of Cone? Is the contention of General Milling Corporation (that it 1s an employer's prerogative to hire a foreign coach) valid and tenable? HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion. It is not true that the hiring of foreign coach is an employer's prerogative. The law is, clear on this point. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor. General Milling Corporation’s rright to choose who to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit. GMC will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the Constitution. No comparison can be made between Cone and Norman Black as the latter is “a long-time resident” of the country and thus, not subject to Article 40 of the Labor Code which applies only to “non-resident aliens.” Neither will obligation of contract be impaired by the imple- mentation of the Secretary's decision. The Labor Code and its imple- ‘menting Rules and Regulations requiring alien employment permits were in existence long before GMC and Cone entered into their con- tract of employment. Provisions of applicable laws especially those relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into contracts. Private parties cannot constitutionally con- tract away the applicable provision of law. GMC’s contention that the Labor Secretary should have deferred to the Immigration Commission’s finding as for the need to employ Cone is again bereft of legal basis. EXAMPLE OF ACASE WHERE THE SUPREME COURT RULED, AMONG OTHERS, THAT EVERY PART OF THE STATUTE MUST BE INTERPRETED WITH50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REFERENCE TO THE CONTEXT, ie., THAT EVERY PART OF THE STATUTE MUST BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PARTS, AND KEPT SUBSERVIENT TO THE GENERAL INTENT OF THE WHOLE ENACTMENT, ‘THE COURTALSORULED THAT THE SPIRIT RATHER THAN THE LETTER OF A LAW DETERMINES ITS CONSTRUCTION; HENCE, A STATUTE, AS IN THIS CASE, MUST BE READ ACCORDING TO ITS SPIRIT AND INTENT. PARAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996 It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other Parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory con- struction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. FACTS: Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City, who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. COMELEC scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1996, At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Due to Paras’ opposition, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time ‘on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, Paras filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City aCHAPTER IL 5 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. ‘The petition was later on dismissed and the TRO was lifted. Ina resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996, Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction was filed, HELD: ‘The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides: “Section 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (b)_ No recall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.” It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that covery part of the statute must be considered together with other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. (Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 464) ‘The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period ‘when such election shall take place. ‘Thus, subscribing to Paras’ interpretation of the phrase regu- lar local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by RA No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase “regular local election,” as erroneously insisted by Paras, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. (Asturiascy STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617) An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as other- wise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, in- formative or nugatory. (PLDT v. Collector of International Revenue, 90 Phil. 674) It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution, Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution to “enact a local gov- ernment code which shall provide for a more responsive and \ccountable local government structure instituted through system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.” ‘Moreover, Paras’ too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity, which we cannot countenance. The spirit rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent. 1. Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence, the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election that certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74(b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been schadsled on ‘May 1997. (Paras v. Commission on Election, G.R. 123169, November 4, 1996, En Bane, Francisco, J. [Resolution])CHAPTER 53 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IIL. EXTRINSIC AIDS Extrinsic aids are any of the following: Contemporaneous cir- cumstances, policy, legislative history of the statute, contempora- neous or practical construction, executive construction, legislative construction, judicial construction, and construction by the bar and legal commentators. Extrinsic aids can be resorted to only after the intrinsic aids have been used and exhausted. 1. CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. — These are the conditions existing at the time the law was enacted such as. the following: (a) History of the times and conditions existing at the time the law was enacted; (b) Previous state of the law; (© The evils sought to be remedied or corrected by the law; and (@ The customs usages of the people. ‘The above-mentioned circumstances constitute the reasons why the law was enacted. Hence, the one interpreting the law should place himself in the position and circumstances of those who used the words in question and be able to feel the atmosphere, the conditions, and the reasons why the law was enacted. 2. POLICY. — The general policy of the law or the settled policy of the State may enlighten the interpreter of the law as to the intention of the legislature in enacting the same, Hence, if a new agrarian law is enacted today and few years from now, there will arise the need to find out why such a law is enacted, the conditions, the prevailing sentiment of the people, the policy of the State, and the executive order issued by the Office of the President preceding the legislative enactment will throw light upon the intention of the legislature in enacting said law. The same thing is true if death sentence is imposed for drug pushers and for those currently involved in the so-called “satanismo” offenses. The conditions of the times and the very destructive and heinous crimes committed even in broad daylight, whether in the city or in the provinces, will convince future interpreters of the law that such a penalty is needed to protect society.5 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE. — ‘Such history may be found in reports of legislative committees, in the transcript of stenographic notes taken during a hearing, legislative investigation, or legislative debates. Are personal opinions of some legislators appropriate aids of construction? Asa general rule, they are not appropriate aids of construction. However, if there is unanimity among the supporters and oppositors to a bill with respect to the objective sought to be accomplished, the debates may then be used as evidence of the purpose of the act. 4. CONTEMPORANEOUS AND PRACTICAL CON- STRUCTION. — Those who lived at or near the time when the law was passed were more acquainted of the conditions and the reasons why that law was enacted. Their understanding and application of the law, especially if the same has been continued and acquiesced by the judicial tribunals and the legal profession, deserve to be consid- ered by the courts. 5, EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION. — The construction given by the executive department deserves great weight and should be respected if said construction has been formed and observed for a Jong period of time. The rules to remember are as follow: (@) Congress is deemed to have beén aware of the contempo- raneous and practical construction made by thé officers charged with the administration and enforcement of the law; (b) The courts should respect that contemporaneous ‘construction except if itis clearly erroneous; (©) Executive construction has more weight ifit is rendered by the Chief Legal adviser of the government who can issue opinions to assist various departments of the government charged with the duty to administer the law; (@ The opinion, however, of the Chief Legal adviser is sub- servient to the ruling of the judiciary, which is in charge of applying and interpreting laws. 6. LEGISLATIVE CONSTRUCTION. — Legislative construction is entitled to consideration and great weight but it cannot control as against the court's prerogative to decide on what is the right or wrong interpretation.CHAPTER IL 55 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 7. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION. — It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the judicial construction of former statutes on the subject. It is also presumed that the statute was enacted in the light of the judicial construction that the prior enactment had received. With respect to a statute adopted from another state, it is presumed that it was adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that State. ‘Should this construction be followed? It should be followed only if it is reasonable, in harmony with justice and public policy and consistent with the local law. 8. CONSTRUCTION BY THE BAR AND LEGAL COM- MENTATORS. — It is presumed that the meaning publicly given in a statute by the members of the legal profession is a true one and regarded as one that should not be lightly changed. The opinion and commentaries of text writers and legal commentators, whether they are Filipinos or foreigners, may also be consulted as, in fact, they are oftentimes cited or made as references in court decisions. SIMPLIFICATIONS OF THE RULE REGARDING THE USE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS. Extrinsic aids, such as those mentioned above, are entitled to respect, consideration and weight, but the courts are at liberty to decide whether they are applicable or not to the case brought to it for decision. EXAMPLE OF ACASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW AS WELL ‘AS THE POLICY AND OBJECTIVE SOUGHT TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 FACTS: PD No. 27, EO Nos. 228 and 229, and RA No. 6657 (Compre- hensive Agrarian Reform Program) were assailed as violative of due process and therefore unconstitutional. ISSUE: Is RA No. 6657 constitutional?86 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION HELD: ‘The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the land and the physical possession of the land in excess of the retention limit and all the beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the for- mer beneficiary. This is within the power of the State to take and regulate private property for which payment of just compensation is provided. Although the proceedings in Section 16 of CARI. are described as summary, the landowners and other interested parties are never- theless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. DAR’s determination of just compensation is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any interested party. DAR’s determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the court of justice will still have the rright to review with finality the said determination in the exercise ‘of what is admittedly a judicial function, Regarding Section 18 thereof which requires the owners of expropriated properties to accept just compensation in Jess than money, the Supreme Court said: “This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. WHAT WE DEAL WITH HERE IS A REVOLUTIONARY KIND OF EXPROPRIATION.” Such program will involye not merely millions but billions of pesos. “[The Court] assume[s] that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top project of the government. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitation of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers.” “(The Court] may assume their intention was to allow such manner of payment as provided by the CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, the title remains with the landowner. ‘No outright change of ownership is contemplated.”CHAPTER IL or AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION EXAMPLE OF CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT DELVED INTO THE INTENTION OF THE LAW AND WHY THE RIGHT OF CULTIVATION WAS EXTENDED TO THE LANDOWNER'S IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS BONIFACIO v. JUDGE DIZON G.R. No, 79416, September 5, 1989 ‘The question (involving the interpretation of Section 36(1) of BA No, 3844 1s this: Is the ejectment of the agricultural lessee valid when the landowner-lessor desires to cultivate the landholding? Section 36 (1) of RA No. 3844 provides as follows: “Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landhold- ing except when his disposseesion has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that; The agricultural lessor-own- er or a member of the immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes.” Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family +80 desired. In s0 providing, the law did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of such right to the members of his immediate family. ‘The right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. ‘To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise conferred upon the landowner’s immediate family members. ‘The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner’s immediate family members to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) wed to cultivate the land with the ald of farm household, In this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural88 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in personal cultivation. Whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term “personal cultivation” cannot be given a re- stricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of the lessor’s or lessee’s immediate family members. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT CONSIDERED CONTEMPORANEOUS AND PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION, AND RULED THAT THE INTERPRETATION MADE BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL CANNOT BE APPLIED PASCUAL v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, 106 PHIL. 466 (1959) AND AGUINALDO v. SANTOS 212 SCRA 768 (1992) An official’s re-election expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during his previous term. The Court may add that sound public policy dictates it. ‘This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot, however, apply to criminal acts, which the re-elected official may have com- mitted during his previous term. FACTS: ‘Mayor Demetriou of Tabaco, Albay charged that Governor Salalima violated Section 60, pars. c) and (@) ofthe Local Government Code, Section 3, par. (G) of RA No. 3019, and the provisions of PD No. 1594, as amended. Mayor Demetriou alleged that despite the delay in the completion of work under contracts entered into by the Provincial Government for the construction of Tabaco Public Market, liquidated damages were not imposed, nor collected from the contractor by the provinces. In another case, Governor Salalima and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan were charged with having retainedCHAPTER TI 59 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION the legal services of a private lawyer and disbursing public fund in payment thereof amounting to 7,380,410.00 in connection with a case filed by the province against the National Power Corporation. It is alleged that this violates Section 481 of the Local Government Code that requires the appointment of a legal officer for the province. ‘The President found Governor Salalima guilty of the charges ‘and suspended the latter from office. In the meantime Governor Salalima was re-elected. ISSUE: Salalima contends that the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending him after he was re-elected, since the administrative offense were allegedly committed during his first term. HELD: ‘The Court agrees with the petitioners that Governor Salalima could no longer be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5450 in connection with the negotiated contract entered into on March 6, 1992 with RYU Construction for additional rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public Market. Nor could the petitioners be held administratively liable in 0.P. Case No, 5469 for the execution in November 1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This is 0 because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, as held in Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija (106 Phil. 466 [1959]) and Aguinaldo v, Santos (212 SCRA 768 [1992]). In Paseual, the] Court ruled: The Court comes to one main issue of the controversy — the legality of disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act committed ty him during his immediately preceding term of In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, (the Court] hals] resorted to American authorities. The Court found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct. The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.6 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and t! especially true where the Constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. ‘The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. ‘The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, ifhe had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. ‘The Court reiterated this rule in Aguinaldo and explicitly stated therein: “Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioners for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.” However, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that Aguinaldo does not apply because the case against the official therein was already pending when he filed his certificate of candidacy for his re-election bid. It is of the view that an official's re-election renders moot and academic an administrative complaint against him for acts done during his previous term only.if the complaint was filed before his re-election. The fine distinction does not impress us. The rule makes no distinction. As a matter of fact, in Pascual, the administrative complaint against Pascual for acts committed during his first term as Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, was filed only a year after he was re-elected.CHAPTER IL a AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION ‘The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar a criminal cases are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule is not only founded on the theory that an official's re-election expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which ‘was committed during his previous term. {The Court] may add that sound public policy dictates it, To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between the re-elected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committed during second term may thus be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of public service. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot, however, apply to criminal acts, which the re-elected official may have committed during his previous term. ‘Thus, any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have incurred in the execution of the retainer contract and incidents related therewith and in the execution of a contract for additional repair for the Tabaco Public Market are deemed extinguished by his re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized clections. So are the liabilities, of petitioner members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Albay, who signed a resolution authorizing Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in question ‘who were re-elected in the 1992 elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the attendant circumstance. CELEBRATED CASE IN 1983 GARCIA-PADILLA v. MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER AND GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS & LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983 In this case, the principal issue is whether the courts can inquire on the Presidential suspension Of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and whether there is right to bail during the suspension Of the privilege of the said writ. This case is an example where the Supreme Court took cognizance of contemporaneous circum- atancea and what was actually being experienced by the soldiers in the battlefield; of the historicaleo STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION basis of the President's power to suspend the priv- ilege of Habeas Corpus; of the policy, reasons and evils sought to be remedied by LOI 1211 authorizing the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order; and of the reasons why it reverted to the Barcelon and Montenegro Rule. This case is also an example where the Supreme Court made a lot of references to opinions, commentaries of legal luminaries and to the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court. There were also some interpretations mentioned in the deci- sion which vested absolute power to the president on the matter of suspending the privilege of Habeas Corpus. (The Author disagreed with the ruling of the Su- preme Court in this case.) FACTS: Nine of the fourteen detainees in this case were arrested on July, 1982 at about 1:45 P.M., when three teams of the PC/INP of ‘Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, etc., after securing a search warrant issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, conducted a raid at the residence of Dra, Aurora Parong. Apprehended during the raid were Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto Portugese and Mariano Soriano who were then having a conference in the dining room of Dra, Parong's residence which had been going on since 10:00 AM. of that same day. The other four detainees were arrested on the following day. The detainees, herein petitioners, were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya from July 6, 1982, until their transfer on the morning of August 10, 1982, to an undisclosed place reportedly to Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela and to Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Josefina Garcia-Padilla, a mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr., filed a petition for habeas corpus on August 13, 1982. It is alleged in the petition that the arrest of petitioners were patently unlawful since it was effected without any warrant of arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest were armed only with a search warrant issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, and no where in said warrant was authority given to make arrest, much less detention; that the search warrant which authorized respondente to seize “subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine andCHAPTER IL 6 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION other subversive paraphernalia” in the house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong was a roving and general warrant and is, therefore illegal per se because it does not state specifically the things that are to be seized; that no criminal charges have been filed against any of the detainees; that there is no judgment, decree, decision or order from a court of law which would validate the continued detention of the petitioner; that while it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was shown tothe detainees on or about July 11 and 12, 1982, but counsel and the detainees have not yet been given a copy of such PCO, nor notified of its contents, raising doubt whether such commitment order has in fact been issued. In an en bane resolution, the Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus and respondents were required to make a return of the writ, In the return to the writ filed on August 23, 1952, respondents, through the Solicitor General, alleged; 1. The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the ex- ception of Tom Vasquez who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOI No. 1211 dated March 9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981. The said PCO was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of PD No. 885; 2 The privilege of habeas corpus cannot be availed of by petitioners. The courts cannot inquire into the validity and cause of their arrest and detention. Upon hearing, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: HELD: ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERED “x x x At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees on July 6, 1982, records reveal that they were then having conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong’s residence from 10:00 A.M. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14) detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra. Parong ‘as their headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) de- tainees scampered towards different directions leaving on top ofo STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION their conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and stu- dent sector. Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, 18,650.00 cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and ready for distribution, and sizeable quantity of print- ing paraphernalia, which were then seized. There is no doubt that circumstances attendant in the arrest of the herein detainees fall under a situation where arrest is lawful even without a judicial war- rant as specifically provided for under Section 6(a), Rule 138 of the ‘Rules of Court and allowed under existing jurisprudence on the mat- ter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when the person to be arrested hhas committed and actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence.” ‘From the facts above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in fact and in law. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from fact that they essentially involve a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction. COMMENTS ON THIS PART OF THE DECISION Besides the attendant circumstances aforementioned, the Supreme Court maintained the position that the arrest of the said detainees fall under the specific provision of Section 6(a), Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court. The law being clear and specific, it concluded that the claim of petitioners was without basi fact and in law. CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES AND WHAT WAS ACTUALLY BEING EXPERIENCED BY ‘THE SOLDIERS IN THE BATTLEFIELD “x x x It is, likewise, all too well-known that when the rebel forces capture government troopers or kidnap private individuals,CHAPTER IL 65 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION they do not accord to them any of the rights now being demanded by the herein petitioners, particularly to be set at liberty upon the filling of bail. As a matter of common knowledge, captives of the rebels or insurgents are not only denied the right to be released, but also denied trial of any kind. In some instances, they may even be liquidated unceremoniously. What is then sought by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is among others, to put the government forces on equal fighting terms with the rebels, by authorizing the detention of their own rebel or dissident captives as the rebellion goes on. In this way, the advantage the rebellion forces have over those of the government, as when they resort to guerilla tactics with sophisticated weapons, is, at least minimized, thereby enhancing the latter's chances of beating their enemy x x x.” THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE PRESIDENTS POWER TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS “Accordingly, [the Court] holds that in times of war and similar emergency as expressly provided in the Constitution, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which has the effect of allowing the executive to defer the prosecution of any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045, including, as @ necessary consequence, the withholding for the duration of the suspension of the privilege, of the right to bail. The power could have been vested in Congress, instead of the President, as it was s0 vested in the United States for which reason, when President Lincoln himself exercised the power in 1861, Chief Justice Taney of the U.S. Supreme Court expressed the opinion that Congress alone possessed this power under the Constitution.” (The Court citing Exparts Merryman, Federal Case No. 9487 [1861)) REASONS AND EVILS SOUGHT TO BE REMEDIED BY ‘LOI 1211 AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF PCO; REASONS WHY IT ABANDONED THE LANSANG DOCTRINE AND WHY IT REVERTED TO. BARCELON AND MONTENEGRO RULE “The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would,66 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.” “Realistically, a person engaged in the rebellion does not, upon being arrested or captured, cease to be as committed to the cause against the government. Through a grand conspiracy, as is of the essence of how rebellion is committed, involving a great mass of confederates bound together by a common goal, he remains in a state of continued participation in the criminal act or design. His heart still beats with the same emotion for the success of the movement of which he is an ardent adherent and ally x x x.” ‘What has been said above shows the need of reexamining the Lansang case with a view to reverting to the ruling of Barcelon v. Baker (6 Phil. 87), a 1905 decision, and Montenegro v. Castaiteda (@1 Phil. 882 [1952)), that the President’s decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is “final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons.” This well-settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang ease which declared that the “function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.” Judicial interference was held as permissible, and the test as laid down therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily. This would seem to be pure semanticism, if we consider that with particular reference to the nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of the grave emergency he has to deal with, which, as clearly indicated in Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, partakes of military measures, the judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to assume the authority to check, reverse or supplant the presidential actions, OPINIONS, COMMENTARIES OF LEGAL LUMINARIES AND RULING OF THE US. SUPREME COURT Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in his concurring opinion said: “x x x It cannot be overemphasized that the writ of habeas corpus, ‘as a constitutional right, is, for eminent commentators, protean in scope. A reference to the opinion of the Court in Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons may not be amiss. Thus: “The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there isCHAPTER IL or AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease.” It continues: Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as “the most important human rights provision” in the fundamental law. Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as “one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty.” For Willoughby, it is “the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by whosoever detention may be exercised.” Burdick echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as “one of the most important bulwarks of liberty.” Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him, “without it much else would be of no avail.” A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief Justices Arellano, Avancena, Abad Santos, Paras, Bengson and Chief Justice Concepcion. It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however, to emphasize quite a few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach.” He also said: “there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired (citing Bowen v. Johnston, 306 US 19, 26, 83 L. ed 24 456, 59S Ct. 422 (1939)) and unsuspended, save only in the case specified in the constitution (citing Smith v. Bennett, 365 US 708, 713, 6 Led 39, 43, 81 S Ct. 898). ‘ON THE MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT LO! 1211 SHOULD BE VIEWED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT RELY ENTIRELY ON PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF LO! 1211 Petitioners relied on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI 1211, which contemplate of the first two situations when an arrest can be made, to wit: 1. The arrest and detention effected by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge; 2 ‘The arrest and detention effected by a military commander or the head of a law enforcement agency after it is determined that the person or persons to be arrested would probably escape for safety. After the arrest, however, the case shall be immediately referred to the city or provincial fiscal, or to the municipality, cireuit, or district judge for preliminary examination or investigation who, if the evidence warrants, shall file the corresponding charges and, thereafter, secure a warrant of arrest;os STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ‘The Supreme Court ruled, thus: “The reliance of petitioners on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI 1211 as to the alleged necessity of judicial warrant before a person may be arrested and detained is not well founded. Neither is the contention that paragraph 3 of LOI 1211 applies only when judicial process is not possible. This is a narrow and constricted interpretation of LOI 1211 when viewed in its en- tirety. Even in instances when a resort to judicial process is possible, where, in the judgment of the President, a resort thereto would not be expedient because it would endanger the public order or safety, a PCO is justified. So, too, when release on bail in the ordinary judicial process will invite the same danger.” By its very nature, and clearly by its language, LOI 1211 is a mere directive of the President as Commander-in-Chiefof the Armed Forces of the Philippines to his subordinates or implementing officers for the ultimate objective of providing guidelines in the arrest and detention of the persons covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 2045. The purpose is “to insure protection to individual liberties without sacrificing the requirements of public order and safety and the effectiveness of the campaign against those seeking the forcible overthrow of the government and duly constituted authorities.” LOL 1211 does not, in any manner, limit the authority of the President to cause the arrest and detention of persons engaged in, or charged with the crimes or offenses mentioned in said Proclamation in that the (President) would subject himself to the superiar authority of the judge who, under normal judicial processes in the prosecution of the common offenses, is the one authorized to issue a judicial warrant after a preliminary investigation is conducted with a finding of probable cause. Those who would read such an intention on the part of the President in issuing LOI 1211 seems to do so in their view that LOI forms of the law of the land under the 1976 amendment of the Constitution (citing Section 6, 1976 Amendment to the Constitution). ‘They would then contend that a PCO issued not in compliance with the provisions of the LOT would be an illegality and of no effect. BRIEF COMMENTS OF THE AUTHOR With all due respect to the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court, the Author cannot subscribes to the reasoning that it is “impractical” or a “useless and futile exercise” for our courts to determine whether the President acted with arbitrariness in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The judicial machinery is embedded in our system of government, or in anyCHAPTER U 6 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION democratic system of government for that matter, precisely to inquire into the validity and legality of the acts perpetrated by any of its citizens and which are being complained of as illegal. The President, I honestly believe, is not an exception. On the contrary, the courts particularly the Supreme Court, should use all available means and facilities to inquire whether there is arbitrariness in the President's decision to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus and whether the detention of any of its citizens is arbitrary. If the ‘Supreme Court is deprived of this right, who else in this Republic can effectively question the act of the President knowing, as we all, know, that he wields extraordinary powers, especially under the present set-up? To agree that the President is answerable to his conscience, to the people and to God is, in effect, to agroe that the doctrine of separation of powers and the democratic processes we are supposed to uphold should be disregarded. ‘The decision apparently gives more strength, power, and pro- tection to the President and to his government machinery instead of affording the individual citizens of a valid and reasonable recourse that they can make use of and when they are detained without a warrant of arrest. As between the government and individual citi- zens, the government enjoys a tremendous advantage in any respect. ‘To lessen further the rights of the citizens just so that the President can effectively meet or quell an alleged invasion of rebellion, or in or- der that the detention of any person can be validated by and through a Presidential Commitment Order, is by any measure a deprivation of life and liberty without due process of law. ‘The underlying reason why the powers of government are allocated to the different departments is precisely to avoid arbitrary rule and abuse of authority. It is believed that concentration of the three powers of government in the same person or body of persons, or in one department, would lead to abuse. On this point, Justice Brandeis said: “The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the government powers, among the three departments, to save the people from_autocracy.” (Myers v. United, 272 U.S. 52, 293) (Underscoring supplied)0 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Let each department of the government act within its own sphere of jurisdiction. And let the system of checks and balances scrutinize the action of the other to the end that public good may be served. This is the system and tradition we have been taught to embrace and it is found out to be more democratic and more in keeping with our culture and tradition as peace loving people. I ‘submit that there is indeed no justification to abandon the doctrine of separation of powers and the system of checks and balance On the issue of bail, the two reasons given by Associate Justice Pacifico P. de Castro and which are quoted above, are not, in my honest opinion, sufficient justification to deny the right to bail for the following reasons: FIRST: In G.R. No. 61388 entitled “In the Matter of the Peti- tion for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus for Dr. Aurora Parong, et al., Josefina Garcia-Padilla, petitioner, v. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, and Lt. Col. Miguel Coronel, respondents,” records show that Dr. Aurora Parong is charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms. This is clearly a bailable offense. The same thing is true with respect to the other detainees. No amount of legal nicety nor the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order can prevail over a clear consti- tutional guarantee expressed in Section 13, Article III of the New Constitution which reads: xxx “SECTION 18. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, t : (Underscoring sup- Excessive bail shall not be required. plied) Since it is clear that the said detainee is charged with a bailable offense and since it is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that she is qualified to bail, there should be no reason nor any barrier to deny the petition for bail. SECOND: While the President has the power to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus under and by virtue of the exceptions in Section 15, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, it is, on the other hand, the power of the courts to grant bail to qualified persons not falling under the exceptions mentioned in Section 18, Article IIT. I ‘see no justification to the statement that “The duty of the judiciaryCHAPTER TI n AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION to protect individual rights must yield to the power of the executive to protect the State x x x” Ten or one hundred detention prisoners, or even more, even granting that they are rebels, cannot overwhelm the vast powers of the government. It will not make a serious difference if they are granted the right to bail. Besides, why should the judiciary yield a power and a duty which is appropriately its own? Moreover, it is not the particular right of the individual that is protected or being protected. Rather, it is the doctrine of separation of powers itself and the system of checks and balances as well as the very Constitution iteelf that guarantees all of these that the judiciary protects. If in the exercise of this duty, an individual or group of individuals are directly or indirectly benefited, itis because they are part and parcel of the State and of the government that they have chosen. After all, the government may come and go at anytime but the people who compose the State remains. They are actually the ones who work to no end just so that the nation and the State can survive. THIRD: In_all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf, x x x” (Section 14, Article IIL, 1987 Constitution) (Underscoring supplied). If one’s right to bail is denied, the above-quoted constitutional right will be defeated and rendered useless. The detainee, for as long as he is detained, cannot effectively prepare his case and his defense. Added to this is tthe fact that during the entire period of his detention and until the case is finally decided, he is, in the eyes of the law, still presumed innocent. The contrary has yet to be proven and yet during the interregnum between the inquiry and the final judgment, he has already lost the battle. Even before the trial starts, he is already ina very disadvantageous position. While the government, with all the powers and facilities in its command, is thoroughly preparing its case and its evidence, the detainee suffers the physical and ‘mental burden of being kept inside the prison cell. Even granting for the sake of argument that he is given a chance to confer with his counsel, the disadvantage in any respect still works against the detainee. This is very evident and clear and any contradiction of reality will only make the truth very obvious,2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NOTE: ‘THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT ON THIS QUESTION ARE NOW LAID TO REST BY ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. ‘The conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court on this question are now laid to rest by Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, thu “The Supreme Court may review, in _an 1987 Constitution) (Underscoring Supplied) ‘The inclusion of the said constitutional provision was made possible by the approval of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. ‘The latter is apparently guided by the past cases and decision on this matter. It will be recalled that when Lansang v, Garcia was de- cided, the Supreme Court was then presided by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, a delegate to the 1986 Constitutional Commis sion. ‘Then and now, the author's position on this subject remains the same. He cannot subscribe to the reasoning that it is “impractical” or a “useless and futile exercise” for our courts to determine whether ‘or not the President acted with arbitrariness in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The judicial machinery is embedded in our system of government, or in any democratic system of government for that matter, precisely to inquire into the validity and legality of the acts perpetrated by any ofits citizens and which are being complained of as illegal. The President, the author honestly believes, is not an exception. On the contrary, the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, should use all available means and facilities to inquire whether the privilege of habeas corpus and ‘whether or not the detention of any ofits citizens is arbitrary. If the ‘Supreme Court is deprived of this right, who else in this Republic can effectively question the act of the President knowing, as we all know, that he wields extraordinary powers, especially whenCHAPTER IL n AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION the country is under martial law? To agree that “the President is answerable to his conscience, the people, and to God" is, in effect, to ‘agree that the doctrine of separation of powers and the democratic processes we are supposed to uphold should be disregarded. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT ARTICLE 1621 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS CLEARLY WORDED AND ADMITS NO AMBIGUITY OF CONSTRUCTION. THE SUPREME COURT ALSO CITED THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SECTION 1, ARTICLE Xill OF THE 1935 CONSTITUTION, AND THE INTENTION BEHIND SECTION 5, ARTICLE Xill THEREOF. IN RELATION TO THIS, THE SUPREME COURT MADE REFERENCE TO THE OLD LANDMARK CASE OF KRIVENKO v. REGISTER OF DEEDS (79 PHIL. 461) CELSO HALILI AND ARTHUR HALILI v. CA AND HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, et al., G.R. No. 113539, March 12, 1998 In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have no right to invoke Article 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural. The Provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction, Undoubtedly, Section 5 (now Section 7) is in- tended to insure the policy of nationalization con- tained in Section 1 (now Section 2). Both sections therefore must be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of “Agricul- tural Land” to aliens. FACTS: Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, private respondent Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, private respondent David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deedu STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION of quitclaim, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon. Among the said parcels of lands that is now in litigation, situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. ‘T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. 'T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. 'T-120259 was issued in the name of David Rey Guzman. On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of Jand to private respondent Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT NO. ‘T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-130721 (M) was issued in the latter's name. Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed acomplaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances — and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Article 1621 of the Civil Code. In its decision dated March 10, 1992, the trial court dismissed the complaint: It ruled that Helen Guzman's waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land was urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemption under Article 1621 of the Civil Code. The Halilis sought a reversal from the CA which, however, denied their appeal. The CA affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that the subject land was urban citing Tejido v. Zamacoma and Yop v. Grageda (121 SCRA 244). It further held that although the transfer of the land to David Rey may have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more point in allowing herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed on to and was thus already owned by a qualified person. Hence, the present petition for review. Petitioners submitted that the CA erred: (1) in affirming the conclusion of trial court that the land in question is urban, not rural;CHAPTER II % AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION (2) in denying petitioner's right of redemption under Article 1621 of the Civil Code; and (b) having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers to her son David illegal, in not declaring the same null and void. RULING: (1) The land is urban; thus, no right of redemption. — Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a rule, is not reviewable by thfe] Court. Basic and long- settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This admits of only few exceptions, such as when the finding are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of fncts; when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of facts; when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence or are contradicted by evidence on record. ‘The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited ex- ceptions. In fact, the conclusion of the trial court — that the subject, property is urban land — is based on clear and convincing evidence Inview ofthe finding hat the subjectland is urban in character, petitioners have indeed no right to invoke Article 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed, is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction. “Article 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land. xx” Under this article, both lands — that sought to be re- deemed and the adjacent lot belonging to the person exercis- ing the right of redemption — must be rural. If one or both6 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION are urban, the right cannot be invoked. The purpose of this provision, which is limited in scope to rural lands not ex- ceeding one hectare, is to favor agricultural development. ‘The subject land not being rural and, therefore, not agri- cultural, this purpose would not be served if petitioners are granted the right of redemption under Article 1621. Plainly, under the circumstances, they cannot invoke it. (2) Sale to Cataniag valid. — Neither doles) {the Court] find{s] any reversible error in the appellate court's holding that the sale of the subject land to Private Respondent Cataniag renders moot any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen. Guzman to her son David Rey. ‘True, Helen Guzman's deed of quitclaim — in which she signed, transferred and conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property she had inherited from her husband —collided with the Constitution, Article XII, Section 7 of which pro- vides: “Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.” ‘The landmark case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds (79 Phil. 461) settled the issue as to who are qualified (and disqualified) to ‘own public as well as private lands in the Philippines. Following a long discourse maintaining that the “public agricultural lands” mentioned in Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court then stat “Under Section 1 of Article XII (now Section 2, Article XII) of the Constitution, natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,” and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alicnate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. Itis partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XITI, and it reads as follows: “Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succes- sion, no private agricultural land will be transferredCHAPTER IL n AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION or assigned except to individual, corporations or as- sociations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippine ‘This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens’ hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizen, Undoubtedly, as above indicated, Section 5 [now Section 7] is intended to insure the policy of nationalism contained in Section 1 [now Section 2]. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in Section 5 {now Section 7] are the very same persons who under Section 1 [now Section 2] are disqualified ‘to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.’ And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non- transferability of ‘agricultural land’ to aliens. x xx” In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee toa qualified Filipino citizen? Thisisnota novel question. Jurisprudence is consistent that ‘if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.” ‘The present case is similar to De Castro v. Tan. In that case, a residential lot was sold to a Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children executed an extrajudicial settlement, whereby said lot was allotted to one of his sons who became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not allow the original vendor to have the sale annulled and to recover the property, for the reason that the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.78 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provi- sion — to keep our land in Filipino hands — has been served. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT CITED AND MADE REFERENCE TO (A) A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PACKAGE OF ELECTORAL REFORMS SOUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED SINCE 1970; (B) ‘THE REALITIES THAT CONFRONT POOR CANDIDATES ‘AND THE REASON WHY THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL OR LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST JUSTIFYING EXERCISE OF THE REGULATORY POWER OF THE COMELEC UNDER ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION. IN THIS CASE, SOME JUSTICES MADE EXTENSIVE CITATION AND REFERENCES TO AMERICAN JURIS- PRUDENCE, AMERICAN LEGAL LITERATURE, AND TO U.S. CASES ACTUALLY DECIDED (i.e, BUCKLEY v. VALEO; AUSTIN v. MICHIGAN STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE) EMILIO M.R. OSMENA AND PABLO GARCIA. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998 Political equality and ban on political adver- tising There is no suppression of political ads, but only a regulation of the time and manner of adver tising. There is a substantial or legitimate govern ment interest justifying the exercise of the regula- tory power of the COMELEC. COMELEC take-over of the advertising page of newspapers on the commercial time of radio and tv stations, and allocating those to the candidates, is valid. Article IX-C, Section 4, is not the only consti- tutional provision that mandates political equal- ity, Article XH, Section 1, requires congress to giveCHAPTER 11 7” AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION the “highest priority” to the enactment of measures designed to reduce political inequalities. Article II, Sec. 26, declares as a fundamental principle of our government “equal opportunities for public service.” FACTS: Petitioners Emilio M.R. Osmefia, candidate for President of the Philippines, and Petitioner Pablo Garcia, candidate for governor of Cebu, urged the re-examination of the ruling in NPC v. COMELEC upholding the validity of Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646. They contend that the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing field, but actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidates by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to pay for while their most affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching votes like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades and handbills. Petitioners claim that the reasoning of NPC is flawed, because it rests on the misconception that Article IX-C, Section 4, mandates the absolute equality of all candidates regardless of financial status, when what this provision speaks of is “equality of opportunity. For the foregoing reasons, petitioners filed a petition for pro- hibition, seeking a re-examination of the validity of Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646, the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air ‘time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commis- sion on Elections. HELD: ‘The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and sustained its ruling in NPC v. COMELEC on the following grounds: 1, There is no suppression of political ads, but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising. — The term political “ad ban,” when used to describe Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646, is misleading, for even as Section 11 () prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air ‘time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. 2. The law's concern is not with the message or content of the ad but with ensuring media equality between candidatesSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION with “deep pockets,” as Justice Feliciano called them in his opinion of the Court in NPC, and those with less resources. The law is part of a package of electoral reforms adopted in 1987. Actually, similar effort was made in 1970 to equalize the opportunity of candidates to advertise themselves and their programs of government by requiring the COMELEC to have a COMELEC space in newspapers, magazines, and periodicals and prohibiting candidates to advertise outside such space, unless the names of all the other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are mentioned “with equal prominence.” The validity of the law was challenged in Badoy, Jr. v. COMELEC. The voting was equally divided (5- 5), however, with that result the validity of the law was deemed upheld. There is a substantial or legitimate government interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC — There is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage ‘of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise ofthe regulatory power of the COMELEC under Article IX-C, Section 4, of the Constitution. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or in- formation, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government- ‘owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal oppor- tunity, time, and space and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. ‘The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They only prohibit the sale or donation(CHAPTER It a AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION of print space and air time to candidates but require the COMELRC instead to procure space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In ‘effect, during the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the candidates. The validity of the COMELEC take over for such temporary period cannot be doubted, In Pruneyard Shop- ping Center v. Robbins, it was held that a court order compelling a private shopping center to permit use of ‘a comer of its courtyard for the purpose of distributing pamphlets or soliciting signatures for a petition opposing ‘a UN resolution was valid. The order either unreasonably impaired the value or use of private property nor violated ‘the owner's right not to be compelled to express support for any viewpoint since it can always disavow any connec- tion with the message. The validity of regulation of time, place, and manner, under well-defined standards, is well-nigh beyond question. — What is involved here is simply regulation of this nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEG, of print space and air time to give all candidates equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring “free, orderly, honest and peaceful, and credible elections.” Article IX-C, Section 4, is not the only constitutional provision that mandates political equality. — Article XIII, Section 1, requires Congress to give the “highest priority” to the enactment of measures designed to reduce political inequalities. Article II, Section 26, declares as a fundamental principle of our government “equal opportunities for public service.” Access to public office will be denied to poor candidates if they cannot even have ‘access to mass media in order to reach the electorate. The Court cannot grant to petitioners what the legislature denied them. — The fact is that efforts have been made to secure the amendment or even repeal of Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646. No less than, five bills were filed in the Senate in the last session82 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION of Congress for this purpose, but they all failed to pass. Petitioners claim it was because Congress adjourned without acting on them. But that is just the point. Congress obviously did not see it fit to act on the bills before it adjourned. NOTE: JUSTICE FLERIDA RUTH ROMERO AND JUSTICE ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN DISSENTED. THEIR DISSENTING OPINIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE FLERIDA RUTH ROMERO 1. A COMELEC study disclosed that newspapers showed biases for or against certain candidates. — Not to be overlooked is the stark truth that the media itself is partisan. Ina study commissioned by the COMELEC itself to determine whether a certain newspaper adhered to the principles of fairness and impartiality in their reportage of the presidential candidates in the 1992 election, the results disclosed that newspapers showed biases for or against certain candidates. Hence, the contention that “Section 11(b) does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises” simply is illusory. Editorial policy will always ensure that the unfavored ones will get minimal exposure, if at all. This underscores the need to give candidates the freedom to advertise, if only to counteract negative reporting with paid advertisements, which they cannot have recourse to with the present prohibition. Worse, the ban even encourages corruption of the mass media by candidates who procure paid hacks, masquerading as legitimate journalist, to sing them Paeans to the high heavens. Wittingly or unwittingly, the mags media, to the detriment of poor candidates, occasionally lend themselves to the manipulative devices of the rich and influential candidates. 2. The prohibition actually gives an unfair advantage to those who have wide media exposure prior to the campaign period. — While there can be no gainsaying the laudable intent behind such an objective, the State being mandated to guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, the prohibition has the opposite effect instead of “equalining” the position of candidates who offer themselves for public office, the prohibition actually give an unfair advantageCHAPTER It AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION to those who have wide media exposure prior to the campaign period. Instead of promoting the interest of the public in general, the ban promotes the interest of a particular class or candidates, the prominent and popular candidates for public office. What is in store for the relatively obscure candidate who wants to pursue is candidacy? Eager to trumpet his credentials and program of government, he finds himself barred from using the facilities of mass media on his own. While incumbent government officials, show business personalities, athletes and prominent media men enjoy the advantage of name recall due to past public exposure, the unknown political neophyte has to content himself with other for which, given the limited campaign period, cannot reach the electorate as effectively as it would through the mass media. To be sure, the candidate may avail himself of COMELEC Time,” but the sheer number of candidates does not make the same an effective vehicle of communication. Not surprisingly, COMELEC Chairman Pardo, at the Oral Argument held by the Court en banc, admitted that no candidate has as yet applied for COMELEC air time and space. More telling, the celebrities are lavished with broader coverage from newspaper, radio and television stations, as well 1s via the commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists, as they are deemed more newsworthy by media, thus generating a self-perpetuating cycle wherein political unknowns, who may be more deserving of public office, campaign in relative obscurity compared to their more popular rivals. Instead of equalizing opportunities for public service, the prohibition not only perpetuates political inequality, but also invidiously discriminates against lesser-known candidates. The use of modern media gives the poor candidate the opportunity to make himself known to the electorate at an affordable cost. — Experience shows that the ban on political advertisement has not been reasonably necessary to accomplish its desired end. First, there are more than 70 provinces, more than 60 cities and more than a thousand municipalities spread all over the archipelago. Previous elections have shown that the ban on political advertising forces a candidate to conduct a nationwide whistle-stop campaign to attain maximum exposure of his credentials and his program of government. Obviously, this necessitates tremendous resources for sundry expensesSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION indispensable for political campaigns, all within a limited period of 90 days. Given the enormous logistics needed for such a massive effort, what are the chances for an impecunious candidate who sincerely aspires for national office? On the other hand, radio and television reach out to a great majority of the populace more than other instruments of information dissemination, being the most pervasive, effective and inexpensive, A 30-second television advertisement, cost- ing around 35,000.00 at present rates, would, in an instant, reach millions of viewers around the country in the comfort of their homes. Indeed, the use of modern mass media gives the poor candidate the opportunity to make himself known to the electorate at an affordable cost. Yet, these means of com- munication are denied such candidates due to the imagined apprehension that more affluent candidates may monopolize the airwaves, If poor and unknown candidates are declared unfit to run for office due to their lack of logistics, the political ad ban fails to serve its purpose, as the persons for whom it has been primarily imposed have been shunted aside and thus, are unable to enjoy its benefits. — To bbe realistic, judicial notice must be taken on the fact that COMELEG, in narrowing down its list of “serious” candidates, considers in effect a candidate's capability to wage an effective nationwide campaign which necessarily entails possession and/or availability of substantial financial resources. Given this requirement, the objective of equalizing rich and poor candidates may no longer find relevance, the candidates ultimately allowed to run being relatively equal, as far as resources are concerned. Additionally, the disqualification of nuisance candidates allegedly due to their inability to launch serious campaigns, itself casts doubt on the validity of the prohibition as a means to achieve the state policy of equalizing access to opportunities for public service. If poor and unknown candidates are declared unfit to run for office due to their lack of logistics, the political ad ban fails to serve its purpose, as the persons for whom it has been primarily imposed have been shunted aside and thus, are unable to enjoy its benefits. If it is difficult to show the number of candidates that can be adequately accommodated by “COMELEC Space” and “COMELEC Time” — Past experience shows that the COMELEC find problem in effectively informing the votingCHAPTER 6 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION populace of the credentials, accomplishments, and platforms of government of the candidates. There are 17,396 national and local elective public positions which will be contested by an ‘estimated 100,000 candidates on May 11, 1998. For national positions the list has been trimmed down to 11 candidates for president, 9 candidates for vice-president, and 40 candidates for senator. It is difficult to see how the number of candidates can be adequately accommodated by “COMELEC Space” and “COMELEC Time.” Resolution No. 2983 of the COMELEC, issued in compliance with Section 92 of B.P. 881, mandates that at least thirty minutes of prime time be granted to the Commission, free of charge, from February 10, 1998, until May 9, 1998. Thirty-minutes of prime time for eighty-nine (89) days is scarcely enough time to introduce candidates to the voters, much less to properly inform the electorate of the credentials and platforms of all candidates running for national office. Let us be reminded that those running for local elective positions will also need to use the same space of time from March 27 to May 9, 1998, and that the COMELEC itself is authorized to use the space and time to disseminate vital election information clearly, “COMELEC Space” and “COMELEC Time” sacrifices the right of the citizenry to be sufficiently informed regarding the qualifications and programs of the candidates. The net effect of Section 110) is, ‘thus, a violation of the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern and makes it a palpably unreasonable restriction on the people's right to freedom of expression. Not only this, the failure of “COMELEC Space” and “COMELEC Time” to adequately inform the electorate, only highlights the unreasonableness of the means employed to achieve the objective of equalizing opportunities for publie service between rich and poor candidates. DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN 1. Actual peso calculations show that Section 11(b), RA No. 6646, is anti-poor. — The majority argues that the ad ban is pro-poor, because it prevents the rich from buying media time and space that the poor cannot afford or match. This argument assumes that media advertising is expensive and, thus, beyond the reach of the poor. 1 respectfully submit that such argument is bereft of factual basis. True, a full-page ad in a major broadsheet maySTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION be priced at about P100,000, a 30-second commercial in a major television, anywhere from 15,000 to 90,000 depending on the time and the program; while airtime of an equal duration in a radio station, anywhere from 300 to 4,500. But even with such price tags, media ads are necessarily expensive, considering their nationwide reach, audience penetration, effectiveness and persuasive value. Realistically, expenses are involved in a candidacy for a National Office like the Presidency, the Vico-Presidency, and the Senate. In recognition of this, the law has limited cam- paign expenditures to ten pesos (P10) for every voter in the case of candidates for president and vice-president, and three ‘pesos (P3) per voter in their constituencies, for other candi- dates. Anyone — whether rich or poor — who aspires for such national elective office must expect to spend a considerable sum, whether of his own or from allowable donations, to make himself and his platform of program of government known to the voting public. The prohibition is not limited in duration but is, in fact and in truth, total, complete and exhaustive. — The ad ban is constitutional because, according to the majority, it is limited in duration for the reason that it is enforced only uring the election period. In my humble view and with all due respect, this is both erroneous and illogical. A political advertisement is relevant only during the campaign period — not before and not after. As petitioners putit, aban on mountain skiing during the winter season cannot be said to be limited in duration, just because it is enforced during winter. After all, skiing is indulged in only when the mountain slopes are covered with snow. To add a further parallel, a ban against the planting of rice during the rainy season is not limited simply because it covers only that season. After all, nobody plants rice during summer when the soil is parched. In the same manner, campaign ads are not resorted to except during the campaign period. And their prohibition does not become any less odious and less comprehensive just because the proscription applies only during the election season. Obviously, candidates need to advertise their qualifications and platforms only during such period. Properly understood, therefore, the prohibition is not limited in duration but, is in fact and in truth, complete and exhaustive.CHAPTER TL a AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 3. The best testament to the utter inutility and ineffectivity of “COMELEC Time,” is the statement of the COMELEC Chairman that no candidate had applied for COMELEC Time. — Finally, the majority opines that the grant of free COMELEC media time and space to candidates more than makes up for the abridgement of the latter's right to buy political ads. With due respect, I believe this is hollow and shallow. Up to this writing, I have yet to hear of any major candidate using this e0-called free COMELEC broadcast time. In fact, during the oral argument of this case on March 5, 1998, COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo frankly admitted that no candidate had applied for an allocation of COMELEC ‘Time. Not even petitioners. This is the best statement to the utter inutility and ineffectivity of COMELEC Time. Indeed, it cannot be a substitute, much less a viable alternative, to freely chosen but paid for media ads. It eannot compensate for the violation of the candidates’ right to free speech and media access, or for the electorate’s right to information. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT MADE REFERENCE TO THE JOURNAL AND THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOKER ARROYO, et ai. v. JOSE DE VENECIA, et al., G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998 There is no need for petitioners to invoke the power of the Court under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution to determine whether, in enacting RA No. 8240, the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion, since that it is what we have precisely done, although the result of our review may not be what petitioners want. It should be added that, even if petitioners’ allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of RA No. 8240, the rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well-settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non- compliance with internal rules.88 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Majority Floor Leader Representative Rodolfo Albano was then moving for the approval of the conference committee report on the bill that became RA No. 8240, which led the Chair, then Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, to ask if there was any objection to the motion, and Representative Joker P. Arroyo asked: “What is that Mr. Speaker?” The Chair allegedly ignored him and instead declared the report approved. Petitioners claim that the question “What is that Mr. Speaker” was a privileged question or a point of order that, under the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters, with the exception to motion to adjourn. ISSUE: Is the said contention of Rep. Arroyo valid and meritorious? HELD: ‘The contention has no merit. Representative Arroyo did not have the floor. Without first drawing the attention of the Chair, he simply stood up and started talking. As a result, the Chair did not hear him and proceeded to ask if there were objections to the Majority Leader’s motion. Hearing none, he declared the report approved. Rule XVI, Section 96 of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides: “Section 96. Manner of Addressing the Chair. — When a member desires to speak, he shall rise and respectfully address the Chair “Mr. Speaker.” Indeed, the transcript of the proceedings of November 21, 1996 shows that after complaining that he was being “hurried” by the Majority Leader to finish his interpellation of the sponsor (Rep. Javier) of the conference committee re- port, Representative Arroyo concluded and then sat down. However, when the Majority Leader moved for the approval of the conference committee report and the Chair asked if there was any objection to the motion, Rep. Arroyo stood up again and, without requesting to be recognized, asked, “What is that, Mr. Speaker?” Apparently, the Chair did not hear Rep. Arroyo since his attention was on the Majority Leader. Thus, he proceeded to ask if there was any objec- tion and, hearing none, declared the report approved and brought down the gavel. At that point, Rep. Arroyo shouted, “No, no, no, wait a minute,” and asked what the questionCHAPTER IL 89 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION was. Only after he had been told that the Chair had called for objection to the motion for approval of the report did Rep. Arroyo register his objection. It is not, therefore, true that Rep. Arroyo was ignored. He was simply not heard because he had not first obtained recognition from the Chair. Nor is it correct to say that the question (‘What is that, Mr. Speaker”) he was raising was a question of privilege or a point of order, Atallevents, Rep. Arroyo could have asked for a reconsideration of the ruling of the Chair declaring the conference committee report approved. It is not true that he was prevented from doing so. The session was suspended, obviously to settle the matter amicably. From all appearances, the misunderstanding was patched up during the nearly hour-long suspension because, after the session was resumed, Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. As the Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows, the session was thereafter adjourned. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, and certified by the respective secretaries of both houses of Congress as having been finally passed. The following day, the bill was signed into law by the President of the Philippines. Petitioners take exception to the following statement in the decision that “The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.” They contend that, following this ruling, even if only 10 members of the House remain in the ses- sion hall because the others have gone home, the quorum may not be questioned. That was not the situation in this ease, however. As noted in the decision, at 11:48 AM. on November 21, 1996, Rep. Arroyo questioned the existence of a quorum, but after the roll call, it was found that there was none. After that, he announced he would again, question the quorum, apparently to delay the voting on the conference report, Hence, the statement in the decision that the question of quorum cannot repeatedly be raised for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. In sum, there is no basis for the charge that the approval of the conference committee report on what later became RA No. 8240 was railroaded through the House of Representatives. Nor is there any~% STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION need for petitioners to invoke the power of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution to determine whether, in enacting RA No, 8240, the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion, since that it is what we have precisely done, although the result of our review may not be what petitioners want. It should be added that, even if petitioners’ allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of RA No. 8240, the rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well-settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with internal rules. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RESORTED TO THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION NOTABLY SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE Il AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE Vil, AND THE ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS UNDER SECTION 11 OF ARTICLE Vil. ‘THE SUPREME COURT ALSO CONSIDERED THE CONTEM- PORANEOUS AND POSTERIOR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTAN- TIAL EVIDENCE INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND INTERPRET- ED THE SAME AS A JUSTIFICATION TO THE TOTALITY TEST PRINCIPLE. ‘THE SUPREME COURT SAID: “AS EARLY AS THE 1803 CASE (OF MARBURY v. MADISON, THE DOCTRINE HAS BEEN LAID DOWN THAT “IT IS EMPHATICALLY THE PROVINCE AND DUTY OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT TO SAY WHAT ‘THE LAW IS. THUS, RESPONDENT'S INVOCATION OF ‘THE DOCTRINE OF POLITICAL QUESTION IS BUT A FORAY INTHE DARK.” (Underscoring supplied) CELEBRATED CASE IN 2001 JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. Nos. 146710-15 March 2, 2001 FACTS: On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a long time friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The next day, then Senate Minority Leader TeofistoCHAPTER II a AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION Guingona delivered a fiery privilege speech. He accused the petitioner of receiving some 220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000, He also charged that petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on Cigarettes intended for Nocos Sur. The House of Representatives conducted its own investigation. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Goilez, decided to investigate the exposé of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Hererra and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner. On October 12, then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development and later asked for petitioner's resignation. However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. On November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Ar- ticles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On December 7, 2000, the impeachment trial started. Several witnesses were presented by the prosecution, but it was Clarissa Ocampo and Secretary Edgardo Espiritu who delivered the most serious accusations. Clarissa Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature “Jose Velarde” on account documents involving 2 P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000. Secretary Espiritu alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading. On January 16, 2001, on a vote of 11-10 (Those who voted “yes” to open the envelope were: Senators Pimentel, Guingona, Drilon, Cayetano, Roco, Legarda, Magsaysay, Flavier, Biazon, Osmena III. Those who voted “no” were Senators Ople, Defensor-Santiago, John Osmeiia, Aquino-Oreta, Coseteng, Enrile, Honasan, Jaworski, Revil- 1a, Sotto II, and Tatad) the senator-judges ruled against the open- ing of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence show- ing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION On January 18, 2001, a 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino ‘Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. This attracted more and more people. Thereafter, there ‘was a resignation by some cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to tthe opening of the highly controversial second envelope. There was no turning back the tide. The tide had hecome a tsunami. On January 20, at about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 P.M., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaiiang Palace, He issued the following press statement: “20 January 2001 ‘Statement from President Joseph Ejercito Estrada At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice-President Gloria ‘Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Re- ‘public of the Philippines, while along with many other le- gal minds of our country, Ihave strong and serious doubts ‘about the legality and constitutionality of her proclama- tion as President, Ido not wish to be a factor that will pre- vent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave Malacatang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of ‘our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. Twill not shirk from any future challenges that may come ‘ahead in the same service of our country. J call on all my supporters and followers to join ime in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. MABUHAY! (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"CHAPTER IL 9 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: “Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution, Iam hereby transmitting this declaration that Iam unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice- President shalll be the Acting President. (Sed.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA” On the same day, January 20, he signed the following letter and sent the same to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 AM. Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 P.M. On January 22, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. O1-1- 05 SC, to wis: “A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before Chief Justice — Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, ‘at noon of January 20, 2001. This resolution is without prejudice to the disposi- tion of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper Party.” From day to day after this, respondent Arroyo attended official functions,ey STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment courtis/unctusofficioandhasbeenterminated. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated “for the record” that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion, ‘A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with th{e] Court G.R. No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757, and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.” He prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” ISSUES: 1. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy. 2. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable contro- versy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. 8, Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution, 4. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be ‘enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.CHAPTER IL 95 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION HELD: 1. WHETHER THE CASES AT BAR INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION — Petitioner's claim that respondent ‘Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. All these, constitute “the political ticket which the Court eannot enter.” This claim is not applicable and the Supreme Court said: “x x x Needless to state, the eases at bar pose legal and Guire_the proper interpretation of certain provisions in_the q fibration of tof petitionet against prsiudicialpubllcity" As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is... ‘Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of politi cal question is but a foray in the dark. (Emphasis and Un- derscoring supplied) 2. WHETHER THE PETITIONER RESIGNED AS PRE- SIDENT — Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the Of- fice of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. The Supreme Court rejected this claim and said: “x xx In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacu- ated Malacaiiang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001, after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, ‘whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001, or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue, Using the totality test, [the Court] hold[s] that petitioner resigned as President.”STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ‘These contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence are as follows: 1 ‘The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time, ‘The petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. Again, [the Court] note[s] that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. ‘The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. ‘Insum, {the Court] hold[s] that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his Jeaving Malacafiang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (8) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; @) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (6) he called on his supporters to join hhim in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the nationalCHAPTER IL 7 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION ‘ithe did not give up the presidency. The press release ‘was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. RARILY UNABLE TO ACT AS PRESIDENT — Petitioner pos- tulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice-President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in Section 11 of Article VIL” This conten- tion is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President. ‘The Supreme Court rejected this claim and ruled: Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Farees of the Philippines, and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary. What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that. he is a President on leave ist, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted98 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. ‘The Supreme Court held that “When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution.” (2) [The Court} reiect{s) his argument that he cannot be r er ‘What is the scope of immunity that.can be claimed by petitioner as anon-sitting President? The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery, and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder that carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of thfe] Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability, It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. ‘There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. Among others the issues related to the subject of statutory construction are the following: 1. ‘Theclaim that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that sho has already taken her ‘oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of Presidency and she has been recognized by foreign governments, are matters which,CHAPTER 99 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION according to the Supreme Court, “the political ticket which the court cannot enter.” The Supreme Court s: ruling on the cope of presidential immunity from suit, Petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1808 case of Marbury v. Madison the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is x x x Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.” (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied) ‘This case is also an example where the Supreme Court took into consideration the contemporaneous circumstances that preceded before former President Joseph Estrada left Malacafiang Palace on June 20, 2001, as well as the posterior facts and circumstantial evidence that led it to conclude that: 1. President Joseph Estrada resigned; and 2. Thenational spirit of reconciliations and solidarity cannot be attained if he will not give up the presidency. SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND. FERDINAND N. TALABONG COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO GR. No. 184836, December 23, 2009 Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. The best indicator of the suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.100 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Wilfredo Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, re- spectively. During his third term of office, on September 2005, the ‘Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. The Supreme Court, however, subsequently lifted the suspension order; hence, he resumed per: forming the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the same position. The petitioners sought to deny due course to his COC or to cancel it on the ground that it would violate the three- term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA No. 7160. ‘The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners, ‘Subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. ISSUE: Whether the preventive suspension of an elected public official is an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA No. 7160. HELD: No. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, ‘except barangay officials, which shall be determined by Jaw, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renun- ciation of the office for any length of time shall not be con- sidered as an interruption in the continuity of his servi for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43(b) of RA No. 7160 practically repeats the constitu- tional provision, and any difference in wording doos not assume any significance in this case.CHAPTER It 101 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a “term” as a period of time — three years — during which an official has title to office and can serve, ‘The second branch relates to the provision’s express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office “shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.” This declaration complements the term limitation. mandated by the first branch. Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. ‘Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an clective official's stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. Old Case: SOCRATES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HAGEDORN G.R. Nos. 155083-84, October 16, 2002 The established rule is that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with