AGUSTIN vs.

IAC typhoon cause a portion of the lands of PR to be separated from the

estate by the current.
Facts: - PR retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred
Private respondents are occupying the western bank of the Cagayan by avulsion to the other side of the river.
River.
Petitioner Agustin occupies the eastern bank.

Through the years, Cagayan River has eroded lands of the eastern
bank among which is Petitioner’s Lot, depositing the alluvium as
accretion on the land possessed by one of the PRs.

After a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course and, in the
process, cut across the lands of the private respondents whose lands
were transferred on the eastern side of the river. To cultivate the lots,
they had to cross the river.

While the PRs were planting in their lots, the petitioners accompanied
by the mayor and some policemen, claimed the same lands as their
own and drove away the PRs from the premises.
- PRs filed separate complaints for recovery of their lots and its
accretions.

Issue: Who owns the land transferred on the eastern part of the river
after the flood?

Ruling:
Private respondents owned the accretion to their lands and it was not
lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan
River when it reverted to its old bed.

The accretion of the western bank of the River had been going on for
a period of 49 years, it was gradual and imperceptible.

Article 459 and 463 apply to this situation. And in this case, the
sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong
CUREG vs. IAC

Facts:
PR claimed to be entitled to the land, 3.5 hectares accretion attached
to their “motherland”. They alleged that when they were about to
cultivate their land together with its accretion, they were prevented
and threatened by petitioners from doing so. Their claim of
ownership over their motherland is anchored on tax declarations.

Petitioners answered that the motherland claimed by PR is non-

existent. That the land that they are claiming is actually an accretion
to their registered land and that they have been in possession of the
accretion for many years now.

Trial Court held that respondents, through his PIN had already
acquired an imperfect title to the subject land. IAC affirmed.

Issue: Who owns the land?

Ruling: It is the petitioner. The alleged “motherland” claimed by

respondents is nonexistent. The subject land is an alluvial deposit left
by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to
A457, it should belong to the petitioner.

However, the title of petitioners is only 4584 sqms and the accretion
to the said land is approximately 5.5 hectares.
- The increase in the area of P’s land, being an accretion left by
the change of course of the Cagayan River does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot
which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title.
- It must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens
System
VIAJAR vs. CA
Facts:
P Viajar bought a land from Sps. Te and they had the lot relocated
only to find out that the property was in possession of the
respondents. She demanded its return by Ladrido refused.
- Instituted an action for recovery of possession, contending
that pursuant to A457 must be construed to limit the
accretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land
to the riparian owners, and should not extend to registered
land.
- Since the lot in questioned remained to be registered in their
name, PRs cannot acquire title thereto in derogation to that of
the petitioners by accretion, for it will defeat the
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title
of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant
gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of
the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot No. 7511 due to
alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants
plowed and planted the same with corn and tobacco.
Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters becomes the
property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. Therefore,
the accretion to Lot No. 7511 which consists of Lots A and B belongs
to the defendants

Issue: WON the claim of Viajar is tenable?

Ruling: The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not
protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his
registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining
stream is well settled.
- Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land
bordering on running streams and are not affected by the
registration laws.

The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was
gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. In the case at bar, the
Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 a
gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot No. 7511 took place by
action of the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial
deposit of 29,912 square meters (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had
been added to Lot No. 7511.

The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot No.
7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period
VDA DE NAZARENO vs. IAC
Facts:
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land formed as a result of
sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the
banks of the Cagayan river.
- Private respondent Jose Salasalan leased the subject lots on
which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno,
petitioner's predecessor-ininterest. Thereafter, private
respondent allegedly stopped paying rentals.
- As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioner filed a case for
ejectment with the MTC which was ruled against private
respondent, which decision was affirmed by the RTC
Nazareno cause the approval by the BL of the survey plan with a view
to perfecting his title over the accretion area claimed by him. Before
the approved suvery plan could be released, it was protested by PR
before the BL.
- it was recommended that the survey plan in favor of Nazareno
be cancelled and that the PR be directed to file appropriate
public land applications
- RD of BL rendered a decision ordering the amendment of the
survey plan by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by
PRs.
Petitioners then filed a case seeking the annulment of the decision.
RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies which resulted in the finality of the decision of the RTC
dismissing the complaint. CA affirmed, contending that the approval
of the survey plans belong exclusively to the DL.
- Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land and
being an accretion to his titled property, A457 should apply.
Issue: WON the subject land belongs to petitioner?
Ruling: No. The BL classified the subject land as an accretion which
was formed by deposits of sawdust in the Balancas Creek and the
Cagayan River. Therefore, the accretion was man-made or artificial.
The subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by
the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. And
according to the ruling in Tiongco vs. DIL, where the land was not
formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river
bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and
deliberate intervention of man , it was deemed man-made accretion
and as such, part of public domain.
Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil
Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites. These are called
the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually
received from the effects of the current of waters.
It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such
boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and
imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current
of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of
Manila, 4 this Court held that the word "current" indicates the
participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due
to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first
and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim
the rights of a riparian owner.
 the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila
Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion,
which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of
NAVARRO vs. IAC claimant’s land which is adjacent to the river bank.

Facts:
PR Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a
parcel of land in Bataan. He claimed that this land is an accretion to
his property. East – Talisay; West – Bulacan; North – Manila Bay.
Talisay and Bulacan flow down towards Manila Bay and acts as
boundaries of the applicant’s registered land.
- Director of Lands opposed stating that PRs do not possess
sufficient title to the subj property, the same being a portion
of public domand.
- Navarro also filed an opposition to PRs application, stating
that the land has always been part of the PD and that he was a
lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by
virtue of a fishpond permit issued to him.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract
of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river,
and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water
the Manila Bay is – an arm of the sea.
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a
sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which
adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such,
the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that lands added
to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action
of the sea, form part of the public domain. Therefore, the land is part
of public domain.

Issue: WON the land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore

land? Or Was the land formed by the two rivers or by action of Manila
bay?

Ruling: The land should be considered as foreshore land.

First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern
boundary to be Manila Bay. Petitioners' land, therefore, used to
adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers
whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account for the
accretion on their land. Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies
now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay.
- If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or
both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should
have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and
western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on
Republic of the Philippines vs. Santos
Facts:
Respondent Santos applied for the registration of a lot, alleging
continuous and adverse possession of more than 10 years.
- Property was located in Paranaque City
- Alleged that the property had been formed through accretion
and had been in their j,o,n,p,c,a possession for more than 30
years.
City of Paranaque opposed the application, stating that it needed the
property for its flood control program.
- Property was within the legal easement of 20m from the river
bank
- Title could not be registered in favor of applicant for the
reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up
and had not resulted from accretion.
RTC granted application. CA affirmed.
The Republic submits that the application by both lower courts of
A457 was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondent’s
evidence did not establish accretion but instead drying up of the
Paranaque River.
Issue: WON A457 is applicable?
Ruling: No.
Respondents carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of
their application by a preponderance of evidence. However, they did
not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil
through the effects of the current of river had formed the lot.
- Instead, their evidence revealed that that property was dried
up river bed of Pque River.
Respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had
formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the
effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the
large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an
area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and
imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about
20 to 30 years. The only plausible explanation for the substantial
increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the
Parañaque River.
The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the
recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up
land did no equate to accretion, which was the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of the soil on the river banks through the
effects of current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and
was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian
owners had no legal right to claim ownership of the lot.
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil
Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to
the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives
to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the
abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the
land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after
paying their value), all river beds remain property of public dominion
and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously
declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable.
Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to
be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to
have acquired the property through prescription.
DACLISON vs. BAYTION
Facts:
Resp Baytion filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Pet Daclison.
- Alleged that he was a co-owner of a parcel of land
- He leased portions of the property to third persons
- Erected on the said property was a bldg which was divided
into seven units and one was leased to a certain Dela Cruz
who used it for her business of selling rocks, pebbles and
similar construction materials.
- When lease of Dela Cruz expired, Daclison and other persons
acting under her took possession of the portion occupied by
Dela Cruz without consent of Baytion.
- Since then, Daclison had been occupying the contested
protions and using it for his business of selling marble and
other materials without paying anything to Baytion.
Daclison insists that what is really in dispute is the filled-up portion
between the riprap, constructed by the government, and Baytion’s
property. Therefore it is outside Baytion’s property.
and not the exclusive result of the current from the creek adjacent to
his property. Baytion failed to prove the attendance of the
indispensable requirement that the deposit was due to the effect of
the current of the river or creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive work
of nature and not a result of human intervention.
Furthermore, the disputed property cannot also be considered an
improvement or accession under Article 445 of the New Civil Code. It
must be noted that Article 445 uses the adverb "thereon" which is
simply defined as "on the thing that has been mentioned." In other
words, the supposed improvement must be made, constructed or
introduced within or on the property and not outside so as to qualify
as an improvement contemplated 'by law. Otherwise, it would just be
very convenient for land owners to expand or widen their properties
in the guise of improvements.
Baytion, not being the owner of the contested portion, does not have
a better right to possess the same. In fact, in his initiatory pleading, he
never claimed to have been in prior possession of this piece of
property. His claim of ownership is without basis.

Baytion posits that although the property is outside the property

covered by his title, it forms and integral part of the property because
it is an accretion, and under the law, any accretion built thereon
belongs to him and his co-owners.

Issue: Who between the parties has a better right over this contested
portion between the land co-owned by Baytion and the constructed
riprap?

Ruling: Baytion does not have a better right over the contested
portion. Baytion’s contention that he owns that portion by reason of
accretion is misplaced. In the case at bench, this contested portion
cannot be considered an accretion under Article 457 on the New Civil
Code. To begin with, the land came about not by reason of a gradual
and imperceptible deposit. The deposits were artificial and man-made
DELOS REYES vs. KALIBO
Facts:
A lot was registered in the name of Jose Peralta’s sister, upon her
demise, Jose caused the registration of the same in his name,
- He divided the property into two, he sold one while the other
remained in his name.
In the meantime, allegedly through accretion, land was added to the
lot. Said area was occupied by Ambrocio Ignacio – Peralta’s tenant.
- Executed a quitclaim of real property in Jose’s favor.
When Jose died, Lot A (supposed area of accretion) was transferred
to his son Juanito Peralta. A TCT was issued for Lot A and the area of
accretion was apportioned and registered under tax decs in the
names of siblings Peralta.
Mayor of Kalibo sought to convert more or less 4H of said area of
accretion into a garbage dumpsite.
- Juanito, opposed said project
- Despite Peraltas’ opposition, Municipality continued the
project under the justification that the contested property is
actually part of public domain.
Peraltas filed a complaint for quieting of title over the two portions of
accretion declared in their name for taxation purposes.
ISSUE: WON the subject parcels of land are accretions or is it part of
public domain?
Ruling: In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the
property which is the subject matter of the action. While legal title
denotes registered ownership, equitable title means beneficial
ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest,
there is no cloud to be prevented or removed. Likewise, the plaintiff
must show that the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that
purportedly casts a cloud on their title is in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
It must be noted that the Peraltas, the petitioners in the instant case,
are not even registered owners of the area adjacent to the increment
claimed, much less of the subject parcels of land. Only the late Juanito
became the registered owner of Lot 2076-A, the lot next to the
supposed accretion. Assuming that the petitioners are Juanito's
rightful successors, they still did not register the subject increment
under their names. It is settled that an accretion does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot that
receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title.
- Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under
the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership
over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code; imprescriptibility of registered
land is provided in the registration law.
- Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act
does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms
and, thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third
parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed
under the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain
judicial procedures have been provided.
If at all, whatever rights the Peraltas derived from their predecessors-
in-interest respecting the area in question came only from the
quitclaim of real property executed by Ignacio in Jose's favor in 1955.
There is no concrete evidence showing any right of title on Ignacio's
part for him to be able to legally and validly cede the property to Jose.
What the quitclaim merely proves is that Ignacio had forfeited any
claim or interest over the accretion in Jose's favor. It is settled that
equitable title is defined as a title derived through a valid contract or
relation, and based on recognized equitable principles, or the right in
the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to
him. In order that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title, he
must show that the one from whom he derives his right had himself a
right to transfer.Considering the aforementioned facts, the plaintiffs
have neither legal nor equitable title over the contested property.

Moreover, even the character of the land subject of the quitclaim is

highly questionable. Ignacio, who was purportedly the first occupant
of the area in 1945 and who was also in the best position to describe
the lot, stated that "the said parcel of swampy land is an integral
expansion or continuity of the said Cadastral Lot No. 2076, formed by
a change of the shoreline of the Visayan Sea, which shoreline has
receded towards the North, thus, leaving the swampy or parcel of
land described in the immediately preceding paragraph which accrues
to the owner of said right of said Cadastral Lot No. 2076 (Torrens Title
No. 24435), Jose O. Peralta by right of lawful accretion or accession.”

Here, Ignacio characterized the land in question as swampy and its

increase in size as the effect of the change of the shoreline of the
Visayan Sea, and not through the gradual deposits of soil coming from
the river or the sea. Also, Baltazar Gerardo, the Officer-in-Charge of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
Bureau of Lands, found upon inspection in 1987 that the subject area
was predominantly composed of sand rather than soil.

Indubitably, the plaintiffs are merely successors who derived their

alleged right of ownership from tax declarations. But neither can they
validly rely on said tax declarations and the supposed actual, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property by
their predecessors-in-interest. Any person who claims ownership by
virtue of tax declarations must also prove that he has been in actual
possession of the property. Thus, proof that the property involved
had been declared for taxation purposes for a certain period of time,
does not constitute proof of possession, nor is it proof of ownership,
in the absence of the claimant's actual possession of said property. In
the case at bar, the Peraltas failed to adequately prove their
possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest.
HEIRS OF TAPPA vs. HEIRS OF BACUD
Facts:
Petitioner Sps Tappa filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession
against Resp Bacud.
- Alleged that they are the owners of the lot, having been issued an OCT
- Alleged that they inherited it from Delfin’s father (Lorenzo) and that they
were in o,c,n,e possession of the lot since time immemorial.
Resp Bacud claimed that the original owner of the lot was (Genaro), Lorenzo’s
father. Upon his death, it was passed on to Lorenzo and Irene who became ipso
facto co-owners of the property.
Lorenzo Heirs – Petitioners
Irene Heirs – Respondents
RTC ruled that the basic requirement of law on quieting of title was met thus
petitioners title is clear and unequivocal.
CA reversed and explained that respondents’ possession over the lot already
ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription.
- Noted that Sps Tappa acknowledged that they have not been. In
possession of the lot and that it is the resps that have been continuously
occupying portions of it.
Issue: WON the action for quieting of title should proper?
Ruling: No, it should fail for the lack of the 2 indispensable requisites.
From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an action to quiet title
to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Sps Tappa failed to meet these two requirements:
1. Spouses Tappa's claim of legal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free
patent and the certificate of title, OCT No. P-69103 issued in their name
cannot stand. The certificate of title indicates that it was issued by virtue of
Patent No. 021519-92-3194. We agree with the CA that at the time of the
application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become private land
by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by
respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of
the Public Land Act,which governs public patent applications.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and
void, and produces no legal effects whatsoever. Private ownership of land
as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered
possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants—is not
affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the
Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of
Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be
public in character and have passed to private ownership.
2. The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find
that; although an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which
allegedly casts cloud on Spouses Tappa's title, it was not shown to be in
fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights to the property.
A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract)
or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparendy
valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by
extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.
The 1963 Affidavit is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It
is dated and appears to be executed and signed by Delfin, his mother, and
sisters. It is also notarized by a public notary. It states that Genaro
originally owns the land described, and that one-half (1/2) of which is
actually owned by Irene as a co-heir. This is contrary to the claim of
Spouses Tappa that the property was solely Lorenzo's. Respondents' argue
that this affidavit evidences the title of their predecessor-in-interest over
Lot No. 3341 and effectively, theirs.
The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or
barred by extinctive prescription. The CA correctly found that Spouses
Tappa's claim of force and intimidation m the execution of the 1963
Affidavit was "unsubstantiated.” The CA pointed out that, "[a]side from the
testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was presented to prove the
claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving." Also, the
1963 Affidavit was duly notarized and, as such, is considered a public
document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and
due execution.
SPOUSES GALANG vs. SPOUSES REYES
Facts:
Resp Sps Reyes filed a case for annulment of OCT against Petitioner Sps
Galang
- Alleged that they have 2 properties separated by Magiman Creek
which later dried up when it changed its course and passed through
property A
o Prop A – subdivision Project
o Prop B - an adjoining property
- And that Sps Galang, by employing manipulation and fraud, were
able to obtain a title over the dried up creek bed,
Sps Galang denied that the land was part of a creek and countered that the
OCT was issued to them after they had complied with the free patent
requirements of the DENR.
- That prop B belonged to their PIN and that assuming that the creek
had indeed changed its course and passed through Prop A, Sps
Reyes had already claimed for themselves a portion of the dried
creek which adjoined and co-existed with their property.
Issue: WON the dried creek belong to Spouses Reyes?
Ruling: No. If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed
its course and passed through the property of the claimant, then, pursuant
to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of
course was automatically acquired by the claimant.
- Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact
of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it
must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without
artificial or man-made intervention.
- Thus, the claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove three key
elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1)
the old course of the creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3)
the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new
location by natural occurrence.
In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove
the old course, its natural abandonment and the new course. In the face of a
Torrens title issued by the government, which is presumed to have been
regularly issued, the evidence of the Reyeses was clearly wanting.
Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not suffice to convince the Court
to order the reconveyance of the property to them. This failure did not
escape the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General. Thus, it
commented:
In the case at bar, it is not clear whether or not the Marigman Creek dried-
up naturally back in 1980. Neither did private respondents submit any
findings or report from the Bureau of Lands or the DENR Regional Executive
Director, who has the jurisdiction over the subject lot, regarding the nature
of change in the course of the creek’s waters. Worse, what is
even uncertain in the present case is the exact location of the subject
matter of dispute. This is evident from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court which failed to specify which portion of the land is actually being
disputed by the contending parties.
The conflicting claims here are (1) the title of the Galangs issued by the
DENR, through the PENRO, and (2) the claim of the Reyeses, based on
unsubstantiated testimony, that the land in question is the former bed of a
dried up creek.
- As between these two claims, this Court is inclined to decide in
favor of the Galangs who hold a valid and subsisting title to the
property which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Court presumes to have been issued by the PENRO in the regular
performance of its official duty.
The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for
cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed,
but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, with mere
preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact
which must be proved
In this case, the allegations of fraud were never proven. There was no
evidence at all specifically showing actual fraud or misrepresentation. Thus,
the Court cannot sustain the findings of the CA
GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS vs. CABRAL
Facts:
Vincent Cabral was the original owner of a parcel of land in Bulacan covered
by a TCT.
- Land was placed under the coverage of PD 27 and three
emancipation patents were issued to Spouses Moraga
Cabral filed a complaint filed a complaint seeking the cancellation of the EP
on the ground that these were obtained through fraud and that the land is
not suitable for rice and corn production and has long been classified as
residential, commercial, by the Zoning Administrator.
PARAD denied the petition so Cabral appealed to the DARAB. While the
appeal was pending, Spouses Moraga subdivided one of the lots into 3
smaller lots, which they sold to Filcon. Subsequently, Filcon sold the 3 lots to
Green Acres. Except for an already cancelled annotation of REM, the titles
were free from any annotations, liens, notices, claims or encumbrances.
New titles were issued to Green Acres, which constructed a warehouse
building complex on the said lots.
In 2001, DARAB ordered the cancellation of the titles issued in the names of
Spouses Moraga and Filcon for having been illegally acquired. Green Acres
filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, claiming that the DARAB decision
casts a cloud on its titles. The case was dismissed. On appeal, the CA also
dismissed the appeal, holding that he only issue in an action to quiet title is
whether there is a cloud in a title to real property because of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or a proceeding that has a prima
facie appearance of validity and the DARAB decision does not fall within said
enumeration.
ISSUE: Is the DARAB decision a source of cloud that is susceptible to an
action for quieting of title?
HELD: YES. A cloud on title consists of (1) any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3)
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and
(4) may be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted.
As Green Acres correctly points out, the DARAB decision, a final one at that,
is both an "instrument" and a "record." Black’s Law Dictionary defines an
instrument as a document or writing which gives formal expression to a
legal act or agreement, for the purpose of creating, securing, modifying or
terminating a right. A record, on the other hand, is defined as a written
account of some act, court proceeding, transaction or instrument drawn up
under authority of law, by a proper officer, and designed to remain as a
memorial or permanent evidence of the matters to which it relates. It is
likewise a "claim" which is defined as a cause of action or a demand for
money or property since Cabral is asserting her right over the subject lots.
More importantly, it is a "proceeding" which is defined as a regular and
orderly progress in form of law including all possible steps in an action from
its commencement to the execution of judgment and may refer not only to
a complete remedy but also to a mere procedural step that is part of a
larger action or special proceeding.
Also, the DARAB decision is apparently valid and effective. It is a final
decision that has not been reversed, vacated or nullified. It is likewise
apparently effective and may be prejudicial to Green Acres’ titles since it
orders the cancellation of the titles of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon all
from which Green Acres derived its titles. However, as discussed above, it is
ineffective and unenforceable against Green Acres because Green Acres was
not properly impleaded in the DARAB proceedings nor was there any notice
of lis pendens annotated on the title of Filcon so as to serve notice to Green
Acres that the subject properties were under litigation. As such, Green Acres
is an innocent purchaser for value.
Furthermore, in the case of Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, this Court had the occasion to rule that one of the proper remedies
of a person who was not impleaded in the proceedings declaring null and
void the title from which his title to the property had been derived, is an
action for quieting title.
HEIRS OF POCDO vs ARSENIA AVILA and CHUA
Facts:
Pocdo began his occupation and claim on three lots that were eventually
surveyed in his name.
- These lots were the subject of a petition to reopen judicial
proceedings filed by the Heirs of Pocdo.
- Registration was issued in the names of petitioners but since the
decision was not implemented within 10 years, the heirs filed their
ancestral land claims with DENR
Polon Pocdo, heir of Pocdo Pool, ceded his rights over the three lots to
Pacifico Podco in exchange for a 1H lot.
- However, Pacifico entered into a contract with Pax and Yaranon
revoking the agreement with Polon
- The sqms where Polon’s house was located became part of the 1H
given to Pax and Yaranon in exchange for their services in the titling
of Pacifico’s lands.
Polon filed a complaint but this was settled by an amicable settlement
between Pacifico and Polon.
- Agreed that Polon would retain the 4875 sqm and Pacifico would
give the 5125 sqms (remaining portions of the 1H share of Polon)
Polon then authorized Resps to undertake the segregation of his 1H land in
accord with the settlement in exchange, Polon would award her 2000sqms.
- CENRO issued Avila a Cert of Exclusion from the Ancestral Land
Claim of the Heirs of Pocdo
However, the Heirs of Pocdo filed an affidavit of cancellation.
- Avila complained for the unlawful cancellation.
Regional Exec Director dismissed the affidavit of cancellation and recognized
the validity of the amicable settlement, catulagan and deed of waiver of
rights that were executed in favor of Avila.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, asserting that the case is not
limited to quieting of title since there are other issues not affected by the
DENR ruling, particularly the validity of the Waiver of Rights and the
Catulagan. Petitioners maintained that the DENR’s ruling that the disputed
property is public land did not preclude the court from taking cognizance of
the issues on who is entitled possession to the disputed property and
whether the questioned documents are valid and enforceable against
Pacifico and his heirs.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that
the DENR had already declared the disputed property as public land, which
the State, through the DENR, has the sole power to dispose. Thus, the claim
of petitioners to quiet title is not proper since they do not have title over the
disputed property. The trial court agreed with the DENR Secretary’s ruling
that petitioner may participate in the public bidding of the disputed
property if qualified under applicable rules.
ISSUE: Was the case for quieting of title properly dismissed in light of the
DENR Secretary’s ruling that the property was already declared public land?
HELD: Yes. In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for an
adjudication that a claim of title or interest in property adverse to the
claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to
remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable
claims or demands exist. Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the
two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the
plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of
any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity.
In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property,
allege that respondents are unlawfully claiming the disputed property by
using void documents. However, the records reveal that petitioners do not
have legal or equitable title over the disputed property, a public land within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation. Thus, the trial court had no other recourse
but to dismiss the case