CHAPTER

1
A TYPOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENTS

The centra l issue in the constitutional debate of the past twenty-

five years ha s bee n th e legitimac y of judicial revie w of consti -
tutional question s b y th e Unite d State s Suprem e Court . Thi s
issue is thought t o have been give n heightened attentio n owing
to th e Court' s historic decision i n Brown v . Board o f Education of
Topeka, Kansas 1 an d thereafte r t o hav e achieved statu s a s th e
question o f the hou r i n the lega l academy with Judge Learne d
Hand's Holme s Lecture s a t th e Harvar d La w School i n 1958. 2
Throughout th e sixtie s the activis m of th e Warre n Cour t kep t
the issu e of this legitimacy alive, and interes t wa s intensified by
the controversia l decisio n i n Ro e v . Wade 3 i n th e seventies . I
think i t i s fair t o sa y that th e questio n o f th e legitimac y of ju -
dicial revie w ha s claime d mor e discussio n an d mor e analysi s
than an y othe r issu e in constitutiona l law. This book i s an ex -
amination of the question of such legitimacy. It may strike some,
however, as going about an answer in a rather odd an d round -
about way.
For i t i s customary among essayists in constitutiona l la w to
address suc h question s i n on e o f tw o ways . Judges an d aca -
demic lawyer s ten d t o examin e th e event s surroundin g th e
adoption o f th e Constitution , it s homel y bu t interestin g text ,
the politica l relationship s th e Framer s were tryin g t o establis h

3
4 CONSTITUTIONA L FATE

and thos e they sought to make impossible,4 even sometimes what

the Cour t itsel f has sai d abou t it s own role. 5 And fro m a com-
petition amon g th e argument s arisin g from suc h examinations,
critics purpor t t o determin e th e prope r scop e fo r th e Court' s
role. On the basis of such arguments it has been artfull y argue d
that to legitimate the acts of Congress th e Court must have the
power o f review , since th e powe r t o affir m necessaril y predi -
cates th e powe r t o strik e down. 6 Elsewher e it ha s bee n note d
that part s o f th e text , fo r exampl e th e Supremac y Clause , au-
thorize the Court' s review of acts of the state legislatures. 7 Oth -
ers following a different reasoning hav e said that the legitimacy
of revie w is confirmed b y a study of discussion s a t th e Consti -
tutional Conventio n addressed to whether or not to include th e
justices o f th e Suprem e Cour t i n a Counci l of Revisio n whose
duty i t would have been t o review all laws before the y became
effective—since al l the arguments fo r an d agains t this proposa l
appear t o shar e th e assumptio n tha t th e court s wer e empow-
ered t o determin e th e constitutionalit y o f thos e law s the y en -
countered i n th e proces s o f decidin g cases. 8 Correspondenc e
among th e Framer s regardin g a Bil l o f Right s also appears t o
reflect thi s assumption.
Still other s hav e argue d tha t institutiona l features o f th e
Court arisin g fro m precisel y tha t insulatio n fro m politica l re -
action tha t i s ofte n though t t o mak e th e Cour t ill-suite d fo r
final review, actually fit the Cour t t o be the conservator o f con-
stitutional principles , th e developmen t an d preservatio n o f
which tak e place by means of judicial review.
These various argument s al l constitute on e sor t o f analysis
and com e mainl y from academi c lawyer s who ar e th e priestl y
critics and opening-nigh t reviewer s of the legal profession .
The secon d kin d of examination begins a little farther back.
Judicial revie w of legislativ e acts, it is said, is proper becaus e i t
is likelies t t o assur e just accommodations . Thi s i s so , o n on e
view of the matter , because th e terms of the origina l social con-
tract woul d inevitably be varied b y political majorities with th e
power t o d o so , s o tha t thes e majorities , and thei r agent s th e
legislatures, must be restrained i n the same way that courts must
often preven t th e coerciv e renegotiatio n o f contract s betwee n
private partie s o f unequal bargainin g power. 9 Bu t sinc e only a
A TYPOLOG Y O F CONSTITUTIONA L ARGUMENT S 5

long dead majority can be said to have originally agreed to such

a contract , th e ful l forc e o f thi s argumen t ca n perhap s b e
avoided.10 I t ma y instead b e offered, however , that court s ar e
the bes t fina l arbiter s o f th e sor t o f hypothetica l contrac t tha t
would b e agree d t o b y all citizens at an y tim e (i n ignoranc e o f
any particula r persona l advantage) , sinc e legislature s mus t re -
spond t o th e powerfu l an d t o shiftin g majoritie s withi n thei r
constituencies11 an d d o no t hav e t o justify thei r decision s b y
appeals t o the principle s of suc h a n "origina l contract." 12 This
argument depend s on the acceptance o f the idea that those rule s
one woul d hav e agree d t o withou t referenc e t o one' s ow n
position i n lif e do , i n fact , reflec t and wil l yiel d a conditio n o f
disinterested justice. Philosophica l argumen t o f thi s kin d fo r
judicial revie w wil l depen d o n a n assumptio n tha t th e Consti -
tution is , or ca n b e interprete d t o be , thi s sort o f origina l con -
tract. Thi s throw s u s bac k o n lega l argument . Thu s th e usua l
philosophical base s fo r judicial revie w take us only to the door-
step o f legitimacy , since i t must stil l b e show n tha t a particula r
use o f th e Constitutio n actualize s the rol e fo r whic h revie w is
justified.
And ye t legal argument—the analysis of the Constitutio n t o
which s o man y abl e mind s hav e devote d themselve s thi s las t
quarter century—canno t establis h independen t legitimac y fo r
judicial review , for it s debate s an d it s analyse s ar e conducte d
by mean s o f argument s tha t themselve s reflec t a commitmen t
to suc h legitimacy . S o althoug h a genera l theor y o f constitu -
tional law may appear to establish the legitimacy of certain kind s
of arguments—a s when a social contrac t theoris t migh t wis h t o
confine court s t o a textua l analysis of th e Constitution 13—it is
in fac t th e othe r wa y round. I t i s because w e are alread y com -
mitted t o the forc e o f an appea l t o text tha t suc h an argumen t
can b e used i n support o f a court's role. When on e argue s tha t
a court' s experienc e wit h parsin g documents , o r it s tim e fo r
reflection, o r it s relative insulation from politica l pressure , an d
so forth, fit it as an institutio n for th e tas k of assessing th e con -
stitutionality of legislation, one i s already committe d t o the vie w
that enforcin g rule s derive d fro m th e constitutiona l tex t i s the
legitimate task at hand .
In th e ensuin g page s therefor e I wil l no t tak e th e conven -
6 CONSTITUTIONA L FAT E

tional tack of raising arguments tha t appear to define the scop e

of legitimat e review . Instead, i n Boo k I , I wil l present a typol-
ogy o f th e kind s o f argument s on e find s i n judicial opinions ,
in hearings , an d i n briefs. Eac h kind of argument mus t be on e
with whic h eac h o f m y readers could agree , though eac h ma y
of course differ a s to its force .
In thi s task i t is not necessar y t o appea l t o rules . Yo u can-
not decide t o b e convince d b y any o f thes e arguments ; nor , o f
course, nee d yo u decide whethe r the y are convincing. There is
a legal grammar tha t we all share an d tha t we have all mastere d
prior t o our bein g abl e to ask what the reasons ar e fo r a cour t
having power t o review legislation.
If yo u doubt this , imagine fo r a moment som e o f the argu -
ments tha t wil l no t appea r i n thi s constitutional typology . On e
does no t se e counse l argue , no r a judge purpor t t o bas e hi s
decision, on arguments o f kinship; as for example, tha t a treaty
should b e hel d t o b e suprem e wit h respec t t o a state' s statut e
because th e judge's brother ha s a land tid e tha t would be vali-
dated thereby. No r does one hear overt religiou s argument s o r
appeals t o le t th e matte r b e decide d b y chance o r b y readin g
entrails. Thes e argument s an d a grea t man y other s ar e no t
part o f our lega l grammar , althoug h ther e have been societie s
and doubtles s are stil l societies within whose legal cultures such
arguments mak e sense.
This suggest s tha t argument s ar e conventions , tha t the y
could b e different, but tha t then w e would be different. This is
evident in Orwell's description o f the revolutionary whose house
is searche d withou t a warrant . "The y can' t d o thi s t o me, " h e
says. "I've go t m y rights. "
This point is not always appreciated. Indeed some commen -
tators ar e incline d t o ignor e th e significanc e of constitutiona l
argument altogether , as when a political scientis t boast s tha t h e
can predict th e vote divisions in Supreme Cour t case s and coolly
concludes tha t politica l bia s decides mos t cases . I t i s not rele -
vant fo r th e tim e bein g whethe r constitutiona l argument s de -
cide case s o r are the decisio n itself , b y which I mea n tha t the y
form th e structur e o f meanin g th e cas e ultimatel y achieves as
precedent. Wha t i s now importan t i s that th e Cour t hear s ar -
A TYPOLOG Y OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS /

guments, read s arguments , an d ultimatel y mus t writ e argu -

ments, all within certain conventions.
In Boo k I , I wil l explor e th e variou s types of constitutional
argument. I shal l begin b y saying that ther e are fiv e types . As
will becom e clear , thes e fiv e ar e reall y archetypes , sinc e many
arguments take on aspect s of more tha n one type . Eventually I
hope t o persuad e th e reade r tha t thes e fiv e type s ar e no t all
there are .
Historical argument i s argument tha t marshal s th e inten t o f
the draftsmen o f the Constitution an d th e people who adopted
the Constitution. 14 Such arguments begi n wit h assertions abou t
the controversies , th e attitudes , an d decision s o f th e perio d
during whic h th e particula r constitutiona l provision t o be con -
strued wa s proposed an d ratified .
The secon d archetyp e i s textual argument, argumen t tha t i s
drawn fro m a consideration o f th e presen t sens e o f th e word s
of th e provision . A t time s textua l argumen t i s confused wit h
historical argument, 15 whic h requires th e consideratio n o f evi-
dence extrinsi c t o the text . Th e thir d typ e of constitutional ar -
gument i s structural argument. Structura l argument s ar e claims
that a particula r principl e or practica l resul t is implicit in the
structures of government and th e relationships that are create d
by th e Constitutio n amon g citizen s an d governments . Th e
fourth typ e o f constitutiona l argument i s prudential argument.
Prudential argumen t i s self-conscious t o th e reviewin g institu-
tion and nee d no t treat th e merits of the particular controversy
(which itsel f ma y or ma y not b e constitutional), instead advanc-
ing particula r doctrine s accordin g t o th e practica l wisdo m of
using the court s in a particular way.
Finally, ther e i s doctrinal argument, argumen t tha t assert s
principles derived fro m preceden t o r from judicial or academic
commentary on precedent . On e wil l no t fin d i n the tex t o f th e
Constitution th e phrase s "two-tie r review " o r "origina l pack -
age" o r an y o f th e othe r necessar y an d ephemera l mode s o f
analysis b y whic h th e Constitutio n i s adapted t o th e commo n
law cas e method, ye t these doctrine s ar e ever y bit as potent a s
those phrase s originall y printed in Philadelphia.
To a n exploratio n o f these five types of argument—histori-
8 CONSTITUTIONA L FAT E

cal, textual , structural , prudential , an d doctrinal— I shal l de -

vote th e remainde r o f Boo k I . I t wil l becom e apparen t tha t
what i s usually calle d th e style o f a particula r judge, a s well a s
the ver y different notion s o f style in particular eras , ca n be ex-
plained a s a preference fo r on e typ e of argument ove r others.
My typolog y o f constitutiona l argument s i s not a complete
list, no r a lis t o f wholl y discret e items , nor th e onl y plausibl e
division o f constitutional arguments. The variou s arguments il-
lustrated ofte n wor k in combination. Som e example s fi t unde r
one headin g as well as another. Fo r example, the constitutional
argument tha t a particula r sor t o f questio n i s best suited t o b e
decided b y one institutio n of governmen t an d ill-suite d to an -
other, ma y i n som e case s b e though t o f equall y plausibl y as a
prudential argumen t or a structural one. Fo r that matter, struc-
tural argumen t itsel f contains a prudentia l componen t jus t a s
arguments o f any kind may be said t o be "doctrinal," sinc e th e
various approache s an d kind s of constitutiona l argument s ar e
embodied i n constitutional doctrines. A different typology might
surely be devised throug h som e sor t of recombination o f these
basic approaches, an d ther e ca n be no ultimate list because new
approaches wil l be developed throug h time .
 7
CHAPTER

ETHICAL ARGUMENT

Thus far , I hav e attempte d t o construc t a typolog y o f consti -

tutional argument s whos e existenc e I shoul d thin k fe w would
deny.1 I hav e briefl y discusse d som e o f th e power s an d short -
comings o f thes e arguments , argument s tha t ar e a s much ap -
proaches t o th e Constitutio n a s they are direction s fo r it s con-
struction.
I no w tur n t o one particula r sor t o f argumen t whos e very
status as a coherent conventio n woul d be perhaps controversial .
For reasons I wil l discuss later, I have called thi s approach "eth -
ical" argument. Fo r the momen t I wil l only try t o show that an
ethical approac h exists , that i t i s reflected i n th e U.S . Reports ,
and tha t it is often th e animatin g argumentative factor i n con -
stitutional decisionmaking . I wil l leav e fo r Boo k I I a fulle r
treatment tha t show s the prope r us e of ethica l arguments , ex -
amines th e sourc e o f thei r legitimacy , an d ask s whether thei r
proper us e woul d hel p justify particularl y difficul t an d other -
wise troublesome decisions .
Thus fa r I hav e discusse d th e followin g types o f constitu -
tional arguments: historical , textual, structural, prudential , an d
doctrinal. I f yo u were t o tak e a set of colored pencils , assig n a
separate colo r t o eac h o f th e kind s o f arguments , an d mar k
through passage s i n an opinion o f the Supreme Cour t decidin g

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94 CONSTITUTIONA L FAT E

a constitutiona l matter , yo u woul d probabl y hav e a multi -

colored picture when you finished. Judges are the artists of our
field, just a s la w professors ar e it s critics, and w e expect th e
creative judge to employ all the tools that are appropriate, ofte n
in combination , to achiev e a satisfyin g result . Furthermore , i n
a multi-membere d pane l whos e members ma y prefer differen t
constitutional approaches , th e negotiated documen t tha t wins a
majority may , naturally, reflect man y hues rather tha n the sin-
gle bright splas h one observes i n dissents.
If yo u eve r tak e u p m y suggestion an d tr y thi s spor t yo u
will sometime s fin d (leavin g aside th e statemen t o f fact s an d
sometimes th e jurisdictional statement ) tha t ther e i s neverthe-
less a patch of uncolored text. And yo u may also find that this
patch contain s expressions o f considerable passio n and convic-
tion, no t simpl y th e idlin g of th e judicial machiner y that on e
sometimes find s i n dictum . I t i s wit h thos e patche s tha t I a m
concerned here.
The clas s o f argument s tha t I wil l cal l ethica l argument s
reflects, lik e othe r constitutiona l arguments , a particula r ap -
proach t o constitutiona l adjudication. I wil l sugges t tha t such
arguments, like the others I have discussed, are especially suited
to certain of the Supreme Court's function s (an d those of other
principal constitutiona l deciders ) an d reflec t a particular com -
mitment regardin g th e ground s fo r th e legitimac y of judicial
review. I hope that I shall be able to convince you not only that
ethical argumen t shares thes e trait s wit h othe r type s of consti-
tutional argument , bu t tha t it does so from a perspectiv e suffi -
ciently coherent an d sufficientl y distinc t as to justify ou r count -
ing it as a separate kin d of argument .
By ethical argumen t I mean constitutional argument whose
force relie s o n a characterization o f American institutions an d
the rol e within them of th e America n people. It i s the charac-
ter, o r ethos, o f th e America n polity that is advanced i n ethical
argument as the source fro m whic h particular decision s derive .
Let me say at once that I am aware of som e of the difficul -
ties created by my choice of this particular name . As I shall use
the term , ethica l argument s ar e no t moral arguments . Ethical
constitutional argument s do not claim that a particular solutio n
is righ t o r wron g i n an y sens e large r tha n tha t th e solutio n
ETHICAL ARGUMEN T 9 5

comports with the sort of people we are and th e means w e have

chosen t o solve political and customary constitutional problems .
I migh t hav e chosen th e wor d 'ethological ' t o describe such
argument, bu t the cultural anthropologists have taken ove r tha t
word; o r I might have invented a word lik e 'ethetic' whic h bear s
a relationshi p t o 'ethos' muc h lik e that born e by the wor d 'pa -
thetic' t o th e wor d 'pathos. ' I migh t hav e especiall y done thi s
since 'pathetic ' ha s to d o wit h the idiosyncratic , persona l trait s
and thu s reflect s on e featur e o f illegitimat e judicial opinion s
which i s often confounde d wit h th e clas s o f argument s I a m
interested i n illuminating . In th e en d I decide d o n th e ter m
'ethical' largely because o f its etymological basis . Our word 'eth -
ical' come s fro m th e Gree k 7)01*6 9 (ethikos), whic h mean t "ex -
pressive o f character " when use d b y the tragedians . I t derive s
from th e ter m r}9o$ (ethos) whic h onc e mean t th e habits an d
character o f th e individual , and i s suggestive o f th e constitu -
tional derivation o f ethical arguments .
There is an almos t utter absence of the discussio n o f ethical
arguments as arguments i n the teachin g of constitutional law. Ei-
ther they are instea d regarde d as disreputable reflection s o f the
moral an d politica l position s o f th e judge wh o lack s sufficien t
willpower t o kee p the m properl y cabined o r the y are indulge d
by bot h th e cynica l and th e sentimenta l fo r bein g wha t "real"
judging i s all about, havin g little to d o wit h th e competitio n o f
arguments pe r se. Book I I wil l provid e a systemati c basis fro m
which t o criticiz e these positions , bu t fo r no w I a m concerne d
with thei r genera l effect , whic h ha s bee n t o encourag e disre -
gard fo r th e treatmen t o f ethical approaches a s legal, constitu -
tional arguments . Wit h respec t t o students , th e resul t o f thi s
has been profound . The y know that th e constitutional cases that
most engag e the m ar e no t decide d o n th e basis , for example ,
of whether th e Framer s though t tha t contraception b y pill could
be banned o r whethe r the word 'speech i n the Firs t Amendment
means, amon g othe r things , wearin g a shir t wit h a four-lette r
word o n it . Because the y know this Constitutional law may take
on a n unrea l aspect fo r the m o r ma y simply dissolve into polit-
ical science , a spher e fro m whic h civilize d la w has , I believe ,
long fled. Therefore I thin k tha t eve n th e mer e recognitio n o f
ethical argument s ma y have som e salutar y effect. T o tha t tas k
96 CONSTITUTIONA L FAT E

of observation—thoug h o f cours e n o observatio n o f thi s

kind i s not theory-laden— I shal l devote th e remainde r o f thi s
chapter.
Let u s begi n wit h som e recen t example s o f ethica l argu -
ment. I n Moore v . City o f East Cleveland, 2 th e Suprem e Cour t
confronted a n Ohi o zonin g ordinanc e tha t limite d occupancy
of a dwelling unit to member s o f a singl e family . Ine z Moore,
who wa s 63 years of age , live d in he r ow n home with he r so n
and tw o grandsons. On e grandso n was the child of the so n liv-
ing a t home . Th e othe r grandso n wa s the son' s nephew . She
was convicte d fo r th e crim e o f havin g faile d t o remov e th e
nephew a s a n "illega l occupant" a s define d b y th e Ohi o ordi -
nance which did no t permit collateral relations to share a home
within a certain area prescribe d b y the zoning code.
Precedent i n th e for m o f previou s cases sympathetic to th e
integrity o f th e family , ha d focuse d o n th e childbearin g an d
childrearing function s o f th e nuclear family , a s Justices Stewart
and Rehnquis t pointed out . A t th e sam e time, the recen t case
of Village o f Belle Terre v . Boraas* ha d uphel d a zonin g ordi -
nance that , i n restrictin g lan d uses , ha d exclude d group s o f
students, friends living together, an d unmarrie d groups lik e the
Moores that were not couples .
Nevertheless, a plurality of the Supreme Court struck down
the Ohi o statute . Justice Powel l read th e earlie r decision s no t
in term s o f thei r doctrina l consistency , that i s in term s o f th e
arguments and rationale s the y shared, but i n terms of the eth-
ical approac h t o constitutiona l questions that the y embodied .
Thus he wrote,
Our decision s establish that th e Constitutio n protects th e sanc-
tity o f th e famil y precisel y because the institutio n o f th e famil y
is deeply rooted i n this Nation's history and tradition. 4

Justice Powel l placed th e decisio n o n a n ethica l ground—on e

based o n th e America n ethos an d no t share d b y all cultures—
that values and utilize s extended kinship.

Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect fo r the bonds

uniting th e member s of th e nuclea r family . Th e traditio n o f
uncles, aunts , cousins , and especiall y grandparent s sharin g a
ETHICAL ARGUMEN T 9 7

household alon g wit h parent s an d childre n ha s root s equall y

venerable an d equall y deservin g o f constitutiona l recognition .
Over th e year s millions o f ou r citizen s hav e grow n u p i n just
such a n environment , and most , surely, have profited fro m it .
Even i f conditions of moder n societ y have brought abou t a de-
cline i n extende d famil y households , they have not erase d th e
accumulated wisdo m of civilization , gaine d ove r th e centurie s
and honore d throughou t ou r history , tha t support s a large r
conception o f th e family. 5
This i s a clea r and , t o m y mind , persuasiv e expositio n o f a n
ethical argument . A s a distinct approach i t not onl y enables u s
to dea l wit h precedent i n a way quite distinc t fro m tha t take n
by th e dissenters , bu t i t also establishes the opinio n a s a differ-
ent preceden t whe n understood i n light of the approach. Th e
value o f thi s characterizatio n ma y b e appreciate d whe n con -
trasted wit h mor e conventiona l analyses . Professor Tribe , fo r
example, i n hi s interesting an d usefu l treatise , i s forced t o re -
sort t o extraordinary doctrina l pyrotechnic s t o rationalize Moore
with Belle Terre. H e note s tha t Belle Terre involve d students wh o
did no t clai m "a n endurin g relationship " wit h on e another .
Consequently, Moore shoul d stan d fo r th e propositio n tha t
"governmental interferenc e wit h an y [enduring ] relationshi p
should b e invalidate d unles s compellingl y justified."6 W e ar e
then tol d tha t Belle Terre, "th e earlie r case, " canno t b e sai d t o
foreclose thi s position.7
I fea r that counsel who rely on thi s view ar e ap t t o be disil-
lusioned. Ther e i s nothing clearly discernible i n th e America n
ethos tha t relie s on th e valu e of endurin g relationship s gener -
ally, excep t possibl y magazine subscription s an d appeal s fro m
one's ol d college . I sugges t tha t i t i s because h e ha s electe d a
different constitutiona l approach tha n tha t take n b y the Cour t
that so able a reader as Professor Trib e is led to so profound a
misconstruction.
Is ethica l argumen t solel y a featur e o f th e curren t scene ?
Of course ther e will be fashions and preference s amon g styles ,
but i f th e Suprem e Cour t ter m tha t sa w Moore v . City o f East
Cleveland wa s th e firs t whos e decision s turne d o n ethica l ar -
gument, I woul d b e incline d t o doubt tha t th e approac h I am
describing i s o n a pa r wit h othe r constitutiona l approaches ;