CASTRO vs.

GREGORIO
FACTS: Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated
later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two
daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart
disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro.
A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was
instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children
with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been remiss
in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-handedly raised and
provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and allege lover,
Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and
Joanne knowledge and consent.
Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he
always offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children that’s why he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the TC
approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as Rosario’s
affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates shows disparity.
One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be
Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate
children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER CONSENT OF THE SPOUSE AND LEGITIMATE CHILDREN 10 YEARS OR

OVER OF THE ADOPTER IS REQUIRED?

HELD: YES. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for
several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own
children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to
adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first
signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
CANG vs. CA
FACTS: Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony are the natural children of Herbert Cang and Anna
Marie Clavano. Later due to the extramarital affairs of Herbert, Anna filed a petition for legal separation
which was granted.
The decree of legal separation conferred Anna the custody of the children. Meanwhile, Ronald V.
Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed a
petition for adoption the three children before the Branch 14 of RTC Cebu City.
This petition was accompanied by an affidavit of consent executed by Anna. The affidavit further alleged
that Herbert had long forfeited his parental rights over their children.
Herbert, upon knowing the institution of such petition for adoption, went home to the Philippines and
interposed his opposition to the adoption claiming that the petition was defective since it lacks his
consent.
He also moved for the reacquisition of his custody over his children and the same was later granted by
Branch 19 of RTC Cebu City. Later, the RTC Branch 14, issued a decree granting the petition for
adoption and in doing so, the RTC ruled that Herbert has abandoned his children and such abandonment
is a ground for dispensing with his consent to the adoption.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION WAS DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF
HERBERT’S CONSENT?

HELD: YES. Based on Article 188 of the Family Code, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption is a requisite for its validity. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed
with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not
sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination.
The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court
must first confront.
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to
the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support
which parents owe their children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
VDA DE JACOB vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo. During the
pendency of the said proceedings, Respondent sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the
deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir.
Respondent presented the Order in Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya
granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the
legally adopted son of Alfredo.
As the presiding judge was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma", his deposition was
taken at his residence. During the taking of the deposition, when asked to identify his signature on the
alleged adoption decree, he said: “I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature
reading Jose; I can’t make out clearly what comes after the name; Jose Moya is not my signature.
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and genuineness of
Judge Moya's signature. Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings
of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.

ISSUE: WHETHER ADOPTION OF RESPONDENT PEDRO PILAPIL EXISTS?

HELD: NO. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.
This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court.
In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The
only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.
Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his
decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information.
Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown
by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter.
In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise,
both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr.
Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.
REPUBLIC vs. CA

FACTS: A petition for adoption was filed by spouses Caranto for the adoption of Midael Mazon, then 15
yrs old, who had been living with private respondent since he was 7 yrs old. When private respondent
later on got married, Midael stayed with them under their care and custody.

RTC set the case for hearing and giving notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Province of Cavite and by the service of the order upon the DSWD and the Solicitor
General.

Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from
Midael to Michael. He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and
innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction
of an entry in the civil registry under the Rule 108 of the Rules.

RTC rendered its decision. It dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground that Rule
108 applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. The correction of
names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108. Further, the Trial Court held
that the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions,
and inconvenience to the petitioners. Therefore, it granted the adoption of Midael Mazon and the change
of his name from Midael to Michael.

CA affirmed in toto the decision of the Trial Court. Here Republic added that RTC did not acquired
jurisdiction over the case because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was Michael,
instead of Midael, which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE RTC CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PRAYER TO CHANGE THE NAME
OF SAID PROSPECTIVE ADOPTEE?

HELD: NO, Rule 108 (entries subject to cancellation or correction) also applies to change of name
(including those correction of name that is clearly misspelled).
Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now 3 of this Rule provides: 3. Parties. – When
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. The
local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding.
He is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not
impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as
it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case
renders ineffectual all the proceeding subsequent to the filling of the complaint including the judgment.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to
give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial
court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to
party and as to the subject matter.
REYES vs. MAURICIO
FACTS: Eugenio is the registered owner of the subject property located in Bulacan, which has been
adjudicated to him by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his
parents.
Mauricios filed a complaint before the DARAB, alleging that they were the legal heirs of one Godofredo
Mauricio, the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject
land and contended that Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated
28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the subject property but such Kasunduan was void,
considering that Librada was illiterate and said Kasunduan was neither read nor explained to her.
Eugenio countered that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents and that Leonida
had no legal personality to file the present suit. Provincial Adjudicator ruled in favor of the MAURICIOS
(concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be
maintained in peaceful possession of the subject land).
The DARAB also ruled in favor of the MAURICIOS (banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or
the leasehold contract executed by Susana in favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship.
Furthermore, the DARAB declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of the
Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such a contract.
Eugenio appealed to CA, CA affirmed DARAB, hence he filed a Rule 45 before the SC, contending that
Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.

ISSUE: WHETHER EUGENIO CORRECTLY QUESTIONED LEONIDA’S STATUS AS AN

ADOPTIVE CHILD OF GODOFREDO IN THE PRESENT RULE 45 PETITION THAT STEMMED
FROM A PROCEEDING ON TENANCY BEFORE THE DARAB?

HELD: NO. As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio.
Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada, Godofredo’s sole
compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a
legal heir.
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the
status of Leonida in the instant petition.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino, in his book “Civil Code of the , Commentaries and Jurisprudence,” noted that the aforecited
doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose.
The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican code (article 335) which provides: “The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or
his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other
way is void.”
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
IN RE: STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

FACTS: Petitioner Honorato-Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie, and
that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle and surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to her adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

ISSUE: WHETHER AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, UPON ADOPTION BY HER NATURAL FATHER,

USE THE SURNAME OF HER NATURAL MOTHER AS HER MIDDLE NAME?

HELD: YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear surname of her father and her mother.
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.
This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the
Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with
social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.
For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters.
The Adoption Act and the Family Code provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent
Hence, Stephanie can assert her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM

FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a
certification of DSWD.
The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998,
Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals
who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court.
Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit.

ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER WHO HAS REMARRIED CAN SINGLY ADOPT?

HELD: NO. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall
jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar.
In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall”
signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.
The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must
comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Sec 7.
Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the
children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical
character and well-being.
NERY vs. SAMPANA

FACTS: This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery against Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana for
failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery believe that
the petition was already filed.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT VIOLATED CANON 16 OF THE CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILING TO FILE THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION
DESPITE RECEIVING HIS LEGAL FEES AND FOR MAKING NERY BELIEVE THAT THE
PETITION WAS ALREADY FILED?

HELD: YES. The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken. Acceptance of money
from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's
cause.
Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of
importance. A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of annulment and
adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short
of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana's proffered excuse of waiting for the
certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy.
In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative,
the intended adoption could be possible.
Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly
adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt is waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of
the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption.
Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in
violation of the Code's mandate to deliver the client's funds upon demand.
A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the
public confidence in the legal profession.
BARTOLOME vs. SSS

FACTS: John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled
under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program.
He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since
the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary
beneficiary, not petitioner.
According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DEATH OF THE ADOPTER DURING THE ADOPTEE’S
MINORITY RESULTS TO THE RESTORATION OF THE PARENTAL AUTHORITY TO THE
BIOLOGICAL PARENTS OF THE LATTER?

HELD: YES. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor
in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor
of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account the Superme Court’s consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for
the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of
law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s
biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,
justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the
consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures
that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate
of their child who was the subject of adoption.
While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of
the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the
rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the
adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain
obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent