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Admin Law
FIRST LEPANTO v. CA 237 SCRA 519 (INCLUDED IN THE LIST FOR PRELIM)
FACTS: This is a MR of the previous case. Petitioner's contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have
superseded art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O.
No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino promulgated in the exercise of legislative authority, is in the nature of a
substantive act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, § 2 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/n Mariwasa correctly filed its appeal with the CA.
RULING: YES (as in previous case). Art. 78 of the Omnibus Investment Code on Judicial Relief was thereafter amended by
B.P. Blg. 129, by granting in § 9 thereof exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the CA over the decisions and final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies. When the Omnibus Investments Code was promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the
decisions and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court was again granted. By then, however, the present Constitution had
taken effect. The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, § 30 that "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." This provision is intended to give the
Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of
expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.
Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the
decisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted without the advice
and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed to have
amended BPBlg. 129, § 9.
5. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)
Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA),
filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He
based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication
of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as
intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by
the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the
following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The
Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issues: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. (2) Whether or not
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. (3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.
Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot
operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not
provide for its implementation.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated
(potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.
The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution
such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above
Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.
6. Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General (Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies)
FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant
to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general
from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said
that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under
this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios
are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further
maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power
to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable —
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that
the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard
needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the
text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the
President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character
not administrative (not executive).
7. AUGUSTO TOLEDO vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 135864 November 24, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by the COMELEC Chairman as Manager of the Education and
Information Department of the COMELEC when he was more than 57 years old. This was his first time to join government
service.
No prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action
and Policies (CSRPAP) was secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into the
government service without prior approval by the CSC.
Atty. Toledo officially reported for work and assumed the functions of his office. COMELEC, upon
discovery of the lack of authority required under the CSRPAP issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared Toledo’s
appointment as void ab initio. Toledo appealed the foregoing Resolution to the CSC.
CSC Resolution No. 89-468 disposed of the appeal by declaring the appointment of Toledo as merely voidable and not
void ab initio and declaring Toledo as a de facto officer from the time he assumed office to the time of the issuance of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2066.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 22, Rule III is valid.
Held: NO. The provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules implementing RA 2260 cannot be accorded
validity. It is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to
implement.
The statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provision prohibiting the appointment or reinstatement in the government
service of any person who was already 57 y/o. The provision at issue is an unauthorized act on the part of CSC – a
supererogation – since it has no relation or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried in effect.
The power vested on the CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into
effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions on it. Apart from this, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of
the time of the application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published.
8. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218; GR NO 84818 18 DEC 1989
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of
the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified
lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications
Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the
NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was
placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-making
power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a
quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that
notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore,
temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of
the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without
first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled
hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner.
9. Lupangco vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 (Rule-making Power)
Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission
to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint
for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter
from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving
handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination?
Ruling: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity
and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On
its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing,
conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions.
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill
motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how
the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination
period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in
view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be
held to be invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the
fulfilment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining
success in their endeavours.
10. PEOPLE VS. MACEREN
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the
law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in
fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the
complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot
consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in
issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the
law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules
to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending,
or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power.
11. IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE. (A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988)
Separation of Powers
Facts: Judge Manzano sent a letter to the SC stating that he was, through Executive Order RF6-04, designated by Gov. Farinas
as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which was created pursuant to PresidentialExecutive Order
No. 856 and was appointed as a member of the Committee. With that, he was asking the Court to authorize him to discharge
the functions and duties of the office and to consider his membership in the Committee as part of the primary functions of an
Executive Judge. He alleged that his membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor
a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B),both of the Constitution, and will
not in any way amount to an abandonment of his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary.
Issue: The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
Held: An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created
to insure the speedydisposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigentones, thus alleviating jail
congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed
abuses in thedischarge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal
justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those
which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislatureor such as are devolved upon the administrative agency
by the organic law of itsexistence.
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, itis provided that—
Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justiceshall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice
Quarterlyaccomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of theSecretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courtsestablished by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi- judicialor administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte ProvincialCommittee on Justice, which
discharges a administrative functions, will be inviolation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig ably
sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not tobe enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical
demands of governmentprecluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required
to assume a position or perform a duty non- judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there isa
plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposedin him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was
emphasized by JusticeBarredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of anexecutive or legislative official,
however eminent. It is indispensablethat there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, asexpected, to be
confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for
the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or
unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of
government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to thesolidity of such structure. As public
officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges
shouldrender assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes forwhich they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental tothe fulfillment of their judicial duties.
12. MAURICIO CRUZ vs.,STANTON YOUNGBERG G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
FACTS: Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to
issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the
constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine
Islands. He also asserted that the sole purpose of the enactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases in the
country.
The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer
was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled
to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from
giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. The CFI dismissed the
complaint because of petitioner’s failure to file another complaint. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
Youngberg contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in
his complaint, still the petitioner cannot be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were
declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective.
ISSUES:1.WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional
2.WON the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend
or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers
3.WON Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law
RULING: 1. No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication. The court
will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so. Aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act
3155 is entirely valid. The latter was passed by the Legislature to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the
introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of
industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the
police power. The Government of the Philippine Islands has the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the
promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. At the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable
necessity therefore and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act.
2. No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. There is no unlawful delegation of legislative
power in the case at bar.
3. No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the
importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not an amendment but merely supplemental to
Tariff Law.
14. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals G.R. No. L-52306. October 12, 1981
Facts: During the period pertinent to this case, petitionercorporation was engaged in the business of telecasting local as well
as foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. for which petitioner
paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code,
the Commissioner issued General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and turned
over to the BIR 30% of ½ of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business in the
Philippines. The last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431
amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from “such
amount” referring to rents, etc. to “gross income.” In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment and demand for
deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The company requested for reconsideration; where the Commissioner
did not act upon.
Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be retroactively applied.
Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive application where to so apply them would be
prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein, the prejudice the company of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is
beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under
General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made
three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a position to withhold taxes
due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no longer control over them when the
new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.