Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T
Keywords: This article examines the budget dimension of the rapid expansion of secondary education in Tanzania since
Secondary education 2004. It aims to illuminate important challenges associated with the current international call for universal
Political economy secondary education and for domestic revenue mobilization to fill the significant financial gap to achieve SDG 4
Financing by 2030. The article sheds light on critical political factors that shaped Tanzania’s education budget allocation, a
Budget
topic scarcely scholarly investigated. In light of the analysis, the article concludes that tax justice, at global and
Tanzania
national level, needs to guide any ambitious agenda for action to finance quality education for all.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2019.02.003
Received 28 September 2018; Received in revised form 27 January 2019; Accepted 12 February 2019
0738-0593/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
S. Languille International Journal of Educational Development 66 (2019) 96–104
which I extensively studied elsewhere. Donor practices influenced the about the magnitude of disputes attached to them, including within the
secondary education budget through various channels (Languille, dominant class.
2014a), including IMF’s prescriptions for tight fiscal discipline that A few authors have set out to illuminate political factors that in-
structurally constrained the fiscal space for education, especially the fluence public spending in African countries within a theoretical fra-
teachers’ wage bill (IMF, 2011). In addition, there might be wide var- mework that borrows from new political economy and neo-patrimonial
iation between a budget and its actual execution, especially at district views of the African state. This (limited) literature has explored two
level where local elites renegotiate central level distributional choices main themes: the relation between electoral competition and pro-poor
(Languille, 2015a). Nevertheless, the budget allocation lens has a public spending (for an application to education, see Stasavage, 2005)
heuristic function and aims to illuminate domestic power dynamics that and the politics of inter-governmental fiscal relations (on Tanzania
underlie the budget, a topic scarcely scholarly investigated. Moreover, Weinstein, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Boex, 2003).
between 2006/07 and 2011/12, while external aid represented a re- This body of literature is problematic from several points of view.
duced share of the education budget (between 16 and 20 per cent, Within their accounts, budget allocation is overdetermined by the logics
against 57 per cent in 2004/05), budget support represented between of rent-seeking and electoral politics, the main causal mechanisms that
70 and 98 per cent of the total development assistance to Tanzania’s are envisaged. This approach draws on the public choice school, ac-
education sector.2 National budget negotiation processes chiefly de- cording to which decisions over public revenues and expenditures are
termine the patterns of budget support allocation. As such, they primarily determined by voters and lobby groups who seek to maximise
therefore reflect domestic elites’ budget preferences. their individual interests (Buchan and Tullock, 1962). The formal
The paper is organized as follows. First, the article examines the budget process and the various actors involved in it are not part of the
literature on the politics of the budget in sub-Saharan Africa, which analysis. Their findings are premised on a rudimentary and normative
appears markedly influenced by donors’ normative perspective on conceptualisation of budget politics, so that they can be amenable to
public finance management. Then, after some methodological con- econometric specifications. For instance, Weinstein (2011) assumes that
siderations, the article describes secondary education budgetary trends Tanzanian decision makers adjust the patterns of central state transfers
in Tanzania since independence. It shows that the ward secondary to districts to ‘punish’ those that decrease their electoral support to the
school policy did not break with the historical budget pattern: a low ruling party. However, such a degree of coordination within the state is
secondary education budget. The following section highlights four cri- very unlikely, and would need to be empirically documented (for a
tical factors that explain elite low budget prioritization for secondary similar critique of Weinstein’s analysis see also Therkildsen and
education, despite a high policy priority. Nevertheless, the budget for Bourgouin, 2012, 41–42). Another important limit of these works lies in
ward secondary schools does not derive from a simple elite consensus; it their data, which are hardly specified, while Tanzania’s inter-govern-
is the outcome of conflict-ridden processes, as shown in section 5. Fi- mental fiscal system is made up of a complex web of flows of funds,
nally, the article argues that the policy was largely funded off budget which are allocated under multiple budget votes (for a mapping of
through a vast movement of revenue mobilization borne by the com- education transfers in Tanzania see Languille, 2014a, 151).
munities. In conclusion, the article draws lessons for the current global In contrast with this body of work, the present article sets out to
education agenda. enrich another strand of political economy analyses of public ex-
penditures in Africa, which are based on detailed case studies. Gray
2. The politics of budgeting in Sub-Saharan Africa: a literature (2018, 2015) draws on a political settlement framework to shed light on
review the role of institutions and distribution of powers in the implementation
of public finance management reforms in Tanzania. However, her
‘The crucial aspect of budgeting is whose preferences are to prevail analysis chiefly centres on issues of grand corruption, a result – she
in disputes about which activities are to be carried on and to what argues – of fierce internal competition within the ruling party. Various
degree, in the light of limited resources’ (Wildavsky, 1992, 595). Unlike other works (Killick, 2004 on Ghana; Rakner et al., 2004 on Malawi;
the field of revenue mobilisation (Moore, 2013; Di John, 2011), the Hodges and Tibana, 2004 on Mozambique) provide insightful analyses
political economy of budget allocation in sub-Saharan Africa has re- of the interplay between dominant actors involved in budgeting. In
mained largely unexplored outside a flourishing technocratic literature. their conclusion, most of these analyses tend to underplay significantly
In particular, donor-led Public Expenditure and Financial Account- the political economy meaning of the budget, which is described as a
ability (PEFA) assessments regularly document the robustness of public ‘theatre that masks the real distribution and spending’ (Rakner et al.,
finance management systems, including the budgeting function, ac- 2004: 4). Similarly, Killick (2004) underlines the ritualistic dimension
cording to a set of international standards (on Tanzania, see ADE 2013). entailed in the budget process. Commissioned by donors, these studies
Public expenditure reviews also provide detailed statistical analysis of also tend to reflect two important features of donors’ good governance
public finance trends at macro and sector levels (on Tanzania’s edu- epistemic frame: the analytical lens is primarily focused on concerns
cation sector see OPM, 2001; World Bank, 2011). Technical by nature, over transparency and accountability and budget decision-makers’ in-
these reports do not provide any insights into the power mechanisms centives are considered the result of a rational calculation of their in-
that shape the patterns of resource allocation. dividual interests. As an exception, Mmari et al. (2005) unravel the
This is equally true of benefit incidence analyses that study the complex power structure that underpins elite budgetary choices.
distributional impact of education public spending. With the rise of Hoffman (2013) study of Tanzania’s budget politics is similarly an-
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies in the early 2000s, concerns chored to a historical analysis of power relations within the ruling
over inequity in government allocation of resources for social services coalition. In line with these two studies, the present article adopts a
gained traction in development economics (Bourguignon et al., 2002). non-normative approach of elites’ education budget preferences.
In Tanzania, the most recent fiscal incidence analysis concluded that
secondary schooling is less progressive than primary schooling, and 3. Methodology and data
both vocational training and public university education are regressive
(Younger et al., 2016), in line with previous analyses (UNESCO, 2012a, The article is based on a mixed methodology, which combines a
231-2; Castro-Leal et al., 1999). However, these studies do not say budget analysis with qualitative interviews that were conducted in
much about the politics underlying these distributional patterns, or Tanzania in 2011–2012 with aid managers and officials in the Ministry
of Education and Vocational Training (hereafter Ministry of Education,
which integrates higher education and research), the Prime Minister’s
2
Author’s own calculation based on URT (2013) and ADE et al. (2012, 5). Office for Regional Administration and Local Governments (PMO-
97
S. Languille International Journal of Educational Development 66 (2019) 96–104
RALG), the Ministry of Finance and Members of Parliament. The article school of all children in the developing world’ (Lassibille et al., 2000,
also draws on data collected during a six-week fieldwork in Lushoto 4).
district (North East Tanzania), which included the visit of 28 secondary Over recent years, Tanzania has experienced a rapid expansion of
schools and interviews with district officials, entrepreneurs, politicians, lower secondary education within the Secondary Education
headmasters, teachers and parents. Development Plan (SEDP). Its implementation started in 2004 but the
Budget power holders in education are multiple but the four in- expansion accelerated in 2006 when Prime Minister Lowassa decided to
stitutions mentioned above are the main actors involved in the educa- act on an electoral promise inscribed in the ruling party Manifesto for
tion budget making process. Delimitating the boundaries of education 2005 Presidential elections: to build one secondary school in each ward
expenses remains a matter of conventional choice, which makes diffi- (the administrative level between district and villages). This ward
cult the integration of budgetary data from different second-hand secondary schools policy called for a partnership between the state and
sources to construct a consistent time-series. Since a seminal education communities: the latter would build school infrastructures; the state
Public Expenditures Review in 1994, Tanzanian education finances would provide for the roofing, teachers and schools’ running expenses.
have been subject to continuous scrutiny. Over the research period, this This decision triggered a movement of expansion of an extraordinary
close examination entailed several public expenditures reviews (for magnitude, throughout the country. Between 2004 and 2012, the total
instance OPM, 2001; World Bank, 2011b); two public expenditures number of secondary schools grew fourfold and the number of students
tracking surveys in 2002 (REPOA, 2004) and 2008–2009 (Claussen and enrolled at O level increased by 348 per cent. However, between 2007
Assad, 2010), a Rapid Budget Analysis (GBS DPG 2007), and most re- and 2013 the failure rate in the Certificate of Secondary Education
cently an Education Brief (UNICEF, 2016). UNESCO (2012a) provides Examination rocketed from 9.7 to 57.1 per cent (URT, 2013a).
the most comprehensive analysis of education finances to date. How- This rapid expansion of secondary education enrolment and school
ever, it only partially covers the period of this research. One key lim- infrastructure occurred without budget expansion. In constant prices,
itation of these different studies for the purpose of the present research between 2002/03 and 2011/12 the total volume of public spending on
project lies in their various definitions of the scope of the education education increased by 186 per cent. In this context of growing edu-
sector. cation budget, secondary education financing underwent a steady de-
The education statistical yearbooks produced by the Ministry of cline, from a peak of 18.2 per cent of the education budget in 2004/05
Education - based on data from the Ministry of Finance - provide the to its lowest level of 6.2 per cent in 2009/10 (Fig. 1).
only time-series of the education budget that covers the entire research The evolution of ‘unit costs’ illustrates, even more forcefully, the
period (URT, 2011). These data have three main limitations: they low budgetary priority given to secondary education during the ex-
provide budgeted amount rather than executed amounts; aggregated pansion phase. Between 2002 and 2009, this unit cost recorded a dra-
allocations by education sub-sector but not the details by spending matic decline: it decreased by about 70 per cent while enrolment in
categories; the total government budget amount does not discount for public secondary schools increased by 590 per cent. Tanzania’s public
the debt service. Nevertheless, in trading off between time-consistency spending on this level was among the lowest in relation to similarly
in intra-sector allocation and disaggregation of data, the first parameter situated sub-Saharan African countries (Fig. 2) (for comparative data
appeared more important to the argument developed in the present see World Bank, 2010).
article. However, given ‘the variety of compromises with accuracy’ However, at the end of the research period, the share of secondary
(Samoff, 1991, 675) that the government production of education fi- education in the education budget recorded a sharp increase from 9.4
nance statistics entails, readers should not be misled by the ‘façade of per cent in 2010/11 to 20.4 per cent in 2011/12. In parallel, the bud-
precision’ (Samoff, 1991) of the budget figures provided here; they are getary envelope for primary education, which had displayed a rela-
invited to rather focus on the general trends in public spending that tively steady growth between 2003/04 and 2009/10, sharply declined
they sketch out. by approximately 20 per cent. In contrast, higher education recorded a
steady resource increase between 2005/06 and 2011/12, both in ab-
4. A long-lasting budgetary neglect: secondary education budget solute terms and as a share of the education budget (27.2 per cent of the
as product of history education budget in 2011/12 against 16.7 per cent in 2004/05).
98
S. Languille International Journal of Educational Development 66 (2019) 96–104
Fig. 2. Spending per student in primary and secondary education, 2002-2012. Source: the author, based on URT (2011; 2012a).
5. Secondary education neglected budget: between elite budget recently, the 2011 Five-Year Development Plan 2010–2015 represented
preferences and budget incrementalism an attempt by a ruling power faction to regain control over national
development. It emphasised an infrastructure-led development agenda
5.1. Elite budget preferences for productive sectors rather than the social services/good governance priorities that shaped
the country’s Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies (2005–2010 and
Four main factors can be highlighted to explain the low secondary 2010–2015) under donor influence (Languille and Dolan, 2012). In the
education budget in a time of extraordinary enrolment and school in- same period, neighbouring countries experienced a similar disen-
frastructure expansion. The first factor is linked to the actual budgetary chantment with a poverty-focused economic strategy and converging
effort towards education as a whole. From the beginning of the 2000s, initiatives to craft alternative developmental models and budgets
Tanzania’s education sector benefited from the increase in government geared towards structural transformation (for Uganda, see Hickey,
expenditures fuelled by good macroeconomic performance, improved 2013; for Mozambique, see De Renzio and Hanlon, 2007).
revenue collection and sustained external aid revenues (UNESCO,
2012). Yet, between 2002/03 and 2010/11, education expenditure 5.2. Elite budget preference for higher education and social order
grew at a much slower pace than the total government budget and in
2011/12, the education share of the total budget was lower than in The second factor behind the low budget for secondary education
2002/03.3 This relative under-prioritisation of education can be ex- lies in domestic elites’ choice to favour higher education in their budget
plained in part by the development model that prevails among Tanza- decision. Understanding the social, political and economic meaning of
nian decision makers. Education is widely viewed as ‘consumption’, a higher education today in Tanzania would require an in-depth analysis.
by-product of rural and infrastructure development that generates the Suffice it to mention that the rising trend in the higher education
resources necessary to finance investments in social services. A senior budget coincided with the setting up of the Higher Education Students
official in the Ministry of Finance exposed the rationale of the relative Loans Board. Established in 2005 under a World Bank project, it issues
under-prioritisation of education: loans to students pursuing studies at accredited higher education in-
stitutions. Because of the very low recovery rate, the system has almost
“Education is consumption. (…) If you don’t have infrastructure, the
been turned into a grant system, which has crowded out primary and
agricultural sector is not ticking, you cannot get resources we require to
secondary education expenses. In November 2011, the recovery rate
make education tick also. (…) Health, also, is consumption. You have,
since the inception of the scheme was 13 per cent.4 The government
as a nation, to have the quick ways in some sectors, which will be the
took some measures to try to increase the recovery rate (World Bank,
backbone of providing the services (interview, Dar es Salaam, 14/12/
2012) but most research informants in the Ministry of Education, the
2011).
Ministry of Finance and Parliament considered the scheme as finan-
In interviews, senior officials in the education administration cially not sustainable. Nevertheless, students’ loans remained a top
(Ministry of Education and PMO-RALG) expressed similar views. Away budget priority throughout the research period.
from the human capital paradigm, education is considered the outcome The budgetary shift at the end of the research period in favour of
of economic transformation, not one of its core engines. secondary education reflected the social commotion caused by the
These tensions over the budgetary balance between education (or, massive failures in the Certificate of Secondary Education Examination
more broadly, social sectors) and productive sectors are not new. (Languille, 2014b). However, decision makers rearticulated their
Between 1999 and 2003, in the context of implementing the Poverty budget priorities at the expense of primary education: after a relatively
Reduction Strategy, the government managed to assert its overriding steady growth in the primary education budget envelope between
budget preference for ‘economic services’ and ‘production’ while ful- 2003/04 and 2009/10, this sub-sector recorded a sharp decline of ap-
filling donors’ conditionality requesting an increase in per capita allo- proximately 20 per cent over the last two fiscal years covered by this
cations to education and health (Mmari et al., 2005: 41–45). More article. Domestic elites’ overarching budget preference for higher
4
Deputy Minister of Education and Vocational Training in The Daily News 09/
3
The author based on URT (2011b and 2012a). 11/2011 ‘From the Parliament - Loans board yet to recover 695bn/’.
99
S. Languille International Journal of Educational Development 66 (2019) 96–104
education consolidated throughout the period. political status quo that deserves massive and continued budgetary
The political economy of the Students’ Loans Board is, as yet, un- injections.
researched. Several factors may explain Tanzanian elites’ prioritization
of higher education: to secure access to a very scarce resource for an 5.3. The limits of strategic budgeting
elite segment who cannot afford the cost of Western universities; elite
fragmentation that prevents a consensus around alternative funding Finally, the low budgetary effort for secondary education illustrates
options; an efficient lobbying of ‘edu-entrepreneurs’ who set up lucra- the limits of strategic budgeting in Tanzania. In theory, the country has
tive private universities; and the converging ideological adherence to abandoned incremental budgeting: performance-based budgeting was
the ‘financialisation’ of higher education among donors and elite seg- introduced in 1998 and in the early 2000s the Medium Term
ments. However, discussion of the education budget at the National Expenditure Framework (MTEF) began to be used (Naschold and
Assembly help reveal out a major reason behind elite budget pre- Fozzard, 2002; Wynne, 2005). Today, the allocation of resources to
ferences for student loans. Indeed, the 2011 Report of the Social ministries is supposed to be closely tied to their three-year strategic
Welfare Committee implicitly highlighted one key driver of MPs’ plan and annual action plans. Each ministry’s objectives result from the
budget preferences for higher education. Under the sub-title ‘Peace and ministry’s ‘vision’, which is itself the translation of various national
Harmony in Colleges Country-wide’ MPs expressed their deep concerns development frameworks (Vision 2025, Mkukuta and the Five-Year
over universities nurturing the political contestation of the social and Development Plan). This strategic planning and budgeting framework is
political order (URT, 2011, 7–8): replicated at all administrative levels, from districts to schools (Inter-
Honourable Speaker, the committee is not happy with the situation pre- views, headmasters and district officials, Lushoto, March-April 2012).
vailing in some of the Higher Learning Institutions. The government This pyramidal structure could, in theory, offer an effective framework
should conduct a research to find the sources of riots and conflicts in to realise a strategic priority shift (for instance towards secondary
government higher learning institutions…there is a feeling that conflict education) in budgetary terms.
and riots of government Higher Learning Institutions are caused by po- However, budget-making realities in Tanzania largely diverge from
litical fanatics and the convincing powers of political party leaders. this textbook objectives-based approach. Indeed, the national MTEF is
not an instrument that allocates financial envelopes to different sectors
MPs see higher education institutions as sites of potential destabi- based on a costed development scenario. Similarly, the education sector
lisation of the social and political order. budget is not the result of a multi-year costed plan computed from
In contrast to the steady growth of the higher education budget, macro-economic and demographic assumptions, enrolment projections
resources transferred to ward secondary schools have remained a by sub-sector and targets for teacher-pupil ratio or book-pupil ratio. The
second-order budget priority. In theory, each year, secondary schools Ministry of Education and the PMO-RALG prepare, in isolation, their
should receive Tsh 25,000 per enrolled student to purchase textbooks own budget estimates, which are simply the incremental projection of
and cover expenses such as infrastructure maintenance and school ad- the current fiscal year ceiling over the two outer years. They are the
ministration. Since the inception of this capitation grant in 2004, the results of the compilation of costed activity plans developed by each
starting point for computing the envelope has never been the theore- unit or department. The starting point of the budget preparation is not a
tical ‘unit cost’. The process leading to the determination of the en- strategic allocation among key priorities or key departments but the
velope available for education grants remains the outcome of informal amount of fuel spent on different field visits or the amount of allow-
negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and the Cabinet, through ances induced by planned workshops (interviews, officials, Dar es
an ad hoc prioritisation process, in the absence of any formal guidance Salaam and Dodoma, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education and
criteria (Boex, 2009; interviews, senior officials, Dar es Salaam, Min- PMO-RALG, 2011–2012). Far from being strategic, the budgeting pro-
istry of Finance, 2011–2012). cess remains a bottom-up incremental exercise; the ministry’s leader-
Two specific categories of education expenditures are however al- ship only gets involved at the very end of the process for final decisions:
ways considered absolutely crucial due to their political sensitivity: ‘In March-April, the MTEF is submitted to the Ministerial budget committee
examination expenses and school meals in boarding schools. Failure to (Permanent Secretary and Directors) to allow management to own the
organise national examinations, highly symbolic moments in the na- budget’ (Interview, budget officer, Ministry of Education, 13 October
tion’s yearly calendar, carries a political risk that national leaders are 2011). Within such a framework, it is difficult to envisage a drastic
not ready to take. An official in the Ministry of Finance highlighted this budgetary reorientation to keep pace with a strategic policy reor-
priority of examination expenses (in the case of budget execution not ientation towards a sub-sector that has been historically financially
budget preparation): ‘During the 1st quarter we only released funds for neglected.
examination. (…) If during 3rd quarter you receive funds you’ll allocate for Budget patterns as highlighted above did not derive from a simple
other activities’ (Interview, Dar es Salaam, 1 March 2012). National consensus among elites. They are also the outcomes of conflict-ridden
leaders also fear the destabilising effect of secondary student riots processes, as described in the next section.
triggered by their food diet, events that regularly occur and receive
wide media coverage. For a senior official in the Ministry of Finance:
‘Meals are very crucial. So if you don’t take care of that it will be terrible’ 6. The education budget as a site of power struggles
(Interview, Dar es Salaam, 14 December 2011). Concerns over social
order supersede government stated commitments to quality education. Tanzania’s organization of power has remained relatively stable
And in the case of boarding school meals, the price is high in terms of since the post-independence period, despite the political and economic
breaching egalitarian goals: food in boarding schools only affects a liberalization of the 1990s (Gray, 2018). The ruling coalition is domi-
handful of students (about 800 in 2012), against about 1.5 million in nated by the Executive, led by the President and a small number of
ward secondary schools. ministers, and the CCM party.5 Even though most upper-level techno-
The politics of education budgeting confirm the prevailing under- crats are CCM cadres, they enjoy a certain autonomy vis-à-vis the party.
standing among elites of education as a device for youth management The secondary education budget, as a site of intra- elite frictions,
(Languille, 2015b). But they appear to assess differently the political
risk embodied by various segments of the youth. The ward secondary 5
The CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Party of Revolution) party was created in
schools policy to contain the poor youth in rural areas has received very 1977 as the merger of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU, the then
little support from the national budget; on the other hand, higher ruling party in Tanganyika, in power since the independence in 1961) and the
education students are perceived as posing a greater threat to the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the then ruling party in Zanzibar.
100
S. Languille International Journal of Educational Development 66 (2019) 96–104
illustrates limits to the country’s elite homogeneity. the education priorities are, the Ministry of Education would have faced
First of all, these budget patterns have been the result of conflicts difficulties in promoting a reorientation of its budget.
between the Executive and Members of Parliament. During the pre- A last example illustrates the power dynamics among domestic
paration of the 2011/12 budget, the Ministry of Education tried to elites and testifies to the ambiguity of their commitment to quality post-
contain the budget-busting trend of the student loans scheme. But the primary education. One main source of finance for vocational training
Parliamentary Committee for Social Welfare rejected its attempt. The comes from the Skills Development Levy, a 6 per cent tax on payroll, 2
Ministry of Education was forced to top up the student loans envelope points of which go directly to the Vocational Education and Training
projected in its initial budget estimates (URT, 2011, 3–4). This battle Authority, a parastatal under the Ministry of Education’ s authority. The
over the budget for student loans provides an example of diverging remaining share has been subject to competing claims: for instance
interests, within the state, between politicians and technocrats. For from Members of Parliament to increase the funding of vocational
representatives of the Ministry of Education, the inflationary envelope training or from the Ministry of Finance to increase the resources of the
for student loans put at stake the survival of the ministry. In 2012/13, Students’ Loans Board and safeguard the fiscal space for primary and
the student loans subsidy absorbed about 60 per cent of its non-salary secondary education. In FY 2012/13, the Ministry of Finance decided to
recurrent budget.6 Also, the success of the Social Welfare Committee in allocate the 4 per cent levy to the Students’ Loans Board.
imposing its budgetary preference on the Ministry of Education ex- However, employers have also long complained about the levy it-
emplifies Parliament’s rising power within the political-administrative self, considering it a burden that inhibits Tanzania’s economic compe-
landscape since the 2010 general elections - an analysis that concurs titiveness in regional and global markets. In 2013, the Association of
with Hoffman (2013) - away from its traditional function of ‘rubber Tanzania Employers drafted a Position Paper in which they ‘urged the
stamping’ government decisions (Mmari et al., 2005; Gray, 2018). government to reduce the Skills and Development Levy’.7 Their lob-
The intra-sector budget allocation in education also constitutes a bying was successful. In FY 2013/14, the Ministry of Finance decided to
site of tensions between the CCM and the government. The ruling party decrease the levy from 6 to 5 per cent. In the same budget, the Ministry
apparatus appeared more sensitive than the government to the popular of Finance introduced a new 14.5 per cent excise duty on all mobile
discontent caused by the massive failure in Form Four examinations. phone services (previously applicable to airtime only), 2.5 points of
According to the party line, secondary education needed to become the which to be used to finance education (URT, 2013b, 51). Given the high
education budget’s overarching priority as a way to lessen the political penetration rate of mobile phones in Tanzania (depending on the
risk fuelled by the popular outcry (Interview, senior official, CCM source, between 47 and 60 per cent in 2011), the simultaneous changes
Secretary, 22 March 2012). But at the same time, the party’s involve- in the tax regime in relation to the financing of education represented a
ment in the budget formulation process takes a highly mediated form. shift of burden from a small segment of the ruling class – the business
elite in the formal sector8 – to the mass of the population. This budget
We [the CCM] think that the ministry should give first priority to
decision, which deepened the regressive nature of public education fi-
secondary education. (…) But the budget is the government thing.
nances, also confirmed the analysis by Mmari et al. (2005, 29) that
The Minister is appointed by the President, all ministers are ap-
singled out business associations as ‘the non-state actor with the most
pointed by the President and are from CCM: there’s direct engage-
influence on the budget process’. This power contrasts with the mar-
ment of the party through the ministers and deputy-ministers.
ginal influence of other Tanzanian civil society organisations, which
Directors are also President’s appointees (Ibid).
have invested in the domain of education public spending, such as
The budget remains the technocrats’ property and the party’s ability HakiElimu and Policy Forum (Mmari et al., 2005; Hoffman, 2013).
to shape patterns of budget allocations appears largely circumscribed. Whilst the education budget is the outcome of intra-ruling class
However, this self-account of CCM’s position as regards government’s tensions, it is also shaped by struggles between power holders and
budget choices reveals a dynamic power sharing between the govern- workers. This is testified by the contentious politics of the teachers’
ment and the party, already pointed out in Mmari et al. (2005). The wage bill. Most government officials interviewed considered teachers’
party acknowledges the government’s pre-eminence in conducting low morale a key obstacle to achieving quality education and teachers’
public affairs and the budget formulation. Yet, it can also choose to salaries a core ingredient of their motivation. Between 2010 and 2012,
reassert its primacy in certain circumstances when it considers that the government recruited new secondary teachers, which drove a
government choices jeopardise the national political stability, and ul- marked increase in secondary level teaching staff between 2010 and
timately the survival of the party. 2012 (+ 98.2 per cent) (URT, 2012a, 108) and a 27 per cent increase in
The budget formulation is also marked by the Ministry of Finance’s the teaching wage bill between 2008/09 and 2011/12.9 Also, in
primacy over other ministries. Education ministries’ budgets are the 2011–2012, when threatened with a teachers’ strike, the government
outcome of close negotiations with the Ministry of Finance, which is decided to settle a long standing dispute with the Tanzania Teachers’
responsible for the oversight of the budget preparation and execution. Union (TTU) over teachers’ salary and non-salary arrears: a Tsh 44
Every year, it issues budget guidelines, provides sector ministries and billion sum was paid to primary and secondary school teachers (inter-
district councils with budget ceilings, gives them instructions to ring- view, senior official, Dar es Salaam, President Office, Public Service
fence some budget items or to exclude some expenditures (for instance, Management, 9 April 2012).
URT, 2007); it also scrutinises their budget proposals before tabling the Despite these positive trends, teachers at the beginning of their
national budget to Parliament for its approval. In the process of re- career earned about half as much as health workers (Tsh 249,600 for
configuration of education budget priorities towards secondary educa- teachers, Tsh 477,200 for health workers), although differences were
tion at the end of the research period, the Ministry of Finance’s en- less pronounced at the end of careers.10 Moreover, industrial action has
dorsement has been critical. For the researcher, the opacity of the
budget negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and the education
administration proved difficult to see through. However, contradictory 7
‘Abolish skills development levy, employers urge govt’, The Citizen, 11/04/
accounts of closed-door processes, provided by informants, converged
2013.
to emphasise the preeminent role of the Ministry of Finance and its 8
In reality, it is difficult to locate the actual incidence of the skills levy: on
internalisation of the secondary education priority. Without the Min- employers (lower profits), workers (lower wages) or customers (higher prices).
istry of Finance’s approval, based on a shared understanding of what 9
The author’s own calculation based on Ministry of Finance budget books.
10
Source: Civil servants’ salary scales for 2010-2012. Salary scales are re-
negotiated every two to three years between civil servants’ trade unions and the
6
Author’s own calculation based on URT, 2012b. government.
101
S. Languille International Journal of Educational Development 66 (2019) 96–104
regularly met with coercive responses from the government. Since the state.
birth of the TTU in the 1990s, the ruling power has deployed traditional Villagers have not only financed a big share of capital costs, they
containment techniques to inhibit its potential destabilising power: have also contributed to running costs. In all schools visited in Lushoto
undermining their leaders’ credibility, intimidating teachers or cap- district, parental fees and other contributions were the school budget’s
turing their leaders within the system (invitation to workshops with main source of revenue. Parents also contributed towards paying the
allowances or appointment of their President – Margaret Sitta – as salaries of ‘Form Six Leavers’ teachers, directly recruited by schools to
Minister of Education in 2005). In 2010, following a strike notice by the fill in the gap in their teaching force. Officially, these teachers did not
TTU, President Kikwete delivered a menacing speech to teachers while exist and their cost was silently passed onto parents (for instance, on the
high-ranking representatives of the army and the police stood os- villagisation process in the 1970s, see Hyden, 1980).
tentatiously behind him. In 2012, in the context of salary negotiations, In this context of a highly political and coercive process that cir-
the government responded to a teachers’ strike with intimidation, cumvented the technocratic apparatus, the budget lost its centrality as
sending a ‘strong warning to teachers’; the action, overwhelmingly the financial arm of the bureaucracy. ‘The strategic planning process was
supported by the teaching force, was challenged in Court and declared turned on its head; it was basically left redundant’ (Interview, economist,
illegal.11 Under externally-imposed macro-economic constraints and in aid agency, Dar es Salaam, 13 October 2011). Therkildsen (2000, 66)
face of a narrow fiscal space, coercion remained the ruling power’s only argues that in Tanzania ‘policy decisions are often taken as if no hard
option to contain labour demands. constraints for reform initiatives exist’. The budget inertia in the face of
the ward secondary schools policy shift illustrates the enduring re-
7. Domestic revenue mobilization via communities’ contributions levance of this characterisation.
102
S. Languille International Journal of Educational Development 66 (2019) 96–104
between elite factions, between the ruling coalition and education Gray, H., 2018. Turbulence and Order in Economic Development. Institutions and
workers as well as between various government branches. Economic Transformation in Tanzania and Vietnam. Oxford: Ozford University Press.
Hickey, S., 2013. Beyond the poverty agenda? Insights from the new politics of devel-
In light of the research main findings, two elements of the current opment in Uganda. World Dev. 43, 194–206.
international agenda require particular attention. First, the damaging Hodges, T., Tibana, R., 2004. The Political Economy of the Budget in Mozambique. DFID,
effects that student loan schemes exercise in practice on the fiscal space London.
Hoffman, B., 2013. The limits of Top-down reform: budget transparency in Tanzania. In:
for primary and secondary education should be explicitly recognised. Khagram, S., Fung, A., de Renzio, P. (Eds.), Open Budgets: The Political Economy of
As acknowledged by the World Bank itself, one of their most vigorous Transparency, Participation, and Accountability. Brookings Institution Press,
advocates: ‘Student loans will always be expensive, and a loan scheme Washington, DC, pp. 183–207.
ICFGEO, 2016. The Learning Generation: Investing in Education for a Changing World.
should not be launched in the mistaken notion that it will become self- The International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity, New
funded’ (World Bank, 2010, 142-3). York.
Second, the international emphasis on domestic revenue mobiliza- IMF, 2011. Tanzania Country Report No. 11/105. International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC.
tion calls for caution. It entails two risks: contributing to regressive
Killick, T., 2004. The Democratic Deficit and the Politics of Ghana’s Budgetary System.
taxation and encouraging aid agencies to curtail their financial con- DFID, London. Draft Report.
tribution. In countries where military and security spending represents Knight, J.B., Sabot, R.H., 1990. Education, Skills and Inequality: The East African Natural
a significant share of the national budget, advocacy towards increasing Experiment. Oxford University Press, New York.
Languille, S., Dolan, J., 2012. Political Economy Analysis of the Education Sector in
domestic resources to education may serve social justice objectives. Tanzania. DFID-Tanzania, Dar es Salaam.
However, in other contexts, limited level of economic development and Languille, S., 2014a. Secondary education expansion in Tanzania, 2004-2012: A political
tax base – more than government putative ‘lack of political will’ – economy perspective. PhD dissertation, unpublished. School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London.
constitute the first barriers to domestic resource mobilization and si- Languille, S., 2014b. Education through performativity. Learning crisis and technology of
milar advocacy campaigns may in practice mean extraction of resources quantification in Tanzania. Int. J. Educ. Dev. 39, 49–58.
from the poor. The article confirms the relevance of analyses that put Languille, S., 2015a. Ecoles secondaires communautaires en Tanzanie: la bataille des
notables dans le district de Lushoto. Politique Africaine 139 (3), 101–121.
tax justice, at national and international level, at the forefront of re- Languille, S., 2015b. Ward secondary schools, elite narratives and Nyerere’s legacy. In:
flections over the financing of SDGs (Cobham and Klees, 2016; Balsera Fouéré, M.-A. (Ed.), Remembering Julius Nyerere: History, Memory, Legacy. Mkuki
et al., 2018). Calls for domestic resource mobilization should not eclipse na Nyota, Dar es Salaam, pp. 303–331.
Languille, S., 2016. The scramble for textbooks in Tanzania. Afr. Aff. 115, 73–96.
the persistent need for robust international aid to achieve SDG 4. Lassibille, G., Tan, J.-P., Sumra, S., 2000. Expansion of private secondary education:
lessons from recent experience in Tanzania. Comp. Educ. Rev. 44 (1), 1–28.
Declarations of interest Lewin, K.M., 1996. The Costs of Secondary Schooling in Developing Countries. Pattern
Prosp. Int. J. Edu. Dev. 16 (4), 367–378.
Mbilinyi, M., 1979. Secondary education. In: Hinzen, H., Hundsdorfer, V.H. (Eds.),
None. Education for Liberation and Development: The Tanzanian Experience. UNESCO
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding Institute for Education, Hamburg, pp. 97–113.
agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Mmari, D., Sundet, G., Selbervik, H., Shah, A., 2005. Understanding Patterns of
Accountability in Tanzania Component 3: Analysis of Values, Incentives and Power
Relations in the Budget Allocation Process. Oxford Policy Management, Christian
Acknowledgement Michaelsen Institute and REPOA, study commissioned by the Governance Working
Group of the Development Partners to Tanzania and funded by DFID.
Moore, M., 2013. Revenue Reform and State Building in Anglophone Africa. ICTD
The author is grateful to Christopher Cramer and Olivier Vallée for Working Paper 10. International Centre for Tax and Development, Brighton.
their insightful feedback during the research presented in the article. Mustapha, S., Krause, P., 2016. Financing Education: Domestic Resource Mobilization and
The author also thanks two anonymous reviewers for their useful Allocation. The Education Commission, New York.
Naschold, F., Fozzard, A., 2002. How, When and Why Does Poverty Get Budget Priority?
comments on an earlier version of the text. Poverty Reduction Strategy and Public Expenditure in Tanzania. Case Study 3. ODI
Working Paper 165. Overseas Development Institute, London.
References Nyerere, J., 1971. Living, learning and working cannot be separated. In: Lema, E.,
Mbilinyi, M., Rajani, R. (Eds.), 2004. Nyerere on Education – Nyerere Kuhusu Elimu.
Selected Essays and Speeches 1954-1998. HakiElimu and E&D Limited, Dar es
ADE, COWI, ITAD, 2012. Independent Evaluation of Budget Support to Tanzania, Draft Salaam, pp. 108–114.
Desk Report, Volume I: Main Report. The European Commission, Brussels. Nyerere, J., 1984. The situation and challenges of education in Tanzania. In: Lema, E.,
Balsera, M.R., Klees, S., Archer, D., 2018. Financing education: why should tax justice be Mbilinyi, M., Rajani, R. (Eds.), 2004. Nyerere on Education – Nyerere Kuhusu Elimu.
part of the solution? Comp. A J. Comp. Educ. 48 (1), 147–162. Selected Essays and Speeches 1954-1998. HakiElimu and E&D Limited, Dar es
Boex, J., 2003. The incidence of local government allocations in Tanzania. Public Adm. Salaam, pp. 146–158.
Dev. 23, 381–391. OPM, 2001. Tanzania: Education Sector, Public Expenditure Review. Oxford Policy
Boex, J., 2009. Tanzania: An Assessment of the D-By-D Compliance of the Planning and Management, Oxford.
Budget Guidelines in Tanzania. PMO-RALG and the Urban Institute Center on Rakner, L., Mukubvu, L., Ngwira, N., Smiddy, K., Schneider, A., 2004. The Budget as
International Development and Governance, Dar es Salaam. Theatre: the Formal and Informal Institutional Makings of the Budget Process in
Bourguignon, F., Pereira da Silva, L., Stern, N., 2002. Evaluating the Poverty Impact of Malawi. DFID, London.
Economic Policies: Some Analytical Challenges. The World Bank, Washington, DC. REPOA (2004) Tanzania Public Expenditure Tracking Study. Study of Financial and non-
Buchert, L., 1994. Education in the Development of Tanzania, 1919–1990. James Currey Financial PEDP flows from Central government to schools in 2002 and 2003. Dar es
Publishers, London. Salaam: REPOA and the Ministry of Finance, Government of Tanzania (unpublished).
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., 2010. Tanzania’s Economic and Political Performance: Rubin, I., 2014. The Politics of Public Budgeting: Getting and Spending, Borrowing and
A District-Level Test of Selectorate Theory. New York University, New York. Mimeo. Balancing. CQ Press, Thousand Oak.
Buchan, J., Tullock, G., 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Unviersity of Michigan Press., Ann Samoff, J., 1991. The facade of precision in education data and statistics - a troubling
Arbor, MI. example from Tanzania. J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 29 (4), 669–689.
Castro-Leal, F., Dayton, J., Demery, L., Mehra, K., 1999. Public Social Spending in Africa: Stasavage, D., 2005. Democracy and education spending in Africa. Am. J. Pol. Sci. 49 (2),
Do the Poor Benefit? World Bank Res. Observ. 14 (1), 49–72. 343–358.
Claussen, J., Assad, M.J., 2010. Public Expenditure Tracking Survey for Primary and Therkildsen, O., 2000. Public sector reform in a poor, aid-dependent country, Tanzania.
Secondary Education in Mainland Tanzania. United Republic of Tanzania: Dar es Public Adm. Dev. 20, 61–71.
Salaam. . Therkildsen, O., Bourgouin, F., 2012. Continuity and Change in Tanzania’s Ruling
Cobham, A., Klees, S., 2016. Global Taxation: Financing Education and the Other Coalition: Legacies, Rises and Weak Productive Capacity. DIIS Working Paper. 2012:
Sustainable Development Goals. The International Commission on Financing Global 06. Danish Institute of Development Studies, Copenhagen.
Education Opportunity, New York. UNESCO, 2012. Education Sector Analysis (RESEN Tanzania): Beyond Primary Education,
De Renzio, P., Hanlon, J., 2007. Contested Sovereignty in Mozambique: the Dilemmas of the Quest for Balanced and Efficient Policy Choices for Human Development and
Aid Dependence. GEG Working Paper 2007/25. Global Economic Governance Economic Growth. . Pôle de Dakar, Dakar.
Programme, Oxford. UNESCO, 2016. Education 2030 Framework for Action. UNESCO, Paris.
Di John, J., 2011. Taxation, Resource Mobilisation and State Performance in Crisis States. UNICEF, 2016. Education Budget Brief- FY 2011/12–FY 2015/16. UNICEF, Dar es
Research Centre Working Paper 84 (series 2). London School of Economics, London. Salaam.
Gray, H., 2015. The political economy of grand corruption in Tanzania. Afr. Aff. 114/456, URT - United Republic of Tanzania, 2007. Guidelines for the Preparation of Medium Term
382–403. Plan and Budget Framework for 2007/08–2009/10. Ministry of Finance and
103
S. Languille International Journal of Educational Development 66 (2019) 96–104
104