Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Agenda 2019

Munir Akram is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn Newspaper on December 23, 2018.
Unlike its daunting domestic objectives, Pakistan’s external agenda, though
challenging, is fairly clear. And, although overstretched, Islamabad has the capacity
in its Foreign Service and the ‘security establishment’ to address this agenda.
Building the Pakistan-China strategic partnership: China has the strategic
motivation and financial, technological and weapons capabilities to help Pakistan
emerge as a militarily strong and economically dynamic state. The substance and
depth of the future strategic partnership will depend mainly on the ability of the
Pakistan government and its private sector to conceive and execute cooperative
projects and ventures with China. A special entity dedicated to timely and efficient
implementation of CPEC could be decisive in realising its full potential.
Managing Sino-US rivalry: The Trump administration has designated China as
a strategic competitor and opposes China’s Belt and Road Initiative including its
flagship, CPEC. The US diplomatic and media onslaught against China and CPEC
has intensified. In fact, China’s investment and infrastructure building can help
stabilise the entire South Asian region including Afghanistan. With growing
indications that Donald Trump wants a hurried withdrawal from Afghanistan,
agreement on the role China can and should play in stabilising the region must
become a priority for Pakistan’s regional diplomacy.
Pakistan should revive its traditional leadership role in the Muslim world.

Afghanistan: Pakistan and US positions appeared to converge recently as the US

belatedly accepted the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan and opened
direct talks with the Afghan Taliban which Pakistan facilitated. However, the entire
negotiating process, including the one initiated by US Special Envoy Zalmay
Khalilzad, may be thrown in disarray by Trump’s announcement to withdraw 7,000
US troops from Afghanistan. Sensing US abandonment, and under unrelenting
Taliban pressure, the Kabul ‘unity’ government, even the Afghan National Army,
may collapse, reviving the likelihood of another prolonged civil war.
Pakistan’s diplomacy must work simultaneously with the US and China, Russia,
Iran and Saudi Arabia to prevent civil war and promote a viable political settlement
in Afghanistan. A conference involving these states and major Afghan parties could
be convened to draw up the broad parameters of such a settlement.
Pakistan-US: In Trump’s ‘America First’ environment, there is a growing
‘Washington Consensus’ against China, Russia and the Muslim world, including
compliant ‘allies’. The US has been reluctant to acknowledge Pakistan’s cooperation
on Afghanistan and continued to adopt punitive measures against it. If the US
leaves Afghanistan without a political settlement, it may feel free to take further
action against Pakistan. Islamabad needs to negotiate the structure of its future ties
with the US in tandem with arrangements for US troops’ withdrawal from
Afghanistan. After America’s exit, Pakistan’s leverage will be diminished.
Kashmir and India: It is evident that Imran Khan, the PTI government and
Pakistan’s army chief desire normalisation with India. This sentiment is not
reciprocated, although Pakistan’s unilateral gesture of opening the Kartarpur
corridor put New Delhi temporarily on the defensive. In the run-up to the 2019
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Indian elections, the Modi government may seek to revive its flagging political
fortunes by generating hostility against Pakistan, or even ‘limited’ military action,
on some cooked-up pretext. Pakistan must remain vigilant and defeat any
aggressive move.
Normalisation with India is highly unlikely so long as it continues its oppression in
occupied Kashmir and refuses to resume a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan.
To defend Kashmiris’ fundamental rights, Pakistan must launch an international
diplomatic and media campaign to project and condemn India’s human rights
violations in occupied Kashmir (confirmed and documented in the recent report of
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights).
Terrorism: India’s campaign to portray Pakistan as a sponsor of ‘terrorism’ is
designed to constrict Islamabad’s ability to advance its national security and
economic development goals. Fortunately, this campaign, although supported by
the US, has failed so far. Pakistan must kill it. To this end, it could: 1) fulfil its
obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions (placing required restraints on
designated entities and persons); 2) insist on elimination of the BLA and TTP
presence from Afghanistan in the context of an Afghan political settlement, and 3)
launch a diplomatic and media campaign to project India’s state-sponsored
terrorism in Kashmir and from Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Saudi Arabia and Iran: The government has, by force of circumstance, revived
Pakistan’s close relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Their financial
support is essential at present to keep the economy afloat. The future commercial
viability of Gwadar (and CPEC) depends to a considerable extent on its emergence
as the oil and gas transshipment centre and a petrochemical complex. This will
become feasible if Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies route a part of their oil, gas and
refined product exports through Gwadar to China.
Pakistan should resist the urge to mediate between Riyadh and Tehran, at least for
now. Pakistan’s ties with Iran are vital and Saudi-Iranian reconciliation is essential
for regional peace and stability. However, the US and Israel are likely to subvert
mediatory efforts. Riyadh is vulnerable to US pressure at this time. Pakistan still
has issues to resolve with Iran including the reported presence of RAW operatives
on its soil and cross-border incidents eg the recent attack on the FC patrol.
Economic diplomacy: Pakistan’s diplomats and embassies should play a larger
role in promoting trade and investment. But Pakistan must first be able to produce
goods and services it can export and create the economic environment conducive
for foreign investment.
Islamic world: Pakistan should revive its traditional leadership role in the
Muslim world which confronts multiple challenges. An initiative to provide
humanitarian support to Muslims in occupied territories and war zones could be a
worthy initiative.
Global challenges: Nor should Pakistan discard its traditional leadership role at
the UN and other international fora. Although by population Pakistan is the sixth
largest country, it has been excluded from most groupings of the powerful — G20,
BRICS, APEC, etc. Yet, by this very token, Pakistan is well placed to lead the vast
majority of developing countries, which have also been excluded from these ‘elite’
groups, and ensure their voices are heard on global issues like climate change,
development and disarmament.
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 Pakistan Foreign Policy 101
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and
head of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan. Published on January 26, 2019.

Foreign policy is the external aspect of national policy. It covers the whole gamut of
global, regional and neighbourhood developments, movements and strategies.
When national policy is substandard it puts a ceiling on the success of foreign policy
no matter how good it is. Similarly, given the external dependency of Pakistan’s
national policy, it cannot achieve its goals without a prioritised and resourced
foreign policy. Some aspects of external policy are primarily dealt with by
specialised ministries, departments and services. But the Foreign Office should not
be held responsible for the negative consequences of bad decisions it had no part in
taking. This often happens and is always at the cost of the national interest.
This is obvious. Yet in practice it is usually ignored. Why? The main reason is the
unwillingness of corrupt or weak governments to take any risks for good
governance, including good foreign policy. This is the soft state syndrome. It is
often a prelude to a failing state. It precludes serving the national interest. Powerful
vested interests define the national interest and make foreign policy. What is to be
done? If the political system is made participatory and inclusive it will eventually
find the right answers. If it remains elitist, exclusive and exploitative it will not.
Changing the system, however, involves risk-taking. Pakistan has 10 major external
relationships. Primarily: India, China, the US, and Afghanistan; and significantly:
Iran, the GCC countries, Russia, the European Union (which still includes the UK,)
the Central Asian states, and the UN.
India is Pakistan’s major adversary. China is Pakistan’s only strategic partner. The
US is still the world’s mightiest and only comprehensive global power. Afghanistan
is a force multiplier for Pakistan’s security or insecurity. Iran confronts Pakistan
with critical choices.

Powerful vested interests define the national interest and

make foreign policy. What is to be done?
The GCC countries are a major source of remittances and ‘brotherly’ assistance
which almost always entails an embarrassing price.
Russia in partnership with China is a significant counterforce to the US and its
alliance with India. Moreover, it has the potential to bring about a less imbalanced
Russian policy towards India and Pakistan. The EU is a major market and the
Pakistani community in the UK (and the US) can be a foreign policy asset. Central
Asia can provide ‘strategic depth’ to Pakistan’s connectivity-based diplomacy.
Improving cooperation with Russia can help here also.
The UN may seem irrelevant. It is not. It is where a country’s image, profile and
voice are confirmed and contested. It is the forum in which the credibility of a
foreign policy is measured. Its agencies, funds and organisations can be important
knowledge-intensive and problem-solving assets.
Due to space limitations only Pakistan’s four ‘primary’ relationships will be very
briefly commented on.

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India: The core issues for Pakistan are progress towards a Kashmir
settlement acceptable to opinion in the Valley and radically improving the
horrendous human rights situation there. For India it is Pakistan’s use of “terrorist
proxies”.
These core issues need to be addressed to the satisfaction of each other if dialogue is
to be meaningful. Finding common ground for a negotiating process to be
sustainable is a challenge. Indian interference in Balochistan is a fact. However, the
Balochistan ‘problem’ is not of India’s making. It is due to institutionalised bad
governance and exploitation over decades. Pakistan should continue to extend its
hand of cooperation irrespective of a lack of response from India. It should keep the
LoC quiet as best it can. It should build on the Kartarpur initiative. It should extend
normal trading or MFN rights as promised. This is arguably a WTO obligation also.
Pakistan should offer travel, communications, confidence and security-building
(including regular nuclear and water-management) discussions and proposals. Let
India take its time to respond. Pakistan cannot lose by being consistent and
reasonable. Realistic rather than provocative narratives need to be developed. The
people of both countries need to get to know each other more directly instead of
through warped images.
Differences need to be contained, addressed and reduced through a realistic
working relationship. This will enable South Asia to meet the survival challenges of
the 21st century. The leaders of both countries should make appropriate statements,
stay in touch, and unfold a range of innovative initiatives. If India demurs, even
after its elections, that is its problem.
China: The BRI and CPEC are golden opportunities for Pakistan. But they are not
magic wands. Moreover, no other country is willing to invest on such a scale in
Pakistan. Pakistan needs to look after its own interests without making
disconcerting public statements. It needs to assure the Chinese that it is a reliable
economic and strategic partner.
Chinese concerns are growing. They need to be addressed. Chinese and Pakistani
‘dreams’ need to be integrated into a shared vision through mutually reinforcing
policies. The BRI is the context for CPEC. Similarly, CPEC is the context for the
transformation of Pakistan. Sensitive issues can be dealt with confidentially,
judiciously and on the basis of complete mutual trust.
The US: It is a strategic ally of India. India is focused on Pakistan. The US is
focused on China. America cannot be a strategic partner for Pakistan. But its
friendship is beneficial while its hostility is harmful. Pakistan must work with the
US for an Afghan settlement, in consultation with China.
Afghanistan: Pakistan cannot eliminate India from an Afghan settlement process.
Nor should it try to. If Pakistan plays its cards right it will always have a stronger
hand than India in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban despite their current military
successes are not the future of Afghanistan. Unless they cooperate for a settlement
they cannot become a 21st-century asset for Pakistan. India is justly regarded as a
large neighbour with a small heart. Many Afghans see Pakistan similarly despite the
massive Afghan goodwill accumulated during the Soviet occupation. Why? Pakistan
need not create a two-front situation for itself. Being large-hearted towards a
smaller neighbour is actually good strategy. Specific issues are more easily resolved
when the fundamentals are okay!
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