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OROCAM ENTERPRISES INC.

V CA 319 SCRA 444 (1999)

Facts:

Lessor X filed a case of unlawful detainer against lessees A, B, C and D for failure
to pay the increased rent which the RTC granted. X then filed a motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution specifically against A and E enterprise (a privy to the contract of
lease between X and A). E enterprise filed an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction which the RTC granted. On appeal, the CA declared the writ of
injunction as null and void.

Issue:

Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring as null and


void the writ of preliminary injunction.

Held:

No. The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order;


as such, it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal
from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing thereon the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari
where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate
and expeditious relief. In the present case, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the execution of the judgment, in spite of the fact that the right of
E to occupy the leased premises has been declared by final judgment to be inexistent.
Having no clear legal right, E's plea should not have merited the favorable action of the
trial court.
SANTIAGO LAND DEV. V. CA 267 SCRA 79 (1997)

Facts:

P, as assignee of the mortgagor, filed action against the mortgagee D to enforce


an alleged right to redeem. Pending this action, D sold the property to X.
Consequently, X filed a motion to intervene. P opposed the motion stating that X's
interest was a mere expectancy. Trial court allowed the intervention.

Issue:

Whether the action of the court was proper.

Held:

No. While D may have legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation, its
interest as transferee pendente lite is different from that of an intervenor. D asserts
that the rules are interchangeable and that it is erroneous to insist on the application of
Rule 3 §20 solely. The purpose of Rule 12 §2 on intervention is to enable a stranger to
an action to become a party to protect his interest and the court incidentally to settle all
conflicting claims. The purpose of Rule 3 §20 is to provide for the substitution of the
transferee pendente lite precisely because he is not a stranger but a successor-
ininterest of the transferor, who is a party to the action. As proper party, a transferee's
title to the property is subject to the incidents and results of the pending litigation and
is in no better position than the vendor in whose shoes he now stands.
SAMANIEGO V AGUILA 334 SCRA 438 (2000)

Facts:

The Office of the President granted the exemption from the coverage of the
"Operation Land Transfer Program" the land owned by X. On appeal, the CA dismissed
the petition questioning the decision of the Office for failure to implead the Office of the
President, as they should be considered as indispensable parties.

Issue:

Whether the Office of the President should be considered as an indispensable


party and must therefore be impleaded pursuant to the Rules.

Held:

No. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final


determination can be had of an action without that party being impleaded.
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, or that the court cannot proceed without
their presence. "Interests" within the meaning of this rule, should be material, directly
in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from a mere incidental
interest in the question involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is
one who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real
interest on the subject matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely because
the technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such party on the record. In the
case at bar, the failure to implead the Office of the President does not warrant the
dismissal of the case as such is considered as a pro forma party.
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC. V CA 326 SCRA 18 (2000)

Facts:

X filed a complaint for damages against Company Y. By way of a counterclaim,


Company Y prayed for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The RTC
then required the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and scheduled the pre-trial
conference. Counsel A, on behalf of X's counsel, Counsel B, file an "Urgent Motion for
Resetting " of the pre-trial conference on the ground that Counsel B was on sick leave.
Company Y was declared as in default on the ground that no medical certificate had
been attached to the motion. The court allowed X to present her evidence ex-parte.

Issue:

Whether Company Y should be declared as in default for their failure to file their
pre-trial briefs at least three days before the pre-trial conference.

Held:

No. In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for postponement of pre-trial,


the court must take into account the following factors: a) the reason for the
postponement, and b) the merits of the case of the movant. In this case, there is no
showing that Company X, in asking for the resetting of the pre-trial conference, sought
merely to cause unjustifiable delay in the proceedings. Also, the presence of another
lawyer from counsel's law firm during the scheduled pre-trial conference negates any
suggestion of bad faith or wanton disregard of the rules on the part of the petitioners.

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