MIAA vs.

CA, July 20, 2006

Facts:

Manila International Airport Authority operates NAIA Complex under MIAA Charter by administering the
land, improvements and equipment therein. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land
transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President.
In 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel issued an Opinion that the Local Government Code
withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of
Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already
due. In 2001, the City issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The
Mayor of the City threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay
the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA filed with CA an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with
prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to restrain the City from imposing real estate
tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. SC ordered the City to
cease and desist from selling at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings.
MIAA admits that the MIAA Charter has placed the title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in the name of
MIAA. However, MIAA points out that it cannot claim ownership over these properties since the real owner of
the Airport Lands and Buildings is the Republic and it is for the benefit of the general public. The Airport Lands
and Buildings are thus inalienable and are not subject to real estate tax by local governments. City invoked the
LGC, which expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of "government-owned and-controlled
corporations" upon its effectivity. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in LGC.
Thus, MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
Issue: whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax. If so exempt, then the
real estate tax assessments issued by the City, and all proceedings taken as per such assessments, are void. YES

Held:

I. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its

governmental functions and thus exempt from local taxation for it is not organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation.

II. The real properties of MIAA are of public dominion and owned by the Republic and thus exempt from
real estate tax. (Arts. 419, 420, 421, 422) They constitute a "port" constructed by the State and are devoted to
public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation.
The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove their character
as properties for public use for they are still "intended for public use" if anyone can use the road under the same
terms and conditions as the rest of the public. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and
Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Properties of public dominion are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Essential public services will stop if properties of
public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. Before MIAA can encumber the
Airport Lands and Buildings, the President must first withdraw these from public use, upon the
recommendation of the Sec. of Agriculture & Natural Resources.

MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic (Admin. Code) Only the President of the Republic can sign such
deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic.

The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was
not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was
merely to reorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous
body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings.

Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable. The term "ports constructed by the State" includes
airports and seaports. Whether intended for public use or public service, these are properties of public
dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic and
thus exempt from real estate tax under LGC.

We DECLARE the Airport Lands and Buildings of the MIAA EXEMPT from the real estate tax imposed by
the City of Parañaque. We declare VOID all the real estate tax assessments issued by the City, except for the
portions that the MIAA has leased to private parties. We also declare VOID the assailed auction sale, and all its
effects.

Sanchez vs. Municipality of Asingan, March 30, 1963

Facts:

The defendant municipality, appellee herein, is the owner of a land situated between the site of the municipal
school building and the provincial road. On that land Sanchez, with the implied consent of the municipality,
constructed temporary stores and buildings of light materials and rented it. When a new administration took
over, the municipal council passed a resolution notifying the occupants of the land that the same was needed for
certain public purposes, such as parking space, expansion of school grounds, widening of the road and waiting
area for pedestrians. Sanchezs were then advised to vacate. Instead of moving, Sanchez filed a petition for
prohibition to prevent the municipality from ejecting them from the land, with the alternative prayer that should
they be ejected, Municipality be ordered to reimburse to them the rents which they had paid.

Issue: Whether the land in question belongs to the Province and therefore, Municipality has no right to order
their ejectment. Whether Sanchez has the right to reimburse the rentals collected in case they should be ejected.
NO

Held:

The premise of the contention is incorrect, for the clear finding of the court a quo is that the said land is owned
by the Municipality. The additional statement by the court "that it is part of the broad shoulder of the provincial
road" does not make the land provincial property, such statement being merely descriptive of its location and
not indicative of its ownership.

It should be noted that in Rojas vs. Municipality of Cavite, while the property involved was clearly devoted to
public use, and outside the commerce of man, and could not under any circumstance have been the object of a
valid contract of lease, the land in question is patrimonial character, not being included in any of the categories
of municipal properties for public use enumerated in Article 424 of the Civil Code. There is indeed nothing in
the decision appealed from to show that the land was devoted to any of those purposes when Sanchez began
their occupancy. Consequently, the implied agreement of lease with them was not null and void, although
terminable upon the notice as Municipality herein elected to terminate it. Therefore, there is no ground on
which reimbursement of the rents may be ordered.

In any event, even granting that the land in question is for public use and therefore the municipality of Asingan
could not legally lease it to private parties, we see no justification for the stand maintained by Sanchez that after
having occupied said land and derived benefits therefrom they should still be entitled to recover what they have
paid as a condition for their ejectment. That would be to enrich them unduly to the prejudice of Municipality.
Besides, it may be said that when they built their temporary structures on the land with the latter's knowledge
and implied consent, they both treated it as municipal patrimonial property. Insofar as the rents already paid by
them are concerned, they are estopped from claiming otherwise in order to obtain a recovery.
Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, March 28, 1968

Facts:

Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of
the then Zamboanga Province. In 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality into
Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that: Buildings and properties which the province shall
abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General. The properties and buildings referred to consisted of
50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the Zamboanga City and covered individually by
Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province
was transferred to Dipolog. Subsequently, in 1948, Republic Act 286 was approved creating the municipality of
Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.

In 1952, RA 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into: Zamboanga del Norte and del Sur. As
to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the 2 new ones, Sec. 6 of that
law provided: Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the
province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.

The Auditor General then apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga. The
Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested
right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable
by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution conveying all the said 50 lots and
buildings thereon to Zamboanga City, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was
transferred to Dipolog.

The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to
25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga, and it was credited to the province of
Zamboanga del Norte. However, in 1961, RA 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39
by providing that: All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and
located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
Zamboanga. Consequently, the Secretary of Finance ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop
from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum taken from it
out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte.

Issue: WON Republic Act 3039 is valid. YES Which of 2 norms: that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under
the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties in question?

Held:

If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its
private capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be
deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. The capacity in which the property is held
is dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted.

The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424. All the properties in question, except the 2
lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga
province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered
patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service"
for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate
use by anyone.

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public;
the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and,
devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health.

In supporting jurisprudence, the following were ruled:(1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, “where

the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the
public school, the public market, or other necessary municipal building, we will, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, presume a grant from the States in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule
may be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes" (2) VIUDA DE TANTOCO V.
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO “ municipal properties necessary for governmental purposes are public in
nature.”(3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS  “a municipal lot which had always been devoted
to school purposes is one dedicated to public use and is not patrimonial property of a municipality.”

Hence, RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects a total of 24 lots which were held by the former Zamboanga
province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. Said lots
considered as public property.

Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots, the records do not disclose whether they were constructed
at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings must
have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that
provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own
expense,  it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds.
Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in
question. But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere accessories to
the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands. Moreover, said buildings,
though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed
of also by the provincial residents. The province then — and its successors-in-interest — are not really deprived
of the benefits thereof.

But RA 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26
remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for governmental purposes.
The fact that these are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the other
hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since registration
cannot convert public property to private. 

The classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art.
424 of the Civil Code is without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. For purpose of this article, the
principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws". Hence, the
classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over
the Civil Code classification in this particular case.

City’s claim that the Province and its predecessor-in-interest are "guilty of laches is without merit. Under
Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of the defunct Province arose only in 1949 after the
Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in question. Partial payments were affected subsequently and
it was only after the passage of RA 3039 in 1961 that the present controversy arose. It results then that
Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City the former's share in the 26 properties which are
patrimonial in nature. RA 3039 took effect only on 1961 after a partial payment had already been made. Since
the law did not provide for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed act. Hence, the amount
should be immediately returned by defendant City to province. The remaining balance, if any, in the amount of
province’s share in the 26 lots should then be paid by City in the same manner originally adopted by the
Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum.
Dream Village Neighborhood Ass. Vs. BCDA, July 24, 2013

The contended lot used to be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban which covers several parcels of land spread out
over Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay, and Parañaque. Maricaban was purchased by the USA early in the American
colonial period, to be converted into the military reservation. The US government later transferred 30 has. of
Maricaban to the Manila Railroad Company. Maricaban was later on ceded to the Philippine Republic

In 1957, President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from sale or settlement the tracts of land
within Fort Bonifacio, and reserving them for military purposes. In 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable, allowing the sale to the settlers
of home lots. In 1987, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 amending Proclamation No. 2476 by
limiting to Lots 1 and 2 the areas in Western Bicutan open for disposition.

In 1992, Bases Conversion and Development Authority was created to oversee the conversion of Clark and
Subic military reservations and their extension camps to productive civilian uses. Now charging the BCDA of
wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its members to summary demolition,
residents filed a letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek its assistance in the verification survey of the subject
property, which they claimed covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they have been occupying the
area for thirty (30) and have built their houses of sturdy materials thereon and introduced paved roads, drainage
and recreational and religious facilities. Dream Village asserts that the lot is alienable and disposable by virtue
of applicable law, and therefore patent applications by the occupants should be processed by the Land
Management Bureau.

COSLAP Ruling: resolved that Dream Village lies outside of BCDA, and particularly, and thus directed the
LMB of the DENR to process the applications of Dream Village’s members for sales patent, noting that in view
of the length of time that they "have been openly, continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property
in the concept of an owner, x x x they are qualified to apply for sales patent on their respective occupied lots
pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in relation to the provisions of the Public Land Act."

The COSLAP, on the other hand, maintained that Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 provides that it may assume
jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes in "other similar land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude," and the present case is one such problem.

Issue: Whether or not Dream Village holds title to lots in Fort Bonifacio. NO

Held:

The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio which has long been decided with finality in Samahan ng Masang
Pilipino sa Makati vs BCDA: “First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has
title and ownership over Fort Bonifacio. xxx”. This case has the same facts

The Supreme Court found that TCT No. 2288 had in fact been cancelled by a TCT in the name of the
Republic, which title was in turn cancelled in 1995 by TCTs in the name of the BCDA. The Court ruled
that the BCDA’s aforesaid titles over Fort Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and beyond question, since
TCT No. 61524 was cancelled in favor of BCDA pursuant to an explicit authority under R.A. No. 7227,
the legal basis for BCDA’s takeover and management of the subject lots.
Dream Village lies outside the area declared as alienable and disposable. Only Lots 1 and 2 are available for
disposition.

The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road was abandoned does not signify abandonment by the
government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then become alienable and disposable. They
remain under the title of the BCDA. While property of the State or any of its subdivisions patrimonial in
character may be the object of prescription, those “intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth” are considered property of public dominion and therefore not
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. 
Issue 2:
Whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by prescription.

Held 2:
No.  The area is not susceptible of acquisition by prescription.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted,
the subject military lands in Metro Manila became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that
the said lands did not thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that they
are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases in Clark and Subic. The
Court noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either “public service” or “the development of national
wealth” under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the public dominion,
albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a
private person as authorized by the BCDA law that they become private property and cease to be property of the
public dominion:

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there
is: (1) a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, (2) with an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive prescription can commence, the property
sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly
declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by
the State, the land remains to be property of public dominion.
The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the State,
because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth, in this case, for the conversion of military reservations in the country
to productive civilian uses.
Ownership of a land registered under a Torrens title cannot be lost by prescription or adverse
possession.  It is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.
Salas vs. Jarencio, August 30, 1972

Facts:

In 1919, the CFI, acting as a land registration court, rendered judgment in a Case, declaring Manila as the owner
in fee simple of a parcel of land, by which the Register of Deeds issued a new TCT. The City then sold portions
of the parcel of land in favor of Villanueva. Original TCT was cancelled and transfer certificates of title were
issued in favor of Villanueva for the portions purchased by her. When the last sale to Villanueva was affected,
another new TCT was issued. Later on, RA No. 4118 was promulgated

Deputy Yap of the Land Authority then addressed a letter to Mayor Villegas, furnishing him with a copy of the
proposed subdivision plan of said lot for resale of the subdivision lots by the Land Authority to bona fide
applicants. City Mayor approved and the Deputy then requested the City Treasurer for the surrender and
delivery to the former of the owner's duplicate of TCT in order to obtain title thereto in the name of the Land
Authority.

For unknown reasons, Mayor Villegas then just filed a petition to declare RA 4118 unconstitutional.

Issues: (1) Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila? (2) Is RA No. 4118
valid and not repugnant to the Constitution?

I.There is one outstanding factor that should be borne in mind in resolving the character of the land involved,
and it is that the City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown
by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property. It is true
that the City as well as its predecessor could validly acquire property in its corporate or private capacity,
following the accepted doctrine on the dual character — public and private — of a municipal corporation. And
when it acquires property in its private capacity, it acts like an ordinary person capable of entering into contracts
for the transmission of title or other real rights. When it comes to acquisition of land, it must have done so under
any of the modes established by law for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights. In the absence of a
title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or
corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality.
Originally the municipality owned no patrimonial property except those that were granted by the State not for
its public but for private use. Other properties it owns are acquired in the course of the exercise of its corporate
powers as a juridical entity to which category a municipal corporation pertains.

Communal lands came into existence when a town or pueblo was established in this country under the laws of
Spain. The municipalities of the Philippines were not entitled, as a matter of right, to any part of the public
domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct of a portion of the public
domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the Government for communal purposes, upon proper
petition, but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any event, the ultimate title
remained in the sovereign

It may be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a
municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is
held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary
purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after
all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being
but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation
is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use.

True it is that the legislative control over a municipal corporation is not absolute even when it comes to its
property devoted to public use, for such control must not be exercised to the extent of depriving persons of their
property or rights without due process of law, or in a manner impairing the obligations of contracts.
Nevertheless, when it comes to property of the municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate
capacity with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the
National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion.

The Congress has dealt with the land involved as one reserved for communal use (terreno comunal). The act of
classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power and it should not be
interfered with by the courts.

II. To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and
unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional
rights is allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns
or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done. That situation does not obtain in this case as the law assailed does
not in any manner trench upon the constitution as will hereafter be shown. Republic Act No. 4118 was intended
to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the Government program of "Land for the
Landless".
Ten Forty Realty & Dev. Corp. vs. Cruz

Facts:

A complaint for ejectment was filed by Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation against Cruz before the
MTCC which alleged that the former is the true and absolute owner of a parcel of lot and residential house
having acquired the same in 1996 from Galino by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale; the sale was acknowledged
by said Galino through a 'Katunayan'; payment of the capital gains tax for the transfer of the property was
evidenced by by the BIR; Ten Forty came to know that Galino sold the same property in 1998 to Cruz, who
immediately occupied the property and which occupation was merely tolerated by petitioner;

On the other hand, respondent answer with counterclaim that never was there an occasion when petitioner
occupied a portion of the premises. In addition, respondent alleges that said land was a public land (respondent
filed a miscellaneous sales application with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office) and the
action for ejectment cannot succeed where it appears that respondent had been in possession of the property
prior to the petitioner;

Issues: (a) WON the action filed by the petitioner was proper. NO (b) WON respondent is entitled to possession
de facto. YES

Held:

Cruz is the true owner of the land.

1) The action filed by Ten Forty, which was an action for “unlawful detainer”, is improper. As the bare
allegation of Ten Forty’s tolerance of Cruz’s occupation of the premises has not been proven, the possession
should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have
been for forcible entry. However, the action had already prescribed because the complaint was filed in 1999 – a
month after the last day for filing;
2) The subject property had not been delivered to Ten Forty; hence, it did not acquire possession either
materially or symbolically. The ownership of immovable property sold to 2 different buyers at different times is
governed by Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
As between the 2 buyers, Cruz was first in actual possession of the property. As regards the question of whether
there was good faith in the 2nd buyer, Ten Forty has not proven that Cruz was aware that her mode of acquiring
the property was defective at the time she acquired it from Galino. At the time, the property — which was
public land –had not been registered in the name of Galino; thus, Cruz relied on the tax declarations thereon. As
shown, the Galino’s name appeared on the tax declarations for the property until its sale to Cruz in 1998. Galino
was in fact occupying the realty when respondent took over possession. Thus, there was no circumstance that
could have placed the latter upon inquiry or required her to further investigate petitioner’s right of ownership.

- Execution of Deed of Sale is not sufficient as delivery. Ownership is transferred not by contract but by
delivery. Execution of a Deed of Sale is not a conclusive presumption of delivery of possession of a
piece of real estate. The execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of
delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected, because of a legal
impediment. Such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, was deemed negated by
the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.
- Private corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain, as provided under
Section 3 of Article XII of the Constitution. While corporations can’t acquire land of the public domain,
they can however acquire private land. However, Ten Forty has not presented proof that, at the time it
purchased the property from Galino, the property had ceased to be of the public domain and was already
private land. The established rule is that alienable and disposable land of the public domain held and
occupied by a possessor — personally or through predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously, and
exclusively for 30 years — is ipso jure converted to private property by the mere lapse of time.
Dela Cruz vs. CA

Facts:

In 1973, a residential lot was the subject of an application under the Land Registration Act by the Ramos
brothers. de la Cruz opposed. After trial, the application was dismissed on the ground that the land was not yet
reclassified and remains part of the forest reserve. The Ramos brothers pursued the reclassification of the land
and were subsequently awarded ownership of it. Villanueva, the private respondent, subsequently purchased the
same lot from the brothers. Upon learning of the said sale, dela Cruz filed a complaint for reconveyance
claiming to be the owner and actual possessor of the lot, having possessed and occupied it openly, publicly,
notoriously, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of an owner, for more than 30 years. Dela
cruz’s complaint was dismissed.

Issue: WON Dela Cruz is vested with a better right over the residential lot to which he possessed and devoted
time, effort and resources in fencing and cultivating the same. NO

Held:
Dela Cruz possessed and occupied the land after it was declared by the Government as part of the forest
zone. In fact, the land remained part of the forest reserve until such time that it was reclassified into alienable or
disposable land at the request of the Ramoses.
“A positive act of the Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest, and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for other purposes. Until such lands have been properly declared to be
available for other purposes, there is no disposable land to speak of. Absent the fact of declassification prior to
the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as
forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by prescription.”
Furthermore, Dela Cruz could not have acquired said land by prescription. Prescription can never lie against the
Government. The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by petitioner cannot be counted in his favor, as it
remained part of the patrimonial property of the State, which property, as stated earlier, is inalienable and
indisposable.
Under Article 1113 of the Civil Code:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription. 
Laluan vs. Malpaya

Facts:
In 1950, the Laluans,  Laguits  and Sorianos  filed with the CFI a complaint against Malpaya, Tambot and
Jasmin for recovery of ownership and possession of 2 parcels of land. Laluan seek a declaration that they are the
owners pro indiviso  of a parcel of Riceland and the owners pro indiviso of 1/2 of a parcel of riceland and
cornland. They base their claim on their alleged right to inherit, by legal succession, from Malpaya’s wife who
died intestate in 1948 and without any children.
The 1st parcel of land they allege as paraphernal property of the late Marciana Laluan. They claim that the
Malpaya, taking advantage of the senility of his wife, sold the land to Tambot, as evidenced by the “Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property” in 1948. The 2 nd parcel of land they allege as conjugal property of the spouses
Malpaya and Laluan, and charge that Malpaya, with right to sell only ½ thereof, sold the whole property, 4 days
after the death of his wife, to Tambot and Jasmin, as evidenced by the “Absolute Deed of Sale.
The respondents filed their answer, denying the allegations of the complaint and claiming that the parcels of
land belonged to the Malpaya as his exclusive property. Tambot and Jasmin further aver that Malpaya had the
“perfect legal right” to dispose of the said parcels of land and that they bought the properties in good faith,
unaware of any flaw in the title of their vendor.

Issue: Can Laluan, et.al recover ownership of the said land? NO

Held:
There arises the possibility that in the interim of 56 from the date of the deed of donation propter nuptias to the
date of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property", the parcels of land contiguous to those described in the
deed of donation passed in ownership from one hand to another, or changes in the man-made or natural
boundaries used to indicate the confines of the parcels set forth in the said document occurred. This could very
well explain the discrepancies between the names of the boundary owners of the piece of land described in the
"Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" and the names of the adjacent owners of the parcels subject of the
deed of donation as well as the absence of any mention of the payas and colos in the later "Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property." In addition, the variance between the location of the land described in the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property" and those of the parcels set forth in the deed of donation could reasonably be
due to the creation of new barrios in Pangasinan, or the alteration of the boundaries of the barrios therein.

However, the apparent difference between the area of the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property" and the areas of the parcels included in the deed of donation propter nuptias should be fully and
properly explained. The record shows that the petitioners neither offered nor attempted to offer any evidence
indicating that the land sold by the Malpaya to Tambot corresponds with any of the 3 parcels described in the
deed of donation. The petitioners failed to specify precisely which of the 3 parcels the subject of the deed of
donation is constitutes the very land delimited in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property."

All these give rise to a grave doubt as to the specific identity of one of the parcels of land in dispute which the
court a quo neither noticed nor considered notwithstanding the obvious fact that the location, area and
boundaries of the land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" do not coincide with those of
any of the parcels described in the deed of donation propter nuptias.
The invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an action to recover ownership, the
person who claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the property
claimed but also the identity thereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land he
claims.  And where doubt and uncertainty exist as to the identity of the land claimed, a court should resolve the
question by recourse to the pleadings and the record as well as to extrinsic evidence, oral or written. (In cases
of doubt as to the land’s identity, the court may conduct an investigation in the form of hearing or an ocular
inspection, or both, to enable it to know positively the land in litigation.)
Absent, therefore, any indicium in the record to show and identify with absolute certainty any of the 3 parcels of
land included in the deed of donation propter nuptias as the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property," the prudent course open obviously consists in an investigation by the court a quo, either in the
form of a hearing or an ocular inspection, or both, to enable it to know positively the land in litigation. If the
"Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" treats of a piece of land entirely different and distinct from the parcels
described in the deed of donation propter nuptias, and considering that the court a quo relied mainly on the said
deed of donation in declaring the land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" as the
paraphernal property of the late Laluan and in nullifying the latter document, then there exists sufficient ground
to remand the case to the court a quo for a new trial on the matter.

All contrary to the basic rule that in an action to recover, the person who claims that he has a better right to the
property must prove both ownership and identity Article 434 which states : “In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim.
Heirs of Clemente Ermac vs. Heirs of Vicente Ermac

Facts:
A lot was originally owned by Claudio and, after his death, was inherited by his children — Esteban, Balbina
and Pedro. Clemente registered the said Lot to his name alone without regards to the other predecessors-in-
interests. The Heirs of Vicente were able to prove consistently and corroboratively that they — as well as their
predecessors-in-interests — had been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession and occupation of the
land in the concept of owners.

According to the appellate court, “The fact that Clemente’s heirs have in their possession certificates of title
which apparently bear out that it Clemente alone who claimed the entire property described therein has no
discrediting effect upon Clemente’s heirs claim, it appearing that such titles were acquired in derogation of the
existing valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose title by succession were effectively disregarded.”

Issues: (a) Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the
property in the names of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest Spouses Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco.
YES (b) Whether or not laches has set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of the lot? NO
Held:
(a) YES. While tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may
constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient
for prescription. Considering that Vicente’s heirs have been in possession of the property for a long
period of time, there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional
evidence to support their claim of ownership.
(b) NO. Clemente’s heirs assert that the ownership claimed by Vicente’s heirs is barred by prescription and
laches because it took them 57 years to bring the present action. The Court disagreed. When a party uses
fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive trust is created in favor of
the defrauded party. Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as the original
owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente meant that the latter held the land in trust for
all the heirs of the former. Since Vicente’s heirs were in actual possession of the property, the action to
enforce the trust, and recover the property, and thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.

 Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be

used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice. Its application should not prevent the rightful owners
of a property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.

Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
German Management vs. CA, September 14, 1989

Facts:

Spouses Jose are the owners of the contended land. The land was originally registered in 1948 in the Register of
Deeds, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President under RA No. 141.

In 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing German Management Services to
develop their property into a residential subdivision. Consequently, German Management obtained
Development Permit from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Finding that part of the property
was occupied by Gernale and 20 other persons, German Management advised the occupants to vacate the
premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the development of the
subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by Gernale, et al.

Gernale, et al. filed an action for forcible entry against German Management before the MTC alleging that they
are mountainside farmers and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association and they were
deprived of their property without due process of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops
and property situated in the land.

Issue: (1) WON CA denied due process to German Management when it reversed the decision of the court a
quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer (2) WON private respondents are entitled to file
a forcible entry case against petitioner. YES

Although admittedly German Management may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible
entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.  Thus, a party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to
remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria. 

Gernale, et.al are entitled to file a forcible entry case. Since they were in actual possession of the property at the
time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, they have a right to commence an action for forcible entry
regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.

Gernale, et.al, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is
not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is
not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondents were in possession of the property
and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this
does not in any way justify their act of ―forcible entry. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition
of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has
the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better
right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property.
As clearly stated in Article 536- ―In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long
as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of
the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

Aneco Realty vs. Landex Development, July 28, 2008

Facts:
Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. is the original owner of a tract of land and it subdivided the land into
39 lots. It sold 22 lots to Aneco and the remaining 17 to Landex.
Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. To stop the construction, Aneco filed a
complaint for injunction with the RTC. Landex, in its Answer, alleged that Aneco was not deprived access to its
lots due to the construction of the concrete wall. Aneco has its own entrance to its property. The Resthaven
Street access, however, was rendered inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building on said street. Also,
Landex claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the express stipulation in
the deed of sale that FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own subdivision project.
RTC: The property in question never did exist as a subdivision, the limitations imposed by Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 440, that no portion of a subdivision road lot shall be closed without the approval of the Court
is clearly inappropriate to the case at bar. That plaintiff’s property is not isolated as it is bounded by Miller St.
and Resthaven St. Plaintiff could easily make an access to a public road within the bounds and limits of its
own property; and that the defendant has not yet been indemnified whatsoever for the use of his property, as
mandated by the Bill of rights. The foregoing circumstances, negates the alleged plaintiffs right of way.
CA: The subject property ceased to be a road lot when its former owner sold it to appellant  Aneco not as
subdivision lots and without the intention of pursuing the subdivision project.
 The law in point is Article 624 of the New Civil Code. This provision allows the continued use of an apparent
easement should the owner alienate the property to different persons. The easement that used to exist on the
subject lot ceased when appellant Aneco and the former owner agreed that the lots would be consolidated
and would no longer be intended as a subdivision project. Re compulsory easement of right of way: Aneco
failed to prove the essential requisites to avail such right:
The essential requisites are: 1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; 2) that proper indemnity has been paid; 3) that the isolation was not due to acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate; 4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest 
Issue: WON Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a concrete wall on its own property (W/N Aneco
should be given the right of way – NO)
Held: Court dismissed the complaint for injunction.
What is involved here is an undue interference on the property rights of a landowner to build a concrete wall on
his own property. It is a simple case of a neighbor, petitioner Aneco, seeking to restrain a landowner,
respondent Landex, from fencing his own land.
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by
means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership.
As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations and restrictions
provided by law. Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, as here, We will not interfere with the
exercise of an essential attribute of ownership.
Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at the time of the
sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI. If Aneco wants to transform its own lots
into a subdivision project, it must make its own provision for road lots.
Petition denied, decision affirmed.
THIS is a simple case of a neighbor seeking to restrain the landowner from fencing his own property.  The right
to fence flows from the right of ownership. Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, We will not unduly
restrain the landowner from exercising an inherent proprietary right.
Jacinto vs. Director of Lands

Facts:
During the period from 1911 to 1913, sales certificates were issued by the Bureau of Lands to Carpenter for
more than 100 lots of the Tala and Piedad Friar Lands states. The total area of the land covered by the sales
certificates being over 1,490 hectares and the purchase price amounting to about P56,600, of which amount
Carpenter up to the year 1923, had paid in installments the sum of P16,272.

Under a judgment rendered against Carpenter in the CFI (execution was levied upon all of his right, title and
interest in the lots purchased together with the improvements thereon, and on 1923, the sheriff of Rizal sold the
property to Jacinto. The sheriff’s sale was registered in the Bureau of Lands, assignments of the Bureau of
Lands’ sales certificates were duly recorded, and certificates of assignment were issued and delivered to Jacinto
in 1924.

In 1925, the Metropolitan Water District instituted proceedings in the CFI Rizal for the condemnation of certain
parcels of land in Caloocan for the construction of an earth dam and a first-class highway 3 kilometers long, in
connection with the so-called Angat Water Works Project.

The lots included in the land sought to be expropriated and Jacinto was made a party defendant in the
proceedings. Nicanor demanded indemnity for the expropriation. As the actual purchase price to be paid by the
purchaser from the Government only amounts to P13,725, including interest, the Metropolitan Water District
considered Jacinto’s demand excessive and declined to pay the claim.

The applicant tendered payment to the Director of Lands of the sum of P4,650 to cover the remaining balance of
the sales price of the lots in question and demanded a corresponding deed of conveyance for said lots. The
Director of Lands, upon the advice of the Attorney-General, rejected the tender and refused to execute and
deliver the instrument of conveyance demanded from him. Applicant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to
compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the applicant for the lots enumerated
belonging to the Tala Friar Lands Estate.

Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to conveyance of the land through mandamus. NO

Held:

The Supreme Court ordered the Director of Lands to receive the balance of the purchase money for any or all
of the lots in question if and when payment thereof is tendered by Jacinto, and denied the petition as to the
execution of deeds of conveyance; without costs.

Petition for a writ of mandamus not proper remedy to compel a conveyance as it involves purely contract
rights. The writ cannot issue in the present case unless it appears that the Director of Lands “unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station.”

The land in question is private or patrimonial property of the Philippine Government and we can find no law
specially enjoining upon the Director of Lands the duty to execute deeds of conveyance to purchasers of such
lands; on the contrary, that duty, under section 567 of the Administrative Code, appears to devolve upon the
Governor-General.
Moreover, by section 14 of Act No. 1120 the Director of Lands is charged with the duty of receiving the
purchase money payable under that Act and may therefore be compelled by mandamus to receive, as a purely
ministerial act, such purchase money when tendered.

-The accused friar lands, to which the government of the Philippines holds title, are not public lands but private
or patrimonial property of the government.

City of Manila vs. Garcia, February 21, 1967

Facts:

Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendants
occupied the property and built their houses. Having discovered, plaintiff through its mayor gave each
defendant written permits, each labeled as “lease contract” to occupy specific areas. For their occupancy,
defendants were charged nominal rentals.

Sometime in 1961, The City of Manila, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their rentals and ordered
defendants to vacate the premises for the expansion of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.

Despite the demand, defendants refused to vacate the said property. Hence, this case was filed for recovery of
possession.

Issue: WON the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes. YES

Held:

The trial judge took judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 . The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires
all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.
Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for
the “construction of additional building” of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.

Defendants insistence that they have acquired the legal status of tenants is untenable.

They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of the
city. Their homes were erected without city permits. These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to
all, defendants are squatters

We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits, written or oral, to
defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void.

Moreover, the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises clearly hinder and impair the use
of that property for school purposes. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good.
The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount.

The houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. They shackle the hands of the
government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a
complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary
instruction".

The public nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the
aid of the courts.