Lessons Learned From Year 2010 Flood

SINDH WATER SECTOR IMPROVEMENT PHASE-1 PROJECT (WSIP-1)
Preparation of Regional Plan for the Left Bank of Indus, Delta and Coastal Zone
TASK I-21: APPENDIX A
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE YEAR 2010 SUPER-FLOOD

IN PAKISTAN AND THE LOWER INDUS RIVER BASIN
Year 2010 Super-flooding and Impacts on Flood Management Structures
By Professor Marshall L. Silver - Ph.D. P.E.

Disaster and Flood Management Specialist
December 2010
SINDH IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE AUTHORITY - SIDA

Hyderabad Pakistan
Louis Berger Group Inc
and
Indus Associated Consultants Ltd
SINDH WATER SECTOR IMPROVEMENT PHASE-I PROJECT
TASK I-21: APPENDIX A

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE YEAR 2010 SUPER-FLOOD
Table of Contents
TASK I-21: APPENDIX A LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE YEAR 2010 SUPER-FLOOD IN
PAKISTAN AND THE LOWER INDUS RIVER BASIN....................................................................2
Table of Contents..................................................................................................................................2
Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................................................................6
Task I-21: Water Disaster and Flood Management in Pakistan and the Lower Indus River Basin.....10
Task I-21 Terms of Reference and Activities..................................................................................10
Water Hazards - Including Floods...................................................................................................11
Background to the Assessment of the Year 2010 Super-flood.........................................................12
Disaster Cycle and Flood Management.......................................................................................12
Historical Flooding in Pakistan and Sindh.......................................................................................14
Background to the Year 2010 Super-flood...................................................................................14
Impact of Recent Flood Events in Pakistan..................................................................................14
Year 2000 Super-flood in Pakistan and Sindh.................................................................................16
Meteorology and Hydrology of the Super-flood..............................................................................18
Frequency Analysis of the Year 2010 Rainfall............................................................................19
River Hydraulics of the Super-flood............................................................................................20
Indus Flood Flows at Taunsa, Guddu and Sukkur Barrages.........................................................21
Indus Flood Flows at Kotri Barrage.............................................................................................22
Hydraulics of the Indus River System during the Super-flood.........................................................23
Peak Flood Flow in the Indus Main Stem from July to September 2010.....................................23
Flood Discharge and Frequency Analysis of the Super-flood......................................................24
Morphology of the Lower Indus River in Sindh..........................................................................26
Flow of Flood Water to the Arabian Sea below Kotri Barrage....................................................27
River Bund Breaches in Sindh.........................................................................................................28
Assessment of the Cause of Breach of MS Bund.........................................................................30
Recommended Methodology for Repair of the Failed Bund Section...........................................32
Impact of Super-flood on Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Infrastructure........................32
Impact on Pakistan from Past Flooding.......................................................................................32
Methodology used to Assess Damage to Irrigation, Drainage, and Flood Protection Infrastructure
from Year 2010 Super-flood........................................................................................................33
Global Damage to Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Sector in Pakistan and Sindh........34
Detailed Damage to Flood Protection and other Infrastructure of WAPDA................................35
Detailed Damage to the Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Infrastructure in Sindh.........37
Sindh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Needs for the Irrigation, and Drainage and Flood
Protection Sector..............................................................................................................................39
Assessment of Ability to Perform Rehabilitation & Reconstruction............................................40
Services and Productivity Losses in Pakistan and Sindh..................................................................41
Impact of Super-flood on Land and Land Use in Pakistan and Sindh..............................................42
Assessment of Flood Affected Areas of Pakistan and Sindh........................................................42
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Province-based Assessment of Flood Affected Areas in Pakistan...............................................43

Flood Affected Areas based on Land Use for Pakistan................................................................44
Flood Affected Areas based on Land Use for Sindh....................................................................46
Impact of Super-flood on Agriculture in Pakistan and Sindh...........................................................48
Historical Impact of Flooding in Pakistan....................................................................................48
Future Trend of Flood Threats in Pakistan...................................................................................48
Scale of the Year 2010 Super-flood.............................................................................................49
Impact of Flooding on Pakistan Agriculture................................................................................49
Impact of Flooding On Sindh Agriculture...................................................................................50
The Way Forward for Agriculture from the Super-flood in Sindh...............................................52
Humanitarian Response to the Super-flood.....................................................................................53
Roles and Responsibilities...........................................................................................................53
Cluster Response to the Disaster..................................................................................................54
Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Response...........................................................................54
SIDA Response to the Super Flood.................................................................................................55
Flood Disaster Management Plan................................................................................................55
Flood Emergency Cell.................................................................................................................55
Recommended Recovery Strategy for the Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Sector...........56
Reconstruction Strategy - For the protected Lower Indus plains.................................................56
Key Challenges to Recovery after the Year 2010 Super-flood.....................................................57
Recovery Needs in Immediate, Short, Medium and Long Terms................................................57
Planning and Studies Required for Immediate, Short and Medium Term Recovery....................59
Main Elements of a Flood Management Strategy........................................................................59
Selection Criteria for Immediate, Short and Medium Term Subprojects.....................................60
Approximate Funds Requirements for First 3 Years....................................................................61
Sindh Flood Management Breakdowns during the Year 2010 Super-flood.....................................61
Damage and Need Assessment Breakdowns................................................................................61
Flood Management and Flood Fighting Breakdowns..................................................................62
Flood Forecasting of the Year 2010 Super-flood.............................................................................63
Modelling of the Year 2010 Super-flood.....................................................................................63
Flood Risk Mapping........................................................................................................................64
Developing an Adaptation Strategy to Super-flooding for Pakistan................................................65
Cause-Effect Analysis of 2010 Floods.........................................................................................66
Strategy for Restoration of Flood Affected Areas........................................................................67
Non-Structural Methods of Environmental Management for Flood Protection...............................68
Damage and Actions for the Restoration of Natural Systems in the Indus Watershed.................68
Environmental Health and Proposed Responses..........................................................................69
Protected Areas and Cultural Assets............................................................................................69
Lessons Learnt from Year 2010 Super-flood – ADB & World Bank Needs Assessment................70
Key Lessons Learnt from Flood Response 2010..........................................................................70
Institution Structure, Legal and Policy Framework for Disaster Management.............................70
Legal and Policy Framework.......................................................................................................71
DRM Strategy and Recommendations.........................................................................................72
Damage to Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Sector Infrastructure................................75
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Lessons Learnt from 2010 Super-flood - World Rivers NGO..........................................................78

Impact of Global Warming and Extreme Weather.......................................................................78
Impact of Miss-management of the Indus River Basin................................................................78
Lessons Learnt to Consider in the Phase-II Study............................................................................79
Capacity of Pakistan and Sindh Government to Implement Recovery from the Super-flood...........79
 Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E).......................................................................................80
Governance and Disaster Recovery.............................................................................................80
Proposed Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy.........................................................................81
Implementation Arrangements.....................................................................................................83
Institutional Framework...............................................................................................................83
Implementation at Provincial/ Regional Level.............................................................................86
Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) System Design and Implementation.......................................87
M&E System for Flood Reconstruction.......................................................................................88
Need to Document Lessons Learned from the Year 2010 Super-flood............................................90
Performance Assessment of SIDA for the Year 2010 Super-flood......................................................91
Assessment of SIDA Performance – Prevention/Mitigation........................................................92
Assessment of SIDA Performance – Preparedness......................................................................93
Assessment of SIDA Performance - Response............................................................................93
Assessment of SIDA Performance – Rehabilitation/Reconstruction............................................94
Assessment of SIDA Performance - Rehabilitation/ reconstruction.............................................95
Assessment..................................................................................................................................95
Gaps, Challenges, Strengths and Opportunities for Improved Water Disaster and Flood Risk
Management in Pakistan and Sindh ..............................................................................................101
Summary, Methodology, Key Findings, Issues and Conclusions .................................................102
Task I-21 Terms of Reference and Activities.............................................................................102
Methodology Used.....................................................................................................................102
Key References.............................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined.
References and Resources..............................................................................................................108
References.................................................................................................................................108
Persons Providing Information on Irrigation and Flood Protection Sector on Year 2010 Super-
flooding.....................................................................................................................................108
Planning Commission, Pakistan.................................................................................................109
Water and Power Development Authority.................................................................................109
Key Agencies of Government Associated with Flood Management and Research....................109
Resources...................................................................................................................................110
ANNEX 21A-A: PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAPS OF THE FLOOD DAMAGE TO WATER
RESOURCE INFRASTRUTURE.....................................................................................................111
Photos of Flood Damage in Pakistan and Sindh............................................................................111
Photos of Irrigation Flood and Infrastructure Damage in Sindh.....................................................130
ANNEX 21A-B: HISTORICAL FLOOD LEVELS MEASURED AT BARRAGES IN SINDH.....133
ANNEX 21A-C: THE CASE FOR THE KALABAGH DAM..........................................................136
Case for the Kalabagh Dam.......................................................................................................136
ANNEX 21-D: INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL PRESS ARTICLES CONCERNED WITH THE
YEAR 2010 SUPER-FLOOD IN PAKISTAN..................................................................................137
Attempts to Tame Indus River Contributed to Disaster in Pakistan, Expert Says..........................137
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Farmlands Inundated by Flood Waters .........................................................................................138

Poor ‘Marketing’ Blamed for Pakistan Aid Shortfall.....................................................................140
Floodwaters Threatening the South of Pakistan.............................................................................141
A Lifetime, Washed Away............................................................................................................141
Experience Isn’t Enough in Pakistani Flood Plain.........................................................................143
Pakistan Flood Sets Back Infrastructure by Years.........................................................................145
Floods Stunt Pakistani Fight against Insurgents.............................................................................148
Instability and Aid.....................................................................................................................150
At Risk for Disease....................................................................................................................150
Food Shortage Fears..................................................................................................................151
Floodwaters Give New Life to Pakistani Class Dispute.................................................................151
Floods Could Have Lasting Impact for Pakistan............................................................................153
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB Asian Development Bank
AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir
BBB Building Back Better
BBS Building Back Smarter
BHU Basic Health Unit
BISP Benazir Income Support Program
BOD Burden of Disease
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CBOs Community Based Organizations
CCI Council of Common Interest
CCP Competition Commission of Pakistan
CCT Conditional Cash Transfers
CD Completely Damaged
CDWP Central Development Working Party
CNG Compressed Natural Gas
CRBC Chashma Right Bank Canal
DDMA District Disaster Management Authority
DDO Drawing & Disbursing Officer
DEWS Disease Early Warning System
DHIS District Health Information System
DHQ Distant Headquarter
DISCO Distribution Company
DNA Damage and Needs Assessment
DOH Department of Health
DRM Disaster Risk Management
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
EAD Economic Affairs Division
EC European Commission
ECNEC Executive Committee of the National Economic Council
EDO Executive District Officer
EPI Expanded Program on Immunization
ERC Emergency Response Cell
ESSAF Environmental & Social Screening and Assessment Framework
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FEWS Flood Early Warning System
FFC Federal Flood Commission
FLCF First Level Care Facility
FMIS Financial Management Information System
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GB Gilgit-Baltistan
GCISC Global Change Impact Study Centre
GDI Gender Development Index
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GIS Geographic Information System
GOP Government of Pakistan
GoPb Government of Punjab
GST General Sales Tax
GTZ German Technical Cooperation
HDI Human Development Index
HEPR Health Emergency Preparedness and Response
HRM Hazard Risk Management
ICT Islamabad Capital Territory
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IFPS Irrigation and Flood Protection Sector
IPP Independent Power Producer
IR Islamic Relief
IsDB Islamic Development Bank
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LG Local Government
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MCH Mother and Child Health
McRAM Multi-cluster Rapid Assessment Mechanism
MFI Microfinance Institution
MoE Ministry of Environment
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoIT Ministry of Information & Technology
MoWP Ministry of Water and Power
MPNR Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Resources
MTDF Medium Term Development Framework
NADRA National Database and Registration Authority
NBFI Non-Bank Financial Institution
NDMA National Disaster Management Authority
NDMC National Disaster Management Commission
NDMO National Disaster Management Ordinance
NDRMF National Disaster Risk Management Framework
NFC National Finance Commission
NGO Non-Government Organization
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NHA National Highway Authority

NIC National Identity Card
NODMC National Oversight Disaster Management Council
NPLs Non-Performing Loans
NRSP National Rural Support Program
NTDC National Transmission & Dispatch Company
NWFP North West Frontier Province
O&M Operation and Maintenance
OGDCL Oil and Gas Development Corporation Ltd
OMC Oil Marketing Company
PARC Pakistan Agricultural Research Council
PARCO Par-Arab Refinery
PC Planning Commission
PCNA Post Crisis Needs Assessment
PD Partially Damaged
PDMA Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PDWP Provincial Development Working Party
PFMA Public Financial Management and Accountability
PHC Primary Health Care
PHED Public Health Engineering Department
PIDA Provincial Irrigation & Drainage Authority
PIFERP Pakistan Initial Flood Emergency Response Plan
PIFRA Project to Improve Financial Reporting and Auditing
PIPD Punjab Irrigation & Power Development
PMD Pakistan Meteorological Department
PMES Project Monitoring and Evaluation System
PPAF Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund
PSDP Public Sector Development Program
PSO Pakistan State Oil
PSP Public Sector Power
PTAs Parent Teacher Associations
RHC Rural Health Center
RR Recovery & Reconstruction
SBP State Bank of Pakistan
SHYDO Sarhad Hydropower Development Organization
SIPD Sindh Irrigation & Power Development
SMCs School Management Committees
SMEDA Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority
SNGPL Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Ltd.
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SSGCL Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd
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SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission

THQ Tehsil Headquarter
UN-ECLAC UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
UNICEF United Nations Children Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNOSAT United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Programme
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VAM Vulnerability Assessment Mapping
WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority
WATSAN Water Supply and Sanitation
WB World Bank
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organization
WSS Water Supply and Sanitation
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TASK I-21- APPENDIX A:

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE YEAR 2010 SUPPER FLOOD
Task I-21: Water Disaster and Flood Management in Pakistan

and the Lower Indus River Basin
Task I-21 Terms of Reference and Activities

The Terms of Reference for Task I-21 were to document, review and evaluate methods for flood
management and associated operations and maintenance (O&M) for the Lower Indus River Basin.
The required Activities for Task I-21 were to:

Document, review and evaluate methods in use or under development, including those
concerning flood forecasting, routing, risk assessment, warning, protection, and real time flood
management, planning and operation and maintenance (O&M) of the river systems, and other
channels and water bodies in the river basin.
The output of this Task was a Chapter on Water Disaster and Flood Management as part of a Phase-I
Report identifying concerns and issues for the existing state of water resource development in the
study area – The Left Bank of the Indus, Delta and Coastal Zone of the Lower Indus River Basin.
Subsequent phases of this project will develop a new Master Plan for Water Resource Management of
the study area; and specific bankable projects that will implement the new Master Plan. A map of the
study area is shown in Figure 21A-1.
To assist in documenting flood management in the Lower Indus River Basin, this Appendix to the
main Chapter Report was prepared to document the lessons learned from the year 2010 super-flood
that decimated Pakistan and Sindh. Pictures of the flooding are presented in Annex 21A-A.
Figure 21A-1: Study Area Showing the Left Bank of Indus, Delta and Coastal Zone
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Water Hazards - Including Floods

management. However floods are only one of a large class of water disaster risks that have potential
impact on the development of water resources and the preparation of a new Master Plan for Water
Resources Management in the Lower Indus River Basin project area.
There are three classes of hazards applicable to the existing risk conditions in Sindh and the Lower
Indus River Basin: Geological hazards, water hazards and man-made hazards. Within each class of
hazards there are several subsets of hazards as shown in Table 21A-1.
Table 21A -1: Primary Disaster Hazards in the Lower Indus Basin and Sindh
Class of Disaster Risk

Disaster Risk
Geological Hazards
Earthquakes
Landslides
Water Hazards
Drought
River flood
Canal and drain breaks
Water logging
Salinity – Irrigation induced
Salinity –saltwater intrusion up estuaries and
into coastal ground water aquifers
Storms and cyclones
Tsunami
Man-made and Other Hazards
Famine - Caused by flood or drought
Forest fires
Industrial pollution
Environmental accidents
Civil conflict
Included as important hazards in the Lower Indus Basin and Sindh are the entire class of water
disasters and especially: Drought; water logging; salinity (both induced by water logging and from
intrusion up estuaries); and storms and cyclones. The magnitude and frequency of all of these water
related disaster risks are expected to be negatively impacted by global warming which was discussed
in more detail in the main Chapter of this report.
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Throughout the main Chapter and this Appendix to the report, reference to the disaster risk of floods,
should be read as the disaster risk of the whole class of water disasters that have catastrophically and
historically impacted the Lower Indus River Basin and Sindh.
Background to the Assessment of the Year 2010 Super-flood

An important component of this task to review and evaluate current methodologies for water disaster
and flood management is to critically evaluate what went wrong in the management of the year 2010
super-flood that devastated Pakistan. It is also important to draw lessons learned so that the same level
of water disaster devastation will not be repeated in the future. This evaluation will be used to develop
improved methodologies and procedures for managing water disasters and flooding in the future.
Within this Appendix, the assessment of lessons learned was focused on disaster management as it
relates to the disaster management cycle and the need for effective planning and action for the
different disaster phases:
 Prevention/mitigation
 Preparedness
 Response
 Rehabilitation/reconstruction
The Appendix focuses on the disaster cycle as it relates to the physical and non-physical water
disaster and flood management aspects of the super-flood disaster. The assessment does not present
the social aspects of the super-flood: Relief (food, clothing, shelter); search and rescue; evacuation;
and other components of the super-flood concerned with the well-being of the affected population.
Lessons learned for these social aspects of the super-flood will be considered in other Chapters of the
report.
Disaster Cycle and Flood Management

The assessment of the year 2010 super-flood was made using the concept of the Disaster Cycle
introduced in the main Chapter of this report and summarized below.
The Disaster Risk Management Cycle (Disaster Cycle), shown in Figure 21A-2, consists of four
phases: Prevention/Mitigation and Preparedness in the pre-disaster stage of the disaster cycle; and
Response and Rehabilitation/Reconstruction in post-disaster stage of the disaster cycle (ADPC, 2002).
 In the Prevention/Mitigation phase of the Disaster Cycle, efforts are made to prevent or
mitigate damage (construction of bunds (dikes) and dams against floods). Activities and
measures for ensuring an effective response to the impact of hazards are classified as
Preparedness (emergency drills and public awareness) and are not aimed at averting the
occurrence of a disaster. Response includes activities such as rescue efforts, first aid, fire
fighting and evacuation
 In the Rehabilitation/Reconstruction phase of the Disaster Cycle, considerations of
disaster risk reduction form the foundations for all activities
Examples of measures taken in each phase of the Disaster Cycle are given in Table 21A-2. Taking
appropriate measures based on the concept of disaster risk management in each phase of the disaster
risk cycle can significantly reduce the overall disaster risk now and into the future.
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Figure 21A-2 Disaster Risk Management Cycle
Table 21A-2 Example of Measures Taken in Each Disaster Risk Management Phase
of the Disaster Risk Management Cycle
Storm
Disaster Earthquake Flood (cyclone, typhoon, Landslide
Phase hurricane)
Seismic design Construction of Construction of tide Construction of

Retrofitting of dikes walls erosion control
vulnerable buildings Building of dams Establishment of dams
Prevention/ forests to protect Construction of
mitigation Installation of seismic Forestation
isolation/seismic Construction of against storms retaining walls
response control flood control
systems basins/reservoirs
Construction and Operation of flood Construction of Operation of
operation of warning systems emergency shelters meteorological
earthquake observation O&M of structural Operation of warning systems
systems and non-structural meteorological
flood management observation
systems systems
Preparedness Preparation of catalogues of historical disaster location, intensity and frequency
Preparation of hazard maps
Food & material stockpiling
Emergency drills
Operation of early warning systems
Preparation of emergency kits
Disaster needs reporting
Disaster damage reporting
Rescue efforts
Response
First aid treatment
Monitoring of secondary disasters
Construction of temporary housing
Disaster resistant reconstruction
Rehabilitation/
Appropriate land use planning
reconstruction
Livelihood support
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Historical Flooding in Pakistan and Sindh

Pakistan is one of the five South Asian countries with the highest annual average number of people
physically exposed to floods, which occur normally due to storm systems that originate from Bay of
Bengal during the monsoon from July to September. Storms originating in Bay of Bengal, passing
over lower Central India and Rajasthan, enter Pakistan and continue towards the North into Kashmir.
The mountain ranges in the extreme north of Pakistan provide a perennial source of inflow into the
Indus river Basin.
Fifty six (56%) percent of the Indus river basin lies in Pakistan and covers approximately 70 % of the
country’s area. Generally major floods in the Indus basin occur in late summer (July-September)
when the South Asian region is subjected to heavy monsoon rains. In upper to mid reaches of the
Basin, tributaries including the Jhelum and Chennab are mostly the cause of flooding. Major flooding
is mainly associated with the monsoon low depression that develops in the Bay of Bengal that moves
across India in a west/north-westerly direction to enter Pakistan.
River floods generally affect Punjab and Sindh; while hill torrents affect the hilly areas of NWFP,
Balochistan and northern areas of the country. Flash floods can also hit hilly and mountain areas of
Sindh, which may cause landslides and road erosion. Cloud Burst Flash Floods (CBFF) may also
occur over Karachi (as happened in Lahore in 1996). Floods in Sindh can also occur due to dam bursts
(as for example the floods in Pasni due to the Shadi Kot dam burst in February 2005) and failures of
the extremely large canal and drainage system that covers the province.
Also, in recent years, vulnerabilities of large cities to flooding have increased. Cities including
Karachi have experienced flooding due to inability of sewerage system to cope with heavy rains.
Background to the Year 2010 Super-flood

Historically, the Indus has had low, medium, high and super floods, on an average, after every 3, 5, 10
and 15 years respectively. A record of historical levels of flooding for the barrages in Sind is given in
Annex 21A-B.
Twice during recorded history, the Indus has changed its course - in 1317 A.D. and in 1758 A.D.,
causing huge loss of life and property. After the last change of course in 1758 A.D., the ancient
capital at Khuda Abad was abandoned and Hyderabad was made the new capital of Sindh. New
inundation canals emerged on the left bank of the Indus and the entire traditional irrigation system of
the Lower Indus Basin was re-developed.
Different high and super-floods have caused damage at different locations along the Indus. The 1942
flood caused heavy losses on the right bank. While the super-floods of 1956 and 1976 had the highest
flood flows of around 1.0 million cusecs at Kotri Barrage; with loss of life estimated at 160 and 425
persons, and flooded areas of 30,000 and 32,000 sq miles respectively in Pakistan. But the year 2010
super-flood 2010 may well be the worst natural disaster in Sindh since 1758 A.D.
Impact of Recent Flood Events in Pakistan

Fourteen major floods that have affected Pakistan since 1947 have caused economic losses and
damage worth USD 6 billion (Table 21A-3). This historical damage was overwhelmed by the super-
flood of year 2010 that is estimated to have caused economic losses and damage worth USD 9.5
billion (NY Times, 15 November 2010).
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Table 21A-3: Major Flood Events in Pakistan

Compared to the Year 2010 Super-flood
Estimated
Villages
Year Lives Lost damage
Affected
(USD)
1950 2,910 10,000
1955 679 6,945
1956 160 11,609
1973 474 9,719
1975 126 8,628
1976 425 9,150
1978 393 9,200
1988 508 1,000
1992 1008 13,208 $6 billion
1995 591 6,852
1998 47 161
2001 201 0.4 million1
2003 230 1.266 million1
2004 85 47
2005 59 1,931
2006 523 2,477
2007 586 6,498
20102 1,300-1,600 62,000 sq miles3 $9.5 billion
1
Number of persons affected
2
As of 16 November 2010; Source: NY Times
3
The area of Great Britain
In assessing the location, duration and impact of flooding in the Lower Indus Basin, it was found that
the SIDA Geographic Information System (GIS) and Remote Sensing (RS) Cell did not have a
comprehensive GIS data base or GIS based map of historical water disaster and flood events for the
Basin. The creation of such a data base is a fundamental first step to improved water disaster and
flood risk assessment and management in the project area.
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider developing a comprehensive data base of historical water
disaster and flood events in the lower Indus Basin. An important data set of this database will be
derived for the year 2010 Super-flood. This database is needed to develop the new Master Plan, and to
assess the potential impact of water disasters and flooding on new projects that will be developed to
implement the new Master Plan.
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Year 2000 Super-flood in Pakistan and Sindh

Flooding began on July 22, 2010 in the province of Baluchistan with the arrival of the annual
monsoon. The flood waters then poured across the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly called Northwest
Frontier) Province in the northwest before flowing south into Punjab and Sindh.
The summer of 2010 produced Pakistan’s worst flooding in 80 years, and possibly in all of recorded
history (New York Times, 15 November 2010):
 Nearly 20 million people were and are still being significantly affected (December 2010),
which is a little less than the entire population of Australia
 The flooding affected about one-fifth of the country - nearly 160,000 square kilometres - or
an area larger than the entire country of Bangladesh
 Estimates of the death toll from the flood range from 1,300 to 1,600
Pictures of the flood devastation are given in Annex 21A-A.
A tabular summary of the super-flood impacts in Pakistan and in Sindh are given in Table 21A-4.
Table 21A-4: Year 2010 Pakistan flood Losses (As of 09 October, 2010)
No. Impact Quantity impacted Total for Percent of

Country impacted
Pakistan
1 Deaths 1,961
2 Injured 2,907
3 Households damaged 1,910,439
4 Population affected 20,184,550
5 Cropped areas 2,244,644 ha
submerged
6 District affected 78
Reference: Pakistan Government official flood website; http://www.pakistanfloods.pk/
A summary of the flood impacts throughout Pakistan as of 16 September 2010 is shown on Figure
21A-3; and a summary of flood impacts within Sindh as of 08 October 2010 is shown on Figure 21A-
4.
It has been assessed by competent disaster relief agencies that the nation’s worst natural calamity has
ruined just about every physical infrastructure developed over 60 years of independence: Roads,
bridges, irrigation, drainage, schools, health clinics, electricity and communications. However, a
physical inventory of damage supporting this assessment is difficult to document because it is not
clear if Pakistan has adopted an internationally recognized system of disaster damage reporting. Such
reporting is a fundamental first step in assessment of relief and rehabilitation needs in all of Pakistan
and in Sindh.
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider adopting an internationally recognized system of disaster
damage reporting for its irrigation, drainage and flood control infrastructure.
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Figure 21A-3: Extent of Flooding in Pakistan

(As of 01 September 2010 UN OCHA, 2010)
(Reference: http://unosat-maps.web.cern.ch/unosat-
maps/PK/FL20100802PAK/UNOSAT_PAK_FL2010_EarlyRecoveryOverview_v2_LR.pdf
Figure 21A-4: Extent of Flooding in Sindh

(As of 06 September 2010 - UN OCHA, 2010)
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Meteorology and Hydrology of the Super-flood

Meteorologists observed that in early July 2010, a strong ridge of high pressure began to develop near
the Ural Mountains in Russia. This ridge became stationary and established a blocking pattern, named
an Omega Block due to its shape, across nearly all of western Russia (Figure 21A-5) (PARC, 2010).
Figure 21A-5: Upper Level Atmospheric Map from Late July and Early August 2010
Showing an Omega Block in western Russia
(Source: University of Reading 2010. Upper level Atmosphere Map.
Department of Meteorology. University of Reading, United Kingdom)
As the ridge remained stationary for nearly two consecutive months, persistent rains fell in major
parts of Pakistan and in parts of Afghanistan and Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir beginning at the
end of July 2010. With an abnormally active jet stream riding around the periphery of the Omega
Block into western Pakistan, profuse amounts of hot and moist air produced what some
meteorologists called a Super-charged Monsoon, as this unstable atmosphere led to a highly unusual
pattern of long duration and high intensity rainfall.
The Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC) analyzed the high intensity and long duration
rain storms that contributed significantly in Pakistan receiving large amounts of rainwater volume
distributed all over the country starting from 27 July 2010 (PARC, 2010).
Total rainfall in July to September 2010 for 10 locations in Sindh was estimated using data from the
Pakistan Meteorological Department (Table 21A-5); and then the percent increase over normal
rainfall for these three months was computed. Out of the 10 cities shown, 8 cities had an observed
increase over normal rainfall ranging from 10 to 147%.
A similar analysis was made to compare total rainfall from July to September 2010 to normal rainfall
expected for the same period in other areas and provinces of Pakistan. The results (Table 21A-6) show
similar trends of high total rainfall and large percentage increase of total rainfall over normal rainfall
over all of Pakistan.
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Table 21A-5: Total Rainfall July to September 2010, Normal Rainfall

and Percent Increase over Normal in Sindh
July to September 2010
Location Total Normal Percent

Rainfall Rainfall Increase over
(mm) (mm) Normal
Badin 298.2 187.2 59
Chhor 285.1 185.9 53
Hyderabad 133.2 121.1 10
Jacobabad 203 89.2 128
Karachi 274.6 136.3 101
Airport
Larkana 219 106 107
Nawabshah 280.6 113.4 147
Padidan 186 93.6 99
Rohri 67 82.4 -19
Moin-Jo-Daro 71 82.5 -14
(Source: Pakistan Meteorological Department)
Table 21A-6: Total Rainfall of July to September 2010,

Normal Rainfall and Percent Increase over Normal in Pakistan
July to September 2010
Province / area Total Normal Percent

Rainfall Rainfall Increase over
(mm) (mm) Normal
Punjab 150 - 903 58 - 842 4 – 412 %
Gilgit, Baltistan and 54 - 870 34 - 695 24 – 206 %
AJK
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 121 - 843 25 - 634 2 – 376 %
Sindh 67 - 280 85 - 185 10 – 147 %
Balochistan 0 - 243 2 - 241 16 -192 %
(Source: Pakistan Meteorological Department)
Frequency Analysis of the Year 2010 Rainfall

As stated above, wide spread heavy rains in July and August 2010 resulted in high runoff in the
Kabul, Swat, Chenab and Indus Rivers. Flash floods in western streams aggravated the peak Indus
flows. The average annual rainfall in Peshawar is 400 mm, but in only six same days 333 mm of rain
feel on the city. Rainfall data for 18 stations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) – the upper catchments of
the Swat, Kabul and Indus Rivers, shows two pre-flood major rainfall events from 27 to 30 July and
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from 3 to 9 August 2010. The 24-hour rainfall on 29 July varied from 21 to 280 mm at various
stations with an average of all stations equal to 128 mm. These two rainfall events deposited
approximately 4.75 cubic kilometers (km3) of water onto KP.
Rainfall frequency analysis based on Gumbel EV Type I, showed that the return period of the 2010
rainfall at Saidu Sharif was 203 years and at Peshawar 2,800 years. This frequency is exceptionally
high. Hydromet stations also recorded 240 mm rainfall in Kamra in Punjab and 189 mm at Ghari
Dopatta in Gilgit Baltistan on 30 July; and 143 mm in Mirpur Khas in Sindh and 73 mm in Zhob in
Balocistan on 29 July 2010. These are also extremely high rainfall values.
River Hydraulics of the Super-flood

An analysis was also made by PARC (2010)of river flows during development of the super-flood. The
analysis, considering stage and discharge values of flood flows for major rivers in the Indus River
Basin, was used to develop trend lines and analysese of peak flood intensity and duration at various
Rim Stations (Tarbela, Jehlum at Mangla, Chenab at Marala, Ravi at Balloki and Sutlej at
Sulemankie) and barrages on the IndusRiver.
Indus Flood Flows at Tarbela, Kalabagh and Chashma

The flood flows of the Indus River at Tarbela, Kalabagh and Chashma are presented in Figure 21A-6.
The first flood peak of 527,000 cusecs at Tarbela occurred on 30 July 010. It continued for almost 48
hours with slight reduction in flood level to 510,000 cusecs. This peak value of flow was held for four
days with some further reduction starting from 29 July to 1 August. The second flood peak of 526,000
cusecs occurred on 10 August, which also continued for three days with some reduction in flow.
Figure 21A-6: Flood flows of Indus River at Tarbela, Kalabag

and Chashma during July to September 2010
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The first flood peak of 856,000 cusecs at Kalabagh occurred on 31 July 2010. It continued for almost
72 hours with a slight reduction in flood flow. The second flood peak of 659,000 cusecs occurred on
11 August, which also continued for four days with some reduction in flow.
The first flood peak of 957,000 cusecs at Chashma occurred on August 1 2010. It continued for
almost 72 hours with slight reduction in flood flow volume. The second flood peak of 796,000 cusecs
occurred during 10-13 August, and also continued for four days with some reduction in flow.
Two flood peaks were observed at the Rim Stations and two Barrages, after that there was a continued
declining trend and flows became stabilized at lower levels of flood flow.
An important point to consider from Figure 21A-6 is that peak flood flows continued up to 96 hours
with slight changes in flow volumes, which shows that there was rapid runoff from the Basin’s upper
catchments to the river system. These long duration flood peaks are considered to be the result of
prolonged rainfall in the upper catchments of the basin watershed. This is an indication that prolonged
rainfall of high intensity, coupled with degraded watershed conditions, results in prolonged flood
peaks.
There is a miss-perception that it is only degraded watershed conditions which result in prolonged
peaks, which is not true. Watershed yield is a combination of the erosive nature of rainfall, its
duration and quantity; all of which are contributing factors to prolonged flood peaks recorede for the
Indus River at Tarbela, Kalabagh and Chashma. However, it is also important to note that degraded
watersheds can prolong the flood duration within a given regime of rainfall.
Indus Flood Flows at Taunsa, Guddu and Sukkur Barrages

The flood flows of the Indus River at Taunsa, Guddu and Sukkur are presented in Figure 21A-7. The
first flood peak of 794,000 cusecs at Taunsa occurred on 2 August 2010. It continued for almost 5
days with slight reduction in flood flows. The second flood peak of 777,000 cusecs occurred during
11-15 August, which also continued for five days with some reduction in flow. Later, continued
reduction in flood flow was observed until the end of September 2010.
The first flood peak of 1148,000 cusecs at Guddu occurred during the period of 8-18 August 2010. It
continued for almost 11 days with slight changes in flood level. Although flood conditions continued,
there was a continued decline in flood up until 30 September 2010.
The first flood peak of 1125,000 cusecs at Sukkur occurred during the period 8-18 August 2010. It
continued for almost 11 days with slight changes in flood water level. Although the flood situation
prevailed, high water continued to decline up until 30 September.
The situation of extremely prolonged peak of over 11 days is a clear indication that there is neither
natural capacity nor a current practical means in the Indus River Basin for flood attenuation. The
obvious reason is the lack of adequate storage upstream or downstream of Tarbela in dams, in the
flood plain or in flood retardation basins.
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Figure 21A-7: Flood flows of Indus River at Taunsa, Guddu and Sukkur
during July to September 2010
It has also been assessed that Sindh province has experienced the worst floods in history because the
country was not able to develop any storage on the Indus River main stem since 1976. All floodwater
is now being accumulated in the Upper Indus Basin and then allowed to flow through the Lower Indus
Basin because during floods there is no way to store water in upstream areas. There is an urgent need
therefore to restore the natural flood storage capacity in the Indus River Flood Plain (Perera, 2003).
A discussion of the potential flood mitigation capacity of the Proposed Kalabagh Dam is given in
Annex 21A-B of this Appendix of the Chapter-21 main Report.
A discussion of how to design, commission and operate flood retardation basins is provided in
subsequent sections of this Appendix.
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider a study for re-establishing natural flood retention basins
within its irrigation and drainage project area as a component of the new Master Plan
Indus Flood Flows at Kotri Barrage

Flood flows of the Indus River at Kotri are presented in Figure 21A-8. The flood peak of 939,000
cusecs at Kotri occurred during the period from 22 August to 1 September 2010. It continued for
almost 11 days with slight changes in flood water levels. The flows started declining after this high
water period until 30 September.
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Figure 21A-8: Flood flows of Indus River at Kotri during July to September 2010
Hydraulics of the Indus River System during the Super-flood
Peak Flood Flow in the Indus Main Stem from July to September 2010
A flood peak flow analysis was conducted by PARC for the Indus River to assess river flows and
hydrologic features of the Indus Main Stem at Rim Stations and at various barrages (PARC,2010).
Flood flows on the main stem of the River were in the range of 527,000 to 1,148,000 cusecs. The peak
started at the Tarbela Rim Station on 30 July 2010 and reached Kotri Barrage on 27 August. It thus
took 29 days for the flood peak to travel from Tarbela to Kotri. This is longer than usual than for
many past floods because the peak flow continued to change at different nodes due to inflow of
floodwater from various tributaries into the Indus Main stem river (Figure 21A-9).
Based on the hydrology of various tributaries, the diversion of water into canals, and the overflow of
flood water through and over flood protection bunds, the flood flow reached Kotri Barrage with the
quantity and timing shown in Figure 21A-9.
The extreme peak flood flows shown in Figure 21A-9 represent discharge flowing below each
barrage, even after considering that large quantities of flood discharge were diverted before the
barrage by breaching or by overtopping of flood protection bunds. In reality, the flood flows would
have been much higher if flood water was fully allowed to reach and flow past the barrages. But due
to concerns over the safety of the barrages, large quantities of floodwater were diverted upstream of
the barrage so that barrages was not placed at risk of failure or excessive damage from large volumes
of discharge over the Barrage.
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Figure 21A-9: Flood peak flows on Indus Main at Rim Stations and Barrages
during Year 2010Super-flood
Physical damage to or failure and loss of a barrage through flood damage would have been an un-
equalled economic catastrophe far outweighing the already high flood damage to agriculture caused
by the super-flood. Included in this assessment is the cost of replacing the barrage and the cost of loss
of opportunity due to loss of cropping because of the inability to divert water to the canal system from
the damaged barrage.
An important point to note is that nothing can be grown without irrigation in Sindh. Agricultural
experts claim that agriculture can be achieved with drought tolerant crops, but these crops do not work
economically because farmers are not interested to grow anything other than food and fibre crops.
Even claims that saline water agriculture can replace traditional food and fibre crops are not true.
Therefore, until flood flow discharge can be controlled or until there exists a system of flood
retardation basins with man-made wetlands within the Indus River Flood Plain, nothing can be done
except breaching the bunds to save barrages from damage or from failure.
Flood Discharge and Frequency Analysis of the Super-flood

As discussed and illustrated above, the first high flood peak at Tarbela was 700,000 cubic feet per
second (ft3s-1) (19822 cubic meter per second; m3s-1) on 30 July. This peak increased to 975,000 ft3s-1
(27,609 m3s-1) at Chashma on 2 August due to the inflows from the Kabul River.
At the Taunsa barrage, the flood peak was observed as 780,000 ft 3s-1 (22087 m3s-1). This peak moved
downstream to the Guddu and Sukkur barrages on 9 and 10 August and increased to around 1,175,000
ft3s-1 (33,275 m3s-1) as the western hill torrents poured more water into the Indus River. The highest
peak at Kotri – the most downstream barrage on the Indus River, was 964,000 ft 3s-1 (27298 m3s-1).
The two highest flood peaks reached the Taunsa barrage from Tarbela in 12 days time and remained
high for 3-4 days for each flood peak. The flood peaks at Guddu and Sukkur Barrages remained high
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for more than 10 days. High flood peaks, multiple flood peaks and long peak values over time
combined together cause repeated and high damage to the irrigation and drainage infrastructure of
Sindh.
Most of the barrages in Sindh experienced their near highest or highest historic flood levels; which in
many cases was above their design discharge values. These high flood values were in spite of large
scale upstream flooding due to breaching of bunds (dikes) in the upper reaches of the Lower Indus
Basin in Sindh. Without this breaching of the bunds, the flood levels at the barrages in Sindh would
have been even higher and would have certainly severely damaged the already flood impacted
barrages.
Flood frequency analysis showed that Tarbela Dam inflows were of very high frequency (3,461 year
return period) followed by Chashma (216 year return period), Taunsa (146 year return period) and
Kotri (102 year return period) (ADB-WB, 2010). The Tarbela flood peak (835,000 cusecs) was the
highest value in its history (682,159 cusecs), but lower than its design flood (1,500,000 cusecs). The
flood peak at Chashma (1,036,673 cusecs) was also the highest on record (1,028,723 cusecs) and
higher than the design capacity of the barrage (950,000 cusecs; 9% higher).
The flood peak at Kotri was also very high (964,897 cusecs) and higher than its design capacity
(875,000 cusecs); but the year 2010 flood peat was lower than the historical flood peak (981,000
cusecs; 10% higher). The yrar 2010flood peaks at Kalabagh, Guddu and Sukkur were lower than their
historical peaks, as well as lower than their design capacity (Table 21A-7).
Table 21A-7: Historical and 2010 Flood Peaks and Return Period for Barrages on Indus
Locations Design 100 -yr 2010 Flood Historic Peak

Discharge Flood
Peak Return
(cusecs) (cusecs)
Period
Cusecs Years Year Cusecs
Tarbela 1,500,000 653,000 835,000 3,461 1929 682,159
Inflows
Kalabagh 950,000 1,091,000 937,453 42 1929 1,200,000
Chashma 950,000 934,000 1,036,673 216 1929 1,028,723
Taunsa 1,100,000 911,000 959,999 146 1929 999,920
Guddu 1,200,000 1,332,000 1,148,738 34 1976 1,176,150
Sukkur (1.5 million 1,290,000 1,130,995 39 1976 1,161,472
as
originally
designed;
reduced to
900000
Kotri 875,000 962,000 964,897 102 1956 981,000
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider a dam safety based study of the operation and performance
of the barrages under its management based on the hydrology, hydraulics and flood flows of the year
2010 super-flood as a component of the new Master Plan
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PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider a study of how natural flood retardation basins can be used
instead of breaching of bunds to protect barrages from damage or failure from extreme values of flood
water flows. The experience of other countries that use flood retardation basins for flood management
(China and Vietnam) should be studied as part of this component of the new Master Plan.
It is considered by many knowledgeable flood management experts that it is politically and socially
impossible to intentionally breach bunds during the height of a flood if a preparedness plan based on
community consultations has not been prepared before the flood event. Also as a minimum, the
breaching plan must break bunds on both sides of the river to show the local population that the
breaching is not done to favour any one landowner or community
Morphology of the Lower Indus River in Sindh

As a consequence of the super-flood, the Indus main channel changed its course due to the breach
before the Sukkur Barrage, where it flows towards the right bank of the river and then joins the Indus
Main branch before the Kotri Barrage (Figure 21A-10).
This change in river course was due to the breaching or overtopping of the flood protection bunds.
This is not considered to have changed the fundamental morphology or hydraulics of the river; it
happened due to the management of the flood to save the Barrage. With the receding of flood water
and the restoration of the damaged flood control bunds, the situation is expected to normalize and it is
expected that river will start to follow its original main channel. However, as the gradient is very low
in the path of the new river channel, it is expected that it will take a long time for flood water to fully
recede from the flood plain of the river along the new channel (PARC, 2010).
Figure 21A-10: Extent and Spatial Spread of Floodwater and Change of River Course
along the Indus Main Channel in Sindh
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Flow of Flood Water to the Arabian Sea below Kotri Barrage

The total quantity of flow of floodwater to the Arabian Sea was estimated using the flow of water
below the Kotri Barrage when from 9 July to 30 September the discharge was in the range of 1,000 to
105,000 cusecs. The equivalent volume of water flowing below Kotri varied from 0.002 to 0.208
million acre feet (MAF) per day; with the maximum amount of water passing below the Kotri Barrage
being 1.862 MAF per day. High floodwater flows of over 1.0 MAF per day were observed during the
period 20 August to 10 September - a 22 day period. Thus the calculated quantity of floodwater flow
to the Arabian Sea below Kotri Barrage during the period 9 August to 30 September equalled 50.5
MAF, which is equivalent to five-times the capacity of the entire Tarbela reservoir.
The flow to the Arabian Sea on 30 September was still 105,000 cusecs, which means that around
0.208 MAF were still flowing below Kotri every day (Figure 21A-11). This quantity of discharge
continued for the month of October with a gradual reduction in flow quantity.
In addition to the flow below Kotri, around 26.5 MAF of floodwater discharged through breached
bunds (Figure 21A-12) between Sukkur and Kotri Barrages contributed to the flood damage in Sindh
(Figure 21A-13). Thus, upstream from Sukkur Barrage, 77 MAF was diverted and did not contribute
to flood damages or to flows below Kotri. If the floodwater which escaped before the Guddu Barrage
or between the Guddu and Sukkur Barrages is added to the quantity of flood water flow, the amount
of water discharged to the Arabian Sea during the active flooding period would increase further.
PROJECT IDEA: A study of the quantity of flood water flow generated by the year 2010 super-
flood flow should be a part of the new Master Plan. It is considered important to assess new values of
flood water that must be handled by the irrigation and drainage system in the Lower Indus River
Basin – Including the required super-flood discharge requirements of the LBOD and Tidal Link.
Figure 21A-11: Flow of Floodwater below the Kotri Barrage to the Arabian Sea in Million Acre
Feet (MAF) between 9 July and 30 September 2010
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Figure 21A-12: Photograph of the Breached Bund between Sukkur and Kotri Barrages in Sindh
Figure 21A-13: Floodwater Volumes that Contributed to Flood Damage between Sukkur and
Kotri Barrages in Million Acre Feet (MAF) from 9 July to 22 August 2010
River Bund Breaches in Sindh

Three major breaches of the Indus River flood protection bunds (embankments) occurred in Sindh as
shown on Figure 21A-14 (Reference). The first breach occurred in the Tori Bund in the Guddu-
Sukkur reach on the right bank of the Indus River shown as breach No. 1 in the Figure. The resulting
flood water overtopped the Begari feeder canal and inundated its corresponding irrigation systems
under 3 to 4 m deep water on the Indus Right Bank in downstream areas. It further inundated almost
the entire NW canal command area and approximately 50% of the Beghari Feeder command area.
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3
2
Fig 21A-14 Bund Breach Locations in Sindh and Inundated Areas
The flood water made its way downstream affecting towns and major infrastructure. The flood water
took almost one month to re-join Indus River at a location about 250 km downstream near Sehwan.
The magnitude and direction of the flow of this flood water is shown in Figure 21A-15.
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From breach point back to river > 250 km long and 30

km wide. One month to reach the main river channel
Inundated Water Flow
Figure 21A-15: Remote Sensing Image of Brach No. 1 in Sindh Irrigation System - Inundated
area shown by JAXA ALOS Satellite, 27 August 2010 (Red color shows inundation)
The second breach occurred in the MS Bund along the left bank of the Indus River downstream of
Kotri Barrage shown as No. 2 in Figure 21A-14. This breach damaged the Pinyari canal system and
inundated irrigation and drainage facilities in about a 50 km long area. This breach was 250-300 m
wide and passed a significant volume of flood water as shown in Figure 21A-12. The breach also took
out sections of the loop bund protecting the land-side of the main bund as illustrated in Figure 21A-
18. It will take some time for this flood water to drain through the normal drainage system. Pictures of
the MS bund and the failed section are given in Annex 21A-A.
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Figure 21A-16: Breach Point of Flood Protection MS Bund on Left Bank of Indus
Figure 21A-17: Schematic Diagram of Bund Breach of MS Bund

on Left Bank of the Indus in Sindh
The third breach occurred in the Indus right bank flood protection embankment also downstream of
the Kotri Barrage and inundated areas of Thatta District shown as breach No. 3 in Figure 21A-14.
Assessment of the Cause of Breach of MS Bund

An assessment of the cause of failure of the MS Bund was made based on an inspection field trip to
the site of the failure after the flood waters had receded but before repair of the bund. The breached
and washed-out section of bund is illustrated in Figure 21A-17. Since the failed section of the bund
had washed away and could not be inspected, the assessment of the cause of the failure relied on an
inspection of the remaining sections of bund upstream and downstream of the breach. The assessment
was also made based on observations of the Indus River morphology in the area of the breach.
It was postulated that the following were potential causes of the failure of the bund:
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1. Inadequate design of the bund

2. Improper alignment of the bund
3. Poor construction of the bund
4. Poor maintenance of the bund
5. Unique river morphology at the failed section
6. Poor performance of river training
7. Other factors
An assessment of the potential for each of these postulated failure mechanisms is presented in Table
21A-8.
Table 21A-8: Assessment of Failure Mechanism of the MS Flood Protection Bund in Sindh
Assessed Postulated Observed condition Assessment

contribution bund
to bund failure
failure mechanism
Low Inadequate The section of failed bund It is assumed that the standard
design appeared to have the Sindh bund section has a long
standard section; and the history and has been developed
same as upstream and down over time to be a good compromise
stream sections between safety, construction
economy and O&M realities
Moderate Improper The failed section has a dog- The failed section alignment may
alignment leg alignment; upstream and have contributed to the breaching
downstream sections are
straight
Low Poor The failed section and its The construction soils at the failure
construction upstream section appeared to section (and upstream and
have the same level of downstream) was almost pure silt
average construction; the that is likely to be erosive when
downstream section had new exposed to fast flowing water. The
better bank protection pitching was placed directly against
pitching the bank section without geotextile
separation fabric
Moderate Poor The failed section and its Their appeared to be a general lack
maintenance upstream section did not of maintenance in the bund section
appear to be well maintained inspected
None Performance There is no river training The absence of river training may
of existing works at the failed section; have contributed to the failure
river training or upstream or downstream
of the failed section
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Assessed Postulated Observed condition Assessment

contribution bund
to bund failure
failure mechanism
High River The river channel in front of It is assessed that the river
morphology the failed section was morphology was the main cause of
aligned directly toward the the bund failure. At high flood
failed section. There is a flows the river channel was
sharp river bend away from directed directly at the location of
the bund the failed section. Spurs are a
possible repair requirement.
Low to Other cause None observed No other potential condition
none making the failed bund section
unsafe was noted
Recommended Methodology for Repair of the Failed Bund Section

Based on the assessment in Table 21A-7 the following repair methodology is suggested for the MS
Bund failed section:
1. Consider a re-alignment of the failed section of bund, and neighbouring upstream and
downstream sections, to make the alignment straighter and less prone to attack by high
velocity river flood flows
2. Increase the particle size and thickness of the new pitching on the reconstructed section
3. Use geotextile as a separation layer between the reconstructed embankment section and the
new pitching
4. Perform a morphology study on Indus River in the area of the failed section to assess the need
and design of a field of spurs to train the river away from the bund
5. If confirmed by a study of the river morphology, construct a spur field in front of the
reconstructed bund section.
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider a dam safety methodology based study of the operation and
performance of the bunds under its management based on the hydrology, hydraulics and flood flows
of the year 2010 super-flood as a component of the new Master Plan.
Impact of Super-flood on Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Infrastructure
Impact on Pakistan from Past Flooding

Floods in Pakistan have universally caused heavy damage to the irrigation, drainage and flood
protection sector. Historically, the country has faced severe floods in 1950, 1956, 1957, 1973, 1976,
1978, 1988 and 1992. Overall, Pakistan has suffered a cumulative financial loss of about PKR 765
billion (USD 9 billion), loss of 8,887 lives; damage to more than 110,000 villages and towns, and
erosion of 285,000 ha of land due to floods in five decades since independence but prior to the year
2010 super-flood (Table 21A-9).
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Table 21A-9: Historical Flood Damage in Pakistan Caused by Major Flood Events
Year Direct losses Lost lives Effected villages Flooded area

(USD (No.) (No.) (Sq-km)
million)*
1950 227 2,910 10,000 17,920
1955 176 679 6,945 20480
1956 148 160 11,609 74406
1957 140 83 4,498 16003
1959 109 88 3,902 10424
1973 2,388 474 9,719 41,472
1975 318 126 8,628 34,931
1976 1,621 425 18,390 81,920
1977 157 848 2,185 4,657
1978 1,036 393 9,199 30,597
1981 139 82 2,071 4,191
1983 63 39 643 1,882
1984 35 42 251 1,093
1988 399 508 100 6,144
1992 1,400 1,008 13,208 38,758
1994 392 431 1,622 5,568
1995 175 591 6,852 16,686
2010** NA 1,600 NA NA
Total 8,923 8,887 109,822 407,132
* 1995 Price Levels
** From Government flood website 15 December 2010 www.pakistanflood.pk
Methodology used to Assess Damage to Irrigation, Drainage, and Flood Protection

Infrastructure from Year 2010 Super-flood
A preliminary assessment was made in mid-October 2010 by a team of Experts from the World Bank
and Asian Development Bank of the direct damage losses to the irrigation, drainage and flood
protection sector infrastructure (World Bank, 2010). These losses include physical damage to
barrages, canals, drains and appurtenant structures and flood protection bunds along rivers. Indirect
and intangible losses such as damage to crops and disruption of irrigation supplies, siltation and water
logging of agriculture land were also made, but are not reported in the following assessment.
This damage was divided into two broad categories:

1. Destroyed or fully damaged—needs full reconstruction
2. Partly damaged - requires partial rehabilitation or restoration
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Except for some headworks in the upper catchments of the Indus River Basin which were fully
destroyed, all other structures in Pakistan and in Sindh were reported as partially damaged. The
assessment identified the following main forms of damage:
1. Breaching and washing away of the flood protection bunds in reaches
2. Erosion along flood protection bunds
3. Damage to barrages/dams/headworks
4. Breaching of irrigation and drainage channels
5. Siltation of irrigation and drainage channels
6. Damage to structures on canals and drains
7. Damage to the tube-wells
8. Damage to the assets (Rest houses, office buildings)
The damage assessment was based on both quantitative and qualitative analyses of the key aspects of
damage to the irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector. The direct damage was defined as the
value of completely and partially destroyed assets. The reconstruction costs were defined as the value
of resources required to reconstruct the partially and fully destroyed assets to their original (their
status before the flood) or to an improved condition.
This assessment was based on data compiled by the provincial governments and regional departments
in their respective regions. These government assessments were validated using baseline information,
satellite imageries of flooded areas and cross-comparison of the data from multiple sources. Google
Earth was also used to know the inundated area. Comparisons with data collected from other sources,
meetings with relevant Governments officials, discussions with technical experts, meetings with
farmers, and field verification of some of the accessible sites also verified the damage data.
Engineering judgment and intelligent guess were also used to verify damage at some locations.
Market rate or composite schedules of rates updated to September 2010 levels were used in estimation
of damage or reconstruction costs.
Global Damage to Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Sector in Pakistan and Sindh
Main flood damage to the irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector included breaches of flood
protection bunds, damage to barrages and headworks, inundation of irrigation and drainage channels,
damage to appurtenant structures and tube-wells; and damage to field offices of provincial Irrigation
Departments. The total direct damage to the irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector in
Pakistan was estimated in mid-October 2010 at about PKR 89,764 million (USD 1,056 million).
These include damage of PKR 68,450 ($805 million) in Sindh. As the total impact of the flood
damage is still being understood, the total damage in both Pakistan and Sindh could be higher. Table
21A-10 shows itemized damage/reconstruction costs for the provinces and regions.
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Table 21A-10: Summary of Damage/Reconstruction Cost for Irrigation

and Flood Protection Sector (As of mid-October 2010)
Description of damage / WAPDA Sindh Total

reconstruction needed losses losses* national
(million (million losses
PKR) PKR) (million
PKR)
Barrages, Headworks and river 96 - 2,921
training works
Dams 0 - 223
Canals and distribution network 1,608 46,700 54,898
Drains and appurtenant structures 36 11,250 12,753
Flood protection bunds 490 10,500 18,682
Tube-wells - - 15
Buildings (Rest houses and office - - 129
building)
Others* - - 143
Total (million PKR) 1,789 68,450 89,764
Total (million US$) 21 805 1,056
* Low damage scenario; considered to be appropriate assessment
Detailed Damage to Flood Protection and other Infrastructure of WAPDA

Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) manages Mangla, Tarbala and Warsak dams and
Chashma reservoir. WAPDA is also responsible for inter-provincial canals such as Chashma Right
Bank Canal (CRBC) and the Ghazi Barotha power channel.
The year 2010 super-flood caused the damage to WAPDA facilities at Chashma Barrage, Chashma
Jhelum Link canal (C-J, Link), CRBC and Ghazi Baroth power channel shown in Table 21A-11.
WAPDA suffered a total damage/reconstruction cost of PKR1790 million ($21 million). The highest
damage occurred to the canal system that are PKR1608 million ($19 million). The
damage/reconstruction cost for hydro-power is covered under energy sector.
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Table 21A-11: Estimated Damage/Reconstruction Cost for WAPDA Infrastructure
No Description Year of Dimensions Damaged works Estimated cost

. construction (million)
PKR US$
1 Chashma 1971 Left branch spur 17.5 0.21
Barrage
Solid stone spur 13 0.15
Right spur 2 10.5 0.12
Trash rack for hydro- 55 0.65
power
Subtotal of Barrage 96 1.13
2 C-J Link 1971 103 km/ Breaches at 13 17.23 0.20
Canal 615m3sec-1 locations and damage
to 7 bridges
3 Chashma 272 km/ 138 Breaches at 17 266 3.13
Right Bank m3sec-1 locations
Canal (CRBC)
7 Raini canal Under 110 km/ 146 Breaches at 13 places 405 4.76
construction m3sec-1 and damage to
distribution system
8 Kachhi canal Under 500 km/ 170 Breaches at 6 locations 915.69 10.77
construction m3sec-1
4 Ghazi-Brotha 2003 Repair of three 4.06 0.05
Hydel Power damaged panels of
Project Power channel
Subtotal of canals 1607.98 18.92
6 Right Bank Under RBOD-I/ (i) Cost for 16.31 0.19
Outfall Drain construction 168km/ 99.2 strengthening R1A
(RBOD) m3sec-1 component and MNVD
Right Bank Under RBOD-III/ (ii) Cost for emergency 20 0.24
Outfall Drain construction 145km/ 34 flood protection works,
(RBOD) m3sec-1 breaches along left side
of RBOD Extension
Drain
Subtotal of drains 36.31 0.43
5 Others Damage to 20 gauge 49.2 0.58
sites and telemetry
system at 5 sites
Total 1789.49 21.05
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Detailed Damage to the Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Infrastructure in Sindh
In Sindh, flood inundation and the assessment of the magnitude of flood damage continues to the date
of this report. The Sindh Irrigation and Power Department (SIPD) was until recently actively engaged
in flood fighting to minimize flood damage. It was therefore difficult to assess the total damage to the
irrigation and drainage infrastructure until the flood waters recede. Also, most of the flooded
irrigation and drainage infrastructure was still underwater and damage can not be assessed fairly until
the submerged structures are visible.
However, SIPD has produced low, medium and high damage assessment scenarios. These scenarios
consider visible damage to the irrigation and drainage infrastructure as well as expected damage that
will not be visible until the flood waters recede. The low damage scenario assumes low damage to
barrages and appurtenant structures with no additional breaching and medium damage to irrigation
and drainage structures in inundated areas. The low damage scenario estimated the damage cost at
PKR 68,500 million (USD 805 million). The medium and high damage scenarios were calculated as
1.3 and 1.6 times the low damage scenario. Table 21A-12 shows restoration cost for the low damage
scenario.
Table 21A-12: Flood Damage Assessment for Sindh Irrigation, Drainage

and Flood Protection Sector – Low Damage Scenario
Description of work Length Effected Restoration Restorat Effected

(Km) area cost ion districts
(km2) (PKR cost
billion) (USD
million)
1. Restoration of Canals
and Distribution System
(i) Guddu Barrage: 1,200 3,024 19.0 223.5 Kashmore,
Begari Sindh system Sukkur,
Jakranda
(ii) Sukkur Barrage: NW 480 806 7.0 82.4 Larkana,
canal system Kamber,
Shahdadkot
(iii) Sukkur Barrage: 240 1008 3.0 35.3 Kamber,
Rice canal system Shahdadkot,
Dadu
(iv) Sukkur Barrage: 560 1411 7.0 82.4 Kamber,
Dadu canal system Shahdadkot,
Dadu,
Jamshoro
(v) Kotri Barrage: 1200 2823 10.5 123.5 Thatta
Pinyari canal system
(vi) Kotri Barrage: Kalri 320 0.2 2.4 Thatta
Begar canal system
Subtotal 4000 9073 46.7 549.4
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(km2) (PKR cost
billion) (USD
million)
2. Restoration of
drainage system
(i) Guddu Barrage: 240 1.5 17.6 Sukkur,
Shikarpur drainage Shikarpur
system
(ii) Sukkur Barrage: 400 1.3 14.7 Larkana,
Kamber-Shehdadkot Kamber,
drainage system Shahdadkot
(iii) Sukkur Barrage: 480 1.5 17.6 Kamber,
Dadu-Jamshoro drainage Shehdadkot,
system Dadu,
Jamshoro
(iv) Kotri Barrage: 1,120 7.0 82.4 Thatta
Thatta drainage system
Subtotal 2,240 11.3 132.4
3. Restoration of Flood
Protection Bunds
(i) Guddu Barrage (right 328 1.6 19.1 Kashmore,
bank) Sukkur,
Jacaranda
(ii) Guddu Barrage 288 1.4 16.8 Ghotki
(left bank) Sukkur
(iii) Sukkur Barrage 544 2.7 31.7 Larkana,
(left bank) Kamber-
Shahdadkot
and Dadu
(iv) Sukkur Barrage 432 2.1 25.2 Khairpur,
(right bank) Noshero
Feroz,
Benazirabad,
Matiari,
Hyderabad
(v) FP bund for Kirther 190.4 0.9 11.1 Larkana,
range flood Kamber-
Shahdadkot
and Dadu
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(km2) (PKR cost
billion) (USD
million)
(vi) Kotri Barrage (left 192 1.0 11.2 Hyderabad,
bank) T.M. Khan
and Thatta
(vii) Kotri Barrage (right 144 0.7 8.4 Jamshoro ,
bank) Thatta
Subtotal 2118.4 10.5 123.5
Total 68.5 805.3

This estimate is based on Schedule of rate and rates quoted by contractors recently for similar works
The breaches are yet not closed and flood water continues to inundate many areas in November 2010.
Most of the flooded canals and drains and appurtenants structures wete still under water. As such,
proper and exact estimation of damage was possible at the time of this assessment.
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider using an internationally recognized methodology based
study of the cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction of its irrigation, drainage and flood protection
infrastructure damaged by the year 2010 super-flood as a component of the new Master Plan.
The damage assessment methodology should be adopted for determination of the need and cost of
rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure after future water disaster and flood events.
Sindh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Needs for the Irrigation, and Drainage and Flood
Protection Sector
An assessment of the rehabilitation and construction needs of the irrigation, drainage and flood
protection sector has been made independently by Idris (2010). He was suggested that one cause of
damage to flood protection infrastructure from the super-flood was the lack of flooding for the last 14
years which changed the morphology of the Indus River flood plain in Sindh and did not give flood
management personnel experience in flood fighting.
After 14 years of low water flows in the Lower Indus Basin, a super flood of 11.48 Lac cusecs
magnitude was recorded on Gudu Barrage on 9th August 2010. Prior to this, recorded discharges were
much less as given below:
Year Gudu Barrage

Discharge (Lac cusec)
1996 5.88 Lac cusec
1997 7.88 Lac cusec
1998 6.67 Lac cusec
1999 4.18 Lac cusec
2000 2.08 Lac cusec
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Year Gudu Barrage

Discharge (Lac cusec)
2001 2.63 Lac cusec

2002 2.84 Lac cusec
2003 3.96 Lac cusec
2004 1.46 Lac cusec
2005 6.48 Lac cusec
2006 6.96 Lac cusec
2007 3.47 Lac cusec
2008 2.79 Lac cusec
2009 2.63 Lac cusec
1010 11.48 Lac cusec
As a result of these low values of discharge, the river bed silted-up and water levels standing against
bunds were high. Thus there was water pressure and flood risk to the bunds. Also, during the past 14
years, many experts and competent flood fighting staff retired and new staff has not had any
experience and training in flood fighting. In fact it has been suggested that there was no flood fighting
spirit in the flood management staff and they did not take the flood situation seriously.
As a result of these factors acting together, a breach occurred in the right bank Tori Bund on 7
August. The breach allowed flood water to inundate vast areas in Kashmore, Sukkur, Shikarpur
Jacobabad, Larkana, Kambar- Shandadkot and Dadu Districts where it damaged irrigation, drainage
and flood protection infrastructure.
Subsequently a breach occurred in the left bank M.S. Bund near Kot Aalmoo above Sujawal on 24
and 25 August which inundated areas in Sujawal and Jati Talrckas of Thatta district. Immediately on
the next day a breach occurred on the right bank of the Indus in the Pana- Baghar bund opposite
Thatta town. This breach was poised to inundate old Thatta town as breaches also occurred in the
K.B. Feeder lower canal. But timely and successful efforts were made to plug this breach with big
stones, and the town was saved.
These three breaches in river protection bunds, and the flooding effects on flood protection
infrastructure, caused extensive damage to canal and drainage systems, bunds and barrages in the
inundated areas. The magnitude of much of this damage is still not known; and most of the damage is
still not repaired (as of mid-December 2010).
Assessment of Ability to Perform Rehabilitation & Reconstruction

Three classes of work will be involved in rehabilitation of the damaged irrigation, drainage and flood
protection infrastructure: earthwork for canals, concrete for bridges and machinery for irrigation
regulators. For earthwork to repair canals, machinery is required. If adequate machinery is provided,
this work can be completed in 4 months.
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Repair of bridges will take a longer time as these need redesign. However, supply of water in canals is
possible even if bridges are not repaired. The minimum requirement is clearance of debris from
waterways.
The main problem is repair/ reconstruction of regulators on canals, without which flow diversion to
canals and its control is not possible. However, if good efforts are made; works are under taken on an
emergency basis; and the required funds are made available, these can be repaired/ reconstructed in
six months.
There is no time constraint for repair drainage works. Water supply to lands is possible even if repairs
to drainage works are delayed.
But works for repair of damages to barrages are of utmost priority and must be completed in time for
the Annual Canal Closure which is in December, 2010 for Kotri barrage, January, 2011 for Sukkur
barrage and April, 2011 for Gudu barrage.
It is assessed by some that works required for supplying water to lands for cultivation are possible in
six months time if funds are provided and works are taken on an emergency basis. InshaAllah it will
be possible to supply water to farmers in flood affected areas in next Kharif season.
It is not possible to estimate cost of rehabilitation reconstruction in Sindh accurately. However,

guesstimates of accomplishing this damage can be made. These estimated costs are:
Rehabilitation of Bunds PKR 20 billion

Rehabilitation of Irrigation system PKR 50 billion
Rehabilitation of Drainage system PKR 20 billion
Rehabilitation of Barrages PKR 10 billion
Total PKR 100 Billion
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA and the Master Plan Project should consider hiring a qualified national or
international specialist river morphologist with experience on the Indus River system and the Lower
Indus River Basin. The work of this river morphology specialist is needed 1) to assess in more detail
the impact of low flows in the recent past on future river flooding; 2) to assess in detail the expected
change in River morphology as a result of climate change; and 3) to assess the impact of sea level
raise on the ability of the current irrigation drainage system to continue to discharge effluent from the
Sindh drainage system into the sea under gravity conditions
Services and Productivity Losses in Pakistan and Sindh

The main effected services in the irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector are disruption of
irrigation water supplies to areas downstream of canal breaches. Sindh is said to be working on
plugging of breaches and plans to restore all irrigation supplies. These restorations were needed to
enable the winter crop season in November-December 2010. It is anticipated that crop sowing in non-
flooded area may not suffer unduly due to damage to irrigation infrastructure. Nevertheless, ensuring
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design water supply in both flood and non-flood affected areas may be difficult; and there is a
possibility for low crop intensities and yields in coming growing seasons.
Agriculture Sector productivity losses will vary depending on crop type; and the depth and duration of
flood water inundation. The productivity losses in non-flooded areas due to a deficit of irrigation
water supplies may vary from 30-40% in Sindh. The productivity loss in areas that are still submerged
from flooding will of course be 100%. The intermediate range of losses in partially flooded areas will
therefore be somewhere between 40-100%. It is worth noting that the total or partial loss of crops and
low productivity will be an indirect loss to the irrigation sector and will be discussed in more detail in
subsequent sections of this Appendix.
Impact of Super-flood on Land and Land Use in Pakistan and Sindh
Assessment of Flood Affected Areas of Pakistan and Sindh

PARC (2010) reported on the results of a comprehensive assessment of the super-flood affected areas
of Pakistan and Sindh. The assessment was performed using remote sensing (RS) data obtained and
analyzed by the UN office of Satellite Technology (UNOSAT) and other agencies. The NRD Flood
Damage Assessment Cell was able to develop active collaboration with UNOSAT and GIS files were
provided to the Cell for analysis at the NRD. A sample of the flood mapping performed by UNOSAT
during the active stages of the super-flood is shown in Figure 21A-18.
Figure 21A-18: Example of Remote Sensing based Flood Mapping Prepared by UNOSAT and
Other International Agencies during the Progress of the Year 2010 Super-flood
Initially at the beginning of the flood disaster, the NRD Flood Damage Assessment Cell downloaded
the completed maps in PDF format developed by UNOSAT and other agencies. Later as the flood
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disaster developed, collaboration was achieved to give access to the base data and work files (shape
files) so that analysis of flood damage could be made within the country. The work done by the NRD
Flood Assessment Cell was also provided back to UNOSAT so that it was available to other users
worldwide.
PROJECT IDEA: The SIDA GIS and Remote Sensing Cell should develop coordination and
cooperation with the NRD Flood Damage Assessment Cell in Pakistan, and with disaster management
mapping agencies outside Pakistan. This should be part of an enhanced Disaster Risk Management
Programme for SIDA. Development of this new coordination and cooperation programme could be a
component of the new Master Plan.
Province-based Assessment of Flood Affected Areas in Pakistan

A province-based flood-affected area study was performed by NRD and PARC using shape files of
the flood affected areas based on the remote sensing data provided by UNOSAT. The total area in
Pakistan affected by the year 2010 super-flood of 10.5 million acres based on satellite images taken
on 16 September 2010 is summarized in Table 21A-13.
Table 21A-13: Province-based Assessment of the 2010 Flood-affected Areas in Pakistan
Flood Affected Area

Province
(km2) (Acres)
Punjab 15,111 3,733,947
Sindh 17,551 4,336,863
KPK 4,996 1,234,518
Balochistan 4,871 1,203,769
Azad Jammu 35 8,697
and Kashmir
Pakistan 42,564 10,517,794
Source: PARC, 2010
Out of total super-flood affected area of 10.5 million acres in all of Pakistan, Sindh had the most
affected province area (41% of total area); followed by Punjab (36%), KPK (12%), Balochistan (11%)
and Kashmir (negligible).
The year 2010 super-flood affected areas in Sindh were extensive. Figure 21A-19 illustrates that at the
maximum flood level, the areas affected by floods in Sindh were largely on the right bank of the Indus
River in the upper part of the Lower Indus River Basin; and on the left bank of the Indus in the lower
part of the Basin.
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Figure 21A-19: Spatial Distribution of Flood Affected Areas in Sindh on 16

September 2010 based on Remote Sensing Satellite Images (From PARK, 2010)
The Figure shows, as discussed above, how the Indus River changed its course in north Sindh below
the Guddu Barrage due to breaches of the bund on the right bank of the River. Also as discussed
above, the river changed its course in central Sindh below the Sukkur Barrage where the flows of the
Indus River diverted from the right bank again before rejoining the Indus main channel.
Some experts have stated that this change in the location of the Indus River main channel may not be
permanent and that the river must be trained to follow its original channel. However it is considered
more likely that the water level and flow quantity of the Indus will reduce drastically during the
winter which will be enough to train the river back to its original morphologic regime. This positive
outcome will of course also depend on the successful repair of the bunds that caused the flood flows
initially and the draining of the flooded areas in the Indus River plain.
Flood Affected Areas based on Land Use for Pakistan

As presented above, the assessment made by the NRD Flood Damage Assessment Cell stated that
approximately 10,518 million acres in all of Pakistan were affected by the super-flooding. This total
national flood-affected area was then characterized based on land use. The largest land use category is
irrigated agriculture covering 6.24 million acres representing 59.3% of the total flood-affected area;
this is followed by bare soil (12.6%), rangelands (8.6%), water bodies (6.4%), forests (4.9%), rain fed
and rod-kohi1 (Gandapur, 2008) farming (4.2%), un-cultivated land (2.9%), and settlements (1.1%).
The details of this assessment are given in Table 21A-14 and shown in Figure 21A-20.
1
Rod-kohi is hill torrent agriculture mostly practiced in Balochistan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rod_Koh
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Table 21A-14: Total Flood Affected Area of Pakistan Based on Land Use
Area Area
Land use
(Km ) 2
(Acres) %
Irrigated agriculture 25,238 6,236,393 59

Bare soil 5,356 1,323,646 13
Rangeland 3,648 901,529 9
Forest 2,078 513,560 5
Rainfed/Rod-kohi
1,803 445,701 4
agriculture
Non-water bodies
1,228 303,502 3
cultivated land
Settlements 484 119,697 1
Total 2,726 673,765 6
Source: PARC, 2010
Irrigated, rain fed and rod-kohi farming systems cover 6.69 million acres equalling 63.5% of the total
super-flood affected area of Pakistan. If rangelands, forests and uncultivated areas are added it comes
to 8.4 million acres representing 79.4% of the total super-flood affected area. Therefore, in spatial
coverage the largest land use is agriculture, rangelands and forestry. This spatial distribution of flood-
affected areas classified based on land use is presented in Figure 21A-21.
Figure 21A-20: Percentage Area of Flood Affected Land Use in Pakistan

(From PARK, 2010)
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Figure 21A-21: Land Use Map of Super-flood Affected Areas of Pakistan

(From PARK, 2010)
Flood Affected Areas based on Land Use for Sindh

The different land uses affected by the floods in Sindh are presented in Table 21A-15 and shown in
Figure 21A-22. The spatial distribution of the different land use systems affected by the super-flood in
Sindh is presented in Figure 21A-23. In Sindh 2.90 million acres of agricultural lands were affected
by floods as presented in Table 21A-15).
Table 21A-15: Super-flood Affected Areas of Sindh Province based on Land Use
Area
Land use Area %
(Sq km) (Acres)
Forest 1,014 250,580 5.8
Irrigated agriculture 11,714 2,894,723 66.7
Rainfed/Rod-kohi
agriculture 21 5,220 0.1
Rangeland 1,653 408,498 9.4
dBare soil 776 191,850 4.4
Settlements 211 52,204 1.2
Un-cultivated land 1,146 283,208 6.5
Water bodies 1,014 250,580 5.8
Total 17,551 4,336,863 100.0
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Figure 21A-22: Percentage Area of Flood Affected Land Use in Sindh

(From PARK, 2010)
Figure 21A-23: Land Use Map of Super-flood Affected Areas of Sindh

(From PARK, 2010)
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider a study of how the land use patterns in Sindh influenced the
magnitude of damage caused by the year 2010 super-flood, as part of a water disaster and flood risk
management component of the new Master Plan.
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Impact of Super-flood on Agriculture in Pakistan and Sindh
Historical Impact of Flooding in Pakistan

During the last sixty years Pakistan has suffered a cumulative financial loss of more then PKR 1,128
billion (US $ 13 billion) as a result of 16 major flood events. More than 9,388 lives have been lost and
millions of people have been dislocated. A summary of flooding in Pakistan from the time of
independence is shown in Table 21A-16 (Marri, 2010).
Table 21A-16: Summary of Flood Events in Pakistan from the Time of

Independence to the Super-flood in Year 2010
Year Value of Property Human Villages
Lives affected
Damaged Lost
(PKR in millions)
1950 11,282 2,190 10,000
1956 7,356 160 11,609
1957 6,958 83 4,498
1973 118,684 474 9,719
1976 80,504 425 18,390
1978 51,489 393 9,199
1988 25,630 508 1,000
1992 69,580 1,008 13,208
1995 8,698 591 6,852
2001 450 219 50
2003 5,175 484 4,376
2004 15 85 47
2005 Not reported 59 1,931
2006 Not reported 523 2,477
2007 Not reported 586 6498
2010 743, 000 1600 20,000
Total 1,128,821 9,388 119,854
Source: DRIP, Tando Jam
Future Trend of Flood Threats in Pakistan

Recent trends in climate change for Pakistan, based on last 70 years of data, shows the following
fundamental changes in the county’s climate:
 A rise in mean daily temperature of 0.6 to 1.0 degree centigrade in arid coastal areas and in
arid western/north-western mountains
 A 10-15% decrease in both winter & summer rainfall in the coastal belt
 A 18-32% increase in rainfall in the monsoon zone (sub-humid and humid areas)
 A further decrease of 5% in relative humidity over the arid plains of Balochistan
 A 3-5% decrease in cloud cover over central and southern Pakistan resulting an increase in
sunshine
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This change in climatic conditions over Pakistan is considered to have given rise to an increase in the
frequency of extreme events such as heavy rains, flash floods, dust/thunderstorms, hailstorms, heat
waves, density and persistence of fog.
The current super-flooding in Pakistan is considered to be mainly due to climate change. An unusual
climate-change-led seasonal cycle of land temperature in Pakistan has aggravated the monsoon
rainfall and produced the largest volume of water run-off in the northern mountainous region of the
country ever recorded in history, causing massive floods in the Indus River Basin (Marri, 2010)
Scale of the Year 2010 Super-flood

The United Nations has rated the current flood in Pakistan as the greatest humanitarian crisis in recent
history with more people affected than the South-East Asian Tsunami and the recent earthquakes in
Kashmir and Haiti combined. This unprecedented flood has affected the entire country of Pakistan
with maximum damage in the provinces of KPK, Punjab and Sindh. The disaster is much bigger and
more complex in scope than the earthquake of 2005 in area, population, duration and damage impacts
(Table 21A-17 and Figure 21A-24).
Table 21A-17: Summary of Year 2010 Super-flood Damage in Pakistan

Districts affected Total 79 Districts (24 KPK, 12 Punjab, 19
Sindh, 10 Balochistan, 7 AJK, 7 GB)
Population affected 20 million out of 168 million
Total Area affected 160,000 square kilometre
Deaths 1600
Injured 2024
Houses damaged 895,596
Infrastructural damage PKR 743 billion
Livestock loss Over 200,000
Agricultural loss PKR 249 billion
Impact of Flooding on Pakistan Agriculture

Agriculture is the primary or sole means to meet household food requirements and secure income in
Pakistan. At least 80% of the population is dependent on agriculture for their livelihood and survival.
Over 3.2 million hectares of standing crops, representing 16% of the cultivatable area of the country,
has been damaged or lost because of the super-flooding across Baluchistan, KPK, Punjab & Sindh:
consisting of maize, cotton, rice, sugar cane, fruit orchards and vegetables.
There is also extensive damage to the agriculture infrastructure especially in irrigation. There is heavy
loss of agricultural tools & machinery. Also, there is a huge loss (500,000 - 600,000 tons) of home
stored seeds of different crops. Over 200,000 livestock have been lost. In addition, there are 100%
poultry losses in some districts and thousands of poultry farms destroyed in whole of the flooded area
of the country.
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Figure 21A-24: Flood Impacted Areas of Pakistan in Mid-August 2010
The agriculture sector of the country has suffered a loss of more than 249 billion PKR which is
equivalent to 20% of GDP. Over 17 million acres (30% of total of farm land) is submerged with 20
million people (13% of the population) displaced. Total crop loss in Pakistan from the flood has been
estimated at PKR 245 billion (Table 21A-18).
Table 21A-18: Estimated Crop Losses from the Year 2010 Super-flood in Pakistan
Crop Loss National Quantity Sindh Quantity
Cotton crops 700,000 acres
Rice crops 200,000 acres
Sugar cane 200,000 Acres
Stocked wheat 500,000 tonnes
Animal fodder & stored 300,000 acres
grain
Total value of crop loss Rs 244 billion
Impact of Flooding On Sindh Agriculture

As stated above, Sindh is one of the hardest hit Provinces in Pakistan from the year 2010 Super-flood.
A summary of the flood induced damage in Sindh is given in Table 21A-19 and the flood impacted
area in Sindh is shown in Figure 21A-25.
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Table 21A-19: Summary of Year 2010 Super-flood Damage in Sindh

Districts affected Total 19 districts
Population affected Over 7 million
Total area affected 2.9 million acres
Villages affected 7,500
Towns affected Over 40
Deaths 179
Injured 700
Houses damaged 402,350
Infrastructural damage PKR 447 billion
Cropland loss 1.7 million acres
Agricultural loss PKR 122 billion
Figure 21A-25: Flood Impacted Areas of Sindh in September 2010
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Negative Impacts of Year 2010 Super-flood on Sindh Agriculture

The negative impacts of the super-flooding on Sindh are almost too great to comprehend:
 Over 540,000 tonnes of stored wheat are estimated to have been destroyed
 Water logging and salinity, which had already been affecting the rice crop yields in right bank
of river Indus in Sindh, will only get worse with the current floods
 Water logged farmlands will be difficult to drain and will be less productive for years
Also, at the end of November 2010, water had not yet receded from flood affected districts and 40%
of Sindh was still submerged, The districts of Kashmore Kandhkot Shikarpur, Jacobabad, Larkana,
Kamber Shahdadkot, Dadu, Jamshoro and Thatta have been badly affected and chances are that the
Rabi crops will not be cultivated this year in these districts (Marri, 2010)
Nearly 2.8 million hectares, or 11% of Pakistan’s total agricultural area, is cultivated with rice. In
Sindh, rice is grown on 0.75 million hectares with an average yield of 2 tons/ha. When the floods
started, the process of transplanting rice was almost complete in Sindh. However the rice growing
districts of Sindh - Sukkur, Shikarpur, Larkana, Badin, and Thatta - have borne the full force of the
floods. For this reason, the rice crop in 2010-2011 is expected to be imperilled.
Also, there are 800 rice mills in Sindh: 200 in Thatta and Badin districts in lower Sindh and 600 in the
districts of Larkana, Dadu, Kambar-Shahdadkot, Shikarpur, Kashmore-Kandhkot, and Jacobabad in
upper Sindh. Out of this total of 800 rice mills, around 315 rice mills have been damaged; some
completely.
Positive Impacts of Year 2010 Super-flood on Sindh

Not all the impacts of the year 2010 super-flood are negative. The following positive impacts can be
expected now and over time:
 Surface salts from saline agricultural lands will be washed away
 Silt deposition in agrarian area will benefit future cropping
 Fresh groundwater zones have been recharged and water quality improved
 100% of riverine area can be brought under cultivation (0.855 Million hectares/ 2.11 Million
Acres)
 Reduction in groundwater pollution (nitrate, fluoride, arsenic)
 Sea water intrusion reduced in Coastal Zone (0.6 million hectares)
 Mangrove forest enhanced (0.129 Million hectares) and shrimp production increased
 Water quality of lakes improved (Hamal and Manchhar)
The Way Forward for Agriculture from the Super-flood in Sindh

There are a number of strategies proposed by DRIP as a way forward for Sind agriculture to overcome
the negative impacts of the super-flood as summarized in Table 21A-20 (Marri, 2010):
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Table 21A-20: The Way Forward for Agriculture to Overcome

Year 2010 Super-flooding in Sindh
Sector Recommended Remediation
Next agricultural Enable farmers to cultivate in time for September/October wheat
season sowing season (Rabi season).
If missed, the impact will be catastrophic on food security and
agricultural livelihoods and may last up to two years.
Seed & fertilizer Provide quality wheat, fodder and vegetable seeds and fertilizer
(where appropriate) for free or at subsidized rates
Clear flood debris in preparation for planting
Provide farm implements
Livestock Distribute emergency feed, vaccination and essential veterinary
supplies
Provide emergency animal shelter construction materials
Farmer livelihood Provide to flood affected people basic necessities: shelter, food,
clean drinking water and health facilities
Provide Agri-packages including pesticides, small tools and
instruments
Provide Agri-credit for rehabilitation of farm facilities like water
course improvement, land levelling for the flood-hit farmers
Sensitize the national/international community for additional
assistance in the fields of agriculture, education and health
Structural flood Improve river bunds and bunds
mitigation Provide alternate means for channelizing flood water
Construct flood diversion structures
Construct flood retardation dams and basins in river catchments
Non-structural Improve flood forecasting and warning systems
flood mitigation
Humanitarian Response to the Super-flood
Roles and Responsibilities

The Government of Pakistan is leading the response to the floods, with the National Disaster
Management Authority (NDMA) assuming responsibility for all coordination at the federal level. At
the provincial level, Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) coordinate the disaster
response.
The Government, through NDMA and deploying the Armed Forces’ logistical capacity, has taken the
lead in responding to the disaster with the deployment of rescue and relief operations. More than
30,000 people have been rescued, while hundreds of thousands were preventively evacuated from
riverine areas. A team of international assessment experts was deployed to flood affected areas and
have coordinated with other humanitarian partners to prepare floods emergency response plans.
UN agencies, international multi-lateral lending agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs are working to
give flood relief assistance and to provide emergency rehabilitation and construction to assist
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vulnerable flood-affected people in seven different geographical areas (Baluchistan, Punjab, Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, Gilgit Baltistan, KPK, Pakistan-Administered Kashmir, Sindh).
An Emergency Response Plan has been developed to enable international partners (UN organizations
and non-governmental organizations) to support the Government of Pakistan in addressing the needs
of flood-affected families for the duration of the immediate relief period (OCHA, 2010). The plan is
constantly being revised to reflect assessed needs as the situation evolves and to provide better
strategies for assisting people with early recovery from the floods.
Cluster Response to the Disaster

To coordinate the contribution of the humanitarian community, the cluster approach shown in Table
21A-21 is operational in Pakistan. Relevant line ministries co-chair the clusters, which operate under
the overall leadership of a Humanitarian Coordinator and the UN Humanitarian Country Team made
up of all UN Agencies working in Pakistan.
Table 21A-21: Cluster Plan for Flood Disaster Relief Established in Pakistan
for the Year 2010 Super-flood
Cluster Governmental Institutions UN Lead

Agency
Food Security National Disaster Management Authority and WFP
Provincial Disaster Management Authorities
Health Ministry of Health WHO
Shelter & NFIs National Disaster Management Authority and IOM
Provincial Disaster Management Authorities
WASH Ministry of Environment, Provincial Public UNICEF
Health Engineering Departments
Logistics, Emergency National Disaster Management Authority and WFP/OCHA
Telecommunications, Provincial Disaster Management Authorities
and Coordination
Nutrition Ministry of Health UNICEF
Protection Ministry of Social Welfare UNHCR
Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Response

Priority needs and sectors were identified through a review of available assessment data and response
capacities and by consultations within the humanitarian community. Each cluster’s response strategy
was developed to recognize that the Government of Pakistan (through its National Disaster
Management Authority) will lead the relief and recovery activities in flood-affected areas, and that the
humanitarian community will focus on covering gaps where the needs exceed the government’s
response capacity.
The actions with in the framework of the disaster response plan to support the government’s response
in the provinces include:
1. Directly preserving life, health or safety
2. Directly protecting livelihoods and dignity
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3. Providing time-critical community services that reduce aid dependence

4. Providing essential common humanitarian services required for an effective emergency
response
Across all clusters, efforts are being made to identify the most vulnerable groups and individuals in
need of protection and assistance. In order to understand who is accessing humanitarian support, all
participating clusters are submitting progress reports disaggregated by sex, age and location.
It is recognized that the severe damage to infrastructure and communications networks will continue
to hamper the delivery of assistance at least in the short term. In addition, the security situation in
some of the affected areas – especially parts of KPK – remains unpredictable.
Considering the size of the area hit by the floods, the number of people who will be found to need
assistance is expected to rise as assessments continue and access improves. The combined population
of the affected districts is around 43 million (out of a total estimated Pakistan population of 168
million) or one-fourth the total population of the country.
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider using Information Communication Technologies (ICT) to
monitor relief needs and response as part of the development of a Water Disaster and Flood Risk
Management component of the new Master Plan.
SIDA Response to the Super Flood

The Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA) recognized early that the year 2010 super-flood
would causeSindh to face history's biggest flood, and that the flood would severely affect villages,
cities and entire life of the people of Sindh.
Flood Disaster Management Plan

SIDA has prepared a flood management plan for protection of the bunds managed by the Badin Left
Bank Canal Area Water Board (SIDA, 2010). This plan describes the characteristics of the bunds
(flood dikes) being protected, emergency communications to be established, the role of the concerned
agencies for assistance in protecting the bunds against catastrophic flooding, and emergency contact
information. This flood plan is published in the SIDA website. No other flood management plans are
available on-line for SIDA.
Flood Emergency Cell

SIDA established a Flood Information Cell (FIC) in the SIDA Secretariat in Hyderabad to monitor
day to day flow and disposition of flood waters. The information cell was fully functional and was
managed under the Coordinator, FIC. The cell is equipped with toll free and land line emergency
telephone numbers through which day to day information was disseminated to local communities who
made enquires concerning the flood position.
During the height of the flood, The Flood Information Cell started its work from morning to midnight;
and was eventually activated for work round-the-clock. Due to the emergency situation, SIDA and
Area Water Board (AWB) staff were available in their offices during Government Holidays. At the
height of the flood, all SIDA officials were deputed in offices to perform flood management duties on
a day-night shift basis.
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Through continuous coordination with the media and through press briefings, flood related statements
were issued by the SIDA Media and Communication Cell on a daily basis. This communication
channel with the media was also used to correct published information, followed by rebuttal, if
incorrect information appeared in the media.
Since the year 2010 super-flood situation was so monumental, SIDA management is accurately
documenting the entire flood scenario for the future record and as a basis of lessons learned to be able
to better respond to and to fight future super-flooding. This documentation is being coordinated by
both the Technical Staff and by the SIDA Media and Communications Cell.
Emergency communications established during the flood were:

 Emergency Kotri Barrage Circle Bunds Control Room telephone Nos.:
 Giddumal Point 022-2938567-2925209
 Detha Landhi Point 022-2938568
 Ghilyan Bund 7th Mile 022-2938570
 Ghilyan Bund 9th Mile 022-2938569
 Flood Information Cell – SIDA telephone Nos.:
 Toll Free Number: 0800-12301
 Land Line Number: 022-9210062
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider using the WSIP-I project to prepare lessons learned from
its flood fighting in the year 2010 super-flood as part of the development of a Water Disaster and
Flood Risk Management component of the new Master Plan.
Recommended Recovery Strategy for the Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Sector
Reconstruction Strategy - For the protected Lower Indus plains

A system of bunds (embankments) protects the infrastructure located in the Lower Indus plain area
against floods. With the provision that the river bunds are structurally well-designed, well-built and
adequately maintained, there is no ground for adopting a "building-back-better" reconstruction
strategy for the infrastructure damaged as a result of the 2010 floods. However, as part of the
proposed review of the country's flood management strategy, strengthening of bunds for certain river
reaches and second-line flood protection bunds in Sindh may need to be considered.
Within the flood plains (kacha areas) permanent public sector infrastructure development is to be
discouraged in view of the inherent high flood risk. Settlements in the flood plains are equally at risk
but their inhabitants have time to prepare for evacuation and temporary relocation because of the
travel time of the Indus floods. While building permanent settlements in the flood plains should be
discouraged, forced relocation is not appropriate as the mostly poor inhabitants depend on livelihood
activities derived from the river and the fertile kacha lands.
Certain flood proofing measures could be considered for the settlements, especially for those far away
from the bunds. These could include, among others, establishing earth mounds or elevated platforms
to be used as refuge areas during floods; essential community and public facilities could be built on
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top of these structures. The system of providing early flood warnings and flood preparedness at
community level to the communities at risk may need to be improved. The Government needs to
clarify its policy towards compensation in case of a flood event for those who opt to use the flood
plains for settlement and productive use despite the inherent risks. The insurance industry should also
consider the flood risk associated with assets located within the flood plains.
Key Challenges to Recovery after the Year 2010 Super-flood

The irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector in Pakistan and Sindh is assessed as having two
main challenges in order to recover following the year 2010 super-flood:
 Rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure
 Preventing/mitigating the scale and scope of flood damage in the future
The irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector can broadly be divided into three main
classifications of rehabilitation and reconstruction works. The first works include the irrigation and
drainage network that supplies water and drains surplus flows in support of agricultural economy and
rural livelihood. Under this category, major changes in design of the irrigation and drainage structures
are not expected. Therefore, most of these structures will either be restored to the original design level
or rehabilitated with minimum improvements. Mainly canals, drains and appurtenant structures fall
under this category.
The second category of rehabilitation and reconstruction works involves structures related to safe
flood water disposal and flood protection. These are mainly flood protection bunds and river training
structures such as spurs.
The third category of works is related to water disaster and flood risk management – The Government
of Pakistan must consider how to develop and implement a comprehensive water disaster and flood
risk management strategy rather than piecemeal flood protection plans.
Barrages are cross-cutting structures contained in all all three categories repair and rehabilitation as
they divert irrigation water, regulate flows and ensure safe disposal of floods.
Recovery Needs in Immediate, Short, Medium and Long Terms
Immediate Recovery Needs (To the end of year 2010)

The needs for immediate recovery of the irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector to be
completed now are:
 Completion of the flood fighting works that were started during the height of the flood; this
includes more accurate assessments of the damage repair needs and costs
 Restoration of irrigation supplies by construction of new temporary irrigation and drainage
facilities where existing infrastructure has been significantly damaged
 Restoration of irrigation supplies by rehabilitation or reconstruction of irrigation and drainage
facilities where existing infrastructure has been partly damaged
 De-silting of canals and drains, and repair of appurtenant structures
Immediate recovery is based on the need for putting the irrigation and drainage system into operation
so that the irrigation conveyance system supplies water for agriculture without delays. Immediate
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recovery may involve the construction of new temporary works for diversion and conveyance of
irrigation water at locations of significant damage; and restoration of existing structures where minor
flood damage has occurred. These works should be completed as soon as possible to ensure irrigation
supplies for the next crop season. Restoration of on-farm water courses, drainage channels, storage
tanks and tube-wells is also immediately needed.
Short-term Recovery Needs (to March 2011)

The needs for short term recovery of the irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector to be
completed in the next six months include:
 Filling of river bund (embankment) breaches
 Restoration of damaged flood dikes, spurs, guide bunds and barrage works
 Strengthening of weak canal/drain sections and repair of damaged appurtenant structures
The damage to bunds and spurs can be identified during low flows in November and December 2010.
Restoration of these damaged is critical to maintaining continuity for uninterrupted supply of
irrigation water and to avoid major damage or another catastrophic flood situation in the next
monsoon season. These sub-projects may require more than six months to complete thereby requiring
immediate mobilization to be ready to resist flooding during the next monsoon season.
Medium-term Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Needs (up to 3 Years)

The needs identified for a rehabilitation and reconstruction programme for the irrigation, drainage and
flood protection sector to be completed in the medium term (1-3 years) include:
 Design and reconstruction of fully damaged structures
 Reconstruction of partly damaged but ill-performing structures
 Reconstruction of flood protection bunds in critical river reaches
 Design and construction of new river training at strategic flood-prone locations;
 Development of an integrated flood management plan that considers flood prevention,
mitigation and protection using flow regulation and economic development. This plan is to be
implemented as a long-term flood management strategy
 Involvement of communities and building of Governmental and non-governmental
organization capacity in flood management.
Rehabilitation and reconstruction of irrigation and flood protection infrastructure will require some
critical decisions so that they are built better able to resist flooding. These decisions may include a
revisit of values of flood design return periods and appropriate changes to standard engineering
designs and design details. The works may involve the construction of a second line of defence or
loop bunds at weak breach sections. Provision of spurs at breach prone sections of bunds instead of
loop bunds may be considered where land acquisition is involved.
Planning and Studies Required for Immediate, Short and Medium Term Recovery
The responsible government agencies should immediately start field investigations including
engineering surveys and detailed design so that immediate and short-term recovery can be
implemented without delay, once recovery funding is available. Planning for medium-term works
should also be carried out that may involve:
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1. Needs assessment and provision of design and construction supervision support for medium
and long-term projects
2. Development and implementation of plans for medium term tasks, conduct field
investigations of damaged infrastructure and formulate a rehabilitation strategy;
3. Start preparation of a medium- to long-term development projects; and
4. Develop and implement framework.
Long-term Flood Management Strategy (Up to year2020)

The year 2010 super-flood has demonstrated the need for Pakistan to adopt a long-term integrated
water disaster and flood management strategy that includes and combines all structural and non-
structural elements. The irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector has the following long-term
tasks to be incorporated into this flood management strategy.
1. Review of the design flood value for all flood protection embankment with considerations of
flash floods with changing climate, reduced watershed rainfall absorption capacity, human
settlements in and near floodplains and inactive river channels. and off-channel water storage
2. Review of the safe discharg capacity of barrages and need for by-pass capacity; if appropriate
3. Review of flood water carriage for flood-prone canals incorporating safe escape capacities
4. Flood management in catchments through building multi-purpose water retention structures,
improving watershed absorption capacities and river trainings
5. Focus on mitigation of hill-torrents for flood protection
6. Strengthening flood forecasting and early warning systems
7. Involving communities, improving flood response and educating flood-prone populations
Main Elements of a Flood Management Strategy

It is now largely accepted that climate change is resulting in more events and more extreme climate
events – prolong drought and severe floods - in the arid environments in Pakistan. The year 2010
super-flood has demonstrated and has posed the question “What is the best flood management
strategy under a changing environment”? A comprehensive Food Management Strategy has to be
evolved in a short course of time resulting from appropriate flood studies and lessons learned. Some
clear main elements of a new flood management strategy for Pakistan to be developed now and up to
year 2020 are outlined here:
1. Promote flood control over flood protection: Flood protection has been the main focus in
Pakistan in the past. A paradigm shift from flood protection to flood control has to be
exercised that may consider capturing water before it is transformed into a flood. This will
involve the building of flood retardation storage in river flood plains and enhancing river
catchment storage capacities through integrated watershed management. It also includes the
management of flash flood flows and hill torrents.
2. Incorporate flood prevention: Flood prevention is directed at preventing floods in flood
prone (high-risk) areas. The objective of flood prevention is preventing damage caused by
floods by avoiding construction of infrastructure in present and future flood-prone areas. This
requires land use planning; building codes; and most importantly strong enforcement.
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3. Include flood protection: Flood protection measures protect flood prone (high-risk) areas
against floods. Flood protection measures are both structural and non-structural measures to
reduce the likelihood of floods and/or the impact of floods in a specific location.
4. Stress flood mitigation: Flood mitigation minimizes the impact of floods. It is defined as
“measures to reduce or limit adverse impacts of floods. Mitigation measures are those taken
prior to floods, to minimize potential damage (pre-flood mitigation) and those implemented
after floods, to alleviate damage caused (post-flood mitigation). Pre-flood mitigation may
include flood proofing and preparedness; and post-flood mitigation such as evacuation, post-
disaster communication, emergency relief and restoring livelihood.
Selection Criteria for Immediate, Short and Medium Term Subprojects
Immediate and Short-term Subprojects (Highest priority projects)

Recommended selection criterion for the highest priority projects that could be completed in one year
are as follows:
1. Works in progress undertaken during high flows of rivers as flood fighting operations
following standard operating practices (SOP)
2. Works of closing relief cuts and breaches of canal networks, drains, flood protection bunds
and spurs
3. Works needed to make the canal system operative for Rabi crops (winter season).The sowing
of wheat as major crop in the Rabi season is to be assured in flood effected areas. This also
includes works relating to damage to canal and drainage structures
4. Works needed for spurs/stone revetments to protect the main structure and arrest further
damage;
5. Works for removal of flood deposited sediments from canals and drains
6. Repairs of conveyance, flow regulating and protective structures including culverts, and canal
bridges needed for immediate use by the farming community
Medium-term Subprojects (High priority projects)

Recommended selection criterion for high priority projects that can be completed in 2-3 years are as
follows:
1. Replacement of fully damaged structures
2. Repair of partly damaged structures needing rehabilitation and reconstruction;
3. Construction of new flood management structures including spurs, dikes and stud or by-pass
arrangements;
4. Strengthening of weak flood protection bunds
5. Establishment of essential work buildings and inspection huts
Approximate Funds Requirements for First 3 Years

Considering the nature of works and potential sub-projects needed in Pakistan to overcome the
impacts of the year 2010 super-flood, funding requirements for a first year programme starting in
August 2010; and for a total 1 to 3 year undertaking have been estimated in Table 21A-22. The
funding requirement for the first year also includes on-going flood fighting expenses.
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Table 21A-22: Tentative Funding Requirement for the Irrigation, Drainage and Flood
Protection Sector in Pakistan for 3 Years
Provinces Tentative financing Tentative financing

/ Regions requirement requirement
(0-1 year) (1-3 year)
PKR USD million PKR USD million
million million
WAPDA 804 9 986 12
Sindh 28,600 336 39,850 469
Total -
National 34,980 412 54,784 645
Sindh Flood Management Breakdowns during the Year 2010 Super-flood
Damage and Need Assessment Breakdowns

The year 2010 super Flood continued in Sindh throughout August and September 2010. However, it
was assessed by some that a comprehensive damage and need assessment of Sindh had not been
properly made by the Federal Flood Commission (FFC), the National Disaster Management Agency
(NDMA) the Provincial Disaster Management Agency (PDMA) - or by Government of Sindh (GOS).
The Government of Sindh was said to have hastily released incomplete data on damage based mainly
on August 2010 figures. Some experts have rejected Government of Sindh estimates and projected
that total losses may finally stand at PKR 1.2 trillion; and the number of flood affected persons may
increase beyond 10 million (Menon, 2010).
It is understood that accurate and verifiable relief needs and damage needs are a fundamental
requirement of disaster management and flood fighting. It has been questioned whether the Sindh
Government has the capacity and trained staff able to make the necessary assessments. These needs
assessments require the following fact findings:
 Assessment of loss of human life
 Assessment of the level and types of injuries
 Assessment of damage to public buildings
 Assessment of damage to education, health and municipal facilities
 Assessment of damage to private housing
 Assessment of damage to transportation infrastructure including roads
 Assessment of damage to agriculture, livestock and agro-industry
 Assessment of damage to irrigation, drainage and flood protection infrastructure
Flood Management and Flood Fighting Breakdowns

It has been observed and reported on by some experts that there were severe breakdowns during the
super-flood on the ability of all levels of government to manage and fight the flood. Some of these
breakdowns are reported as follows (Menon, 2010):
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 The Torri and MS Bund breaches were perceived to be man–made with demands for an
impartial inquiry. Possible negligence and corruption of the Irrigation and Power Department
has been suggested
 The Government of Sindh remained in panic, and dis not have any solid disaster management
plans
 The heavy pilferage of Relief Funds has been reported with resulting indifference and insults
to flood affected persons
 Politicians are seemingly unaware of the potential socio-political change in the after-math of
the year 2010 super–flood; with the potential for wrath of voters and sympathizers
 Political parties are avoiding to resettle flood affected in the cities of Sindh for sectarian
reasons
 The efforts of civil society and NGOs for efficiency in delivering flood relies are being
generally appreciated
 Large landowners, especially in Kacha areas, are being considered equally responsible for the
disaster along with the National and Sindh government
 There are renewed demands for Land Reforms and proper land utilization in Kacha
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider adopting an internationally recognized methodology based
method to estimate damage and costs related to water disaster and flood damage to its irrigation,
drainage and flood protection infrastructure.
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should perform an in-depth study of engineering and political inputs that
had an impact on how it managed its irrigation, drainage and flood protection civil works before,
during and after the year 2010 super-flood.
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Flood Forecasting of the Year 2010 Super-flood

Pakistan is said to have comprehensive flood predictive capacity with modern hydrologic and
hydraulic modelling capability. This modelling is performed by the Pakistan Meteorological
Department (Met Department).
A number of criteria are used to assess the type and magnitude of flooding precicted and measured by
the Pakistan Met Department as shown in Table 21A-23.
Table 21A-23: Criteria Used in Pakistan to Assess the Type and Level of Severity of Predicted
and Measured Flood Levels
Criteria Descriptors Comment

Flood type Flash floods
Coastal floods
Urban floods
River (or fluvial) floods
Ponding (or pluvial flooding)
Flood Alert The international - READY
assessment
Alarm The international - SET
level
Critical The international - GO
River gauge Level 4 River at a reference station is
height about 40% full
Level 6 River at reference station is about
60% full
Level 10 River at a reference station is
100% full
Modelling of the Year 2010 Super-flood

The output of this flood modelling for the year 2010 super-flood was available on the internet during
the progress of the year 2010 super-flood2. A sample of the output of the modelling available on the
internet is given in Figure 21A-26. It is hard to see from the form of the output of the flood prediction
how a competent flood manager could use the output of the modelling to mitigate regional or local
flooding. It is easy to see from the form of the output that non-specialist disaster managers, flood
managers, or how civil society can have no clue as to what the output of the flood modelling can
provide in the way of flood management information.
2
www.metdepartment.gov.pk
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Figure 21A-26: Flood Predictions for 13 October 2010 Made Available on the Internet
by the Pakistan Met Department
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider how use and possibly guide the improvement the flood
modelling and predictive outputs of the Pakistan Met Department as part of the development of a
Water Disaster and Flood Risk Management component of the new Master Plan.
Flood Risk Mapping

A series of Flood maps for Pakistan are available on the Website of the Pakistan Meteorolocical
Department3 for the Lower Indus River Basin. A sample of one of these maps for Dadu, Hyderabad
and Thatta District is illustrated in Figure 21A-27. The methodology used to prepare these flood maps
and the date of preparation is not given on the website.
It has been reported that a newer, more comprehensive set of flood maps was prepared as part of the
ADB Second Flood Management project. However, these maps seem to have been published in a
limited number of copies and they can not be found on the internet.
3
Http://www.pakmet.com.pk
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Figure 21A-27: Flood Maps Prepared by the Met Deparment Available on the Internet –
Dadu, Hyderabad, Thatta District
Developing an Adaptation Strategy to Super-flooding for Pakistan

The Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC) has developed an adaptation strategy to prepare
for and to respond to future super-floods in Pakistan that has direct applicability to the Lower Indus
River Basin and Sindh. PARC states that (PARC, 2010):
“There is a need to develop strategy for adaptation of autonomous adjustments and strategic
interventions for restoration of flood-affected areas in Pakistan and management of river
basin to avoid future devastations, which have crippled the economy during 2010.
Floodwater has to be considered an opportunity and need to be managed rather than
considering it a commodity to be disposed or let it create devastations for human settlements,
infrastructure and agriculture.”
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Cause-Effect Analysis of 2010 Floods

A cause and effect analysis of the 2010 floods was conducted by PARC to develop a strategy for
future adaptation to super-flooding in Pakistan. The findings of the analysis are discussed below:
1. Meteorologists observed that in early July 2010, a strong ridge of high pressure began to
develop near the Ural Mountains in Russia. This ridge became stationary and established a
blocking pattern, named an “Omega Block” across nearly all of western Russia. As the ridge
remained stationary for nearly two consecutive months, persistent rains fell in major parts of
Pakistan and in parts of Afghanistan and Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir beginning at the
end of July 2010. With an abnormally active jet stream riding around the periphery of the
‘Omega Block’ into western Pakistan, profuse amounts of hot and moist air produced what
some meteorologists called a “Super-charged Monsoon” with unstable atmospheric conditions
that led to a highly unusual pattern of long duration and high intensity rainfall.
2. High intensity and long duration rain storms contributed significantly in delivering large
amounts of rainwater volume distributed all over Pakistan starting from 27 July 2010. The
high intensity of flooding during July-August (compared against historical events) were
largely due to i) high intensity rainfall and longer duration of storms; ii) degraded watersheds
with reduced infiltration of rainwater; and 3) a higher percentage of runoff.
3. The long duration of flood peaks from almost a day in upstream areas to over 11 days at
Sukkur barrage was due to two basic factors: High intensity rains and degraded watershed
conditions (because degraded watershed conditions result in larger values of runoff.)
 Longer duration for flood peaks was due to longer duration rain storms. Degraded
watershed conditions can’t contribute to longer duration of floodwater flows. Rather
improved watershed conditions will depress flood peaks and flood duration will be
decreased – a positive impact due to depressing peak flows.
 Higher values of runoff were mainly due to less surface cover and reduced infiltration of
rainwater into the soil. Rainfall drop energy was not intercepted fully by vegetation and
the degraded soil structure resulting in reduced infiltration.
4. High intensity and longer duration rainwater storms are also an indication of climatic
variability and change; and most climate change experts are of the opinion that in future
extreme events (floods and droughts) are going to be more severe in arid and semi-arid
environments like the Indus River Basin.
5. Watershed degradation in the Indus River Basin watershed is the result of indiscriminate
cutting of forests and extensive overgrazing of rangelands carried out over the last century.
Now watersheds are extensively affected due to increased populations of people and
livestock; infrastructure development; converting of forest lands and pastures to crop
cultivation; extensive road and highway networks; poultry farms; housing societies, and other
similar factors. Roads and buildings contribute significantly to higher and faster runoff as do
degraded watersheds and rangelands.
6. Lack of understanding and miss-perceptions regarding the impact of changing conditions in
watersheds due to increases in human and livestock population, ranching and farming,
infrastructure development, housing and sewage. This changed situation within watersheds
has to be accepted when developing plans for future management of watersheds. Also, water
quantity and quality both have to be considered when planning for future watershed
management. Human and infrastructure development are the two major constraints to be
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addressed while developing new management plans. The concepts of land, wastewater and
solid waste management have to be linked to watershed management. Cover crops including
grasses and shrubs should be given equal importance to agriculture when preparing plantation
plans.
Strategy for Restoration of Flood Affected Areas

The elements of the proposed strategy for restoration of flood affected areas especially for the
agriculture sector proposed by PARC are presented below:
Restoration of Agriculture and Livelihood

1. Develop adaptation interventions for the plantation of forthcoming Rabi crops in flood
affected areas. These crops include: wheat, rapeseed, mustard, Rabi vegetables, fodders, etc.
Vegetables that can provide returns in 30-40 days be selected so that initially these vegetables
provide family nutrition and later on can serve as a source of livelihood. The concept of
kitchen gardening at the household level should also be used.
2. Develop early mechanisms for cleaning and grading of available grains and use the best grade
for seed; because certified seeds are not available in the country to meet the large requirement
of replanting in flood affected areas.
3. Provide graded grains as seed to flood affected farmers for plantation during the Rabi season.
4. Provide diesel fuel and daily remuneration for local tractor rental to provide tillage machinery
at a reasonable bulk rate.
5. Provide packages of crop inputs that allow plantation of 1-5 acres of Rabi crops to flood
affected farmers at no cost in terms of seed, seedbed preparation and plantation costs. Beyond
five acres of plantation, packages of shared seed cost alone may be provided for up to 25
acres with the remaining inputs to be the responsibility of the farmer. The objective should be
to provide support to the many compared to the few with a full package (possibly including
fertilizers). Some scientists are of the opinion that fertilizer support should also be provided
free of charge; but this may increase the cost of the package too much and possibly benefit the
few and not the many.
Irrigation and On-farm Water Management

1. Provide damage assessments and reconstruction of damaged irrigation structures including:
Barrages, headworks, regulators, weirs, diversion bunds, repair of breaches, and similar
works.
2. Provide rehabilitation of secondary and tertiary irrigation systems. Identify secondary
irrigation systems (distributaries and minor canals) for rehabilitation through active
involvement of farmers and their Farmer Organizations (FO’s). Contractors should not be
involved in this work because the country can nott afford poor quality work at high cost and
with rent seeking.
3. Rehabilitation of watercourses by farmers and their Farmer Organizations so that reduced
supply of canal based irrigation water does not adversely affect the Rabi crop as a result of
broken or damaged watercourses or minors/distributary canals.
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Other Farming System Water Management

1. Develop action plan for Katcha areas and recession agriculture so that future floods do not
damage tubewells and other infrastructure in these areas.
2. Develop a strategy for storage of runoff in reservoirs and ponds for supplemental irrigation in
Barani areas.
River Basin Management

1. Enhance the management of experimental watersheds like Rawal, Mithawan and Sulaiman
ranges of Barkhan and Musa Khel. PARC already has presence in these areas for developing
mass-movement based improved watershed management at an experimental level. Here, basic
interventions can be designed and implemented in a cost-effective way; prior to adoption at a
larger scale in other small-dam watershed areas.
2. Develop a conceptual framework for Integrated River Basin Management so that future
floods are not accepted as an agent of devastation; but rather an opportunity to divert and use
flood water for productive purposes. The concept of excess flood storage in river flood plains
should be developed and linked with recharging of groundwater and developing freshwater
aquifers in deserts and currently unproductive areas.
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider the following components of the PARC Strategy for
Restoration of Flood Affected Areas as part of the new Master Plan.
 River basin management

 Restoration of agriculture and livelihood
 Irrigation and on-farm water management
 Other farming system water management
Non-Structural Methods of Environmental Management for Flood Protection

The Joint ADB-WB Pakistan Flood Damage and Needs Assessment (ADB-WB, 2010) revealed the
following key environmental sector issues. Particularly important are the included assessment of how
these environmental concerns may be converted into non-structural methods of water disaster and
flood management and mitigation.
Damage and Actions for the Restoration of Natural Systems in the Indus Watershed
Damage to Forests and Mangroves

The flood damage to riparian and non-riparian forests, as well as wildlife resources, reported by the
provinces is about PKR 992 m (US$ 11.67 m)4. These estimates include damage to trees and forest
lands, avenue plantation, block plantation, forest nurseries, and Department infrastructure and other
assets. No estimates are available for the damage to wetlands and mangroves, for which follow-up
studies are needed.
4
The team did not receive data on forest damage for Sindh and GB.
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Restoration of Natural Systems

Up to 2010, most efforts in Pakistan to manage the effects of floods focused on structural measures,
such as large-scale and capital-intensive embankments. However, relying only on rehabilitating these
structures might be unduly expensive, yield low returns, engender a false sense of security in the
floodplains, and accelerate damage to ecosystems in normally flooded areas. Restoration of forests,
rangelands, and wetlands in the catchment areas, as well as riparian vegetation in the Indus flood
plains and its tributaries must be incorporated into the flood prevention initiative. All of these
interventions would be carried out in a phased approach and would involve communities to ensure
their sustainability. The key elements and associated cost estimates are described below.
Forest Restoration
Forest cover attenuates peak flows and the runoff of water. Forests need to be protected to reverse the
prevailing trends of deforestation on an urgent basis. In addition, degraded and denuded forests need
to be restored in a systematic manner.
Riparian Vegetation Restoration

Riparian vegetation plays an important role in flood control (particularly in the plains), controlling
ingress of sediments in the river and nutrients and pollutants in the water bodies, and stabilizing
stream channels. Riparian vegetation in Punjab and Sindh needs to be protected and restored to be part
of an effective natural flood control system.
Wetland Restoration
Wetlands help regulate river flows, filter pollutants, are spawning zones for fish, and provide sources
of livelihood for communities. Severely degraded wetlands need to be recovered and restored
Mangrove Restoration
In order to protect the coastal areas from sea storms and sea intrusion, the mangrove cover lost over
the years needs to be restored. Restoration of severely degraded mangroves is a priority.
Environmental Health and Proposed Responses
Disease Vectors from Stagnant Water

The receding flood water will leave behind some 4,146 stagnant water ponds in the affected areas.
These ponds are the main source of disease vectors such as mosquitoes, and need to be dewatered.
Debris Disposal
Inappropriate disposal of debris can potentially cause environmental problems such as water
contamination, siltation resulting in shortening of water reservoir life spans, effects on aquatic flora
and fauna, and reduction in the services provided by wetlands. While a follow-up study is
recommended to carefully assess this damage, environmentally safe debris disposal is a requirement
of any recovery plan.
Protected Areas and Cultural Assets

No estimates are available for the damage the floods caused to cultural assets. There have been reports
that the Makli Hills, a World Heritage Site, have been used by displaced people as a camping area. In
addition, floods have reportedly damaged several shrines in Sindh. Furthermore, the Moen -jo-Daro
ruins were surrounded by flood water, a situation which could further exacerbate the damage to the
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ruins caused by rising groundwater through capillary action. Detailed field surveys by archeologists
have been proposed to determine the extent and nature of this damage, if any, and the associated
restoration costs.
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider these non-structural environmental strategies as a

component of any water disaster and flood management project developed under the new Master Plan.
Lessons Learnt from Year 2010 Super-flood – ADB & World Bank Needs Assessment
Key Lessons Learnt from Flood Response 2010
Disaster Preparedness and Management

following flood response issues. The exceptional intensity and prolonged period of the rains and
consequent flooding clearly overwhelmed national, provincial and local disaster/flood management
capacities, particularly at the district level. There was only partial implementation of already prepared
national response and contingency plans. Also their were severe limitations of existing early warning
arrangements down to community level effects in all aspects of disaster preparedness, emergency
response mechanisms and structural mitigation.
Affected communities lacked disaster preparedness awareness, sensitization and education regarding
localized hazard and flood risk reduction, emergency preparedness and response functions -
particularly required for populations located within flood plains.
Climate Change and Flood Linkages

Climate change is considered a critical factor behind changing rainfall patterns and the visible
increase in precipitation during monsoon seasons in parts of the country. Research work based on
long-term climate change data points towards a scenario of future occurrence of heavy rainfall events
during monsoon seasons over north-west Pakistan instead of north-east. As a result, areas along the
western rivers of the country (Indus and Kabul) will be more vulnerable to flood episodes similar to
the one experienced during the current season.
Institution Structure, Legal and Policy Framework for Disaster Management
System evolution and description

As in many other countries, Pakistan had a disaster-response strategy predominantly centered on
"Emergency Response Paradigm". The post-2005 earthquake promulgation of the National Disaster
Management Ordinance 2006 and the National Disaster Risk Management Framework are reflective
of the initial steps by the country to move towards a pre-emptive and pro-active approach towards
disaster management. Under the Ordinance, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is
now the lead agency at federal level for dealing with disasters 5. The National Disaster Management
Commission (NDMC) has been established as the policy-making institution on DRM, while NDMA
serves as its executive arm. NDMC functions under the leadership of the Prime Minister as a multi-
sectoral platform encompassing all relevant stakeholders in the public, as well as the private, sector
and civil society.
5
NDMA is currently working under an executive order, as the NDMO 2006 is with parliament for approval (As of October 2010).
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At the decentralized level are the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) 6 and District
Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs). PDMAs have been established in Punjab, Sindh,
Balochistan, KP, as well as Gilgit-Baltistan, but establishment of the District Disaster Management
Authorities (DDMAs) could not be completed. DDMAs have been notified in some districts but have
limited capacity7.
Legal and Policy Framework
National Disaster Risk Management Framework (NDRMF)

The NDRMF serves as a policy document to provide strategic guidance for DRM activities in the
country. It also highlights priorities over a five-year period. The NDRMF has identified nine priority
areas for action, i.e. institutional and legal framework, hazard and vulnerability assessment, training,
education and awareness-raising, DRM planning, community level risk reduction, establishment of
multi-hazard early warning system and emergency response system, mainstreaming DRR into
development, and capacity development for post-disaster recovery.
Flood Management
The Federal Flood Commission (FFC) is the main agency responsible for flood control in the country.
The agency is mandated to ensure coordination and management of floods and flood protection works
in an integrated manner. FFC is also responsible for formulating a National Flood Protection Plan
including structural and non-structural elements and ensuring its implementation through the
provinces. However, WAPDA and PMD also have important roles to play in terms of flood
management in the country including flood forecasting and early warning 8.
Climate Change
The Ministry of Environment (MOE) is the coordinator, manager and custodian of work on climate
change. The MOE is developing a Climate Change Policy and plan of action which are based on
recommendations of the Task Force on Climate Change. The Global Change Impact Study Center
(GCISC), a technical institution partnering with the MOE, is responsible for scientific work in
climatology and assessing the impact of climate change on agriculture and water resources.
Evolution of and relationship between flood management and DRM institutional/functional

structures
The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was established in 1959 and was designated
as the focal agency for dealing with water-related matters in the country. Flood management became a
serious concern for the Government in the aftermath of the 1976 floods leading to the creation of the
Federal Flood Commission (FFC) through a resolution. The agency was created with the purpose of
ensuring effective coordination and management of floods, flood protection works and formulating a
National Flood Protection Plan for implementation through the provinces. Provincial Irrigation and
Drainage Authorities (PIDA/PID) also play a key role in flood management and implementation of
flood mitigation interventions.
6
However, under the 18th amendment, many subjects previously falling under the Federal Government are now the responsibility of the
Provinces. There is a need to also define the roles of the Federation and the Provinces in disaster management.
7
DDMAs are inter-departmental committees similar to District Emergency Boards functioning in Punjab prior
to NDMO 2006.
8
Details on Flood management, including recommendations, are covered in detail under the sector annex for
Irrigation.
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Traditionally, Pakistan has been following a response-based approach towards disaster management
geared towards relief activities. The armed forces have been extensively used for this purpose and the
only other organized civilian structure in this regard has been the Civil Defense Organization created
under the Civil Defense Act 1952. Other legislation relating to the relief/response structure includes
the Natural Calamities Act 1958 under which the appointment of the Relief Commissioners and their
powers have been defined. The Civil Defense Act was substantially revised in 1994 to include
activities geared towards mitigation and response including policy planning, coordination and
training. An Emergency Relief Cell was also established in the Cabinet Division in 1971 for disaster
relief at the national level. In the aftermath of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, the NDMO 2006 allowed
for the establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) with extensions in
provinces and districts9.
Despite all these developments, the major issue of how these various structures interact and
coordinate with each other has remained rather problematic. Response agencies often have different
reporting lines both at federal and provincial levels and overlapping roles and responsibilities.
Although the National Disaster Risk Management Framework attempts to define roles and
responsibilities, it is just a framework and, in the end, actual reporting lines and controlling ministries
and departments determine tasking of response agencies. It is, therefore, critical that all response
agencies have distinct roles and, where possible, assimilation takes place.
DRM Strategy and Recommendations
Rationale
During the course of the assessment the Assessment Team met a number of public and private
sector/civil society/community-level stakeholders - a process that helped in informing policy
recommendations by the team, as well as with the identification of issues in the sector which need
attention and intervention. The recommendations on DRM policy and institutional development are
based on an assessment of the state of current DRM structures, including a (de facto versus de jure)
comparative analysis between NDMO 2006 provisions and actual practice.
Secondly, the lessons learnt on disaster response and preparedness from the current flood event 7 form
the basis of improvements suggested in respect of the existing disaster response and preparedness
apparatus and dispensation.
Thirdly, recommendations on the array of future DRM related analytical work in five key strategic
areas are aimed to complement the National Disaster Risk Management Framework. They are based
on a strategic portfolio review of the NDRMF with a flood focus and resultantly proportioned across
these five strategic areas.
Policy and institutional

The NDMO 2006 lays the foundation for the establishment of new DRM structures at all tiers within
the country. The following measures are recommended to enhance the effectiveness of the structure:
9
Refer to section 4.1.2, i.e., system description for details.
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(a) Policy
1. Key gaps in the NDMO 2006 need to be addressed through inclusion of the status of pre-
existing and existing parallel structures, institutional coordination and cooperation, and
funding mechanisms at all tiers10.
2. There should be clear communication channels between technical agencies and DRM
authorities to ensure prompt translation of technical recommendations into actions.
3. A national climate change framework/policy should be formulated, backed by climate change
legislation and its linkages to Disaster Management in the country.
4. Water governance policies and guidelines for management of the country's groundwater
resources for emergency situations should be established.
5. The National Flood Management Strategy needs to be reviewed and updated in light of the
current disaster.
(b) Institutional
1. A management and capacity assessment/study of NDMA needs to be undertaken looking at
the organizational mandate and responsibilities, and the resources available, both human and
financial.
2. Capacities of PDMAs and DDMAs need to be enhanced, including human and financial
resources. Districts may utilize the Civil Defense machinery and EDO Social Welfare for
DRM-specific responsibilities.
3. An improved central system for integrated data and information management is needed with
linkages to provinces, down to district level.
Risk identification
It is important to identify the overall national risk environment through collation of existing
information, identification of gaps and additional mapping exercises. While conducting various
mapping activities, the Government should ensure that a common platform is utilized so that all
information can easily be integrated.
1. Develop and implement a National Integrated Multi-hazard Decision Support and Alert
System (NIMS) with a focus on flood-related disaster management and ex-ante risk reduction.
2. Undertake flood hazard and risk mapping to identify vulnerable areas and communities at
risk.12
Mitigation Measures
(a) Early Warning
1. There is a need to restore and enhance the performance of key elements of the country's
multi-hazard early warning systems including flood related elements. Existing systems need
to be integrated and new systems put in place where these do not exist for certain types of
disasters in the multi-hazard context, to enable timely early warning and response.
2. Downstream community linkages with multi-hazard early warning systems need to be
streamlined; early warning dissemination systems to communities need to be made more
efficient and effective; and a system of sustained community sensitization campaigns about
10
NDMA has already undertaken an assessment/analysis of the NDMO 2006 and will propose changes which may be a good starting point.
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early warning systems needs to be put in place at district and sub-district levels with support
from Community Based Organizations (CBOs).
(b) Community
1. DRM needs to be integrated as part of the curriculum for schools, awareness needs to be
raised at the village level and capacity of communities built.
2. Women and people with disabilities need to be empowered and integrated to be part of the
reconstruction and preparedness activities.
3. NGOs need to have disaster risk reduction as a mainstreaming element in all their programs,
particularly those targeting communities. They should adopt community disaster risk
management planning exercises including hazard vulnerability assessments.
Capacity building, knowledge management and education

Within the framework of developing integrated (interdisciplinary) approaches to flood risk
management, relevant research, training, education and capacity building need to be undertaken. This
would entail: Short-, medium- and long-term training course(s) for government officials at different
levels of the government, NGOs, as well as provision of technical experts on flood risk management
and relevant new technologies, tools (modelling, GIS and remote-sensing applications, etc.) and
institutional issues in data analysis and data fusion, and safe drilling techniques.
Strengthening the integrated flood risk management education and curricula of Pakistani tertiary
educational institutions, and their partnerships with international universities and institutions.
Risk transfer and sharing. The Government of Pakistan is usually unable to absorb the losses arising
from disasters and mainly relies on ex-post donor funds to meet its expenditures. Such an ex-post risk
financing strategy has proved to be insufficient, leaving an ex-post resource gap. Furthermore, the
lack of advance planning and resource allocation prevents funds from being immediately available
after a disaster. Short-term resource gaps, due to a lack of liquidity, may severely retard economic
recovery. Such a liquidity gap may have negative implications for the provision of public services,
particularly if post-disaster resources are insufficient to restore existing lifeline and health services
infrastructure. The following actions are, therefore, recommended:
Development of a country catastrophe risk financing strategy

Such a strategy could rely on reserves to finance frequent but not severe hazards (e.g. with a return
period of five years or less), contingent credit facilities to finance the mezzanine layer of risk (e.g.
events with return periods between 5 and 20 years), and (parametric) insurance and/or catastrophe
bonds to finance the upper layer of risk (e.g. events with return periods higher than 20 years).
Development of a catastrophe insurance market

The Government should investigate the development of a private catastrophe insurance market, for
example, through catastrophe insurance pools. The Insurance Department and the Security Exchange
Commission of Pakistan could initiate a dialogue with the insurance industry.
Emergency preparedness for effective response and recovery

Emergency preparedness and response is essential for a successful flood risk management strategy
since, despite all flood control measures, there always will be a 'residual' risk that a disaster might
happen. Recommendations include:
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1. Encouraging planning, simulation drills, and community participation in early warning,

disaster response and recovery.
2. Developing capacity, methodologies, and institutional systems for carrying out assessments
such as multi-hazard risk assessments and damage and needs assessments (DNA).
Climate change adaptation

Climate variability produces extreme events such as floods, cyclones and drought. It is likely that
climate change is accelerating climate variability and bringing about such unusual changes. Moreover,
it is widely felt that climate change adaptation is the right solution to climate change, which only has
limited mitigation options. The Government should consider the following actions in relation to
climate change:
1. Prioritizing recommended actions in the National Task Force Report and using these as a
basis to formulate a national climate change action plan with costing and timelines.15
2. Strengthening the technical capacity in the Ministry of Environment to deal with climate
change issues, increasing support for national climate change research centers and fostering
increased cooperation with regional and international climate change bodies/organizations
including data sharing.
3. Needs Estimation of Recovery and Reconstruction
Damage to Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Sector Infrastructure

following key irrigation, drainage and flood protection sector issues:
 Deferred maintenance of flood bunds resulting in structural failures
 Insufficient reservoir/storage capacity to absorb flood peaks
 Lack of response mechanisms to early warnings
 Need for expanding flood early warning system (FEWS) to cover the Swat and Kabul
Rivers and hill torrents
 Encroachment of the flood plains and riverine areas.
The breaches in flood protection bunds along the Indus River caused the main damage. None of the
breaches occurred due to overtopping of the bunds. The aging infrastructure coupled with deferred
maintenance necessitates immediate attention to this critical infrastructure.
Important Needs for Future Disaster Mitigation for the Sector

The impact of climate change, expected to cause more frequent extreme flood events in the future,
needs to be taken into account while reviewing structural designs, and maintenance requirerments and
procedures. In addition to the review, a comprehensive inspection protocol for critically important
major river training works and bunds (similar to the inspection protocol for dams) needs to be
introduced.
Barrage Safety is in Question

The 2010 flood peaks were significantly higher than the discharge capacity of the Chashma, Sukkur
and Kotri Barrages on the Indus River. In the case of Sukkur Barrage, flood passing capacity has
significantly reduced due to the choking of several gates. Fortunately, the flood peak, which was
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higher than the reduced capacity, passed through safely but it might have caused damage to the
barrage structure and the guide bunds. Both Kotri and Sukkur Barrages were at high risk of washing
away due to sustained water above their capacity for a consecutive seven and fifteen days
respectively.
Although the 2010 flood event demonstrated that floods higher than design capacity can safely pass
through, construction of spillways to improve the safety of these critical structures needs to be
considered. Such spillways, together with downstream confined spillway channels, would minimize
the extent of flooding in case of extreme floods.
Flash Flood Safety Required

Unprecedented flash flood peaks occurred in the Swat River resulting in what was probably the
maximum flood in the Kabul River at Nowshera - more than double the highest peak ever recorded at
that site in the past. The current FEWS does not cover the Kabul and Swat Rivers and needs to be
expanded so that early flood warnings will also become available for these rivers. The FEWS could
also be expanded to include major hill torrents. However, the floods in the hill torrents, as well as in
the upper reaches of the Swat River are of a flash nature. Therefore, the warning system there would
need to be backed by a swift response system to avoid loss of lives and minimize damages. In
addition, the Government may need to consider relocating public infrastructure out of high flood-risk
riverine areas and refrain from issuing building permits to the private sector in these areas.
The 2010 flash floods in KP also triggered river bank erosion at numerous places sweeping away
houses and other infrastructure close to river banks, particularly in the upper reaches where rivers are
narrow and steep. Due to shifts in river courses, houses and infrastructure that were away from the
river bank before the floods have now become exposed to river bank erosion. For such cases, erosion
protection works are needed which are included in the medium-term reconstruction program for
critical river sections in KP, AJK, FATA and GB. The 2010 floods also demonstrated the
vulnerability of the low lying areas, particularly Nowshera and Charsada districts, to extreme floods
from the Swat and Kabul Rivers. Critical protection measures such as flood dykes to control spillover
of rivers along the lower reaches of the Swat and Kabul Rivers are included in the medium-term
reconstruction program.
Need for flood Plain Management

Although the response time in Sindh is longer than in KP due to the longer travel time of the floods,
the Government may need to consider the same approach for the unprotected flood plain (katcha) as
for the high risk riverine areas in KP, since further infrastructure development in these flood plains
would increase flood vulnerability. The settlements in these flood plains are also at risk but their
inhabitants get time to evacuate. While building of permanent settlements and infrastructure in the
flood plains should be discouraged, forced relocation is not appropriate as the mostly poor inhabitants
depend on livelihood activities derived from the river and productive katcha lands. However, where
social infrastructure such as schools and basic health units need to be re-constructed, flood proofing
measures should be considered for their reconstruction. The system of providing early flood warnings
to the public and flood preparedness at community level may need to be improved. The Government
also needs to clarify its policy towards compensation in case of a flood event for those that opt to use
the flood plains for settlement and productive use despite the inherent flood risks.
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Potential for Disaster Risk Insurance

The insurance industry may need to consider flood risks for infrastructure in flood-prone areas. The
existing flood plain maps and flood forecasting models of the major rivers should be used to
reconfirm or identify the high flood risk areas which should be notified by the Provincial Disaster
Management Authorities. For other rivers, high flood risk areas could provisionally be identified
based on the 2010 flood event and previous major floods in consultation with local communities.
Dam and Reservoir Safety Considerations

The 2010 floods have also demonstrated the effectiveness of the country's major reservoirs. The
already planned reservoirs on the Swat River at Munda, Indus River at Kalabagh and its tributaries
would enhance the country's capacity to manage exceptional floods as well as preserve flood water for
productive purposes.
Need for Effective Flood Risk Management

The above flood management-related issues call for an urgent need to revisit the country's overall
flood management strategy and implement a comprehensive long-term multifaceted flood
management program.
The following elements could be considered for this strategy review:

 Enhancing the absorptive capacity of catchments to prolong run-off concentration
time
 Building additional reservoirs to absorb flood peaks
 Enhancing discharge capacity of the existing barrages and river training works
 Adopting a "living with the floods" approach for the riverine areas in Sindh
 Improving and expanding flood forecasting and early warning systems
 Enhancing evacuation and flood relief capacities
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider these lessons learned from the year 2010 super-flooding as
part of the preparation of the new Master Plan; and as components of any water disaster and flood
management project developed under the new Master Plan.
Lessons Learnt from 2010 Super-flood - World Rivers NGO

According to the NGO International Rivers, there are global lessons to learn from the year 2010
super-flood catastrophe in Pakistan. The main lesson is that mismanagement of river systems by
building dams and bunds for the benefit of short-term gain, such as along the Indus River, has major
long-term costs (World Rivers, 2010).
Impact of Global Warming and Extreme Weather

The rise in planetary temperature has been said by many to have reached a tipping point. We are now
in a new era of extreme weather. We should therefore be doing everything we can to cut our
greenhouse gas pollution. At best, we can slow the rise in heat and limit the maximum temperature
level.
We also need to step up efforts to protect ourselves from this new normal of extreme weather. We
need to do all we can to stop weather disasters becoming catastrophes. This means increasing the
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resilience of our infrastructure, economies and communities. Greater resilience in Pakistan should
include better emergency warning and evacuation systems, better flood protection for key
infrastructure (schools and other community buildings that can serve as flood shelters) and plans to
help communities recover once the flood waters recede.
Impact of Miss-management of the Indus River Basin

The main point is the way we have miss-managed the Indus for the past century. Although these
policies have provided various short-term benefits, these have come at major long-term costs. We
have ended small- and medium-scale flooding on many rivers through building dams and bunds, but
in doing so we have greatly increased the scale of - and our vulnerability to - very big floods.
Increasing resilience to floods in Pakistan is going to require reversing our river management
mistakes through restoring rivers and floodplains, including taking out bunds and dams.
In Pakistan, two of the world's biggest dams and a vast associated system of barrages and diversion
canals have greatly reduced the amount of water and sediments carried by the Indus in most years.
The most obvious consequence of this has been the destruction of the farmlands, fisheries and
mangrove forests of the Indus Delta – possibly one of the 20th century's great environmental disasters.
Another consequence is that the river normally lacks sufficient flows to carry away the riverine
sediments that are not trapped behind dams. Sediments that once would have been deposited onto the
floodplain in normal floods are trapped inside the flood plain by thousands of miles of bunds. These
sediments build up on the riverbed, steadily reducing its capacity to handle large flows. When,
inevitably, a major flood comes, the shrunken river channel, restricted within its bunds, can no longer
hold the flow; the Indus then surges out over the densely populated floodplain.
“According to Daanish Mustafa of King's College London in National Geographic, recalling

the fable in which a man sells his soul to the devil in exchange for a life of luxury, ‘The major
river engineering is basically a Faustian bargain'. Mustafa is a geographer who has studied
the history of Pakistan's river management. Until a few decades ago, there were typically
mild floods each summer: when the monsoon rainfall hits and when snowmelt from the
Himalaya and Karakoram Mountains is at its peak. Because humans have sculpted the river
and the surrounding natural floodplain and wetlands for farming and other needs, there are
fewer floods. But when they hit, they are far worse.
Allowing the Indus River to flood more regularly and naturally could help temper the floods and
make them more tolerable, say many experts. Managing Pakistan's floods is a delicate balance
between giving the river more room and building barriers to protect people and their land. As Mustafa
explains, the unusual monsoon pattern behind the current catastrophe has been seen in a weaker form
already several times in the past decade. The hydrological past is no longer a reliable guide to the
hydrological future and we need to rethink our management of rivers to take account of this.
Lessons Learnt to Consider in the Phase-II Study

The main points from this pronouncement by World Rivers and others who say essentially the same
thing is that in preparing a new SIDA Water Resources Master Plan it is important to consider the and
address the following concerns:
1. Increasing the resilience of our infrastructure, economies and communities
2. Greater resilience in Pakistan should include better emergency warning and evacuation
systems, better flood protection for key infrastructure (schools and other community buildings
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that can serve as flood shelters) and plans to help communities recover once the flood waters
recede
3. Consider how allowing the Indus River to flood more regularly and naturally could help
temper extreme floods and make them more tolerable
4. Consider that the hydrological past is no longer a reliable guide to the hydrological future and
the need to rethink the management of the Indus River Basin to take account of this facticity
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider the following as should be part of the new Master Plan.
 Adaptation to extreme weather and extreme magnitudes of water disasters and

flooding
 New and improved structural flood control methodologies such as controlled flooding
in flood retardation basins; and better protection of key infrastructure
 New and improved non-structural flood control methodologies such as emergency
warning and evacuation; and community rehabilitation after flooding
 The hydrological past is no longer a reliable guide to the hydrological future; and the
need to rethink the management of the Lower Indus River Basin
Capacity of Pakistan and Sindh Government to Implement Recovery from the Super-flood
The World Bank and The Asian Development Bank have jointly performed an assessment of the
country’s needs to recover from the ravages of the year 2010 super-flood. As part of this assessment
an evaluation of the institutional capacity of the government to carry out the recovery was made
(ADB-WB, 2010). The assessment considered:
 Governance and disaster recovery
 Proposed recovery and reconstruction strategy
 Implementation arrangements
 Institutional framework
 Implementation at provincial / regional level
 Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E)
Governance and Disaster Recovery
Weak State Capacity

Pakistan has long been characterized by political instability leading to a lack of policy continuity and
impaired economic management. The country is governed by fragile coalitions at the centre and the
provinces. Unrest in KP and Balochistan has kept civilian governments under pressure, diverting their
attention from institutional reform to matters of a more immediate and ad hoc nature. The political
situation remains unstable and the institutional decline has marred state capacity to effectively deliver
basic services.
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Institutional Capacities
The failure to turn resources into development outcomes is directly attributable to low institutional
capacity across the provinces. Widespread corruption, misallocated and inefficient public expenditure
influenced by elected or unelected vested interests and incentives dilute the impact of public programs
aimed at improving the welfare of citizens, particularly the poor and marginalized segments of the
population including women. Governance reform efforts have also been only partially successful and
the country has not undertaken any major civil service reform since the 1970s.
Local Government Rollback

Prior to the floods, the local government system was rolled back while new arrangements for
representative and accountable local governance were not put in place. KP and Balochistan have
enacted new laws, while Sindh and Punjab provinces have yet to decide on this vital issue. Currently,
unelected administrators are managing districts and tehsils, further eroding capacities as almost 50
percent of district level posts remain vacant.
District Capacities
Reconstruction capacity at the district level is a factor of two sets of staff: the designers and executors
(Engineering Departments) and planners and approvers (Finance and Planning Offices). In Sindh, the
district level engineering staff generally appeared to be in place with fewer vacancies, though there
were significant gaps in staffing levels at the Finance and Planning Office level.
Recent Shifts in Governance Paradigm

Notwithstanding the structural constraints faced by governance in Pakistan, the country has
undertaken wide-ranging reforms in the past few years. These reforms have a direct relationship with
the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. One, the agreement on the 7th National
Finance Commission (NFC) Award has increased the share of the provinces in the federal divisible
pool from 47.5 percent to 57.5 percent. Two, the passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment in
April 2010 is aimed at achieving 'participatory federalism'. The vast concurrent list of legislative
subjects has been eliminated, providing provinces with exclusive legislative powers and control over
vital development domains. Three, Pakistan has also witnessed the growth of a robust electronic
media that has impacted the traditional culture of governance.
Exacerbated Capacity Gaps

As the reconstruction challenge mounts and the weak technical and PFM capacities start showing
signs of stress, lagging reconstruction targets and unfulfilled expectations will be directly translated
into popular anger and resentment. During FY 2009/10, Punjab was only able to spend less than 61
percent of its ADP, while Sindh spent 60 percent and KP spent only 51 percent. The picture was more
acute at the district level where average utilization figures for districts most affected by floods were as
low as 10 percent in Punjab, 20 percent in districts from Sindh, and 68 percent in KP. The project
development cycle typically suffers from inadequate capacity to prepare PC-I's104 of some
complexity particularly at the district level, where the technical expertise is lacking due to shortage of
qualified staff. The budgetary releases still suffer from last quarter lumping, though expenditure
accounting has improved due to PIFRA SAP software installation in all of Sindh.
Reconstruction Super Load vs. Existing Capacity

The usual public sector capacities in the provinces are likely to be challenged by anything between
four to seven times the normal development workloads. If the existing planning and implementation
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capacities of the provinces - currently showing ADP utilization of less than 50-60 percent of the
allocated development budgets - and districts most affected by floods are pitched against the twenty-
fold expected increase in the post-flood reconstruction workload105 and more than hundred times
their actual execution of last year, the "business-as-usual" approach is likely to fail.
Implementation Arrangements Must Consider Huge Capacity Gaps

The need for a nodal coordinating body at the center is clear but there is also a need for a provincial
body to coordinate implementation. Functions at the federal level include: funding (mobilization,
funds allocation and flow); national policy; oversight of funding and policy compliance; and
implementation of national programs. Functions at the provincial level include: implementation of
provincial programs including planning, design, approvals, construction, materials and equipment;
monitoring and reporting; and grievance redressal. Specific arrangements at the federal, provincial
and district levels must be included in the overall strategy.
Proposed Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy
Strengthening Human Resources

In the reconstruction phase, a comprehensive HR framework will be required. Currently, there are
districts with high levels of vacancies (in some cases up to 50 percent) 11. The technical capacity of
existing staff (mostly male) to plan, manage, and monitor reconstruction projects is weak and gaps in
skills need to be plugged. Similarly, frequent postings and transfers would need to be avoided, and
incentive systems (like market based salaries) developed to attract and retain quality officers in the
districts. The required departmental capacity should be strengthened through external resources such
as consultants, contractual staff, short-term trainings, central/regional capacity pools, and so on.
Streamlining Public Administration Systems

A regular fund flow and fast-track approval processes need to be created to ensure timely and
effective reconstruction implementation, but not at the cost of transparency and accountability. It will
be necessary to work with the provincial P&DDs to enhance approval limits and hold frequent,
mandatory meetings of project approving bodies.
Strengthening Grievance Redressal System

Grievance redressal systems need to be strengthened and a separate special window could be set-up to
deal with reconstruction implementation, together with alternate dispute resolution mechanisms for
dealing with issues related to contracts. In their absence, the existing judicial systems that are already
overburdened will be further clogged. Legal aid centers established in the aftermath of the 2005
Pakistan earthquake, have successfully assisted in over 26,000 cases (complaints lodged by men and
women) including some 700 court cases, and could be a model to follow in the post-flood
rehabilitation program.
Improving Intergovernmental Coordination

Mechanisms for vertical coordination between federal, provincial and district governments, as well as
mechanisms for horizontal coordination between various departments need to be clarified. A Nodal
Agency at the center will be necessary to ensure overall coordination and M&E, also acting as an
interface for donors and so on. A dedicated set up is required - with special features for public
transparency and citizen oversight - both at provincial (e.g. a special cell in P&DD) and district level.
11
Sex disaggregated data was difficult to obtain due to inherent the problem of record-keeping within the government. However, it could be safely assumed that
most of these vacancies are generally filled by male personnel.
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Resettlement
Resettlement, reconstruction and flood zoning issues need to be addressed for the riverine and wetland
areas (kacha areas) based on international good practice. This will help guide the reconstruction
activities in these areas, along with the attendant reinforcement requirements whereby reconstruction
is considered safe based on defined criteria.
Improving Procurement
Inadequate planning and inaccurate cost estimates can lead to weaknesses in project implementation.
Therefore, cost estimates must be based on market rates. Similarly, it must be ensured that these
projects are awarded to competent and qualified firms through a transparent, competitive process in
which citizens are provided due information on selection criteria. Collusion among contractors,
suppliers and consultants will have to be avoided by ensuring that all procurement opportunities are
widely disseminated and technical assistance is taken from the Competition Commission of Pakistan
(CCP).
Ensuring Transparency and Monitoring Results

The Government should create transparent mechanisms and provide up-to-date information about
financial and physical performance (expenditure and results) on a dedicated website whereby the
public can track progress. In rural areas, local decisions in this regard can be announced through
Union Council offices and project details can be pasted on public notice boards for citizen access.
CBOs can also play a useful role in enhancing public access to information in rural areas.
Ensuring Community Participation

In the aftermath of the floods, it is important that reconstruction activities establish a feedback loop,
which incorporates direct, gender-responsive and socially inclusive, community participation.
Involving the affected communities and ensuring women and all marginalized sections such as
minorities and the disabled, are included in reconstruction provides a direct stake (income generation)
to the affectees in reconstruction and also utilizes the resource pool present in those communities.
Implementation Arrangements
Considering the magnitude of the program, its urgency, its unprecedented geographic scope and the
multitude of stakeholders to be involved, implementing the recovery and reconstruction program will
pose an unprecedented challenge for the Government. The challenge will be to absorb, manage and
disburse increased levels of funding while meeting higher expectations to restore lost assets and
services.
This challenge goes far above and beyond the challenges already posed by routine public service
delivery. Factors such as the recent shifts in the governance paradigm resulting from the 18th
Constitutional Amendment, inadequate public financial management capabilities, human resources
constraints, complex intergovernmental coordination mechanisms add to this challenge. At the same
time, concerns about accountability and transparency on the part of the public and the Government's
development partners need to be addressed. It will take between six to ten years to complete the
reconstruction program resulting from the DNA if the "business-as-usual" approach is applied, clearly
an unacceptably long timeframe for the millions of people affected by the floods.
Institutional Framework
Having a clear institutional framework is essential for efficient and transparent delivery of the
reconstruction portfolio. It also establishes Government commitment to the early commencement of
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the reconstruction process and credibility for mobilizing resources. The following key guiding
principles should be considered while firming up the institutional framework:
Clarity of the Overall Mandates

The mandates of the various levels of government will have to be in line with the 18th Constitutional
Amendment. In accordance with this, the federal government is to take the lead in overall
coordination and monitoring and formulation of reconstruction policies and strategies, necessary for
equity considerations. The provincial and regional governments are to take the lead in implementation
of the reconstruction program including coordination, policy, planning and monitoring at the
provincial level.
Nodal Agencies for Reconstruction

In view of the existing capacity gaps and the stress created by the floods and related reconstruction in
the institutions handling public sector programs, and the absence of dedicated institutional
frameworks for flood reconstruction, additional capacities would be required to undertake the
reconstruction functions. Nodal Agencies may need to be established at the federal and
provincial/regional levels for this; the multi-sector nature of the reconstruction program and the
multitude of institutions to be involved are further reasons to set up such Agencies.
Early Articulation of Policies, Strategy and Standards

The provincial and regional governments have already started articulating their responses, especially
after the 18th Amendment and given the urgency of reconstruction; also depending upon their
capacity. The federal government needs to ensure that the overall reconstruction policies and
strategies are articulated as soon as possible to avoid inconsistencies and major divergence in
reconstruction implementation among the provinces and regions.
Equitable Allocation of Resources

Floods have impacted the four provinces and various regions differentially depending upon location,
topography and socioeconomic situation. This has given rise to diversity in the response and needs.
The allocation of resources among provinces/regions has to be based on the needs and the associated
disaster risks for reconstruction.
Setting a Definite Time Frame for Reconstruction Implementation

Planning for reconstruction has been weak in the case of previous disasters in Pakistan. The federal
government, in consultation with the provinces, needs to set a definite time frame for reconstruction
implementation to install an emergency mindset within government institutions and reconstruction
partners (multilateral and bilateral institutions, and non-government organizations). The
reconstruction implementation plan should take into account private and public sector capacities and
systems and, in case of gaps, should include measures to fill these to complete the reconstruction
program within the set time frame. Special policies, laws or special dispensations for reconstruction
can then also be bound to this definite time frame.
Effective Coordination
Effective coordination among all levels of government and reconstruction partners (government and
donor agencies) is essential and can best be achieved through national, provincial and district level
coordination forums and sectoral coordination where required. These forums will facilitate
information sharing, better planning and collaboration among the multiple partners as well as more
targeted management of reconstruction resources.
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Enhanced Transparency
Independent oversight and monitoring involving representatives of civil society is essential to achieve
transparency. The Government has put in place the first element to achieve this through the
establishment of the National Oversight Disaster Management Council (NODMC) comprising
independent and reputable individuals from civil society. The Government will also submit regular
progress reports and the outcomes of the reconstruction M&E and audits to the NODMC. Enhanced
disclosure on reconstruction policies, strategies, criteria, procurements and plans to the Pakistani and
international community will need to be done through a pro-active program and strategic
communications on reconstruction implementation, both at the federal and provincial levels. The
expectations and information needs of the public, particularly the affected communities, should also
be taken into account and any strategy to enhance transparency should be supported by a strong public
awareness campaign, conducted at community level.
Implementation through Existing Government Institutions as "First-Choice" Option

Implementation arrangements need to respect the mandate of existing institutions. Setting up parallel
structures should be avoided to the extent possible. Existing institutions should be supported with
additional capacity in order to deliver against the additional requirements and expectations associated
with large-scale reconstruction programs.
Adoption of the Subsidiary Principle

Reconstruction implementation responsibility should be delegated to the lowest level of government,
to increase accountability and reconstruction outreach. However, implementation capacity should be
strengthened where necessary through redeployment of existing government resources or by provision
of external resources.
Enhanced Accountability
Enhanced fiduciary safeguards and risk mitigation measures, including internal controls and external
audits, are to be adopted. The existing public sector financial management systems (PIFRA) should be
used where possible, augmented by robust integrated FMIS to track reconstruction/donor funding.
Additional internal control/audit staff may be required at the district or regional (division) levels to
strengthen internal controls in the affected areas. All reconstruction programs and projects channeled
through the government's budget systems may be audited by the Auditor General (AG) of Pakistan as
the external auditor in conformity with the International Standards of Auditing. Given the urgency of
the reconstruction programs a dedicated Audit Unit may be established within the AG office to carry
out special performance audits and provide annual audit reports efficiently. Some of these activities
could be outsourced by the audit department if required.
Institutionalizing Fast-tracking
Procedures and systems to fast-track the reconstruction program especially for disbursements,
procurement, and approvals should be institutionalized. In some cases procedures have been
developed for emergencies but are rarely followed due to lack of capacity and reluctance on the part
of implementing agencies unfamiliar with these procedures. The federal Nodal Agency could assist
and technically back-stop mandated institutions to further elaborate and streamline the procedures for
simplified projects and umbrella approval, public sector procurement, fund flow, and financial
management. The fast-track procedures should be accompanied by clear systems, controls and
instructions to minimize corruption and ensure accountability.
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Incentivizing the Human Resource Base

To break the "business as usual" culture of the institutions handling reconstruction, special incentives
for staff working on reconstruction have to be introduced. Depending upon the role of the institution
in the reconstruction, the incentives could be target-oriented and based on outputs. Return of
government staff to the flood affected areas needs to be facilitated and incentive systems designed to
attract and retain quality staff working under difficult conditions.
Full use of private sector capabilities

Private sector services and capacities are to be tapped where possible and appropriate. The additional
capacities required in the short- to medium-term for reconstruction could also be outsourced so that
government institutions can continue to perform their normal operations. The outsourcing could
benefit from innovative options like turn-key (design-build) and public-private partnership models.
Strict compliance with and efficient use of fast-track procurement and implementation procedures will
incentivize the participation of capable and reputable consulting firms, contractors and suppliers in
reconstruction implementation.
Enhancing Community Participation

Community participation in reconstruction implementation may be promoted and facilitated.
Partnerships could be with individual households in the case of housing programs, and CBOs and
NGOs to support implementation of community-based reconstruction approaches.
Socially Responsive Implementation

The existing legal system is already stressed and cannot efficiently handle the additional burden posed
by reconstruction activities. A timely and effective response to grievances and complaints, both
individual and institutional (in relation to delays, procurement etc.), needs to be ensured through the
establishment of effective grievance redressal systems and complaints handling procedures. Ensuring
timely redress will avoid delays in reconstruction implementation, as well as effectively protecting
individual rights and entitlements. The system has to be supported by a monitoring mechanism to
ensure its effectiveness.
Maintain Social and Environmental Safeguards

While the reconstruction program calls for accelerated implementation, social and environmental
safeguards need to be maintained. This will require social and environmental review and approval
procedures to be adjusted in view of the nature and urgency of the reconstruction program and at the
same time development/acquisition of additional capacities to undertake these reviews and implement
and monitor safeguard plans.
Focusing on Results
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems already exist at the provincial and federal level for public
sector programs. However reconstruction programs, due to their urgency and multiplicity of donors,
require real time segregated information. Internal and external M&E of reconstruction implementation
will have to integrated with existing systems to address the information and monitoring needs
resulting from the flood response. The focus of monitoring should be on the process and results, as
well as the regular inputs and outputs.
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Flexible Implementation Modalities for External Reconstruction Partners

To maximize mobilization of external resources, external partners are to be given the opportunity to
support the reconstruction program based on their strengths and capacities but in conformity with the
overall reconstruction needs, policies and strategies. While encouraged to adopt government delivery
and on-budget systems, external partners should be offered the possibility to provide reconstruction
support through in-kind or direct implementation. The federal Nodal Agency will be the first point of
contact for external off-budget donors and needs to keep track of all external resources to ensure their
efficient use within the overall reconstruction context.
Implementation at Provincial/ Regional Level

The institutional structure for recovery recognizes the lead role of the provincial and regional
governments in reconstruction implementation based on the reconstruction policies and strategies
issued by the federal government.
Each of the provincial/regional governments will establish a Reconstruction Committee to provide

overall guidance and oversight at the provincial/regional level for the implementation of on-budget
reconstruction programs. The Committee may include: (i) the Chief Minister (Chair), (ii) an
opposition Member of the Provincial Assembly, and (iii) the Secretaries of the departments involved
in reconstruction implementation.
A Provincial/Regional Government-Donor Coordination Group will be established to serve as a forum

to coordinate the implementation of on- and off-budget reconstruction programs. The group will
include representatives of the Planning and Development Departments (PDDs) and other relevant
departments, a representative from the federal Nodal Agency and representatives of the reconstruction
partners with major programs in the province/region.
The PDD will be the provincial/regional Nodal Agency and as such will be responsible for
coordination of reconstruction implementation. It will ensure compliance with reconstruction policies
and strategies across the various sectors. PDD will also ensure that fast-track procedures will be
operationalized for reconstruction implementation.
The PDD will establish a dedicated Reconstruction Unit that will be the focal point for reconstruction
planning and coordination, and M&E. The unit will act as the clearing house for reconstruction pro-
grams to be approved at Federal or the Provincial level. The Unit will also facilitate the participation
of off-budget partners in reconstruction implementation provincially/regionally.
The existing provincial forums will approve the reconstruction projects submitted by the provincial
departments. A representative of the federal Nodal Agency will be co-opted in the approval forum at
the provincial level to increase coordination and improve synergies. With regard to federally
transferred funds, the provinces will have the authority to approve projects up to a threshold to be
determined by the Government, including the possibility of unlimited delegated authority to approve
subprojects under umbrella PC-Is approved at the federal level.
Line Departments will be responsible for the preparation of reconstruction projects in their respective
sectors and implementation of these following their approval. Line Departments with a large
reconstruction program may need to establish a dedicated reconstruction unit. Reconstruction
implementation may need to be outsourced where departments lack the required resources.
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The District Offices will be involved in small-scale local level reconstruction programs. They will
also facilitate the implementation of off-budget reconstruction programs and establish a district-level
coordination forum for this purpose.
Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) System Design and Implementation

The demand for urgency, transparency and the need to be able to respond to the dynamic situation on
the ground as the flood response develops, requires an effective Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)
system in place at the outset. Monitoring is challenged by dispersed implementation across a range of
sectors and the diverse information needs of multiple partner, donors, decision makers, general public,
affected population and implementation agencies.
The Project Monitoring & Evaluation System (PMES) currently used at the federal Planning
Commission captures the Public Sector Development program (PSDP) funded projects by the
federation only - its basic point of reference is the PC-1 and annual plans. It is mainly used to monitor
physical progress and fund allocation and use. It does not currently offer adequate connectivity to the
provincial PSDP or donor funding. It is a web based program for which access is being slowly
extended to all federal line ministries.
The provincial M&E systems independent of the PMES also use PC-1 as a point of reference in their
design. However the quality, extent and operation of these systems varies substantially between
provinces. Almost all these systems are outside the public domain, and are not designed to capture
any activity outside the PC-I. No qualitative data is being captured by these systems although some
pilot work is ongoing under PMES. The only M&E system that has extended its boundaries to include
multiple sources of funding, diverse information needs of multiple stakeholders and provides
information to the general public has been designed by the Government of Punjab (GoPb).
M&E System for Flood Reconstruction

Reconstruction activities have special M&E needs that are not necessarily aligned with PMES. The
reconstruction programs are expected to be financed both on- and off-budget, by multiple sources of
funds provided by multiple donors. There are reconstruction programs that are not PC-I based such as
in housing and cash grants, and many others where in-kind support is being extended such as in
agriculture and livestock. In addition an M&E system supported by an MIS in reconstruction provides
information to coordinate the reconstruction activities between multiple agencies and also provides
management information for efficient decision making. Similarly reconstruction information and
reporting has to be efficient to facilitate delivery in short timeframes; this requires multiple access and
control of the systems.
It is important that reconstruction requirements do not undermine but supplement and strengthen
existing M&E systems, without overloading them with activities that may not go beyond the
reconstruction phase. Based on these consideration the Government may consider a two-pronged
strategy for M&E: a) strengthening PMES, by consolidating existing requirement and adding modules
that are common to reconstruction and the future needs of the system; and b) develop an M&E/MIS
capturing the reconstruction requirements not served by existing and future needs of the PMES, with a
well developed interface in case of future disasters.
The model developed by Punjab serves as a very good starting point but this will have to be reviewed
in the context of the multiplicity of requirements in sectors/themes and players whose information
needs have to be met. All provinces and regions may not have the same technical capacity, so the
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system design and its use has to take account of these limitations. The recommended approach is to
start with a basic system, and build this up incrementally once it starts operating.
The attached line diagram shows the monitoring responsibilities at different levels. The M&E system
for reconstruction may be developed at the federal Nodal agency level. Implementation would take
place at different levels, for which additional capacities and training would have to be provided at the
relevant levels of the provinces, districts and off-budget donors to operate such a system.
Figure 21A-28: Suggested Reconstruction Policy, Strategy and

Implementation Coordination Mechanisms (From ADB-WB, 2010)
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Figure 21A-29: Suggested Flow of Funds and Coordination Mechanisms (From ADB-WB, 2010)
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Need to Document Lessons Learned from the Year 2010 Super-flood

It is assessed as important to document the lessons learned from the year 2010 super-flood in Pakistan
to provide guidance to Pakistan and other countries in Asia on how to prepare for and fight the same
level of catastrophic water disasters in the future.
It is proposed to hold an International Conference on Lessons Learned from the Year 2010 Pakistan
Super-flood on Asia. The out come of the Conference will be written proceedings published by an
internationally recognized publisher of water resources publications. Each chapter of the Proceedings
will be authored by internationally and nationally recognized experts in their fields.
Recent past super-water disasters in Asia also to be considered include:

1. Christmas day tsunami -
2. Irrawaddy flooding in Myanmar
3. Cyclones in Bangladesh
4. Other similar disasters
Potential topics of Chapters of the Proceedings of the Conference are:

1. Impact of global and regional climate change on the location, severity, duration and extent of
super-flooding in Asia
2. Water Resources and water management of the Indus River Basin
3. Morphology of the Indus River Basin
4. Flooding in the Indus River Basin
5. Hydrology and hydraulics of the year 2010 super-flood
6. Impacts of the super-flood: Individual sectors
7. Response – Relief
8. Recovery – Rehabilitation and reconstruction
9. Flood preparedness – Future
10. Flood management – Future
11. Financing of recovery from super-flooding
12. Governance and capacity building for management of super-flooding
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA, under the WSIP-I project, should consider sponsoring an International
Conference on Lessons Learned from the Year 2010 Pakistan Super-flood on Asia. The out come of
the Conference will be written proceedings published by an internationally recognized publisher of
water resources publications. Each chapter of the Proceedings will be authored by internationally and
nationally recognized experts in their fields. Chapters will be on:
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider full funding of the International Conference on Lessons
Learned for the Year 2010 Pakistan Super-flood on Asia under the WSIP-I project.
Early contact with the World Bank as sponsor of the WSIP-I project is recommended.
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Performance Assessment of SIDA for the Year 2010 Super-flood

It is instructive to study and assess the performance of SIDA before, during and after the year 2020
super-flood to find lessons learned to improve Authority performance in future water disasters and
floods.
The format of the assessment is effectively performed within the various components of the Disaster
Risk Cycle presented above. The components of SIDA’s response to the year 2010 super-flood within
the disaster risk cycle are shown in Table 21A-24.
Table 21A-24: Performance Requirements of SIDA to the Year 2010

Super-flood within the Disaster Risk Cycle
Storms, Water logging,
Disaster Floods cyclones & salinity and salt Drought
Phase tsunami water intrusion
Development of Development of Development of Development of
effective Flood Integrated Water Resource Water Resource
Plain Management Coastal Zone Management Management
Programme Management Master Plan Master Plan
Establish Disaster Programme Establish Disaster Establish Disaster
Management Unit Establish Disaster Management Unit Management Unit
(DMU) Management Unit (DMU) (DMU)
Construction of (DMU) Construction of Support for
bunds Development of drainage systems planting of drought
Development of storm prediction Construction of tolerant crops and
flood prediction & and warning irrigation systems plant species
warning systems systems Efficient allocation
Prevention/ Construction of salt
Afforestation of Construction of water intrusion of scarce water
mitigation
riverine forests tide barriers barriers supplies
Construction of Afforestation of Construction of tube Upgrading of
flood control basins mangrove forests wells irrigation systems
to protect against to minimize water
Construction of Construction of water
storms losses
early warning level and salinity
systems Construction of monitoring stations Construction of
storm and tsunami early warning
Adding global Adding global
warning systems systems
warming concepts warming concepts to
to flood Adding global water disaster Adding global
management warming concepts management warming concepts
to storm & tsunami to drought
management management
Implementation of Implementation of Implementation of Development of
effective Flood Integrated Water Resource Water Resource
Plain Management Coastal Zone Management Management
Monitoring of Management Master Plan Master Plan
hydro- Programme
meteorological Monitoring of
Preparedness observation systems meteorological
Management of observation
flood retardation systems
basins Construction &
Implementation of marking of
flood plain evacuation routes
management
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Storms, Water logging,

Disaster Floods cyclones & salinity and salt Drought
Phase tsunami water intrusion
Preparation of Emergency Action Plan
Establishment of disaster damage reporting methodology
Implementation and training of Disaster Management Unit
Operation and monitoring of early warning systems
Operation and maintenance of irrigation and drainage systems
Preparedness Preparation of catalogues of historical water disaster and flood location, intensity and
(Continued) frequency
Preparation of hazard maps
Preparation of emergency communication systems
Repair material stockpiling
Training and emergency drills
Monitoring of changes to water disaster hazards from climate change effects
Implementation of Emergency Action Plan
Implementation of Command and Control
Implementation of coordination and cooperation
Response
Implementation of emergency communication
Reporting of disaster damage assessments and measurements
Monitoring of secondary disasters
Integrated River Basin Management
Integrated Flood Plain Management
Integrated Coastal Zone Management
Rehabilitation/ Irrigation and drainage rehabilitation planning
reconstruction Updating of disaster damage assessments and measurements
Appropriate land use planning
Disaster resistant reconstruction of irrigation and drainage infrastructure
Livelihood support
Assessment of SIDA Performance – Prevention/Mitigation

The Prevention/Mitigation performance of SIDA prior to the events of the year 2010
supper-flood may be made by assessing strengths and weakness of the Authority’s actions
based on the activities presented in Table 21A-24.
 Development of effective Flood Plain Management Programme
 Establish Disaster Management Unit (DMU)
 Development of flood prediction and warning system
 Construction of bunds
 Afforestation of riverine forests
 Construction of flood control basins
 Construction of early warning systems
 Adding global warming concepts to flood management
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Assessment of SIDA Performance – Preparedness

The Preparedness performance of SIDA prior to the events of the year 2010 supper-flood
may be made by assessing strengths and weakness of the Authority’s actions based on the
activities presented in Table 21A-24.
 Implementation of effective Flood Plain Management Programme
 Monitoring of hydro-meteorological observation systems
 Management of flood retardation basins
 Implementation of flood plain management
 Preparation of Emergency Action Plan
 Implementation and training of Disaster Management Unit
 Operation and monitoring of early warning systems
 Operation and maintenance of irrigation and drainage systems
 Preparation of catalogues of historical water disaster and flood location, intensity and
frequency
 Preparation of hazard maps
 Preparation of emergency communication systems
 Repair material stockpiling
 Training and emergency drills
 Monitoring of changes to water disaster hazards from climate change effects
Assessment of SIDA Performance - Response

The response of SIDA to the events of the year 2010 supper-flood may be made by assessing
strengths and weakness of the Authority’s activities based on the activities presented in Table
21A-24.
Emergency Management Planning

An Emergency Management Plan is the basis for application of command and control.
Important questions after an event are:
 Based on lessons learned from the event, does the Emergency Action Plan Need to be
improved?
 What factors, if any, could mitigate the risk of the incident recurring?
Command and Control

Command and Control (C and C) is an important concept in Disaster Risk Management. If it operates
effectively, the agency is usually assessed as competent in managing the emergency; if it does not
operate effectively, the agency is always assessed as being incompetent in managing the emergency.
Command during emergencies is called the management structure during other times. An easy way to
understand the term is to recognize that it operates only within an agency or organization. It is the
responsibility of each agency to establish a command structure that will enable it to manage its own
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resources during an emergency. Important questions to ask about command during an assessment of
performance after an emergency are:
 Were the command structures adequate?
 Did the structures operate effectively?
 Was the application of the personnel and physical resources, both internal and external,
adequate to fulfill tasks and responsibilities that were agreed by the Agency to undertake ?
 Were the tasks and responsibilities that the agency has agreed to undertake effectively
managed by Agency Managers and their line managers ?
 Can the command structure be improved?
Control during emergencies is about leading the strategy ofor the management of the event.
The designated agency responsible for responding to water disaster and flood events in the
Lower Indus River Basin should be assessed on the following basis:
 Was there an effective strategy or strategies for the management of the incident and
the recovery
 Was the strategy effectively applied?
 Can the strategy or strategies be improved?
Coordination and Cooperation

Effective Command and Control during a disaster event requires coordination. Coordination
and Cooperation during emergencies is about bringing together resources to support the
activities of agencies involved in the management of the incident. Important questions after a
disaster event are:
 Were the resources to support the activities of the agency or agencies effectively
coordinated through effective cooperation?
 Can coordination and cooperation be approved?
Assessment of SIDA Performance – Rehabilitation/Reconstruction

The Rehabilitation/Reconstruction of SIDA following the events of the year 2010 supper-
flood may be made by assessing strengths and weakness of the Authority’s activities based on
the activities presented in Table 21A-24.
 Integrated River Basin Management
 Integrated Flood Plain Management
 Integrated Coastal Zone Management
 Irrigation and drainage rehabilitation planning
 Appropriate land use planning
 Disaster resistant reconstruction of irrigation and drainage infrastructure
 Livelihood support
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Assessment of SIDA Performance - Rehabilitation/ reconstruction

An assessment of SIDA Performance for the Rehabilitation / Reconstruction Phase of the Year 2010
super-flood considered the following categories of actions:
 Integrated River Basin Management
 Integrated Flood Plain Management
 Integrated Coastal Zone Management
 Irrigation and drainage rehabilitation planning
 Appropriate land use planning
 Disaster resistant reconstruction of irrigation and drainage infrastructure
 Livelihood support
 Other components
Assessment
The assessment of the performance for all phases of the Disaster Risk Cycle exercised by
SIDA before, during and after the year 2010 super-flood is given in Tables 21A-25.
Based on this assessment, it is recommended that SIDA implement an improved programme

of Disaster Risk Management to manage all future water and flood disasters. This improved
Disaster Risk Management programme should focus on improved coordination and
cooperation with other agencies of government and with civil society. The improved Disaster
Risk Management Plan should also include an improved Emergency Management Plan with
appropriate training and drills.
PROJECT IDEA: SIDA should consider developing a new Disaster Risk Management Programme
for managing all future water disaster and flood emergencies. The new programme should be based
on a new improved Emergency Master Plan. The development of the improved Disaster Risk
Management Programme could be a component of the new Master Plan.
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Table 21A-25 ‘A’: Assessment of Prevention/Mitigation Practice by SIDA prior to the Year 2010 Super-flood
No. Component Performance Required in current Flood Actual performance prior to Recommended changes
Management Programme
assessment year 2010 super-flood
1 Flood Management Programme Planning
2 Disaster Management Unit Development
3 Flood prediction and warning Development
4 Bunds Construction
5 Afforestation of riverine areas Planting
6 Flood control basins Construction
7 Early warning system Establishment
8 Other non-structural interventions Development
9 Other structural interventions Development
10 Damage assessment methodology Adoption
11 Global warming Inclusion
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Table 21A-25 ‘B’: Assessment of Prevention/Mitigation Practice by SIDA prior to the Year 2010 Super-flood
No. Component Performance Required in current Flood Actual performance prior to Recommended changes
assessment Management Programme
year 2010 super-flood
1 Flood Management Programme Implementation
2 Flood plain management Implementation
3 Emergency Action Plan Development
& implementation
Disaster Management Unit Implementation
& training
Hazard mapping Preparation
Emergency communications Implementation
Repair material Stockpiling
Early warning system Establishment
& monitoring
Flood prediction Monitoring
Bunds O&M
Afforestation of riverine areas O&M
Flood control basins O&M
Other non-structural interventions O&M
Other structural interventions O&M
Training & emergency drills Implementation
Damage assessment methodology Implementation
& training
Global warming Inclusion
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Table 21A-25 ‘C’: Assessment of Response Performed By SIDA during the Year 2010 Super-flood
No. Component Performance Required in current Actual Recommended
assessment Emergency Action performance in changes
Plan year 2010
super-flood
1 Emergency Action Was there an Emergency Action Plan in place before the event
Plan
1.1 Based on lessons learned from the event, does the Emergency Action Plan
Need to be improved
1.2 What factors, if any, could mitigate the risk of the incident recurring
2 Command Was there a Command structure in place before the event
2.1 Were the command structures adequate
2.2 Did the structures operate effectively
2.3 Was the application of the personnel and physical resources, both internal
and external, adequate to fulfill tasks and responsibilities that were agreed
by the Agency to undertake
2.4 Were the tasks and responsibilities that the agency has agreed to undertake
effectively managed by Agency Managers and their line managers
2.5 Can the command structure be improved
3 Control Was there a Control structure in place before the event
3.1 Was there an effective strategy or strategies for the management of the
incident and the recovery
3.2 Was the strategy effectively applied
3.3 Can the strategy or strategies be improved
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No. Component Performance Required in current Actual Recommended

assessment Emergency Action performance in changes
Plan year 2010
super-flood
4 Coordination & Was there a and coordination and cooperation system in place before
cooperation the event
4.1 Were the resources to support the activities of the agency or agencies
effectively coordinated through effective cooperation
4.2 Can coordination and cooperation be approved
5 Damage needs How effective was the performance
assessment
* EAP = Emergency Action Plan
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Table 21A-25 ‘D’: Assessment of Rehabilitation/Reconstruction Practice by SIDA

after the Year 2010 Super-flood
No. Component Performance Required in current Flood Actual performance after Recommended changes
assessment Management Programme the
year 2010 super-flood
1 Integrated river basin management Implementation
2 Integrated flood plane management Implementation
3 Integrated coastal zone management Implementation
4 Land use planning Implementation
5 Irrigation and drainage rehabilitation Planning
6 Disaster resistant irrigation & drainage Construction
7 Livelihood support Implementation
8 Other activities Implementation
9
10
11
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Gaps, Challenges, Strengths and Opportunities for Improved

Water Disaster and Flood Risk Management in Pakistan and Sindh
The following assessment of the gaps, challenges, strengths and opportunities for improved water
disaster and flood risk management in Pakistan and Sindh is based on the need to have four
components to be able to effect change in a public oriented good:
1. The Need
2. A Plan
3. The Financing – Adequate Money
4. The Political Will – Generated by a Champion
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Summary, Methodology, Key Findings, Issues and Conclusions
Task I-21 Terms of Reference and Activities

management and associated operations and maintenance (O&M) for the river basin.
The required Activities for Task I-21 were to:
Document, review and evaluate methods in use or under development, including those
concerning flood forecasting, routing, risk assessment, warning, protection, and real time flood
management, planning and operation and maintenance (O&M) of the river systems, and other
channels and water bodies in the river basin
The output of this Task was a Chapter on Flood Management as part of a Phase-I report identifying
concerns and issues for the existing state of water resource development in the study area – The Left
Bank of the Indus, Delta and Coastal Zone of the Lower Indus River Basin. Subsequent phases of this
project will develop a new Master Plan for Water Resource Management of the study area; and
specific bankable projects that will implement the new Master Plan.
The study did not make specific recommendations for the development of new procedures for managing
flood disasters in the study area. It is anticipated that in Phase-II of the study, new and improved
appropriate procedures for flood disasters will be developed for the Lower Indus Basin.
Methodology Used
All activities required to fulfil the Terms of Reference (TOR) of this assignment were performed for
all of Pakistan; and for the specific project study area which is the Left Bank of the Indus River, Delta
and Coastal Zone of the Lower Indus River in Sindh Province. A map of the project area is given in
Figure 21A-30.
Figure 21A-30: Map of the Study Area Showing the Left Bank, Delta
and Coastal Zone of the Lower Indus Basin
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The following methodology was used to fulfil the TOR for this task:
1. Assess the distinctions used for disaster management and risk assessment in the Pakistan
and the project area; including the use of the Disaster Risk Management Cycle and the all
encompassing disaster risk term water disasters in place of the more limited term flood
2. Understand the geography, climate and water resource needs of the Indus River Basin and
the project study area – Left Bank, Delta and Coastal Zone of the Lower Indus Basin
3. Catalogue and rank the forms of water disasters that put the study area at most risk: Floods,
storms, cyclones, water logging and salinity, salt water intrusion, and others
4. Assess the form of legislation governing flood (water disaster) management in Pakistan
and in the study area
5. Assess the institutions concerned with flood (water disaster) management in Pakistan and
in the study area
6. Discuss the historical experience with flood management in Pakistan and in the study area
– Including positive and negative aspects of flooding
7. Assess the technical framework used for flood management in Pakistan and in the project
area
8. Discuss and critically evaluate the response and lessons learned from the year 2010 super-
flood
9. Discuss the requirements of an Integrated Basin Flood Management Plan for the study area
– Including how the existing flood management programme of the entire Indus River Basin
and the Lower Indus River Basin
10. Present a summary of the task in the form of Gaps, Challenges, Strengths and
Opportunities for Improved Flood Management in Pakistan and in the Lower Indus Basin
A summary of lessons learned from the Year 2010 flooding in Pakistan is given in Table 21A-26.
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Table 21A-26: Summary of Lessons Learned From Year 2010 Pakistan Flooding 12
Disaster cycle category Commonly heard Impacted Proposed remediation Comment

stakeholders
criticism
Flood preparedness
Flood prediction
Flood warning
Flood management
Phase II Project Ideas

The following are ideas for Phase-II Project development given inside boxes within the text above:
1. SIDA should consider developing a comprehensive data base of historical water disaster and
flood events in the lower Indus Basin. An important data set of this database will be derived
for the year 2010 Super-flood. This database is needed to develop the new Master Plan, and to
assess the potential impact of water disasters and flooding on new projects that will be
developed to implement the new Master Plan
2. SIDA should consider adopting an internationally recognized system of disaster damage
reporting for its irrigation, drainage and flood control infrastructure
3. SIDA should consider a study for re-establishing natural flood retention basins within its
irrigation and drainage project area as a component of the new Master Plan
4. SIDA should consider a dam safety based study of the operation and performance of the
barrages under its management based on the hydrology, hydraulics and flood flows of the
year 2010 super-flood as a component of the new Master Plan
5. SIDA should consider a study of how natural flood retardation basins can be used instead of
breaching of bunds to protect barrages from damage or failure from extreme values of flood
water flows. The experience of other countries that use flood retardation basins for flood
management (China and Vietnam) should be studied as part of this component of the new
Master Plan
6. It is considered by many knowledgeable flood management experts that it is politically and
socially impossible to intentionally breach bunds during the height of a flood if a
preparedness plan based on community consultations has not been prepared before the flood
event. Also as a minimum, the breaching plan must break bunds on both sides of the river to
show the local population that the breaching is not done to favour any one landowner or
community
12
This summary is for structural and non-structural components of the disaster management cycle; it does not
include social aspects of the super flooding (search and rescue, relief, food-clothing-shelter, loss of livelihood,
and similar social oriented topics that are presented in other chapters of this Report
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7. A study of the quantity of flood water flow generated by the year 2010 super-flood flow
should be a part of the new Master Plan. It is considered important to assess new values of
flood water that must be handled by the irrigation and drainage system in the Lower Indus
River Basin – Including the required super-flood discharge requirements of the LBOD and
Tidal Link
8. SIDA should consider a dam safety methodology based study of the operation and
performance of the bunds under its management based on the hydrology, hydraulics and flood
flows of the year 2010 super-flood as a component of the new Master Plan
9. SIDA should consider using an internationally recognized methodology based study of the
cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction of its irrigation, drainage and flood protection
infrastructure damaged by the year 2010 super-flood as a component of the new Master Plan.
The damage assessment methodology should be adopted for determination of the need and
cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure after future water disaster and flood
events
10. SIDA and the Master Plan Project should consider hiring a qualified national or international
specialist river morphologist with experience on the Indus River system and the Lower Indus
River Basin. The work of this river morphology specialist is needed 1) to assess in more detail
the impact of low flows in the recent past on future river flooding; 2) to assess in detail the
expected change in River morphology as a result of climate change; and 3) to assess the
impact of sea level raise on the ability of the current irrigation drainage system to contimue to
discharge effluent from the Sindh drainage system into the sea under gravity conditions
11. The SIDA GIS and Remote Sensing Cell should develop coordination and cooperation with
the NRD Flood Damage Assessment Cell in Pakistan, and with disaster management mapping
agencies outside Pakistan. This should be part of an enhanced Disaster Risk Management
Programme for SIDA. Development of this new coordination and cooperation programme
could be a component of the new Master Plan
12. SIDA should consider a study of how the land use patterns in Sindh influenced the magnitude
of damage caused by the year 2010 super-flood, as part of a water disaster and flood risk
management component of the new Master Plan
13. SIDA should consider using Information Communication Technologies (ICT) to monitor
relief needs and response as part of the development of a Water Disaster and Flood Risk
Management component of the new Master Plan
14. SIDA should consider using the WSIP-I project to prepare lessons learned from its flood
fighting in the year 2010 super-flood as part of the development of a Water Disaster and
Flood Risk Management component of the new Master Plan
15. SIDA should consider adopting an internationally recognized methodology based method to
estimate damage and costs related to water disaster and flood damage to its irrigation,
drainage and flood protection infrastructure
16. SIDA should perform an in-depth study of engineering and political inputs that had an impact
on how it managed its irrigation, drainage and flood protection civil works before, during and
after the year 2010 super-flood
17. SIDA should consider how use and possibly guide the improvement the flood modelling and
predictive outputs of the Pakistan Met Department as part of the development of a Water
Disaster and Flood Risk Management component of the new Master Plan
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18. SIDA should consider the following components of the PARC Strategy for Restoration of
Flood Affected Areas as part of the new Master Plan
- River basin management
- Restoration of agriculture and livelihood
- Other farming system water management
19. SIDA should consider these non-structural environmental strategies as a component of any
water disaster and flood management project developed under the new Master Plan
20. SIDA should consider these lessons learned from the year 2010 super-flooding as part of the
preparation of the new Master Plan; and as components of any water disaster and flood
management project developed under the new Master Plan
21. SIDA should consider the following as should be part of the new Master Plan
- Adaptation to extreme weather and extreme magnitudes of water disasters and
flooding
- New and improved structural flood control methodologies such as controlled flooding
in flood retardation basins; and better protection of key infrastructure
- New and improved non-structural flood control methodologies such as emergency
warning and evacuation; and community rehabilitation after flooding
- The hydrological past is no longer a reliable guide to the hydrological future; and the
need to rethink the management of the Lower Indus River Basin
22. SIDA, under the WSIP-I project, should consider sponsoring an International Conference on
Lessons Learned from the Year 2010 Pakistan Super-flood on Asia. The out come of the
Conference will be written proceedings published by an internationally recognized publisher
of water resources publications. Each chapter of the Proceedings will be authored by
internationally and nationally recognized experts in their fields. Chapters will be on:
23. SIDA should consider full funding of the International Conference on Lessons Learned for
the Year 2010 Pakistan Super-flood on Asia under the WSIP-I project.
Early contact with the World Bank as sponsor of the WSIP-I project is recommended
24. SIDA should consider developing a new Disaster Risk Management Programme for
managing all future water disaster and flood emergencies. The new programme should be
based on a new improved Emergency Master Plan. The development of the improved Disaster
Risk Management Programme could be a component of the new Master Plan
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References and Resources
References
ADB-WB (2010), Pakistan Floods – Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment, Asian
Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank (WB), Islamabad, November 2010
ADPC (2005), The Disaster Risk Management Cycle, Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Bangkok,
2005
http://www.adpc.net
Gandapur, Aminullah Khan, 2008, Tarikh-e-Sarzamin-e-Gomal, National Book Foundation
Islamabad 2008, Page-261-62
Marri, Md Khan (2010), Impacts of Floods on Agriculture – The Way Forward, Drainage and
Rcclamation Institute of Pakistan (DRIP), Tando Jam, December 2010
Menon, Ali Rajab (2010), Sindh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction [After the Year 2010 Super-
flood], Keykote Address, Sindh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Conference, STP, Hyderabad, 26
September 2010
New York Times (2010), “2010 Pakistan Floods”, New York Times, Updated 07 September, 2010.
Http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/floods/2010_pakistan_floods/index.ht
ml?scp=1-spot&sq=pakistan%20floods&st=cse
OCHA (2010), Pakistan – Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan, Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian affairs (OCHA), United Nations, Geneva, August 2010
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SKEA-887J5J
PARC (2010), Assessment of 2010 Flood Impacts in Pakistan: Extent and Coverage of Impacts and
Adaptation Strategy, National Resources Division, Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC),
Final Report, October 2010
Perera, Jayantha (2003), Irrigation Development and Agrarian Change, A Study in Sindh Pakistan,
Rawat Publications, New Delhi, 2003
Idris, Rajput Muhammad (2010), Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Needs of the Irrigation and
Drainage Sector in the After-math of the Super Flood 2010, STP Conference, Hyderabad, 26
September 2010
SIDA (2010), Flood Report of River Protective Bunds, Year 2010, Left Bank Canal Area Water
Board Badin, Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA), Hyderabad, 2010
WMO (2007), “Formulating A Basin Flood Management Plan - A Tool for Integrated Flood
Management”, Associated Programme on Flood Management, World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), March 2007.
http://www.apfm.info/pdf/ifm_tools/Tools_Basin_Flood_Management_Plan.pdf
World Rivers, (2010),
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Persons Providing Information on Irrigation and Flood Protection Sector on Year 2010 Super-
flooding
Ministry Water and Power, Islamabad

Mr Zarar Aslam, Chief Engineering Adviser/ Chairman Federal Flood Commission, Ministry of
Water and Power Islamabad. Ph. +92 51 9244600
Engineer Athar Hameed, Principal Engineer, Federal Flood Commission, Ministry of Water and
Power Islamabad.
Mr. Riaz Ahmad Khan, Advisor Ministry of Water and Power, Islamabad
Pakistan Meteorological Department

Dr. Qamar-uz-Zaman Chaudhry, Director General, Pakistan Meteorological Department, Islamabad
Mr Arif Mahmood, Chief Meterologist, Pakistan Meteorological Department, Islamabad. Ph:+92 51
9250365; Fax: +92 51 9250368
National Disaster Management Authority
Mr. Mohammad Bilal, Director National Disaster Management Authority, Prime Minister’s
Secretariat, Islamabad. +92 51 9204429; cell 0302 851 8705; E-mail. bilal1963pk@yahoo.com
Mr. M. Idrees Mahsud, Director National Disaster Management Authority, Prime Minister’s
Secretariat, Islamabad. +92 51 9215391; cell 0302 851 8707; E-mail. idreesmahsud1@ndma.gov.pk
Planning Commission, Pakistan

Engr. Tahir Shamshad, Joint Secretary/ Director General (Infrastructure) Projects wing Planning
Commission, Chughtai Plaza Blue Area Islamabad. Ph: +92 51 920 1409; Fax: +92 51 920 4227;
Cell: +92 300 854 3683; Email: tahirshamshad@yahoo.com
Water and Power Development Authority

Sayed Raghib Abbas Shah, Member (Water), Water and Power Development Authority, 705 WAPDA
House, Lahore. Ph: +92 42 9920 2226; Fax: +92 42 9920 2485; Cell: +92 333 425 7879; E-mail:
memberwater@wapda.gov.pk
Mr. Hamdullah, General Manager (Hydel), WAPDA House Lahore.
Mr. Mohammad Ali Shah, General Manager (C&M) Water, Ph: +92 42 99202610; E-
mail:gmcmwater@wapda.gov.pk
Mr.Nazir Gul Afridi, Chief Engineer, Chashma Right Bank Canal (CRBC)
Mr. Muhammad Shafique, Executive Engineer, Chashma Right Bank Canal (CRBC)
Sindh Irrigation and Power Department

Engr Mazhar Ali Shah, additional Secretary Irrigation and Power Department, Government of Sindh,
Karachi. Ph: +92 21 9211446; Cell: +92 300 301 6620: E-mail: mzhr107@yahoo.com
International Organizations
Mr. Tomohiro Kozono, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Representative in Pakistan.
Ph: +92 51 924 4500; Fax: +92 51 924 4508; Cell: 0334 513 1839, Email:
Kkozono.Tomohiro@jica.go.jp
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Mr. Mohsin Rose, Project Development Officer, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations. Ph: +92 51 2655881; E-mail: Mohsin.Rose@fao.org
Key Agencies of Government Associated with Flood Management and Research

Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA)
www.sida.gov.pk
Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC)
http://www.parc.gov.pk/
Drainage and Reclamation Institute of Pakistan (DRIP), Tando Jam
http://icpsr.org.ma/?Page=showInstitute&InstituteID=DRIP113&CountryID=Pakistan
Directory of Pakistan Government Agencies
http://www.google.com/Top/Regional/Asia/Pakistan/Government/
Federal Flood Commission (FFC)
http://www.ffc.gov.pk/
Resources
GOP Super-flood website
http://www.pakistanfloods.pk/
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Project Portal for Asia and the Pacific
http://www.drrprojects.net/drrp/drrpp/home
Water Sector Improvement Project Phase-I (WSIP-I)

http://www.wsip.com.pk
Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority – General information

http://www.sida.gov.pk
Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority – Flood management information
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ANNEX 21A-A: PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAPS OF THE FLOOD DAMAGE TO WATER

RESOURCE INFRASTRUTURE
Photos of Flood Damage in Pakistan and Sindh
Figure 21A-A1: Flood Damage in Indus River Basin
Figure 21A-A2: State of Flooded Areas on 15 August 2010
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Photos of Irrigation Flood and Infrastructure Damage in Sindh
Figure: Bund Breach Locations And Inundated Areas
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From breach point to exit to river, more than l=250km

b=30km, it takes a month or more to reach
Inundated Water Expected Flow
Figure: system inundated area by JAXA ALOS Satellite, 27 Aug. (Red Color for Inundation)
Figure: Breach Point of Flood Protection Embankment in of Pinyari Canal
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Figure: Schematic Diagram Of Embankment Breach
Figure: Inundated Area at Bund Breach Section in Sindh
Figure: Typical Failure Pattern of Unprotected Embankment Slope in Sindh
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Figure: Riprap damage on Bund

(The maximum flood level was around 1m below the bund crest)
Figure: Flood Fighting Activities in Sindh
Figure: Breached Bund Section in Sindh
Figure: Sluice Gate Failure in Sindh
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ANNEX 21A-B: HISTORICAL FLOOD LEVELS MEASURED AT BARRAGES IN SINDH
PEAK DISCHARGES AT GUDDU, SUKKUR AND KOTRI BARRAGE
KOTR LAG % Rec

YEAR GUDDU Barrage SUKKUR BARRAGE DADU MORO KORI BARRAGE
GAUGE SUK Kotri
Date U/S D/S Date U/S D/S Date Gauge Date U/S D/S
Cu ft/sec Cu ft/sec Cu ft/sec Cu ft/sec ft Cu ft/sec Cu ft/sec ft day %
1955 - - 30.8.55 804760 765270 6.9.55 804536 791221 24.7 7 105
1956 - - - 10.8.56 998112 979377 14.8.56 982771 980529 26.4 4 100
1957 - - - 4.8.57 707260 661230 11.8.57 561488 542156 20.5 7 85
1958 - - - 18.8.58 1097624 1049869 24.8.58 764094 743749 24.5 7 73
1959 - -- 11.8.59 948817 906000 18.8.59 679391 658268 24.5 7 75
1960 - -- 25.8.60 684858 646000 1.9.60 502258 483171 20 7 78
1961 - - 23.8.61 648619 601349 29.8.61 446097 441554 19.2 6 74
1962 - - - 25.8.62 432457 390385 27.8.62 300908 276792 15.2 2 77
1963 6.8.63 547938 501535 20.8.63 522552 478902 1.9.63 322341 299982 16.1 12 67
1964 27.8.64 - 701700 29.8.64 710010 682793 6.9.64 536278 524349 20.3 8 79
1965 5.8.65 660303 571444 7.8.65 664573 515166 11.8.65 410012 381315 16.6 4 80
1966 16.8.66 613158 559136 18.8.66 .665028 618240 23.8.66 619373 587145 17.8 5 100
1967 12.8.67 677657 650949 15.8.67 656945 610382 20.8.67 519884 505238 16.8 5 85
1968 21.8.68 651447 626197 23.8.68 585896 537215 28.8.68 561604 544696 17 5 105
1969 20.8.69 683212 653416 23.8.69 658157 606963 31.8.69 553247 529145 17.7 8 91
1970 8.9.70 349292 325237 10.9.70 326043 281551 16.9.70 260448 255495 15.4 6 93
1971 17.8.71 613242 584513 19.8.71 581600 527372 24.8.71 294915 266502 15.4 5 56
1972 15.8.72 407586 375561 17.8.72 374971 320685 26.8.72 210988 186346 14 66
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KOTR LAG % Rec

GAUGE SUK Kotri
1973 19.8.73 1083742 1062954 22.8.73 1115576 1076542 30.8.73 811648 785829 25.4 8 75
1974 4.9.74 324271 294768 6.9.74 306387 275431 7.9.74 164262 133472 14.8 1 60
1975 30.8.75 1002496 987943 2.9.75 1051316 1024884 9.9.75 490468 476436 19.2 7 48
1976 15.8.76 1199290 1176450 17.8.76 1200132 1161472 24.8.76 791992 765392 25.3 7 68
1977 12.8.77 541400 519800 13.8.77 521950 484140 18.8.77 349532 323107 17 5 72
1978 18.8.78 1155873 1138272 20.8.78 1116430 1092770 27.8.78 722139 710739 24.3 7 66
1979 11.8.79 523719 503423 11.8.79 501334 458766 15.8.79 301078 293562 16.75 4 66
1980 16.8.80 652045 622958 18.8.80 615778 560521 21.8.80 283037 253857 15.8 3 50
1981 6.8.81 729122 693524 8.8.81 631359 582995 26.8.81 316246 302172 16.2 18 _
1982 19.8.82 486119 463561 20.8.82 465000 414857 25.8.82 125.2 29.8.82 249260 219661 13.9 9 60
1983 10.9.83 758655 736248 19.8.83 754943 719293 15.9.83 128.8 19.9.83 493163 474311 19.3 69
1984 4.9.84 647753 625512 6.9.84 608883 560609 9.9.84 127.3 14.9.84 371171 384895 16.85 8 66
1985 15.8.85. 425835 393724 16.8.85 387238 333391 17.8.85 123.9 19.8.85 186019 156489 13 3 56
1986 13.8.86 1173292 1172010 15.8.86 1166574 1122874 20.8.86 130.65 25.8.86 502940 471369 19 10 45'
1987 3.9.87 343067 315711 5.9.87 316245 263829 8.8.87 122.6 10.9.87 152790 122639 12.5 5 58
1988 31.7.88 1162653 1138676 31.7.88 1118856 1069426 5.8.88 132.3 18.8.88 660618 649594 23.5 18 62
1989 9.8.89 944888 914485 11.8.89 910295 866800 14.8.89 128.3 16.8.89 309088 282615 16.25 6 36
1990 6.7.90 589430 555544 8.7.90 551526 498791 19.7.90 128.3 23.7.90 307818 274840 15.9 15 62
1991 26.6.91 606211 567612 27.6.91 567165 511288 29.6.91 127.8 7.8.91 300766 270917 15.7 10 59
1992 1.8.92 709838 700148 2.8.92 703200 693600 20.8.92 129.1 24.8.92 555965 549972 20.3 22 80
1992 18.9.92 1086919 1069268 20.9.92 1064200 1022065 26.9.92 130.1 30.9.92 689309 673809 21.8 10 67
1993 31.7.93 626412 590421 2.8.93 564348 506313 31.7.93 127.6 6.8.93 420417 389477 18.1 4 83
1994 29.7.94 773300 739901 2.8.94 757350 738050 7.8.94 130.8 13.8.94 800381 793522 23.6 11 107
1994 17.8.94 738439 718930 19.8.94 670381 625381 26.8.94 825177 817749 24 7 132
1995 3.8.95 988410 970156 7.8.95 985929 939554 15.8.95 131.3 19.8.95 799435 771365 24.4 12 85
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KOTR LAG % Rec

GAUGE SUK Kotri
1996 14.8.96 588461 553842 15.8.96 552503 493333 29.8.96 412917 384462 18.8 14 83 "
1997 5.9.97 786612 763093 8.9.97 831280 807772 26.9.97 130.1 13.09.97 321180 301979 16.5 5 40
1998 23.7.98 667493 631585 25.7.98 628874 572564 02.08.98 295986 263998 15.9 8 52
1999 16.8.99 418975 390225 18.8.99 389260 334030 21.8.99 124.9 23.8.99 220680 189294 13.3 6 66
2000 6.8.2000 208090 171635 9.8.2000 170775 117675 9.8.2000 120.1 12.8.00 66471 47845 8.3 6 56.48
2001 30.7.01 253215 219803 31.7.01 222021 168935 2.8.2001 120.4 5.8.01 95205 61670 8.2 6 56.35
2002 21.8.02 284241 255102 22.8.02 242690 186440 25.8.02 120.7 27.8.02 105972 78648 9.6 6 56.83
2003 4.8.03 396194 365355 5.8.03 333340 297663 10.8.03 126.9 12.8.03 240907 231417 16 8 81
2004 1.8.04 146506 116524 3.1.04 101419 42449 6.8.04 115.75 8.8.04 30648 23188 4.3 6 72
2005 23.7.05 548147 515870 25.7.05 508427 447407 1.8.05 128.15 14.8.05 310495 274283 16.8 21 69
2006 14.8.06 596390 569431 16.8.06 554078 511898 22.8.06 127.75 27.08.06 371870 356516 17.9 12 72
2007 22.8.07 347407 322587 24.8.07 303610 258660 27.8.07 124.1 28.8.07 157340 136081 13.5 5 61
2008 13.8.08 279476 256189 14.8.08 250040 196010 17.8.08 123.5 19.8.08 138204 103139 11.8 6 70
2009 24.8.09 263342 231132 26.8.09 195717 134620 28.8.09 123.3 01.9.09 120498 115473 12.1 7 89
2010 08.8.10 1145738 1148200 10.08.10 1130995 1108795 17.8.10 132.3 27-8-10 964897 939442 26.8 17 87
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ANNEX 21A-C: THE CASE FOR THE KALABAGH DAM
Case for the Kalabagh Dam

The Nation, a Punjab Province-based daily newspaper, began a campaign this month for one of the
most controversial dam projects, the Kalabagh dam, which is opposed by communities in the
northwest of Pakistan whose land would be flooded, and also in this southern province, where people
fear it would cause even greater water shortages in the delta.
The case for the Kalabagh dam has long been deadlocked by fierce disagreements between Pakistan’s
four provinces, and in particular by the most powerful and populous province, Punjab, against the
other three — Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and Sindh — which complain they have always
been short-changed in the decisions over natural resources.
Even the military dictator Gen. Pervez Musharraf failed to push the project through during his nine
years in power because of resistance in the provinces. The governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, a
strong advocate of the dam who has done a study on the issue, said it was necessary to meet pressing
electricity and water demands of Pakistan’s growing middle class. Pakistan does not have a dam to
catch the heavy monsoon rains, and if Kalabagh had been built it would have prevented the recent
flood damage in north-western Pakistan, he contended.
Yet the people of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, formerly called the North-West Frontier Province, who have
long opposed the dam because it would deluge their lands, said the floods had proved their long-held
position that towns like Nowshera, which suffered badly in the flooding, would be harmed more by a
dam below the town at Kalabagh.
In Sindh, the fishermen, and also many farmers, oppose plans for more dams and irrigation projects
on the Indus, and advocate turning to coal power rather than hydropower for Pakistan’s electricity
needs, Mr. Shah, the Fisherfolk Forum representative, said.
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ANNEX 21A-D: INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL PRESS ARTICLES CONCERNED WITH

THE YEAR 2010 SUPER-FLOOD IN PAKISTAN13
Attempts to Tame Indus River Contributed to Disaster in Pakistan, Expert Says14
By Robert Mackey August 18, 2010
NASA A satellite image of the Indus River around the Pakistani city of Jacobabad on Tuesday taken by NASA.
Waters have swollen considerably around Sukkur, where a barrage modifies river flow. The image was made
from a combination of infrared and visible light
In a radio interview broadcast on Wednesday, Daanish Mustafa, a scholar who studies the intersection
of development and water resources, told the BBC that attempts to tame the Indus River, beginning
during British rule in the 19th century, laid the foundations for the deadly floods that swept Pakistan
this month.
Mr. Mustafa, who teaches at King’s College in London and has worked on social development and
environmental preservation projects in Pakistan, also suggested that changes in weather patterns may
force the country to rethink fundamentally the way it manages the river that is its most precious
natural resource.
Mr. Mustafa noted that “Pakistan exists because of the Indus,” which makes fertile the land in its
flood plain. But, he added, “poor management” of the river for more than a century seems to have
made devastating floods more likely. He said:
One cannot pin blame on the last six months or last year or something, this is something that’s been
going on for 150 years — and not just in the Indus. It’s been happening in most major river valleys
around the world, where there’s a balance between protecting yourself from excess water in the river
and of course reaping the benefits of the flood plain, the fertile soil that you get there, crops that you
can grow there.
13
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/floods/2010_pakistan_floods/index.html?
scp=1-spot&sq=Pakistan%20floods&st=cse
14
New York Times, 18 August 2010
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So Pakistani society in a manner of speaking has made a Faustian bargain whereby we have
substituted high-frequency low-intensity floods for low-frequency, high-intensity events. The reason
being that every river has a pulse — flood pulses that happen — and the Indus used to have the same.
But ever since we started regulating it, started trying to tame it, put it between levies, put down
infrastructure, barrages and stuff, rivers like to move around and we don’t want them to move around.
If you’re going to put down a barrage and have a river go somewhere else, we don’t want it to do that.
It doesn’t have room to expand; it doesn’t have room to flow the way it used to flow. We have
controlled its pulses by walling it in. So when you wall it in, and then you divert — out of 144 million
acre-feet of water that gets into the system, we annually divert about 106 million acre-feet of water —
which means that there’s just not enough flow in the main stem river on average to carry the sediment
load that it has, which it deposits, with the result that the channel capacity is reduced significantly.
In a lot-less-than-ideal world you would have lots of wetlands and unfortunately the river managers in
Pakistan — and that may also be true of river managers around the world — do not recognize the
importance of wetlands to modulating the flow, the kind of ecosystems services that wetlands provide
in terms of recharging the groundwater in terms of biodiversity and all those things. Those are not
romantic things, those are very, very material to the livelihoods of the poor people who live in these
flood plains. Instead, unfortunately, the focus has been on dams, which have their usefulness, but
wetlands unfortunately have been drained and have been settled and have been removed, with the
result that the river’s excess water has no place to go.
It’s a disaster that has happened; it’s going to happen again and again and again. The kinds of
monsoonal patterns you’re seeing this year are very unusual. The scary part is that this sort of unusual
monsoonal pattern we have seen about four or five times this past decade. …
We certainly have to think about, well, what if this becomes the pattern, then what? The way we have
been managing the system is not going to work. It will not be to the benefit of our society and the
costs will far outweigh the benefits that we are getting. …
Let’s sort of reevaluate, what do we want this river to do? What are the sorts of hazards, what are the
sorts of opportunities for equitable sharing, if you will, of the benefits as well as prevention of the
hazards. Because it turns out the poorest people, who benefit the least from the irrigation system also
happen to be the ones who suffer the most. And that doesn’t seem like a very fair situation to me and
that’s what we need to confront.
Farmlands Inundated by Flood Waters 15
By Mohammad Hussain Khan, 24 September 2010

MORE areas in Dadu and Jamshoro districts inundated by floodwater will make it impossible for
growers to sow crops in the coming Rabi season. The entire right bank area is expected to make
nominal contribution to the Rabi crop. The government is still going through early recovery
programme for flood-hit farmers, and still assessing the damages. But official sources say some
incentives like subsidy on farm inputs are being planned for growers.
Water will take some time to recede from farmlands and then growers will need time to prepare or
level their lands for the Kharif season next year, provided the government announces the required
15
Dawn, Md. Hussain Khan, 24 September 2010, www.dawn,com
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subsidies. Agriculture department officials say only 60 per cent area in Larkana district and 20 per
cent in Shikarpur district have remained safe while the rest has been inundated.
Last year, wheat was cultivated on 2.7 million acres because of an attractive support price of Rs950
per 40kg. Growers in Jacobabad, Kashmore, Qambar-Shahdadkot, Larkana districts, who used to
produce gram, got interested in growing wheat. Even katcha area has been producing wheat,
sugarcane, cotton and paddy.
The wheat sowing target has not been fixed as yet. Rabi season in Sindh commences from November
1 and according to an agriculture department official, the sowing continues as late as January 10 in
lower Sindh. Government seems to be planning to focus on wheat cultivation in areas which remained
unaffected on the left bank, barring Thatta district.
The Sindh Abadgar Board (SAB) president Abdul Majeed Nizamani observes that in view of the
present situation, sunflower cultivation seems to be the only option for growers and the government
should also capitalise on it. Sunflower crop can be sown as late as February in upper Sindh which
remained unaffected and where water is receding. “We can save our import bill by producing edible
oil through sunflower production on 1.5 million acres. It is currently grown on 500,000 acres,” he
says.
Nizamani estimates that government can save on an import bill of Rs85 billion by investing Rs12
billion on subsidy on inputs like DAP, urea, seed and Rs3,000 for land preparation per acre.
Sindh Chamber of Agriculture president Dr Nadeem Qamar is hopeful about wheat cultivation on the
left bank, provided irrigation department officials work effectively to provide water on time. He,
however, sees no chances of Rabi crop on Indus right bank area. “The area is completely devastated
by floods. I see no future for Rabi crop for our right bank counterparts,” he said.
According to Senior Member, Board of Revenue, Syed Ghulam Ali Shah Pasha, the main problem is
that upper Sindh area doesn’t have any drainage system which can make water recede. “Water table in
these areas is already high. I don’t see chances for Rabi crop there,” he says. Growers need to make
their land cultivable first for which the government is committed to support them, he remarks.
Upper Sindh growers have late sowing patterns as compared to lower Sindh region for Rabi. Area that
is normally brought under cultivation for wheat in Dadu and Jamshoro districts is currently bearing
the brunt of floodwater due to breaches in the Main Nara Valley Drain (MNVD) and Manchar Lake.
The farm labourers have also suffered badly due to flood. Displaced, they are staying in relief camps
in different cities. They have to return first to their native towns for their landowners to start
cultivation.
The irrigation system also stands damaged in upper and lower Sindh by floodwaters. Performance of
irrigation department has never been impressive. While a quarter of population of Sindh was affected
by flood, a big population of growers kept demanding availability of water for their Kharif crop.
Two persons are reported to have committed suicide in upper Sindh due to non-availability of water
for their crops. Growers’ protests still continue in areas of left bank in Sindh for supply of irrigation
water.
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Poor ‘Marketing’ Blamed for Pakistan Aid Shortfall16
By Robert Mackey – 17 August 2010

A report from Britain’s Channel 4 News on Monday showed Pakistanis struggling to cope with the
devastation brought by flooding.
As international aid trickled into Pakistan to help flood victims, Mark Malloch Brown, a former
deputy secretary general of the United Nations, criticized the country’s leader for failing to make the
scope of the destruction and the urgency of the need clear to international donors.
In an interview on Tuesday, Mr. Brown told the BBC, “this is a very confusing crisis” and a visit by
President Asif Ali Zardari to Europe – with a stop at his family’s chateau in France – while monsoon
rains ravaged large portions of his country, had not been helpful:
The leadership of Pakistan on the civilian side has gotten off to a rather muddled and slow start. It’s
very hard for donor governments — let alone donor public opinion — to be entirely convinced at the
seriousness of a crisis when the country’s president is filmed at his own private chateau in France or
continuing with government visits to the U.K.
Crises, it’s a terrible thing to say but, you know, they require disciplined marketing. There needs to be
a clear message that lives are at stake and the whole of the domestic effort of the country is devoted to
trying to save those lives.
Mr. Brown also said that Pakistan’s military leaders “were very effective in Kashmir a couple of years
ago after the earthquake and again they seem to be sort of pushing the civilian leadership aside and
taking control and frankly that’s probably good news.”
Her added that the relief effort was now a competition between “the efficiency of these two rival
systems: Islamic relief agencies versus the one institution of the Pakistani state which works, the
army.”
As my colleague Waqar Gillani reports, “With disastrous flooding spreading yet more widely in
Pakistan, reports of looting and protests over food on Tuesday deepened the sense of desperation
across Punjab Province, the country’s most populous region and its agricultural hub.”
There were also clashes between the police and flood victims at an aid distribution point in southern
Sindh Province on Tuesday, according to images shown on Pakistani television.
This video report from Al Jazeera on Tuesday showed residents of the Swat Valley in the country’s
devastated northwest lining up for hours in the rain to be winched across a raging river in a precarious
basket — the only way to cross now that all the bridges have been washed away:
Floodwaters Threatening the South of Pakistan17

Multan Pakistan (20 August 2010) - Surging waters are shifting flood damage southward in Pakistan,
as the water level rises at one of the main flood barriers north of the city of Hyderabad, officials said
Friday.
16
17
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The next two days will be critical for the city’s 1.5 million people, but bunds strengthened over the
last 10 days offer some protection, said an officer at the flood control room there, who gave his name
as Major Ehsan. “We have done a lot of work, making sandbags and stone pitches to build up the
bunds,” he said.
The Indus River, which has flooded five to seven miles beyond its banks, is flowing at a rate of more
than 700,000 cubic feet per second, he said, which is expected to rise to 800,000 cubic feet per second
in the next 24 hours at the flood barrier, called the Kotri barrage, he said. “If the water coming does
not exceed that, we will be able to pass through this,” he said.
Villages upriver are still being inundated, and although most of the population has been evacuated
from low-lying areas, the military was still getting phone calls from people stranded in their homes
and was sending out rescue boats, he said.
The floods, which have stricken about one-fifth of Pakistan’s territory, were set off by torrential
monsoon rains in the northern highlands that began July 28. Water tore through the upper part of the
country with terrifying velocity, and it is now spreading out through the flood plains of central Punjab
and southern Sindh Provinces on its way to the Arabian Sea.
Questions have been raised about the national and local preparedness, whether there were delays in
warning local officials of the pending flooding and whether officials who were alerted failed to react
promptly. On Friday, government officials warned that high tides in the Arabian Sea expected next
week will add to the flooding in the coastal areas south of Hyderabad.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has accepted an offer of $5 million of aid made by its archrival India, after
several days of hesitation. Receiving assistance from India is politically delicate in Pakistan, and the
government can expect criticism from some of the religious and nationalist parties that support the
fight for an independent Kashmir, the contested region split between India and Pakistan.
India also donated assistance after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and the
government also waited then before accepting the offer. As of Friday, the United Nations had received
more than $263 million, plus more than $54 million in additional pledges. “This is not just Pakistan’s
hour of need — Pakistan is facing weeks, months and years of need,” said Ban Ki-moon, the United
Nations secretary general.
A Lifetime, Washed Away18

Rahimyar Khan, Pakistan (18 August 2010) - A few days ago, I stood atop a 30-foot-high levee in
Pakistan’s south Punjab, looking out as the waters from the greatest Indus River flood in memory
flowed past, through orchards, swirling around a village on higher ground half a mile out. Twenty
miles wide, the flood was almost dreamlike, the speeding water, as it streamed through the upper
branches of trees, carrying along bits of brightly colored plastic and clumps of grass.
Many of the displaced people had left the area in the past few days, driving whatever was left of their
herds, carrying whatever they were able to rescue. In Pakistan, your primary loyalty is to your
biraderi, an untranslatable word, something like clan, but more visceral and entailing greater
responsibility and connection. You marry among your biraderi, you must travel and be present when a
member of your biraderi is married or buried and, in times of trouble, you stand by your biraderi. In
Frost’s words, they are the people who, when you have to go there, they have to take you in.
18
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The hundreds of people camped on the levee were those who had no biraderi outside the flooded area,
or who couldn’t afford to make the journey to them. Each family had claimed a little spot, made it
home, rigged up some sort of shelter like a blanket on a frame of branches. Many had rescued a bag or
two of grain, and they sat combing this out in the dirt, trying to dry it. As I walked past, I could smell
that much of the grain had spoiled, a bitter loamy odor.
These families’ poverty and loss shone in the little piles of their belongings, the things they had
carried with them when the water came: two or three cheap tin plates, a kettle. In one family’s
encampment, discordantly, sat a dresser with a mirrored door — how did the man who had brought
that through the floodwater think it would be useful?
I found most pitiful a family gathered around a prostrate brown-and-white brindled cow. The father
told me that the cow had been lost in the water for four days, and the previous night it had clambered
up on another section of the levee, a mile away. The people of this area recognize their cattle as easily
as you or I recognize a cousin or neighbor — they sleep with their animals around them at night, and
graze them all day; their animals are born and die near them. Someone passing by told the family that
their cow had been found, and the father went and got it and led it to their little encampment.
In the early morning the cow had collapsed, and I could see it would soon be dead. Its eyes were
beginning to dull, as the owner squatted next to it, sprinkling water into its mouth, as if it were
possible to revive it. Its legs were swollen from standing in water, and its chest and torso were
covered with deep cuts and scrapes, sheets of raw flesh where branches rushing past must have hit it.
The rest of the family sat nearby on a string bed, resigned, waiting for the end. This was their wealth,
but when it died they would tip it into the water and let it float away to the south. Through the past
few days they had seen it all, houses collapsed, trees uprooted, grain spoiled, and this was just one
more blow.
Driving back to my farm, which has (so far) been spared from the flood, an image of the cow’s ordeal
kept coming to me: splashing through the flood for hours and hours, at dusk or in the blank overcast
night, with nothing around it but a vast expanse of water stretching away, an image of perfect
loneliness. It must have found high ground, waited there as the water rose, then set off again, driven
by hunger. In the immensity of the unfolding tragedy, this littler one, this moment of its death, seemed
comprehensible to me, significant.
It is difficult to convey the scope of what was lost by those who had labored with ax and shovel to
bring this land under cultivation. Fifty years ago, the area was all savanna, waving fields of reeds and
elephant grass running for a thousand miles on both sides of the river. As a boy, I hunted there for
partridge, walking among a line of beaters, the tall grasses so dense that I was invisible to the next
man only 10 feet away. This was wild country.
But in the years since, these people tamed the land, leveling it by hand, expanding their plots acre by
acre, until they had conquered it all. Last year, from where I stood on the levee, one would have seen
orderly fields proceeding all the way to the river on the horizon. These lands had not been flooded in
living memory, and so people built solid houses and granaries, planted trees, raised mosques. This
was their life’s work.
Now all that has been swept away. In this area, the best-paying crop by far is sugar cane, which was to
be cut in November but now stands submerged, except for the tips of the fronds, dead and rusty gray
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on the surface. When the water recedes, the people will, if they are lucky enough to have any, sell
their cattle and their wives’ ornaments, their dowry gold, to rebuild the watercourses and to level the
fields. Some will plant winter wheat, but it will be sown late and will not pay, not enough to cover the
costs of reclaiming the land.
Others may plant another crop of cane, which will be sown in February and harvested the following
October, 14 months away. Before that, they will have no income whatsoever. The generosity of these
people’s relatives, their biraderi, cannot possibly carry them through. They are ruined, and there are
millions of them.
This disaster is not like an earthquake or a tsunami. In the 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan,
80,000 people died more or less at one blow; whereas the immediate death toll from this flood is
likely to be in the low thousands. The loss of property, however, is catastrophic. It is as if a neutron
bomb exploded overhead, but instead of killing the people and leaving their houses intact, it piled
trees upon the houses and swept away the villages, crops, and animals, leaving the people alive.
For months and even years, the people of the Indus Valley will not have sufficient income for food or
clothing. They will rebuild, if they can afford it, by inches. The corrupt and impoverished Pakistani
government cannot possibly make these people’s lives whole again. It’s not hard to imagine the
potential for radicalization in a country already rapidly turning to extremist political views, to
envision the anarchy that may be unleashed if wealthier nations do not find a way to provide sufficient
relief. This is not a problem that will go away, and it is the entire world’s problem. It is said, the most
violent revolutions are the revolutions of the stomach.
Experience Isn’t Enough in Pakistani Flood Plain19

Kunal Sharif, Pakistan (22 August 2010) - Half of the primary school for girls was shorn right off by
the floodwaters that passed through here 20 days ago. The rest of the red-brick building now gapes
over a steep drop to a new waterway that never existed before.
Within hours, 20 feet of water surged into this village on the night of Aug. 1 when the torrent in a
nearby canal breached its walls and spilled across farmland and villages for miles. A local police
constable raised the alarm and most people got out, wading through waist-high water, but three people
— an elderly couple and a 13-year-old girl — died when their house collapsed on them, villagers said.
Some of the flooding in this part of southern Punjab Province was caused intentionally as officials
sought to divert the torrential flow away from the large towns, power stations and national assets. But
here, the breach was unintentional and catastrophic. At least 150 houses were damaged in this village
alone. Later, army engineers blew openings in an embankment to the southeast and drew the water
away to the Chenab River.
As they sat in tents on the high ground, or on rope beds in the nearby bazaar, waiting for the floods to
recede, villagers, like many around the country, tried to make sense of the calamity and argued over
whom to blame.
Criticism has been leveled at the government for everything from uncontrolled logging that has
caused extensive deforestation in the northern mountains, years of neglect of the canal system and
river bunds, failure to build the necessary dams to capture the monsoon rains and glacial runoff, and
virtually no warning system to announce flood alerts.
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In Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, the hardest hit region in north-western Pakistan, officials had just a
few hours to act and little understanding of the damage the unusually strong torrent would cause.
But in Punjab Province, a traditional flood plain that is criss-crossed with canals, flood barrages and
sluice gates to handle the annual floodwaters, officials had long experience of floods, and at least 48
hours warning of the torrent that was heading their way. That has caused many here to accuse the
government of failing to act and even of officials or powerful landowners of protecting their own
lands at the expense of others.
Ali Abass, 55, a labourer, was angry. The brick walls of his family house had collapsed in the seven
feet of water that reached his village, and now he was living in a tent on sand dunes on the edge of
Kunal Sharif with his family. “It was a decision to save the town of Muzaffargarh, but the town would
not have been inundated anyway,” he said. “No one told us, and in 10 hours the water flooded
everything,” he said.
The governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, a successful businessman who was visiting the area on
Saturday and stopped in to see the broken school, dismissed the accusations as “all ignorance and
nonsense.”
There is a breach committee whose job is to decide when and where to breach canals and waterways
in times of flood, and the army then comes in and lays the explosives, he said. “When a dike is
breached, it is a very technical issue,” he said. “It cannot be done individually.”
Officials delayed making the necessary breaches too long in some areas, but it was understandable
because it was not an easy decision to flood areas, he said.
The governor praised government workers for working round the clock to protect four power stations
threatened in the province. One worker died from electrocution as he worked in the water at one
station, but the workers succeeded in hoisting the distribution system above the water so the power
station could keep operating, he said.
One of the more prosperous farmers of Kunal Sharif, a tall man dressed in white clothes and a white
turban, Ghulam Shabir, 30, confirmed that the breach that destroyed much of the village was
accidental. “It was an act of God,” he said.
Nevertheless, Mr. Shabir is facing ruin and is looking to the government for help. He lost his fish
farm that extended over 30 acres and several belonging to neighbours’ that he was managing, and has
lost an investment of $25,000. He has not been able to reach his house since evacuating the family at
night on their tractor, but he pointed to it across the expanse of water, half-submerged behind a rusty
gate.
Prices have doubled, cattle feed is not available and the farmhands and labourers are in real hardship,
he said. He said he did not trust the government to provide any assistance: “The rich people will get
the money.” He was hoping that the government would instead waive the bank loans many farmers
have taken out. “If the loans are waived that will be a big relief,” he said. “The whole Muzaffargarh
District is affected.”
The governor was visiting the area to bring relief assistance but also to put out the message that the
government was working hard and would help the people. “Today, I brought relief goods, and this is
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only the first. Afterwards, we will try to rehabilitate you, and we will stand by you,” he told displaced
people gathered in a nearby town, Thata Sial.
There have been fears of unrest among the estimated four million made homeless by Pakistan’s
largest floods, but most of those interviewed in the area showed a resigned dignity despite their
destitution.
A man thrust a folded paper into a reporter’s hand. “It is requested that this person is very poor, who
bought a buffalo after a lot of hard labor. It has died in the flood, and it is requested you help,” it read.
It was signed with a thumb print, by Muhammad Amin, from the village of That Salay, in Jhok Kalay
Khan. Attached with a small piece of string was a photocopy of his ID card that showed he was 32.
Pakistan Flood Sets Back Infrastructure by Years 20

Sukkur, Pakistan (26 August 2010) - Men waded waist deep all week wedging stones with their bare
hands into an embankment to hold back Pakistan’s surging floodwaters. It was a rudimentary and
ultimately vain effort to save their town. On Thursday, the waters breached the levee, a demoralizing
show of how fragile Pakistan’s infrastructure remains, and how overwhelming the task is to save it.
Even as Pakistani and international relief officials scrambled to save people and property, they
despaired that the nation’s worst natural calamity had ruined just about every physical strand that knit
this country together — roads, bridges, schools, health clinics, electricity and communications.
The destruction could set Pakistan back many years, if not decades, further weaken its feeble civilian
administration and add to the burdens on its military. It seems certain to distract from American
requests for Pakistan to battle Taliban insurgents, who threatened foreign aid workers delivering flood
relief on Thursday. It is already disrupting vital supply lines to American forces in Afghanistan.
The flooding, which began with the arrival of the annual monsoons late last month, has by now
affected about one-fifth of the country — nearly 62,000 square miles — or an area larger than
England, according to the United Nations.
At the worst points, the inundation extends for scores of miles beyond the banks of the overflowing
Indus River and its tributaries, said Cmdr. Iqbal Zahid, a Pakistani Navy battalion commander in
charge of rescue operations in Sindh Province.
“You have to highlight that the infrastructure all the way from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa to Sindh is
ruined,” Commander Zahid said, referring to Pakistan’s northernmost and southernmost provinces. “It
will take years to rebuild.”
Nearly 20 million people have been significantly affected, about the population of New York State,
the United Nations said. The number in urgent need is now about eight million and expected to rise.
More than half of them are without shelter.
The government’s estimates of the damage are equally grim. More than 5,000 miles of roads and
railways have been washed away, along with some 7,000 schools and more than 400 health facilities.
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Just to build about 500 miles of road in war-ravaged Afghanistan, the United States spent $500
million and several years, according to the Web site of the United States Agency for International
Development.
And the agency has spent $200 million to rebuild just 56 schools, 19 health facilities and other
services since the momentous earthquake in the Pakistani-controlled portion of Kashmir in 2005.
One estimate, in a joint study from Ball State University and the University of Tennessee, put the total
cost of the flood damage at $7.1 billion. That is nearly a fifth of Pakistan’s budget, and it exceeds the
total cost of last year’s five-year aid package to Pakistan passed by Congress.
Standing on the edges of the floods, the scale of the damage is evident. The water has torn mile-long
breaches atop two of the main canals in Sindh Province, where tens of thousands of people were
evacuated Thursday. Until the gaps can be repaired, water will continue flooding districts along the
right bank of the Indus, officials said.
Floodwaters have ripped up the road from here to Jacobabad, cutting off the main highway that
reaches both Baluchistan Province, Pakistan’s poorest, and into Afghanistan, one of the main supply
routes used by United States forces.
What the waters have not destroyed, rescue workers have been forced to, in some cases. In the
southern provinces, Pakistani government workers pointed out places where they had to blow up
roads, bunds and even the railway line to steer the flow of water away from the larger towns.
The velocity of the floods was greatest in northern Pakistan, home to steep mountain valleys, and the
infrastructure damage there was the worst.
The mountainous Swat Valley, which was still struggling to rebuild from the army’s campaign against
Taliban insurgents, has lost every bridge and whole sections of its roads. An entire neighborhood of
the town of Madyan, along with the hospital compound and an electricity station, were swept away,
leaving sand and stones in their place.
Great chunks of the famed Karakoram Highway — a celebrated feat of high-altitude engineering built
by the Chinese over two decades — have disappeared as cliffs fell away in the torrent. The route,
which winds hundreds of miles from the Chinese border in the Himalayas to the Pakistani capital,
Islamabad, may now be impassable for years, officials said.
A number of hydroelectric dams in the north, which are being built by China, have also been
damaged. Five workers, including two Chinese engineers and three Pakistanis, drowned when floods
swept through one construction camp earlier this month, the government reported.
The United States has agreed to help the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank conduct a
damage and needs assessment for the Pakistani government. The figure is bound to be big.
The recovery cost will have to be met by a mixture of domestic money, international donations and
loans from development banks, the administrator of A.I.D., Dr. Rajiv Shah, said after a tour of
flooded regions on Wednesday.
The lack of electricity, especially through the infernally hot summer months, is a constant problem for
the government and a reason for repeated strikes and public protests throughout Pakistan, even in
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ordinary times. The damage to the electricity and power sector alone could run to $125 million,
according to a government report shown to The New York Times.
Water and energy were a prime focus of the five-year $7.5 billion American aid package for Pakistan
passed by Congress last year. The Obama administration had hoped to use the legislation as the
centerpiece of a lasting strategic partnership with Pakistan and to help buttress the economy and
Pakistan’s weak government institutions.
Now, American officials fear that money will end up being spent just to get Pakistan back to where it
was before the “super flood.” The United States has already redirected $50 million of the aid package
to help with the flood recovery, and the disaster will force a review of all projects that had been
planned, Dr. Shah said.
“Priorities will necessarily have to shift and shift so that there is more of a recovery and
reconstruction approach than people were thinking just a few months ago,” he told reporters during a
trip to Sukkur.
He and other American officials are insisting that the disaster be treated as an opportunity for Pakistan
to “leapfrog” ahead and help it build water and energy systems better than what was destroyed.
They point to successes that grew out of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, namely the creation of the
National Disaster Management Administration, which is now spearheading the government response
to the floods. But diplomats said government accountability and reforms in the rule of law would have
to accompany the effort and the aid money.
“This is going to be very, very difficult, this is a huge scale disaster,” Dr. Shah said. “But we have to
continue to be optimistic and look for those opportunities to help Pakistan to use this to build back
better.”
Floods Stunt Pakistani Fight against Insurgents21

Kalam, Pakistan (13 September 2010) - The destruction caused by the recent floods and the huge
relief effort undertaken since by the Pakistani Army have forced it to alter plans to combat Taliban
and Qaeda militants, Pakistani military officials here said.
Troops who have been fighting Islamist militants in the Swat Valley for the last two years will have to
stay here for six months longer than planned, army officers here said. Elsewhere, some planned
offensive actions have been converted to defensive actions to consolidate gains already made, Maj.
Gen. Athar Abbas, spokesman for the military, said in a telephone call.
While the changes do not appear to involve any major retrenchment in the nation’s counterinsurgency
strategy, they are the first sign of the strain the countrywide flooding has put on Pakistan’s armed
forces, which are overstretched in dealing with a virulent insurgency. The Pakistani military has
already delayed operations against North Waziristan, the central hub of militancy and Al Qaeda,
because it says its forces are overextended.
The armed forces had to divert 72,000 men at the peak, including army and navy commandos of its
Special Services Group, to do the heavy lifting of the flood rescue and relief effort, as well as provide
security for United States helicopters that have joined the relief effort.
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The Pakistani military insists that not many of the 147,000 troops deployed in the northwestern region
have been diverted by the floods and that continuing operations against militants in the border region
with Afghanistan have not been affected. Troops are continuing to conduct offensive operations in
several places, like the Orakzai and Khyber regions, General Abbas said.
Yet the floods have disrupted communications and supply lines for the army as well as the civilian
population in places like the Swat Valley, and have forced the army to divert helicopters to relief
efforts, the general conceded.
“It has drawn the army’s attention for different reasons,” he said.
The army has moved to safeguard gains made in recent months against militant networks in South
Waziristan, Bajaur and Orakzai and will continue to deny the insurgents space to maneuver, he said.
“In some places where the army was on offensive operations, they have taken defensive positions,” he
said.
General Abbas said he was unaware of any specific plans for deployments in the Swat region, except
that the army was building four permanent military garrisons in the Swat Valley. But during a recent
visit to Kalam, a small mountain resort at the northern end of the Swat Valley, Pakistani officers said
they would be delaying plans to withdraw.
The army had been planning to scale down military operations and hand over policing to a
strengthened police force by October, said Col. Nadeem Anwar, deputy commander of the army
brigade deployed in the Swat Valley. That plan has now been postponed at least six months until next
spring or summer, he and other security officials said.
The valley has been largely cleared of militants after two years of a sometimes brutal military
campaign, yet militants keep seeking to slip back into the valley and make a show of their presence.
In the days immediately after New York Times journalists visited Kalam, catching a ride on a United
States Marine helicopter that was ferrying aid up the valley, militants attacked two schools in the
district, bombing one and setting another on fire.
The Pakistani Army unit based in the town of Kalam is continuing counterinsurgency operations,
including night patrols in the surrounding mountains, to watch for any return of militants. “We know
their favorite places,” one commando said.
Yet at the same time the unit is managing a large-scale relief effort, with a constant daily flow of
helicopters bringing in humanitarian assistance and ferrying townspeople out. The army is also
running a tented camp and providing for nearly 4,000 homeless people, registering and dispensing
humanitarian parcels to many more who are affected by the floods, and organizing 300 workers to
start clearing more than two miles of road covered by landslides.
Colonel Nadeem was sent in from the brigade’s base in Mardan to oversee relief work in Kalam, so
that counterinsurgency operations would not be interrupted. A corps of army engineers has also been
sent lower in the valley to work on restoring communications, building temporary bridges and
reopening roads.
The Swat Valley was one of the first regions in Pakistan to be hit by flooding and was among the
worst hit. Though there seems to be little local enthusiasm for the army presence — residents said
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they were afraid to speak to a reporter in the presence of the military — many people here owe their
lives to the presence of the army.
After four days of torrential monsoon rains, it was army officers who first noticed the danger signs
when they encountered two unusually big landslides that cut the main road below Kalam around dusk
on July 28.
As the river visibly rose, the army ordered the evacuation of some 6,000 Pakistani tourists from hotels
along the riverbank, as well as townspeople from the houses and shops on the other side. By 9 p.m.
the river had turned into a raging torrent that swept away the town’s bridge, a four-story riverside
hotel, and houses and shops. Such was the force of the water that it permanently altered the course of
the river.
A month later an army engineer was organizing the construction of a temporary metal bridge, inching
it across the river with the combined muscle power of several dozen civilian workers. On the other
side of the river, men worked feverishly to mix cement and prepare a strong base for the bridge.
Nearby villagers carrying donated sacks of flour crossed a footbridge made of freshly hewn tree
trunks on the start of a long trek to their homes further up the valley.
“No food is reaching here. All the bridges are down,” said a farmer, Afsal Khan, 25. “There are no
facilities; everyone is trying to get down the valley.” He was lined up with hundreds of other men
hoping to catch a ride down the valley on a United States Navy helicopter to buy supplies for his
family. It would be a 24-hour hike — for some a two-day trek — to carry them back up the mountain
to their homes, he said.
Army engineers have already set up temporary bridges lower in the valley and hope to open a rough
road, passable by light jeeps, within a month. But Colonel Nadeem estimated it would take months, or
longer, to reopen the valley to normal freight trucks. That will not only hamper the military operation
but also leave thousands of farmers — who cannot move their produce down the valley to market or
bring up basic staples and agricultural necessities — dependent on aid, he said.
Taliban insurgents, meanwhile, are intent on continuing their campaign of violence, yet they seem to
be aiming at soft targets, using sleeper cells to set off car bombs and suicide attacks rather than
instigating direct military clashes with the army, General Abbas said. There have been several serious
suicide bomb attacks in the cities, he said, but no significant ground action by militants since the onset
of the floods.
Instability and Aid

The destruction could set Pakistan back many years, if not decades, further weaken its feeble civilian
administration and add to the burdens on its military.
The floods in Pakistan have upended the Obama administration's carefully honed strategy in a country
that was already one of its thorniest problems.
Pakistan is a central pillar of American regional strategy to combat the Taliban and Al Qaeda but also
a place long troubled by a weak government and economic woes. Hard-line Islamic groups stepped in
to provide aid where the government has failed to reach; the United States also sent aid with an eye to
improving its reputation among ordinary Pakistanis.
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For the past year, the Pakistani government and the military were engaged in a campaign to restore
public services in Pakistan’s northwest, trying to rebuild trust after more than two million people were
displaced in 2009 when government forces launched a major offensive against militants. But the
reconstruction efforts were painfully slow, and the public mood shifted from frustrated to furious.
The country's infrastructure was devastated by the floods in the summer of 2010. More than 5,000
miles of roads and railways were washed away, along with some 7,000 schools and more than 400
health facilities.
The United Nations appealed for international donations of $460 million, but only one-third of that
had been provided as of August 16. The World Bank pledged to reroute money from other projects to
provide $900 million in emergency funds to help recovery efforts.
The United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, who flew over the country on August 15 with
President Asif Ali Zardari, said he had never seen such a disaster and urged foreign donors to speed
up their assistance. President Zardari, who came under stinging criticism for making a trip to Europe
as the flood disaster unfolded, made his first tour of flood-hit areas on August 12.
At Risk for Disease

United Nations officials said that a shortage of aid funds left some six million people, the majority of
them children and infants, at risk of potentially lethal diseases borne by dirty water.
Photo: K.M. Chaudary/Associated Press
Aid workers confirmed the first reports of cholera in the Swat Valley of the northwestern Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa Province and in the remote Rajanpur district in Punjab Province.
Cholera is common in South Asia during the rainy season, but flooding that overflows outhouses and
sewage canals compounds the problem. The authorities’ ability to contain the disease depends on
whether they can get antibiotics to people who are ill and clean water to people who are not.
Food Shortage Fears

Even as the government and international relief workers struggle to get food and clean water to
millions of flood-stricken Pakistanis, concerns are growing about the enduring toll of the disaster on
the nation’s overall economy, food supply and political stability.
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Providing clean water for millions and avoiding the spread of diseases like cholera are the first
priorities. But there are also looming food shortages and price spikes, even in cities. There is also the
danger that farmers will miss the fall planting season, raising the prospect of a new cycle of shortfalls
next year.
The prospect of immediate hunger combining with long-term disruptions to food supplies was a chief
concern. The floods have submerged about 17 million acres of Pakistan’s most fertile croplands, in a
nation where farming is an economic mainstay. The waters have also killed more than 200,000 head
of livestock, and washed away large quantities of stored commodities that feed millions throughout
the year.
While dire conditions threaten rural communities, severe inflation and shortages of fresh produce
loom for even large urban centers relatively unaffected by the floods, like Karachi.
Floodwaters Give New Life to Pakistani Class Dispute22

THATTA, Pakistan — Despite being flooded out of their homes and forced to camp on bunds, there is
one community that is happy about Pakistan’s worst floods in living memory. They are the fishermen
of the Indus River delta, whose livelihoods have diminished over the years from a lack of water, and
who welcome the sudden abundance.
“It is a blessing,” said Yar Ali Mallah, 21, who comes from a long line of fishermen living in the
delta, at the southern end of Pakistan. “When good water comes, our livelihoods will improve, fish
will come,” he said.
Yet even as the fishermen rejoice at the floodwaters, other, more powerful figures are calling for more
dams and irrigation projects upstream to contain the water flow and prevent such wide-scale
destruction in the future. The “superflood” has reopened longstanding disputes over water
management all along the Indus River, which runs the length of Pakistan, and many of the poorer
victims fear that they will once again be ignored in favor of rich and powerful interests.
Pakistan’s government will have to grapple not only with the needs of millions of people who
suddenly lost homes, crops and livelihoods, but also with the explosive political repercussions over
water distribution and how to spend reconstruction assistance fairly.
“Unless there is a radical break from the past, new measures are likely to favour large World Bank-
funded projects that sequester still more of the resources of this river into the hands of the powerful,
rather than focusing on the long-term survival of marginalized communities such as delta fisherpeople
or smallholders in the upper reaches of the valley,” Alice Albinia, author of a book on the Indus,
“Empires of the Indus,” wrote in an e-mailed reply to questions.
The damage done to the Indus delta by nearly 100 years of extensive irrigation upstream — perhaps
the largest in the world — is well documented. It has made Pakistan a food and cotton exporter and
helped enrich landowners the length of the river. But so much water is used up that the Indus, one of
Asia’s greatest rivers, runs virtually dry before reaching the delta, where the river empties into the
Arabian Sea.
The lack of river water has allowed sea water to inundate some two million acres of the delta,
destroying once fertile paddy fields and killing off coastal mangroves, which are the natural breeding
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ground for fish, say leaders of the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum, a nongovernmental organization that
works to support the rights of the fishermen communities.
Floodwaters, with their nutrient-rich silt deposits, are critical to the survival of life on the delta and of
fish stocks, said Gulab Shah, a social worker and district president of the Fisherfolk Forum in Thatta.
“The River Indus has so many canals, dams and barrages that water does not come into the river, and
because of the shortage of fresh water, the fish catch has gradually decreased,” he said.
The fishermen say their fathers and grandfathers recall netting far larger catches in their day. The
famous Palla fish, a saltwater fish and delicacy here in Sindh Province that would swim up the Indus
to breed, has not been seen for years, said Allah Dino, 30, another fisherman.
The fishermen live a precarious life in wooden shacks on islands in the river delta and fish in the
small freshwater lakes created by the meandering river. A group camped on an embankment just
outside Thatta, a river town about 70 miles east of the southern port of Karachi, said that over the last
40 years they lost their homes four times because of floods and once because of a cyclone. Each time
they rebuilt their houses without any help from the government, and will do so again, they said.
They are more concerned about better regulation of the river that would allow the natural flood cycle
to replenish the delta, they said. “The permanent solution is continuous water in the Indus and for it to
flow into the sea,” said Mr. Mallah, the fisherman who welcomed the floodwaters. Yet they have
powerful competitors for the water upstream who say the floods show that Pakistan must build more
dams to collect the monsoon rains and produce more badly needed electricity.
Floods Could Have Lasting Impact for Pakistan23

KARACHI, Pakistan (August 16, 2010)) — Even as the government and international relief workers
struggle to get food and clean water to millions of flood-stricken Pakistanis, concerns are growing
about the enduring toll of the disaster on the nation’s overall economy, food supply and political
stability.
More rain fell on Monday, adding to the worst flooding in memory and confronting Pakistan with a
complex array of challenges, government and relief officials warned. Though they range over the
immediate, medium and long term, nearly all need to be addressed urgently.
Providing clean water for millions and avoiding the spread of diseases like cholera are the first
priorities. But there are also looming food shortages and price spikes, even in cities. There is also the
danger that farmers will miss the fall planting season, raising the prospect of a new cycle of shortfalls
next year.
“There was a first wave of deaths caused by the floods themselves,” said Maurizio Giuliano, a United
Nations spokesman. “But if we don’t act soon enough, there will be a second wave of deaths,” caused
by a lack of clean water, food shortages and diseases transmitted by water or animals.
“The picture is a gruesome one,” Mr. Giuliano said.
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The prospect of immediate hunger combining with long-term disruptions to food supplies was a chief
concern. The situation confronting Maqbool Anjum, 50, a small-scale wheat farmer in the Khanpur
area of southern Punjab Province, was typical.
For the time being, he said in an interview by telephone: “We don’t have food rations in our house.
There isn’t a single grain of flour with us right now.”
For the last three weeks, he said, he and his family have survived on bread and pickles. There was no
dry wood to light a fire in the stove. “What we’re doing is breaking off legs from our wooden bed and
using that.”
No one from the government or any relief organization had contacted them. Still, in less than two
months, he and his brothers are supposed to reseed the soil on about eight acres they own for next
year’s wheat harvest. That may be impossible now.
His seeds are lost, as is the cotton crop on part of that land, along with any income it may have
brought. Two of his brothers’ homes were destroyed. For the time being he would try to survive on
his wife’s salary of $50 a month as a health worker. But the prospect of mounting debt seemed
inevitable.
“It’ll take three to four years before we can grow anything on our land again,” he said.
Of the 4,000 people in his village, half of them also own agricultural land and were similarly wiped
out.
His struggle is multiplied by many millions across the country. The floods have submerged about 17
million acres of Pakistan’s most fertile croplands, in a nation where farming is an economic mainstay.
The waters have also killed more than 200,000 head of livestock, and washed away large quantities of
stored commodities that feed millions throughout the year.
Relief workers warned that if farmers like Mr. Anjum missed the deadline to reseed in the fall
planting season, the nation could face long-term shortages.
“If we miss, we’re in real trouble,” said David Doolan, a senior officer of the United Nations’ Food
and Agricultural Organization in Pakistan. “We need to ensure livelihoods, so that next year we’re not
still saving lives.”
The United Nations has appealed for $460 million in international donations, but only about a third of
that has been provided so far. Relief officials were clearly concerned that donations from abroad
would fall short of what was needed, especially when compared with those for relief of other recent
disasters, like the earthquake in Haiti.
“An earthquake is a much more dramatic, emotional, telegenic event because it happens so quickly,”
said John Holmes, the humanitarian aid coordinator at the United Nations. In Pakistan’s case, he said,
“What is clear is that we need a lot more, and we need it quickly.”
It seems impossible that the country could absorb the cost of the calamity on its own. Bridges, power
plants and communications networks have been lost or severely damaged across the country, a fifth of
which is estimated to be under water. Arbab Alamgir Khan, Pakistan’s minister for communications,
said damage to roads alone was estimated at $76 million.
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The loss of even nonfood crops, like cotton for the nation’s textile industry, could undercut the
nation’s ability to recover.
With 20 percent of cotton washed away, Pakistan’s famed textile industry, which accounts for 60
percent of the country’s exports, is certain to stagger. As a result, textile plants are likely to make
large-scale layoffs. Plants that do manage to purchase cotton will face electricity shortages, as more
than seven major power stations have been demolished.
While dire conditions threaten rural communities, severe inflation and shortages of fresh produce
loom for even large urban centers relatively unaffected by the floods, like Karachi.
Karachi relies on Punjab for about 70 percent of its fresh foods and has fed itself on food stored in
warehouses since the floods arrived in late July. But even those supplies will be depleted by the end of
this week, according to local officials and wholesale food suppliers, and the small quantities of Punjab
produce that survived the floods are now held up by disruptions in transportation.
Already, prices of fresh foods have more than doubled in Karachi’s markets, and the city’s food retail
association and government officials expect prices to rise by a multiple of six within the next week.
Farid Qureshi, who heads the Karachi Retail and Grocers Group, said that he had not received
packaged milk since July, and that his inventory would run out in less than a week. His own company
supplies packaged milk to 35 percent of Karachi’s retail market.
“Obviously the government hasn’t told the public the retail situation is this bad,” he said.
Agriculture experts say the government may have to import rice for the first time in more than a
decade.
Shoaib Bukhari, a provincial minister in charge of food pricing in Sindh Province, has pleaded with
wholesalers and retailers to adhere to prices fixed by the government. But he expected the worst.
“May God bless me, but there will be a catastrophe here in the next five to 10 days,” he said. “There
will definitely be a hue and cry here, strikes and large-scale problems. We’ll be hiding somewhere,
and people will be beating up the city government.”
Making matters worse, the squeeze comes during Ramadan, the monthlong Muslim fasting season,
when families normally hold elaborate evening meals to break the daytime fast.
Adding to Karachi’s worries and potential volatility, many of those displaced by the floods in rural
areas have migrated here. Last summer, when monsoon rains paralyzed the city for three days,
residents responded by attacking the offices of Karachi’s power supply company.
Economists argue that the only viable solution, as is often the case in Pakistan, will be international
loans that allow at least five-year concessions for Pakistan to pay off the debt.
“There are no other alternatives, unless the world wants Pakistan to become an even more unstable
state,” said A. B. Shahid, a retired economist who has advised the National Accountability Bureau,
the nation’s primary anticorruption organization.
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Instability is a worry both for the government and for its foreign allies. The regions suffering most
from the crisis are far more likely to breed militancy, according to a study by the Sustainable
Development Policy Institute, based in Islamabad. It found that the 20 districts with the worst food
insecurity were also home to the worst militancy. In many of those places, hard-line Islamic charities
have stepped in.
“It’s the mullah-Marxist nexus,” said Abid Suleri, the head of the institute and one of the nation’s
leading experts on food insecurity. “It’s a class conflict exploited by mullahs who say, ‘If you are
living in misery, it’s better to at least kill the infidels.’ ”
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Lessons Learned From Year 2010 Flood

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Lessons Learned From Year 2010 Flood

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SINDH WATER SECTOR IMPROVEMENT PHASE-1 PROJECT (WSIP-1)

TASK I-21: APPENDIX A

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE YEAR 2010 SUPER-FLOOD

Year 2010 Super-flooding and Impacts on Flood Management Structures

By Professor Marshall L. Silver - Ph.D. P.E.

SINDH IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE AUTHORITY - SIDA

TASK I-21: APPENDIX A

Province-based Assessment of Flood Affected Areas in Pakistan...............................................43

Lessons Learnt from 2010 Super-flood - World Rivers NGO..........................................................78

Farmlands Inundated by Flood Waters .........................................................................................138

Abbreviations and Acronyms

NHA National Highway Authority

SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission

TASK I-21- APPENDIX A:

Task I-21: Water Disaster and Flood Management in Pakistan

Task I-21 Terms of Reference and Activities

The required Activities for Task I-21 were to:

Water Hazards - Including Floods

Class of Disaster Risk

Background to the Assessment of the Year 2010 Super-flood

Disaster Cycle and Flood Management

Figure 21A-2 Disaster Risk Management Cycle

Seismic design Construction of Construction of tide Construction of

Historical Flooding in Pakistan and Sindh

Background to the Year 2010 Super-flood

Impact of Recent Flood Events in Pakistan

Table 21A-3: Major Flood Events in Pakistan

Year 2000 Super-flood in Pakistan and Sindh

Pictures of the flood devastation are given in Annex 21A-A.

No. Impact Quantity impacted Total for Percent of

Figure 21A-3: Extent of Flooding in Pakistan

Figure 21A-4: Extent of Flooding in Sindh

Meteorology and Hydrology of the Super-flood

Table 21A-5: Total Rainfall July to September 2010, Normal Rainfall

July to September 2010

Location Total Normal Percent

Table 21A-6: Total Rainfall of July to September 2010,

July to September 2010

Province / area Total Normal Percent

Frequency Analysis of the Year 2010 Rainfall

River Hydraulics of the Super-flood

Indus Flood Flows at Tarbela, Kalabagh and Chashma

Figure 21A-6: Flood flows of Indus River at Tarbela, Kalabag

Indus Flood Flows at Taunsa, Guddu and Sukkur Barrages

Indus Flood Flows at Kotri Barrage

Hydraulics of the Indus River System during the Super-flood

Flood Discharge and Frequency Analysis of the Super-flood

Locations Design 100 -yr 2010 Flood Historic Peak

Morphology of the Lower Indus River in Sindh

Flow of Flood Water to the Arabian Sea below Kotri Barrage

River Bund Breaches in Sindh

Fig 21A-14 Bund Breach Locations in Sindh and Inundated Areas

From breach point back to river > 250 km long and 30

Inundated Water Flow

Figure 21A-17: Schematic Diagram of Bund Breach of MS Bund

Assessment of the Cause of Breach of MS Bund

1. Inadequate design of the bund

Assessed Postulated Observed condition Assessment

Assessed Postulated Observed condition Assessment

Recommended Methodology for Repair of the Failed Bund Section

Impact of Super-flood on Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Protection Infrastructure

Impact on Pakistan from Past Flooding

Year Direct losses Lost lives Effected villages Flooded area