G.R. No.

85215 July 7, 1989  THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE

THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS.
vs. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.)
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE
Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB
RAMOS, respondents. 86. 

Nelson Lidua for private respondent.  (s) Felipe Ramos 

NARVASA, J.: (Printed) F. Ramo

What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the
respondent Judge of the right of an individual not to "be compelled to be
a witness against himself"  accorded by Section 20, Article III of the
Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the
commission of an offense . . . to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The relevant
facts are not disputed.  to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having
allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales
of plane tickets, 1 the PAL management notified him of an investigation
to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation
was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with
the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which
Ramos pertained.2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his
superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading as follows: 
2-8-86 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:  indictment, 5 he (Ramos) —
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch
Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station
Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and
PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed
"of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response
to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were
tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had
been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the
money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame,"
that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a
"compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be
known in the next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation
to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be
represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that
he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). 4 How
the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it
would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less
consummated. 
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe
Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in
Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29,
1987. In that place and during that time, according to the
 .. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did
then and there willfully ... defraud the Philippine
Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following
manner, to wit: said accused ... having been entrusted
with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers for
one-way trip and round-trip in the total amount of
P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the
proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to return
those unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead
of complying with his obligation, with intent to
defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate, misapply
and convert the value of the tickets in the sum of
P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed
and refused to make good his obligation, to the damage
and prejudice of the offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not
Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was
undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of
the Fiscal.  unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written
offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988,6which included "the (above
mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9,
1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as
Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on February
8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.  detained at the time, or the investigation was administrative in character
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s
Evidence."7 Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection
was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken
without the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was
objected to "for the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'  Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the People of the
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the
exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in
connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits
A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible
in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos
taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an
investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not
appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same
and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel."
He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission
made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the
same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not
appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said
admission." 
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was
denied, by Order dated September 14, 1988. 10 In justification of said
Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v.
Juan Ponce Enrile, et al.,  121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit,  135 SCRA
467,  People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v. Decierdo,  149
SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations
the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
the present Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed
out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station
was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of
the tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage
of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not
could not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional
provision cited." 
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now
assailed in the petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this
Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required
Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition, and directed
issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . .
ENJOINING the respondents from proceeding further with the trial
and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe
Ramos), including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the 1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right
aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the same case, now of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First himself — set out in the first sentence, which is a
Judicial Region." The Court also subsequently required the Solicitor verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the
General to comment on the petition. The comments of Judge Ayson, 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by
Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The the Fifth Amendment of the American
Solicitor General has made common cause with the petitioner and prays Constitution, 12 and 
"that the petition be given due course and thereafter judgment be
rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to 2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e.,
admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the
thereby removed whatever impropriety might have attended the commission of an offense." 
institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the
Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the
action in question.  individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in
separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue — of be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in
whether or not it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in
have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now
resolve it.  contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.13

At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Right Against Self-Incrimination 
Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has given a construction that
is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:  The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena,
against himself Any person under investigation for the in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" 
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this not a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.  he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular
incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only
rights, dealt with in the section, namely:  when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to
the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the
court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be
sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some
offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the
constitutional guaranty. 
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
does not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial,
hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness
of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows
or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom that every
one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no
one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the
witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a
question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or
automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in
behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows
that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to
claim it at the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation 
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second
right, or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons
"under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects"
under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these
rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against
self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any
person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.  result of interrogation can be used against him.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for
an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a
decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law
enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for
the commission of an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him; 22 and 
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards
laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation"
being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding
against the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have
been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or
make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a
 
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals
in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statement without full warnings of constitutional rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial
interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." 26 And,
as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." 27 The situation contemplated has also been
more precisely described by this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial
investigation begins a confrontation arises which at
best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is brought to
an army camp or police headquarters and there
questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but
as many investigators as may be necessary to break
down his morale. He finds himself in strange and
unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he
considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-
trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study have
taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it,
out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and
are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if
they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of
the officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance. 
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some
crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made
"under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one
case, 29 where a person went to a police precinct and before any sort of
investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up
for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him
by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was
admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial
interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.  be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case 
As Regards Giving of Testimony 
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed,
i.e., (1) that against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial
interrogation apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already
charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by
the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the
time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors'
office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already
pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion
to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by
the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer under
"custodial interrogation." 
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary
investigation before the public prosecutor), in common with all other
persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the first
sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right
to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the time that it is
put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in
the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused
"occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under
the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled
among others- 
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify
as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may
to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against
him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a
witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify
or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or
one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena
or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a
witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for
himself. 33 In other words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a
civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only
the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the
time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to
testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn,
answer any question. 34And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect
or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used
against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so.
This is his right. But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined
as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters
stated in his direct examination, or connected therewith . 36 He may not
on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that
the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would
have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is
charged. 
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action
be asked a question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with
which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of
which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on
the strength of the right against self-incrimination granted by the first
sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section
17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for
murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-
examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might
be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any
particular question which might implicate him for a different and
distinct offense, say, estafa. 
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and
subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the following
rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or
with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant
way, and on being interrogated by the police: the
continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force,
violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in
violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — 37
a) to refuse to be a witness; 
b) not to have any prejudice
whatsoever result to him by such
refusal; 
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject
to cross-examination by the
prosecution; 
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to
answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate him for some
crime other than that for which he is
then prosecuted. 
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has
misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as
applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In
so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to
substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical.
The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state
of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application
of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded,
whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are
hereby, annulled and set aside.  But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was
not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be
properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into
the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have
had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did
not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is
also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to
him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986
and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the
note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on
February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to
compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even
spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground
that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.  interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of)
the violation of the right of any person against self-incrimination when
the investigation is conducted by the complaining parties, complaining
companies, or complaining employers because being interested parties,
unlike the police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to
protect, they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on
their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements
under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy and undue
influence." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory
requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed
on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has
been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be
informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and
opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of
statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative
investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of
counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course,
refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege.
him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the
administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought
against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to
be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial
investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements,
whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him
precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the
investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of his
liability. 
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances
the judge's expressed apprehensions may be realized, that violence or
intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to bear on an
employee under investigation — or for that matter, on a person being
interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. In such an
event, any admission or confession wrung from the person under
defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable
proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in justice be
received against the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded
any evidentiary value at all. 
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting
aside the Orders of the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R,
dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered
to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said
Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the trial and
adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26,
1988 having become functus officio, is now declared of no further force
and effect.
G.R. Nos. 118866-68 September 17, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  same import as their respective testimonies in court.5 On June 27, 1992,
vs.
RODOLFO DE LA CRUZ, alias RODOLFO DOMINGO or
"OMPONG," accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
In this appeal from three sentences of reclusion perpetua, accused-
appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz, aliasRodolfo Domingo or "Ompong,"
consistent with his negative pleas when arraigned on November 5, 1992
and January 11, 1993,1 impugns his conviction for multiple murder in
Criminal Cases Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031 by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 74,2 of Antipolo, Rizal. He anchors his entreaty for
the reversal thereof mainly on the ground that he was not fully and
appropriately apprised of or allowed to exercise his constitutional rights
prior to and while undergoing custodial investigation.
In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of Teodorico
M. Laroya, Jr. and his children, 12-year old Karen Verona D. Laroya
and 10-year old John Lester D. Laroya, were discovered in their
residence at 13 Emerald Street, Greenpark Village, Cainta, Rizal by
their horrified neighbors. The star-crossed trio were all bloodied
consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of them had a knife still
embedded in and protruding from their bodies when found. Karen
Verona also bore external signs of sexual assault.3
None of their neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders.
Two of them later testified in court, namely, Harold Jim F. Balocating
and Anita F. Pangan. The former merely recounted how, while playing
table tennis in front of the Laroya residence, he and his friends stumbled
upon the dead bodies of the victims. Anita Pangan, on the other hand,
recalled that at around 9:00 P.M. of June 23, 1992, appellant, who was a
brother-in-law of Teodorico Laroya, Jr., purchased some candies at her
store which is located inside the village.4
Both Balocating and Pangan had previously executed sworn statements
just three days after the incident, the assertions in which were of the
the police authorities apprehended appellant at the house of his brother
in Fort Bonifacio. SPO1 Carlos R. Atanacio, Jr., a member of the Cainta
Police Station in Cainta, Rizal interrogated appellant regarding the
crimes on the same day that he was arrested.
This police officer declared in the trial court that before he questioned
appellant as to his participation in said crimes, all steps were undertaken
to completely inform the latter of his rights and this he did in the
presence of appellant's supposed counsel, one Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-
Villanueva. Appellant then signed, likewise in the presence of said
counsel, an extrajudicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he
allegedly snuffed out the lives of the victims.6
When presented as the lone witness for himself, appellant was observed
by the trial court to be afflicted with a problem in expressing himself
and an impediment in his speech (ngo-ngo). By appellant's own account,
he only reached the fourth grade of elementary schooling and, although
conversant with Tagalog, he is unable to read and write, although he can
sign his name. He bluntly repudiated the version of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr.
and insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel of his choice,
much less met said Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, when he was
interrogated at the police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal and signed his
supposed extrajudicial confession. Parenthetically, his answers to the
questions appearing therein are in surprisingly fluent, flawless and
expressive Tagalog,7 which could not have been done by him because of
his defect in speech and articulation.
He further claims that he was instead tortured by the police authorities
into signing the same, and not that he did so voluntarily. While he
admits having been at the residence of the victims on the night that they
were murdered, he flatly denied having killed them as he left the trio
well and alive that same night when he proceeded to his brother's place
in Fort Bonifacio.8
1. In unambiguous and explicit terms, Section 12, paragraph 1, of
Article III of the Constitution requires that "[a]ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Corollary thereto,
paragraph 3 thereof declares that any confession or admission obtained
in violation of the same shall be inadmissible in evidence against the
confessant.
An accused person must be informed of the rights set out in said
paragraph of Section 12 upon being held as a suspect and made to
undergo custodial investigation by the police authorities.9 As explained
by this Court in People vs. Marra,10 custodial investigation involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken
into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory
question which tend to elicit incriminating statements.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite
function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to
the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful
communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere
perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would
thus not suffice.
The defendant in the dock must be made to understand
comprehensively, in the language or dialect that he knows, the full
extent of the same. A confession made in an atmosphere characterized
by deficiencies in informing the accused of all the rights to which he is
entitled would be rendered valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it
is by non-compliance with the procedural and substantive safeguards to
which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further
implemented and ramified by statutory law.11
2. In the present case, SPO1 Atanacio, Jr., admitted in his testimony
before the lower court that the investigation of appellant in connection
with the murders actually commenced at around 9:00 A.M. on June 27,
1992 at the police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal, at the time when
appellant was still without counsel.12 The sworn statement containing
appellant's extrajudicial confession itself shows that it was taken at
around 11:00 A.M.13 Further, while SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed
appellant in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he
made could be used for or against him in any court, and that he could
have counsel preferably of his own choice, he nonetheless failed to tell
appellant that if the latter could not afford the services of counsel, he
could be provided with one.14
The foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities are all fatal to
the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession supposedly executed by
appellant before SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. Jurisprudence along these lines
have all been too consistent — an accused under custodial interrogation
must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start
thereof. Indeed, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, could not be
any clearer.
To reiterate, prior to the commencement of the investigation, the
accused must perforce be informed, on top of all his other rights
enumerated therein, that where he lacks a counsel of his choice because
of indigence or other incapacitating cause, he shall be provided with
one. Without this further safeguard, the cautionary right to counsel
would merely impress upon the accused, more so upon an impecunious
person like appellant who is hardly educated, that his right thereto would
mean simply that he can consult a lawyer if he has one or has the
financial capacity to obtain legal services, and nothing more.
Curiously, the record is completely bereft of any indication as to how
appellant was able to engage the services of Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-
Villanueva, the counsel who was allegedly present when appellant
executed his confession and who was not even subpoenaed to testify
thereon. This significant circumstance lends credence to the latter's
denial that he ever met in person, much less executed the confession in
the presence of, said counsel. What emerges from a perusal of the record
is that this counsel was merely picked out and provided by the law
enforcers themselves, thus putting into serious doubt her independence
and competence in assisting appellant during the
investigation15 as to affect its admissibility.
Moreover, had she been equal to her responsibility in the face of such
serious charge involved in the cases, the failure of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. to
fully apprise appellant of all his rights, particularly the requirement that
if he could not afford the services of a lawyer he shall be provided with
one would have been rectified by said counsel at that very stage of the
investigation. Indeed, from our earliest jurisprudence, the law
vouchsafes to the accused the right to an effective counsel, one who can
be made to act in protection of his rights,16 and not by merely going
through the motions of providing him with anyone who possesses a law
degree.
Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of such counsel
at that stage of custodial interrogation are the signatures which she
affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a cursory reading of the confession
itself and SPO1 Atanacio's version of the manner in which he conducted
the interrogation, yields no evidence or indication pointing to her having
explained to the appellant his rights under the Constitution.
In People vs. Ayson, etc., et al.,17 this Court aptly emphasized these
constitutional safeguards in this wise:
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural
safeguards laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody
interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an
adversary proceeding against the suspect.
He must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise those rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer or make a statement. But
unless and until such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado" interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights.
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial
interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused
persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." The situation contemplated has also been
more precisely described by this Court.
 . . . After a person is arrested and his custodial
investigation begins, a confrontation arises
which at best may be termed unequal. The
detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and "cross-
examined" not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break
down his morale. He finds himself in strange
and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person
he meets, he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in
their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study have taught
them to extract the truth, or what may pass for
it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were,
the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of
the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this
imbalance.
3. Necessarily, even while there is evidence of the corpus delicti in this
case, appellant's conviction must be set aside for his extrajudicial
confession is obviously inadmissible in evidence against him. The rule
is that an extrajudicial confession, where admissible must be
corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti in order to sustain a
finding of guilt.18 Both must co-exist. The insistence of the Office of the
Solicitor General that appellant's confession could nonetheless be treated
as an "admission" which could therefore be admitted in evidence is
misplaced, for the Bill of Rights treats of both "confessions" and
"admissions" in the same light. 19 In addition, it should be stressed that
in appellant's case, no eyewitnesses to the actual killings were ever
presented to testify in court, and the prosecution relied primarily on
circumstantial evidence to inculpate appellant in crimes wherein he was
meted three penalties of reclusion perpetua.
It is significant that, with the exception of appellant's putative
extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of his alleged guilt has been
presented by the People. The proposition that the medical findings jibe
with the narration of appellant as to how he allegedly committed the
crimes falls into the fatal error of figuratively putting the horse before
the cart. Precisely, the validity and admissibility of the supposed
extrajudicial confession are in question and the contents thereof are
denied and of serious dubiety, hence the same cannot be used as the
basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would assume that which has still
to be proved, a situation of petitio principii  or circulo en probando.
Evidently, herein appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme penal
consequences of the crimes on account of the shaky and decrepit
circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution. While the defense
of alibi advanced by appellant is by nature a weak one by itself, it
assumes commensurate significance and strength where the evidence for
the prosecution itself is frail and effete. For, needless to state, the
prosecution must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the
defense but upon the vigor of its own.20 In sum, the presumption of
innocence enjoyed by appellant has remained intact and impervious to
the prosecution's assault thereon.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the judgments of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, of Antipolo, Rizal in Criminal Cases
Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and accused-appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz, alias Rodolfo Domingo or
"Ompong," is hereby ACQUITTED. His immediate release is
accordingly ordered unless there be any other lawful cause for his
continued incarceration.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132154               June 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
PACITO ORDOÑO Y NEGRANZA alias  ASING and APOLONIO
MEDINA Y NOSUELO alias  POLING, accused-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
COURTS are confronted, repeatedly, with the difficult task of
scrutinizing the sufficiency of extrajudicial confessions as basis for
convicting the accused. The drive to apprehend the culprits at any cost,
particularly in crimes characterized by brutality and savagery, not too
infrequently tempts law enforcement agencies to take unwarranted
shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal constraints that are
intended to ensure that only the guilty are punished. In the delicate
process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, courts play a
crucial role in assuring that the evidence gathered by government agents
scrupulously meets the exacting constitutional standards which if not
met impose a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., "any confession or admission
obtained in violation of Art. II, Sec. 12 (1), shall be inadmissible in
evidence."
This case is on automatic review of the 11 December 1997 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Br. 34, Balaoan, La Union, in Crim. Case No.
2415 finding both accused Pacito Ordoño y Negranza alias Asing and
Apolonio Medina y Nosuelo alias  Poling guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape with homicide and imposing upon each of them two (2)
separate death penalties.
The records show that on 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a
young girl was found among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay
Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as Shirley
Victore, fifteen (15) years old, a resident of Barangay Guesset,
Poblacion, Santol, La Union, who three (3) days before was reported
missing. Post-mortem  examination conducted by Dr. Arturo Llavore, a
medico-legal officer of the NBI, revealed that the victim was raped and
strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina as
the authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the police thereupon
invited the two (2) suspects and brought them to the police station for
questioning. However, for lack of evidence then directly linking them to
the crime, they were allowed to go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina
returned to the police station one after another and acknowledged that
they had indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the
police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions
in writing. The investigators however could not at once get the services
of a lawyer to assist the two (2) accused in the course of the
investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the
Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. Be
that as it may, the statements of the two (2) accused where nevertheless
taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in their own
dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by
a competent counsel of their choice. Upon their acquiescence and
assurance that they understood their rights and did not require the
services of counsel, the investigation was conducted with the Parish
Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police
officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the
giving of the voluntary statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted
their participation in the crime.1âwphi1.nêt
The first to confess was Apolonio Medina who in addition to the Parish
Priest, the Mayor, the Chief of Police and the other police officers was
also accompanied by his wife and mother. Apolonio Medina narrated
that in the morning of 2 August 1994 while he was walking towards the
house of Pacito Ordoño in Sitio Buacao, Poblacion, Santol, La Union,
he noticed a young woman walking towards the school at the Poblacion.
Upon reaching Sitio Buacao, he saw Pacito Ordoño standing along the
road. When the woman reached him he suddenly grabbed her, held her
tightly and covered her mouth with his right hand. As Medina neared
them, Ordoño turned to him and said, "Come and help me, I am feeling
uneasy."
Although Medina claimed he was surprised at the request, he
nonetheless went to Ordoño, helped him hold the legs of the young
woman including her bag and umbrella and together they carried her to
the hushes where they laid her down. Medina held her legs as requested
while Ordoño continued to cover her mouth with his hand and boxing
her many times on the head. When she was already weak and weary
Ordoño knelt near her, raised her skirt and lowered her panty down to
her knees. Medina continued to remove her panty as Ordoño removed
his short pants, then his briefs. Ordoño then raped her, boxed her head
continuously, with Medina continuously pinning her legs down and
boxing those legs every time she struggled.
After Ordoño had satiated himself Medina took his turn in raping the
same victim with Ordoño holding her legs. After they were through,
Medina left to watch out for intruders while Ordoño tied a vine around
the girl's neck, hanged her on a tree that ended her life. Then, they went
back to the road and parted ways.
After Medina said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into
tears. He then affixed his signature on his statement and so did his wife,
followed by all the other witnesses who listened to his confession.
Pacito Ordoño narrated his story in the afternoon. According to him, in
the morning of 2 August 1994 he was on his way to Sitio Guesset,
Barangay Manggaan, Santol, La Union, when he saw a girl followed by
Apolonio Medina. When the girl was near him he immediately grabbed
her and covered her mouth. Medina drew near, held her two legs, bag
and umbrella and together they carried her into the thicket. After laying
her down Ordoño boxed her breasts and face while Medina boxed her
legs. When she became weak Ordoño raised her skirt and lowered her
panty while Medina completely removed it. Ordoño then removed his
pants and walker briefs, went on top of Shirley and as Medina spread
her legs Ordoño immediately inserted his penis into her vagina. After
ejaculating Ordoño turned to Medina for him to take his turn in raping
the girl. Ordoño was now holding her legs. At the end of his narration
Ordoño affixed his thumbmark on his statement in lieu of his signature
as he did not know how to write.
Thereafter, Apolonio Medina and Pacito Ordoño were detained at the
Santol police station. News about the apprehension and detention of the
culprits of the rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon spread that Roland
Almoite, leading radio announcer of radio station DZNL, visited and
interviewed them. In the interview which was duly tape-recorded both
accused admitted again their complicity in the crime and narrated
individually the events surrounding their commission thereof. According
to Medina, his remorse in having committed the crime was so great but
his repentance came too late. 1 He and Ordoño hoped that the parents of
Shirley Victore would forgive them. 2 Upon conclusion of the interview,
Roland Almoite immediately went to radio station DZNL and played the
taped interview on the air. The same interview was played again on the
air the following morning and was heard by thousands of listeners.
A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the
office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance and
counseling. In a closed-door session, PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz
apprised each of the accused of his constitutional rights and, even
though their confessions were already written in their dialect, explained
to them each of the questions and answers taken during the
investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the consequences of
their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second
signature/thumbmark thereon.
After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and
informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and
thumbmarks for the second time in their respective confessions. Once
again Atty. Corpuz apprised the two (2) accused of their constitutional
rights, explained the contents of their respective statements, and finally,
accompanied them to Judge Fabian M. Bautista, MTC judge of Balaoan,
La Union, who further apprised the two (2) accused of their
constitutional rights and asked them if they had been coerced into
signing their confessions. They assured Judge Bautista that their
statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance
that they had not been coerced into giving and signing their confessions,
Judge Bautista finally asked the accused Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio
Medina to affix their signatures/thumbmarks on their respective
confessions, and to subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then
signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by a few
members of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing.
On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded
not guilty.
In his defense, Pacito Ordoño testified that on 5 August 1994, while he
was cooking at home, the police arrived and invited him to the
headquarters for questioning. The police asked him his whereabouts on
2 August 1994 and he answered that he worked in the farm of Barangay
Captain Valentin Oriente. According to Ordoño, the questioning took
one (1) hour with the police boxing him several times on his stomach
and on his side. They even inserted the barrel of a gun into his mouth in
an effort to draw out answer from him. This being fruitless, he was
placed in jail and released only the following morning, 6 August 1994.
Three (3) days later, or on 9 August 1994, the police once again invited
him to the headquarters where he was told that he was responsible for
the rape and death of Shirley Victore.
Accused Pacito Ordoño insisted on his innocence and maintained that he
was working with a certain barangay captain; nonetheless, he was
detained. Later that night the police took him out from jail and brought
him to the room of investigator SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga where he was
hit with the butt of an armalite and forced to admit to the rape and slay
of Shirley Victore. On 10, August 1994 SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga took
a typewriter and asked questions from him for one (1) hour without a
lawyer assisting him nor a priest witnessing the investigation. A barrel
of a gun was placed inside his mouth forcing him to admit the
commission of the crime and to affix his thumbmark on the document.
He was also brought to the office of the PAO lawyer twice but did not
affix his thumbmark on any document because he could not understand
its contents. A radio announcer visited him inside his cell for an
interview but he declined to answer his questions. He only answered the
radio announcer during his fourth visit when SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga
threatened to hit him if he did not admit to the commission of the crime.
As to Apolonio Medina, he heard from the police that he was also
detained but maintained that he (Ordoño) did not know Apolonio.
For his part, Apolonio Medina testified that on 5 August 1994 while he
was pasturing his carabaos at Barangay Guesset, in Santol, La Union,
the police came and invited him for questioning. They asked him where
he was on 2 August 1994 and he replied that he was carrying bananas
for his aunt Resurreccion. The interrogation lasted for about an hour
with neither a lawyer assisting him nor a relative being present, after
which he was placed in jail. Later, he was brought out and taken to a hut
near the headquarters where he was boxed, kicked and hit with a
nightstick. He lost consciousness and recovered only after he was
brought back to his cell. That same night he was returned to the hut
outside the police headquarters where he was again boxed. On 8 August
1994, with his legs tied to the ceiling beam, he was hanged upside down.
His breast was hit with the butt of a gun which was fired near his ear. A
barrel of a gun was inserted into his mouth. He was threatened that he
would be salvaged if he did not admit to killing the victim. He was
forced to sign a statement but could not recall its date of execution. He
was brought to the office of the PAO lawyer twice but he did not sign
the document. The investigator warned him that if he did not sign he
would be buried in the pit which he himself dug. On his third visit to the
office of the PAO lawyer he signed the document. He could not
remember having gone to the office of the MTC Judge of Balaoan, La
Union.1avvphi1 He was interviewed by a radio announcer and was
instructed by the investigator to narrate those that were in his statement.
He admitted he knew Pacito Ordoño. He showed his bruises to his
mother when the latter visited him in jail, prompting the latter to request
medical treatment for her son but the request was denied.
On 11 December 1997 the trial court adjudged accused Pacito Ordoño
and Apolonio Medina guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended
with conspiracy, and imposed upon each of them two (2) death penalties
on the basis of their extrajudicial confessions.
The accused are now before us assailing their conviction on the ground
that constitutional infirmities attended the execution of their
extrajudicial confessions, i.e., mainly the lack of counsel to assist them
during custodial investigation thereby making their confessions
inadmissible in evidence.
Under the Constitution 3 and the rules laid down pursuant to law 4 and
jurisprudence, 5 a confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy
four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the confession must be
voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express;
and, (d) the confession must be in writing. 6 Among all these
requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused's
right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield
him from the otherwise condemning nature of a custodial investigation.
The person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of the offense.7 Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of
the custodial investigation any statement elicited from the accused is
inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is premised
on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through, menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is
forcefully apparent. 8  counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in
In the instant case, custodial investigation began when the accused
Ordoño and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to
confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit
information and/or confession from them. At such point, the right of the
accused to counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly, after
informing the accused of their rights the police sought to provide them
with counsel. However, none could be furnished them due to the non-
availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the
remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of Balaoan, La
Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the
police should have already desisted from continuing with the
interrogation but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to
proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the police, they
requested the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of
Santol as well as the relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of
coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the accused of their
statements before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way
the absence of a lawyer during the investigation.
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the
accused's parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister
of the gospel as chosen by the accused may be present, RA 7438 does
not propose that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for
counsel without any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein
that before the above-mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions
must be met: (a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and, (b) a valid
waiver must be executed. RA 7438 does not therefore unconditionally
and unreservedly eliminate the necessity of counsel but underscores its
importance by requiring that a substitution of counsel with the above-
mentioned persons be made with caution and with the essential
safeguards.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol,
the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police
and other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of
continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be
effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. 9 Consequently, any admission obtained from the two (2)
accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be
inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later
does not remedy this omission either. Although there was a showing that
the PAO lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the
accused, enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their
admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid
and valuable advice given by counsel still came several days too late. It
could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel
during the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements were
being taken. 10 
The second affixation of the signatures/thumbmarks of the accused on
their confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting with the
PAO lawyer, in the presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the
PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions
an informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial investigation
without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing and later
signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Q: Do you want that we will continue with this
Constitution. 11 If the lawyer's role is diminished to being that of a mere investigation after having been appraised of all your
witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit an indication rights?
therein that there was compliance with the constitutional rights of the
accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), A: Yes, sir.
are not met. The standards utilized by police authorities to assure the
constitutional rights of the accused in the instant case therefore fell short Q: And, do you want that we continue with the
of the standards demanded by the Constitution and the law. investigation even without a lawyer of your own choice
to represent you?
It should further be recalled that the accused were not effectively
informed of their constitutional rights when they were arrested, so that A: Yes, sir.
when they allegedly admitted authorship of the crime after questioning,
their admissions were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights
Q: Are you now prepared to give your voluntary
against self-incrimination under Sec. 20, Art. IV, of the Bill of Rights.
statement consisting only the truth, without any lies
whatsoever?
As testified to, the police informed the accused of their rights to remain
silent and to counsel in a dialect understood by them, but despite the
A: Yes, sir . . . .
accused's apparent showing of comprehension, it is doubtful if they were
able to grasp the significance of the information being conveyed.
Pertinent portions of the extrajudicial confessions of Pacito Ordoño and PRELIMINARY —
Apolonio Medina, translated into English, read —
Mr. Apolonio Medina, I inform you that you are being
PRELIMINARY — investigated of an offense but before we proceed with this
investigation, I am informing you that you have the right to
remain silent to all questions asked of you, according to the new
Mr. Pacito Ordoño, I am informing you that you are being
Philippine Constitution.
investigated of an offense but before we continue, I tell you that
you have the right to remain silent under the new Constitution
of the Philippines. And you are likewise reminded that all statements you give may
be used for or against you in any Philippine court and you have
a right to have a lawyer of your own choice to represent you in
And you are also herein reminded that all statements you give
this investigation, do you understand this?
may be used for or against you in any Philippine court as
evidence and it is herein likewise reminded that you have the
right to secure the services of a lawyer of your own choice to ANSWER — Yes, sir.
represent you in this investigation, do you understand all these?
Q: After having known all your rights; do you want
A: Yes, sir because all that I will state will only be the that we continue with the investigation?
truth.
 A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you want that we continue with this
investigation even without a lawyer to represent you?
A: Yes, sir because all that I will state are the truth.
Q: Are you now prepared to give your voluntary
statement consisting only the truth, nothing but the
truth?
A: Yes, sir.
The advice proffered by the investigating officer to Ordoño starkly
resembles that given to Medina, thus leading us to conclude that the
advice was given perfunctorily and belonged to the stereotyped class —
a long question by the investigator informing the appellant of his right
followed by a monosyllabic answer — which this Court has condemned
for being unsatisfactory. 12 The desired role of counsel in the process of
custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer gives an
advice in a cursory manner as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the
rights of the person undergoing questioning. If advice is given casually
and tritely as to be useless, understanding on the part of the accused is
sacrificed and the unconstrained giving up of a right becomes impaired.
To be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates
"the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle." It is not enough for the interrogator to merely enumerate to
the person under investigation his rights as provided in Sec. 12, Art. III,
of the Constitution; the interrogator must also explain the effect of such
provision in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation
may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. 1  as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their
With the extrajudicial confession of the accused rendered inadmissible
in evidence, we are left with the interview taken by DZNL radio
announcer Roland Almoite as evidence. The taped interview was offered
to form part of the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to whom the
admissions were made and to prove through electronic device the
voluntary admissions by the two (2) accused that hey raped and killed
Shirley Victore. The defense objected to its acceptance on the ground
that its integrity had not been preserved as the tape could easily have
been spliced and tampered with. 14 However, as Roland Almoite
testified, it was the original copy of the taped interview; it was not
altered; the voices therein were the voices of the two (2) accused; and,
the defense never submitted evidence to prove otherwise. Under the
circumstances, we are inclined, as was the lower court, to admit the
authenticity of the taped interview.
A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's
testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free from any
influence or intimidation from police officers and was done willingly by
the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority
ordered or forced the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it
may be expected that police officers were around since the interview
was held in the police station, there was no showing that they were
within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where the interview was
being conducted. At most, the participation of the police authorities was
only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview.
The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily
admitted to the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having
perpetrated the crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made
by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence. 15 By analogy, statements
made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held
admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an investigation as
the response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked by
the radio reporter, not by the police or any other investigating officer.
When the accused talked to the radio announcer, they did not talk to him
uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional
rights.
Sec. 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the
verbal confessions of the two (2) accused to the radio announcer. What
the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts
or confessions. The rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 16  of their confessions, if there was any, when the latter asked them
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. 17 It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are
primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain
rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant,
rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that
government has the duty to protect. 18 Governmental power is not
unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect
the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies.
The admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly
tape-recorded are further bolstered and substantiated by the findings of
the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post
Mortem Findings. The narration of the accused Apolonio Medina that
Asing boxed the victim, who was struggling as she was being
raped, 19 was proved by the Autopsy Report stating that the victim
suffered contusions on the leg, right, lateral aspect, middle third,
etc.; 20 that accused Pacito Ordoño boxed the face of the victim to make
her weak 21 was proved by the testimony of the NBI Medico-Legal
Officer that there was blackening on the face of the victim due to
hematoma caused by violence or boxing on her face; 22 and, that accused
Pacito Ordoño hanged the victim on a tree by tying a vine around her
neck, 2 was proved by the finding of a depressed mark involving the
anterior and lateral portions of the neck. 24  A: Only that, sir.
As to the assertion of the accused that they were tortured and subjected
to inhuman treatment, we find such allegations baseless. The accused
were given several opportunities to decry the maltreatment they
allegedly suffered in the hands of the police but at no time did they
complain about it. First, they could have told the radio announcer
outright of the abuses they were subjected to before signing their
confessions. Second, when they were brought before the PAO lawyer
they likewise did not make any such claims but instead chose to ponder
over the lawyer's advice and deferred the signing of their confessions.
Lastly, they had the chance to tell the MTC judge about the fatal defect
whether they voluntarily signed the same and whether coercion was
used in extracting their confessions; however, they answered in the
negative. The accused cannot therefore on a later date make assertions
that they were maltreated when at no time — during their detention and
when they were in the presence of persons who could have helped them
— did they make such complaints.
The doctor who physically examined them further disproved their
assertions when she testified thus —
FISCAL TECAN:
Q: Now, you said that you talked with the prisoners, Pacito
Ordoño and Apolonio Medina, what did you actually tell them?
A: I said, "What do you feel on your body?" and I also said,
"What part of your body are (sic) painful?"
Q: What did they answer?
A: They did not answer me, sir.
Q: More or less, how many questions did you ask?
Q: After you have observed the prisoners, did you notice any
injury?
A: None, sir . . . .
 Q: . . . . You noticed any injury on their bodies?
A: None, sir, that is why I looked to see what was really
painful. 25  were in the same town where the crime happened. For alibi to prosper, it
Considering that the doctor was a witness for the defense, it was
surprising that she never mentioned about any maltreatment. She saw
not a single scratch on the bodies of the accused. She even inquired into
their physical well-being but they did not tell her of any pain or injury.
They could have easily asked the doctor for immediate treatment if
indeed they were physically harmed, but they did not. This puts their
claim of maltreatment into serious doubt. With this, the testimony of the
mother of the accused Apolonio Medina alleging that the police refused
treatment for her son despite his critical condition becomes a
fabrication, a mere figment of the imagination. As found by the lower
court, her tale of buying an antibiotic for her son, all on her own,
without the prescription of a doctor, is hard to believe since she is
already an elderly woman, seventy-three (73) years of age, unschooled
and illiterate. 26  (STATEMENT OF ACCUSED APOLONIO MEDINA) —
To further exculpate themselves, the accused invoked alibi. Ordoño
testified that at the time of the incident he was at work in the place of
Barangay Captain Valentin Oriente, 27 while Medina claimed that he
went to carry bananas for a certain aunt Resurreccion. 28 However, such
allegations deserve no credit as alibi becomes worthless when it is
established mainly by the accused themselves. 29 The defense of alibi is
always considered with suspicion and received with caution, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can
easily be fabricated. 30 
Quite interestingly, Bgy. Capt. Valentin Oriente was presented as a
witness for the prosecution, not for the defense, while "aunt
Resurreccion" was not presented at all. Bgy. Capt Oriente testified that
Pacito Ordoño did not work with him on 2 August 1994; on the
contrary, he saw him on the bridge at Sitio Guesset. 31 
Other than their lame assertions that they were with the above-
mentioned persons, the accused failed to substantiate their defense and
to give details on what transpired that fateful day, especially since they
must be convincing enough to preclude any doubt about the physical
impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its
immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. 32 Since the accused failed
to convince the Court otherwise, their defense must fall.
The lack of prior design or plan to rape and kill the victim prior to the
commission of the crime does not negate conspiracy. For conspiracy to
exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a
condition precedent. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of
the offense the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution. From the foregoing, it is evident that the accused helped each
other in carrying out their bestial acts. The taped interview as played in
open court clearly revealed thus —
INTERPRETER:
When I was walking there already about to be near him, he was already
holding the woman and said, come and help me because I was (sic) not
feeling well. Well, I was shocked of what I saw, sir. But later on, as
usual I regained my composure and so I finally went to help him, sir.
FISCAL TECAN: We will continue, Your Honor.
INTERPRETER:
And then we laid her down among the bushes then Asing boxed her
because she was struggling, Your Honor. And Asing did what he
wanted, sir. And then he asked me to take my turn and then I went
outside to look and see if there are (sic) people and then Asing went to
get a vine, sir. And when I arrived at their place, he was already tieing
(sic). After that, we left for home, sir. 3 
 x x x           x x x          x x x
(STATEMENT OF ACCUSED PACITO ORDOÑO)
Q: But Apolonio Medina was already there as your companion?
A: He was there already, sir. He was the one who held her legs,
sir.
Q: Who was the first one to rape or use her?
A: Me, sir. and after that, Apolonio Medina, sir.
Q: And after you were through, what did you do, was she still
conscious?
A: She was practically unconscious, sir.
Q: What did you do then?
A: We tied her neck and hanged her on a tree, sir. 34  In 1991, in People v. Flores  39 registered nurse was successively raped
The modifying circumstance of conspiracy being present, each of the
accused shall be liable for the other's acts as well. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "when by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death"
In 1971, in People v. Jose  35 this Court convicted the four (4) accused
with forcible abduction with rape, and three (3) counts of rape, and
imposed upon each of the accused four (4) death penalties in view of the
existence of conspiracy.
36 
In 1981, in People v. Yutila  this Court affirmed the judgment of the
court a quo declaring each of the three (3) accused guilty of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide and sentenced each of them to
suffer a single penalty of death. However, Justice Barredo in his
separate opinion interposed that in accordance with the doctrine laid
down in the Jayme Jose case, three (3) death penalties should have been
imposed on each of the accused.
In People v. Vizcarra  37 where the four (4) accused were charged with
rape with homicide, the Court held that only one of them should be held
liable for the crime of rape with homicide and all the rest for simple
rape. But since four (4) successive offenses were charged and proved,
each of the accused was imposed four (4) death sentences for four (4)
separate and distinct crimes of rape. The existence of conspiracy among
them, the overwhelming evidence as to the nature and the number of
crimes committed, as well as the attendance of the aggravating
circumstances, fully justified the imposition of four (4) death penalties.
In 1988, in People v. Diño  38 where the three (3) accused took turns in
ravishing the victim and thereafter killed her, the Court declared each of
them guilty of three (3) crimes of rape with homicide and sentenced
each of them to three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua. The penalty in
fact should have been death but with its proscription in the 1987
Constitution the penalty imposed was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
by four (4) men and then killed. The trial court convicted each of them
with the special complex crime of multiple rape with homicide on four
(4) counts and as a consequence thereof sentenced each of them to four
(4) death penalties. This Court affirmed the decision of the lower court
with the modification that the accused should instead suffer four (4)
penalties of reclusion perpetuaby reason of the constitutional
proscription on the imposition of the death penalty. The four (4) death
penalties for each of the appellants were explained to be ordained by the
fact that conspiracy had been established beyond reasonable doubt.
In 1996, in People v. Laray  40 this Court convicted two (2) of the
accused charged therein with multiple rape and sentenced each of them
to suffer two (2) counts of reclusion perpetua  because of the existence
of conspiracy.
Accordingly, herein accused Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina
should be held liable for the special complex crime of rape with
homicide on two (2) counts as defined and penalized in Art. 335 of the G.R. No. 136253      February 21, 2001
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
We have held that the indemnification of the victim shall be in the vs.
amount of P100,000.00 if the crime of rape is committed or effectively CLEMENTE JOHN LUGOD, accused-appellant. 
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the applicable amendatory laws. 41 In addition, this Court GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
has likewise ruled that in crimes of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages must be awarded to the victim without need of proof nor
This is an automatic review of the Judgment1 dated October 8, 1998 of
even pleading the basis thereof. 42 
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28 in
Criminal Case No. SC-6670 finding the accused, Clemente John Lugod
Four (4) Justices of the Court however continue to maintain the alias "HONASAN", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
unconstitutionality of RA 7659 insofar as it prescribed the death penalty; with homicide.
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that
the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully
On October 10, 1997, an Information2 for rape with homicide was filed
imposed in the case at bar.
against the accused as follows:
WHEREFORE, the 11 December 1997 Judgment rendered by the
"That on or about September 16, 1997 in the municipality of
Regional Trial Court-Branch 34, Balaoan, La Union, as AFFIRMED
Cavinti, province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
with the MODIFICATION that the two (2) accused PACITO ORDOÑO
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means force and
y NEGRANZA alias  ASING and APOLONIO MEDINA y
intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there willfully,
NOSUELO alias POLING are held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
the special complex crime of rape with homicide on two (2) counts and
NAIRUBE J. RAMOS, an eight-year old girl, against her will
are sentenced each to two (2) DEATH PENALTIES. Each of the
and by reason or on the same occasion and in order to hide the
accused is further ordered to indemnity the heirs of Shirley Victore in
crime he just committed, dump the victim in the grassy coconut
the amount of P200,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 for
plantation area, which resulted in her death due to shock
moral damages for both counts of rape. Cost against both accused.
secondary to vulvar laceration committed on her by the herein
accused, to the damage and prejudice of the surviving heirs of
In consonance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659 amending Art. 83 of the the victim."
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the
Upon arraignment, the accused with the assistance of counsel entered a
possible exercise of his pardoning power.1âwphi1.nêt
plea of not guilty.3 Thereafter, trial ensued.
SO ORDERED.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses in support of its
charge against the accused:
EDILBERTO CASTILLO, the medico-legal officer who examined the
cadaver of Nairube on September 19, 1997, testified that during the
course of his examination of the cadaver, he discovered an 8 cm. wound
penetration in her vagina which was probably caused by the insertion of
a penis; that the cadaver was in an advanced state of decomposition; that
more or less, the approximate time of death of the victim was three (3)
days prior to his examination; and that the cause of death of the victim
was hypovolenic shock secondary to the laceration.4
RICARDO VIDA, the Task Force Chief of Cavinti, testified that on
September 18, 1997, at around 4:35 p.m., the accused pointed out where
the body of the victim was; that the accused pointed to a place inside
Villa Anastacia which was two hundred (250) meters from the road; that
at the time the accused pointed to the place, he was handcuffed to the
accused; that the accused used his left hand in pointing towards the
direction; and that the father of the victim cried upon identifying the
victim."5
VIOLETA CABUHAT testified that on September 15, 1997, at around
10:00 p.m., she was weaving hats at her house. At that time, she was
together with her three children, Joey, Jessica and Jovelin and Loreto
Veloria. The accused suddenly entered her house and asked her if he
could sleep there but she declined. After she declined, he suddenly
forced her to move to one side of the place where she was seated by
forcing his body against hers and held her chin. She noticed that he was
drunk at that time because she smelt liquor on his breath. After he held
her chin, she went upstairs and slept. She claims that the accused left her
house at 10:20 p.m. since she looked at her watch when she went
upstairs. She does not remember what happened next. In court, she
identified that accused as the person who entered her house that night. 6
LORETO VELORIA testified that on September 15, 1997, at around
10:10 p.m., he was at the house of Violeta Cabuhat. While he was there,
the accused, whom he identified in court, suddenly arrived. He noticed
that the accused was wearing a pair of muddy rubber slippers the bottom
of which was color red while the top was color yellow. Since the
slippers of the accused were muddy, he asked him to remove them but
the accused did not comply with his request. Veloria also noticed that
the accused was wearing a black collared T-shirt. In court, he identified
a pair of slippers (Exhibit "D") as the one he saw the accused wearing
that night and on several other occasions. He also identified a black
collared T-shirt in court (Exhibit "E") as the one he saw the accused
wearing that night and on two Veloria stated that the accused sat beside
Violeta and tried to catch her chin; that he conversed with Violeta but
did not hear the accused's request if he could stay overnight. After the
accused left, he also left the house of Violeta.7
PEDRO DELA TORRE testified that on September 15, 1997, at 10:30
p.m., the accused arrived at his house and joined the drinking session of
his son. He noticed that the accused was wearing a black T-shirt and
appeared to be drunk. Dela Torre claims that the accused left at around
11:45 p.m.8
ROMUALDO RAMOS testified that at around 8:30 on the morning of
September 16, 1997, he was driving his tricycle towards the poblacion
of Cavinti. While driving towards the poblacion, he noticed the accused
coming out of the gate of Villa Anastacia. Upon seeing the accused, he
stopped his tricycle thinking that the accused would board the same but
the accused did not mind him. He noticed that the accused was wearing
only a pair of white short pants with a red waistline and was not wearing
a T-shirt or any slippers. The accused also appeared to be drunk.
Thereafter, he proceeded to the poblacion terminal where he discovered
that Nairube was missing. He also learned that the accused was the
suspect behind her disappearance. Upon learning this, he told Ricardo
Vida, the Chief of the barangay tanod who was searching for the victim,
to look for her at Villa Anastacia because it was the place where he saw
the accused come out from. Ramos further testified that the house of the
victim is about five hundred (500) meters away from the place where he
saw the accused but if one passes through the coconut plantation, it is
only two hundred (200) meters away.9
ALMA DIAZ testified that around 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. of September 16,
1997, she went with the search party to look for Nairube. The search
party was composed of around ten (10) persons including Violeta and
Helen Ramos, the mother of the victim. They first searched the back
portion of the victim's house. During the course of their search, she
found a panty around three hundred (300) meters away from the house
of the victim. Helen identified the panty as belonging to her daughter
and cried upon seeing the same. The panty was laid behind a barb wire
fence (the boundary of Villa Anastacia) and had a spot of blood and
some mud on it. In court, she identified Exhibit "F" as the panty she saw
but stated that it was already clean. Thereafter, they continued the search
and found a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the
end of the sleeve hanging on a guava twig. The T-shirt appeared clean at
the time. She picked up the T-shirt and brought it along with her to the
house of the victim. Upon reaching the house, the T-shirt fell in mud
and got dirty. Diaz further stated that the panty was found less than a
hundred (100) meters away while the black T-shirt was fifty (50) meters
away from the place where the body of the victim was found inside
Villa Anastacia and that the panty and T-shirt were around thirty (30)
meters away from each other. Diaz also claims that eight days after the
death of the child, the mother of the accused, Irene Lugod, came to her
house to ask her for help in seeking an amicable settlement of the case
with the Ramos spouses. On cross-examination Diaz stated that she
found the panty closer than the black T-shirt to the body of the victim.10
HELEN RAMOS, the mother of the victim, testified that on September
15, 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., she was asleep in her house together with
her husband and children, Nimrod; Neres and Nairube, the victim.
Nairube slept close to her "on the upper part II of her body. At around
12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going
down the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in
the place where she was sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely
answered the call of nature. After three minutes of waiting for Nariube's
return, she stood up and began calling out for Nairube but there was no
answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw that the backdoor of
their house was open. She went outside through the backdoor to see  if
Nairube was there but she was not. Helen also testified that Nairube's
blanket was also no longer at the place she slept but that her slippers
were still there. She further stated that she found a pair of rubber
slippers on top of a wooden bench outside of her backdoor. The sole of
the slippers was red while the strap was a combination of yellow and
white. She assured the court that the slippers did not belong to any
member of her family. In court, she identified Exhibit "D" as the
slippers she found that night. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of
Alma Diaz to ask her for help. Then, in the morning of September 16,
1997, she went to the police station to report the loss of her child. She
also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers. She then went home
while the police began their search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m.,
Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching team. During the
search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of her
daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was thereafter ordered to
go home while the others continued the search. On September 18, 1997,
they found the dead body of her daughter in Villa Anastacla. Helen also
testified on the amounts she spent in connection with the funeral of her
daughter and produced a list which totaled P37,200.00.  During cross-
examination, Helen stated that the pair of slippers she found on top of
the bench was muddy.11
SPO2 QUIRINO GALLARDO testified that on September 16, 1997 at
around 7:30 in the a.m., Helen Ramos reported that her daughter,
Nairube, was missing. He thereafter proceeded to the house of the
victim together with members of the Crime Investigation Group, the
PNP and some townspeople to conduct an ocular inspection. Helen
Ramos gave hi m a pair of slippers and pointed to him the location
where she found the same. Alma Diaz also gave him a black T-shirt
which she found. Loreto Veloria informed him that the two items were
worn by the accused when he went to the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At
around 7:00 p.m., he apprehended the accused on the basis of the pair of
slippers and the black T-shirt. He then brought the accused to the police
station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first, the accused
denied that he did anything to Nairube but after he told him what
happened to the girl. Gallardo claims that the accused told him that after
the drinking spree on September 15, 1997, the accused wanted to have
sexual intercourse with a woman. So after the drinking spree, the
accused went to the house of Gemma Lingatong, the neighbor of Helen
Ramos. Upon his arrival at the house of Gemma, he bumped pots which
awakened the occupants of the house. Considering the commotion he
caused, he left and went to the house of Nairube Ramos. After removing
his slippers, he entered the house of Nairube and slowly went upstairs.
He saw that Helen Ramos was sleeping beside-her husband so he took
Nairube instead. In court, Gallardo demonstrated how the accused
claimed to have lifted the child by raising two of his hands as if he was
lifting something off the ground. After taking Nairube, he brought her to
the farm where according to the accused; he raped her three times. After
successfully raping Nairube, the accused slept. When he woke up, he
saw the lifeless body of Nairube which he wrapped in a blanket and hid
in a grassy place. Then, he took a bath in the river. He then returned to
Villa Anastacia and went out through its gate. Although he admitted to
having raped and killed Nairube, the accused refused to make a
statement regarding the same. After having been informed that the body
of Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with other members
of the PNP, the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued the search
but they were still not able to find the body of Nairube. It was only when
they brought the accused to Villa Anastacia to point out the location of
the cadaver that they found the body of Nairube. Gallardo stated that the
accused pointed to the location by using his lips.12
PO2 ANTONIO DECENA's testimony corroborates the testimony of
Ricardo Vida although he claims that the accused pointed to the location
of the body of the victim by using his lips.13
DANILO RAMOS, the father of Nairube, testified that on September
15, 1997 at around 7:00 in the evening, he was asleep in his house
together with his wife, Helen and five children, Nimrod, Neres, Nairube,
Nixon and Nerdami. At around 12:30 a.m., he felt someone going down
the stairs of their house. He woke his wife up and checked if his children
were all there. He noticed that Nairube was not there so his wife went
downstairs and checked if she was downstairs. After three minutes, his
wife returned and told him that Nairube was not downstairs. So, he went
down to double check. Upon his return, his wife gave him a pair of red
rubber slippers. He described the slipper as having a red sole but that he
did not notice the color of the strap since the light was dim. In court, he
identified Exhibit "D" as the pair of slippers he saw that night. In the
early morning of September 16, 1997, they continued searching for
Nairube. On September 18, 1997, a member of the bantay bayan went to
their house informing them that the accused would be pointing out
where the body of Nairube was. At around 4:00 p.m., the accused
pointed out the location of the body of Nairube inside Villa Anastacia by
using his lips.14
FLORO ESGUERRA, the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti, testified that on
September 19, 1997 at around 3:30 p.m., he attended the funeral of
Nairube. After the funeral, he visited the accused in his cell. In the
course of his conversation with the accused, the accused confessed to
the commission of the offense.15
On October 8, 1998 the RTC rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, this Court finds the accused
CLEMENTE JOHN LUGOD GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the special complex crime of
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE under Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law,
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, NAIRUBE RAMOS the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for her death and P37,200.00 as actual damages.
The accused is further ordered to pay the cost of the instant suit.
SO ORDERED."16
In view of the imposition of the death penalty, the case is now before
this Court on automatic review.
In his brief, the accused-appellant assigns the following errors
committed by the RTC:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE WHICH DID NOT PROVE WITH MORAL
CERTAINTY THAT HE WAS THE PERPETRATOR OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.
 THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT
CONFESSED HIS GUILT BEFORE THE VICE-MAYOR,
WHICH CONFESSION IS ADMISSIBLE AS IT WAS NOT
MADE IN RESPONSE TO ANY INTERROGATION.17
In support of his appeal, accused-appellant submits that the evidence
presented by the prosecution fails to establish that he raped and killed
Nairube Ramos beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution did not
present any direct evidence to inculpate him in the commission of the
crime. Neither did the prosecution present circumstantial evidence
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover,
accused-appellant claims that the alleged confession he made to the
vice-mayor was not a confession. He prays that the judgment of
conviction of the RTC be reversed and that he be acquitted of the crime
charged.
After a careful review of the case, we agree with the submission of
accused-appellant and find that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
In rendering its decision, the trial court disregarded accused-appellant's
defense of denial and alibi and relied on the following pieces of
circumstantial evidence culled from the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses to justify its judgment of conviction:
"(1) In the evening of September 15, 1997, Accused
CLEMENTE JOHN LUGOD wearing a pair of slippers and
black T-shirt, had a drinking spree with the son of Pedro dela
Torre outside their house at Udia, Cavinti, Laguna;
(2) On the same evening, accused wearing the same pair of
slippers and black T-shirt and under the influence of liquor,
entered the house of VIOLETA CABUHAT without her
consent;
(3) On the same evening, LORETO VELORIA saw accused
wearing the same pair of slippers and black T-shirt;
(4) At about 12:30 in the early morning of September 16, 1997,
father of the victim noticed somebody going downstairs of their
house;
(5) The pair of slippers were found near the door of the victim's
house;
(6) The panty of the victim was found inside the premises of
VILLA ANASTACIA at Cavinti, Laguna;
(7) In the early morning of September 16, 1997, Romualdo
Ramos saw accused coming out of from VILLA ANASTACIA
barefoot and half-naked;
(8) Accused pointed to RICARDO VIDA and SPO2 ANTONIO
DECENA the place where the cadaver of the victim could be
found;
(9) Accused confessed to the Mayor and the Vice- Mayor of
Cavinti, Laguna, that he committed the offense imputed against
him; and
(10) Almost all eyewitnesses for the Prosecution positively
identified the accused in open court as CLEMENTE JOHN
LUGOD."18
There is no question that at the time of his apprehension, accused-
appellant was already placed under arrest and was suspected of having
something to do with the disappearance of Nairube. In fact, the lower
court declared that accused-appeIlant's warrantless arrest was valid
based on Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.19However, at
the time of his arrest, the apprehending officers did not inform the
accused-appellant and in fact acted in a blatant and wanton disregard of
his constitutional rights specified in Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides:
 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,  or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his rig ht to
re main silent and to counsel, and that if he can not afford to have
counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there
is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides,
even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be
made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, the
accused-appellant's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped
and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used
against him for having transgressed accused-appellant's rights under the
Bill of Rights.20 This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be
disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may
be. In the same vein, the accused-appellant's act in pointing out the
location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the
accused-appellant's right to remain silent. The same was an integral part
of the uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous
tree. Thus, in People vs. De La Cruz,21  we ruled that:
"Equally inadmissible, for being integral parts of the
uncouselled admission - or fruits of the poisonous tree - are the
photographs of subsequent acts which the accused was made to
do in order to obtain proof to support such admission or
confession, such as (a) his digging in the place where Virginia
Trangia was allegedly buried, (b) his retrieving of the bones
discovered therein (c) his posinq before a photographer while
executing such acts."22
Even if we were to assume that accused-appellant was not yet under
interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time
he was brought to the police station, the acts of accused-appellant
subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been
voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his
detention. His confession was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised
him that he would help him if he told the truth. Furthermore, when
accused-appellant allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2
Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly one hundred (100) of
the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that
the townspeople were antagonistic towards accused-appellant and
wanted to hurt him.23 The atmosphere from the time accused-appellant
was apprehended and taken to the police station up until the time he was
alleged to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim was
highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous response.
Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, accused-appellant's claim
that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very
serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession. The
Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited accused-appellant in the
jail cell, he noticed that the accused-appellant had bruises on his face,
corroborated accused-appellant's assertion that he was maItreated.24
In addition, the records do not support the confession allegedly made by
the accused-appellant to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavinti. Records
show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial.
Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged
confession made by the accused-appellant is not conclusive. The Vice-
Mayor's testimony reads as follows:
"TRIAL PROSECUTOR;
Q:       More or less what time did you visit Clemente John
Lugod in his cell?
A:       Between 3:30 and 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.
Q:       Do you have any companion at the time you visited
Clemente John Lugod?
A:       Nobody, sir.
Q:       Tell us how you were able to visit him in the said cell?
A:       My first intention in visiting him was just to know him,
sir.
Q:       Did anybody introduce to you Clemente John Lugod?
A:       A police officer called Clemente John Lugod, who was
then lying inside the cell, sir.
Q:       What did the police officer say to Clemente John Lugod?
A:       The police officer said: "Lugod, the vice mayor wants to
talk to you."
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q:       What did Lugod do if any when he was called by the
police officer?
A:       He arose and he greeted me good afternoon, sir.
Q:       What happened after he greeted you good afternoon?
A:       I pitied him during that time. I asked him why he did that
thing.
COURT:
Q:       Did you specify to him what you mean by why he did
such a thing?
A:       No, Your Honor, I merely asked him why was he able to
do that.
Q:       Do you know if Lugod understood what you mean?
A:       I think he understood my question then, Your Honor.
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q:       what was the response of Clemente John Lugod when
you asked him that question?
A:       He told me he was so drunk, he did not know what
happened next. "Hindi niya namalayan na ganoon ang
nangyari."
Q:       Did you ask him what he has done? WITNESS:
A:       I asked him why he went to that place, sir.
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q:       What place are you referring to?
A:       That house. I did not ask the specific place, what I was
referring then was that house.
Q:       What was the response of Clemente John Lugod?
A:       He answered he thought of his two children, sir. A:       Yes, sir.

Q:       What about if he thought of his two children? Q:       Please point at him.

A:       According to him he planned to go back to Brgy. Layog
where he left his children.
Q:       Did you ask him what he do (sic) in that place?
A:       I did not ask, sir.
Q:       What else did he tell you?
A:       I asked another question, sir.
A:       (Witness going down of the witness stand and pointed to
a person who when asked of his name answered Clemente John
Lugod, the accused in this case).
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:    That will be all, Your Honor.
COURT:    Cross
ATTY. DE RAMOS:    With the permission of the Honorable
Court?

Q:       What is that other question? COURT:    Proceed.

A:       I asked him if it was the mother whom he liked then, sir. ATTY. DERAMOS:

Q:       What was the answer? Q:       Vice mayor, when you visited John Lugod on September
19, 1997 at around 3:30 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, you
A:       Allegedly not the mother, sir. stated that he was lying in his cell, is that correct?

TRIAL PROSECUTOR: A:       Yes, sir.

Q:       Did you ask him what did he do (sic) in that place? ATTY. DE RAMOS:

A:       No more, sir. Q:       And the reason why the police officer called John Lugod
is because you approached that police, is that correct?
Q:       What else did he tell you aside from what you have
testified? A:       Yes, sir.

A:       No more, sir, I bid him goodbye. Q:       And you asked him where is John Lugod?

Q:       Is Clemente John Lugod present in court? A:       Yes, sir.

Q:       Because you do not know John Lugod personally?
A:       Yes, sir.
Q:       When you were about to talk to John Lugod, was he still
inside the cell or outside the cell?
A:       He was still inside the cell, sir.
Q:       So you are outside the cell?
A:       Yes, sir.
Q:       How about the police officer who called John Lugod?
A:       He was outside the cell, sir.
Q:       So the police officer who called John Lugod was present
while you were conversing with John Lugod?
A:       No, sir, he was no longer present because after calling
John Lugod he left.
Q:       What was John Lugod wearing at that time?
WITNESS:
A:       I cannot remember anymore, sir.
ATTY. DE RAMOS:
Q:       But you can still remember his physical appearance at
that time?
A:       Yes, sir.
Q:       What was the physical appearance of Clemente John
Lugod at that time?
A:       As far as I can recall it seemed that he had some bruises
on his face (witness pointing to his lower jaw)
COURT
Q:       Did you not ask him what happened to his face?
A:       No, sir.
Q:       Did it not occur to you to think in that appearance that
there was something that happened?
A:       No, Your Honor, because my first intention was just to
know him.
Q:       Did not the accused Clemente John Lugod inform you of
any maltreatment done to him by the police officers?
A:       He did not say anything about that, Your Honor.
Q:       Did you not ask John Lugod whether somebody laid
force on him?
WITNESS:
A:       I was not able to ask that, Your Honor.
ATTY. DE RAMOS:
Q:       Aside from bruises on his face did you notice any other
bruises or wound on other parts of his body?
A:       No more, sir.
 Q:       You stated earlier that you asked John Lugod why did
you do that, tell the Court what was his response to your
question?
A:       He said he was so drunk then, sir.
Q:       He did not tell you that he raped the victim and killed
her?
A:       He did not say that, sir.
Q:       He did not directly answer your question because your
question did not ask direct to something?
A:       Yes, sir." 25
As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, accused-
appellant merely responded to the ambiguous questions that the Vice-
Mayor propounded to him. He did not state in certain and categorical
terms that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted
that the accused-appellant did not tell him that he raped and killed
Nairube. In addition, we note the contradiction between the testimony of
the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he spoke to the
accused-appellant and that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was
present when accused-appellant confessed to the Mayor and Vice-
Mayor.
Considering that the confession of accused-appellant cannot be used
against him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the
prosecution is the fact that several persons testified having seen accused-
appellant the night before the murder of Nairube and on several other
occasions wearing the rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the
house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively as well as the
testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he
saw accused-appellant in the early morning of September 16, 1997
leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These
pieces of evidence are circumstantial in nature. Circumstantial evidence
is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference.26 Under Section 4 of Rule
133 of the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.27
In the present case, much emphasis was placed by the trial court on the
discovery of the pair of rubber slippers at the victim's house and the
black T-shirt hanging on a guava twig near the cadaver of Nairube
which were allegedly worn by accused-appellant the day before
Nairube's disappearance. The trial court also relied on the fact that there
was an eyewitness who saw accused-appellant leaving Villa Anastacia,
the place where the body of the victim was found, in the morning after
the disappearance of the victim. However, the combination of the above-
mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical
conclusion that accused-appellant raped and murdered Nairube. At most,
these circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses, merely establish the accused-appellant's whereabouts on that
fateful evening and places accused-appellant at the scene of the crime
and nothing more. The evidence of the prosecution does not provide a
link which would enable this Court to conclude that he in fact killed and
raped Nairube. It must be stressed that although not decisive for the
determination of the guilt of the accused-appellant, the prosecution did
not present any evidence to establish that he was at any time seen with
the victim at or about the time of the incident. Neither was there any
other evidence which could single him out to the exclusion of any other
as being responsible for the crime.
It may be argued that his presence at the scene of the crime was
unexplained and gives rise to the suspicion that the accused-appellant
was the author thereof but this circumstance alone is insufficient to
establish his guilt. It is well settled that mere suspicions and speculations
can never be the bases of conviction in a criminal case.28
More important, it appears that the rubber slippers, which were found at
the house of the victim on the night Nairube disappeared, are an
ordinary pair of rubber slippers without any distinguishing marks to
differentiate the same from any other. In People vs. De Joya,29 this
Court ruled that:
"Rubber or beach walk slippers are made in such quantities by
multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not
hundreds of slippers of the same color, shape and size as the
pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife. And even if
conclusive identification of the slippers had been offered, and it
is assumed that appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those
slippers on that fatal afternoon, still the presence of that singular
slipper did not clearly and directly connect the appellant to the
robbery or the slaying. At most, under that assumption, the
presence of that slipper in the house of the Valencias showed
that the accused had gone to the house of the Valencias and
there mislaid the slipper. We note in this connection, that
appellant himself had testified that he did enter the house of the
Valencias that afternoon, but after the killing of Eulalia Diamse
had been perpetrated, and there found many persons in the
house viewing the body."30
31
Likewise, in People vs. Mijares,  this Court ruled that the fact that the
accused was the last person seen with the victim and that his slippers
were found at the crime scene do not necessarily prove that he killed the
victim. This Court stated that:
"That the appellant was the last person seen with the victim on
the night she disappeared does not necessarily prove that he
killed her. It was not established that appellant and the victim
were together until the crime was committed. It was not even
shown that the appellant proceeded to the crime scene, either by
himself or together with the victim.
Likewise, the fact that the slippers which appellant borrowed
from Elizabeth Oglos were found near the victim's dead body
does not necessarily prove that he was the perpetrator of the
crime. Even if we were to conjecture that appellant went to
the locus criminis  and inadvertently left them there, such
supposition does not necessarily imply that he had committed
the crime. Indeed, it was not established whether appellant went
to the place before, during or after the commission of the crime,
if at all. Moreover, the prosecution has not ruled out the
possibility that the slippers may have been brought by another
person to the crime scene, precisely to implicate him and thus
exonerate the real culprit. Clearly, several antithetical
propositions may be inferred from the presence of the slippers
at the crime scene, and appellant's guilt is only one of them."32
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment dated
October 8, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 28 in Criminal
Case No. SC-6670 finding the accused, Clemente John Lugod alias
"HONASAN", guilty of the crime of rape with homicide is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable
doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless
held for some other legal cause.
No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135562 November 22, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  upon her, a fracture on the skull, which directly caused
vs.
BENITO BRAVO, accused-appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
On January 15, 1994 the decomposing body of a child was found in a
vacant lot along the road leading to Patul, Rosario Santiago City. 1 Her
body was found between two concrete fences half naked, shirtless and
skirt pulled up, her panty stuffed in her mouth. 2 The body was identified
to be that of a nine year old girl named Juanita Antolin, a resident of
Rosario, Santiago City and known in her neighborhood as Len-len. Her
body was found about 700 meters from her house putrid and in rigor
mortis. 3 The scalp on the left side of her head was detached exposing a
fracture on the left temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal examination
showed fresh laceration at 2:30 o'clock and old lacerations at 5:00 and
7:00 o'clock and easily accepts two fingers. The cause of death was
cerebral hemorrhage. 4
On May 25, 1994 an Information for rape with homicide 5 was filed
against herein accused-appellant which states:
That on or about the 12th day of January 1994, in the
municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design
and by means of violence and intimidation, have carnal
knowledge with one Juanita Antolin y Jandoc, a nine
year old girl, against her will and consent; that on the
occasion and by reason of the said rape, the said
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and hit with a blunt
instrument the said Juanita Antolin y Jandoc, inflicting
her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On September 26, 1994 the accused was arraigned and pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. 6
Evelyn San Mateo an eight year old second grader from
Rosario, Santiago City neighbor and cousin of the victim
testified that she was with the deceased the night before she
disappeared. She stated that while they stood on the roadside
watching "Home Along Da Riles" from an open window of a
neighbor's house the appellant approached them and asked Len-
Len to come with him to a birthday party and then he will buy
her Coke and balut. Len-Len asked her to go with them but she
did not want to because she was watching television. Len-Len
went alone with the accused. The following morning Len-Len's
mother told Evelyn and her mother that Len-Len was missing.
In court, Evelyn positively identified the appellant as the person
last seen with Len-len before she was found dead. 7
The owner of the house where Len-len and Evelyn watched television,
Gracia Monahan, corroborated Evelyn's testimony that on the evening of
January 12, 1994 she saw the appellant talking to Len-len while the two
girls were watching television from her open window and that when she
looked again towards the end of the program to the direction where the
girls were situated, only Evelyn was left watching television. Monahan
testified that she is familiar with the appellant and the two children
because they are neighbors. 8
The Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Santiago Police Department,
Alexander Mico, testified that on January 15, 1994 his office received a
report that a dead body was found in a vacant lot. The body was later
identified as Juanita Antolin. Mico stated that he interviewed San Mateo
who pointed to the appellant as the man last seen with the deceased.
Mico found the appellant at his place of work at the Spring Garden
Resort at Sinsayon, Santiago City. Upon seeing Bravo, Mico informed
him that he is a suspect in the killing of a girl in Rosario, Santiago City
and asked him to come with him for questioning. The appellant agreed.
Mico further narrated in court that at the police station the appellant
admitted he was with the girl and he carried her on his shoulder but he
was so drunk that night that he does not remember what he did to
her. 9 On cross-examination Mico admitted that he did not inform the
appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and of
his right against self-incrimination before the appellant made the said
admission because according to Mico he was only informally
interviewing the accused when he made the admission and that custodial
interrogation proper was conducted by the assigned investigator. 10
The appellant Benito Bravo testified in court that on his way home after
work at around five o'clock in the afternoon of January 12, 1994 he was
invited to go on a drinking spree at Purok 1, Rosario, Santiago City
where he and four other men consumed five round bottles of gin until
7:30 that evening. He then headed for home. Appellant admitted in court
that he passed by the house of Gracia Monahan but stated that he did not
see the two girls watching television along the road. At home, he found
his mother very sick and so he decided to stay home all night. He woke
up the following morning at around 4:30 a.m. and prepared to go to
work. On January 15, 1994 a policeman came to his place of work and
apprehended him without a warrant of arrest and at the police station he
was forced to admit commission of the crime of rape with homicide of
Juanita Antolin. The appellant denied the accusation and stated that the
deceased was his godchild and that he has known Fely Handoc, the
mother of the child, for three years prior to this proceedings. 11
Juanito Bravo, the brother of the appellant testified that the appellant
stayed home on the night of January 12, 1994 to take care of their sick
mother who died a few days thereafter. 12
Ernesto Pastor, the foreman at the Spring Garden Resort where the
appellant was employed, testified that he has known the appellant for a
long time and that he knows him to be hardworking and of good moral
character. Pastor corroborated the appellant's testimony that police
investigator Mico came to the Spring Garden Resort and arrested Bravo
without a warrant. 13
The testimony of the Municipal Health Officer who conducted the
autopsy was dispensed with by the prosecution as the handwritten
Autopsy Report made by the Municipal Health Officer of Santiago,
Isabela, marked as Exhibit B, was admitted by both parties. 14 The
Report reads:
AUTOPSY REPORT
JUANITA ANTOLIN
PUROK 1, BARANGAY ROSARIO
AGE: 9
FATHER: ANTONIO
MOTHER: OFELIA JANDOC
Was investigated under the mango tree where the crime
was committed and left side of the face is covered by
sand (done by anay) with rigor mortis and with
putrification, easy pulling of the skin and plenty of
small worms coming out from the ears, nose, eyes and
mouth (without panty), the whole body is edematous.
After complete washing, coming out of small worms
on both eyes and ears and mouth, scalp on the left side
was detached and skull exposed.
— Fracture of the skull with left temporal
— Edematous
 — Abdomen, extremities has no pertinent findings
except easy pulling of skin and all are edematous
Vaginal examination — shows fresh laceration at 2:30
o'clock, old lacerations at 5:00 and 7:00 o'clock —
could easily accept two fingers.
Cause of death — cerebral hemorrhage (fracture of
skull temporal region, left). 15
On August 25, 1998 the trial court rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty of the crime charged as follows:
Wherefore, finding the accused BENITO BRAVO
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE punishable under Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 7659, the court sentences him the penalty of
DEATH and ordering him to pay the heirs of Juanita
Antolin y Jandoc the amount of one hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) as indemnity and three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 16
and held that abuse of confidence and treachery attended the
commission of the crime.
This case is before us on automatic review in view of the penalty
imposed by the trial court.
Both counsels for the accused-appellant and the appellee plead for the
acquittal of the accused. Both the accused-appellant and the appellee
invoke the constitutionally guarded presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused and the latter's right to remain silent and to counsel. The
testimony of the policeman that the accused admitted he was with the
victim on the evening of January 12, 1994 but the latter was too drunk to
remember what happened should have been held inadmissible by the
trial court in view of the policeman's own admission in court that
although he informed the accused that he is a suspect in the rape and
killing of one Juanita Antolin he did not inform the accused of his
constitutional rights before he asked him of his participation in the crime
under investigation. Both the appellant and the appellee are in
agreement that the trial court grievously erred in finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the sole circumstantial
evidence that the victim was last seen by her cousin in the company of
the accused whereas the Rules of Court clearly requires the presence of
at least two proven circumstances the combination of which creates an
unbroken link between the commission of the crime charged and the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The single circumstance
proven by the prosecution that the victim was last seen conversing with
the accused two days before she was found dead cannot serve as basis
for any conclusion leading to the guilt of the accused of the crime
charged. The evidence for the prosecution falls short of the quantum of
evidence required by the Rules to establish guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In sum, both the appellant and the appellee profess
that the presumption of innocence of the accused was not successfully
overturned by the prosecution.
We resolve to acquit Benito Bravo.
Sec. 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory
protection afforded a person under investigation for the commission of a
crime and the correlative duty of the State and its agencies to enforce
such mandate. It states:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
 (1) No torture, force, exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police
violence, threat, interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion,
intimidation or any physical and psychological, of the suspect to admit
other means which responsibility for the crime under investigation. It was not
vitiate the free will intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt, if
shall be used against he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the
him. Secret detention accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although
places, solitary, untrue. 18 Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively
incommunicado, or communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to
other similar forms insure that it is fully understood. Any measure short of this
of detention are requirement is considered a denial of such right. 19 Courts are
prohibited. not allowed to distinguish between preliminary questioning and
custodial investigation proper when applying the exclusionary
(2) Any confession rule. Any information or admission given by a person while in
or admission custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time
obtained in violation without the competent assistance of an independent counsel
of this or section 17 should be struck down as inadmissible. 20 It has been held,
hereof shall be however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a
inadmissible in confidant of the accused is not covered by the exclusionary
evidence against rule. 21
him.
The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a
(3) The law shall written extra-judicial confession; the admission was allegedly made to
provide for penal and the arresting officer during an "informal talk" at the police station after
civil sanctions for his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin.
violations of this The arresting policeman testified that the appellant admitted that he was
section as well as with the victim on the evening of January 12, 1994, the probable time of
compensation to and the commission of the crime and that he carried her on his shoulder but
rehabilitation of that he was too drunk to remember what subsequently happened. The
victims of torture or arresting policeman admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his
similar practices, and constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. We note that the
their families. alleged admission is incriminating because it places the accused in the
company of the victim at the time the crime was probably committed.
The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision
covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody The exclusionary rule applies.
for investigation of his possible participation in the commission
of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin
commission of a crime although not yet in custody. 17 The and any statement allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible
complicity in the crime without prior notification of his constitutional
rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's apparent attempt to
circumvent the rule by insisting that the admission was made during an
"informal talk" prior to custodial investigation proper is not tenable. The
appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry
for any possible lead to the perpetrators of the crime under investigation.
At the time the alleged admission was made the appellant was in
custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and
killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary rule presumes that the
alleged admission was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid.
Supportive of such presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial
confession to that effect and the appellant's denial in court of the alleged
oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck down as
inadmissible.
We also agree with both the appellant and the appellee that the trial
court erred in rendering judgment convicting the appellant based on a
single circumstance. Only one circumstantial evidence was proven i.e.,
that the victim went with the accused to buy soda and balut on the
evening of January 12, 1994. Section 4 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
states:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a) There is more than
one circumstance;
b) The facts from
which the inferences
are derived are
proven; and
c) The combination
of all the
circumstances is
such as to produce a
conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the case of People vs. Adorfina 22 this court held that:
. . . a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, that is, the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that
of guilty.
The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances
which in complete sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than
that of the guilt of the accused. The two witnesses for the prosecution
testified to a single circumstance, namely, that the victim was seen in the
company of the appellant on the night of January 12, 1994. This
circumstance alone cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction.
There is no other proven circumstance linking the appellant to the crime
as the perpetrator thereof to the exclusion of any other possible
culprit e.g. that the appellant was at or near the scene of the crime at the
time it was probably committed or any other evidence to establish the
appellant's participation in the commission thereof. The prosecution's
theory that the appellant is guilty of the crime charged because he was
seen with the victim a few days before she was found dead is not
tenable. The approximate time the crime was committed was not
established at all because the physician who made the autopsy report
was discharged as a witness when both parties admitted the report. The
two day interval between the evening of January 12th when the victim
was seen with the appellant and the day when her dead body was found
on January 15th presents a wide range of possibilities as to the
perpetrator of the crime. The Rules and jurisprudence demand no less
than an unbroken chain of proven facts pointing to the appellant as the
guilty person to the exclusion of all others. This the evidence for the
prosecution failed to do. Both counsels for the appellant and the appellee
are correct in their submission that the single circumstance that the
victim was seen with the appellant two days before she was found dead
is clearly insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused.
The rape and killing of nine year old Juanita Antolin is supported by
concrete evidence undisputed by both parties. The unpardonable assault
on the child is tragic and the trial court may have been swayed by the
tide of human indignation. We must however uphold the primacy of the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused when the evidence at
hand falls short of the quantum required to support conviction.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. The
appellant Benito Bravo is acquitted of the crime charged herein. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to immediately release
him from custody unless he is detained for another legal cause.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.  Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial Region Branch XIII, dated January 25,
1984, which "finds the accused USMAN HASSAN y AYUN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and
there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby imposes upon the said accused the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and all its accessory penalties; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the
amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2
Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon
Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single, and a resident of Zamboanga City. 3 At the
time of his death on July 23,1981, the deceased was employed as
manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. On the other
hand, Hassan was an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador. 4
The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever brightest
when they are applied with more jealousy to the poor, the marginalized,
and the disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the herein accused-appellant,
belongs to this class. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime,
he was poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged. He was a flotsam in a sea
of violence, following the odyssey of his widowed mother from one
poverty-stricken area to another in order to escape the ravages of
internicine war and rebellion in Zamboanga del Sur. In the 15 years of
Hassan's existence, he and his family had to evacuate to other places for
fear of their lives, six times. His existence in this world has not even
been officially recorded; his birth has not been registered in the Registry
of Births because the Samal tribe, to which he belongs, does not see the
importance of registering births and deaths. 
for the prosecution and the sloppiness of the investigation conducted by
the police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the Homicide
and Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also
testified for the prosecution. 
We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt and that Usman Hassan must, therefore, be set free. 
The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old
when he testified, married, and a resident of Zamboanga City. On the
day of the killing, he was employed at the sand and gravel business of
the father of the deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination- Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr.
in-chief on February 3, 1982.  to the hospital you came to know that
he was already dead, is that correct? 
He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in
the evening of July 23, 1981; that he was a backrider in the motorcycle A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead. 
of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the
Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police? 
mangoes, he saw a person stab Ramon who was seated at his red Honda
motorcycle which was parked about two or three meters from the fruit A They just asked the description of
stand where he Samson) was selecting mangoes; that he saw the that person as to his attire and his
assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that after the stabbing, the appearance. 
assailant ran towards the PNB Building. When asked at the cross-
examination if he knew the assailant, Samson said, "I know him by face
Q And it was while in the hospital that
but I do not know his name." 5
you told them the description of the
one who stabbed Ramon Pichel, Jr.? 
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito
Pichel, Jr. was holding the motorcycle with both of his hands, the
A Yes, Sir. 
assailant come from behind, held his left hand and stabbed him from
behind on his chest while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He
claimed that he was able to see the assailant because it was very bright Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to
there that Ramon was facing the light of a petromax lamp, and that all the Funeraria La Merced? 
these happened in front of the fruit stand a — distance of about 6 to 7
meters from the side of the road.  A Yes, sir, 

Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt Q Can you recall what time was that? 
and maong pants, but "he did not see if the aggressor was wearing
shoes," that the assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but "he did not A I do not know what time was that. 
exactly see what kind of knife it was, and he did not see how long the
knife was He said he brought the wounded Ramon to the Zamboanga Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police
City General Hospital in a tricycle.  brought to you the accused? 

On cross-examination, Samson testified:  A . . . 

xxx xxx xxx Q For Identification? 

A Yes, sir. 
 Q And he was alone when you Identified him?  by coincidence to this incident, our
eye met each other and immediately
A Yes he was alone.  thereafter, he fled the area toward the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). That
Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their this unidentified person was sporting
sand and gravel business, do you have any blood a semi-long hair, dressed in White
relationship with them?  Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve), maong
pants height to more or less 5'5, Dark
Complexion. That as this unidentified
A Yes. sir. 6
person fled the area I immediately
came to aid my companion, Ramon
(Emphasis supplied)  Pitcher, Jr., and rushed him to
Zamboanga General Hospital, on
xxx xxx xxx board a Tricycle. That may
companion (Ramon) did not
What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which was taken whispered (sic) any words to me for
only on July 25, 1981, two days after the stabbing, and sworn to only on he was in serious condition and few
July 27, 1981, also two days after it was taken, or four days after the minutes later, he expired. 
killing, was never presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all. The
information was practically forced out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Q-15. Was tills unidentified person
Carpio, a witness for the People, during his cross-examination. 8 The was with companion when he attack
sworn statement contained the following questions and answers:  (sic) Ramon Pitcher Jr.? 

xxx xxx xxx A-15. He was alone Sir. 

Q-14. What and please narrate it to
me briefly in your own words, the
incident you are referring?  your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr.,
A-14. While I was busy selecting
some mangoes, I saw unidentified
person whom I can recognize by face
if seen again embraced my companion
Ramon Pitcher Jr. while the latter was
aboard his motorcycle parked within
the area. That this person without
much ado, and armed with a knife
suddenly stabbed him (Ramon). That
Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic)
this person who attacked and stabbed
that evening in question? 
A-16. Yes, Sir, 
Q-17. Do you still remember that
confrontation we made at the Office
of La Merced Funeral Homes,
wherein you were confronted with
one Usman Hassan, whom this more to say, add or alter in this
Officer brought along?  statement? 

A-17. Yes, Sir.  A-22. No more Sir. 

Q-18. Was he the very person, who Q-23. Are you willing to give a
attacked and stabbed your companion, supplemental statement if needed in
Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?  the future? 

A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person A-23. Yes, Sir. 9
who attacked and stabbed my
companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that (Emphasis supplied) 
evening in question. 
xxx xxx xxx
Q-19. Why? 
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement 10 is
A-19. Because his face and other substantially the same as that embodied in the "Case Report," Exhibit it
physical appearance were fully noted "C", by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit "2." This
by me and this I cannot forget for the exhibit for the prosecution confirms the sworn statement of witness
rest of my life.  Samson that an unidentified person, whom he recognized only by face,
appeared and without any provocation, the latter embraced the victim
Q-20. Before this incident, was there and stabbed the same allegedly with a knife." The rest of the Case
any altercation that had ensued while Report: is also significant in that it confirms the confrontation between
in the process of buying some the accused and Jose Samson in the funeral parlor arranged by the police
mangoes in that area?  Investigator and prosecution witness, Corporal Carpio. 

A-20. None Sir.  xxx xxx xxx

Q-21. Were you able to note what From this end, a follow-up was made within the
kind of knife used by said Usman premises of the Old Barter Trade, wherein the person
Hassan in stabbing your companion, of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this
Ramon Pitcher Jr.?  City, was arrested in connection with the above stated
incident. That this Officer and companions arrested this
A-21: None Sir,  person Usman due to his physical appearance, which
was fully described by victim's companion. Jose
Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to Samson. During his arrest, a knife, measuring to more
ask of you, do you have anything or less seven (7) inches in blade was confiscated in his
 possession. The person of Usman Hassan was brought
along at the La Merced Funeral Homes for a
confrontation with victims companion, Jose Samson
and in this confrontation, Jose Samson positively
Identified said Usman Hassan as the very person who
stabbed the victim.  flawed and therefore suspect. 12
Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges
levelled against hub and admitted ownership of said
knife; claiming among other things that he used said
knife for slicing mangoes. 11
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not
satisfy the quantum of proof — beyond reasonable doubt — required by
the Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict an
accused person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty which
would allow us to pronounce, without uneasiness of conscience. Usman
Hassan y Ayun guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y
Uro, and condemn him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him
into a flotsam again in a sea of convicted felons in which he would be a
very young stranger.  The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of the
In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the
prosecution against the denial and alibi of the accused, value judgment
must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed presumption
of innocence.  have no doubt that Usman Hassan was "presented" alone 17 to Jose
When the evidence for the prosecution and the
evidence for the accused are weighed, the scales must
be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the
constitutional presumtion of innocence the accused
enjoys as a counter-foil to the awesome authority of the
State that is prosecuting him. 
The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must
operate against the inference of guilt the prosecution
would draw from its evidence. That evidence, as it
happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement
of the two policemen which, as previously observed, is
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and
unconvincing. And so with the evidence sought to be introduced by
Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the expert
testimony of the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Dr. Valentin Bernalez, presented by the prosecution,
contradicted, on material points, the testimony of the one eyewitness,
Jose Samson. While Samson averred on the witness stand that he saw
the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" 13 only once,
the NBI medico-legal officer Identified two stab wounds, one at the
front portion of the chest at the level and third rib, (sic) and another stab
wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14 The same medical
expert also concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound,
which was the cause of death, that the same was inflicted on the victim
while the alleged accused was in front of him." 15
Zamboanga Southern Police Sector, 16 at Zamboanga City, particularly
by Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much to be desired. For
one, we are not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police
investigators in the Identification of the accused as the assailant. We
Samson by the police investigator and prosecution witness, Police
Corporal Carpio, and his police companions, at the office of the La
Merced Funeral Homes in Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the
very evidence 18 of the prosecution, the procedure adopted by the police
investigators was a confrontation" between Jose Samson, Jr. and Usman.
Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was
alone when he was brought to Samson for confrontation in the funeral
parlor. However, on cross-examination, Carpio made a turnabout by
saying that the accused was Identified by Samson in a "police line-up;"
this tergiversation we dare say, was an afterthought, more the result of
an over or careless cross-examination, augmented by the leading
questions 19 of the trial judge rather than a fastidiousness if not sincerity,
on the part of the police investigator, to honestly correct erroneous
statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both
Samson and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman
was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such
police line-up as the police investigator, to honestly correct erreoneous
statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both
Samson and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman
was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such
police investigator claimed on second thought.  was not investigated. Nor is any explanation given as to why the
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and
Identify the accused alone at the funeral parlor, without being placed in
the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence
where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told,
subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highly
singular method of Identification, which revolts against the accepted
principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just
man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance." 20
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between
the self-proclaimed eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right
of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the
commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage — the
Identification of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a
confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment, the scales of justice
tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused.
The police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused was
presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence
of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled
confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally
entrenched protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-
appellant should be acquitted.  of the earlier incident, with the suspect in that frustrated homicide case
Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of
the investigation of the crime and the preparation of the evidence for
prosecution were done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and superficially.
Samson was not investigated thoroughly and immediately after the
incident. As previously mentioned, his statement was taken by the
investigator only two days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and
sworn only two days after it had been taken. Similarly, there is nothing
in the record to show that the fruit vendor—from whom Samson and the
deceased were buying mangoes that fateful evening and who certainly
must have witnessed the fatal stabbing—was investigated, or why he
companion 21 of the accused at the time Corporal Carpio arrested him
(accused) 'sitting on a pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00
P.M., according to Usman) of that same evening near the scene of the
crime, was not also investigated when he could have been a material
witness of the killing or of the innocence of the accused. In addition, the
knife and its scabbard, 23Confiscated by Carpio from Usman (tucked on
the right side of his waist") at the time of his arrest, were not even
subjected to any testing at all to determine the presence of human blood
which could be typed and compared with the blood type of the deceased.
A crime laboratory test — had Carpio or the prosecuting fiscal, or even
the trial judge, insisted on it — would have revealed whether or not the
knife in question (confiscated from the accused by Carpio one hour after
the alleged commission of the crime) had indeed been the weapon used
to kill Ramon. The police investigator instead nonchalantly dismissed
this sin of omission by saying that the knife could have been cleaned or
the bloodstain could have been taken away. 24 This presumption of the
deadly weapon's having been "cleaned" of bloodstains is tantamount to
pronouncing the accused of being guilty. 
Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by a
resolution, 25 in a separate case, 26 of Assistant City Fiscal of Zamboanga
City and deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo Murillo, which
clearly reveals that on July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of Ramon
Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing near the place
being a certain Benhar Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly police character" in
Zamboanga City, with a long record of arrests. In that resolution, Fiscal
Murillo said the same Benhar Isa was tagged as 'also a suspect in the
stabbing of Ramon Pichel, Jr. to death and the stabbing of Pastor Henry
Villagracia at the Fruit Paradise, this City." The said resolution further
states that "with regards to this incident or witnesses ever testified for
fear of possible reprisals." 27
The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981. Benhar Isa
himself was killed by a policeman on August 28, 1981, while he (Isa)
"was apparently under the influence of liquor armed with a knife (was)
molesting and extorting money from innocent civilians' and "making
trouble." 28 The records of the case at bar do not show any attempt on the
part of Corporal Carpio, or any other police officer, to investigate or
question Benhar Isa in connection with the killing of Pichel, Jr. Was it
fear of the notorious police character that made the police officers
disregard the possible connection between the slaying of Ramon and
that of the person (Harun Acan y Arang of the Ministry of National
Defense) 29 who was allegedly stabbed by Benhar Isa a day after the
killing of Ramon Jr.? And yet questioning Isa might have provided that
vital link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence. But why
should the police officers investigate Isa when Usman Hassan was
already in custody and could be an available fall guy? Usman Hassan,
instead, became a victim of a grave injustice. Indeed, Usman Hassan is
too poor to wage a legal fight to prove his innocence. And he is so
marginalized as to claim and deserve an honest-to-goodness, thorough,
and fair police investigation with all angles and leads pursued to their
logical, if not scientific, conclusions. Sadly circumstanced as he is, the
authority of the State was too awesome for him to counteract.  with approval by this Court that "(T)he wicked flee when no man
The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by Usman "that
he was arrested at the former barter trade, which is a place just across
the place of the stabbing at the Fruit Paradise." 30 The trial judge found it
"therefore strange that on the very evening of the stabbing incident he
was still at the barter trade area by 8:00 o'clock in the evening when he
usually comes to the city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning
and goes home at past 5:00 o'clock and sometimes 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon." 31 Usman's explanation — that, at around 7:00 o'clock P.M.,
he was waiting for transportation to take him home — was found by the
trial court as 'flimsy and weak since he did not explain why he had to go
home late that evening." 32 But the whole trouble is nobody asked him.
The trial judge did not propound any single question to the accused, and
only three to his mother on innocuous matters, by way of clarification, if
only to put on record what the mother and son could articulate with
clarity. Taking into account their poverty and illiteracy, the mother and
son needed as much, if not more, help, than the trial judge extended to
the prosecution witnesses during their examination by asking them
clarificatory and mostly leading questions. In that sense and to that
extent, the accused was disadvantaged. 
A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the innocence of the
accused but the importance of which was brushed away by the trial
judge was the presence of the accused near the scene (about 100 to 150
meters away) soon after the stabbing (he testified at around 7:00 P.M.
although Police Corporal Carpio stated it was 8:00 P.M.) where he was
found sitting on his pushcart with a companion. If he were the assailant,
he would have fled. But the trial court instead indulged in conjecture,
foisting the probability that the accused 'was lulled by a false sense of
security in returning to the place (of the stabbing), when no police
officers immediately responded and appeared at the scene of the crime,"
adding 'there are numerous cases in the past where criminals return to
the scene of their crimes, for reasons only psychologist can
explain." 33 It must have escaped the trial court's attention that Usman
has no criminal record, and, therefore, he could not be generally classed
with criminals. In the second place, the trial court's rationalization
ignores the biblical truism recognized by human nature and endorsed
pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 34
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but note the
total absence of motive ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon, a
complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is not
essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a
state of mind, 35 procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with
the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a
pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there is
doubt as to the Identity of the culprit 36 as when 'the Identification is
extremely tenuous," 37 as in this case.  Decree No. 603, as ammended by Presedential Decree
We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier manner in
which the trial court disregarded the claimed young age of Usman
Hassan.  Supreme Court that "In cases where the age of the
The defense claims that the accused Usman Hassan is a
minor, basing such claim on the testimony of Lahunay
Hassan, the mother of said accused, who declared that
her son Usman Hassan, who is one of her four (4)
children, was born in the year 1967. She testified that
she was just told by a person coming from their place
about the year of the birth of her son Usman. However
on cross-examination, Lahunay Hassan cannot even
remember the date or year of birth of her other
children. The failure of Lahunay Hassan to remember
the date or year of birth of her children is of course
understandable, considering that she is unschooled and
she belongs to a tribe that does not register births,
deaths or marriages, however, it is strange that she only
took pains to find out the year of birth of her son
Usman. For this reason, the Court granted a motion of
the defense on September 13, 1982, to have the herein
accused examined by a competent dentist to determine
his age. However, the findings of the dentist of
Zamboanga General Hospital which is marked as
Exhibit "5" shows the following: "age cannot be
determined accurately under present mouth conditions.
Approximately, he can be from 14 to 21 years of age."
This simply means that the herein accused could either
be 14 years of age or 21 years of age, or any age in
between those aforestated years. From the observation
of this court, the accused Usman Hassan was about 18
years of age at the time he committed this crime and
this observation is based on his personal appearance,
his size and facial features and other personal
characteristics, hence he can not be classified as a
youthful offender under Article. 189 of Presendential
No. 1179. In the case of U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 13
and People vs. Reyes and Panganiban, CA 48 O.G.
1022, cited in the Edition, Page 680, it was ruled by the
culprit is at issue as a basis for claiming an exempting
mitigating circumstance, it is incumbent upon the
accused to establish that circumstance ad any other
elements of defense. 38
Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from
punishment or cause the suspension of his sentence under Articles 12
and 80, respectively of the Revised Penal Code, if found guilty, more
meticulousness and care should have been demanded of medical or
scientific sources, and less reliance on the observation of the judge as
had happened in this case. The preliminary findings of the dentist that
the accused could be anywhere between fourteen to twenty one years,
despite the difficulty of arriving at an accurate determination due to
Hassan's mouth condition, would have placed the trial judge on notice
that there is the probability that the accused might be exempted from
criminal liability due to his young age. All the foregoing indicates that
the accused had not been granted the concern and compassion with
which the poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged so critically deserve. It
is when judicial and police processes and procedures are thoughtlessly
and haphazardly observed that cries of the law and justice being denied
the poor are heard. In any event, all this would not be of any moment
now, considering the acquittal of the accused herein ordered. 
WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused
Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His
release from confinement is hereby Ordered, unless he is held for
another legal cause. With costs de oficio. 
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109143               October 11, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  members of the N.P.A. demanded eight thousand pesos (₱8,000.00)
vs.
PEDRO G. TALIMAN, BASILIO M. BAYBAYAN, AMADO B.
BELANO, DANILO OBENIA and RUFINO VALERA, JR., accused,
PEDRO G. TALIMAN, BASILIO M. BAYBAYAN and AMADO B.
BELANO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Camarines Norte, Branch 40, Daet1 finding accused Pedro Taliman,
Basilio Baybayan and Amado Belano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordering
them to pay the heirs of the victim, Renato Cuano, indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (₱50,000.00), funeral expenses of ten thousand pesos
(₱10,000.00) and actual damages for unrealized income in the amount of
one million forty six thousand pesos (₱1,046,000.00). The trial court
also ordered that alias  warrants of arrest be issued against accused
Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr. who are at large.2 
We state the facts.
The victim was Renato Cuano (hereinafter referred to as "Renato").
Prosecution witness Ernesto Lacson (hereinafter referred to as "Lacson")
was the uncle and employer of Renato, who was the caretaker of his
gravel and sand truck.3 
On July 21, 1990, Renato came to see Lacson and informed him that
armed and hooded persons4 were asking for money amounting to six
thousand pesos (₱6,000.00). The amount was reduced to six hundred
pesos (₱600.00) and finally to two hundred pesos (₱200.00).5 
On July 22, 1990, Lacson arrived home from church. His wife handed
him a letter delivered to her by a child. In the letter, purportedly
from him.6 We quote the letter:7 
"Sayo TaTay Erning
"Rebolusyonaryong pagbati sa yo/
sa inyo layunin ng sulat kong ito upang ipahiwatig sa yo na ang
pakikibaka pang kalawakang pakikibaka ay humihingi ng tulong sa iyo
Tay "Erning" Siguro alam mo na amg aming pakay lalo na sa aming
pangangailangan pinansyal upang magamit sa kilusan bigyan mo po
kami ng halagang 8,000.00 at ito po ang aming inaasahan "okey"
inaasahan ko po at maghihintay kami doon sa kabilang ilog papuntang
nalisbitan dalhin mo ang "jeep" mo iyan ang aming palatandaan alas
4:00 p.m. July 22,90 inaasahan po namin ang iyong pakikipakaupira at
inaasahan po namin na walang ibang makakaalam.
"Okey salamat sigi po maghihintay kami alas 4:00 mamaya.
"MELCO GROUP
"KA BONG
"MABUHAY ANG N.P.A."
On the same day, at around eight o’clock in the morning (8:00 a. m.),
Lacson instructed Renato to take his passenger jeep and to proceed to
his "gold field" in Nalisbitan to get his collectibles from the field. This
was the last time Lacson saw Renato alive.8 
Also on the same day, Lacson told his employee,9 prosecution witness
Elizer Obregon (hereinafter referred to as "Elizer"), to go to the crossing
of Nalisbitan,10 the place mentioned in the letter to investigate who the
persons demanding money were.11 
Elizer complied and reached the place at around five o’clock in the
afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of the same day.
Upon reaching the place, Elizer saw Renato and spoke with him. In the On July 24, 1990, a medical officer of Labo, Camarines Norte issued a
vicinity, Elizer saw accused Basilio Baybayan, Pedro Taliman and certificate of death of Renato Lacson Cuaño, stating as cause of death,
Amado Belano. At that time, accused Sgt. Pedro Taliman and C1C the following:21 
Basilio M. Baybayan were members of the Camarines Norte
Constabulary/Integrated National Police Command.12 Elizer saw two "Immediate cause : a. Irreversible shock due to massive
other civilians in their company.13  hemorrhages

Elizer then saw accused Pedro Taliman and Basilio Baybayan take "Antecedent cause : b. Internal and External secondary to
Renato14 to a hilltop, where he was guarded by accused who were armed.
Elizer heard one of the accused say that Renato must be taken as "he "Underlying cause : c. Gunshot wound and multiple stab
must be acting as a lookout (for Lacson)."15  wounds."

Elizer then proceeded to Bagong Silang and reported to Lacson that
Renato was taken by accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and
Amado Belano.
A custodial investigation was conducted.
On July 23, 1990, Attorney Nicolas V. Pardo was mayor of Labo,
Camarines Norte. He went to the police station upon invitation of police
corporal Cereno to "assist" accused during their custodial
investigation.16 Accused executed extra-judicial statements, confessing
to the commission of the crime.
It was during this custodial investigation that accused Basilio Baybayin
confessed to prosecution witness Sgt. Bonifacio Argarin that he
participated in the killing of Renato because Renato did not give them
the money they were demanding. This confession was given without the
assistance of counsel and was not reduced to writing.17  the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
On December 18, 1990, Provincial Prosecutor Pascualita Duran-Cereno
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Norte an information for
murder against accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan, Amado
Belano, Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr. alleging:
"That on or about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 22, 1990, at
Crossing of sitio Malisbitan, Brgy. Exiben, municipality of Labo,
province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill,
with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior
strength, assault, attack, stab and shoot one RENATO CUAÑO alias
LAPOY, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wound and multiple
stab wounds on the different parts of his body, and which injuries were
the proximate cause of the death of said Renato Cuano alias Lapoy, to

On July 23, 1990, police authorities, accompanied by accused Basilio "CONTRARY TO LAW."22 
Baybayan went to the place indicated in a sketch prepared by accused
Pedro Taliman.18 It was in the place indicated that they found the On February 26, 1991, accused Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayan
cadaver of Renato.19 This was the same place or hilltop where and Amado B. Belano were arraigned. They pleaded "not
prosecution witness Elizer saw Renato being guarded.20  guilty."23 Accused Danilo Obenia24 and Rufino Valero, Jr. were not
arraigned because they remained at large.
On March 21, 1991, accused waived the pre-trial conference25 and trial
ensued.26  accused Basilio M. Baybayan.32 The warrant of arrest was returned
On May 29, 1992, the trial court declared the case submitted for
decision.27  On November 11, 1992, accused Pedro G. Taliman filed a notice of
On September 24, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, the decretal
portion of which provides:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused Pedro Taliman,
Basilio Baybayan and Amado Delano are all found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged, and are hereby
each sentence (sic) to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (or life
imprisonment) (sic). The accused are furthermore jointly and severally
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim for his death the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) and for funeral expenses the amount of ten
thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos, and considering that the deceased victim
was only 27 years old when killed and applying the formula (2/3 x [80-
27] - life expectancy of the American Table of Mortality, said deceased
victim has still 44 years more to live were he not killed by the accused.
Therefore, since he was employed and receiving monthly salary of
₱2,000.00 his unrealized income for the 44 more years of his life is
₱1,046,000.00 for which the accused likewise are jointly and severally
ordered to pay.
"Considering that accused Danilo Obenis and Rufino Valera, Jr., are still
at large, let an alias Warrant of Arrest be issued against them. In the
meantime, let the records of the case be archived and reinstated as soon
as they are apprehended.
"SO ORDERED."28 
On October 28, 1992, the decision was promulgated.29 However, accused
Basilio M. Baybayan was not present,30 despite due notice.31 
On October 30, 1992, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of
unserved as he could not be found.33 
appeal with the trial court.34 
On May 26, 1993, we resolved to accept the appeal.35 
We state at the onset that while counsel for accused represents all five
accused in this appeal, the benefit of this appeal is only accorded
accused-appellants Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayan36 and
Amado B. Belano.
The other two accused Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr., were not
arraigned.37 Thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons.
The rule on trial in absentia cannot apply to Danilo Obenia and Rufino
Valera, Jr. In People v. Salas,38 the Court declared that one of the
requisites for trial to proceed in absentia is that the accused had been
arraigned.
Now, the merits.
Accused-appellants submit that the extra-judicial confessions on which
the trial court relied were inadmissible in evidence because they were
obtained in violation of their constitutional rights.39 We agree with
accused-appellants on this point. The extra-judicial statements alone
cannot be a basis for conviction.
Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides:
"Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel (underscoring ours)."
Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for
accused during their custodial investigation.
In People v. Culala,40 we held that the extra-judicial confession of the
accused-appellant was inadmissible as he was "assisted" by the
incumbent municipal attorney. In People vs. Bandula,41 we held that a
municipal attorney could not be an independent counsel as required by
the Constitution. We reasoned that as legal officer of the municipality,
he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the
municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people,
including the maintenance of peace and order. It is therefore seriously
doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused
without running into conflict of interests.
Besides, lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given
as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are suspects. In
many areas, even less obvious than that obtaining in the present case, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic.42  This was the substance of Elizer’s testimony. The trial court did not find
If in the aforecited cases, we disregarded the extra-judicial statements of
the accused, how much more must we do so now, given that it was the
mayor himself, and not just the provincial attorney, that assisted
accused-appellants?
Even assuming that the right to counsel was orally waived during
custodial investigation,43 still the defect was not cured. The Constitution
expressly provides that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence
of counsel.44 This, accused-appellants did not do.
However, while we agree that the extra-judicial statements of the
accused are inadmissible in evidence, we find that there is still sufficient
evidence to convict.
While no one saw the actual killing of Renato, circumstantial evidence
proved its commission. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential,
when to insist on direct testimony would set felons free.45 
Rule 133, Section 4 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence provides:46 
"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient - Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
"(a) There is more than one circumstance;
"(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
"(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt."
In the present case, we find the following circumstances attendant:
First, Renato was last seen alive in the company of accused-appellants.
reason not to believe him. Neither do we.
It is the trial court and not this Court that had the opportunity to observe
Elizer’s manner of testifying, his furtive glances, his calmness, sighs or
the scant or full realization of his oath.47 The trial court’s assessment of
the credibility of witnesses is entitled to respect.48 
Second, accused-appellants, two other civilians, Renato and Elizer were
the only persons present at the Nalisbitan crossing, on July 22, 1990, at
five o’clock in the afternoon. The place and the time are significant.
This was the very place, the very date and more or less the time of day
indicated in the letter of demand that Lacson received.49 While Renato’s
and Elizer’s presence in the area was explained, the presence of
accused-appellants in that area and during that crucial time can be only
explained by the fact that accused-appellants were the very ones
demanding money from Lacson.
"Facts or circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of a. Upon reaching the place at the crossing of Nalisbitan I have
the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, constitute evidence talked with Renato Cuaño who asked where I was going. I have
which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence not confided to him that I was doing surveillance work on the
in its effect upon the court."50  person demanding money from Ernesto Lacson and so I
proceeded. I walked and upon reaching a point I have seen
Third, motive is apparent. Renato was first approached by accused- Basilio Naybayan in the company of two (2) civilians and I
appellants with an oral demand. Renato relayed the demand to Lacson.51  continued with my walk and ahead of them I saw Mr. Taliman
with Belano and I did not notice that I was followed by Mr.
The oral demand was followed up with a written demand.52  Renato Cuaño.

When Renato passed through the Nalisbitan crossing, he was driving
Lacson’s jeepney. This was the very jeepney indicated in the letter. The
letter instructed Lacson to bring money and to drive a specific jeepney
to Nalisbitan. Yet, when accused-appellants confronted Renato, he did
not have the money they demanded.
The fact that Renato was the driver of the jeepney indicated in the letter
can explain accused-appellants’ reason for killing him.
This conclusion is supported by Elizer’s testimony.1âwphi1 We quote
the pertinent portions:53  a. When I was on my way back taking the same route my way
"q. Now, you said you were requested by Mr. Lacson to proceed to that
crossing of Nalisbitan for you to see the person who was demanding
money and identified themselves as members of NPA. Were you able to
go to that place?
a. Yes, sir.
q. What time was that?
a. I reached the place more or less 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon
of that same date July 22, 1990, sir.
xxx
a. I saw, sir, Renato Cuaño was taken by Mr. Taliman and
Belano, sir.
xxx
q. Now, when you go back taking the same route what did you
see if any?
was blocked by Belano and Taliman accompanied by civilian
and inquired from me whether I was the driver of the jeep.
q. What was your answer if any?
a. I denied being the driver of the jeep, sir.
q. Why did you deny being the driver of the jeep?
a. I denied being the driver of the jeep because I saw already
Renato Cuaño on top of the hill on a cut guarded by Baybayan
with a ccivilian in their company, sir.

q. What did you do when you reached that Nalisbitan Crossing? xxx
 q. The question of this Court is why did you say that this
Renato Cuaño is being guarded?
a. They are guarding Renato Cuaño, sir, because that is the
person they have conferred with to whom they have relayed the
demand of money and he is the driver of the jeep. He is the one
who pretended to be the driver of the jeep.
xxx
q. Now, when Amado Belano asked you whether you know
Renato Cuaño and you denied it, what more did Amado Belano
ask you if any?
a. Amado Belano further made a statement that it is better for
them to take along that man, referring to Renato Cuaño,
because Renato Cuaño might be acting as a lookout."
The letter54 provided that "no one else should know"55 about the demand.
Thus, Renato’s presence would naturally alarm accused-appellants.
Motive is a key element when establishing guilt through circumstantial
evidence.56 Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from
which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor,
motive may be sufficient to support a conviction.57  awarded.63
Fourth, Renato’s corpse was discovered in the same place where he was
held and guarded by accused-appellants.58  (₱50,000.00) is proper.64 Renato’s father testified that because of his
Fifth is the facts of death of Renato, which is the corpus delicti of the
crime.
However, while Renato’s death in the hands of accused-appellants was
proven, we find that the manner of killingwas not so evidenced. There
was no showing of treachery.
Treachery exists when the accused employs means, methods, and forms
which directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.59 Treachery, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.60 
In the absence of proof as to how the killing was perpetrated, the crime
committed was homicide.61 
The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. In the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty is
imposed in its medium period.62 The Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies.
The trial court awarded the heirs of Renato Cuaño one million forty six
thousand pesos (₱1,046,000.00) as actual damages for unrealized
income. We delete this award as it is not supported by receipts. The
testimony of Renato’s father as to how much Renato was earning at the
time of his death is self-serving and hearsay.
The trial court’s award of actual damages for funeral expenses in the
amount of ten thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos is likewise deleted. The
claim is not supported by any receipt. The rule is that every pecuniary
loss must be established by credible evidence before it may be
 
An award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
son’s death, he felt "great pain" and his wife suffered some "sleepless
nights" and "cried for several days."65 
The trial court’s award of fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity for wrongful death is affirmed. This can be awarded without
need of proof other than the death of the victim.66 
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines
Norte, Branch 40, Daet, dated September 24, 1992 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M.
Baybayab and Amado B. Belano are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, and in the absence of any modifying circumstance,
are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal,as maximum.
Accused-appellants are jointly and severally ordered to pay the heirs of
Renato Cuaño, moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00) and civil indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00). The award of actual damages for funeral expenses and
unrealized income is DELETED.
The case is archived as to accused Danilo Obenis and Rufino Valera, Jr.,
until their arrest and submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133685-86             May 20, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,  jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
vs.
AMADO BAGNATE, appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment rendered
by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) of Tabaco, Albay, finding
appellant Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in
Criminal Case No. T-2874 and of Rape with Homicide in Criminal Case
No. T-2875, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Death in each case.
The Information against appellant in Criminal Case No. T-2874 reads as
follows:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 o’clock in
the morning, more or less, at Barangay Buhian, Municipality of
Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to kill and while armed with a bolo, with nocturnity,
treachery, superior strength, and with disregard of the respect
due to the victim on account of age and sex, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and hack
with said bolo one AURIA BROÑA,1 a 70-year old blind
woman, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which
caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.
ACTS CONTARY TO LAW.2
The Information in Criminal Case No. T-2875 reads:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 o’clock in
the morning, more or less, at Barangay Buhian, Municipality of
Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the
with lewd design and by means of violence, force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with ROSALIE RAYALA,
against her will and consent, and on the occasion thereof, with
intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and while
armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and hack aforenamed Rosalie Rayala,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different
parts of her body, which caused her death, to the damage and
prejudice of her heirs.
 ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.3
When arraigned on December 1, 1997, Bagnate pleaded "not guilty" to
both charges against him,4 and joint trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:  PRELIMINARY : Mr. Amado Bagnate, you are in this
In the afternoon of August 7, 1997, appellant was turned over to
SPO2 Junwel Ambion for custodial investigation. Without
asking the name of appellant, SPO2 Ambion informed him in
the Bicol dialect of his right to remain silent, to be assisted by
counsel, that whatever he says may be used against or in his
favor, and that he cannot be tortured or molested. Asked if he is
willing to cooperate, the accused assented and gave his name as
Amado Magnate. SPO2 Ambion later learned that appellant’s
real name is Amado Bagnate. When appellant told SPO2
Ambion that he is willing to confess, SPO2 Ambion again
informed appellant of his rights, and asked him further if he
wants to be assisted by counsel but appellant said that his
counsel was in Manila. SPO2 Ambion offered the services of
Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, which appellant accepted. SPO2
Ambion then left to fetch Atty. Brotamonte whose office was
located several meters away from the police station. However,
Atty. Brotamonte told SPO2 Ambion that he will just follow as
he was having his office blessing at that time. After some time,
Atty. Brotamonte arrived at the police station. Before
proceeding with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte asked the
policemen to leave the investigation room and conferred with
appellant. He introduced himself to appellant and informed him
of his rights. He also asked and examined appellant to see if he
was physically harmed by the policemen and found none
although Atty. Brotamonte noticed that appellant’s left hand
was handcuffed to the table. Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte
that he is willing to give a statement. The investigation was then
conducted in the Bicol dialect, with SPO2 Ambion asking the
questions. It was translated thereafter into English with the help
of Atty. Brotamonte, for the purpose of putting it into writing.
After typing the first page of the confession, Atty. Brotamonte
translated and explained the contents thereof to appellant, then
Atty. Brotamonte and appellant signed thereon. While all this
was going on, SPO1 Rogelio Gonzales was taking
pictures.5 The first page of the confession reads:
office being investigated for your involvement in the
crimes imputed against you particularly the killing of
Aurea Bronia and Rosalie Rayala and at the same time
having carnal knowledge of the two in Buhian, Tabaco,
Albay. But before we proceed in this investigation,
may I inform you that under our New Constitution, you
have the right to remain silent, and that anything you
may say may be used in your favor or against you in
any court proceedings in the entire Philippines; that
you have the right to be assisted by a counsel of your
own choice or if you cannot afford to have one, the
state represented by our office will provide you a
competent counsel; that you are free from torture or
any form of physical violence which will tend vitiate
your statements. Do you clearly understand your
constitutional rights which were related to you in Bicol
dialect?
ANSWER : Yes sir, I clearly understand my
Constitutional Rights because it was related to me in
Bicol dialect.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you want to avail of your
Constitutional rights?
ANSWER : I want to be assisted by a competent
counsel.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you have a counsel of your
own choice?
 ANSWER : I have none sir.
INVESTIGATOR : Since you do not have your own
counsel, our office will provide you one, is this
acceptable to you?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : If our office will provide you the
services of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, who is a
competent lawyer is this acceptable to you?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : May I again remind you that
anything you say in this investigation may be used in
favor or against you in any court proceedings in the
entire Philippines. Do you still wish to give your free
and voluntary statements?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you understand the questions
that were asked from you?
ANSWER : Yes sir, because they were related to me in
Bicol dialect.
INVESTIGATOR : Are you willing to sign your given
statements?
ANSWER : Yes sir.6
SPO2 Ambion then proceeded with the second and third pages of the
confession, following the same procedure of propounding the questions
in the Bicol dialect and translating it thereafter into English for each
page.7 Atty. Brotamonte again read and explained the contents thereof to
appellant8 after which they again separately signed on pages two and
three thereof. The second and third pages are quoted in verbatim, to wit:
03. Q- Please state your name and other personal
circumstances?
A- AMADO BAGNATE Y BRONIA, 28 years old, single,
duck caretaker presently working in Balatong Pulilan, Bulacan
and a native of Buhian, Tabaco, Albay. 
04. Q- When and where did the incident happened?
A- At on or about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 at Buhian,
Tabaco, Albay.
05. Q- Will you please narrate in detail, your knowledge of the
said incident?
A- At on or about 6:00 P.M. August 6, 1997 I together with
Faustino Bufi9 and Carlito Begil drink a bottle of gin at the store
of Yolanda Buban at Buhian, Tabaco, Albay and while we were
drinking said Carlito Begil told us that he will have sex with a
woman on that night, however he did not elaborate who the
woman is and at about 8:00 P.M. of same date we already
consumed the bottle of gin and we decided to go home.
06. Q- Please continue
A- So I proceeded to the house of my brother-in-law Roberto
Angeles to spend the night at the said house however at on or
about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 I go out of the house and
proceeded to my grandparents house which is about five arms
length from the house of Roberto Angeles leaving the bolo on
the ground and entered my grandparents Aurea Bronia’s house
and go directly on the room where Rosalie Rayala is sleeping
and once inside the room I embraced the sleeping Rosalie
Rayala and started on kissing her however Rosalie Rayala
spank and boxed me but still I continued on kissing her but still
he spank me, so I go out of the room and sits on the door but
Rosalie Rayala followed me so I kissed her again but she spank
me again so I got hold of the bolo and hack Rosalie Rayala
hitting her on her neck which caused her to fall on the ground
and I pulled Rosalie Rayala and have carnal knowledge of her
while she is still alive, while Carlito Begil and Roberto Angeles
were standing and viewing what I am doing and after satisfying
my lust said Carlito Begil goes on to of Rosalie Rayala and
started on pumping her and after satisfying his lust, my
grandparent Aurea Bronia shouted although she was blind and
thinks that my grandparent Aurea Bronia heard what I am doing
I hacked her on her neck and when she fall I pulled her away
from the house towards the grassy portion of the yard wherein
Carlito Begil and Roberto Angeles followed me wherein I was
unable to determine who from the two had carnal knowledge of
my grandparent because I already left them and I proceeded to
the main road to Tabaco, Albay.
07. Q- Please continue further.
A- Before I finally proceeded to the main road I passed by the
house of Jose which I had forgotten his family name and
Armando Bosque both Barangay Tanods of our place and told
the two that is being wanted by my godfather Julian Baloloy
that there was something that happened in the house of my
grandparents house, and the two goes with me and because I
was already then frightened I just go with them and hurriedly
left the place and proceeded to Roberto Angeles house and
called my sister and I was allowed to enter and I prepared a cup
of coffee and after drinking same I hurriedly left the house and
finally proceeded to the highway and boarded a jeep bound for
the town proper and spend the rest of the night at the town plaza
and at about 6:00 A.M. August 7, 1997 I proceeded to the
church to hear mass and after that I went to my sister’s house at
Tayhi, Tabaco, Albay and I eat my breakfast and after eating I
left my sister’s house named Avelina Calla and it came to my
mind that I will evade arrest and decided to proceed to Metro
Manila then to my place of work in Pulilan, Bulacan.
08. Q- How were you able to reach the Tabaco Police Station?
A- I was apprehended by residents of Bankilingan, Tabaco,
Albay for accordingly an alarm to apprehend me was set by
elements of the Tabaco Police wherein one of them was able to
trace me but luckily I was able to evade them but finally I was
apprehended at Bankilingan, Tabaco, Albay and later on was
brought to the Tabaco Police.
09. Q- How are you related with the victims namely Rosalie
Rayala and Aurea Bronia?
A- This Rosalie Rayala she is my nephew and Aurea Bronia she
is my grandparent.
10. Q- This investigator, had no more question to ask from you,
do you have anything more to add in this statement of yours?
A- Now no more sir, but I will just relate other details if the
need arises.
11. Q- Are you willing to sign this statement of yours?
A- Yes sir.10
After appellant’s confession was typed and signed, Atty. Brotamonte
left the police station and went back to his office. As far as he could
recall, the entire process took more than an hour.11
The next day, August 8, 1997, appellant was brought before Judge
Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. Judge
Base requested the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently
examined the voluntariness and veracity of the confession as well as the
authenticity of the signatures of appellant and Atty. Brotamonte. He also
explained to appellant the consequences of his confession to the crimes
charged and asked him if he was coerced into admitting them. Judge
Base inspected appellant’s body and asked him if he was forced or
coerced. Judge Base then asked appellant if he was still willing to sign it
again and appellant answered in the affirmative saying that his
conscience bothered him. Judge Base asked him to sign the confession
again in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after which appellant affixed
his signature.12
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the extra-judicial
confession of appellant showed how the crimes were committed by him.
Appellant repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial court
and assailed its admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of
his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent and
independent counsel of his own choice; and that he was not fully
apprised of the consequences of his confession. He testified that the real
perpetrators of the crime were his brother-in-law, Roberto Angeles, and
a certain Carlito Begil, and that he was only forced into owning up to
the crimes because Angeles threatened to harm him or his sister,
Angeles’s wife, if he did not do so.
Appellant recounted on the witness stand that in the afternoon of August
6, 1997, he was having a drink with Carlito Begil and Faustino Bufe at
the store of Yolanda Bulan in Buhian, Tabaco, Albay. While they were
drinking, Begil mentioned that he is planning to have sex with someone
he did not identify. They finished drinking at around 8:00 in the evening
and started walking home. While he and Begil were walking, Begil
asked him to accompany him to Rosalie Rayala’s house but he declined
because he was already hungry and he wanted to eat first. He then went
to the house of Roberto Angeles who is married to his sister Maria
Nellie Bagnate. While he was on the porch having a smoke, Angeles
arrived very drunk. Begil arrived later. Begil and Angeles drank
"kalampunay". He took only one glass of the drink and went inside the
house to get a cigarette. When he went back to the porch, Angeles and
Begil were already gone. At around 12:30 in the morning, he went
inside and slept. The shout of his ninong, Julian Baloloy, telling him to
fetch a barangay tanod, awakened him. He fetched Jose Rodriquez and
Armando Bosque and they went to the house of Rosalie, located thirty
meters away. He was told to build a fire while the rest searched for
"something." After idling in the yard for some time, he went back to
Angeles’s house to have coffee. Angeles and Begil then arrived and
Angeles told him to flee or he (Angeles) will kill his (appellant’s) sister.
Angeles gave him ₱10.00. He took a jeep to Tabaco and reached the
Tabaco plaza at 2:00 in the morning. He proceeded to his sister’s house,
Avelina Bagnate, in Tayhi, Tabaco, Albay, and passed the time there.
Then he went to the Tabaco town proper. He was finally arrested in
Bangkilingan, Tabaco and brought to the police headquarters at 5:00 in
the morning of August 7, 1997.13
The trial court found appellant’s extra-judicial confession admissible in
evidence on which basis, it convicted appellant of the crimes charged
against him. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged in
Criminal Case No. T-2874 and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of
Auria Broña the amount of ₱50,000.00 as damages;
and,
2. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide
as charged in Criminal Case No. T-2875 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to
indemnify the heirs of Rosalie Rayala in the amount of
₱50,000.00 as damages.
SO ORDERED.14
In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
I
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIMES OF MURDER AND RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.15
The main issue in this case is the admissibility of appellant’s confession.
Appellant claims that Atty. Brotamonte was not a competent and
independent counsel as he failed to advise him of the penalty to be
imposed on the crimes he was accused of committing; hence, he was not
aware of the consequences of his admissions. 
To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must be
express and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an
independent and competent counsel, and a person under custodial
investigation must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very
start thereof. The presence of counsel is intended to secure the
voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession, and the assistance given
must be independent and competent, that is, providing full protection to
the constitutional rights of the accused.16
The rule is premised on the presumption that the accused is thrust into
an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical
or psychological is forcefully apparent.17 It is not intended as a deterrent
to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so
desires but to protect the accused from being coerced to admit any that
is untrue.18 To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all
the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is
not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might
incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.19
In the present case, the assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more
than perfunctory. Before the onset of the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte
privately conferred with appellant to ascertain the voluntariness of his
confession and to make sure that no force or duress was employed by
the police authorities on the latter to make him admit the crimes
charged. He informed appellant of his constitutional rights and was clear
in explaining to him the questions propounded by SPO2 Ambion. The
testimony of Atty. Brotamonte during cross-examination leaves no room
for doubt that he adequately assisted appellant during the investigation,
viz:
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
Q: Now, upon your arrival, were you offered a seat?
A: No, because immediately when I arrived I asked the accused
to stand and examined the body of the accused, if there were
injury or what and I asked the accused, if these policemen
inflicted injury to him, if he was harmed and according to
accused, none.
Q: And in doing that particularly, what did you do to examine
the body of the accused of it bare some signs of injury?
A: Because as a lawyer I have to protect the right of the
accused. If the accused has body injury definitely I will be
requiring the policemen to submit the accused for medical
examination before the investigation will be conducted.
Q: In doing that, how did you do it to the accused?
A: I let the accused to stand and I asked him if any of the
policemen harmed inflicted bodily injury to him and he told me
no one of the policemen.
Q: Any of the policemen present?
A: No, when I arrived, I request two (2) policemen to step-out
because I have to talk to the accused when I propound question
and examine the body of the accused and the accused was
inside the room.
...
Q: And you were satisfied by the answer of the accused and you
did not even bother to search the body of the accused?
A: In my observation, the accused was telling the truth.
Otherwise, he will inform this representation because I already
informed him that I am a lawyer and I will protect him if
somebody harmed him.
...
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
As narrated in that affidavit, I explained to the accused that
before I introduced myself, I told him that the policemen
informs this representation that you are going to give your
sworn statement before the police and I told him that I am a
lawyer and I will assist him until the policemen finished the
investigation and I told him to tell the truth to the policemen
and told him that if you want to give your sworn statement to
the police, you can do it because that is your right under the
constitution, to remain silent.
Q: That is why for example, right to be informed; you have the
right to remain silent, and whatever you said will be used
against in you, did you not explain these one by one?
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
I explained that one by one. In fact I told the accused that the
sworn statement you are going to make now might be used
against you by the police but the accused is willing to give his
sworn statement.
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
Q: I see. Now, you said that you helped in the translation of the
sworn statement in the Bicol dialect. Meaning that the questions
were propounded in English and you helped the police
investigator to translate it in Bicol dialect?
A: No, when I state that I helped the police in the translation of
the answer, what the policemen were asking the witness in
Bicol and they translated in English and I even helped the
policemen in the translation of the question and the answer of
the witness in Bicol dialect.20
Clearly, appellant signed the confession with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel, Atty. Brotamonte, and it was also
sworn to by him before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tabaco, Albay, who, before administering the oath to appellant,
conferred with him and informed him of his rights and the consequences
of his confession. Judge Base testified, thus:
Q: Judge, please explain to the Honorable Court the
circumstances how this sworn statement, how the affiant was
able to come into your house and the sworn statement was
sworn to?
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
The witness is not sure whether he was in his house or office.
A: The police investigator came to my office and informed me
that they were investigating a rape and murder case that
happened somewhere in the mountain of Tabaco, Albay and
informed me that the suspect has been apprehended and that the
suspect is willing to sign an affidavit of confession so I advised
the police investigator to comply strictly with respect to
investigation custodial legis and I informed him that that case
should be assisted by a lawyer and the investigator told me that
he contacted Atty. Brotamonte to assist the suspect in the
investigation and I said It’s better. So, after that the suspect was
brought to me together with Atty. Brotamonte because I
requested Atty. Brotamonte to be present also and the suspect. I
investigated the suspect and he admitted to me that what he
stated in this affidavit which is actually a confession that he
killed the two women and actually raped one of them is correct
and true. So, after explaining to him the consequence of his
having confession to the crime being charged against him and
he was still willing to sign the confession I let him sign the
confession in my presence and in the presence of Atty.
Brotamonte and after which I subscribed the affidavit.
PROSECUTOR BERANGO: (To witness)
Q: Now, Judge could you tell the Honorable Court while the
accused was in your presence if there was any pressure or
compulsion upon the accused to sign this document?
A: When the police investigator came to me I instructed him not
to use any force and when the suspect was presented to me,
actually I inspected his body if there was any sign of abrasion
and I actually asked the suspect if he was forced or coerced into
signing the crime charged and he said, no. And I asked him if
this confession is voluntary and he said, yes. And he said he is
being bothered by his conscience.21
The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable
penalty of the crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike
down appellant’s extrajudicial confession. Section 12 (1) to (3), Article
III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 1722 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
Thus, what the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is
confession given by an accused without having been informed of his
right to remain silent, or, without having been given competent and
independent 
counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of
counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was
not in writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he was
tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence or any other means
that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the Constitution that
mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for the
crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel
is incompetent or not independent just because he failed to apprise the
accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit
is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the
resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the commission of a crime.
To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of
assisting an accused during a custodial investigation, it is only required
for a lawyer to be:
"….willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving
a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the
individual’s constitutional rights. In People v. Basay (219
SCRA 404, 418) this Court stressed that an accused’s right to
be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather
than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle."23
As previously stated, Atty. Brotamonte ably assisted appellant during
the entire procedure – from the time appellant signified his intention to
give his extrajudicial confession up to the time he signed the same.
Besides, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant was not aware of the
consequences of his admissions as Judge Base explained it to appellant
when he appeared before the latter to swear to the veracity of his
confession.  the Constitution. It constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the
The Court notes that while Judge Base testified that he asked appellant
to sign anew the extrajudicial confession in his presence, the copy
thereof marked as Exhibits "A", "B", and "C" attached to the records of
the case do not show any subsequent signature made by appellant.
Nevertheless, appellant did not refute Judge Base’s testimony, and it
does not detract the fact that appellant executed the extrajudicial
confession voluntarily with the assistance of an independent and
competent counsel, and that he subsequently acknowledged having
executed the same voluntarily and swore to its veracity before Judge
Base.  of corpus delicti, that is, the body of the crime and, in its primary sense,
Appellant failed to substantiate his bare claim that when he was brought
to the Tabaco police station, the police officers boxed and kicked him,
telling him to confess to the crimes.24 As the records show, like Atty.
Brotamonte, Judge Base also asked him if he was forced to confess but
Bagnate said that he was not. If it were true that he was forced to
confess to the crime, then appellant should have complained of such
abuse to Atty. Brotamonte or Judge Base as he had the opportunity to do
so when the two conferred with him on separate occasions. 
Where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress
or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the
officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their
bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as
factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.25
To consider appellant’s allegation of maltreatment as true is to facilitate
the retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of
torture, without any proof whatsoever.26
The taking of appellant’s confession has conformed to the safeguards of
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately
and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience.27
Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial
confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. The Rule
specifically requires that there should be some other evidence "tending
to show the commission of the crime apart from the
confession."28Appellant’s confession is corroborated by evidence
that a crime has actually been committed.29
The evidence of corpus delicti in both cases consists of the victims’
deaths, as evidenced by the death certificates of Aurea Broña30 and
Rosalie Rayala,31 and the findings of the autopsies conducted on the
victims’ cadavers by Tabaco Rural Health Officer Dr. Amelia Guiriba
showing that both were hacked to death and Rosalie was raped.
The autopsy on victim Aurea disclosed the following:
Hacked wound back of the neck about four (4) inches in length
affecting skin, subcutaneous tissue, muscle and the cervical
bone.
Hacked wound, neck anteriorly affecting larynx about 2 inches
in length.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to hacked
wound, neck.32
While the autopsy conducted on Rosalie revealed the following:
Stabbed wound neck, posteriorly about 1 ½ inches in length, 2
inches depth reaching the cervical bone.
Hacked wound left shoulder about 1 ½ inches length superficial
slanting direction.
Hacked wound - right neck about 4 ½ inches length affecting
skin subcutaneous muscle & Blood vessels, right earlobe cut.
Hacked wound below the chin about 3 ½ inches length affecting
skin and subcutaneous tissue.
Hacked wound, left neck about 5 inches in length affecting skin
subcutaneous tissue, muscle, Blood vessels and the cervical
bone.
Hacked wound, left middle ear auricle about 1 inch in length,
left occipital region about 1 inch in length.
Multiple linear abrasion both scapular region.
Contusion floor of the vaginal wall.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to multiple
hacked wound, neck.33
The foregoing findings coincide with appellant’s extrajudicial
confession. As he stated therein, he hacked both victims on the neck
with a bolo and he dragged Aurea towards the grassy portion of the
yard. Appellant also admitted that he raped Rosalie. The autopsy report
shows that Rayala had contusions on the floor of her vaginal wall, thus
confirming that Rosalie had been raped. The autopsy report likewise
confirmed that the victims suffered hack wounds on their necks. The
recovery of the bolo after appellant had left the place likewise jibes with
appellant’s declaration in his confession that he hacked both victims
with a bolo.34 These are details that appellant could not have known if he
did not commit the crimes. 
It must also be noted that appellant was arrested only five hours from
the occurrence of the crimes. It is not possible that within such short
span of time, appellant would be able to know the details of the crimes
as he described them when he gave his confession if it were true that he
really did not commit them. The voluntariness of a confession may be
inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession
exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details – which could only be supplied by
the accused – reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered
voluntary.35
Lending additional credence to the truthfulness of appellant’s
extrajudicial confession is the defense evidence itself, establishing that:
Around 12:00 midnight of August 7, 1997, defense witness Julian
Baloloy heard cries for help coming from the house of Aurea. Together
with his son, Rodel, who brought a flashlight, they went to the house
and called out to Aurea and Rosalie but there was no response. When
they went inside the house, they saw blood and strands of hair on the
floor but there was no sign of the two. They shouted for help and
Roberto Angeles, whose house is located in front of the victims’ house
about thirty meters away, arrived. Appellant arrived next, saying that he
just came from work and was not able to clean his hands. When Rodel
Baloloy shone his flashlight on appellant, they saw that his hands were
sticky and covered in red. Julian Baloloy then ordered appellant to fetch
a barangay tanod. When Armando Bosque and Jose Rodriguez arrived,
they started to look for Aurea and Rosalie while appellant was told to
build a fire. At the back of the house, they saw impressions on the yard
indicating that an object had been dragged, after which, they found the
dead bodies of Aurea and Rosalie fifty meters away.36
Defense witnesses also testified that appellant did not join the search
and therefore, the latter could not have known or seen the injuries
suffered by the victims when they were found. It has been noted that
appellant, in his confession, had accurately specified the injuries he
inflicted on both victims. Julian Baloloy’s testimony that they saw
marks on the yard indicating that something has been dragged
corroborated appellant’s statement that he dragged Aurea. Moreover,
that Julian Baloloy saw appellant’s hand sticky and covered in red,
which Baloloy described "as if you have just slaughtered a pig and you
(sic) hands smudge with blood and when you washed your hands, it
could still (sic) red," bolsters the conclusion that appellant indeed had
participated in the gruesome crimes.37
Thus, the confession of appellant being admissible in evidence and
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, the trial court correctly
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder
and Rape with Homicide.
In imposing the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. T-2874,
the trial court considered the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity,
treachery, superior strength, and disregard of the respect due to the
victim on account of age and sex, as alleged in the Information, thus
qualifying the killing of Aurea to murder. 
However, the Court finds that the trial court erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. The evidence on record does not
sufficiently prove that it attended the commission of the crime as no one
actually saw the incident. The fact that Aurea was blind does not
necessarily qualify her killing as treacherous. Treachery exists when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.38 Appellant’s confession
merely stated: "after satisfying his lust, my grandparent Aurea Bronia
shouted although she was blind and thinks (sic) that my grandparent
Aurea Bronia heard what I am doing I hacked her on her neck and when
she fall (sic) I pulled her away from the house towards the grassy
portion of the yard . . .". There is nothing in appellant’s confession that
demonstrates that he deliberately employed a particular means, method
or form of attack in the execution of the crime.
Neither could nocturnity be considered as an aggravating circumstance
considering that it was not shown that the darkness of the night was
purposely sought by appellant to facilitate the commission of the crime
nor to ensure its execution.39
It is not disputed that the crime was committed in Aurea’s house.
However, dwelling may not be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the consideration of his criminal liability as it is not
alleged in the Information.40
Nonetheless, it is alleged in the Information and established by the
prosecution that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 7659,41 any person who shall kill another shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by death if committed with
abuse of superior strength. Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the
death penalty in Criminal Case No. T-2874.42
As regards the damages awarded to the heirs of Aurea Broña in the
amount of ₱50,000.00, the Court considers the same as representing
civil indemnity. In murder cases, civil indemnity requires no further
proof other than death.43
The award of civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of
moral damages, which is based on a different jural foundation and
assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.44 Considering
that the prosecution failed to show any proof that the heirs of Aurea
Broña are entitled to moral damages, the same may not be awarded.45
In accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages
may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.46 Considering the generic aggravating circumstances of
disregard of age of the victim and dwelling, the award of ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is in order.47
In Criminal Case No. T-2875, the trial court likewise correctly imposed
the death penalty. Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7659 imposes the penalty of death when by
reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed.  inflicted all the injuries sustained by the victims.
The Court, however, has to modify the award of civil indemnity in favor
of the heirs of Rosalie Rayala. Recent rulings increased the amount of
civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide to ₱100,000.00.48 The
heirs of Rosalie must be awarded the amount of ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages without need of proof,49 in view of the rape suffered by victim
Rosalie. The fact that the heirs suffered the trauma of mental or physical
and psychological sufferings which constitute the basis for moral
damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require recital
thereof at trial.50
Considering that the crime of rape was committed inside the dwelling of
the victim, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 should
likewise be awarded to the heirs of Rosalie.
The Court finds that the heirs of both Aurea and Rosalie should be
awarded the amount of ₱54,259.00 as actual damages in view of the
admission made by the defense that the family of Aurea and Rosalie
incurred expenses in said amount.51
Before concluding, the Court observed, as borne by the records of this
case, that appellant could not have been the only perpetrator of the
crimes. As appellant revealed in his confession, he hacked each of the
victims on the neck with his bolo only once. The autopsy report,
however, shows that Aurea Broña suffered two neck wounds while
Rosalie Rayala suffered five hack wounds and one stab wound, all on
the neck. Appellant confessed that he dragged Aurea towards the grassy
portion of the yard and immediately 
left the scene. Yet, Rosalie was also found on the grassy portion of the
yard. The autopsy report further showed that Rosalie likewise suffered
multiple linear abrasions on both scapular regions, thus giving the
impression that she was also dragged towards the yard. Somebody else
must have brought Rosalie to the place where she was found. Indeed,
there are clear indications that there are other perpetrators of the crimes
of murder and rape with homicide. Appellant alone could not have
 
In view of all these circumstances, the police authorities as well as the
prosecutor’s office of Tabaco, Albay, should be required to apprise the
Court whether or not further investigation of this case was conducted for
the identification and arrest of the other perpetrators of the crimes to
completely bring justice to their victims.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) of
Tabaco, Albay, in Criminal Case No. T-2874 finding appellant Amado
Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to damages. Appellant
is ordered to pay the heirs of Aurea Broña the amounts of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. T-2875, finding   SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, 
Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape   CARPIO, 
with Homicide and imposing on him the penalty of death   AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, 
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The appellant is ordered to pay   CORONA, 
the heirs of the deceased victim Rosalie Rayala civil indemnity in the - versus - CARPIO MORALES, 
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00); moral damages   CALLEJO, SR., 
in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00); and   AZCUNA, 
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages.   TINGA,
  CHICO-NAZARIO, 
Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of both Aurea Broña and Rosalie   GARCIA, and
Rayala the amount of Fifty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Nine   VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Pesos (₱54,259.00) as actual damages.    
  Promulgated:
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending EDNA MALNGAN y MAYO,  
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let Appellant. September 26, 2006
the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the x----------------------------------------x
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
 
The Chief of the Tabaco Police Station and the Tabaco Prosecutor’s
DECISION
Office are hereby ORDERED, with ten (10) days from receipt of copy
of herein resolution, to apprise the Court whether or not subsequent  
investigations were conducted to determine the other perpetrator(s) of  
the crimes involved herein. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 
SO ORDERED. cralaw
The Case
EN BANC  
  For review is the   Decision [1]  of the Court of Appealsin
PEOPLE OF   G. R. No. 170470
THE PHILIPPINES,   CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01139 promulgated on 2 September
Appellee, Present: 2005, affirming with modification the   Judgment [2]  of the
    Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in
  PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
  PUNO, Criminal Case No. 01-188424 promulgated on 13 October
  QUISUMBING,  2003, finding appellant Edna Malngan   y  Mayo (Edna)
  YNARES-SANTIAGO, 
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of 'Arson with
Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six
(6) people, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of
death.  shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a
The Facts
 
As summarized[3] by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts are as
follows:  proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who
 
From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the
Barangay Chairman in the area, as well as the personal
account of the pedicab driver named Rolando Gruta, it
was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when
Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-
appellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto
Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different
directions, hurriedly leaving the house of her employer
at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She
was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven
by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was
heard by the pedicab driver to have instructed that she
be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there,
she changed her mind and asked that she be brought
instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted,
after paying for her fare.
 
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay
Chairman Bernardo's group later discovered that a fire
gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid.
Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods
responded to the fire upon hearing shouts from the
residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire District
1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.  then detained.
When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the
Barangay Hall, he received a report from pedicab
driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that
woman (the housemaid) coming out of the house at No.
172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila and he
received a call from his wife telling him of a woman
(the same housemaid) who was acting strangely and
suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman
Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods
was later identified as the accused-appellant. After
Rolando Gruta positively identified the woman as the
same person who left No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut,
Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his
tanods apprehended her and brought her to the
Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall,
Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr.
and whose house was also burned, identified the
woman as accused-appellant EDNA who was the
housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a
disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant
EDNA's bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA
confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the
presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the
Barangay Hall that she set her employer's house on fire
because she had not been paid her salary for about a
year and that she wanted to go home to her province
but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in
going home.
 
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to
arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan,
who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta.
Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and
 
When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire
Station to give her sworn statement, she had the
opportunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA at the
latter's detention cell why she did the burning of her
employer's house and accused-appellant EDNA replied
that she set the house on fire because when she asked
permission to go home to her province, the wife of her
employer Roberto Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa
(sic) shouted at her: 'Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo
maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating mo
maputi ka na (TSN, January 22, 2002, p.6) (Go ahead,
when you arrive your color would be fair already. Ride
a broomstick, when you arrive your color would be fair
already.') And when Mercedita Mendoza asked
accused-appellant EDNA how she burned the house,
accused-appellant EDNA told her: 'Naglukot  ako  ng
maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter
at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng
bahay(TSN, January 22, 2002, p. 7.) (I crumpled
newspapers, lighted them with a disposable lighter and
threw them on top of the table inside the house.')
 
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of
ABS-CBN Network, accused-appellant EDNA while
under detention (sic) was heard by SFO4 (sic) Danilo
Talusan as having admitted the crime and even
narrated the manner how she accomplished it. SFO4
(sic) Danilo Talusan was able to hear the same
confession, this time at his home, while watching the
television program 'True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas
also of ABS-CBN Network.
 
The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of
Roberto Separa, Sr. and other adjoining houses and the
death of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa
together with their four (4) children, namely: Michael,
Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.  sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of
 
On 9 January 2001, an Information[4] was filed before the RTC of
Manila, Branch 41, charging accused-appellant with the crime of Arson
with Multiple Homicide.The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
01-188424. The accusatory portion of said Information provides: 
 
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to
cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-
storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and
family mostly made of wooden materials located at No.
172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting
crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter
inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited
house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a
consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the
said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining
residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason
and on the occasion of the said fire, the following,
namely, 
 
1.            Roberto Separa, Sr., 45
years of age
2.            Virginia Separa y Mendoza,
40 years of age
3.            Michael Separa, 24 years of
age
4.            Daphne Separa, 18 years of
age
5.            Priscilla Separa, 14 years of
age
6.            Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years
of age
 
their death immediately thereafter.[5]
   x x x x
   
When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de Witness:
cralawYes, sir.
oficio, pleaded[6]'Not Guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial  
ensued.[7] Pros. Rebagay:
cralawWhen was that?
 
 
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, A:On January 2 she was interviewed by the media, sir.
SPO4[8] Danilo Talusan, Rolando Gruta, Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita The one who took the coverage was Carmelita
Valdez of Channel 2, ABS-CBN. They have a
Mendoza and Rodolfo Movilla to establish its charge that accused-
footage that Edna admitted before them, sir.
appellant Edna committed the crime of arson with multiple homicide.   
  Q:And where were you when Edna Malngan made that
statement or admission to Carmelita Valdez of
SPO4 Danilo Talusan, arson investigator, testified that he was one of ABS-CBN?
those who responded to the fire that occurred on 2 January 2001 and  
which started at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila.He stated A:I was at our office, sir.
 
that the fire killed Roberto Separa, Sr. and all the other members of his Q: Was there any other occasion wherein the accused
family, namely his wife, Virginia, and his children, Michael, Daphne, made another confession relative to the
admission of the crime?
Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.; the fire also destroyed their abode as well as
 
six neighboring houses. He likewise testified that he twice heard A:Yes, sir.
accused-appellant ' once while the latter was being interviewed by  
Q:When was that?
Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN, and the other time when it
 
was shown on channel 2 on television during the airing of the television A: Last Friday, sir. It was shown in True Crime of Gus
program entitled 'True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas ' confess to having Abelgas. She was interviewed at the City Jail
and she admitted that she was the one who
committed the crime charged, to wit: authored the crime, sir. 
   
Pros. Rebagay: Pros. Rebagay:
Based on your investigation, was there any And where were you when that admission to Gus
occasion when the accused Edna Malngan Abelgas was made?
admitted to the burning of the house of the  
Separa Family? A:I was in the house and I just saw it on tv, sir.
   
 Q:What was that admission that you heard personally,
when you were present, when the accused
made the confession to Carmelita Valdez?
 
A:Naglukot  po siya ng papel, sinidihan niya ng lighter
at inilagay niya sa ibabaw ng mesa yung mga
diyaryo at sinunog niya.
x x x x
Q:Aside from that statement, was there any other
statement made by the accused Edna
Malngan?
 
A:Yes, sir. 'Kaya po niya nagawa 'yon galit po siya sa
kanyang amo na si  Virginia, hindi siya
pinasuweldo at gusto na po niyang umuwi na
(sic) ayaw siyang payagan. Nagsalita pa po sa
kanya na, 'Sumakay ka na lang sa walis.
Pagbalik mo dito maputi ka na. (sic) 'Yon po
ang sinabi ng  kanyang  amo.
 
Atty. Masweng:
That was a statement of an alleged dead person, your
Honor.
 
Court:
Sabi ni Valdes, ha?
 
Pros. Rebagay:
Sabi ni Edna Malngan kay Carmelita Valdez, Your
Honor.
 
Court:
Double hearsay na 'yon.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
No, Your Honor, the witness was present, Your Honor,
when that confession was made by the accused
to Carmelita Valdez.
[9]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
 
Rolando Gruta, the pedicab driver and one of the barangay tanods in the
area, testified: 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawMr. Witness, what is your profession?
 
A:cralawSidecar driver, sir.
 
Q:cralawOn January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the
morning, do you recall where were (sic) you?
 
A:cralawI was at the corner of Moderna Street , sir.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
And while you were at the corner of Moderna
St., what happened if any, Mr. Witness?
 
A:cralawI saw Edna coming out from the door of the
house of Roberto Separa, sir.
 
Q:cralawDo you know the number of the house of the
Separa Family?
 
A:cralaw172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
 
x x x x
 
Q:cralawAnd you said you saw Edna coming out from
the house of the Separa Family. How far is that
house from the place where you were waiting
at the corner of Moderna and Paulino Streets?
 
A:cralawAbout three meters from Moderna and
Paulino Streets where my pedicab was placed.
My distance was about three meters, sir.
x x x x
 
Q:cralawAnd how did you know that the house where
Edna came out is that of the house of the
Separa Family?
 
A:cralawMismong  nakita  po ng dalawang mata ko na
doon siya galing sa bahay ng Separa Family.
 
Q:cralawHow long have you known the Separa Family,
if you know them?
A:cralawAbout two years, sir.
 
Q:cralawHow about this Edna, the one you just pointed
(to) awhile ago? Do you know her prior
to January 2, 2001 ?
 
A:cralawYes, sir. I knew(sic) her for two years.
 
Court:
cralawWhy?
 
Witness:
cralawMadalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking
pedicab.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawHow about the Separa family? Why do you
know them?
 
A:cralawThey were the employers of Edna, sir.
Q:cralawYou said you saw Edna coming out from the
house of the Separa Family. What happened
when you saw Edna coming out from the
house of the Separa Family?
A:cralawWala pa pong ano 'yan naisakay ko na siya
sa sidecar.
 
Q:cralawAnd what did you observe from Edna when
you saw her coming out from the house of the
Separa family?
 
A:cralawNagmamadali  po siyang lumakad at palinga-
linga.
 
x x x x
Q:cralawAfter she boarded your pedicab, what
happened, if any?
 
A:cralawNagpahatid  po siya sa akin.
 
Q:cralawWhere?
 
A:cralawTo Nipa Street, sir.
 
Q:cralawDid you bring her to Nipa Street   as she
requested?
 
A:cralawYes, sir.
 
x x x x
 
Q:cralawYou said that you brought her to Nipa Street.
What happened when you go (sic) there
at Nipa Street, if any?
 
A:cralawNagpahinto  po siya doon ng saglit, mga
tatlong minuto po.
 
Q:cralawWhat did she do when she asked (you) to stop
there for three minutes?
 
A:cralawAfter three minutes she requested me to bring
her directly to Balasan Street, sir.
x x x x
 
Q:cralawWhat happened after that?
 
A:cralawWhen we arrived there, she alighted and pay
(sic) P5.00, sir.
 
QcralawAnd then what transpired after she alighted
from your pedicab?
 
Witness:
cralawI went home and I looked for another passenger,
sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawAfter that, what happened when you were on
you way to your house to look for passengers?
AcralawNakita ko na nga po na pagdating ko sa
Moderna, naglalagablab na apoy.
Q:cralawFrom what place was that fire coming out?
A:cralawFrom the house of Roberto Separa Family, sir.
x x x x
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawAfter you noticed that there was a fire from the
house of Roberto Separa Family, what did you
do if any?
 
A:cralawSiyempre po, isang Barangay Tanod po ako,
nagresponde na po kami sa sunog. Binuksan
na po ng Chairman naming 'yung tangke,
binomba na po naming 'yung apoy ng tubig.
Q:cralawAfter that incident, Mr. Witness, have you
seen Edna Again (sic).
 
A:cralawNo, sir.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawAnd after that incident, did you come to know if
Edna was apprehended or not?
 
cralawx x x x
 
A:cralawI was called by our Barangay Chairman in
order to identify Edna, sir.
x x x x[10]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
 
Remigio Bernardo, Barangay Chairman of the area where the fire
occurred, stated:
Pros. Rebagay:
On January 2, 2001, do you recall if there is a
fire that occurred somewhere in your area of
jurisdiction, particularly Moderna Street?
A:cralawYes, sir.
Q:cralawNow, where were you when this incident
happened?
A:cralawKasi ugali  ko na po tuwing umagang-umaga
po ako na pupunta sa barangay Hall mga
siguro 6:00 or 5:00 o clock, me sumigaw ng
sunog nirespondehan namin iyong sunog  eh
me dala kaming fire.
Court:
You just answer the question. Where were you
when this incident happened?
 
Witness:cralaw
cralawI was at the Barangay Hall, Your Honor.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
And you said that there was a fire that
occurred, what did you do?
 
Witness:
Iyon nga nagresponde kami doon sa sunog eh
nakita ko iyong sunog mukha talagang arson
dahil napakalaki kaagad, meron pong mga
tipong ' Iyong namatay po contractor po iyon
eh kaya siguro napakaraming kalat ng mga
pintura, mga container, kaya hindi
po  namin  naapula kaagad  iyong apoy,
nasunog ultimo iyong fire
tank  namin  sa  lakas, sir.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawNow, will you please tell us where this fire
occurred?
 
A:cralawAt the house of the six victims, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhose house is that?
 
A:cralawThe house of the victims, sir.
x x x x
 
Pros. Rebagay:
You said that you responded to the place, what
transpired after you responded to the place?
A:cralawIyon  nga  po ang nagsabi may lumabas na
isang babae po  noon sa bahay na
nagmamadali habang may sunog, me isang
barangay tanod po akong nagsabi may
humahangos na isang babae na may dalang
bag papunta po roon palabas ng sasakyan,
sir.
 
Q:cralawAnd so what happened?
 
A:cralawSiyempre hindi  naman ako nagtanong kung
sino ngayon may dumating galing na sa bahay
naming, may tumawag, tumawag po si
Konsehala Alfonso na may isang babae na
hindi mapakali doon sa Calle Pedro Alfonso,
ke konsehal na baka ito sabi niya iyong ganito
ganoon nirespondehan ko po, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhere did you respond?
 
A:cralawAt Balasan, sir, but it's not the area of my
jurisdiction. 
 
x x x x
 
Q:cralawWhat happened when you reached that place?
 
A:cralawSiya  po ang nahuli ko doon, sir.
 
Court:
cralawWitness pointing to accused Edna Malngan.
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawAnd what happened?
 
A:cralawI brought her to the barangay hall, sir.
 
Q:cralawAnd what happened at the barangay hall?
 
A:cralawInembestigahan ko, kinuha naming iyong bag
niya, me lighter siya eh. Inamin niya po sa
amin na kaya niya sinunog hindi siya
pinasasahod ng more or less isang taon na eh.
Ngayon sabi ko bakit eh gusto ko ng umuwi ng
probinsya ang sabi sa akin ng amo ko
sumakay na lang daw po ako ng walis tingting
para makauwi, sir.
 
Atty. Herman:
We would like to object, Your Honor on the
ground that that is hearsay.
Pros. Rebagay:
That is not a hearsay statement, Your Honor,
straight from the mouth of the accused.
Atty. Herman:
It's not under the exemption under the Rules of
Court, Your Honor. He is testifying according
to what he has heard.
Court:
That's part of the narration. Whether it is true
or not, that's another matter. Let it remain.
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are
telling you this?
A:cralawIyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan
doon nakapaligid, siyempre may sunog
nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga
mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay
papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh anim
na tao and namatay, kaya iyong mga tao
kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-
pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na
iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doon sa barangay
hall napakahirap awatin.  Gustong-
gusto siyang  kunin  ng mga taong-bayan,
nagalit dahil ang daming bahay hong
nasunog.[11]
 
 
For her part, Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of the Separa
Family and whose house was one of those destroyed by the fire,
recounted:
Pros. Rebagay:
Madam Witness, on January 2, 2001, do you
recall where were you residing then?
A:cralawYes, sir.
Q:cralawWhere were you residing at?
A: cralawAt No. 170 Moderna St., Balut,
Tondo, Manila, sir.
Q:cralawWhy did you transfer your residence? Awhile
ago you testified that you are now residing
at 147 Moderna St., Balut,
Tondo,  Manila ?
   
A:cralawBecause our house was burned, sir. A:cralawThey were first cousins, sir.
   
Q:cralawMore or less, how much did the loss incurred Q:cralawHow far is your house from the house of the
on the burning of your house (sic)? Cifara (sic) family?
   
A:cralawMore or less, P100,000.00, sir A:cralawMagkadikit  lang  po. Pader lang ang pagitan.
   
Q:cralawDo you know the accused in this case Edna Q:cralawYou said that Edna Malngan was working
Malngan? with the Cifara (sic) family. What is the work
  of Edna Malngan?
A:cralawYes, sir.  
  A:cralawNangangamuhan po. House helper, sir.
Q:cralawWhy do you know her?  
  Q:cralawHow long do you know Edna Malngan as
A:cralawShe is the house helper of the family who house helper of the Cifara (sic) family?
were (sic) burned, sir.  
  A:cralawI cannot estimate but she stayed there for
Q:cralawWhat family? three to four years, sir.
   
A:cralawCifara (sic) family, sir. Q:cralawDo you know who caused the burning of the
  house of the Cifara (sic) family?
Q:cralawWho in particular do you know among Cifara  
(sic) family? Witness:
  Edna Malngan, sir.
A:cralawThe woman, sir.  
  Pros. Rebagay:
Q:cralawWhat is the name? cralawWhy do you know that it was Edna Malngan
  who burned the house of the Cifara (sic)
A:cralawVirginia Mendoza Cifara (sic), sir. family?
   
Q:cralawAre you related to Virginia A:cralawWhen the fire incident happened, sir, on
Mendoza Cifara (sic)? January 3, we went to San Lazaro Fire Station
  and I saw Edna Malngan detained there, sir.
A:cralawMy husband, sir.  
  Q:cralawAnd so what is your basis in pointing to Edna
Q:cralawWhat is the relationship of your husband to Malngan as the culprit or the one who burned
the late Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)? the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
  
A:cralawI talked to her when we went there at that day,
sir.
Q:cralawWhat transpired then?
A:cralawI talked to her and I told her, 'Edna, bakit mo
naman ginawa 'yung ganun?
Q:cralawAnd what was the answer of Edna?
 
A:cralawShe answered, 'Kasi pag nagpapaalam ako sa
kanyang umuwi ng probinsya, nagpapaalam
po siyang umuwi ng probinsya ang sinasabi
daw po sa kanya ni Baby Cifara (sic)  na,
(sic)Sigeumuwi ka, pagdating mo maputi ka
na. Sumakay ka sa walis pagdating mo maputi
ka na.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawWhat is the basis there that she was the one who
burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
A:cralawI also asked her, 'Paano mo ginawa 'yung
sunog? She told me, 'Naglukot ako ng
maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng
disposable lighter at hinagis niya sa ibabaw
ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay.(sic)
[12]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
 
Lastly, the prosecution presented Rodolfo Movilla, owner of the house
situated beside that of the Separa family. He testified that his house was
also gutted by the fire that killed the Separa family and that he tried to
help said victims but to no avail.
 
The prosecution presented other documentary evidence[13] and
thereafter rested its case.
When it came time for the defense to present exculpatory evidence,
instead of doing so, accused-appellant filed a Motion to Admit Demurrer
to Evidence[14] and the corresponding Demurrer to Evidence[15] with
the former expressly stating that said Demurrer to Evidence was being
filed 'x x x without express leave of court x x x.[16]
 
In her Demurrer to Evidence, accused-appellant asserts that the
prosecution's evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the following reasons:[17] (a) that she is charged
with crime not defined and penalized by law; (b) that circumstantial
evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
and (c) that the testimonies given by the witnesses of the prosecution
were hearsay, thus, inadmissible in evidence against her.
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition to accused-
appellant's Demurrer to Evidence.
 
On 13 October 2003, acting on the Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC
promulgated its Judgment[18] wherein it proceeded to resolve the
subject case based on the evidence of the prosecution. The RTC
considered accused-appellant to have waived her right to present
evidence, having filed the Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. 
 
In finding accused-appellant Edna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide, the RTC ruled that:
 
The first argument of the accused that she is charged
with an act not defined and penalized by law is without
merit. x x x the caption which charges the accused with
the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide is merely
descriptive of the charge of Arson that resulted to
Multiple Homicide. The fact is that the accused is
charged with Arson which resulted to Multiple
Homicide (death of victims) and that charge is
embodied and stated in the body of the information.
What is controlling is the allegation in the body of the
Information and not the title or caption thereof. x x x.
 
xxxx
 
The second and third arguments will be discussed
jointly as they are interrelated with each other. x x x.
xxxx
 
[W]hile there is no direct evidence that points to the
accused in the act of burning the house or actually
starting the subject fire, the following circumstances
that show that the accused intentionally caused or was
responsible for the subject fire have been duly
established:
1.cralawthat immediately before the burning of the
house, the accused hurriedly and with head turning in
different directions (palinga-linga) went out of the said
house and rode a pedicab apparently not knowing
where to go x x x;
 
2.cralawthat immediately after the fire, upon a report
that there was a woman in Balasan St. who appears
confused and apprehensive (balisa), the Barangay
Chairman and his tanods went there, found the accused
and apprehended her and brought her to the barangay  
hall as shown by the testimony of Barangay Chairman
Remigio Bernardo; and 
 
3.cralawthat when she was apprehended and
investigated by the barangay officials and when her
bag was opened, the same contained a disposable
lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the
Barangay Chairman.
 
[T]he timing of her hurried departure and nervous
demeanor immediately before the fire when she left the
house and rode a pedicab and her same demeanor,
physical and mental condition when found and
apprehended at the same place where she alighted from
the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter in her bag
thereafter when investigated indisputably show her
guilt as charged.
cralawIf there is any doubt of her guilt that remains
with the circumstantial evidence against her, the same
is removed or obliterated with the
confessions/admissions of the commission of the
offense and the manner thereof that she made to the
prosecution witnesses Barangay Chairman Remigio
Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and to the media,
respectively.
xxxx
 
[H]er confessions/admissions are positive
acknowledgment of guilt of the crime and appear to
have been voluntarily and intelligently given. These
confessions/admissions, especially the one given to her
neighbor Mercedita Mendoza and the media, albeit
uncounselled and made while she was already under
the custody of authorities, it is believed, are not
violative of her right under the Constitution. 
The decretal part of the RTC's Judgment reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby
denied and judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple
Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6)
people and sentencing her to suffer the mandatory
penalty of death, and ordering her to pay the heirs of
the victims Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa
and children Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto,
Jr., the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
for each victim and the amount of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as temperate damages
for their burned house or a total of Four Hundred
Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos and to Rodolfo Movilla
the amount of One Hundred [Thousand] (P100,000.00)
Pesos.
 
 
Due to the death penalty imposed by the RTC, the case was directly
elevated to this Court for automatic review. Conformably with our
decisionin People v. Efren Mateo y Garcia,[19] however, we referred
the case and its records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. 
On 2 September 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification
the decision of the RTC, the fallo  of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
October 13, 2003 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 41, finding accused-appellant Edna
Malngan y Mayo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Arson with multiple homicide and sentencing her to
suffer the DEATH PENALTY is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that she is further ordered to
pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and another
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the
victims who perished in the fire, to be paid to their
heirs. She is ordered to pay Rodolfo Movilla, one
whose house was also burned, the sum of P50,000.00
as exemplary damage.
 
Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-
03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became
effective on October 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals,
after rendering judgment, hereby refrains from making
an entry of judgment and forthwith certifies the case
and elevates the entire record of this case to the
Supreme Court for review.
[20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
It is the contention of accused-appellant that the evidence
presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the
crime charged. In support of said exculpatory proposition,
she assigns the following errors [21]:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED; and 
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
ALLOWING AND GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND UNCOUNSELLED
ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY GIVEN BY THE
 ACCUSED TO THE WITNESSES BARANGAY
CHAIRMAN REMIGIO BERNARDO, MERCEDITA
MENDOZA AND THE MEDIA.
 
THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WITH (MULTIPLE)
HOMICIDE. 
The  Information  in this case erroneously charged accused-
appellant with a   complex crime ,  i.e.,  Arson with Multiple
Homicide . Presently, there are two (2) laws that govern the
crime of arson where death results  therefrom   ' Article 320
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic
Act (RA) No. 7659, [22]   and  Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1613 [23] , quoted hereunder, to wit:
Revised Penal Code:
ART. 320. Destructive Arson. ' x x x x
If as a consequence of the commission  of any of the
acts penalized under this Article, death results,
the mandatory penalty of death shall
imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Presidential Decree No. 1613:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. ' If by
reason of or on the occasion of the arson death results,
the penalty of reclusion  perpetua to death shall be
imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
 
Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, with respect to destructive
arson, and the provisions of  PD No. 1613   respecting other
cases of arson provide  only one penalty for the commission
of arson, whether considered destructive or otherwise,
where death results   therefrom . The   raison d'tre   is that
arson is itself the end and death is simply the
consequence. [24]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant
death or will have to be a separate crime altogether, the
joint discussion [25]  of the late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon
C.  Aquino   and Mme. Justice Carolina C.   Grio-Aquino, on
the subject of the crimes of arson and murder/homicide, is
highly instructive:
Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to
kill a particular person who may be in a house and that
objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is
murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing
committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that
be
fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that
end. There can be no murder without a design to take
life.[26] In other words, if the main object of the
offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is
murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the
building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by
the crime of arson.[27]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x x
If the house was set on fire after the victims therein
were killed, fire would not be a qualifying
circumstance. The accused would be liable for the
 separate offenses of murder or homicide, as the case
may be, and arson.[28]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
cralaw Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death
occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated ' whether arson, murder or arson
homicide/murder, it is   de rigueur  to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the
burning of the building or edifice, but death results by
reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime
simply   arson,  and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b)
if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice,
when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such
goal the crime committed is   murder  only; lastly, (c) if the
objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in
fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted
to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed '   homicide/murder
and arson .
Where then does this case fall under?
From a reading of the body of the Information:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to
cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-
storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and
family mostly made of wooden materials located at No.
172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting
crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter
inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited
house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a
consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the
said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining
and
residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason
and on the occasion of the said fire, the following,
namely, 
1.    Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of
is age
2.    Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40
years of age
3.    Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4.    Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5.    Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6.    Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of
age
 
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of
their death immediately thereafter.[29] [Emphasis
supplied.]
accused-appellant is being charged with the crime of
arson. It   itis clear from the foregoing that her intent was
merely to destroy her employer's house through the use of
fire.
We now go to the issues raised. Under the first assignment
of error, in asserting the insufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellant argues that the prosecution was only
able to adduce circumstantial evidence ' hardly enough to early to perform routine chores for their employers,
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She ratiocinates [31]  one of which is preparing and cooking the morning
that the following circumstances: meal for the members of the household; and necessity
  requires her to go out early to look for open stores or even
1.            That immediately before the burning of the
house , the accused hurriedly and with head nearby marketplaces to buy things that will complete the
turning in different directions (palinga-linga) early meal for the day. [32]  She then concludes that it was
went out of the said house and rode a pedicab
normal for her to have been seen going out of her
apparently not knowing where to go for she
first requested to be brought to Nipa St. but employer's house in a hurry at that time of the day and 'to
upon reaching there requested again to be look at all directions to insure that the house is secure and
brought to Balasan St. as shown by the
that there are no other persons in the vicinity.
testimony of prosecution witness
Rolando Gruta; [33]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
   
2.            That immediately after the fire, upon a report
that there was a woman in Balasan St. who cralaw We are far from persuaded.
appears confused and apprehensive (balisa),  
the Barangay Chairman and his tanods went True, by the nature of their jobs, housemaids are required
there, found the accused and apprehended her
and brought her to the barangay hall as shown to start the day early; however, contrary to said assertion,
by the testimony of Barangay Chairman the actuations and the demeanor of accused-appellant on
Remigio Bernardo; and
that fateful early morning as observed firsthand by
 
3.cralawThat when she was apprehended and Rolando Gruta, one of the witnesses of the prosecution,
investigated by the barangay officials and belie her claim of normalcy, to wit:
when her bag was opened, the same contained
 
a disposable lighter as likewise shown by the
Q:cralawYou said you saw Edna coming out from the
testimony of the Barangay Chairman.
house of the Separa Family. What happened
[30]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
when you saw Edna coming out from the
  house of the Separa Family?
fall short of proving that she had any involvement in  
A:cralawWala pa pong ano 'yan naisakay ko na siya
setting her employer's house on fire, much less show guilt
sa sidecar.
beyond reasonable doubt, given that 'it is a fact that  
housemaids are the first persons in the house to wake up
Q:cralawAnd what did you observe from Edna when
you saw her coming out from the house of the
Separa family?
A:cralawNagmamadali  po  siyang lumakad at palinga-
linga.
x x x x
Q:cralawAfter she boarded your pedicab, what
happened, if any?
A:cralawNagpahatid  po siya sa akin.
Q:cralawWhere?
A:cralawTo Nipa Street, sir.
Q:cralawDid you bring her to Nipa Street   as she
requested?
A:cralawYes, sir.
 
x x x x
Q:cralawYou said that you brought her to Nipa Street.
What happened when you go (sic) there
at Nipa Street, if any?
 
A:cralawNagpahinto  po siya doon ng saglit, mga
tatlong minuto po.
Q:cralawWhat did she do when she asked (you) to stop
there for three minutes?
A:cralawAfter three minutes she requested me to bring
her directly to Balasan Street, sir.
 
x x x x
 
 
We quote with approval the pronouncement of the RTC in
discrediting accused-appellant's aforementioned rationale:
[O]bviously it is never normal, common or ordinary to
leave the house in such a disturbed, nervous and
agitated manner, demeanor and condition. The timing
of her hurried departure and nervous demeanor
immediately before the fire when she left the house and
rode a pedicab and her same demeanor, physical and
mental condition when found and apprehended at the
same place where she alighted from the pedicab and
the discovery of the lighter in her bag thereafter when
investigated indisputably show her guilt as charged.
[34]
All the witnesses are in accord that accused-appellant's agitated
appearance was out of the ordinary. Remarkably, she has never denied
this observation.
 
We give great weight to the findings of the RTC and so accord credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as it had the opportunity
to observe them directly. The credibility given by trial courts to
prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which
appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe
them, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the
direct and cross-examination by counsels. Here, RemigioBernardo,
Rolando Gruta and Mercedita Mendoza are disinterested witnesses and
there is not an iota of evidence in the records to indicate that they are
suborned witnesses. The records of the RTC even show houses and killed the Separa family, her guilt may still be
that Remigio Bernardo, the BarangayChairman, kept accused-appellant established through circumstantial evidence provided that:
from being mauled by the angry crowd outside of the barangay hall: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from
  which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the
Pros. Rebagay: combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
Now, who were present when the accused are
(sic) telling you this? conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
  [37]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A:cralawIyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan
 
doon nakapaligid, siyempre may sunog
nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a
mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh anim
established by inference. [38]  It is founded on experience
na tao and namatay, kaya iyong mga tao
kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya dahil pin- and observed facts and coincidences establishing a
pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na connection between the known and proven facts and the
iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doon sa barangay
hall napakahirap awatin. Gusting-gusto facts sought to be proved. [39] In order to bring about a
siyang kunin ng mga taong-bayan, nagalit conviction, the circumstantial evidence presented must
dahil ang daming bahay hong nasunog. constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and
[35]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
  reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
  exclusion of others, as the guilty person.
Accused-appellant has not shown any compelling reason why the [40]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
witnesses presented would openly, publicly and deliberately lie or  
concoct a story, to send an innocent person to jail all the while knowing In this case, the interlocking testimonies of the
that the real malefactor remains at large. Such proposition defies prosecution witnesses, taken together, exemplify a case
logic. And where the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive where conviction can be upheld on the basis of
on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their circumstantial evidence.   First, prosecution witness
testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith and credence.[36] Rolando Gruta, the driver of the  pedicabthat accused-
  appellant rode on, testified that he knew for a fact that she
While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused- worked as a housemaid of the victims, and that he
appellant actually starting the fire that burned several positively identified her as the person hurriedly leaving
the house of the victims on   2 January 2001 at  4:45 a.m., and In her second assigned error, accused-appellant questions
acting in a nervous manner.  That while riding on the admissibility of her uncounselled extrajudicial
the  pedicab, accused-appellant was unsure of her intended confession given to prosecution witnesses, namely
destination. Upon reaching the place where he originally Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza, and to the media.
picked up accused-appellant only a few minutes after Accused-appellant Edna contends that being uncounselled
dropping her off, Rolando  Gruta   saw the  Separas  house extrajudicial confession, her admissions to having
being gutted by a blazing fire.Second,  RemigioBernardo committed the crime charged should have been excluded in
testified that he and his   tanods , including Rolando  Gruta, evidence against her for being violative of Article III,
were the ones who picked up accused-appellant Edna Section 12(1) of the Constitution.  
at  Balasan Street (where Rolando  Gruta   dropped her off)
after receiving a call that there was a woman acting  
strangely at said street and who appeared to have nowhere Particularly, she takes exception to the testimony of
to go.  Third, SPO4Danilo  Talusan  overheard accused- prosecution witnesses Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita
appellant admit to Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of Channel Mendoza for being hearsay and in the nature of an
2 (ABS- CBN) that said accused-appellant started the fire, uncounselled admission.  
plus the fact that he was able see the telecast of  
Gus  Abelgas  show where accused-appellant, while being With the above vital pieces of evidence excluded, accused-
interviewed, confessed to the crime as well.   The foregoing appellant is of the position that the remaining proof of her
testimonies juxtaposed with the testimony alleged guilt, consisting in the main of circumstantial
of Mercedita  Mendoza validating the fact that accused- evidence, is inadequate to establish her guilt beyond
appellant confessed to having started the fire which killed reasonable doubt.
the  Separa  family as well as burned seven houses  
including that of the victims, convincingly form an We partly disagree.  
unbroken chain, which leads to the unassailable conclusion  
pinpointing accused-appellant as the person behind the Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
crime of simple arson.  
  (1)cralawAny person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
 competent and independent counsel preferably of his Arguably , the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one.These rights this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
of counsel. 
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall
 
xxxx in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect,
  actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several
(3)cralawAny confession or admission obtained in
houses as well as killed the whole family of
violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence. Roberto  Separa, Sr.She was, therefore, already under
  custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by
We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have
stage of custodial investigation ' when the investigation is already been observed or applied to her. Accused-
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but appellant's confession to   Barangay   Chairman Remigio
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect. [41]  Said Bernardo was made in response to the 'interrogation made
constitutional guarantee has also been extended to by the latter ' admittedly conducted without first informing
situations in which an individual has not been formally accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or
arrested but has merely been 'invited for questioning. done in the presence of counsel.   For this reason, the
[42]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay
  Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence
extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following against her as such were obtained in violation of her
requirements:   constitutional rights.
   
(1)             it must be voluntary; Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-
(2)             it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; appellant's confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio
(3)             it must be express; and  Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically
(4) cralawit must be in writing.[43] lead to her acquittal.It should well be recalled that the
 
  constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations
do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by
the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner being merely hearsay. With this imputation of inadmissibility, we agree
whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed with what the Court of Appeals had to say:
the offense as what happened in the case at bar when  
accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of Although this testimony of SFO4 Danilo Talusan is
hearsay because he was not present when
the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the Gus Abelgas interviewed accused-appellant EDNA, it
fire in the  Separas  house.  The testimony of Mercedita may nevertheless be admitted in evidence as an
independently relevant statement to establish not the
Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for
truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that the
accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and statement was made [People v. Mallari, G.R. No.
is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. 103547, July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA 621 citing People
v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965, 14
Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely
SCRA 944.]. In People vs. Velasquez, G.R. Nos.
governs the relationship between the individual on one 132635 & 143872-75,  February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA
hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not 455,  the Supreme Court ruled that:
 
concern itself with the relation between a private Under the doctrine of independently
individual and another private individual ' as both relevant statements, regardless of their
accused-appellant and prosecution truth or falsity, the fact that such
statements have been made is
witness   Mercedita   Mendoza undoubtedly are. [44] Here, relevant. The hearsay rule does not
there is no evidence on record to show that said witness apply, and the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as
was acting under police authority, so appropriately,
to the making of such statement is not
accused-appellant's  uncounselled   extrajudicial confession secondary but primary, for the
to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC. statement itself may constitute a fact
in issue or be circumstantially
 
relevant as to the existence of such a
Accused-appellant likewise assails the admission of the testimony of fact.[45]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SPO4 Danilo Talusan.Contending that '[w]hen  
 
SPO4 Danilo Talusan testified in court, his story is more of events,
As regards the confession given by accused-appellant to
which are not within his personal knowledge but based from accounts of
the media, we need not discuss it further for the reporters
witnesses who derived information allegedly from the accused or some
were never presented to testify in court.
other persons x x x. In other words, she objects to the testimony for
 
As a final attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant
asserts that since the identities of the burned bodies were
never conclusively established, she cannot be responsible
for their deaths.
 
Such assertion is bereft of merit.   the damage caused,[48] to wit:
In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are
immaterial in that intent to kill them particularly is not
one of the elements of the crime. As we have clarified
earlier, the killing of a person is absorbed in the charge of
arson, simple or destructive.   The prosecution need only
prove, that the burning was intentional and that what was
intentionally burned is an inhabited house
dwelling.  Again, in the case of  People v.   Soriano, [46]  we
explained that:
 
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime
of Arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the
accused. There is a presumption that one intends the
natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown
that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the
prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of
his wrongful intent.[47]
 
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant
guilty of?
 
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of
arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under
Presidential Decree No. 1613.Said classification is based on the kind,
character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning
of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by
any person or group of persons.[[49]]The classification
of this type of crime is known asDestructive Arson,
which is punishable by reclusion  perpetua to death.
or The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively
discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly
crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and
protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a
brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and
despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates greater
retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The
exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this
crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to
human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these
structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to
adopt precautions against its commission, and the
difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the
greater impact on the social, economic, security and
political fabric of the nation. [Emphasis supplied.]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the
acts penalized under Art. 320, death should result, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
 On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321
to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the
governing law for Simple Arson. This decree
contemplates the malicious burning of public and
private structures, regardless of size, not included in
Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as
other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings,
government buildings, farms, mills, plantations,
railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other
industrial establishments.[[50]] Although the purpose
of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high
incidence of fires and other crimes involving
destruction, protect the national economy and preserve
the social, economic and political stability of the
nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to
offenders. This separate classification of Simple
Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity of
punishment commensurate to the act or acts
committed, depending on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied.]
To emphasize: 
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from
Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts
committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code
(as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to
the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.[51] On
the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under
Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into
Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying
circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.]
[52]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
 
Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description of the
crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite
evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime
of Simple  Arson ' for having 'deliberately set fire upon the two-storey
residential house  of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x  x  x  knowing the
same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place
and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said
building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses,
were razed by fire. [Emphasis supplied.]
 
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case
of People v. Soriano.[53]The accused in the latter case caused the
burning of a particular house.Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted
down five (5) neighboring houses.The RTC therein found the accused
guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1[54] of Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.This Court,
through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
 
x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec.
3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of
 reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetuafor other cases
of arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant
are specifically described as houses, contemplating
inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law.
The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended
Information particularly refer to the structures as
houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The
applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD
1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In
case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is
well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly
against the government, and liberally in favor of the
accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613
are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.
[55]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged
with having intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of
Robert Separa.Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven
(7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the
trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime
of simple arson.Such is the case 'notwithstanding the error in the
designation of the offense in the information, the information remains
effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged
therein.[56]What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violate, x xx, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited.[57]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec.
5 of PD No. 1613 categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed
for simple arson is:
 
 
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. -If by reason
of or on the occasion of arson death results, the penalty
of reclusionperpetua  to death shall be imposed.
[Emphasis supplied.]
 
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the
Information, the imposable penalty on accused-appellant
is reclusion  perpetua.
Apropos the civil liabilities of accused-appellant, current
jurisprudence[58]dictate that the civil indemnity due from accused-
appellant is P50,000.00 for the death of each of the victims.
[59] However, the monetary awards for moral and exemplary damages
given by the Court of Appeals, both in the amount of P50,000.00, due
the heirs of the victims, have to be deleted for lack of material basis.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages to
Rodolfo Movilla in the amount of P50,000.00 for the destruction of his
house, also has to be deleted, but in this instance for being
improper. Moral damages cannot be award by this Court in the absence
of proof of mental or physical suffering on the part of the heirs of the
victims.[60] Concerning the award of exemplary damages, the reason
for the deletion being that no aggravating circumstance had been alleged
and proved by the prosecution in the case at bar.  
[61]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary  
  SO ORDERED.
To summarize, accused-appellant's alternative plea that she be acquitted
of the crime must be rejected. With the evidence on record, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals.  It is indubitable that accused-appellant is the author of the
crime of simple arson. All the circumstantial evidence presented before
the RTC, viewed in its entirety, is as convincing as direct evidence and,
as such, negates accused-appellant's innocence, and when considered
concurrently with her admission given to Mercedita Mendoza,
the former's guilt beyond reasonable doubt is twice as evident.Hence,
her conviction is effectively justified. More so, as it is propitious to note
that in stark contrast to the factual circumstances presented by the
prosecution, accused-appellant neither mustered a denial nor an alibi
except for the proposition that her guilt had not been established beyond
reasonable doubt. 
 
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2
September 2005, in CA G.R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby
AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of accused-appellant
EDNA MALNGAN  Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to
be imposed and the amount of damages to be awarded,
however, are MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1613, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to   RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-appellant is
hereby ordered to pay the heirs of each of the
victims   P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.