G.R. No. 136368; 16 Jan.

2002
FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of
absolute sale over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose
Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this
deed, the same contracting parties entered into another agreement
whereunder Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase
the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on January 4,
1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against
the Magdangals for reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the
Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real
intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.

RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:

1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the
parties, hereby declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;

2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the
finality of this decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid;

3)xxx.

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties
received the decision of the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13,
1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgement the decision xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment
which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become
final and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of

Possession alleging that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner
has expired.

On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in
question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from
the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13, 1996. The
redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial
court by the petitioner?

1HELD:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs
finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10
and 11 provide:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for
new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the
judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book
of entries of judgments. The date when the judgments or final resolution
becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall
contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be
signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has
become final and executory.

SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or

resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the
motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on
finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as

a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the
action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if
no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment
obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or
judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry
thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of
justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure

should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great
injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the
subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the
procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing
the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject
lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised
Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the
right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive
application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot
be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the
laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption. 

Sebastian vs. Morales 445 Phil 595, 605

Facts:Private respondents Leonila Sarenas, Josephine Sarenas-Dayrit,
Evangeline Sarenas, Estrellita Sarenas Tan, Cecilio Marcos Sarenas, Manuel
Gil Sarenas, Daisy Rita Sarenas, and Joy Sarenas Private respondents are
the heirs of the late Guillermo Sarenas, who died intestate. During his lifetime,
Guillermo owned agricultural landholdings, all located in Samon and
Mayapyap Sur, Cabanatuan City.
Private respondents filed an application with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for retention of over five hectares of the late Guillermo’s
landholdings. Among the lots which private respondents sought to retain
under Section 6 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657). the DAR Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga granted private
respondents’ application.
petitioner Sebastian moved for reconsideration of the foregoing order before
the DAR Regional Director. The DAR Regional Director found that the order
dated June 6, 1997 in was contrary to law. He then issued a new order which
instead allowed private respondents to retain a parcel of land with an area of
4.9993 hectares, covered by TCT No. 143564, located at San Ricardo,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija.
Private respondents then appealed the order to the DAR Secretary. The
Secretary of Agrarian Reform set aside the order and in lieu thereof issued a
new one.
Petitioner Sebastian then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this motion
was denied, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with the Court of
Appeals. the Court of Appeals, without going into the merits of the case,
dismissed it after finding that “petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal.
Petitioners then timely moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court
denied their motion. Hence this case.
Petitioners admit that there was error in the remedy resorted to before the
Court of Appeals. They insist, however, that a perusal of their initiatory
pleading would show that said pleading contained all the features and
contents for a petition for review under Rule 43, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Hence, the court a quo should have treated their special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 as a petition for review
under Rule 43, since dismissals based on technicalities are frowned upon.
Petitioners contend that procedural rules are but a means to an end and
should be liberally construed to effect substantial justice.
Issue:Whether the CA committed a reversible error in not liberally applying the
Rules of Court.
Held:
No, liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect
substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided
on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not mean, however, that
procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience
of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of
justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by
providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose
that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as
often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly
presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules
of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
explain his failure to abide by the rules. The SC agreed with the appellate
court that petitioners’ reliance on Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 “is not merely a
mistake in the designation of the mode of appeal, but clearly an erroneous
appeal from the assailed Orders.
ASIA UNITED BANK, Petitioner, v. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 187104. August 03, 2010]
FACTS:
Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member
of the union of faculty and employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements
contained the following provision that for teaching employees in college who
fail the yearly evaluation, who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in
five (5) years, shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during
which period all benefits due them shall be suspended. Petitioner placed
respondent on forced leave for failing to achieve the required rating points.
Respondent sought recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery, but to no
avail. Respondent filed a case with DOLE but circulation and mediation again
failed. The parties submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration
before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA). Respondent argued that the CA already
resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case between the parties, ruling that
the forced leave for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within
a five-year period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the
same five-year period. Petitioner argued that said CA decision is not yet final.
The VA dismissed the complaint. Respondent filed with the CA a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but failed to pay the filing fees and
to attach the material portion of the records. Motion for reconsideration was
filed, complying with the procedural lapses, and CA reinstated the petition.
ISSUES:
Remedial Law
(1)  Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating respondent’s
petition despite her failure to appeal (docket) fee within the reglementary
period.
RULINGS:

(1)  Yes. The CA erred in its ruling. Appeal is not a natural right but a mere
statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the
provision set by law.  Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from
the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of
judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay
to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance
with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petition’s
dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is
not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essno appeal has been
filed. Here, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of the full
docket fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the reglementary
period.
There are, however, there are recognized exceptions to their strict
observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve
a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately
paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the
appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to
each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12)
importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by
the judge, guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be
an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable
or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute CASE DIGEST - Civil Procedure -

Commencement of action
Facts: 1996 SLI filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession
with damages against Gipa et al. SLI alleged that it is the absolute owner of a
parcel of land. Gipa et al who had been informally occupying portion of the
said property refused to vacate premises despite demand. Gipa et al asserted
that they did not heed SLI’s demand to vacate as they believe that they have
the right to stay on the said property relying on the fact that they and their
predecessors in interest occupied the property since the 1950s.

RTC ruled in favor of SLI having proven its ownershi. CA dismissed since the
it was not shown that appellate court docket fees and other lawful fees were
paid. Gipa attached a certification from the RTC that they paid the appeal fee
in the amount of P3000. Then, CA further required Gipa to pay P30 for legal
research fund which was apparently was not included in the P3000 appeal
fee. 9 months after they still failed to comply. Hence, CA dismissed the appeal
for nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees.

Issue: WON CA gravely erred in dismissing the appeal for the failure of

petitioners to remit the P30 for legal research fund after having advanced a
substantial portion of docket fees.

Held: No. Gipa et al concede to the fact that payment of the full amount of
docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure but a jurisdictional requirement they nevertheless are praying for
the relaxation of the application of the rule on the payment of the appeal fee in
the name of substantial justice and equity. The Court held that "concomitant to
the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the
part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by
the rules.” Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have
the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason
warranting such departure. Gipa’s failure to advance any explanation as to
why they failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the
same within the period allowed by the CA is thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a
departure from the rule on the payment of the appeal fee is unwarranted.

Sps Oco v Limbaring GR. 161298, Jan. 31, 2006

Sabas Limbaring transferred his lot to his two nieces- Jennifer and Sarah
Jane. His daughter, Oco, filed a case of perjury and falsification against her
uncle, Victor, his 2 daughters. They agreed to return the lots with Oco paying
necessary expenses of 25k (30k at first but renegotiated to 25k).

Oco was able to transfer the lot to her name. Respondent, however, filed a
case against Sps Oco fo for the rescission of the sales contracts, with
recovery of possession and ownership of the two parcels of land. Oco filed a
MTD on the ground that respondent was not a real party in interest. In his
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, respondent contended that he was a
trustor, whose property was being held in trust by his daughters.

Oco filed an Answer with Counterclaim, alleging in the mainly: 1) that

respondent had tried to secure a DAR clearance and to have a certificate of
title issued in his name, but failed because Republic Act (RA) 6657 prohibited
the acquisition of more than five hectares of agricultural land; 2) that through
deceit and manipulation, respondent was able to convince Sabas Limbaring to
execute the two Deeds of Sale, notwithstanding the lack of any consideration.

RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the Complaint and Counterclaim,
on the ground that respondent was not the real party in interest. 

CA held that a trust relationship was created and reversed the RTC decision.

Issue: Is Respondent a real party-in-interest? NO.

Rule on real parties in interest

GR: only contracting parties, the parties bound by it, are the ones who can
violate and benefit from it. Thus, one who is not a party to a contract, and for
whose benefit it was not expressly made, cannot maintain an action on it. One
cannot do so, even if the contract performed by the contracting parties would
incidentally inure to one’s benefit.

Except: those who are not principally or subsidiarily obligated in a contract, in

which they had no intervention, may show their detriment that could result
from it.
Eg. Contracts pour autrui
Respondent’s Complaint, entitled "Rescission of Contract & Recovery of
Possession & Ownership of Two Parcels of Land," is clearly an action on a
contract. The agreements sought to be rescinded clearly show that the parties
to the Deeds of Absolute Sale were Jennifer and Sarah Jane Limbaring as
vendors and Percita Oco as vendee. Clearly then, the action upon the
contracts may -- as a rule -- be instituted only by Jennifer and Sarah Jane
against Percita.
No trust relationship was created. One who alleges a trust relationship has the
burden of proof. Respondent has presented only bare assertions that a trust
was created.

Sps Oco v Limbaring GR. 161298, Jan. 31, 2006

Sabas Limbaring transferred his lot to his two nieces- Jennifer and Sarah
Jane. His daughter, Oco, filed a case of perjury and falsification against her
uncle, Victor, his 2 daughters. They agreed to return the lots with Oco paying
necessary expenses of 25k (30k at first but renegotiated to 25k).

Oco was able to transfer the lot to her name. Respondent, however, filed a
case against Sps Oco fo for the rescission of the sales contracts, with
recovery of possession and ownership of the two parcels of land. Oco filed a
MTD on the ground that respondent was not a real party in interest. In his
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, respondent contended that he was a
trustor, whose property was being held in trust by his daughters.

Oco filed an Answer with Counterclaim, alleging in the mainly: 1) that

respondent had tried to secure a DAR clearance and to have a certificate of
title issued in his name, but failed because Republic Act (RA) 6657 prohibited
the acquisition of more than five hectares of agricultural land; 2) that through
deceit and manipulation, respondent was able to convince Sabas Limbaring to
execute the two Deeds of Sale, notwithstanding the lack of any consideration.

RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the Complaint and Counterclaim,
on the ground that respondent was not the real party in interest. 

CA held that a trust relationship was created and reversed the RTC decision.

Issue: Is Respondent a real party-in-interest? NO.

Rule on real parties in interest

GR: only contracting parties, the parties bound by it, are the ones who can
violate and benefit from it. Thus, one who is not a party to a contract, and for
whose benefit it was not expressly made, cannot maintain an action on it. One
cannot do so, even if the contract performed by the contracting parties would
incidentally inure to one’s benefit.
Except: those who are not principally or subsidiarily obligated in a contract, in
which they had no intervention, may show their detriment that could result
from it.
Eg. Contracts pour autrui

Respondent’s Complaint, entitled "Rescission of Contract & Recovery of

Possession & Ownership of Two Parcels of Land," is clearly an action on a
contract. The agreements sought to be rescinded clearly show that the parties
to the Deeds of Absolute Sale were Jennifer and Sarah Jane Limbaring as
vendors and Percita Oco as vendee. Clearly then, the action upon the
contracts may -- as a rule -- be instituted only by Jennifer and Sarah Jane
against Percita.
No trust relationship was created. One who alleges a trust relationship has the
burden of proof. Respondent has presented only bare assertions that a trust
was created.

Relucio vs. Lopez

TOPIC: REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; NECESSARY PARTY
FACTS: Angelina Lopez filed a petition for Appointment as Sole Administratix
of Conjugal Partnership of Properties, Forfeiture, etc. against her husband
Alberto and Imelda Relucio, for Alberto abandoned Angelina and her four
children and maintained an illicit relationship with Relucio.
A motion to dismiss was filed by Relucio on the ground that Angelina Lopez
has no cause of action against her. RTC denied her Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that some of the properties are registered in her name. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by Relucio but the same was denied by the RTC.
CA denied.
ISSUE: WON Relucio is an indispensable party or only a necessary party.
HELD: Neither. “A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit." In this case, petitioner would not be
affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable
party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final
determination of an action. Petitioner's participation in Special Proceeding is
not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering
Alberto to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent,
and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto’s
conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto’s share in property
co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and
enforceable against Alberto. Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in
Special Proceedings.
A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined
as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. In the
context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be
accorded complete relief if Alberto were ordered to account for his alleged
conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent
and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and
dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with
respondent.

[G.R. NO. 153267 : June 23, 2005]

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ARMED FORCES AND POLICE SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, INC. (AFPSLAI),

Leticia Naguit Aquino vs Cesar B. Quiason

G.R. No. 201248, March 11, 2015

LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO, MELVIN NAGUIT, ROMMEL NAGUIT, ELMA

NAGUIT TAYAG, YSSEL L. NAGUIT, ROSALINA NAGUIT AUMENTADO,
RIZEL NAGUIT CUNANAN, CARIDAD NAGUIT PARAJAS, MILLIE NAGUIT
FLORENDO, MARNEL NAGUIT, EDUARDO NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT,
ZOILO NAGUIT, AND AMELIA NAGUIT DIZON, REPRESENTED BY YSSEL
L. NAGUIT, Petitioners, v. CESAR B. QUIAZON, AMANDA QUIAZON, JOSE
B. QUIAZON AND REYNALDO B. QUIAZON, REPRESENTED BY JAIME B.
QUIAZON, Respondent.

A complaint for Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed before the RTC by
the petitioners. They alleged that they were the heirs of the late Epifanio
Makam and Severina Bautista, who acquired a house and lot consisting of
557 square meters, by virtue of a Deed of Sale, dated April 20, 1894; that
since then, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, adverse, and notorious possession for more than a hundred
years, constructing houses and paying real estate taxes on the property; that
sometime in June 2005, they received various demand letters from the
respondents.

The respondents claiming ownership over the subject property and

demanding that they vacate the same; that upon inquiry with the Register of
Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga, they confirmed that the property had
been titled in the name of respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 213777-R; that the said title was invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable; and that they were the true owners of the
property. Respondents asserted that they were the absolute owners of the
subject land as per TCT No. 213777-R; that they had inherited the same from
their predecessor-in-interest, Fausta Baluyut, one of the registered owners
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-1138 (11376), as per the
Project of Partition and Deed of Agreement and those petitioners had been
occupying the property by mere tolerance. They denied the allegations in the
complaint and proffered affirmative defenses with counterclaims.

They argued that: First, the petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient
cause of action "against them, because their deed of sale was spurious and
could not prevail over Land Registration Decree No. 122511 issued on June
28, 1919 in Land Registration Case No. 5, LRC Records No. 128, by the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in favor of their predecessor-in-interest.
The predecessors-in-interest of petitioners were among the oppositors in the
land registration proceeding but, nevertheless, after the trial, the subject lot
was awarded, decreed and titled in favor of respondents' predecessor-in-
interest, as per OCT No. RO-1138 (11376) of the Registry of Deeds of
Pampanga. Second, the action was barred by prescription and that petitioners
were guilty of laches in asserting their interest over the subject lot, considering
that Land Registration Decree No. 122511 was issued on June 28, 1919 and
OCT No. RO-1138 (11376) was issued on May 12, 1922. Hence, it was much
too late for petitioners to institute the action after more than 80 years. They
also raised the settled rule that a title registered under the Torrens system
could not be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession, or by
prescription. Third, the action was also barred by res judicata and violated the
prohibition against forum shopping, considering that petitioners had earlier
filed a similar case for quieting of title against respondents, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5487, which the RTC-Br. 56 dismissed.

As regards the allegation of prescription, the petitioners countered that an

action to quiet title did not prescribe if the plaintiffs were in possession of the
property in question. They argued that they were neither guilty of laches nor
were they in possession of the property by mere tolerance, their possession
being in the concept of owner for more than a hundred years.

Lastly, regarding the argument on res judicata, petitioners explained that they
were not the same plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5487 and that the case was
dismissed without prejudice. Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in
considering external factors beyond the allegations in the petition. They aver
that it is a settled rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action,
only facts alleged in the complaint shall be considered, and it is error for the
court to take cognizance of external facts or hold a preliminary hearing to
determine their existence.

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that it was within
the discretion of the trial court to conduct a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defense of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of
action, where both parties were given the chance to submit arguments and
evidence for or against the dismissal of the complaint. Furthermore, they
argue that the Court has previously upheld cases where the court took into
account external factors in the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
lack of cause of action. They assert that since petitioners were given
reasonable opportunity to present evidence to prove their cause of action,
they are now estopped from invoking the rule that only allegations in the
complaint should be considered.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners'

complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause
of action.

Held:
The Court notes that respondents raised the affirmative defense in their
Answer that petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action,"
raising factual matters, which is effectively the ground of "lack of cause of
action."

The distinction between the grounds of "failure to state a cause of action" and
"lack of cause of action" was aptly discussed in Dabuco vs. Court of Appeals,
to wit:
As a preliminary matter, we wish to stress the distinction between the two
grounds for dismissal of an action: failure to state a cause of action, on the
one hand, and lack of cause of action, on the other hand. The former refers to
the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, the latter to the insufficiency of
factual basis for the action. Failure to state a cause may be raised in a Motion
to Dismiss under Rule 16, while lack of cause may be raised any time.
Dismissal for failure to state a cause can be made at the earliest stages of an
action. Dismissal for lack of cause is usually made after questions of fact have
been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.

Although the two grounds were used interchangeably, it can be gleaned from
the decisions of both the trial court and the CA that respondents' defense of
"lack of cause of action" was actually treated as a "failure to state a cause of
action," which is a ground for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16. This is
apparent from their reliance on Section 6 of Rule 16, which pertains to
grounds of a motion to dismiss raised as affirmative defenses; as well as the
doctrines cited in resolving the case. The CA even referred to both as one and
the same ground for a motion to dismiss when it stated that: "Indubitably, lack
of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action, being one of the
grounds for a motion to dismiss, is included thereby."

The trial court held a preliminary hearing resolving the ground of "lack of
cause of action" pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 16, which allows the court to
hold a preliminary hearing on grounds for dismissal provided in the same rule
that have been raised as an affirmative defense in the answer. The ground of
"lack of cause of action," as already explained, however, is not one of the
grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, and hence, not proper for
resolution during a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Section 6. On this
point alone, the trial court clearly erred in receiving evidence on the ground of
"lack of cause of action" during the preliminary hearing. The factual matters
raised by respondents in their affirmative defense arguing the non-existence
of a cause of action, should have been duly resolved during a trial on the
merits of the case. Rule 16 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for
a motion to dismiss. The pertinent ground is found under Section 1(g), which
reads as follows:

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

The test for determining the existence of a cause of action was amply
discussed in Insular Investment and Trust Corporation v. Capital One Equities
Corporation, citing Perpetual Savings Bank v. Fajardo, to wit:
The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a
cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting
hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, a
judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint. In Rava
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court elaborated on this
established standard in the following manner:

"The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of

lack of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the
averments thereof. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition
as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged,
the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer thereof (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 197
SCRA 663 [1991]).

In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the

complaint may properly be considered. It is error for the court to take
cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their
existence. If the allegation in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint may be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless
of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants.

In the case at bench, petitioners' cause of action relates to an action to quiet

title under Article 476 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
real property or any interest therein.

In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must
concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest
in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Evangelista v. Santiago elucidates:
The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of action, similar
to a motion to dismiss based on the same ground, requires a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the Complaint. In the case of Garcon v.
Redemptorist Fathers, this Court laid down the rules as far as this ground for
dismissal of an action or affirmative defense is concerned:

It is already well-settled that in a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack

of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations of fact made in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action, and not on whether these allegations of fact are true, for said
motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint; that the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of said complaint.
Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in the
face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the
determination of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action, only the
facts alleged therein and no other matter may be considered, and the court
may not inquire into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false
before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in
the allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as
basis for said motion.
Exceptions and Section 6 of Rule 16 not applicable

The Court does not discount, however, that there are exceptions to the
general rule that allegations are hypothetically admitted as true and inquiry is
confined to the face of the complaint. First, there is no hypothetical admission
of (a) the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice; (b)
allegations that are legally impossible; (c) facts inadmissible in evidence; and
(d) facts which appear, by record or document included in the pleadings, to be
unfounded., inquiry is not confined to the complaint if culled (a) from annexes
and other pleadings submitted by the parties; (b) from documentary evidence
admitted by stipulation which disclose facts sufficient to defeat the claim; or
(c) from evidence admitted in the course of hearings related to the case.

Pointing to the exception that inquiry was not confined to the complaint if
evidence had been presented in the course of hearings related to the case,
the CA ruled that it was within the trial court's discretion to receive and
consider other evidence aside from the allegations in the complaint in
resolving a party's affirmative defense. It held that this discretion was
recognized under Section 6 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which allowed
the court to conduct a preliminary hearing, motu proprio, on the defendant's
affirmative defense if no corresponding motion to dismiss was filed. This
section reads in part:
Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - If no motion to dismiss
has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may
be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of
the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss
had been filed.

A review of the first ground under paragraph 6 of the answer reveals that
respondents alleged that "plaintiffs have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of
action against the defendants." It is at this point that it must again be
emphasized that it is not "lack or absence of cause of action" that is a ground
for dismissal of the complaint under Rule 16, but rather, that "the complaint
states no cause of action." The issue submitted to the court was, therefore,
the determination of the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to
constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact were
true, as there was a hypothetical admission of facts alleged in the complaint.
An affirmative defense, raising the ground that there is no cause of action as
against the defendants poses a question of fact that should be resolved after
the conduct of the trial on the merits. A reading of respondents' arguments in
support of this ground readily reveals that the arguments relate not to the
failure to state a cause of action, but to the existence of the cause of action,
which goes into the very crux of the controversy and is a matter of evidence
for resolution after a full-blown hearing.

It is of note that although the trial court might not have erred in holding a
preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of prescription and res
judicata, it is readily apparent from the decisions of the lower courts that no
disquisition whatsoever was made on these grounds. It cannot be denied that
evidence in support of the ground of "lack of cause of action" was received
and given great weight by the trial court. In fact, all the evidence given
credence by the trial court were only in support of the ground of "lack of cause
of action." This all the more highlight that the trial court erred in receiving
evidence to determine whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Although neither the RTC nor the CA ruled on the affirmative defenses of
prescription and res judicata, it appears that this case could not have been
dismissed on these grounds. First, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if
the plaintiffs are in possession of the property, which is the situation prevailing
in the present case. Second, there appears to be no res judicata nor a
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping considering that Civil Case
No. 5487 had been dismissed, without prejudice, years before petitioners
initiated their complaint for quieting of title.

NORLINDA S. MARILAG, petitioner, vs. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ,

respondent.
Facts: Rafael Martinez (Rafael), respondent's father, obtained from petitioner
a loan in the amount of P160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly interest
of five percent (5%), payable within a period of six (6) months. The loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-208400. Rafael failed to settle his
obligation upon maturity and despite repeated demands, prompting
petitioner to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage.
Rafael failed to file his answer and, upon petitioner's motion, was declared in
default. Records do not show that this Decision had already attained
finality.
Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, respondent agreed
to pay Rafael's obligation to petitioner which was pegged at
P689,000.00. After making a total payment of P400,000.00, 11 he executed a
promissory note binding himself to pay on or before March 31, 1998
the amount of P289,000.00, "representing the balance of the agreed financial
obligation of [his] father to [petitioner]. After learning of the Decision,
respondent refused to pay the amount covered by the subject PN despite
demands, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for sum of money and
damages before the court a quo.
ISSUE WON the dismissal of the collection case by the CA is proper? YES. –
No res judicata but it is barred by litis pendentia
HELD: After a punctilious review of the records, the Court finds the principle of
res judicata to be inapplicable to the present case. This is because
the records are bereft of any indication that the August 28, 2003 Decision in
the judicial foreclosure case had already attained finality. This
notwithstanding, the Court holds that petitioner's prosecution of the collection
case was barred, instead, by the principle of litis pendentia in
view of the substantial identity of parties and singularity of the causes of
action in the foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure
case barred petitioner's recourse to the subsequent collection case.
Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on Rafael's unpaid loan obligation
by filing a petition for the judicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a personal action for the
collection of the unpaid balance of said obligation not comprising a
deficiency arising from foreclosure, without violating the proscription against
splitting a single cause of action, where the ground for dismissal is
either res judicata or litis pendentia.
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the
creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor-
mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for
collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to
foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not
cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself.
Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he
waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt, except
only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding
obligation of the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price
in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Accordingly, a
deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the
mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an amount less than the
outstanding obligation.
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee,
instituted an action for judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule
68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the
foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to
the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in
this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the
foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained
finality.

Association of Flood Victims v. COMELEC

Facts:
SC affirmed COMELEC Resolution cancelling the certificate of registration of
the Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List which won in the party-
list elections in the 2010 national elections. The disqualification of the ABC
Party-List resulted in the re-computation of the party-list allocations in the
House of Representatives, in which the COMELEC followed the formula
outlined in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections. The COMELEC then
issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.

Petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Hernandez filed with the SC a

special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. Petitioners assert that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal capacity to sue.

Held:
No. Under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3, only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, which must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

In their petition, it is stated that petitioner Association of Flood Victims “is a

non-profit and non-partisan organization in the process of formal
incorporation, the primary purpose of which is for the benefit of the common
or general interest of many flood victims who are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties,” and that petitioner Hernandez “is a Tax
Payer and the Lead Convenor of the Association of Flood Victims.” Clearly,
petitioner Association of Flood Victims, which is still in the process of
incorporation, cannot be considered a juridical person or an entity authorized
by law, which can be a party to a civil action.

More so in this case where there is no showing that petitioner Hernandez is

validly authorized to represent petitioner Association of Flood Victims.

Since petitioner Association of Flood Victims has no legal capacity to sue,

petitioner Hernandez, who is filing this petition as a representative of the
Association of Flood Victims, is likewise devoid of legal personality to bring an
action in court. Neither can petitioner Hernandez sue as a taxpayer because
he failed to show that there was illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law.

Besides, petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing. Locus standi or

legal standing is defined as:

x x x a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest
in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Living @sense vs malayan insurance
FACTS

Petitioner Living @ Sense, Inc. sub-contracted to Dou Mac, Inc. (DMI) its
underground open-trench work for the Network Project of Globe Telecom in
Mindanao. As required, DMI gave surety and performance bonds which it
secured from respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (Malayan) which
bound itself jointly and severally liable with DMI. The bonds will answer for the
loss and damage to petitioner if DMI fails to perform its obligations under the
subcontract.

The excavation and restoration works by DMI was later stopped by the
government after it found DMI's work unsatisfactory. Eventually, petitioner
terminated the subcontract and demanded from respondent insurance
company indemnification in the amount of P1.04 million. Respondent Malayan
denied petitioner's claim arguing that the liability of its principal, DMI, should
first be determined before Malayan can be held liable. Thus, petitioner sued
Malayan for specific performance and breach of contract.

Respondent Malayan claimed that the suit should be dismissed because

petitioner failed to implead DMI as an indispensable party. Petitioner, on the
other hand, argued that respondent is a surety who is directly and primarily
liable to indemnify petitioner, and that the bond is "callable on demand" in the
event of breach of obligation. The Regional Trial Court  ruled for the
respondent, and the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on a pure
question of law.

ISSUE

Is DMI an indispensable party in this case?

RULING

No, DMI is not an indispensable party in this case. Article 1216 of the Civil
Code on solidary obligations allows petitioner, as creditor, to proceed against
any of the solidary debtors. Since respondent Malayan bound itself "jointly
and severally" with DMI under the surety and performance bonds, it is
considered a solidary debtor and is therefore not an indispensable party. This
is because petitioner can claim indemnity directly from respondent insurance
company who has bound itself solidarily with DMI for the obligations under the
bonds.

An indispensable party is defined as "a party-in-interest without whom no final

determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiff or defendant." Without it, the court cannot act on the case not only as
to the absent party but also as to those present.

Even if assuming that DMI was indeed an indispensable party, the Regional
Trial Court should not have dismissed the case but should have ordered the
petitioner to implead the indispensable party, which can be done on motion of
the party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action.

Divinagracia v. Parilla, et al.,

G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015
Facts:
Conrado, Sr. owned a parcel of land in Iloilo City. He had 2 children with his
first wife,
namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and 7 children with his second wife,
namely, Mateo, Sr,
Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo and Cebeleo, Sr. He also
begot 3 illegitimate
children, namely Eduardo, Rogelio and Ricardo. Both Mateo, Sr. and
Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased
Conrado, Sr. leaving children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin,
Eusela, Giovanni,
Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and
Neobel. Santiago, who
allegedly bought the shares of majority of the heirs of a property left by
Conrado, Sr. He filed a
complaint for partition but did not implead Mateo, Sr.’s children.
RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner
of the subject
land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same.
However, the RTC held that
Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over the subject land,
considering that Felcon
admitted the lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo, Sr.’s
share thereon.
CA, on appeal, dismissed Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition. It held the
Mateo,
Sr.’s children are indispensable parties to the judicial partition and thus, their
non-inclusion as
defendants would necessarily result in its dismissal. CA denied the motion for
reconsideration of
the heirs of Santiago, hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Is the action for partition proper without impleading Mateo, Sr.’s
children?
Held: No because the co-heirs are indispensable parties.
The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation
of their
direct ascendant – have vested rights over the subject land and, as such,
should be impleaded as
indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of
Santiago’s
complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was
impleaded, excluding
therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to
Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest
over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when
pursuant to Article 972 of
the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his
children, Cebeleo,
Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his
complaint for
partition defective.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s
action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
The party’s interest
in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the
At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just. the
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void. for want of authority to act. Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as
defendants. The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be
indispensable. April 8. With regard to actions for partition. complete. Sr. the
correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC
for the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and
for the disposition of the case on the merits. 379380 (2004). x x x In view of
the foregoing. citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. the Court definitively
explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties. viz.
However. all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties.. Scheer. further citation omitted). Section 1. 450 Phil. –
A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
provided in this Rule. 486 Phil. Land Bank of the Philippines. 235. 541
(2003).: SEC. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. (Gabatin v. G.
setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the property. not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present. 265 (2004). parties may be
added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If
the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court. CA. 2013. the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on
account of Santiago’s failure to implead all the indispensable parties in his
complaint. as such. that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with the order. Thus.other parties’ that his legal presence as
a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. No. 366. 1. to wit: The non-
joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
or equitable. 201816. In his absence. . (Domingo v. an action for partition will
not lie without the joinder of the said parties. 695 SCRA 345. Thus. 466 Phil.
532. the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case. there
cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is
effective.R. Heirs of Fian. In Heirs of Mesina v.
BENGUET EXPLORATION INC. VS. CA
351 SCRA
DOCTRINE: Authenticity and due execution constitutes only 4 things: (1) that
the document was signed; (2) that
the document complied with all the formalities under the laws; (3) that when
the document was signed, it was in
the original form without any alteration; and (4) that the document was
delivered.
FACTS: Petitioner Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a complaint for
damages against SeawoodShipping
and Switzerland General Insurance, Co., Ltd.
Rogelio Lumibao, marketing assistant of Benguet, was in charge of
exportation. His responsibilities included the
documentation of export products, presentations with banks, and other duties
connected with the export of
products. He explained that private respondent Seawood Shipping was
chartered by petitioner Benguet to
transport copper concentrates. The bill of lading stated that the cargo,
consisting of 2,243.496 wet metric tons of
copper concentrates, was loaded on board Sangkulirang No. 3 at Poro Point,
San Fernando, La Union. It was
insured by Switzerland Insurance (marine insurance policy was marked.
When the cargo was unloaded in Japan,
however, Rogelio Lumibao received a report dated August 19, 1985, from a
surveyor in Japan stating that the
cargo was 355 metric tons short of the amount stated in the bill of lading. For
this reason, petitioner Benguet
made a claim of the loss to Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance. In
its letter, dated August 21, 1985,
petitioner Benguet made a formal demand for the value of the alleged
shortage. As both Seawood Shipping and
Switzerland Insurance refused the demand, petitioner Benguet brought these
cases against Seawood Shipping
and Switzerland Insurance.
Ernesto Cayabyab had been with Benguet for 13 years and, at the time of his
testimony, he was secretary of Nil
Alejandre, manager of Benguet. According to Cayabyab, he was sent to the
warehouse at La Union to assist in
the loading of the copper concentrates. These copper concentrates were to
be loaded on the ship Sangkulirang
No. 3. Cayabyab said he was present when the cargo was loaded on the ship,
as evidenced by the Certificate of
Loading, Certificate of Weight, and the Mate's Receipt all dated July 28, 1985.
According to Cayabyab, the Marine
Surveyor and the Chief Mate would go around the boat to determine how
much was loaded on the ship.
Cayabyab stated that he saw petitioner Benguet's representative and his
immediate superior, Mr. Alejandre, and
the Inspector of Customs, Mr. Cardenas, sign the Certificate of Weight.
Cayabyab also witnessed the ship captain
sign the Certificate of Weight, which stated therein that 2,243.496 wet metric
tons of copper concentrates were
loaded on the ship. Cayabyab likewise confirmed the authenticity of the
Mate's Receipt, saying that he witnessed
the Chief Mate sign the document.
Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents
presented, i.e., Bill of Lading,
Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, Mate’s Receipt, were properly
established by the testimony of its
witness, Ernesto Cayabyab, and that as a result, there is a prima facie
presumption that their contents are true.
ISSUE: Whether the genuineness and due execution of the documents
presented were properly established by
the testimony of the plaintiff’s witness, resulting to prima facie presumption
that their contents are true.
RULING: This contention has no merit. The admission of the due execution
and genuineness of a document
simply means that “the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it
or that it was signed by another for
him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and
figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such
as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived
by him.” Genuineness and due
execution of the instrument means nothing more than that the instrument is
not spurious, counterfeit, or of
different import on its face from the one executed.
It is equally true, however, that ¾ execution can only refer to the actual
making and delivery, but it cannot involve
other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of
the rule was to enable a plaintiff to
make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a
defendant from introducing any defense
on the merits which does not contradict the execution of the instrument
introduced in evidence.
Respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of these
documents. Switzerland Insurance
presented Export Declaration No. 1131/85 which petitioner’s own witness,
Rogelio Lumibao, prepared, in which it
was stated that the copper concentrates to be transported to Japan had a
gross weight of only 2,050 wet metric
tons or 1,845 dry metric tons, 10 percent more or less. On the other hand,
Certified Adjusters, Inc., to which
Switzerland Insurance had referred petitioner’s claim, prepared a report which
showed that a total of 2,451.630
wet metric tons of copper concentrates were delivered at Poro Point. As the
report stated: It is to be pointed out
that there were no actual weighing made at Benguet Exploration’s site. The
procedure done was that after
weighing the trucks before and after unloading at Poro Point, the weight of the
load was determined and entered
on “Philex” Trip Ticket which was later on copied and entered by the truck
driver on Benguet Exploration, Inc.’s
Transfer Slip.
Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing the actual
amount of copper concentrates
transported to Poro Point and loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the
exact amount of copper
concentrates shipped.
Thus, whatever presumption of regularity in the transactions might have risen
from the genuineness and due
execution of the Bill of Lading, Certificate of Weight, Certificate of Loading,
and Mate’s Receipt was successfully
rebutted by the evidence presented by Switzerland Insurance which showed
disparities in the actual weight of the
cargo transported to Poro Point and loaded on the vessel. This fact is
compounded by the admissions made by
Lumibao and Cayabyab that they had no personal knowledge of the actual
amount of copper concentrates loaded
on the vessel.
In the face of these admissions, appellant’s claim of loss or shortage is placed
in serious doubt, there being no
other way of verifying the accuracy of the figures indicated in appellant’s
documentary evidence that could confirm
the alleged loss of 355.736 MT. Notwithstanding the figure stated in Bill of
Lading No. PP/0-1 that 2,243.496
WMT of copper concentrates was loaded by appellant at the port of origin, it
should be stressed that this is merely
prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of said cargo as described in
the bill of lading. Thus, it has been
held that recitals in the bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a
rebuttable presumption that such goods
were delivered for shipment and as between the consignor and a receiving
carrier, the fact must outweigh the
recital. Resultingly, the admissions elicited from appellant’s witnesses that
they could not confirm the accuracy of
the figures indicated in their documentary evidence with regard to the actual
weight of the cargo loaded at the port
of origin and that unloaded at the port of destination, in effect rebuts the
presumption in favor of the figure
indicated in the bill of lading.

BOUGH and BOUGH, plaintiffs-appellants,vs CANTIVEROS and HANOPOL,

defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 13300
FACTS:
Matilde Cantiveros, owner of various parcels of realty of the value of thirty
thousand pesos or more in Carigara, Leyte. On December 24, 1912, Matilde
Cantiveros and her husband Jose Vasquez, signed a marital contract of
separation.
Lived with Cantiveros is Basilia Hanopol, a cousin, who was married to
Gustavus Bough.
Bough, brought a story to Cantiveros that her husband Vasquez was in town
and might contest the contract for the separation of the conjugal property.
Cantiveros was induced to sign a fictitious contract of sale of all her property
which consist of 63 parcels of land to Basilia Bough. This document was
prepared in due from and acknowledged before a notary public, the amount of
the consideration, P10K instead of P30K actual value.
In order to reassure Cantiveros that they would not take advantage of the
fictitious sale, Gustavus Bough and Basilia Bough prepared and signed
another document, which is a donation by them to Cantiveros of all the
property to be effective in case of the death of themselves and their children
before the death of Cantiveros. She has remained in possession of the
property.
Complaint of plaintiffs Basilia Bough and Gustavus Bough who sought to have
themselves put in possession of the property covered by the deed of sale
quoted in the complaint, and to require the defendant Matilde Cantiveros to
pay the plaintiffs the sum of five hundreds pesos by way of damages, and to
pay the costs.
Cantiveros answered with a general denial and a special defense, not sworn
to, in which she asked that judgment be rendered declaring the contract of
sale theretofore made between herself and Basilia Bough null. The plaintiffs,
thereupon, denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the so-
called donation intervivos set forth in the answer. Presbitera Hanopol was
permitted to intervene as a defendant.
Honorable W. E. McMahon, judge of first instance, in favor of the defendants,
declaring the deed of sale, Exhibit A, fictitious, null, and without effect, and
absolving the defendants from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs.
ISSUES :
WON, The lower Court erred in permitting the defendants to present
evidence, over the objections of the plaintiff, tending to impugn the
genuineness and due execution of the document, Exhibit A, and in admitting
them to show the circumstances under which it was executed.
SC : We hold that although the defendants did not deny the genuineness and
due execution of the contract of sale of December 9, 1913, under oath, yet the
defendants could properly set up the defenses of fraud and want of
consideration.
2.WON, the lower Court erred in finding that the plaintiff Gustavus Bough,
having prepared a contract of separation between the defendant Matilde
Cantiveros and her husband, Jose Vasquez, sought to cause her to believe
that she exposed herself to a suit by her husband regarding her property,
notwithstanding the contract of separation, and for that reason and for the
purpose of shielding herself from the consequences of the apprehended suit,
that she and her mother executed the document Exhibit A.”
SC : While thus as the law well says “public instruments are evidence of the
fact which gave rise to their execution” and are to be considered as containing
all the terms of the agreement, yet, if the validity of the agreement is the
issue, parole evidence may be introduced to establish illegality or fraud. We
hold that parole evidence was properly admitted to show the illegality of the
contract of sale introduced as Exhibit A.
3.WON, the defendant, having accepted the donation expressed in the
instrument Exhibit 1, is now estopped from denying the consideration set forth
therein. A sufficient answer is, that it having been established that Exhibit A is
invalid, such an instrument cannot be made the basis of an estoppel.
SC : We hold that the so-called donation in favor of Matilde Cantiveros did not
operate to create an estoppel.
4. WON, there is an effect of the illegality of the instant contract.
SC : In this instance, the grantor, reposing faith in the integrity of the grantee,
and relying on a suggested occurrence, which did not in fact take place, was
made the dupe of the grantee, and led into an agreement against public
policy. The party asking to be relieved from the agreement which she was
induced to enter into by means of fraud, was thus in delicto, but not in pari
delicto with the other party. The deed was procured by misrepresentation and
fraud sufficient to vitiate the transaction. The rights of creditors are not
affected. We feel that justice will be done if we place the grantor in the
position in which she was before these transactions were entered into.
It is further well settled, that a party to an illegal contract cannot come into a
court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The rule is
expressed in the maxims: “Ex dolo malo non oritur actio,” and “In pari delicto
potior est conditio defendentis.” The law will not aid either party to an illegal
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. (Article 1306, Civil Code;
Perez vs. Herranz [1907], 7 Phil., 693.) Where, however, the parties to an
illegal contract are not equally guilty, and where public policy is considered as
advanced by allowing the more excusable of the two to sue for relief against
the transaction, relief is given to him.
HELD : We resolve each assignment of error against the appellants, and
having done so, affirm the judgment of the trial court, with costs of this
instance against the appellants. So ordered.

ELIZA ZUÑIGA-SANTOS v. MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN**, GR

No. 197380, 2014-10-08
Facts:
petitioner Eliza Zuñiga-Santos (petitioner), through her authorized
representative, Nympha Z. Sales,[5] filed a Complaint[6] for annulment of sale
and revocation of title against respondents Maria Divina Gracia
Santos-Gran (Gran) and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City before the
RTC... petitioner alleged, among others, that: (a) she was the registered
owner of three (3) parcels of land located in the Municipality of Montalban,
Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
N-5500,[9] 224174,[10]  and N-4234[11] (subject properties) prior to their
transfer in the name of private respondent Gran; (b) she has a second
husband by the name of Lamberto C. Santos (Lamberto), with whom... she
did not have any children; (c) she was forced to take care of Lamberto's
alleged daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged to make it appear
that the latter was petitioner's daughter; (d) pursuant to void and voidable
documents, i.e., a Deed of Sale, Lamberto... succeeded in transferring the
subject properties in favor of and in the name of Gran; (e) despite diligent
efforts, said Deed of Sale could not be located; and (f) she discovered that the
subject properties were transferred to Gran sometime in November 2005.
Accordingly,... petitioner prayed, inter alia, that Gran surrender to her the
subject properties and pay damages, including costs of suit
For her part, Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss,[13] contending, inter alia, that (a)
the action filed by petitioner had prescribed since an action upon a written
contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the cause of
action accrues,... or in this case, from the time of registration of the
questioned documents before the Registry of Deeds;[14] and (b) the
Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable
documents sought to be nullified were not properly... identified nor the
substance thereof set forth, thus, precluding the RTC from rendering a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer to surrender the subject properties
RTC granted Gran's motion and dismissed the Amended Complaint for its
failure to state a cause of action... the CA sustained the dismissal of
petitioner's Amended Complaint
Issues:
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the dismissal
of petitioner's Amended Complaint should be sustained.
Ruling:
At once, it is apparent that the CA based its dismissal on an incorrect ground.
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that "insufficiency of factual basis" is
not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Rather, it is a ground which becomes
available only after the questions of... fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. The procedural
recourse to raise such ground is a demurrer to evidence taken only after the
plaintiff's presentation of evidence. This parameter is clear under Rule 33 of
the
Rules of Court:
RULE 33
Demurrer to Evidence
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied he shall have the... right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall
be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
At the preliminary stages of the proceedings, without any presentation of
evidence even conducted, it is perceptibly impossible to assess the
insufficiency of the factual basis on which the plaintiff asserts his cause of
action, as in this case. Therefore, that ground could not... be the basis for the
dismissal of the action.

First Sarmiento vs. Philippine Bank of Communications

G.R. No. 202836 ; June 19, 2018
Leonen, J:
FACTS:
First Sarmiento obtained from PBCOM a 40 Million loan, which was secured
by a real estate mortgage over 1,076 parcels of land. The loan amount was
however increased to 100 Million. PBCOM filed a petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. It claimed that it sent First Sarmiento
several demand letters, yet, First
Sarmiento still failed to pay the principal amount and accrued interest on the
loan. First Sarmiento attempted to file a complaint for annulment of real
estate mortgage with the
RTC, however, the Clerk of Court refused to accept the Complaint in the
absence of the
mortgaged properties’ tax declaration, which would be used to assess the
docket fees. On December 29, 2011, the RTC granted First Sarmiento’s
Urgent Motion to Consider the Value of Subject Matter of the Complaint as not
capable of pecuniary estimation, and ruled that First Sarmiento’s action for
annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Also, on the same date, the mortgaged properties were auctioned and sold to
PBCOM as the highest bidder. Thereafter, First Sarmiento filed a complaint
for annulment of real estate mortgage. It claimed that it never received the
loan proceeds of 100 Million from
PBCOM yet the latter still sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage. In its opposition, PBCOM asserted that the RTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the First Sarmiento’s complaint because the action for
annulment of Mortgage was a real action,
thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair market value of
the mortgaged properties.
The RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, because of the
failure of payment of appropriate filing fees. First Sarmiento sought direct
recourse with the SC through a Petition for Review under Rule 45. It insists
that its complaint for the annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of
pecuniary estimation. It claims that
its complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage was an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation because it merely sought to remove the lien on its
properties, not the recovery or reconveyance of the mortgaged properties. It
insists that it had ownership and possession of the mortgaged properties
when it filed its complaint,
hence, it never expressly or impliedly sought recovery of their ownership or
possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento’s Complaint
for
annulment of real estate mortgage

RULING:
Yes. Section 19 (1) of B.P. 128, as amended, provides RTCs with exclusive,
original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.” In the case of Lapitan vs. Scandia, the SC
held that to determine whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sough must
first be established. However, where the money claim is only a consequence
of the remedy sought, the action is said to be one incapable of pecuniary
estimation.“In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation. However, where the basic issue
is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of , the principal relief
sought like in suits too have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.” A careful
reading of First Sarmiento’s complaint convinces the Court that petitioner
never prayed for the reconveyance of the properties foreclosed during the
auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over them.
Rather it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage
that it entered with PBCOM because it supposedly never received the
proceeds of the 100 Million loan agreement. In the case of Far East Ban vs,
Shemberg, the Court ruled that an action for cancellation of mortgage has a
subject that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Where the issue involves
the validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The registration of the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff after an
extrajudicial sale is a mandatory requirement; thus, if the certificate of sale is
not registered with the Registry of Deeds, the property sold at auction is not
conveyed to the new owner and the period of redemption does not begin to
run. In the case at bar, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City of Malolos was
restrained from registering the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds
and the certificate of sale was only issued to PBCOM after the Complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage was filed. Therefore, even if the properties
had already been foreclosed when the complaint was filed, their ownership
and possession remained with petitioner since the certificate of sale was not
registered with the Registry of Deeds. This supports First Sarmiento’s claim
that it never asked for the reconveyance of or asserted its ownership over the
mortgaged properties when it filed its Complaint since it still enjoyed
ownership and possession over them. Considering that petitioner paid the
docket fees as computed by the clerk of court, upon the direction of the
Executive Judge, the Court is convinced that the Regional Trial Court
acquired jurisdiction over the Complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage.

.ALONA G. ROLDAN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES CLARENCE I. BARRIOS AND

ANNA LEE T. BARRIOS, ROMMEL MATORRES, AND HON. JEMENA
ABELLAR ARBIS, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 6,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AKLAN, 

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)

FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy.
Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila

Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a

writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ
of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the
writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of
jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of
Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act
placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for
demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over
"all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.YES

RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion
to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party
may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or
by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier -
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser
to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a
party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should
have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was
issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be
carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83
C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with
dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and
regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the
defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to
hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows
an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had
been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the
same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was
present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that
the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer.
Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The
surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

FIGUEROA VS. PEOPLE

558 SCRA 63
TOPIC : JURSDICTION / ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. The RTC found him guilty. In his appeal before the CA,
the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the case .The
CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by
laches has already precluded the
petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4
years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever
raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the
lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time
even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the
principle of laches will not be applicable.Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the
trial of this case, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately
raised in petitioner’s appeal to the CA.
RULING: No. Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as
a general rule, the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only
in cases in which the factual milieu
is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present
for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, that is, lack of jurisdiction must
have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.In Sibonghanoy, the
party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage
when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is
an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. In the case at bar, the
factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner Atty.
Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty
of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said
court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her
compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should
not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect
could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings
so as to take the case within
the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the
mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to
comply.
The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of
the RTC, consideringthat he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the
appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for
laches to attach.
Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed.

CALIMLIM vs. HON. RAMIREZ

G.R. No. L-34362
November 19, 1982
118 SCRA 399
VASQUEZ, J.:
Facts:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to
compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in
order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of
the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title not being in
his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court
directing him to surrender the said title. This prompted Independent
Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to declare TCTNo. 9138 as
cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was granted
by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a
new title in the name of the corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon
learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled,
filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying
for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the court dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of
TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted
to the
filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that
had been made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138,
against Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from
Independent Mercantile Corporation.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the
property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated
on the title thereof atthe instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco Ramos
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations.
Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the
ground of estoppel by prior judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by
prior judgment
Held:
No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein
petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as
a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the subsequent civil case. In order
to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that
the judgment in the prior action
must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was
rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of
the parties, the judgment or order
cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential element
of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the
case. The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an
apparent
invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land
registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First Instance, acting as a
land registration court, is a court of
limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for
the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions
involving ownership or title to real property.

FRIANELA VS BANAYAD
PRINCIPLE/S:

Remedial Law
a) When issue of lack of jurisdiction may be raised; exception
General Rule: Issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may
be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal,
and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. 
            Reason: The principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the
government.
Exception: Delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction has been made during the
execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a court (Tijam Ruling).

b) How jurisdiction is determined

- Jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action unless such statute provides for
a retroactive application thereo
- Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations or averments in the complaint or
petition.

Special Proceedings
a) Jurisdiction in Probate Procceedings (Sections 19 and 3314 of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129)
RTC - gross value of the estate exceeds ₱20,000.00
MTC - demand does not exceed ₱20,000.00

n) Amount of the estate of the decedent must be stated in petition

- Jurisdiction over probate proceedings depends on the gross value of the
estate. Hence the gross value of the estate of the decedent must be stated in
the petition in order to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case.

FACTS: Petitioner Frianela was named as devisee in the will after the death

of her uncle testator Banayad. Frianela filed before the RTC for
the allowance of the November 18, 1985 holographic will of the
decedent. Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and
counter-petitioned for the allowance of two other holographic wills of the
decedent dated September 27, 1989 and another dated September 28,
1989.RTC rendered its Decision6 declaring the September 27, 1989
holographic will as having revoked the November 18, 1985 will. CA ruled that
the September 27, 1989 holographic will had only revoked the November 18,
1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of Moises’s real property was
concerned. Frianela’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence she filed
this instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing Decision1 of the CA.  But SC noted that RTC and CA focused
all of its attention on the merits of the case without first determining whether it
could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and decidesuch probate
proceeding.

ISSUE/S: WON RTC could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and

decide the probate proceeding.

HELD: NO. Sections 19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 provides

that jurisdiction over a probate proceeding is conferred to the appropriate
court depending on the gross value of the estate and such value must be
alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed. In this case, the petition does
not state the gross value of Moises’s estate. Hence, the case should be
dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.

Why Tijam Ruling cannot be applied in this case:

In Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has only been raised during the
execution stage. In this case, the trial court’s assumption of unauthorized
jurisdiction over the probate proceedings has been discovered by the Court
during the appeal stage of the main case, not during the execution stage of a
final and executory decision. Thus, the exceptional rule laid down in Tijam
cannot apply.

DUERO VS. CA
373 SCRA 11
Topic:
Jurisdiction and the application of estoppel
FACTS:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradel entered and
occupied petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302,
located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax
declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. Petitioner informed
respondent that the land was his, and
requested the latter to vacate the land. However, despite repeated demands,
private respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against
private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio
Ruena. Petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which
became the trial court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12,
1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to
respect the ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private respondent
Eradel was not a party to the
agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the
complaint.
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8,
1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was
ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the lot. On June 10, 1996, private
respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying
the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that
he turned over the complaint and
summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a
better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it.
However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. Private respondent
then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the
same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. The RTC again denied the
Petition. Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he
alleged that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the value of the
land is only P5,240, which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, the
RTC denied the MR. Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a
petition for certiorari which the latter granted.
Issues:
1) Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2) Whether the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of RTC after he
has successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom

RULING:
1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic
Act 7691 amending BP 129.
2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be
unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a
tool of injustice. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken
belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his
landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs
of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to
answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He then
filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He filed
before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court
denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his
Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction. This motion
was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case,
was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new
trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions
for reconsideration The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the
court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their
silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may
assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the
proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that
the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action
Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of the
court to dismiss an action
'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.'
(Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Thus, the ruling of the CA is affirmed. The
decision of the RTC and its Order that private respondent turn over the
disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, are annulled
and set aside.
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CA, GR No. 75919,
1987-05-07
Facts:
(1)
Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land with damages,... while the present case is an action for torts
and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining
order,... etc.
(2)
In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment
of title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and
delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of...
damages and... attorney's fees... in the present case, the prayer is for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of
the action against the defendants announced forfeiture... of the sum of P3
Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such
property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that
maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract
of purchase and sale of the subject... property and annul defendants' illegal
forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to
pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages
The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the
body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million... as
damages suffered by plaintiff.
(3)
Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as
to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case.
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion.  As
maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the
designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific
performance.
Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of
the... complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the
amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the
filing fee.
(4)... plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended...
complaint... for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-
plaintiff and by eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body
of the complaint.  The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the
amounts which they are asking for.
plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00.
Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer.
Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of
P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint
as it did not consider the damages to be merely ancillary or incidental...
amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the
government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of
damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00.
Issues:
filing fee should be... levied by considering the amount of damages sought in
the original complaint.
Ruling:
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of
ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should
be the basis of assessment.  Although the payment of the docketing fee of
P60.00 was found to be insufficient,... nevertheless, it was held that since the
payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the
case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular."
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the
allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that
it is an action for damages and specific performance.
The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount... of
damages as alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court."
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers
and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the asessment... of the filing fees in any
case.  Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee.
WHEPEFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.

UN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY

vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION (Judge, RTC Quezon City) and MANUEL
CHUA UY PO TIONG

G.R. Nos. 79937-38; February 13, 1989; GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:  On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance filed a complaint

with the RTC Makati for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire
insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against
private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in
default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.

On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in
the RTC QC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, initially against petitioner Sun Insurance, and
thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants.
The complaint docketed as Civil Case Q-41177 sought, among others, the
payment of damages. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify
the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of
the complaint to be about P50 Million.

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee
which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was
disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding
over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together
with 22 other cases assigned to different branches of the RTC QC which were
under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to
the SC. The SC ordered that the cases be re-raffled, the judges in said cases
to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its
payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates
of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify
in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.

Thus, Judge Solano, to whose sala Civil Case Q-41177 was temporarily
assigned, instructed the Clerk of Court to issue a certificate of assessment of
the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to
include the same in said certificate. On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default,
a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an
amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two
additional defendants aforestated.

Respondent Judge Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter
assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a
Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk
of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution
of the SC since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the
exact amount sought to be recovered. Private respondent filed a
"Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not
less than P10 Million as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the
body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent
alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of about P44,601,623.70.

On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the
second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted
proper compliance with the SC Resolution and that a copy thereof should be
furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The
reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of
"not less than P10 M as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to
P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the said
order of Judge Asuncion.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging
an additional claim of P20 M as damages so the total claim amounts to about
P65 Million. Seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private
respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.
On August 13, 1987, the CA denied the petition insofar as it seeks annulment
of the order, and petitioner’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
Hence, the instant petition.

During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment
of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.

ISSUE:
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 even if there
was nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee?

Petitioners’ contention: Considering that the total amount sought to be

recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the
docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or
less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should
be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. As basis,
petitioners cite Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.

Respondent’s contention: Manchester cannot apply retroactively for at the

time said civil case was filed in court there was no such ruling as yet. Magaspi
v. Ramolete applies wherein it was held that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.

HELD: YES, the court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Nevertheless, the contention that Manchester cannot retroactively apply is

untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, this Court held that the payment of the
full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal. Plaintiff-appellant deposited the deficiency in the docket fee outside
the 15-day reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the CFI (as appellate court)
did not acquire jurisdiction as the appeal was not perfected.

In Lee vs. Republic, the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to

become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of
the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956.
Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of
intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing
fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
In Malimit vs. Degamo, the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee
were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right
to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of
the CFI, within the one-week period after the proclamation as provided
therefor by law. However, the required docket fees were paid only after the
expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such
payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and
not the date when it was mailed.

Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee
must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we
also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of
several wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate
action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same
special proceeding then pending before the same court.

Then in Magaspi, this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a

case is deemed filed only upon payment of the correct docket fee regardless
of the actual date of its filing in court. In the said case, there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee
because the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket
fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one, for damages, the
SC upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the
damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the
trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.

However, SC overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an
action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc.. The amount of damages
sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint
alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this
Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by
payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of
the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and void.

The facts and circumstances of the present case are similar to Manchester.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case.
The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due is
obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of
the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee untill
the case was decided by the SC on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to
the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a
quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint
could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and
void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still
insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which
the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or
clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due,
he must require the private respondent to pay the same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing
fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court
of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the
additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the
total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the
supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the
prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any,
without pronouncement as to costs.

UNITED OVERSEAS BANK VS. HON. JUDGE REYNALDO ROS August 07,
2007
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation filed an
action for damages, accounting, release of the balance of the loan and
machinery and annulment of foreclosure sale against petitioner before the
RTC of Manila. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the private
respondent's complaint on the ground of improper venue. Consequently, the
private respondent amended its Complaint, this time praying for Accounting,
Release of the Balance of the Loan and Damages. The RTC of Manila issued
an Omnibus Resolution denying the same for lack of merit. Private
respondent filed a Second Amended Complaint, dropping Lourdes Pascual as
plaintiff and impleaded the officers of the petitioners as defendants. Private
respondent filed another action for Injunction with Damages before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan. The filing of the above mentioned case prompted the
petitioner to file a second Motion to Dismiss before the RTC of Manila on the
ground of forum shopping. The Manila RTC denied the second Motion to
Dismiss for lack or merit. A third Motion to Dismiss Civil Case was filed by the
petitioner with the Manila RTC this time raising the issue of jurisdiction. The
Manila RTC denied petitioner's third Motion to Dismiss Civil Case on the
ground that petitioner was already estopped to raise the issue. Court of
Appeals affirmed the Manila RTC Orders. ISSUE:
Whether or not an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order

RULING:
No appeal under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, may be taken from
an interlocutory order. In case of denial of an interlocutory order, the
immediate remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file an appropriate
Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the
commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter
but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. A "final" judgment or order
is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the
Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the
basis of the evidence presented on the trial, declares categorically what the
rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res
judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far
as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the
litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except
to await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and
ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
"final" or, to use the established and more distinctive term, "final and
executory." Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and
does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory"
e.g., an order denying motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or
granting of motion on extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing
amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or
production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment
or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order
may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Since an
Order denying a Motion to Dismiss does not finally dispose of the case, and in
effect, allows the case to proceed until the final adjudication thereof by the
court, then such order is merely interlocutory in nature. We find occasion here
to state the rule, once more, that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be subject of a
petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the
ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary
procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. As
a general rule, an interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition
of the judgment on the merits for a contrary rule would delay the
administration of justice and unduly burden the courts. However, we have
ruled that certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order
(1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse jurisdiction and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief. 3
4. CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests – Selected Cases (4-Manresa
2008-2009)
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is in estoppel to question the jurisdiction of
the Court. RULING:Yes."Unlike Manchester, however, were the jurisdictional
issue arising from insufficiency of the docket fee paid was seasonably raised
in the answer of the defendant in the trial court, in this case, the issue is being
raised for the first time. Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court
without question. It filed a counterclaim seeking affirmative reliefs, and
actively took part in the trial. A party who voluntarily participates in the trial
cannot later on raise the issue of the Court's lack of jurisdiction. In the case at
bar, the said [petitioner] filed their counter-claim seeking affirmative relief and
then filed a motion to dismiss without raising the issue of non-payment of
docket fees. And when plaintiff's witness Dra. Lourdes S. Pascual was
presented on direct examination the said [petitioner] did not object and
participated in the proceedings. It is only when the said witness was to be
cross examined that the issue of non-payment of docket fees was raised.
Clearly, the said [petitioner] [is] in estoppel to question the jurisdiction of the
Court. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a Motion to Dismiss at the
earliest opportune time to raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction,
more so, that this issue is susceptible to laches. Petitioner's failure to
seasonably raise the question of jurisdiction leads us to the inevitable
conclusion that it is now barred by laches to assail the Manila RTC's
jurisdiction over the case. (Norliza Mamukid ) RIVERA vs. RIVERA HELD:
Unlawful detainer case is still under the jurisdiction of the MeTC even if there
was an assertion of ownership. Lower court’s adjudication of ownership is
only provisional. (Kahlil Elbanbuena ) SEA POWER vs. CA HELD: From
NLRC to SC not valid. Petition should be Rule 45 to CA. Rule 65 to SC only if
there is grave abuse of discretion
NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION v. PRESIDING JUDGE OF
RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, GR No. 179878, 2008-12-24
Facts:
On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with
Damages... against NOPA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City
According to the Complaint, Campos and NOPA entered into two separate...
contracts denominated as Molasses Sales Agreement. Campos allegedly paid
the consideration of the Molasses Sales Agreement in full, but was only able
to receive a partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to
the quality of the products being delivered.
On 17 August 2005, more than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file
the correct filing fee.
According to NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in his Complaint the
exact amount of actual... damages by opting to estimate the value of the
unwithdrawn molasses in order to escape the payment of the proper docket
fees.
RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss
NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration
RTC issued an Order denying NOPA's Motion for Reconsideration.
NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari
Failure of the Petitioner to state in its Verification that the allegations in the
petition are "based on authentic records", in violation of Section 4, Rule 7, of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading."
Failure of the petitioner to append to the petition relevant pleadings and
documents, which would aid in the resolution of the instant petition, in
violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain,... speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or... officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the... paragraph of section 3, Rule 46."
NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution... attaching
thereto an Amended Petition for Certiorari in compliance with the
requirements of the Court of Appeals deemed to have been violated by
NOPA. The Court of Appeals denied the said
Motion
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS VERIFICATION THAT THE
ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND FAILURE TO
ATTACH THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON ITS PLEADINGS AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Ruling:
NOPA claims that this Court has in several cases allowed pleadings with a
Verification that contains the allegation "to the best of my knowledge" and the
allegation "are true and correct," without the words "of his own knowledge,"
NOPA is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated before 1 May 2000, when
Section 4 of Rule 7 was amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10.  Before the
amendment, said Section 4 stated:
SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
As amended, said Section 4 now states:
SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
amendment was introduced in order to make the verification requirement
stricter, such that the party cannot now merely state under oath that he
believes the statements made in the pleading.  He cannot even merely state
under oath that he has... knowledge that such statements are true and
correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to be either
personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records.
Section 4 of Rule 7, as amended, states... that the effect of the failure to
properly verify a pleading is that the pleading shall be treated as unsigned:
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks
a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the
same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned... pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of
this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly
report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action. (5a)
A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party's
knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the
court to allow the deficiency to be remedied.
Court of
Appeals, in the exercise of this discretion, refused to allow the deficiency in
the Verification to be remedied, by denying NOPA's Motion for
Reconsideration with attached Amended Petition for Certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2007
and 16 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651, outrightly
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros Oriental
Planters Association, Inc. against private... respondent Aniceto Manojo
Campos, are AFFIRMED.  No costs.

PANTRANCO North Express, Inc., and Alexander Buncan, versus

Standard Insurance Company, Inc., and Martina Gicale,
G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005.

NATURE OF THE CASE: The case was elevated to the SC by Pantranco and

Buncan by reason of the ruling of the CA against them and the denial of the
appellate court of their motion for reconsideration. The CA ruled that there
was no misjoinder of parties in the complaint filed by Standard and Gicale
against them, and that they are to be held accountable to the money claims of
the respondents.

FACTS: Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his

mother Martina Gicale. Alexander Buncan, on the other hand, was driving a
bus owned by Pantranco North Express Inc. Both drivers were travelling along
the National Highway of Talavera, Nueva Ecija in a rainy afternoon. Buncan
was driving the bus northbound while Cripin was trailing behind. When the two
vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus
overtook the jeepney. In so doing, thhe passenger bus hit the left rear side of
the jeepney and sped away. 
            Crispin reported the incident to the police and to the insurer of their
jeepney, Standard Insurance Co. The total cost of the repair amounted to
P21, 415. Standard only paid P8,000 while Martina Gicale shouldered the
remaining P13,415. Thereafter, Standard and Martina demanded
reimbursements from Pantranco and Buncan, but the bus company and the
driver refused. Thus, Standard and Martina were prompted to file a complaint
for sum of money with the RTC of Manila.
            Pantranco and Buncan denied the allegations of the complaint and
asserted that it is the MeTC which has jurisdiction over the case.

RTC: The trial court ruled in favor of Standard and Martina, and ordered
Pantranco and Buncan to pay the former reimbursements with interests due
thereon plus attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.

Pantranco and Buncan: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint.

            1) Martina Gicale was claiming P13,415, while Standard was claiming
P8,000. Their individual claims are below P20,000. Thus, the case falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
            2) There was a misjoinder of parties.

CA: The appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC.

            1) Under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19 of BP 129, it is
the sum of the two claims that determines the jurisdictional amount. At the
time this case was heard, cases involving money claims that amounts to more
than P20,000 falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. 
            2) Even assuming that there was a misjoinder of parties, it does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint.
The claims of Gicale and Standard arose from the same vehicular accident
involving Pantranco's bus and Gicale's jeepney. Thus, there was a question of
fact common to all parties.

            Pantranco and Buncan's motion for reconsideration was denied by the

CA.

Gicale and Standard: There was no misjoinder of parties. Their individual

claims arose from the same vehicular accident and involve a common
question of fact and law. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: WON there was a misjoinder of parties in the case.

HELD: No. Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the

following requirements for a permissive joinder of parties: (a) the right to relief
arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a
question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such
joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on
jurisdiction and venue.

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s
bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney.  There is also a common question of
fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent.   There being a single
transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same
cause of action against petitioners.

To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the

same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action
would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had
respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would
have been presented to sustain the same cause of action.    Thus, the filing by
both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order.   Such
joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient,
speedy and orderly administration of justice.

There is NO MISJOINDER OF PARTIES if the money sought to be claimed is

in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s.

On the issue of lumping together the claims of Gicale and Standard, Section
5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides:
“Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading
assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he
may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for
recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction.”

Further, the Court reiterates the Totality rule exemplified by Sec. 33 (1) of BP

129: “where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions.”Hence, PETITION IS DENIED.
INIEGO V. PURUGANAN
FACTS:
Fokker Santos filed a complaint forquasi-delict and damages against Jimmy
T.Pinion, driver of the truck involved in the traffic accident, and against
Artemio Iniego, owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint
stemmed from a vehicular accident in 1999, where a freight truck driven by
Pinion hit PR’s jitney which santos isdriving at the time
of the accident. The total amount of damages claimed is P490,000 Santos
filed a Motion to Declare Iniego in default for failure of the latter to file his
answer within the final extended period. Iniego filed a Motion to Admit and a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the cause of action. Judge Guillermo G. Purganan of the RTC
issued the assailed Omnibus Order, which ruled:  The Motion to Declare
Iniego in default must be denied, as iniego failure to file his answer because
the Order was sent to the wrong address, and so Iniego never received it.
 The main cause of action is not the claim for only as a result of the alleged
fault or negligence
of both defendants under Art. 2176 in the case
of Pinion, and Art. 2180 for Iniego. But since fault
or negligence cannot be the subject of pecuniary
estimation, this court (RTC) has exclusive
jurisdiction.
Iniego moved for reconsideration, which
was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount of damages is within
the jurisdiction of the RTC
HELD:
YES.It is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining
the
jurisdiction of courts, whether the claim for damages arises from the same or
from different
causes of action. The Court concurs with Iniego that actions for damages are
actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation. However, the total amount
of damages still exceeds the jurisdictional limit of P400,000 and remains
under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The distinction made between damages
arising from injuries in a QD (actual damages) and those arising from a
refusal to admit liability for a QD (moral and exemplary damages), which
Iniego claims, is more apparent than real, as the damages sought originate
from the same cause of action: the QD. (Note: The basis for the moral and
exemplary damages here is supposedly Iniego refusal to acknowledge his
liability and pay the corresponding damages. The basis for the actual
damages is the accident itself. ) The fault or negligence of the employee and
the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer are the seeds of
the damages claimed, without distinction. Even assuming that the claims for
moral
and exemplary damages arose from a cause of action other than the QD, their
inclusion in the computation of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still
proper. Rule 2, Sec. 5 (d)
provides that where the claims in joined causes of action are principally for
recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction.Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based
on a single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the total amount
thereof which shall govern.