10 From Circumspection

to Insight
Eddo Evink

From its start philosophy has had the tendency to search for purely theoreti-
cal knowledge, to look for theory (theoria), an intellectual vision or view
that was a goal in itself and the highest human achievement (Aristotle 1984,
1177a11–1179a32; Plato 1997, 90a-d). This purely theoretical reflection
aimed at pure and unprejudiced knowledge.
In the early twentieth century, Husserl developed his phenomenology on
the basis of the same ideal. Husserl sought pure and absolutely certain intui-
tive insights that would serve as a foundation for scientific knowledge. His
new method of transcendental epoché and reduction, combined with the
eidetic reduction, were the main ingredients of a rigorous analysis of every-
day experience. Scrupulous phenomenological analysis laid bare the inevi-
table structures in which human experience was always already embedded.
According to later phenomenologists, however, these bodily, cultural and
historical structures not only sustain theoretical reflection but also under-
mine the purity of such reflection and of its results, because it could never
completely transcend them.
This article discusses several features of the development of theoretical
reflection out of pre-reflective practical behavior through reading passages
from the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. It will show
how reflection relates to the horizon of what it reflects, how scientific-
theoretical reflection constructs such a horizon by means of abstraction, and
also how reflection itself is always embedded in horizons. Finally, a distinc-
tion will be made between scientific-theoretical and philosophical reflection.
As a point of departure, I have chosen Jan Patočka’s asubjective phe-
nomenology, which he developed as an alternative to the methodological
approaches of Husserl and Heidegger (§1). Following the main ideas of this
asubjective phenomenology, I will discuss the rise of reflection out of basic
layers of bodily experience, in line with the work and views of Merleau-
Ponty (§2). In addition, Heidegger’s view on theoretical knowledge and its
understanding of being will be considered (§3), after which I will return to
Patočka to examine the main features of philosophical reflection, which will
be shown to be not only theoretical but also practical (§4).
174 Eddo Evink
1. Jan Patočka’s Asubjective Phenomenology
In many of his texts, both published and unpublished, Patočka critically
discusses Husserl’s phenomenological method and the primacy of con-
sciousness in Husserl’s philosophy. Even in his early work, The Natural
World as a Philosophical Problem, Patočka already distinguishes between
act-intentionality and horizon-intentionality, considering them as equally
primordial (Patočka 2016, 70–75). At this stage of his philosophical devel-
opment, Patočka considers consciousness and world as one whole that can
never be entirely surveyed. In his later critical engagement with Husserl’s
method, he explicitly develops an “asubjective phenomenology,” or a
“phenomenology of the appearing as such.” In Husserl, the transcenden-
tal epoché and the transcendental reduction lead to subjective—and in the
later Husserl, also intersubjective—consciousness as the field of appearing.
According to Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology, however, all our behav-
ior, including actions, perceptions and so on, are developed within a world,
in such a way that the world has primacy over the subject who acts and
perceives. In Patočka’s view, the transcendental epoché and reduction do
not lead to (inter)subjective consciousness as the phenomenological field of
appearing, but to the world as an always presupposed unity that sustains
the coherence of our experiences. One of the characteristics of the field of
appearing is that we can distinguish between the phenomena that appear,
the way in which they appear and the subject for whom they appear. These
three aspects cannot be reduced to each other. They presuppose a unity and
coherence that cannot appear as a being in itself and can never completely
be encompassed by rational reflection. This unity is basically a temporal
unity: things appear within a totality at once, but this totality of our experi-
ence, which cannot itself be grasped, also involves the genetic constitution
of things. This pre-reflective temporal unity is what Patočka calls “horizo-
nal consciousness” (Patočka 2000, 107).1
The transcendental epoché thus leads to the insight that all objects can
only appear as phenomenon within the always presupposed unity of a pri-
mordial world. What does “world” mean here? The world as the basic field
of appearances, the “world-a priori” is not the same as the world that we
experience: the world-form of experience is what makes possible the experi-
ence of world. Within this world-a priori, subjects and objects mediate each
other reciprocally in their appearance. The objects come to the subject with
Realisierungsappelle, “realization calls,” which the subject must answer. In
these responses, the subject realizes itself (Patočka 2000, 90–91).2 Thus,
Patočka speaks of a reciprocal mediation that presupposes the horizon of
the world-a priori as an encompassing frame. The world discloses us, and we
disclose other things. This mediation is possible within the framework of the
world that organizes the subject as one of its centers (Patočka 1991, 262).3
Patočka elaborates on this asubjective phenomenology in an ongo-
ing discussion with Husserl’s texts. Again and again he attempts to trace
 From Circumspection to Insight 175
precisely where subjective Cartesianism is presupposed in Husserlian phe-
nomenology, and the problems to which this leads. A few times, however,
he makes clear that his asubjective phenomenology also distances itself from
Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as “world creating” (weltbildend). According
to Patočka, in Being and Time, and shortly afterward, Heidegger still held
to a view of Dasein as the leading power in its own world, overemphasizing
the subjective side of opening up worlds, rather than the world as a pre-
supposed field of appearing. In Heidegger’s own terms: “Worldliness is an
existential” and “characteristic of Being of Dasein” (Heidegger 1986, 44,
64; transl. 2010, 44, 64). In other words, worldliness is primarily thought
as belonging to Dasein, rather than the other way round. Patočka criticizes
Heidegger’s notion of “Understanding” (Verstehen) as “project” or “pro-
jection” (Entwurf), arguing that understanding is an interpretation of that
which is not created by Dasein, but rather that which addresses Dasein, to
which it has to answer and on the basis of which Dasein can understand
itself (Patočka 2000, 88).4
However, it would be fair to say that Heidegger’s understanding of
Dasein as “Being-in-the-world” is somewhat more complex. In our every-
day experiences, we engage with the world in terms of the “handiness”
(Zuhandenheit) of “useful things” (zuhandenes Zeug), where “our dealings
with useful things are subordinate to the manifold of references of the “in-
order-to”’ (Heidegger 1986, 69; transl. 2010, 69). We approach things with
“circumspection” (Umsicht) and we are subordinate to them. We implic-
itly understand ourselves from out of the world, rather than the other way
round. In everyday experience, therefore, the world is prior to us. Then
again, Heidegger makes a distinction between “authenticity” and “inau-
thenticity” (Eigentlichkeit, Uneigentlichkeit). The everydayness of our expe-
riences is first of all characterized by an inauthenticity in which Dasein has
not yet discovered its own relation to the world as “project.” Heidegger
speaks of this inauthentic mode of existence as a “falling prey” (Verfallen).
Hence, on the one hand, in Heidegger’s approach we can find the notion of
being absorbed in the world; on the other hand, however, this is a falling
prey that is in need of repair through a better understanding of Dasein’s
own “disclosedness” (Erschlossenheit). In defense of Heidegger, one might
rightly state here that the change toward authenticity does not alter the
status of the world as a presupposed unity. Patočka’s criticism then comes
down to a critique of the emphasis on the active and creative side of Dasein
as Sein-können within this framework.
Patočka’s view of the relation between the primordial world-a priori and
human existence is actually closer to the later Heidegger, after the Kehre,
although he develops his asubjective phenomenology with the use of a more
Husserlian method and terminology. According to this phenomenological
framework, human existence is enrooted in the world in many pre-reflective
structures that are presupposed in every rational reflection. How does
reflection arise from these basic layers of experience?
176 Eddo Evink
2. Reflection within Horizons—Merleau-Ponty
Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty emphasize in their own way that the
relation between subject and object starts at the level of pre-reflective practi-
cal behavior. Patočka agrees with both of them in this regard, while staying
closer to Husserl’s phenomenological methodology. He especially elaborates
on the ideas of Merleau-Ponty in his Body Community Language World
(Patočka 1998), although he does not offer as extensive a description of
these relations as Merleau-Ponty.
Merleau-Ponty offers profound analyses of the non-thetical, pre-objective
and pre-conscious dimensions of perception. His descriptions of the pre-
conscious connections between world and body-subject—even more so
his later analyses of intertwining flesh and chiasm—accord very well with
Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology, as described above. Merleau-Ponty
describes how the way we look at objects presupposes a common structure
of visibility, in which both the objects and my eyes participate. Comparably,
our dynamic orientation while walking in a room is possible only on the
basis of general structures of spatiality, in which my moving body and the
accessibility of the room take part. This intertwining, as Merleau-Ponty
calls it, has to be understood as the worldly relations in which subjects
and objects are always already embedded. The general structures that con-
stitute basic practices function at a pre-conscious and pre-reflective level.
Embedded in these pre-reflective, worldly connections, one can discern sev-
eral levels of behavior, perception and reflection, from unconsciously practi-
cal routine behavior to a purely theoretical attitude.
In many passages of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty
describes the flaws of intellectualist efforts to understand perception as a
sort of semi-intellectual reflection on sense data. Instead, he proposes that
we understand reflection not as a step outside of oneself, which would pres-
ent the reflected subject as a transparent object, but as a structural change
in a previous self, a reflection that knows itself as reflection and as having
its starting point in a pre-conscious perception.

The core of philosophy is no longer an autonomous transcendental sub-

jectivity, to be found everywhere and nowhere: it lies in the perpetual
beginning of reflection, at the point where an individual life begins to
reflect on itself. Reflection is truly reflection only if it is not carried
outside itself, only if it knows itself as reflection-on-an-unreflective-
experience, and consequently as a change in structure of our existence.
(Merleau-Ponty 1945, 75–76; transl. 1962, 62)

Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that reflection does not transcend the world we

live in; it does not attain a transcendental position beyond the world but
takes up another perspective within the world. In his analyses, he mainly
focuses on the kind of reflection that looks for an understanding of how
 From Circumspection to Insight 177
perception works. However, there are many other kinds of reflection,
including more practical reflections.
Imagine you are painting a chair. Your basic movements are holding the
brush, dipping the brush in the paint, brushing the paint on the wood, etc.
One can be wrapped up in this work, completely concentrating on paint-
ing. Your bodily movements and perceptions, such as smoothly moving the
brush over the wood and feeling the wood of the chair through the brush,
are participating in structures of space, matter, time and kinaesthetic percep-
tion, in pre-objective and pre-conscious dimensions.
Then you might stop, step back and ask yourself: “Do I still have enough
paint?,” “Do I need another brush?,” “How far to go?” These are reflec-
tions that change your perspective within the context of the simple per-
formance of painting a chair. What happens here is that we are no longer
concentrating on one movement, but have stepped back to look at the chair
and the task from a meta-perspective. While at first we were focused on a
specific part of the action or behavior and the rest was blurred and appeared
as part of the horizon that surrounded what we focused on, now, from the
broader perspective, we see what before was part of the horizon; the other
parts of the chair, for example. This reflection takes place as part of the
performance, the work of painting a chair. It is a reflection that finds a meta-
perspective within a practice, and hence we can still call it practical.
A different sort of reflection would be entailed in questions or remarks
such as: “Do I really like this color?,” “This is a nice relaxing thing to do.”
These are reflections that take more distance from the act of painting and
attempt to survey it as an act, as a performance. They are different sorts of
a meta-perspective, by which the horizon is broadened again.
In other words, acts are performed within temporal, spatial and social
horizons that frame and condition them. When we reflect on what we do,
the focus changes from the action to the context or horizon and the relation
between action and context. This can be done on several levels and in sev-
eral directions. Reflections can open up many domains that were implicitly
and potentially present in the action or behavior: an aesthetic reflection on
the color of the paint, a moral reflection on whether to choose ecologically
sound paint, economic reflections, etc. One of these domains is what we
might call the epistemological domain: “What exactly just happened in my
perception, in my action?” This is the sort of reflection Merleau-Ponty was
writing about. He would have emphasized, for example, the irretrievable
nuances of the way your hand touches the wood through the brush. This is
a different sort of reflection, in the sense that it attempts to discern the pre-
conscious elements of perception, whereas most of my examples concerned
reflection on conscious aspects of painting a chair. Although this is a dif-
ferent sort of reflection, it still has many similarities with those I indicated.
These similarities include the fact that the reflection focuses on a coher-
ent stream of impressions and their context. Reflection always concerns the
horizon of what is reflected upon; it chooses a meta-perspective.
178 Eddo Evink
In its turn, the reflection is itself embedded in broader horizons. Among
these are horizons of thought and language. Merleau-Ponty devoted several
sections of Phenomenology of Perception to the relation between thought
and language. Just as my hand and I are immersed in the dynamic relation
between brush, paint and wood when painting a chair, in the same manner
my thoughts are developed in their expression in language. Our thought,
according to Merleau-Ponty:

does indeed move forward with the instant and, as it were, in flashes,
but we are then left to lay hands on it, and it is through expression that
we make it our own. The denomination of objects does not follow upon
recognition; it is itself recognition.
(Merleau-Ponty 1945, 207; transl. 1962, 177)

In this way, reflections that regard perceptions from a higher level are
themselves embedded in horizonal structures that we cannot survey at the
same time. The horizons of reflection not only include linguistic structures
but also the social and cultural dimensions of the discussions we participate
in, the thoughts of others that we interpret and that we develop further and
so on.
In other words, reflections are practices of their own, performed within
structural horizons that include language and other social connections. In
the act of reflection, we rise to meta-levels, surveying behavior and actions
and at least parts of their horizons. However, we can never transcend horizons
as such, no matter how theoretical or abstract our reflections may be. Even
purely theoretical abstractions are performed in reflective thought-actions,
in practices that function within their own horizons; for example, linguistic,
historical or institutional horizons.
Husserl also considered the historical and linguistic embedding of sci-
entific reflection, for example, in his “The Origin of Geometry” (Husserl
1962). However, he insisted that it was possible to have access to the
“supertemporal” truths of geometry and their ideal objectivity. This is
precisely where Merleau-Ponty decisively turns from Husserl’s thought.
He emphasizes that the horizons within which scientific thought devel-
ops are open and infinite, that they can never be objectified and that,
therefore, scientific truths cannot be absolutely fixed (cf. Merleau-Ponty
2002).
Following these ideas of Merleau-Ponty, we can say that reflections
never completely grasp or encompass their reflected object, because they
are interpretations from a specific perspective, and because they are them-
selves embedded in the reflected structures of experience in the transcenden-
tal field of appearances. They cannot completely transcend these structures
but modify and recover them in the act of reflecting (Merleau-Ponty 1945,
278–280; transl. 1962, 241–242).
 From Circumspection to Insight 179
3. Disclosing New Horizons—Heidegger
What, then, can we say about the relation between theory and praxis?
While acknowledging that theoretical reflections arise from pre-conscious
and conscious acts, when do they become theoretical? Questions such as
“Do I still have enough paint?” or “Do I really like this color?” are part of
conscious reflection, but it would be an exaggeration to call them theoreti-
cal. They are practical reflections within a practical context. Other, more
philosophical reflections, such as “What is a brush?” or “What is color?,”
are, of course, more general and more theoretical.
There is a gray area between practical and theoretical reflections rather
than any strict distinction. It may be argued that theoretical reflection is inde-
pendent and abstract, that it has a goal in itself and, therefore, attains a cer-
tain autonomy. This autonomy, however, is only relative, because even highly
theoretical contemplations, for example, on the essence of being human, may
have practical results, for example in views of how to develop medical treat-
ments. While chemistry can be purely theoretical, it can also be in the service
of the invention of environmentally friendly paint: quite a practical purpose.
In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger makes a specific distinction
between the practical use of things and an abstract theoretical perspective
on them. This is the well-known distinction between zuhanden and vorhan-
den, “handiness” and “objective presence,” first discussed in §15. Things
appear to us first of all as “equipment” (Zeug), as useful things that we
handle with circumspection, and to which our actions are even subordinate:

Our dealings with useful things are subordinate to the manifold of ref-
erences of the “in-order-to.” The kind of seeing of this accommodation
to things is called circumspection [Umsicht].
(Heidegger 1986, 69; transl. 2010, 69)

How does Heidegger distinguish this circumspection from a theoretical

view? Both entail a kind of concern or care and both involve a kind of
sight: “Rather, observation is a kind of taking care just as primordially as
action has its own kind of seeing” (Heidegger 1986, 69/69). The attitude of
theoretical observation is different from practical action; it is observing in
an abstract manner, a way of looking that is not subordinate to a practical
context but lets its own way of seeing be guided by a method: “Theoretical
behaviour is just looking, noncircumspectly. Because it is noncircumspect,
looking is not without rules; its canon takes shape in method” (Heidegger
1986, 69/69). In the remainder of this section, Heidegger only discusses use-
ful things and their world.
There are two other passages that are important for a clear understand-
ing of Heidegger’s view on the objective presence of things and the theoreti-
cal attitude. In §33, Heidegger discusses the role of assertion or “statement”
180 Eddo Evink
(Aussage) in relation to “understanding” (Verstehen) and “interpretation”
(Auslegung). A statement can only be understood as having its source in an
interpretation that understands. Nevertheless, it also brings about the step
from handiness to objective presence:

Something at hand with which we have to do or perform something,

turns into something “about which” the statement that points it out
is made. Fore-sight aims at something objectively present in what is at
hand.
(Heidegger 1986, 158; transl. 2010, 152)

The way in which Heidegger describes this change has a clearly negative
tone:

The as-structure of interpretation has undergone a modification. The

“as” gets pushed back into the uniform level of that which is merely
objectively present. It dwindles to the determination that belongs to the
structure of just letting what is objectively present be seen. This level-
ling down of the primordial “as” of circumspect interpretation to the
“as” of the determination of the objective presence is the specialty of
the statement. Only in this way does it gain the possibility of a pointing
something out in a way that we merely look at it.
(Heidegger 1986, 158; transl. 2010, 153, my italics)

The suggestion of these assertions, of this tone, is that the Aussage, the state-
ment, takes the handy phenomenon out of its meaningful context and lets it
float in the air, in the mode of “just letting it be seen.” In the remainder of this
section, Heidegger mainly focuses on how the “logic” of “logos” is grounded
in the existential analytic of Dasein. He does not mention theoretical behavior,
although he mentions all of the characteristics with which he had described
it in §15. In §33, Heidegger’s strategy is to show that traditional logic does
not have its own origin in itself but that it is based in the existential analytic
of Dasein. The allegedly self-evident manner of taking beings as objectively
present is criticized as blind due to the fact that it conceals other possibilities
of being (Heidegger 1986, 160; transl. 2010, 154–155).
The modification of care into theoretical discovery is explicitly discussed
in Being and Time §69b. Such a modification does not simply amount to
refraining from the use of tools. On the contrary, theoretical research has
its own praxis: doing experiments, observing animals, measuring data, etc.
Decisive in the step from praxis to theory, according to Heidegger, is that:
“The understanding of being guiding the heedful dealings with innerworldly
beings has been transformed” (Heidegger 1986, 361; transl. 2010, 344). An
important aspect of this modification of the understanding of being is the
“releasing of the surrounding world” (Entschränkung der Umwelt) and the
delimitation of the realm or region of what is objectively present. In other
 From Circumspection to Insight 181
words, theoretical reflection is a specific way of opening up the world—of
projecting a world. The object of reflection is lifted out of its practical hori-
zon and transformed by molding it into a projected world with abstract facts.
Heidegger discusses the origin of early modern mathematical physics as a
classic example of this. It was not the discovery of facts or of a mathematical
method that created a new modern science, but:

the mathematical projection of nature itself. This project discovers in

advance something constantly objectively present (matter) and opens
the horizon for the guiding perspective on its quantitatively definable
constitutive moments (motion, force, location and time). Only “in the
light of” a nature thus projected can something like a “fact” be bound
and be taken as a point of departure for an experiment defined and
regulated in terms of this project. The “founding” of “factual science”
was possible only because the researchers understood that there are in
principle no “bare facts.” What is decisive about the mathematical proj-
ect of nature is again not primarily the mathematical element as such,
but the fact that this project discloses an a priori.
(Heidegger 1986, 362; transl. 2010, 345)

The development of a new science thus starts with the construction of a new
ontological framework that decides what will count as “fact,” “method,”
“proof,” “truth,” etc.:

the methods, the structure of conceptuality, the relevant possibility of

truth and certainty, the kind of grounding and proof, the mode of being
binding and the kind of communication—all these will be determined.
The totality of these moments constitutes the complete existential con-
cept of science.
(Heidegger 1986, 362–363; transl. 2010, 345)

Heidegger calls this constitution a “thematization.” It is an objectifying

projection that decides about “the articulation of the understanding of
being, the definition of the subject-matter defined by that understanding,
and the prefiguration of the concepts suitable of these beings” (Heidegger
1986, 363; transl. 2010, 346). Hence, a specific “understanding of being”
(Seinsverständnis) is the decisive moment in the disclosure of the scientific
world. Such a disclosure is first of all dependent on specific features of the
existence of Dasein: “If the thematization of what is present . . . is to become
possible, Dasein must transcend the beings thematized” (Heidegger 1986,
363; transl. 2010, 346). The main feature here is that Dasein always has an
understanding of being: “if the thematization modifies and articulates the
understanding of being, insofar as Dasein, the being that thematizes, exists,
it must already understand something like being” (Heidegger 1986, 363;
transl. 2010, 346).
182 Eddo Evink
Here, we again find the central role of Dasein, which discloses worlds
and phenomena and has an understanding of being—the central position
that was criticized in Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology. However, what
is also striking in the comparison of the passages quoted above is the dif-
ferent tone and terminology. On the one hand, in §69b Heidegger neutrally
and formally describes the theoretical view of science as a specific form of
the understanding of being. On the other hand, as we saw above, in §33,
his tone is much more negative when he describes how the “statement”
(Aussage) makes something be seen as “merely objectively present,” pre-
cisely in a way that loses sight of its functioning within a coherent dimen-
sion of practical usefulness. Perhaps §69b is not as neutral as it seems to be
but is implicitly critical of the usual positivistic praise of “facts” and math-
ematical methods. In any case, both descriptions of rational reflection are in
line with Heidegger’s famous adage that “thematization” in the history of
ontology has been characterized by the oblivion of being.
In summary, the relation between practice and theory is reflected upon
by Heidegger as a problematic abstraction from the everyday world and
the disclosure of a new, abstract world. The structures and parameters of
this world are not determined by the actual coherence of “useful things”
and the praxis in which they participate, but by an abstract construction
of a new ontological framework. In Being and Time, Heidegger empha-
sizes the role of Dasein in the projecting of these worlds, although he also
writes that “a world must be disclosed” to Dasein (Heidegger 1986, 364;
transl. 2010, 346). After the turn (Kehre) in his thought, he emphasized the
history of being as a manifestation of destiny (Geschick) that determines
human beings in a profound way. For reflection, this means that the his-
tory of thought and language is highly determining of what we can think.
According to the later Heidegger, “We never come to thoughts. They come
to us” (Heidegger 1954, 11; transl. 1971, 6).

4. Reflection on Horizons, Horizons of Reflection—Patočka

If we compare the views of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger on reflection,
we can see that, on the one hand, Merleau-Ponty describes reflection on
the pre-reflective as a practice that changes perspective within horizons but
can never transcend the horizon as such and remains enrooted within these
horizons. In addition, I attempted to show how reflection always takes a
step to a meta-level by relating the reflected act to the horizon within which
it functions. On the other hand, Heidegger sketches the scientific worldview
as entailing a practice that abstracts from practical experiences and presup-
poses the constitution of a new world that is taken to be the “real” world
but that has forgotten about its own constitution. In other words, scientific
reflection discloses or constructs a new abstract horizon that determines
what can be taken as “real.” Furthermore, Heidegger points to implicit pre-
suppositions in these disclosures with regard to the understanding of being.
 From Circumspection to Insight 183
In Being and Time it is Dasein that opens worlds or horizons, or to whom
they are opened. In Heidegger’s later work, the history of being has the deci-
sive position in disclosing worlds. The history of being thus might be seen
as the most encompassing horizon.
These two approaches can be combined in such a way that they mutually
enrich each other. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the openness of horizons, that
is, the irretrievability of the objects and horizons of reflection, and therefore
also the finitude of reflection. Heidegger underlines the specific character-
istics of scientific reflection that constitute abstract horizons, as well as the
role of the implicit understanding of being that can be found in all reflec-
tion. If being is the most universal horizon, the horizon of all horizons,
how do we relate to it? With regard to this question, some elements of Jan
Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology might be helpful.
According to this asubjective phenomenology, the a priori unity of the
world is the field of appearing for all phenomena. The subjects to whom
phenomena appear participate in this world; they have to understand them-
selves as involved in the world, as centers around which phenomena mani-
fest themselves. This world is not a static, fixed or monolithic foundation
but a dynamic whole that is constantly in movement. The appearing as such
of phenomena is also thought by Patočka as a dynamic movement.
Patočka distinguishes three sides to this movement, three movements of
human life by which human beings are integrated into the world (Patočka
1990a, 246–267 and 1998, 147–161). The first movement consists in our
being enrooted or anchored in natural and cultural structures, mainly in a
passive way. The second movement entails our active orientation in the world,
through work, conflict and all kinds of strategies. This movement includes
practical reflection above all, but also theoretical reflection, which has to be
understood as a practice of its own. Both movements take place in relation
to phenomena within the world on several levels and within several horizons.
The third movement of human life is a special one. In this movement,
human beings start to relate to themselves as such, to their entire existence,
as well as to the world as a whole. We do not merely reflect on a particular
event or thing and its horizon, but on the world as a whole, on the horizon
of all horizons. Since we cannot survey reality as a totality, nor our life in its
entirety, we are confronted with the limits of reflection itself. Here we attain
a new level of reflection, which is not only theoretical but also philosophical.
Theoretical reflection comes about within the larger framework of research
projects, established theories, research institutions, etc. Philosophical reflec-
tion can also relate explicitly to these frameworks or horizons, not only
the theoretical and institutional horizons of scientific research, but also its
own horizons, in other words, the limits of philosophical reflection itself.
Philosophy necessarily calls itself into question. An inevitable uncertainty is
built into philosophy. The most fundamental questions—What is “knowl-
edge”?, What is “truth”?, What “is” “being”?, What “is” “human exis-
tence”?—cannot be answered in a definitive or a conclusive way. Reflection
184 Eddo Evink
on these questions is infinite, and the answers we have to give are necessar-
ily finite. Given the fact that definitive answers are no longer possible, we
have to give an account of our answers, of the guiding principles we adhere
to. The third movement thus reflects on our understanding of being that is
presupposed in both practical and theoretical reflection.
Therefore, since the limits of reflection are themselves horizons, the third
movement of human existence implies a reflection on horizons as such. This
means that, on the one hand, we can find an orientation in traditional theories
and currents of thought, in the answers and questions that we inherit from
them—that is, in the horizons of philosophical reflection. On the other hand,
however, all this orientation needs to be radically questioned, for these hori-
zons necessarily remain vague. They cannot be firmly fixed or established,
and they move with us when we attempt to locate and understand them.
Hence, philosophy is performed in a movement back and forth between
questions and answers; within philosophy, as well as between philosophy
itself and that which it reflects upon, be it scientific theories, ethical or
political issues, or questions of everyday life. Philosophy radically brings
its own horizons into question, while at the same time remaining embedded
within horizons. This movement toward principles and back, between radi-
cal questions and answers, between principles and their uncertainty, is what
characterizes philosophy, according to Patočka.
Is the question of being the most fundamental question in this regard, as
Heidegger would say? In the course of the development of his asubjective
phenomenology, Patočka expressed his doubts about the primacy of being
in Heidegger’s philosophy (Patočka 2000, 114, 146); however, in his last
philosophical work, he articulated the view that the fundamental position
of the human is in relation to being (Patočka 2015). It is, however, not the
question of being itself but primarily the human’s relation to it that interests
Patočka, especially the practical side and consequences of this connection.
What are the practical sides of radical philosophical reflection? First, this
reflection is in itself a practice, with its own terminology and canon, its own
institutional embedding, its own tradition. Second, radical philosophical
reflection is not purely theoretical, insofar as it has practical consequences for
ethical and political matters. Questions that seem to be strictly ontological or
epistemological are related to power, to social and political, medical and juridi-
cal issues, etc. Third, philosophical reflection is not purely theoretical, insofar
as it demands a specific attunement or state of mind (Befindlichkeit) and atti-
tude. In the third movement of human life, the subject not only questions his or
her own judgments and prejudices, but also his or her own interests. Patočka
describes this movement as a surrender to others and to being: one has to give
up oneself in order to find oneself. Philosophical reflection is not just a theo-
retical act; it is a way of life, which Patočka calls the “care of the soul” or “liv-
ing in truth” (Patočka 2002 and 2007, 37–136). His evaluation of the human
relationship to being is therefore different from that of Heidegger. Whereas
Heidegger prefers a more passive attitude in “mindfulness” (Gelassenheit) and
 From Circumspection to Insight 185
in the contemplative consideration of art, Patočka emphasizes the ethical pos-
ture that comes with the care of the soul (Patočka 1990b).

5. Conclusions
With help of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Patočka, I have attempted
to distinguish between three levels of reflection: practical, theoretical and
philosophical. They can be understood as different ways of dealing with
the horizons of our thoughts and actions. Practical reflections relate the
acts reflected upon to the practical context and horizon within which they
function, but they remain within the realm of circumspection, subordinated
to the broader horizons of practice. Theoretical reflection has its roots in
pre-reflective behavior and perception but abstracts from these horizons
and develops insight into general structures, which is made possible by a
new world disclosure, with a new understanding of “facts,” “truth,” etc.
Philosophical reflection is the highest form of theoretical reflection, which
thematizes the horizon as such and focuses on how world disclosure takes
place. It reveals how both practical and theoretical reflection are performed
within encompassing horizons that include views on “being” and “life” as
such, which have their own history and can be critically discussed but never
completely surveyed. This world disclosure is not only a subjective perfor-
mance, it is a movement within the world that includes and guides human
beings and their reflections. We take part in these disclosures and we bear a
responsibility for them, but we can never have a complete overview of them.
In such a philosophical reflection, looking back on the world disclosure
that made modern scientific reflection possible, one can see the strengths as
well as the flaws of this scientific worldview. It has led to immense rational
insights and unexpected technological developments. However, it also has
its blind spots, the most significant of which are alienation from the practi-
cal lifeworld and the error of too readily seeing its own constructions as
equivalent to reality itself. Phenomenological reflection on the world as a
field of appearing and on horizons as dynamic frameworks in which we
are always already taken up is necessary to understand what theoretical
reflection is about. It must lead theoretical reflection back to the practi-
cal lifeworld in which it is enrooted and develop insight into the historical
framework of our lives, our thoughts and our cultures—in other words,
insight into the conditions of possibility as well as the boundaries of reflec-
tion. Such philosophical reflection turns out to be not only theoretical, but a
practice of its own that should be understood as a way of life.

Notes
1. ‘Genau dies: ein unthematisches Vorauswissen über das Eine Umfassende, das als
Entwurf in allem Einzelwissen da ist im Modus der Vergessenheit und dort, wo
es visiert ist, sich zunächst als Weiterführung der Einzelerfahrung vermummt, ist
Horizontbewusstsein’.
186 Eddo Evink
2. ‘Die Möglichkeiten schaffe also nicht ich, sondern sie schaffen mich, sie kommen
zu mir von außen, aus der Welt, die für sie ein Rahmen ist, worin sich die Dinge
als Mittel zeigen und ich selbst mich als Realisator der Zwecke, denen die Mittel
dienen, zeige, als derjenige, der schon immer die in der Realisierung sich manifes-
tierenden Möglichkeiten gehabt hat’, Patočka (2000, 90–91).
3. ‘Durch das Mir-Erscheinen hat die Welt ein Zentrum bekommen, und es gibt
viele solche Zentren in der einen allumfassenden Welt, welche selbst für sich
kein Zentrum voraussetzt noch besitzt’. For a discussion of the development of
Patočka’s notion of asubjective phenomenology, see Karfík (2008) and Novotný
(2000, 11–35).
4. ‘Heidegger sagt: Verstehen (von Möglichkeiten) hat in sich den Charakter des
Entwurfs; damit annulliert er den Charakter von Verstehen—das Verstehen ist
Erfassen von etwas, was ich nicht . . . erschaffen habe, so, dass sich mir dieses
,Erschaffen‘ zeigt—Es . . . ist mir von außen erschienen, wird von mir verstan-
den, es ist eine der Möglichkeiten, die in der Welt sind, als die die Welt ist, eine
Möglichkeit, die mich anspricht und aus der ich mich dann selber verstehe’.

References
Aristotle (1984). Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by William David Ross with revi-
sion by James Opie Urmson. In Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of
Aristotle, Vol. 2, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1729–1867.
Heidegger, Martin (1954). Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Pfüllingen: Neske.
Heidegger, Martin (1971). “The Thinker as Poet.” In Poetry, Language, Thought,
translated by Albert Hofstadter New York: Harper & Row, 1–14.
Heidegger, Martin (1986). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
Heidegger, Martin (2010). Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany:
State University New York Press.
Husserl, Edmund (1962). “Der Ursprung der Geometrie.” In Die Krisis der
Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husser-
liana VI, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 365–386.
Husserl, Edmund (1970). “The Origin of Geometry.” In The Crisis of European Sci-
ences and Transcendental Phenomenology, translated by David Carr, Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 353–378.
Karfík, Filip (2008). Unendlichwerden durch die Endlichkeit. Eine Lektüre der Phi-
losophie Jan Patočkas. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin
Smith. London: Routledge.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (2002). Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology. Trans-
lated by John O’Neill and Leonard Lawlor. Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 5–89.
Novotný, Karel (2000). “Einführung. Struktur des Erscheinens und endliche Frei-
heit.” In Jan Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem. Texte aus dem Nachlaβ.
Freiburg and München: Karl Alber, 11–35.
Patočka, Jan (1990a). Die natürliche Welt als philosophisches Problem. Vienna and
Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Patočka, Jan (1990b). “Séminaire sur l’ère technique.” In Jan Patočka, Liberté et
sacrifice. Écrits politiques, edited and translated by Erika Abrams, Grenoble:
Millon, 277–324.
Patočka, Jan (1991). “Weltganzes und Menschenwelt.” In Jan Patočka, Die Bewe-
gung der menschlichen Existenz, edited by Klaus Nellen, Jan Němec a Ilja Šrubař,
Vienna and Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
 From Circumspection to Insight 187
Patočka, Jan (1998). Body Community Language World. Chicago: Open Court.
Patočka, Jan (2000). Vom Erscheinen als solchem. Texte aus dem Nachlaβ. Freiburg
and München: Karl Alber.
Patočka, Jan (2002). Plato and Europe. Translated by Petr Lom. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Patočka, Jan (2007). L’Europe après l’Europe. Translated by Erika Abrams.
Lagrasse: Verdier.
Patočka, Jan (2015). “On Masaryk’s Philosophy of Religion.” In The New Year-
book for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Vol. 14, Edited by
Ludger Hagedorn and James Dodd and translated by Jiří Rothbauer, London:
Routledge, 95–135.
Patočka, Jan (2016). The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem. Translated by
E. Abrams. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Plato (1997). Timaeus. Translated by Donald J. Zeyl. In John M. Cooper (ed.),
Plato: Complete Works, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1224–1291.