Oxford Scholarship Online: Myanmar: A Political History

The Centrality of Myanmar in India’s Look East
Policy
University Press Scholarship Online

Oxford Scholarship Online
Myanmar: A Political History

Nehginpao Kipgen
Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780199466306
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199466306.001.0001
The Centrality of Myanmar in

India’s Look East Policy
Nehginpao Kipgen
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199466306.003.0010
Abstract and Keywords
It examines India-Myanmar bilateral relations in the context of

India’s look-east policy. It analyses why the Indian foreign
policy toward Myanmar shifted from pro-democracy to pro-
military government. It argues that foreign policy is primarily
built on a country’s national and security interests. The look-
east policy was basically a goal change of the Indian
government in the aftermath of the Cold War era. India’s
policy shift was not merely economic policy, but was a
strategic consideration of India’s vision of the world. It was a
move to check the growing strategic and military influence of
China in the region. India shifted its policy from pro-
democracy to pro-military government as it best served its
national and security interests. Regardless of which political
party or coalition government comes to power, it is likely that
the look-east policy will remain an important element of
India’s foreign policy. Similarly, the Myanmar government
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Policy
(either democratic or military or any authoritarian regime) will

continue to maintain bilateral relationship with India largely
because of economic and political reasons.
Keywords: foreign policy, insurgency problems, look-east policy, national

interests, security concerns, strategic interest
Foreign Policymaking
Foreign policy of a nation is fundamentally shaped by national
and security interests. Similarly, foreign relations are strained
when national and security interests are jeopardized or
threatened. Charles F. Hermann (1990), in his article,
‘Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect
Foreign Policy’, talks about two circumstances under which
foreign policy are changed. First, foreign policy shift happens
with regime change. Second, foreign policy change happens
when the existing government chooses to move in a different
direction. For the existing government, foreign policy is a
programme or a plan designed to address some problems or to
pursue some goals that entail actions towards foreign entities.
Hermann talks about four levels of foreign policy change: (i)
adjustment change; (ii) programme change; (iii) problem or
goal change; and (iv) international orientation change
(Hermann 1990: 5). (p.177)
‘Adjustment changes’ happen in the level of effort or in the

scope of recipients, such as refinement in the class of targets.
However, the fundamental purpose of the policy remains the
same and the changes are usually quantitative in nature.
‘Programme changes’ are made in the methods by which the
goal or problem is addressed, and such changes are
qualitative in nature, in which new instruments are involved.
For example, diplomatic negotiation is preferred than the use
of military force. Under this type of policy change, what is
done and how it is done changes, but the purpose of the policy
is not changed. In ‘problem or goal changes’, the initial
problem or goal is replaced or forfeited. Under this policy
change, the purpose of the initial plans is also changed.
‘International orientation changes’ are the most extreme form
of foreign policy change. They involve redirection of the
state’s orientation towards world affairs. These changes do not
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focus on single or specific policy change. Many foreign policies

of the world are changed more or less simultaneously
(Hermann 1990).
Background of the Look East Policy

The concept of India’s Look East Policy goes back as far as the
Sino-Indian War of 1962. After the war, China and India began
competing in South and East Asia. China expanded its trade
and economic ties with Asian nations. In doing so, China
became the closest ally and supporter of the Myanmar military
junta, which was isolated by the international community,
particularly the Western democracies, in the aftermath of the
1988 pro-democracy uprising that was believed to have led to
the killing of thousands of people, mostly students, and the
subsequent nullification of the 1990 general election results.
China also established closer ties with India’s neighbour and
rival, Pakistan, and also competed for influence in Bangladesh
and Nepal. India’s Look East Policy officially started in 1991
during the Indian National Congress (INC) government under
Prime Minister Pamulaparti Venkata (P.V.) Narasimha Rao
(1991–6), and was rigorously pursued by successive
governments: Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government under (p.178) Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998–2004), followed by
Congress Party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
government under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from
2004–14 and the BJP-led NDA government under Narendra
Modi from 2014 onwards.
The philosophy behind the Look East Policy was a strategy to

work with Asian partners to expand engagement with the rest
of the world. The aim was that India’s future economic and
political interests would be better served by greater
integration with East and Southeast Asian nations.
Cooperation with ASEAN, formed in 1967, was India’s
recognition of the region’s increasing importance strategically
and economically. In other words, the Look East Policy was
not merely an economic policy, but was a strategic shift in
India’s vision of the world. It was a policy of economic
liberalization, especially expansion of regional markets for
trade, investments, and industrial development. The two other
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important reasons behind the Look East Policy were: (i) to set
a new course of action moving away from the Cold War era,
during which India was part of the Non-Aligned Movement,
while the world was literally divided into two super blocs led
by the US and the Soviet Union; and (ii) to check or
counterbalance China’s growing strategic and military
influence in the region.
On India–China relations, Mohan Malik (1994: 144) said that

because of India’s long adversarial relationship with China, ‘…
anything that promotes China’s interests in its immediate
neighbourhood, or expands China’s influence, worries India’.
However, during my interview with the Indian Ambassador to
Myanmar, Gautam Mukhopadhaya, in Yangon on 27 February
2014, the ambassador said that the concept of India’s Look
East Policy was not in the context of Myanmar. Myanmar was
a ‘marginal player’ and it was ‘incidental’ when the policy
initially started. The diplomat said that the Look East Policy
was in the context of India’s broader foreign policy. India saw
that East and Southeast Asia were growing, which coincided
with India’s ‘economic opening’ period. India was looking for
‘economic opportunities, foreign investments, learning from
each other, partnership trade, and market access’.
Mukhopadhaya said that the role of China and India’s
competition in Myanmar had been (p.179) ‘overemphasized by
some scholars, mainly to hype other rivalries that they would
rather not draw attention to’ (Mukhopadhaya 2014).
Look East Policy and Myanmar

Myanmar’s importance to India’s Look East Policy can be
defined by different factors, including its shared history,
culture, ethnic relations, and religious ties. Not only do India
and Myanmar have a shared land border about 1,600
kilometre long, but the two countries are home to millions of
people from the same ethnic community, separated during the
creation of India and Myanmar in 1947 and 1948, respectively.
Examples are the Kachins, the Kukis, the Nagas, and the
Shans, who live side by side along the India–Myanmar border
region. An estimated 2.5 million people of Indian origin live in
Myanmar. Four north-eastern states of India—Arunachal
Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland—are
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geographically contiguous to Myanmar. The two countries also

share the waters of Bay of Bengal, including the strategically
important Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Myanmar serves as a
gateway to other ASEAN nations, and also provides a
geographical contiguity to the Asia-Pacific region. Due to its
geographical proximity, Myanmar also provides India a transit
route to southern China (Routray 2011: 300).
Traditionally, India supported the pro-democracy movement in

Myanmar. During the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, when
thousands of Myanmar people were killed and several tens of
thousands fled the country, India was one of the first countries
to welcome refugees into its own territory. India provided
provisions and other necessary facilities for the Myanmar
people in exile to continue their pro-democracy activities from
within India. New Delhi was also vocal about human rights
and democratic reforms, by openly criticizing the SLORC, the
then military government (Kipgen 2009). However, the nature
of engagement between Myanmar and India shifted
significantly in the last two decades. With the introduction of
Look East Policy, India’s foreign policy towards Myanmar
shifted from pro-democracy to pro-military, and subsequently
the support for democracy movement gradually faded. The
policy shift began during the Congress government, (p.180)
with the BJP-led NDA government continuing to pursue the

same policy. This was evidence of a broader support for the
Look East Policy across the Indian political spectrum.
India was gradually fascinated by the rising trade and

economic opportunities in Southeast Asian region. The role of
Myanmar in India’s Look East Policy became more significant
when Myanmar took ASEAN membership in 1997.
Subsequently, India instituted two institutional projects with
Myanmar as its primary geographical node: the Bangladesh–
India–Myanmar–Sri Lanka–Thailand Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC) in 1997; and the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation
(MGC) in 2000. China also launched the Kunming Initiative,
Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM), in 1999. The
launching of such multilateral projects was welcomed by
Myanmar since it provided an opportunity to revive regional
diplomatic and commercial ties after years of isolation. The
construction of infrastructure programmes like the Trans-Asia
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Highway Project paved the way for regional cooperation

(Egreteau 2008: 941–2).
Myanmar’s Response to Look East Policy

While Myanmar openly welcomed India’s friendship through
its Look East Policy, it also continued to maintain cordial
relationship with China, thereby playing a balancing game
between the two major Asian powers, which are traditionally
economic and political rivals. Why is it important for Myanmar
to appease both China and India?
Ties with India

During President Thein Sein’s visit, the two countries held
discussions on a wide range of issues, including cooperation
on tackling insurgency problems in north-east India. Nay Pyi
Taw was seeking New Delhi’s recognition and support over its
democratic reform process. The visit took place at a time when
there was glimmers of hope for democratic change in
Myanmar under the USDP, a political party backed by former
military generals. The visit was considered mutually (p.181)
beneficial and important for the two nations for strengthening

their strategic partnership. Ahead of the high-level visit, the
two countries engaged in a series of low-level official
meetings.
At the request of the Indian government, the Myanmar Army,

in the first week of September 2011, attacked the camps of
north-east Indian insurgents based in Sagaing region, in north-
west Myanmar. During those years, India was criticized by the
Myanmar opposition and the Western democracies for not
speaking up on human rights and democratic reforms. In order
to strengthen bilateral relations, Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh made a three-day visit to Myanmar in May 2012. As part
of mending relations with the democratic forces, Congress
President Sonia Gandhi, through Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, invited the Myanmar opposition leader, Aung San Suu
Kyi, to visit India. Subsequently, Suu Kyi paid a week-long visit
to India in November 2012.
Ties with China

In an attempt to mend any potential misunderstanding arising
out of President Thein Sein’s order to suspend the Myitsone
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Dam, a US$ 3.6 billion hydroelectric project in Kachin state,

the Myanmar government sent a delegation led by its Vice
President, Tin Aung Myint Oo, to China from 21 to 26 October
2011, a few days after Thein Sein’s return from India. The
dam, developed by China Power Investment, was the first of
seven to be built on the Irrawaddy River. The dam was
basically designed to provide electricity to the Yunnan
province of China. The suspension was announced because of
massive opposition from the to-be affected local people and
environmentalists.
China has great interest in the natural resource-rich

Myanmar, which is evident from the range of its investments,
from hydropower to mining to natural gas, with bidding
competition from India. China, the biggest lender to Myanmar,
invested US$ 10 billion during the fiscal year 2010–11 and
remained the biggest trading partner in 2011–12, exceeding
US$ 5 billion, according to Myanmar’s Central Statistical
Organization (Kipgen 2011). (p.182)
Benefits of the Balancing Game

The Myanmar government’s primary objective of balancing
diplomacy is to benefit from both India and China. The
Myanmar government needs the support and partnership of
both countries for two similar reasons—economy and politics.
Besides receiving financial assistance, Nay Pyi Taw
successfully convinced New Delhi to remain reticent on
sensitive political issues, such as human rights and democratic
reforms. On the other hand, Beijing remained a faithful
partner and supporter whenever Myanmar needed its support.
The strong bilateral relationship was manifested at the UNSC
in January 2007 when China vetoed a draft resolution on
Myanmar that demanded the release of all political prisoners,
the initiation of a widespread political dialogue, and an end to
military attacks and human rights abuses against the ethnic
minorities.
Though India’s engagement with Myanmar was part and

parcel of the broader Look East Policy agenda, its fundamental
objectives were: to seek Myanmar government’s help in
tackling insurgency problems in north-east India; to limit or
counter China’s growing influence in the region; and to
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expand India’s international market in Southeast Asia via

Myanmar. By engaging Myanmar, the intent was to maximize
India’s security and its national interests. Myanmar, the only
Southeast Asian country to share about 1,643 kilometre
(1,020.913 miles) boundary with four north-eastern Indian
states and a maritime boundary, serves as India’s gateway to
the other 10 member states of ASEAN. Because of its strategic
location and geographical proximity to China, it is crucial for
India to befriend Myanmar, regardless of which group or party
is in power.
In order to strengthen bilateral ties, Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh made a three-day visit to Myanmar in May
2012 and the two countries signed a number of bilateral
agreements: memorandum of understanding (MoU) regarding
US$ 500 million line of credit; air services agreement between
India and Myanmar; MoU on India–Myanmar border area
development; MoU on establishment of Joint Trade and
Investment Forum; MoU on the establishment of Advance
Centre for Agriculture Research and Education (ACARE); MoU
on establishment of Rice Bio Park at the Department of
Agricultural (p.183) Research in Nay Pyi Taw; MoU towards
setting up of Myanmar Institute of Information Technology;
MoU on cooperation between Dagon University and Calcutta
University; MoU on cooperation between Myanmar Institute of
Strategic and International Studies and Indian Council of
World Affairs; agreement on cooperation between the
Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies and
the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; cultural
exchange programme (2012–15); and MoU on establishing
border haats across the border between the two countries
(Singh 2012).
As part of mending relations with the democratic forces, as

mentioned earlier, Congress President Sonia Gandhi (through
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh) invited the Myanmar
opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, to visit India.
Subsequently, Suu Kyi paid a week-long visit to India in
November 2012. To further strengthen bilateral ties, an 11-
member team from Myanmar made a goodwill mission to
Manipur state in April 2013. The Manipur state government
from the Indian side and the Sagaing region government from
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Myanmar side reached certain bilateral agreements: Manipur

to supply 2/3 megawatt power for use in Tamu township, with
approval from the Indian central government; and Manipur to
set up coal-based thermal power plant at Moreh. The
Myanmar government will provide the coal for the said
thermal plant; Manipur government to install high-tension
power lines and transformers in Tamu township in Sagaing
region. The two governments agreed to develop the Manipur–
Myanmar connecting road into an all-weather road; and
Myanmar to open a consulate general office in Manipur at the
earliest (The Sangai Express 2013).
Myanmar–India Military Cooperation

The military relations between India and Myanmar, especially
between the Indian Army and the Myanmar Army, became
significant since the early 1990s, with India as the supplier
and Myanmar on the receiving end. With the inception of the
Look East Policy, the Congress government began to supply
weaponry and equipment, including 105 mm guns, T-55 tanks,
light helicopters, transport (p.184) planes, artillery
ammunition, and some naval crafts. Later, the BJP-led NDA
government supplied infantry and artillery weapons to
Myanmar, including imported weapons. This was evident when
some of the weapons having batch numbers from the lot
imported from Sweden fell into the hands of the KIA, which
led to adverse international publicity and consequent
embarrassment for India (Sen 2013).
In 2006, the Indian Army provided special warfare training to

the Myanmar Army. The Indian Army supplied a few light
artillery guns and armoured personal carriers. The Indian Air
Force chief offered his Myanmar counterpart generous air
force support in upgrading avionics of fighter aircraft in
Myanmar’s inventory. In August 2012 when Myanmar’s
Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, General Min Aung
Hlaing, visited India, the Indian government again offered to
train Myanmar Army personnel (Sakhuja 2012). The
increasing importance of military ties was further evidenced
by the joint exercise of warships and the coordination of patrol
in the Bay of Bengal for the first time in March 2013 (Pandit
2013). By providing military training and supplying weaponry
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and equipment, the Indian government anticipates that the

Myanmar Army will take action on the north-east insurgents,
who have bases inside Myanmar. New Delhi has been seeking
Nay Pyi Taw’s cooperation and assistance to neutralize the
Indian insurgent groups. However, there has been a little
success on this front, as the armed groups continue to operate
within Myanmar.
Prospects of the Look East Policy

Regardless of which political party or coalition government
comes to power, it is likely that the Look East Policy will
remain an important element of India’s foreign policy.
Similarly, the Myanmar government (either democratic, or
military, or any authoritarian regime) will continue to maintain
bilateral relationship with India largely because of economic
and political reasons. One of the prospects in the near future
is of the introduction of regular, direct flight service between
the two countries. The two countries are also expected to
(p.185) begin bus service via Moreh–Tamu–Kalemyo–Kalewa
road. This was agreed upon during Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh’s visit to Myanmar in May 2012. The service was
initially proposed to start by end of March 2013, but got
delayed because the Myanmar government was yet to chalk
out the operational modalities with regard to immigration and
land check post. The two countries had also agreed to open
passport and visa processing facilities in India–Myanmar
border areas.
The central argument is that foreign policy is primarily shaped

by a country’s national and security interests. The Look East
Policy was basically a goal change of the Indian government in
the aftermath of the Cold War era. India’s policy shift was not
merely in terms of economic policy, but was a strategic
consideration of India’s vision of the world. It was a move to
check the growing strategic and military influence of China in
the region. Myanmar is India’s gateway to Southeast Asia
region, particularly the 10-member ASEAN states. India
shifted its policy from pro-democracy to pro-military junta as it
best served the country’s national and security interests.
Myanmar diligently manoeuvred India’s political gesture by
playing a balancing game between China and India. It was a
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mutually beneficial transaction for economic and political

reasons.
If not tackled, insurgency problems will continue to be a

challenge and a threat to the realization of real peace and
prosperity in the region. The issue of insurgency problems was
raised again during Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma
Swaraj’s four-day visit to Myanmar in August 2014. In her
meetings with Myanmar President Thein Sein and Foreign
Minister Wunna Maung, Swaraj said that India was gravely
concerned with the north-east Indian armed groups having
bases inside Myanmar and asked the Myanmar government to
take action against them. The Myanmar leadership said it
would not allow its territories to be used for terrorist activities
(Press Trust of India 2014). The importance of Look East
Policy was evident when Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who
was attending the East Asia Summit plenary session during
the ASEAN Summit in Myanmar in November 2014, upgraded
the Look East Policy to ‘Act East Policy’.
(p.186) References
Bibliography references:
Egreteau, Renaud. 2008. ‘India’s Ambitions in Burma: More

Frustration than Success?’, Asian Survey, 48(6): 936–57.
Hermann, Charles F. 1990. ‘Changing Course: When

Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy’, International
Studies Quarterly, 34(1): 3–21.
Kipgen, Nehginpao. 2009. ‘India’s Myanmar Policy

Discouraging’, The Korea Times, 8 June.
———. 2011. ‘Burma’s Balancing Acts with India and China’,

Epoch Times, 11 October.
Malik, J. Mohan. 1994. ‘Sino-Indian Rivalry in Myanmar:

Implications for Regional Security’, Contemporary Southeast
Asia, 16(2): 137–56.
Mukhopadhaya, Gautam (Indian Ambassador to Myanmar),

Personal interview, Yangon, 27 February 2014.
Page 11 of 12
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Pandit, Rajat. 2013. ‘India to Step up Military Cooperation

with Myanmar’, The Times of India, 29 July.
Press Trust of India. 2014. ‘Sushma Swaraj Describes

Myanmar Visit as “Very Successful”’, 11 August.
Routray, Bibhu Prasad. 2011. ‘India–Myanmar Relations:

Triumph of Pragmatism’, Jindal Journal of International
Affairs, 1(1): 299–321.
Sakhuja, Vijay. 2012. ‘India and Myanmar: Choices for Military

Cooperation’, Indian Council of World Affairs Issue Brief, 11
September.
Sen, Gautam. 2013. ‘Cooperation between Indian and

Myanmar Armed Forces: Need to Move Away from a Weapons
& Equipment Supply-based Relationship’, IDSA Comment,
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 15 January.
Singh, Udai Bhanu. 2012. ‘An Assessment of Manmohan

Singh’s Visit to Myanmar’, Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses Issue Brief, 1 June.
The Sangai Express. 2013. ‘CM Assures Power Supply to

Myanmar’, 3 April.
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The Centrality of Myanmar in India’s Look East

University Press Scholarship Online

Myanmar: A Political History

Print publication date: 2016

The Centrality of Myanmar in

Abstract and Keywords

It examines India-Myanmar bilateral relations in the context of

(either democratic or military or any authoritarian regime) will

Keywords: foreign policy, insurgency problems, look-east policy, national

‘Adjustment changes’ happen in the level of effort or in the

focus on single or specific policy change. Many foreign policies

Background of the Look East Policy

The philosophy behind the Look East Policy was a strategy to

On India–China relations, Mohan Malik (1994: 144) said that

Look East Policy and Myanmar

geographically contiguous to Myanmar. The two countries also

Traditionally, India supported the pro-democracy movement in

with the BJP-led NDA government continuing to pursue the

India was gradually fascinated by the rising trade and

Highway Project paved the way for regional cooperation

Myanmar’s Response to Look East Policy

Ties with India

beneficial and important for the two nations for strengthening

At the request of the Indian government, the Myanmar Army,

Ties with China

Dam, a US$ 3.6 billion hydroelectric project in Kachin state,

China has great interest in the natural resource-rich

Benefits of the Balancing Game

Though India’s engagement with Myanmar was part and

expand India’s international market in Southeast Asia via

In order to strengthen bilateral ties, Prime Minister

As part of mending relations with the democratic forces, as

Myanmar side reached certain bilateral agreements: Manipur

Myanmar–India Military Cooperation

In 2006, the Indian Army provided special warfare training to

and equipment, the Indian government anticipates that the

Prospects of the Look East Policy

road. This was agreed upon during Prime Minister Manmohan

The central argument is that foreign policy is primarily shaped

mutually beneficial transaction for economic and political

If not tackled, insurgency problems will continue to be a

Egreteau, Renaud. 2008. ‘India’s Ambitions in Burma: More

Hermann, Charles F. 1990. ‘Changing Course: When

Kipgen, Nehginpao. 2009. ‘India’s Myanmar Policy

———. 2011. ‘Burma’s Balancing Acts with India and China’,

Malik, J. Mohan. 1994. ‘Sino-Indian Rivalry in Myanmar:

Mukhopadhaya, Gautam (Indian Ambassador to Myanmar),

Pandit, Rajat. 2013. ‘India to Step up Military Cooperation

Press Trust of India. 2014. ‘Sushma Swaraj Describes

Routray, Bibhu Prasad. 2011. ‘India–Myanmar Relations:

Sakhuja, Vijay. 2012. ‘India and Myanmar: Choices for Military

Sen, Gautam. 2013. ‘Cooperation between Indian and

Singh, Udai Bhanu. 2012. ‘An Assessment of Manmohan

The Sangai Express. 2013. ‘CM Assures Power Supply to

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