TORTS AND DAMAGES

Quasi-delict

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by

those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.

It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the
circumstance justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.

The Court declared the test by which to determine the existence of

negligence.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular

case Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act

whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is
this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from
that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.35

Elements of negligence:

The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation. Duty refers to the standard of behavior that imposes
restrictions on one's conduct.

Three kinds of negligence may form the basis of a claim, thus:

contractual negligence, civil negligence and criminal negligence.

The fundamental difference between the legal concepts

of comparative and contributory negligence is that comparative
negligence seeks to compensate the injured party at least for some part of his or
her injuries, while contributory negligence is a total bar to any damage award to
the plaintiff.

The rule on contributory negligence where the damages to be awarded are

mitigated
CASE no.1 Rakes v The Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf company

Facts:

Petitioner filed a complaints for damages against defendant company for the injury
that he suffered while he was working due to an accident that involves a railroad
used by the company for the transportation of heavy materials from the harbor to
the dock. He contends that the failure to replace the crosspiece after the typhoon
was the immediate cause of the incident.

The defendant argued that the petitioner’s fault was a contributory negligence
because it was a company prohibition to stand by the side of a hand car and that
petitioner got injured through his own negligence hence he is barred from recovery.
The defendant anchors his argument from an american court decision of Railroad
vs. Norton that the parties being mutually in fault, there can be no
apportionment of damages. The law has no scales to determine in such
cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned
the mischief.

Issue: WON the petitioner is barred from recovery because of such contributory
negligence.

Held:

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall
be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple.

Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim
not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. For
instance, the cause of the accident under review was the displacement of the
crosspiece or the failure to replace it.

This produced the event giving occasion for damages that is, the sinking of the
track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in
walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the
damage which came to himself.

Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission of
duty, that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident,
for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

Accepting, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the trial court, fixing the
damage incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos, the equivalent of 2,500 dollars,
United States money, we deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amount fairly
attributable to his negligence, and direct judgment to be entered in favor of the
plaintiff for the resulting sum of 2,500 pesos, with costs of both instances, and ten
days hereafter let the case be remanded to the court below for proper action. So
ordered.

CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer

for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first
prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the
accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to
judgment.

LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his

employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.

FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the
"Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred
through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted
in Philippine jurisprudence.

Contributory negligence is the plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable care for

their safety. Contributory negligence could reduce the plaintiff's compensation if
their actions increased the likelihood of the incident occurring.
Case no. 2 Gilchrist v Cuddy

Facts:

Gilchrist contracted Cuddy for his film. Said film was to be premiered to the public
of Iloilo in his theatre on May 26th 1913. Espejo, having the knowledge that the film
was rented by another, offered Cuddy thrice the price of the film in exchange for it
to be filmed in his theatre on the same week as Gilchrist. Gilchrist filed an
injunction against espejo and the court of Iloilo granted it. Espejo filed a cross-
complaint for damages against Gilchrist for the alleged wrong issuance of an
injunction but was dismissed by the court.

With regards to tor-dam:

If Gilchrist filed for breach of contract by inducement resulting to damages against

Espejo then under the old civil code, to wit: that a person who, by act or omission,
causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a
condition precedent to the liability of a tortfeasor that he must know the identity of
a person to whom he causes damage. Hence, Espejo shall be liable for the
damages incurred to Gilchrist by his negligent act of inducing Cuddy to breach his
contract with Gilchrist.

Issue: WON Espejo may claim damages against Gilchrist on the ground of the
alleged wrongful issuance of injunction.

WON there is a breach of contract by inducement by Espejo between Gilchrist and

Cuddy?

Held:

Espejo’s claim against Gilchrist is now precluded on the grounds of res judicata.

Tt clearly appears that there remains nothing about which to litigate, the whole
subject matter of the original action having been settled and the parties having no
real controversy to present. At the time the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga
offered their claim for damages arising out of the wrongful issuance of the
restraining order, there was nothing between them and the plaintiff to litigate, the
rightfulness of plaintiff's demand having already been finally adjudicated and
determined in the same action.
Case no. 3 WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC

Facts: Wright was on the way home on a calesa, as he crosses the street he
bumped into a railroad causing the horse to leap and the car to tumble resulting in
wright falling off the calesa and incurring injuries to himself. It was undisputed that
the rails were 6 inches above ground. Wright filed a complaint for damages against
Manila electric. The latter admitted that it was negligent in maintaining its tracks
but contended that Wright was intoxicated at the time of the accident and such
intoxication was the principal cause of the accident thus barring him from recovery.

Issue: WON ML’s contention is correct.

Held:

Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish
a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other
evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial
whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be
imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be exercised by an
intoxicated man for his own protection than by a sober one. If one's conduct is
characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he
is drunk or sober.

The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's
negligence was not as great as defendant's and under the authority of the case of
Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) apportioned the damages and awarded
plaintiff a judgment of P1,000.

Affirmed by the SC.

Case no. 4 Samson v dionisio

Facts:

Samson filed a complaint for damages against dionisio for contructing a dam at the
mouth of magos creek which empties to the bocaue river and that during rainy
seasons, the accrual of water rose to a higher level and affects the neighboring
lands including his fish pond which resulted in the escape of his 2000 fishes
equivalent to 100P. He further alleges that said creek is a property of the public and
is for public use. The defendant denies the allegation and contends that the creek is
part of the property he purchased and the dam did not injure other estates in the
locality.

Issue: WON defendant is liable for damages.

Held:

Article 339 of the Civil Code provides that:

Property of public ownership is that destined to the public use, such as

roads,canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and
banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.

Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission,
characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for
the damage done.

Hence, the creek in question was of public ownership, and not the property of the
defendants, it is clear that the latter had no right whatever to construct the said
dams, closing its entrance into and communication with the Bocaue River; and,
inasmuch as they did it without any authority and to the loss and prejudice of the
plaintiff, they are under obligation to indemnify the latter for the reasons alleged by
him in his complaint.
Case no. 5 BERNAL (because the father never recognized purificacion. The child
lived with her mother enverso) Enverso V HOUSE AND TACLOBAN ELECTRIC ICE
PLANT( court stated that they have no liability because they only assume the
business from house almost a year after the incident.

Facts:

Fortunata and her child purificacion attended a procession. After the event ended,
both mother and child and two acquaintances walked along Gran Capital street. The
mother allowed her child to gain a few distance in advance from them when
suddenly a car drove past and frightened the child. As the child tumbled away from
the gutter, she accidentally fell in the ditch. The mother and her friends brought the
child to the hospital and was later pronounced dead. The doctor declared that the
cause of death were 3rd degree burns whole body.

Bernal, purificacion’s birth father, and her mother enverso filed a complaint for
damages against tacloban electric and ice plant but was later substituted by J.V.
House.

The defendant moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of contributory
negligence thus bars the plaintiff from recovery and that they were authorized to
permit hot water to flow through public streets.

Issue: WON such negligence bars the mother from recovery?

Held:

No. Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or
omission, characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be
liable for the damage done.

The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as
a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.

Case no. 6 BARREDO v GARCIA

Facts:

Garcia filed a complaint for damages against Barredo for negligence in employing
Fontanilla, who was known to have violated the automobile law and speeding
multiple times, which perpetuated the accident that took away the life of his son.

Barredo contended that his liability is governed by the rpc and that he is only
subsidiarily liable and since there is no civil complaint against Fontanilla, the person
criminally liable, he cannot be held primarily liable in this case.

Issue: W/N the parents may bring separate civil action against Barredo, thus
making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code
as an employer

Held:

YES. CA Affirmed.

Quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all on its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime

Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the
primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
Case no. 7 Calalas v Court of Appeals

Culpa contractual – breach of contract of carriage

Facts:

Sunga rode a jeepney owned by Calalas. As the jeepney was full, the conductor
gave Sunga an “extension seat”, a wooden stool located at the back of the door at
the rear end of the vehicle. The jeepney, on the way to its destination made a stop
to let out a passenger. Sunga, as she was at the rear end of the vehicle, gave way
to the outgoing passenger. As she was doing so, an isuzu truck bumped the rear
left portion of the jeepney as it was not parked properly. Sunga was injured. Sunga
then filed a complaint against Calalas for damages on the ground of negligence
under culpa contractual. Calalas contends that the fault was caused by the truck
and not his jeepney.

Issue: WON Calalas is liable for negligence?

Held:

Yes. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides
that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined
in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof. It was shown from the facts above that the jeepney did
not show due diligence of a common carrier when it gave Sunga an extension seat
by reason of the carrier being maxed out and when it did not park correctly while
letting off a passenger. Failure of the defendant to prove otherwise makes him
liable for the damages done to the plaintiff.

Assumption of risk is absurd and not considered negligence on her part.

Case no. 8 VIRATA v OCHOA

Facts:

Arsenio Virata was bumped by a jeepney owned by Ochoa. He died as the result
therof. During the criminal prosecution of the crime, the heirs of Virata reserved the
right to file a separate civil action for damages and filed the same in another court.

The jeepney driver was acquitted. Ochoa filed for the dismissal of the civil action
based on the acquittal that he merely caused an accident. The court then dismissed
the civil action.

Issue: WON the heirs of Virata can prosecute an action for damages on quasi-delict
against Ochoa.

Held:

The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case
No. 3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages
based on quasi-delict. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in
Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law.
Quasi delict - Under the NCC, whoever by act or omission causes damages to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Case no. 9 LIM V PING

Facts:

Lim filed a criminal case of estafa against Kou Co Ping regarding the undelivered
bags of Cement. The RTC of Pasig acquitted Kou Co Ping for insufficiency of
evidence. Lim appealed the case to CA. During the pendency of the appeal, Lim
filed a civil action against Kou Co Ping in the RTC of Manila. Kou Co Ping filed a
motion to dismiss the civil case in RTC Manila on the ground of lis pendens and
forum shopping. RTC Manila dismissed the said motion. Kou Co Ping filed an appeal
to the CA. Hence this case.

Issue:

Whether Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance
and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal
case for estafa?

Held:
No, A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise
to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto,
that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may
be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability
may be based on “an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony,” as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of
contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute
felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific
provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries”). Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil
liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of
civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.
Case no. 10 CEREZO v TUAZON

Facts: Tuazon, a tricycle driver was involved in an accident wherein a bus, owned
by Cerezo, recklessly overtook an opposite lane and collided with Tuazon’s tricycle.
Tuazon not only suffered the loss of his mode of income but also severe injuries
that resulted in his physical disability. Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against
Cerezo for hiring an employee like Fortunato with no proper supervision and
management. Due to the default of the Cerezos, the court decided in favor of
Tuazon. The defendant opposed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
bus driver which was an indispensable party as such there can be no determination
of the case without him.

Issue: Are the spouses Cerezo liable for damages incurred by Tuazon?

Held: Although liability under Art. 2180 originates from the negligent act of the
employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly.
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom — one is responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Negligence, negligence related to the cases and the standards of conduct (avoid
negligence) found in jurisprudence and law.
 Negligence

Case no. 1
PNR v Brunty
Facts:
Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen, visited the Philippines. She and her host, Mr.
Garcia traveled to baguio city in a mercedez benz driven by Mr. Marcelita. While
passing tarlac, they accidentally collided with a train owned by PNR. Marcelita was
instantly killed and Brunty was pronounced dead subsequently while Garcia suffered
severe head injuries but survived the incident.
Ethel, Rhonda’s mother, filed a complaint for damages against PNR alleging that
PNR was grossly or recklessly negligent in not providing the necessary equipment
such as a bar or a red light signal to warn or protect the motorists crossing the
railroad at any time of the day. That such negligence was the direct and proximate
cause of the death of Rhonda.
PNR answered that it has no legal duty to put up a bar nor a red signal light
because there were adequate, visible and clear warning signs strategically posted
beside the road. That the direct and proximate cause of the death of Rhonda was
Mr. Marcelita’s negligence.
The court held that the petitioner was found negligent because of its failure to
provide the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing
the railroad track. As such, it is liable for damages for violating the provisions of
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The court also held that contributory negligence is not applicable in this case
because Brunty’s relation with Marcelita was not proven therefor the damage award
due to Brunty cannot be mitigated by Marelita’s negligence.
Case no. 2
PNR v CA
Facts:

Tupang boarded train 516 owned by PNR in Camarines bound to Manila. It was
alleged that the train was so overcrowded that Tupang and other were seated on
the platforms in-between the coaches of the train. On that day, Iyam bridge was
under construction. The train, upon reaching Iyam bridge, did not slow down but
maintained its normal speed. Tupang was caught off guard and fell off the train
resulting in his own demise. The passengers were alarmed and tried to alert the
train conductor. The conductor, instead of making a full stop, continued on its way
calling only for verifaction and confirmation of the alleged incident to its station
agent in quezon.