5
RECOGNITION OF STATES AND
GOVERNMENTS’
1, RECOGNITION AS A GENERAL CATEGORY
Whenever state acts in a way which may or does affect the legal rights or
, the question arises ofthe legal
in the Eastern Greenland case
of her Foreign Minister, accepted Dani46 PERSONALITY AND RECOGNITION RECOGNITION OF STATES AND GOVERKMENTS oa
‘ofthe continental shelf), and actually illegal activity (apart from issues involving fun- M_ since recognition is a mere declaration or acknowledgement of an existing state of
damental principles, jus cogens)* within which issues are most sensibly settled on law and fac, legal personality having been conferred previously by operation of lw.
ad lateral bass: indeed, cases concerned with relatively well-setied areas of {MPAs Hall says ‘States being the persons governed by international law, communities
law are often decided on the basis of facts, including elements of acquiescence, estab- MB _are subjected to law...from the moment, and from the moment only, at which they
ing 2 special content of obligation between the pasties, and this quite apart from #Escquie the marks of Sate” Thus, ina relatively objective forum, such as an interna
ygition may be 7 ‘would be entirely proper to accept the existence ofa state although
of other states,a rd states, recognize it. The award inthe
that case Great By
sessions granted by the former rev
2. STATES AND GOVERNMENTS IN RELATION
TO RECOGNITION tions determined by inguty, not nto its defacto sovereignty and
sgularty oF origin,
the fsue with which those applying
re of the non-tecognition of
to government under Tinoco
mn by her Allies inthe
ot outweigh the evi
er of Tinoco government,
inent aspect of the general
legal writing has edopted the emphasis and terminology of political relations. The
‘of the category ‘recognition’ has led to some perverse doctrine. When &
in dispute over legal tite to teritory, for exarnple, a legal forum will examine
all he legally significant conduct and declarations of either party. A declaration ty IMF according othe standard set by international hw
fone parry that
‘The reasoning employed here applies also to recogition of states. In addition there
isa substantial state practice behind the declaratory view. Unrecognized sates are
‘ite commonly the cbject of international claims, charges of aggression, and other
he slatemcnt haves specific egal signticance ME beaches ofthe United Nations Chater, by the very state refusing recognition
existence states and government is “The declaratory theory of recognitions opposed tothe constitutive view. According
ous tothe latter, the pol 3 the existence of legal
right: in ts exten form thi
two matters are interdependent)* govern
de ue poverent
‘on these ops are the eneral wor
so clegt Rees
198 Cour dppl de Pai GD Woh RSS (928, 294NY 372: Solo Nasional Cy Bark
[MANY 220 Desh Continental Gas Geshu
"0 Opiion Net i, 206 Cle
yd
{Ava charges pint rs, Une Stes charges gust Noct Vet
ruktd he Vier War and ltrntinal Law (1968), 383 See otha cn mpied recognition
Serle the Montrieo Conon Right and Dues of ite, 1938, AC 3 Hodson. It. Le is 62,
rigs.
Tn atbtace es deeas PERSONA’
"Y AND RECOGNITION
to accept itis clearly
shany competence of other states whi
‘does not depend on agreement or concession." Brierly comment
possible that different states shold act on
(of fats. This does not mean
only that there exist a present
from the lack of centelized
dent dc tothe stage’
ute ofthe system.
it doctrine creates a great many difficulties. Its adherents may feel a
jon ofthe uncecognized state and in doing som
leads to various difficulties
gn
knowledge ofthe facts? Cogent arguments of principle and the preponderance of state
practice thus dictate a preference for declaratory doctrine, yet to reduce 0
feduce the issues to. choice between the two opposing theories is to greatly oversimn-
plity he legal situation,
3. THE VARIED LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACTS
OF RECOGNITION AND POLICIES OF
NON-RECOGNITION
farm type of recognition or non-recognition. The te
ications and declaratior
"de facto recognition, 'f recognition, for
Ii any ease ‘recognition’ isnot aterm of art. The term
pr 3S farther Chen, The Intrrtiona
7 ibducenet unequally
Spe
Ec theviewsof River Fauhile ond Hyde: 16
[RECOGNITION OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS fo
and thus recognition may takethe form ofenagreement,or
ns, oF a congratulatory message on
inment of independence, The typical act of recognition has two legal functions,
. the determination of statehood, a question of law: such individual determina:
Secondly, the act is a condition
ns, including diplo.
matic relations and the conclusion of teates. It is this second function which has
been described by some jurists as ‘constitutvist’, although here itis nota condi
of statehood ! Since states cannot be required by the law (apart from treaty) actually
tomake public declaration of recognition, and since they are obviously not required
‘to-undertake optional relations, the expression of state ‘will’ involved is political in
sense of being vol ay alo be political in a more obvious sense. An
ition may not rest on any legal bass at all there being no attempt to
the egal question of statehood as such, Non-recognition may simply be part
spproval and boycott. Again, recognition may be part of a
legal consequences will here
policy of aggression a
from the breaches:
term ‘recognition’ daes not absolve the lawyer from inqui
Ihe government concerned and then placing thisin the context ofall the relevant facts
and rules of aw.
4, IS THERE A DUTY OF RECOGNITION?
‘Lauterpacht”” and Guggenheim adopt the view that recognition is constitutive, but
has been vigorously criticized"
sansstency, since in an oblique
ile the legal duty can only be valid
‘marks of statehood and (although
Lauterpacht does rot express it thus) it is owed tothe entity concerned. The argument
postulates personality on an objective basis. However, discussion of Lauterpacht’s
ews often reveals a certain confusion among the critics. Recognition, as « public
on and Gage mia eat ecg
so exiseace bat oastaive of reper
pcan: sad Cll Peper 321 Ser ae UK comment nth raf Dec fhe Right90 PERSONALITY AND RECOGNITION
legally if they ignore the
thatthe Arab neighbou
non-ent le United Nations organs and individual have taken
the view that ted, and bound, by the principles ofthe United Nations
(Charter governing the use of force. In this context of state conduct there is duty to
accept and apply ce rues of international lew: there isa legal duty
jut no duty tomake an express, public, and
declare readiness to enter into diplomat
ter type of recognition remains poli
iplomatic relations
5, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS”
In principle most of the considerations set out previously apply equally to recognition
‘of tates and governments. Ithas been seen elsewhere that the ex
‘and independent government is the essence of statehood, and,
tion of states may take the form of recognition ofa government. Thus
Foreign Office declared that the British Government recognized the Estonian National
8 de facto independent body with the capacity to set up a prize cot
zation of the recognizing government and the relevant
state may be closely related,
NECOGNITION OF STATES ANP GOVERNMENTS o
undertakings, for
‘and voluntary
lations, an
1 acceptance of particular claims, or the giving
‘The sphere of optional rela
‘aneecognized government is no etter off than an unrecognized
6. DE JURE AND DE FACTO RECOGNITION
between dejureand defacto recognition are
wg depends onthe inten
jaternent may be intended to be or to include a legal
govern
cognition can be withdrawn.” In the po
inays be withdrawn: in the legal sense itcannot be unless a change of circu
warrants it, Ofcourse ifa statemento DrRSONALETY AN! Iner10%
[RECOGNITION OF STATES AND
{OVERNMENTS 98
of international organizations ofthe type ofthe League
ns and United Nations provides a variety of occasions for recognition, of one
sort or another, of states, Recognition by individual members of other members, or of
non-members, may occur in the course of voting on admission to membership and
consideration of complaint involving threats to or breaches ofthe peace. Indeed,
thas been argued that admission fo the League and the United Nations entailed rec-
‘ognition by operation of law by all other members, whether or not they voted agai
admission, The position, supported by principle and state practice, would seem to be
25 follows. Admission to membership is prima facie evidence of statehood,
sing members are at risk ifthey ignore the basic rights of existence ofa
recognition. United
10, NON-RECOGNITION AND SANCTIONS
‘One form of collective non-recognition commonly seen in practice isthe resolution oF
‘ofan organ of the League of Nations, and now the United Nations, based ona
determination thatan illegal acthas occurred. Its possible, though by no means nec
essay, to refer to such practice as collective non-recognition There is no doubt a duty
les patties toa system ofc tral conventions not
te support or condone acts or situations contrary to the treaty concerned. *In some
beassociated with meacures recommended or commanded by an organ of
saga form ofeanction or enforcementagainsta wrongdoer. The Secu
11, ISSUES OF RECOGNITION BEFORE
binding with NATIONAL COURTS®
‘Whether, and to what exte
general purposes
Criteria employed in a given cage.” Attitudes of non-recognition may depend on the
ical prejudices of individwal members and the view that in any case the special
membership contained in Article 4 are not fulfilled: statehood may
be necessary but is not sufficient. The approval cf the credentials of state represents
wves by organsof the notidentical wit,
Within the sphere of domestic law, recognition may have important practical conse-
‘quences. Where th local courts are willing or are, a a matter of public law obliged 10
fallow the advice ofthe executive, the unrecognized state or government cannot
5 Se Laerpucht Coll Paper, 221; de Vibe, Three als en dei internation
eof btenationa ae Cn en 5-6 Mager. ta Sorensen,
changes ough abou bythe ose of
Cal Paper 57-48
rest, 4 BY (48-6
where eal cnseguecer ofan eegnton te
9b 10849 (Europ Ce of LD
sec gncaly Merely 30 ACLQ 71), 476-98 Ned, 50 1CLO (SD. 38-41 Vetoes, 19296 oN OF STATES AN MENTS 7
ALITY AND RECOGNITION nee
MAILE SELASSIE V, CABLE AND WIRELESS LTD. (NO. 2)**
imed the annexation of Ethiopia fol
. through an agent had made & contract
37 he commenced proceedings to recover money due under the
i recognized
authorities and imported
ve goods were their prop:
from dealing with them, and damages
hem. The def
recognized the Soviet Government 2s the ‘de facto Government of Russi’,
the former Provisional Government, recognized by the British Government, had bet
dispersed on 13 December f Appeal found for the defendants. On
sues concerning recognition the Court held that forthe present purpose no di
ction was to be drawn between defacto and de jure recognition. Bankes,
country having...recognized the Soviet Government
ession of the powers of sovereignty in Russer master and the managing director of the owners agreed to hold the vessel
was in the London docks under arrest by the Admiralty Marshal, atthe disposal ofthe
‘Nationalist authorities. At that stage the Republican Government issued the present
ler which they claimed to have possession of the ship adjudged to them. The
ist authorities moved to set aside the writ on the ground that it implesded a
foreign sovereign state The judge at frst instance directed that inquiry be made of the
Foreign Office asto the status ofthe Nationalist authorities. In reply” it was stated that
British Government recognized Spain asa foreign sovereign state and recogs
the Government ofthe Spanish Republic as the only de jure Government of Spain oF
‘any part oft It was also stated that:
5. His Majesty’s Government recogolses the Nationalist Government asa Government
‘whieh at present exercises de facto ada oF
itcative control over the larger po
Spain
6, His Majesty's Government recognizes
exercises effective administrative control overall the Basque Provinces of Spa.
7. His Majeaty’ Goverament have not accorded any other recognition tothe
Government
foreign Sovereign
the preceding
which the question i ase.
The House ofl ords hele thatthe Foreign Office letter established thatat the date ofthe
vwrit the Nationalist Government of Spain was a foreign sovereign state and could not
be impleaded. Lord Atkin sai
By ‘exer
de facto administrative contol’ or ‘exercising effective administrative con
Tunderstand exercising ll the functions ofa sovereign government... There isample
rity forthe proposition that ther is no diference forthe present purposes between &
Fecognition ofa State defacto a8 opposed to de jure, Allthe reasons fr immunity which are
the bass ofthe doctrine in international lw as incorporated into our law exis.
20; Recon pp. 286-84, 3658; Brigg 3
re Lond stanly peed wth Lord Aan
RECOGNITION OP STATES AN
WVERNMENTS »
Yet they interpreted and accepted it as conclusive on important issues of low.
s peobably intended to be literally a statement of
fact its ermphasis on ‘administrative control's significant. Moreover, a t
\d not ‘recognized’ the Franco authorities as de facto gov:
Nor was the letter of the Foreign Office inten
ara. 9) previous cases like the Gagar
Selasiev. Cable and Wireless Ltd. (No. 2)?*the recognition de facto had occurred 28
political act and in respect of «government f the state as a whole. As a matter
in view ofthe still effective competition of the de jure govern
, the Foreign Office letter did not necessarily accord equality to
lea government in partial control ofa state territory with,
jowever, two other
re pragmatic basis
y wai
forthe decision,
'& proposition controversi
‘but nat absurd, since a belligerent entity may soon become a de jure government.
‘Secondly and this point is connected with the foregoing, Lord Atkin states principle
ive2” “Une non- belligerent state which recognizes
fovernments, one de jure and one de facto, will nt allow them to transfer the
{quarrels tothe area of the jurisdiction of its municipal court: Such a principle would
tthe dubious acceptance of belligerent entities engaged in civil war as sovereign,
CARL ZEISS STIFTUNG V. RAYNER AND KEELER, LTD. (NO. 2)"
jscase raised, asin interlocutory question the issue ofthe validity of title to proper
based upon le ive acts of the German Democratic Republ
st Germany) The Foreigh Office certificate available stipulated that since the
irawal of Allied forces from the zone allocated to the USSR in 1945 “Her Majesty’
‘Government have recognized the State and government of the USSR as de jure eati-
to exercise governing authority in respect of that zone...and...have not recog.
ity purporting to exercise governing
4) WLR LIE, 9). Forcamment ee enon 67.1.
lof Starr Ox Co (9), 262 200 Upright Merry
s i Corpora’ Patent
Machines Company. 2
Thee Meperides Hoes Le Ares Tash Haida
fore a pra 2PERSONALITY AND RECOGNITION
he zone Inthe face ofthis the Court of Appeal” held
o the acts of the East German legal system. The House
‘of laws and East Germany was a aw
even though the sovereignty on which ths
an obiter dictum of great interest Lord
yas ‘an open question in English law, whether
the courts must accept the doctrine ofthe absolute invalid acts flowing from
unrecognized governments
‘THE RHODESIAN CASES
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council concerning the validity of
fer the usurpation of power by the Smith regime in 1965,"
ish courts as such concerning the recognition of Rhodesian divorce
raise substantially similar issues of policy to those presented by the Carl
1 determinant was the const
ry ofthe Smith eegime.* Thus even divorce decrees emanating from
the Rhodesian courts were refused recognition by the English courts
GUR CORPORATION V. TRUST BANK OF AFRICA LTD."
igtion the "Republic of Cskei'counter-claimed fora declaration in relation
House of Lords in the Carl Zeiss
together sith a process of judi
(supra) Thus the executive certificate produ
ference, was held to justify the view that the
RECOGNITION OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS wo
Republic of Ciske’ was an emanation of the Republic of South Africa asa sovereign
was acting by virtue ofa delegation oflegislative power from South Africa.
12, BRITISH POLICY ON RECOGNITION
OF GOVERNMENTS
In 1980 the British Government adopted a new practice concerning recognition of
governments. The relevant statement was a follows:
swehave decided thet we shall no longer acord rec
Government recognise States in accordance with cm
‘Where an unconstitutional change of régime
of this change has been unfortunate. Executive certificates ike
case eupra) may be indecisive and reflect the
ational aw. Such a
acy afthe régimein ques-
Taw for example, whePART III
TERRITORIAL
SOVEREIGNTY