Almagro vs.

Kwan, October 20, 2010

Facts:
This case involves a parcel of land registered in the name of spouses Kwan Chin and Zosima Sarana. Kwans are
the legitimate children of said spouses, who both died intestate and inherited the contended lot through
hereditary succession. In 1996, respondents filed with the MTC an action for recovery of possession and
damages against spouses Duran, spouses Vinalver, spouses Bati-on, spouses Deciar, spouses Palongpalong,
spouses Kiskis, spouses Pio and Encarnita, spouses Andres and Leonides, spouses George and Noela, spouses
Go, spouses Bangay, spouses Pachoro, spouses Cepriano and Elsa, spouses Remolano, spouses Miravalles,
Dronica, Lara, Orlina, Malahay and the PNP Agan-an, Negros Oriental. Subsequently, spouses Almagro
intervened as successors-in-interest of spouses Bangay.
During pre-trial, the parties agreed to refer the case to the Chief of the Land Management Services Division to
conduct a verification survey of the lot. When the PENRO personnel failed to conduct the verification survey,
the court and the parties designated Engr. Suasin as joint commissioner to do the task, who conducted the
verification and relocation survey of the lot in the presence of the parties, some of their lawyers, and the MTC
Clerk of Court. Thereafter, Engr. Suasin submitted a written report with the findings that a big portion of the lot
is submerged under the sea and only a small portion remain as dry land, on which some of the defendants have
constructed their houses inside the dry land while others have constructed outside or only a small portion of
their houses are on the said dry land.

MTC: dismissed the complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of the lot has become foreshore
land and should be returned to the public domain.; RTC: observed that the small portion referred to by Engr.
Suasin as dry land in his report actually remained dry even during high tide. Thus, the disputed remaining
portion of the lot is not foreshore land. Remand the case to MTC for the reception of further evidence to
determine who among the defendants-appellees are builders or possessors in good faith and who are not.; CA:
Affirmed and modified RTC’s decision. There is no longer a need to determine who among the petitioners are
builders in good faith or not considering that it has been established in the MTC that they knew all along that
the subject lot is a titled property.

Issue: whether the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is still private land or has become foreshore land which
forms part of the public domain. (PRIVATE)

Held:
Almagros contend that the disputed portion of the lot is already foreshore land and claimed that they have
foreshore lease permits from the DENR. However, this is merely lip service and not supported at all by concrete
evidence. No evidence was submitted to the MTC to show that they have been granted foreshore leases.

It is undisputed that the subject land is part of the lot registered in the name of the Kwans’ parents. It is a private
property covered by a Torrens Title and that Almagros should vacate the disputed property or make other
arrangements with respondents. Furthermore, from the report of Engr. Suasin, it can be clearly gleaned that the
contested land is the small portion of dry land of the lot. Even Engr. Suasin was adamant in stating that the
remaining portion of the lot is not foreshore because “it is already dry land” and is “away from the shoreline.”

The disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies
between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
The land's proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land. In this case, it
was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even during high tide. Indeed, all the evidence
supports the conclusion that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land but remains
private land owned by respondents.
Santos vs. Moreno (Secretary of Public Works and Communications), December 4, 1967
Facts:
The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned a vast track of marshland called Hacienda San Esteban,
administered and managed by the Ayala. From the year 1860 - 1924 Ayala devoted the hacienda to the planting
and cultivation of nipa palms from which it gathered "tuba." It operated a distillery plant to produce alcohol.
Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem. Ayala therefore dug which
facilitated the gathering of tuba and the guarding of the hacienda by security guards. By the gradual process of
erosion these canals acquired the characteristics and dimensions of rivers.

Ayala shifted to bangus culture. It converted the Hacienda to a web of fishponds. It cut down the nipa palms,
constructed dikes and closed the canals criss-crossing the hacienda. Ayala later sold a portion of Hacienda to
Santos who also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. Santos then closed and built dikes. The closing of
the man-made canals in the Hacienda drew complaints from residents of the surrounding communities.
Claiming that the closing of the canals caused floods during the rainy season, and that it deprived them of their
means of transportation and fishing grounds. Subsequently, Mayor Yambao opened the closed dikes.
Whereupon, Santos and said Mayor both filed civil cases.

The Secretary of Commerce and Communications conducted his own investigation and found that the 6 streams
closed by Santos were natural and navigable and were utilized by the public for transportation since time
immemorial, and ordered to demolish the dikes. However, he then declared the streams in question privately
owned because they were artificially constructed. The investigator of the Bureau of Public Works submitted his
report recommending the removal of the dikes and dams in question. The Secretary of Commerce and
Communications rendered his decision ordering Ayala to demolish the dikes and dams across the streams.
Days before the Secretary of Commerce and Communications rendered his aforementioned decision, Ayala
made representations with the Director of Public Works for a compromise agreement, offering to admit public
ownership of the creeks provided the rest of the streams were declared private.

Panopio submitted his report to the Director of Public Works recommending that some streams be declared
public and some private on the ground that they were originally dug by the hacienda owners, and recommended
to revoke the order of demolition of the 6 dikes. The municipality of Macabebe and the Zobel family executed
an agreement whereby they recognized the nature of the streams. Then Secretary of Justice issued an opinion
holding that the contract executed by the Zobel family and the municipality of Macabebe has no validity,
however, the streams in question remained closed.

In 1950, Congress enacted RA No. 2056. In 1958, Senator de la Rosa requested in writing the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications to proceed in pursuance of Republic Act No. 2056 against fishpond owners
in the province of Pampanga who have closed rivers and appropriated them as fishponds without color of title.

Issues: (1) Did Roman Santos exhaust administrative remedies? (2) Was venue properly laid? (3) Did the lower
court err in conducting a trial de novo of the case and in admitting evidence not presented during the
administrative proceeding? (4) Do the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain or to the owner
of Hacienda San Esteban according to law and the evidence submitted to the Department of Public Works and
Communications?

Held:
If said streams are public, then Republic Act 2056 applies; if private, then the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications can’t order demolition of the dikes and dams across them pursuant to his authority granted by
said law. The lower court held RA No. 2056 is constitutional but ruled that it was applied by respondents
unconstitutionally. Discussing now the applicability of Republic Act 2056, the same applies to two types of
bodies of water, namely, (1) public navigable rivers, streams, coastal waters, waters or waterways and (b) areas
declared as communal fishing grounds. The question therefore is: Are the streams in the Hacienda public and
navigable?

The agreement of Ayala and the Municipality of Macabebe which was approved by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications only in 1935, could not however bind the Government because the power of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to enter thereto had been suppressed by the Philippine
Legislature when it enacted Act 4175 in 1934.

As stated, the conclusion of the lower court that the streams in question were artificially made hence, private
ownership which is in accordance with the findings of Panopio as contained in his report, finds ample support
from the evidence presented and admitted in the administrative investigation.

We next consider the issue of whether the streams in question are public or private. Pursuant to the Spanish Law
of Waters of 1866, and the Spanish Civil Code, channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of estates
over which they flow. The channels of the streams in question which may be classified as creeks, belong to the
owners of the Hacienda. Canals constructed by private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively for
private use must be of private ownership.

The facts as then found by the Bureau of Public Work in the Macabebe case, do not support the factual premise
that the streams in question were used by the public "without the objection of the parties who dug" them. Hence,
it’s not applicable in here.

The case at bar should be differentiated from those cases where We held illegal the closing and/or appropriation
of rivers or streams by owners of estates through which they flow for purposes of converting them into
fishponds or other works. In those cases, the watercourses which were dammed were natural navigable streams
and used habitually by the public for a long time as a means of navigation. Consequently, they belong to the
public domain either as rivers or as property devoted to public use under Article 339 of the same Code.
Whereas, the streams involved in this case were artificially made and denoted to the exclusive use of the
hacienda owner.

The petition for the opening of Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Nigui, Pepangebunan, Nasi and
Bulacus was dismissed by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the case considered closed.
All the other streams, being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the hacienda owner and his
personnel, are declared of private ownership. Hence, the dams across them should not be ordered demolished as
public nuisances.

- The Secretary of Public Works and Communications being the alter ego of the President, his actions are
presumed to have implied sanction of the latter. Hence, an appeal from his decision to the President can
be dispensed with.
- Republic Act No. 2056 which provides for an expeditious administrative process to determine whether
or not a dam or dike should be declared a public nuisance and ordered demolished has already been held
as constitutional.
- The evidence adduced in the administrative proceedings show that the streams involved in this case,
except one, were originally man-made canals constructed by the former owners of Hacienda San
Esteban and that said streams were not held open for public use. Under Art. 339 of the old Civil Code,
canals constructed by the State and devoted to public use are of public ownership. Conversely, canals
constructed by private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively for private use must be of
private ownership. Hence, the dams across them should not be ordered demolished as public nuisances.
- Sapang Cansusu, being a natural stream and a continuation of the Cansusu River, admittedly a public
stream, belongs to the public domain. Its closure therefore by the predecessors of Roman Santos was
illegal.
Taleon vs. Sec. of Public Works, May 16, 1967

Facts:

Petitioner-appellant Taleon is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which she acquired from her co-
petitioner- Solis who had constructed therein man-made canals and fishpond dikes. In 1961, respondent-
appellee Tolentino wrote a letter-complaint to the Secretary of Public Works stating that several fishpond
operators/owners have built dams across and closed the Cabatan River, a public navigable stream, depriving her
and the residents therein of passageway, fishing ground and water supply. Taleon filed her answer denying the
existence of the alleged river and claiming that the dams were constructed inside her registered property and
that her water source was a man-made canal connected to the sea.

Secretary of Public Works rendered a decision finding that Taleon, et al were indeed obstructing the Cabatan
River, which used to pass inside their lands, with the dams they constructed thereon, and ordering their
demolition. Taleon elevated the case to the Office of the President, and said office affirmed the decision of
1961. In 1962, Taleon was informed by the District Engineer that her dams would be demolished upon orders of
the Executive Secretary, the administrative decision having become final and executory.

Issue: (1) WON the court a quo erred in dismissing the case without giving them a full trial, thereby depriving
them of the opportunity to prove that the alleged extension of the Cabatan River passing across their property is
but a depression and that the decision rendered by Secretary Moreno is genuine. (2) WON of Public Works has
no jurisdiction over the case, since the dams and the body of water in question were located inside registered
private property.

Held:

The Public Works Secretary under RA 2056 has the power to declare as a public navigable stream any alleged
bodies of water even inside titled properties. Such fact-finding power on his part was merely incidental to his
duly to clear all navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions hence, its grant did not constitute an unlawful
delegation of judicial power. The administrative finding that the alleged depression was really a part of the
navigable Cabatan River was supported by substantial evidence.

The alleged 2nd decision of the Secretary, its non-existence has been officially certified by the Chief of the
Records Division of the Department of Public Works, the official custodian. And even conceding jurisdiction,
the 2nd decision could still affect nothing since it was reversed by the ruling of the Office of the President,
which denied the motion to reconsider filed.

It is recognized that the trial court may dismiss a petition for certiorari even after an answer is filed upon a
motion to dismiss, where said petition is found to be patently without merit. But the court a quo did not
summarily dismiss the petition. It conducted a pre-trial conference and even ordered the records in the
administrative case to be elevated to it. Now the Rules of Court authorizes the trial court to render judgment on
the pleadings or a summary judgment, as justice may require, if at the pre-trial it finds that facts exist which
would warrant such judgment. All the necessary facts being already before the court a quo, no further trial was
required. Its decision rendered at that stage was therefore sanctioned by the Rules.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners-appellants. 
Hilario vs. City of Manila, April 27, 1967

Facts:

Dr. Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land. Upon his death, this property was inherited by his
son, Hilario, Jr. During the lifetime of Dr. Hilario, the estate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo
River. To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike was constructed on the northwestern
side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. However, a great flood occurred which
inundated the entire place. The river destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed and meandered
into the Hilario estate. The U.S. Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the premises and started extracting
soil, gravel and sand from the nearby areas the River. Consequently, a claim for damages was filed with the
U.S. War Department by Hilario. The U.S. Army paid. The plant’s operation was taken over by the City of
Manila.

Hilario filed his complaint to restrain the City from excavating and extracting gravel, sand and soil from his
property and that they solidarily pay damages. Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines who complained that the
disputed area was within the bed of the river so that Hilario should not only be enjoined from making
extractions therefrom but should also be ordered to pay the fees and penalties for the materials taken by him,
and Atty. Calalang who claimed that he was authorized by Hilario to extract materials from the disputed area
but this notwithstanding, the Provincial Treasurer collected from him a sand and gravel fee which would be an
illegal exaction if the disputed area turns out to be of private ownership were respectively allowed to join the
litigation as intervenors. Hilario amended his complaint, converting his claim to one purely for damages
directed against the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works for the cost of materials taken since 1949,
as well as those to be extracted therefrom until they stop their operations.

Issue: (1) When a river, leaving its old bed, changes its original course and opens a new one through private
property, would the new riverbanks lining said course be of public ownership also?

Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, the question should be determined in accordance
with the provisions of the old Civil Code and those of the Law of Waters of 1866.

Held:

All riverbanks are of public ownership — including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and opens a
new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of the old Civil Code is very clear: Property of public ownership
is —That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;

Moreover, the riverbank is part of the riverbed as per Law of Waters. Since rivers are of public ownership, it is
implicit that all the running water, bed, and bank be of the same nature also. By the Law of Waters, riverbanks
became of public ownership. But this law, while expressly repealing all prior inconsistent laws, left undisturbed
all vested rights then existing. This was perhaps the reconciliation effected between the private ownership of the
banks, and the policy of the law to devote all banks to public use. The easement would preserve the private
ownership of the banks and still effectuate the policy of the law. So, the easement in Art. 73 only recognized
and preserved existing privately owned banks; it did not authorize future private appropriation of riverbanks.
We are not declaring that the entire channel, i.e., all that space between the "secondary bank" line and the
"primary bank" line, has permanently become part of the riverbed. What We are only holding is that at the time
the defendants made their extractions, the excavations were within the confines of the riverbanks then.

Secondly, it is not correct to say that plaintiff would be deprived of his property without any compensation at
all. Under Art. 370 of the old Civil Code, the abandoned bed of the old river belongs to the riparian owners
either fully or in part with the other riparian owners. And had the change occurred under the Civil, Hilario
would even be entitled to all of the old bed in proportion to the area he has lost. The City can’t be accused of
unjustly profiting at plaintiff's expense. They were not responsible for the shifting of the River. It was due to
natural causes for which no one can be blamed.
Another judgment is hereby entered as follows: (1) Defendants City of Manila and the Director of Public Works
and his agents and employees are hereby absolved from liability to plaintiff since they did not extract materials
from plaintiff's property but from the public domain. (2) All that portion within the strip of land in question,
starting from the line running parallel to the western waterline of the river and twenty meters east from the
camachile tree in the New Accretion Area, and going to the west up to the western boundaries of the Hilario
estate, is hereby declared as not part of the public domain and confirmed as part of Hilario’s private property.

Martinez vs. CA, April 29, 1974

Facts:
Spouses Martinez, now petitioners-appellees, are the registered owners of 2 parcels of land, both are fishponds.
The property involved in the instant case is the 2nd parcel. The disputed property was originally owned by
Montemayor, who secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883, and passed it to his successors-in-interest,
who in turn, sold it to Garcia. Because Garcia was prevented by the then municipal president, from restoring the
dikes constructed on the contested property, the former filed a civil case against Beltran to restrain the latter in
his official capacity from molesting him in the possession of said 2nd parcel, the dikes around the property in
question remained closed until a portion thereof was again opened just before the Pacific War. In 1925, Garcia
applied for the registration of both parcels of land in his name which was granted by the CFI. These parcels of
land were subsequently bought by Cruz de Dios. Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands
until eventually they were acquired by spouses Martinez.
The parties agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on Rivers and Streams and it declared that the 2 nd parcel
was not a public river but a private fishpond owned by the spouses. The municipal officials refused to recognize
the decision, and spouses Martinez instituted a civil case to stop the former from molesting them in their
possession of their property and in the construction of the dikes therein. While it was still pending, then
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, ordered another investigation of the said parcel of land,
directing the spouses to remove the dikes they had constructed, by virtue of RA 2056.
Issue: WON the spouses are purchasers for value and in good faith of the parcel of land alleged to be a public
river. NO
Held:
In Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, this Court held: A simple possession of a certificate of title under the
Torrens system does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a
person obtains title under the Torrens system which includes by mistake or oversight, lands which can’t be
registered under the Torrens system, he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the
land illegally included.
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable
rivers which are parts of the public domain, and can’t validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a
private applicant. The right of reconveyance to the State of the public properties fraudulently registered and
which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.
When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works & Communications to
order the removal to navigation along a public river has been definitely settled and is no longer open to
question.
The evidence submitted shows that Lot No. 2 is a river of the public domain. It is a branch of the main river that
has been covered with water since time immemorial and, therefore, part of the public domain, which is not
capable of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription.
There is no weight in the spouses’ argument that, being a purchaser for value and in good faith of Lot No. 2, the
nullification of its registration would be contrary to the law and to the applicable decisions of the SC as it would
destroy the stability of the title which is the core of the system of registration. Spouses can’t be deemed
purchasers for value and in good faith since before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that they
didn’t know exactly the condition of the land that they were buying and the obstacles or restrictions thereon that
may be put up by the government in connection with their project of converting Lot No. 2 in question into a
fishpond.
Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, March 31, 1915

Facts:

The provincial fiscal of Cavite, representing the municipality, filed a complaint in the CFI alleging that the
municipal corporation is the successor to the rights said entity had under the late Spanish government, and
which had exclusive control and administration over the streets, lanes, plazas, and public places of the
municipality. Rojas, by virtue of a lease secured from the municipality, occupy a parcel of land in area that
forms part of the public plaza, belonging to the municipality, constructing thereon a house. Rojas were
obligated to vacate the leased land for their occupation is ultra vires and therefore ipso facto null and void, for
the said land is an integral portion of a public plaza of public domain and use, and the municipal council has
never had any authority to withdraw it from public use, and to lease it to a private party.

Issue: WON the lease agreement between the parties was valid. NO

Held:

By section 3 of the said Act No. 1039, the Philippine Commission granted to the municipality of Cavite all the
land included in the tract called Plaza Soledad. According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public
use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and
public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces." The
said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907
withdraw from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of Rojas. In leasing a portion
of said plaza to Rojas for private use the municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by
executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.

Everything which is not outside he commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are
outside of this commerce Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract whereby the municipality of Cavite
leased to Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect, because it is contrary to
the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract.

Since the said lease is null and void in accordance with the provisions of article 1303 of the Civil Code Rojas
must restore and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality of Cavite, which
in its turn must restore to the said Rojas all the sums it may have received from her in the nature of rentals just
as soon as he restores the land improperly leased. For the same reasons as have been set forth, and as said
contract is null and void in its origin, it can produce no effect and consequently the defendant is not entitled to
claim that the municipality indemnity her for the damages she may suffer by the removal of her house from the
said land.
Republic vs. Reyes, June 18, 1976

Facts:

In 1972, private respondent Palatino filed with the RTC an application for registration of title under the Land
Registration Law of a parcel of land; A notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the Commissioner of Land
Registration; RTC issued an order of general default against all persons, including the Director of Lands, for the
failure of anyone to appear and oppose the application; Notice of this order of general default was received by
petitioners in 1973; RTC then issued its decision granting the application for registration.

Republic filed with the trial court a motion to life order of general default and for reconsideration of the order
on the ground that the original record of the case was not forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General,
which prevented him from investigating all the facts alleged in the application and that the order adjudicating
the lot applied for by the Palatino, is without basis in fact because the applicant could not have possessed the
land applied for at least 30 years immediately preceding the application for the reason that the land was
originally part of the United States Military Reservation reserved by the then Governor General and it was only
in 1967 that the President declared the land applied for are classified as alienable and disposable. Republic
assailed that RTC erred in ruling that the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is
registrable, and in not granting the government the opportunity to prove that the land applied for was
inalienable.
Issue: whether or not an appeal had been perfected on time by the Republic. NO

Held:

Certain essential requisites of procedural law were not complied with by the Repblic. There was a failure to
perfect an appeal and consequently this failure had the effect of rendering final and executory the judgment or
final order of the trial court.

As clearly and unambiguously declared by this Court in the past, the judgment rendered in a land registration
case becomes final upon the expiration of 30 days to be counted from the date on which the interested party has
received notice of the decision. The decision granting the registration of the parcel of land applied for by
Palatino, having become final and executory, there now remains only the issuance of the decree and the
certificate of title over the property. Thus, following its time-honored dictum: After a decision has become final,
the prevailing party becomes entitled as a matter of right to its execution; that it becomes merely the ministerial
duty of the court to issue the writ of execution. 

Despite, however, this harsh stricture of our law which had worked against the State and had caused the loss of
portions of the national patrimony to those who may not in equity be entitled to a grant thereof, the State is not
without remedy in recovering of inalienable public lands unduly ordered registered. This is based on the
premise that our Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title to land only. It was
not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land, much less title to lands of the public
domain. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have over the land. Where
the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he can’t acquire one under the Torrens
System of registration.

In such action for reversion, Republic may perhaps be permitted to raise the question belatedly sought to be
raised herein that Palatino was not possessed of registerable title, on the strength of their allegation that the lot,
alleged to be the same lot finally awarded by the RTC to Palatino, is part of the Mariveles Military Reservation
and that this area had been declared as disposable and alienable land of the public domain by Presidential
Proclamation No. 210-B. Should petitioners duly establish by competent evidence these allegations, they may
then raise the crucial question whether Palatino and his predecessors-in-interest may be deemed to have validly
and legally commenced occupation of the land and physically occupied the same for 30 years or more to entitle
them to registration under the Public Land Act.Such questions as may be raised by the Republic in a separate
case of reversion are of course understood to be subject to such counter-evidence and defenses as the Palatino
may properly put up including res judicata where applicable.

Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, August 12, 1911

Facts:

In 1907, the Attorney-General filed a written complaint in the CFI against the firm of Aldecoa & Co., alleging
that Aldecoa, a mercantile copartnership, continues to operate knowing that it had no title or right to 2 adjoining
parcels of land, which belong to the domain and administration of the Government of US. They’ve been
occupying them illegally for the past 17 years, retaining wall, a pier or wharf, a railway, and warehouses for the
storage of coal, for its exclusive use and benefit; that these lands belonged to the late Spanish Government and
are now the property of the Government of US and were placed under the control of the Insular Government, by
virtue of the treaty of Paris; Aldecoa has been requested repeatedly by the Attorney-General, in representation
of the Insular Government, to recognize the latter's right of dominion over the same and to deliver to it the said
property. Aldecoa agreed to return the land, but after several delays, it concluded by persisting in its attempt
illegally to continue occupying the said land and refused to return it to the Insular Government.

It was likewise proved that nearly all the land in question was low land and swampy in certain places, with
aquatic bushes growing upon it; that it had been gradually raised by the action of the sea. The retaining wall
erected to prevent the sea water from reaching the said warehouse, contributed in a large measure toward raising
the level of the land. It is incontrovertible that the land in question is of the public domain and belongs to the
State.

Aldecoa endeavored to prove that the 2 lands, belonged to them in fee simple, on account of their having begun
to occupy it through a verbal permit from the then politico-military governor. However, Aldecoa didn’t obtain
permission from the Government to establish themselves there and erect thereon their buildings and works, nor
did they endeavor to obtain any title of ownership to the said land.

Issue: WON the subject lands are of public domain for purposes of public utility? YES

Held:

The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant
has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain a part of the public domain and are for public
uses, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the State, such lands, thrown up by the action of the
sea, and the shores adjacent thereto, are not susceptible of prescription, inasmuch as, being dedicated to the
public uses, they are not subject of commerce among men.

The occupation of any land formed upon the shore by accretions deposits occasioned by the sea, where the
occupant is a private person and holds without previous permission from the Government is illegal and amounts
to nothing more than a mere detainer of the land, which is out of the sphere of the commerce of men. The record
does not disclose that Aldecoa obtained from the Spanish Government the requisite authorization legally to
occupy the said 2 parcels of land; wherefore, the possession which the allege they hold is a mere detainer that
can merit from the law no protection such as is afforded only to the person legally in possession.

The land in question, together with the shore of which it forms a part, is not, comprised within the provisions of
Act No. 926, for the reason that it can’t be deemed to be agricultural public lands, nor mangrove-swamp land,
as the record shows it to have been proven, that the disputed property is land which was reclaimed from the sea
through accretions produced by the action of the water upon a high part of the shore, and is, therefore, land
intended for public uses. Under no consideration could the land herein concerned be classed as agricultural land
susceptible of appropriation, and as such form the basis for the allegation of the possession of an imperfect or
prescriptive title thereto, because, so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved
for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express
authorization granted in due form by a competent authority.

However, on the supposition that Aldecoa began to occupy the said land and shore after first obtaining verbal
permission from a politico-military governor, it is right to hold that it acted in good faith, and under such a
supposition, the provisions of article 361 of the Civil Code must be complied with.

Municipality of Tigbauan vs. Director of Lands, December 16, 1916

Facts:

In representation of the municipal corporation of Tigbauan, its president applied for the registration in the
property registry of a tract of land composing of 7 parcels described in the application. The application was
based on the claim that the municipality had acquired the land by continuous possession since time immemorial,
and was opposed by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, in so far as concerned the registration of the parcels
Nos. 1, 6, and 7, on the ground that the first of these was a public square in the public use of said municipality,
and that the other 2 were property of the Government of US under the control and administration of the
Philippines.

The applicant withdrew in favor of the Insular Government its application for the registration of the parcel No.
1, but maintained its claim with respect to the other 2 parcels.

Issue:WON said parcels are public or government lands. YES

Held:

It was not established in the record that this land had been granted by the Government to the municipality to
form a part of its municipal assets or estate; nor that there was erected thereon any building belonging to the
municipality and intended for public service; nor that the Municipality had used these parcels for recognized
public purposes. Therefore, under the rule laid down by this Supreme Court, it is evident that the applicant
municipality can’t be held to be the owner of said 2 parcels of land or to be entitled to enter them in its name in
the property registry.

The mere facts that during many years the municipality has been cutting can from the cane brakes which have
been growing on said 2 parcels land from the time of the Spanish Government, and the further fact that it is
subsequently planted thereon trees now yielding product, do not prove that the municipality is the owner of
these parcels, but only that it has been enjoying their usufruct, which does not give it the right to have them
entered as its own in the property registry.

As the property in question is agricultural land, aside from the possible presumption that the government might
have granted it to the applicant municipality to enable this latter to meet public needs, it can’t be understood,
that this corporation was accorded the benefits allowed by Act No. 926 and consequently neither may said
municipality, in order to obtain said title, allege the right of prescription provided for in the Code of Civil
Procedure, for Act No. 926 clearly prescribes that all persons claiming title to government lands who do come
not within the classes specified in the section 55 are excluded from the benefits of of said Act which comprises
these 2 sections.

On the other hand, pursuant to Act No. 648 of the Philippine Commission, the Governor-General is authorized
to reserve for public uses the public lands comprised within certain boundaries, whether they belong to the
Insular Government or to provincial or municipal governments. This provision unquestionably shows that the
municipalities cannot appropriate to themselves public or Government lands without a prior grant from the
Government and without reservation in the manner and by the procedure. It is also evident that municipalities
can’t acquire the ownership of public lands through prescription, as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure,
nor do they need to avail themselves of this means for acquiring the same.