ASATNov KETHOD* ql) (2) (3) (4) (5) w (7) (8) (9) Introduction; the uimits of argument. counterinduction i: Theories. uhilosophical Background: itill, Megel. Counterinduction ii: Emperiments, Observati ons, The Yower Argument Stated. Zirst Steps of the analysis. tural Interpretations. The Tower Argument, Analysis continued. Tue uaw of ine-tias Progressive 3ole of ad ‘loc “ypotheses. (10)cummary of analysis of Tovor Argument. (lL) uistovery and Justification; Cbservation and theory. (12)Rationality Acain. (13) Igcommensurability. (1g)The Choice Between compreh. nsive .deologies. (15}Conelusion. Fo we ppont at tema rch (om ina blat be me Mahemes Seite = en abe bom - ——— alAGAINST METHOD fer G12) : ‘ (2) Cow ler iucducttous Meodes (13- a Aiden Seca Tuas : it} Cam teri natal ge its Expode ante ‘ i Cuaecvaheut, Facts ¢38-) " [itive “lesser Hedymert Stalear rived When we gee that we have arrived at the slepc of Ma duals furh : utmost extent of human {understanding}, we KC) Nabiewl ube phete hme Curr sit down contented. HUME) (The Tower Prqgucenet we (oe A OTT The more solid, welldefined, and splendid Ve) The Law g ue hia (Fa) the @ifice erected by the understanding, Ka) Progresciv & be of Oot Happbeek eres the more restless the urge of life ... to fic) Qasausoy Qabyrd fe Tower remove itself from it into freedo: : Ovguuauth \ee2) % LAvpearing as] reason it is negative and I Qestovery ae Sh 2 ey dialectical, for it dissolve: into at Goteethy wgene be) nothing the detailed determinations of the he acy understanding. HEGEL? Pees Een bi pcone ts) Top, ores. ctl _ Although science taken as Whole is a Cisy Couelaseom Oe) nuisance, one can still learn grom it. a, BENN. (1) Imbroduction; the Liaits of argument, The idea of a methodology that provides ffra, absolute (meraxeistnrmvusnwds and eternal : into: consi- ; ae derable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical principles for conducting the business of science gé. . Ps femy research. We find, then, that there is not dsingle rule, however watl! Eppanted- ty woawod" that is not violated at some time or other. we learn that such violations are not accidental occurrences, results of insufficient knowledge or of inatvention wid: might have been * avoided, but that they are necessary for progress. Indeed, one of the (i) A Treatise of Human Nature ed. Selby-Rigge, xxii. The word "reason" has been replaced by "understanding" in order to establish coherence with the terminology of the Geman idealist: is taken f (2) The first part of the quotation, up to “appearing as °" Difference des Fichteschen und schellingache: ems_der Philo: Teprint, Hamburg 1962, 13.gphe eecond part is from the ,issenschaft cer pee i, 6 (Felix weiner, Mimburg). ae 3) Letter to Gert Mi n, 1l.ix. 49. quoted from Gottfried Benn, uyrik und Prose, Briefe @ Wiesbaden 1962, 22% 235. et ied * Rs initia . cssaill2 most: ouopadaing features of recent methodological thought is the realization that events such as the Copernican evolution, or the development of atomiom in antiquity and daring the past 100 years (kinetic theory; quantum theory) took place only because some scientists *obttous ” either decided not to be bound by certain/methodological dekmmm demands {ocmedeatsintcmrnemeginemacqathectentementeieqentirten, or because they unwittingly broke thea.4 These scientistapvere not completely without guidance, however. é They had ideas concerning the manner in whicn the incomplete matt they possessed could be improved, and perhaps auperseded with the in- nses, tracitions) perfect meana (auxiliary theories, instruments at their disposal. They has strong views about the structure, or the “nature” of knowledge (simplicity, empirical adequacy, truth, etc.) ag well as about the maim features of the sorld they lived in, some of these views wore held by them quite dogmatically; yet, they wre never enforced, come vhat may.” for example, new hypotheses were not abandoned cov with ee pesrmin bat remalts : ‘when they clashed with experience’ of the most solid and comvincing ind or when thay turned out, on elaboration, to become rather clumay, and perhaps even inconsistent. In practice the guiding ideas functioned ther fore mk not ss exclasive and inexorable norms of reason; they were rather theated like rules of thumb: they arose in a somexhat erratic fadion, (omtagtentian damenege-tneatght pay thot: HS neire at geTat ew modropabepeticelapideducedey, they were given due consideration, but Tay For details and further literature of. "Problems of Empiricisa, Part 41° in ang Function of Scientific Theory ed. Colodny, Pittebargh BS: (5) An excellent example is Newton who made his discoveries by violating almost every single rule of the methodology he introduced (‘which still keupmchitmiing the winds of contemporary empiricists). Cf. footnote 27. raratyses ‘init camithey were certainly not..skavishly obeyed. Thig liberal practice, we have aaid, ie not just a fact of the history of science; it ia not merely a manifestation pf human inconstauc and ignorance; it ig reasonable, and absolutely necessary for the grovth of knowledge. Hore specifically, one can show the following: considcring ony rule, however "fundamental", there are always circum stances when it is advisable not only not to listen to the rule, but to adopt ite opposite. For example, there are circumstances when it is advisable to introduce, clmrate, defend ad hoc hypotheses, or hypo- theses which contradict well establiehed and generally accepted experi- mental results, or hypotheses whose content ia emaller than the content of the existing (and empirically adequate) alternatives, or inconsistent nypophenea, and 80 on.° Té) One one the few physicists to see this feature of the development of ackhtific knovledge vas Niels Bohr: "... he would never try to outlir a finished picture, but would patiently go through all the phases of the development of a problem, starting from some appar-nt paradox and gradually leading to ita elucidation. In fact, he never regarded ach ved results in any other light than as startingapoints for further explo- ration. in speculating acout the prospects of some line of investiga- tion he would dismiss the usual cojsiderations of simplicity, elegance, ‘even consistency with the remark that such qualities can only be pro- perly judged after the event ..." A. Pais in S. Rozentnal (ed.) Niels Bobr. Hie Li and _,ork as seen by his Friends and Colleagues New York 1967, 117- For further information concerning Bohr’s philosophy cf. alsc ay essay "On A Recent Critique of Complementarity" Philosophy of ci ence Bawxi96R4GR Dec. 1968/March 1969.- As regards the quotation one must o: Acourse realise that science does not achieve final results and is there- fore always "before" the event, never "aéter" it.There are even circumstances - and they occur rather frequently -~ when argument loses its progressive and critical role and becomes an instrument of backwardness and of oppression. Nobody wants to assert” that the teaching af gmall children is exclusively shatver of argument (though argument may enter into it and should enter into it to a large extent than is customary®), and almost everyone agrees that what looks mater like result of reason - the matarg of a language; the exiatence of a richly articulated perceptual world; logical ability - may be due (7) Children others and so learn to look upon standards of b 0) ed of fixed, ‘given rules .. and euch things as sympathy and nation may play an important role in thie development", k.%. Popper, The Open gociety and Its Enemies 5th mitxtex edition, vol. ii, 390. One should also compare the romain- @er of appendix 1/15 which gives a clear account of the irrational elements in the progress of thought. (8) In one of hia numerous lucubrations in praise of Ordinary English ("Moore and Ordinary Lenguage" The Philosophy of G.E. Moore ed. Schillpp, Evanston 1952, 354f) fiz1colm makes the following comam t: “If a child who was learning tne lafiuege were to say, in a situation where we are sitting in a room with chairs acout that it was (highly probable’ that there were chairs, then ve would smile and correct his language." | Italics in the -riginal]. One can only hope that the children whom welcolm addresses in this manner are not as gullibli as are most of his students and that they will retain their intelli- gence and their imagination in the face of thie and of other "methoda! of edication™. (9) Cf. below, text to footnote ~ - \ / 48partly to indoctrination, partly to a process of growth that proceeds witao the forwe of natural las, oomovaacanig and where erguments ioP seem to have an effect this is often due to their physioal repetition rather than to their semantic content.° This much having been admitted we must also concede the possibility of non argumentative growth in the adu@)t as well as in (the theoretical parts of ) dnatgtutions such as science, religion, prostitution, and so on. we certainly cannot take it for granted that what is possible in the case of children - to slide, on the slightest provbeation, into entirely new reaction patterns - is beyond the reach of their elders and inaccessible to one of the wuite (go everyone says) most outstanding adult activities: soienc the contrary. It is to be expected that catastrophic changes, exasene wars, the breakdown of encompassing systems of morality, political revo lutions will transform and perhaps aultiply reaction patterns, patterns of arguaentation inclhded!+, just as an ecological crisis pultiplies mutations. This aay again be en entirely natural process, like growing in aize and the only function of rational discourse may consist in increasing the mental teneion that precedee and causes the behavioural outburet. And auch a natural process may be triggered by theoretical [O) Coanenting on his early education by his father, unu especially on the explanations he received on aatters of légic, J.St. Mill offera the folloving observations; "The oxplanations did not make the matter at al clear to me at the time; but they were not therefore useless; they re~ seined a nucleus for my observations and reflections to crystallise upo the import of his generel recarks being interpreted to me, by the parti quler instances which came under my notice afterwards’.— In "Problems 0 saprioiam, vart ii" I have arvued that the developaent of scicnce exnit dif-erences of precisely this kind, a new principle serving as a Snucleua for observations and reflections to cryatallise upon” until we obtain a theory that is understood even by the most uneducated empiria! Tor a aq imecat discussion of Hea prob tem tevehed pen irr mark of he Unmet , Ulsgenacaly ster deyik Vet i, FI- otebreakdowns as well, thus giving rise to a period of scientific revolution. Now - does not the occu: rence of such developments restrict the effectiveness of argument (except as a causative agent oh” leadime to developments very different from what is denandedby their content)? Does it not show that sdience which, after all, is part of th: evolution of man™* ig not entirely rational and cannot be entirely rational’ For @f there are events, not necessarily arguments, which cause ug to adopt new standards,will it then not be up to the defenders of the stems quo to provide, not just arguments, but ale» contrary causes? And if the old forms of argumentation turn out to be too weak ot & contrary cause, aust they then nat either give up, or reat to strong: end more “irrational” means? (It is very difficult, and perhaps entirely impossible, to combat the effecte of brainwashing by argument). ven the most puritanical rationalist will then be forced to leave argument and to use, say, propaganda not, because some of hie arguments have way in which apparently aimless talk may lead to new ideas and to a new state of consciousness has been described, bfiefly, but ex- quisitely, by H@inrich von Kleist, "Ueber die allmaehliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden" available a.o, in Hans Meyer (ed) Meisterwerke Deutscher Literaturkritik stuttgart 1962, 741-747. (11) "Recourse to direct action changed the whole tenor of the struggle for the workers’ self-cénfidence is enormously increased once they act without delegating any of their power to polétical parties or trade unions, ‘The factory is ours - so do we need to start working for the bosses again?’ This idea arose quite spontaneously, not, by command, or under the aegas of the so-called vanguard of the proletariat [with its special methods, rules, prescriptions and its special idea of xm tatio- nality], but simply as a natural response to a concrete situation." Cohn-Bendit Obsolete Comuniam, The Left Jing Alternative London 1968, 67.- Cohn-Bendit's omphasia on “spontaneity, ... the chief eneay of all burocrats" op. cit., 154] agrees with the tenor of the present paper which wante to eliminate burocracy not only from government, but damm also from the administration of knowledge (where it apprars as on fy appeal to retionality). (12) For the interpretation of science as a continuation of the struggle for survival cf. soltzmann, Populaere Schriften Leipzig 1906, Mach Br~ kenntig und Irrtua Leipzig 1916 as well ae footnote 37ceaged to be d, but because the psychological conditiong w ich enable him to effectively argue in this manner, end thereby to influenc thet others, have disappeared. Amd what is the use of an argument tht leavi 13 peopke unmoved? Ti3) 1a] K-R. Popper whose views I have in mind when criticizing the omnipresence of arguaent has admitted that "rationalism is necessarily far from comprehensive or self contained” (Qp. cit., 231]. But the question I am asking ia not wheter there ere limite to our reason; the question is where these limits are situated. Are they outside the aciences, go that science itself remains entirely rational (though the decision to become acientific may be an irrational decision); or are irrational changea an eesent@ifl part of even the most rational enterprt- se that hes been invented by man? Does the histirical phenomenon “scien: contain ingredients which defy a rational analysis? Can the abstract ail to come closer to the truth be reached in an entirely rational fashion, is it perhaps inancessible to those who decide to rely ‘on argument only’ These are the questions to which I want to address myself in the presen essay. {B] surprising insight into the limitations of all methodological rules as well as into their dependence on a certain developmental. atage of mankind is found in Lenin's and Mao's political writings. Iteneeda omly little imagination to turn the positive advice contained in thea writings into advice for the scientist, or the philosopher of science. Thue we read on pp 40f of Lenin's *'left .Jing' Communism, an Infantile Disorder first published in 1920; quoted from the edition of the Foret, Tenguage Press Peking 1965; very useful as a theoretical besis for the criticism of contemporary left radicalism, campus radicals and other le: overs from the political stoneage]: "we can (and aust) begin to build Socialism-not with imaginary human material [as does the doctrine of liberalism, especially in the form defended in \sil1's Qn Liberty - see elow, section 3] nor with human material specially prepared by us {as do all Stakiniete, both in politica, and in the philosophy of scien but with the quite specific human material bequeathed to us by capi- taliem. True, that is very ‘difficuly'; but no other approach to this task is serious enough to warrant discussion".- Replace "socialism" by “rationality of the future” and "capitaliam" bg, e.g., "Popperian metho- dology" = and our case is stated with perfect clarity. - I wuld like at this point to acknowledge that my interpretation of science oweds/qui a lot to the political writings of Lenin, Marx, Kao, Hegel. It is surpr sing how substitutions euch as the one just carried out will tronsform a political lesson into a lesson for “rationality” which, after all, is part of the process by means of which we move from one historical stage to another, It would also seem to me that attention to the wader politi context is necessary if the philosophy of science wants to free itself from the, Nagel-Carnap~Popper-Kuhn carouseell and if it wants to procede to a trepformation not just of its own pt doctrines, but of science ite ihe only philosopher who secretly imbibes the forbidden brew of Leninis is Lakatos - and the results are evident in his magnificent work. All t! is needed is that he confess his vices openly so that others may learn delight and enlighten us in a similar way.8 These general considerations are supported by what we have learned and are continuously learning about the history of human perception, thought, and self consciousness. Was it argument that led to the idea of self determination and freedom or did whatever arguments existed receive content only aftereman had staited to see himself as an autono- mous originator of action ragher than as an intersection point of cosmic forces and political demands? And was this latter development not the result of the breeking up of old orders and of quite irrational cetestrophies such as vars and revolétions?’* Wes human self conscious ness not raised to a higher level by turbalent events such as the French Revalution so that it needed argument and this particular and rather violent experience to comprehend and to make .ense of an otherwi purely verbal, or "abstract" notion of freedom? Starting from a stage taat views wan as a bundle of limbs? occasionally invaded by mis— chievous demons, thus causing him to become angry, or ead, or ferocious Tid) "As social practice cohtinues, thimgs that give rise to man's sense perceptions and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed ... Between concepts and sense perceptions there is not only a quantitative but ale a qualitative difference." Mao Tse-Tung, "On Practice” in Four Essays o Philosophy Forgeign Language Press Peking 1966, 5.- "Practice, knowledg again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeata iteelf in endles cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice und knowledge rises to a (qualitatively different] higher level." Qp. ciu., 20.- A develop- pent euch ag thie ie a “htesorival process which can only be realised i action ... It is not guaranteed by any law, and though probable, it is vy no means inevitable ... The real meaning of revolution ie not a chan in management, but a change in man.” Cohn-Hendit, op. cit., ll1f. (15) B. Snell, The viscovery of Mind Harper ‘orchbooke 1960, Ch. i, esp Te he E.R. Dodds, 1 kg _und the Irrational Boston 1957, Ch. i, Ch, esp. 16: “This fabit of ‘objectiviaing emotional drives’, treating not-self, wast have opened the door wide to the religious idea of psychic intervention ..."Si ~ ba Rei cies SL OE cL A hc ii me 9 we witness the gradual arrival both of the notion and of the phemomenon of individuality?” until the individual turns from a somewhat insignifi- cant though perhaps unique element of an oppressive social world into a judge of the uost basic principles of this world.!® ,t the seme time there ar.ive new, more @ mplex, and more realistic forms of argumenta- tion: a new consciousn seeing the world in new ways, approaches it with new inatrumemge. Now it is cleer that the appeal to argument has either no content at all and can be made to conform with any pro- 19 cedure’? or else it is bound, at such turning points, to have a con- servative function: jt tries to set limite to what is about to becone a natural way of behaviour.°° 1t is aleo clear thet in the latver case the appeal cannot remain entirely rational (where the word “rational” ie now interpreted in the more definite sense of the second alternative | Being his argument on natural habits of ressoning which have et ther be- come extinct or which have no point of attack in the new situation thst urceundevhiw tha a champion of "rationality" must first restore the earlier conditions. This, however, involves him in "a struggle of interests and forces, not of argument". Ti7) Snell, op, cit., chs. iii, iv. (18) R. kroner Speculation and Revelation in the age of @hristianity philadelphia 1959, 43ff. (19) According to Popper we do not “need any ... definite frime of reference for our criticiem} we may revise even the nost fundamental ru) and drop the most fundemental demands if the need for differeht measures of excellence should arise (Qp- cit., 390]. (20) No new progressive ejoch has ever defined iteelf by kte own limi- tations ... In our case however watching the boundaries is regarded as gore virtuous than tranecending them". Speech of Milan Kundera at the ivth Congress of Czech authors, Prague, June 1967. Quoted from Reden_zuz v, Kor zr hoslovakigchen Schriftstellerverbandes Verlag ‘Subrkanp 1308, 7. "Our case" is pf course ulso the case of revolutiona: developments in science and methodology.- In his introduction to the tre lation of Burke's writings on the French Revolution Gentz comments in similar vein [quoted from P.G. Gooch Gemany and the “rench Revolution London 1965, 95]: "...the eulogist of new systems always finds opinion on his side joptiaist!] while the defender of the old must appeal to reason." The "opinion" pf today is, of course, the “reason” of tomorrow which is already present in a naive, immediate, undevelaped form.10 That interests, forces, propaganda, brainvashing techniques play a much greater role in the growth of our knowledge and, afortiori, of science than is comonly believed can also be seen from an akalyois of the relation between idea and action, Cne often takes it for granted that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes and should precede any formulation and any institutional expression of them. Eiret ve have an idea, then we act,!i.e, either speak, or build, or destroy. Thie seaumphdwa certainly does not apply to saall children. They use words, they combine them, they play with them until they grasp 0 weaning that so far has been beyond their reach, and the initie playful activity ie an essential presupposition of the final act of ‘ugderstanding.+°124 there ia no reason why this neshanism shauld cease ‘to functivon in the grownup (unless he ‘is the unfortunate victim of teachers and institutions who believe that everyoné grows into and_ then forever wmains in a certain stage of behavioural adaptation to his eurroundings, called “rationality"). yuite the contrary, we must expect for example, that the idea of Liberty ¢ould be made clear only by seans of the ‘very same actions which were supposed to bring it about. So that these actiong were guided, not by a well defined program but by specific banoyi ser a vague urge giving rise to wetiems/ which in turn created the ideas necessary for looking at the whole process in a ratignal nanner. ition Betrayed New York 1965, 86f. (22) T cannot believe that « revolution such as the French Revolution nese of {the} rights [which people jseese) aa wen and citizens” as Wilhelm von dumbdldt expressed hinsel: Lquoted from Gooch, op, cit.» 109] or that a revolution such as the \ bapernican Revolution proce.ded|in the full comsciousess bf the ideas and methods, and with a full understanding of the instruments about i.e. within the next 300 yei ra] to be-enthroned. In all these cases the element of S unreasonable, nonsensical, mad, immoral action whan geen from the point of view of. contemporary - is @ necessary Pr supposionfot whatever clarity one would like to posseag, but can achie only after the event, as the result of the actions performed. forn similarly the determined use of the telescope <6 an ingetrument for the exploration of a Copernican reality was an essential element in the tales on discovery of the theories which/provided scientific justification for feo it. Strictly speaking Galileo vomterert to treat unknown phenomena . hast as if they were perfectly familiar andjto regard parts of a refuted theory as strong positive evidence for another refuted theory. and this je the normal case: theories often become clear only after incoherent parts of them have been used for a considerable time mwermennerAair paneraorapeersmidhrmncevinareekbede and such unreasonable, masensical, unaetnodfoa) foreplay is a necessary precondition of clarity and empirical success.”> An attempt to describe developaents of this kind in a genera) manner must of courge use the existing forms of thinking - mst but it oebyrtmemeto apply them in a Pickwickiaa fashion. "Moreover, since the traditional categories are the gospel of Svoryday thinking (including ordinary scientific thinking) and of everyday practice [such an attenpt et understanding] in effect presents rules and fo as of falae thinking and action - falseg, that is, from the atandpoint of ee material from the history of science cf. "Probless of Empiricism, Part Ti" gp. cit., sap. sections 7,8, 11. In politics the point just made implies the necessity of (mass) action over ‘and above party doctrine, guon if the doctrine should happen to contain definite and absolutely ‘year rules of procedure. For such rules, while cheer and complete whe Compared with other mujes are always woofly inadequate vis-a-vis the cospecnanging multitude of social coaditions. But it is just to such c Sitione that their content muat be referred and ie the process "anar- chistio" action i.e. action that ie(neither directly related) tqtheery for to the existing institutions hes to play én essential part: "We nornot tell .+. what jamediate cauge will most sore to rouse, kindle, end impel into 8 Sttuagle the very wide masses ,of scientists, for example] who are at present dormant... History generally, and the hist ry of revoluttons in pargicular, ie always richer in content, more varied, more manyeided, more lively and ‘subtle’ that even the best parties and the most clase conscious vanguards of the most advanced Basses imagine ... Prom thie smfollow§tyo very important practical conclusions: first, that in order to fu fil ite task the revolutioner: class must be able to master all forms, or aspects, of social mit ac!comonsense."“ This ia how dialectical thinking ari of thought that "dissolves into nothing the detailed determinations of the understanding".” we sec, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality wriaes from too naive a view of man and of his social surroundings. To those who look at the rich terial prowided by history and who are not intent on impoverishing this material in order to make it fit ccrtain preconceived notions, to such people it will soem that there is only one principle that can ve defended under circumstances and sf stages of human development. It is the principle: anvtaing geos.”? This abstract principle must now be elucidated, aad explained in cor crete detail, Gityp without exception...; second, that#the revolutionary class aust te veady to pasa from one form to another in the quickest and most un— expected manner." Lenin, op. cit., 102f, 100f - the applacation to ecies fo quite atraightforyard if we keep the proper rules of translation (fn, 13,8]) in mind. Cohn-Bendit op, cit., gives a vivideaccpant of an snarohiem of thie kind. "Problems of Empiriciem, Part ii" eglies the lesson to acience. (23) Our understanding of ideas and concepts, says Hegel [Gymnasialred quoted from K. Loewith, N. Riedel eds., jegel Studienausgabe Vol. £ Prenkfust 1968, 54] starte with “an uncomprenended knewledge of thom’ [Bs iat damit dergelbe Fall wie ait anderen Vorstellungen und segrif- fon, deren Verstehen gleichfalle ait einer unverstandenen Kenntnis an- facngt...."). Y- atso loge Vt-i, 20f- (24) H. Marcuse Reason end Revolution Boston 1960, 130. The quotetion ig about Hegel's logic. . (25) "It would be absurd to formulate o recipe or general rule ... to beve all cases, One must use one's ovn brains and be able to find one's de: in each separate cage.” Lenin op, cit., 64. Cf. also Footnote 13/B).— It ia interesting (but not at all surpewming) to goo how well revolutionaries such as Marx,’ Sngels, Lenin, Mao, Cohr— Bendit comprehend the concrete situation of the knoving subject and how far ahead they are in this respect of all the contempaary chil- teen of the Vienna Circle. Moreover, they are able to express tne sr findinge in the language of the com.on people so that everyenc and not only a smell sect of professionala, crn profit from thegs “here ia the philosopher of science who can write equally well and who is guided by similarly humanitarian condiderations? Cf. also footnote 72.ineories. It was said that considering any (2) Counterinduction rule, however fundamental or “necessary for science” one can imagine circumstances when it is advisable not only not to listen to the rule, but to adppt its opposite. Let us apply thie to the rule tnat "experience", or "the facts", or "experimental results", or whatever words are being used to describe the "hard" elements of our testing procedures moasure the success of a theory co that meemmsx agreement is to be regarded as favouring the theory (ur as leaving the situation unchanged) while disagreement endangers, or perhaps even eliminates it (this rule is an essential part of all theories of in- duction, including even some theories of corroboration). vaking the opposite view we suggest introducing, elborating, and propagating hypotheses which are inconsistent either with well established theories, or with well established facts or, as wef shall expres: ourselves, ve suggest _to proceed counterinductively.There is no need to discuss the first part of the sug estion whica favours hypotheses inconsistent with weli established theories. b summarise it by saying that evidence that is relevant for the test of The main argument has already been publisHed clsewhere.™ we may a theory T can often be unearthed only with the help of an incompatibl alternative theory T' so that the advice to postpone alternatives until the first refutation has tmkmmxpters occurred means putting the cart before the horse. In thie connexion I also advised increasing the (actually available) empirical contents with the help of a prin~ ciple of proliferation: invent and elaborate theories which are incon- sistent with the accepted point of view even if the latter should happen to be highly confirmed and generally acce.ted. Considering the arguments just summarised such a principle would seem to be an essen— tial part of any critical enpiricion.4 *7 36) "Problens af Empiricism” Beyond the Jdge of Gorteinty ed. Colodny Prentice Hall 1965, sections ivff, cepecially section vi.(Jhe relevant material has been reprinted in P.H. Nidditch (ed) Tho Philosophy of Science Oxford 1969, 12 ff,epecially 25-33.) "Realism and Instrumenta— lism” The Critical approach ed. Bunge,Glencoe 1964. "Reply to Criti- ciea" Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. ii, Cohen and Wartofsky eds., New York 1965. (24) Lovking back into history we see that progress, or what is regard as progress today, has almost alwaye been achieved by counterinduction Thales’ principle according to which there is unity behind the variety of appearances lies at the bottom of all science, ancient and modern. Yet tm it is camtradicted by observations of the most primitive kind (change; difference between air and iron, for example). The same appli and to an even larger extent to Parmenides' principle of the imppssi- pility of all motion (even a rationalist like Popper now fecle incline to attack Parmenides on empirical grounds). The modern interpretation of mental iliness as being due not to the action of some external spir tual principle, but to autonomous distuarbances of the sick organism ran counter to numerous instonc where the action of such a principle was both felt (split personality; hearing voices; forced movement; objective appearance of emotions and dreams - here the reader is invit to compare footnote 16 - nightmares; and.so on) and objectively o| gerved (phantom pregnancy; disintegration of speech patt..rms). Derying the power of the devil in these times was almost as foolish (or, con— sidering the treat of hellfite, much more foolish denying the exi-1s It is also an essential part of a humanitarian outlook. Progressive educators have always tried to develop tie individuality of their *Upile and to bring to fruition the particular and somotimes quite unique talents and beliefs they may posseas. But such an education very often seemed to be a futile exercise in daydreaming: is it not necessary to prepare tht young "for life”; and does this not mean that they must learn one particular set of views to the exclusion of everything else? And if there should still remain a trace of their youthful gift of imagination - will it not find ite proper application in the arts, that is, in a thin domain of dreams that has but litle to do with the world we live in? Will this procedure not finally l-ad to a eplit between a hated reality ani welcome fantasies, science and the arte, careful description and unrestrained self-expression? The need for proliferation shows that such ia not the case, It is possible i” 5 of material objecte is regarded /foday. Then Copernicus put forth his magnificent hypothesis and upheld in the face of plain and indu- bitable experience [fot literature cf. thc mference in footnote 4]. Eve! Wewton who explicitly advises against the use of alternatives for hypo— these@ which are not yet contradicted by experience and who invited the * scientiat not merely to guess, but to deduce his laws from "phenomiina” (ef. his famous rule iv) can do so only by using as “phenomena” laws which are inconsistent with the observations at his disposal (as he say! himgelf: "In laying down ... phenomena I shall neglect these small and inconsiderable errors" - rrincipia, ed. Motte-Cajori, California 1953, 405. For a more detailed analysis of Newton's dogmatic philosophy and of his dialectical method cf. ny paper "Classical Empiricism" The Methodological Heritage of Newton ed. 2.E. Butts, ‘oronto 1969.) Yet - all these lessons are in vain. Now as ever counter-induction is ruled out by methodology. "The Counterinductive rule" says W. Sekmm Salmon in his essay "The Foundation of scientific Inference", Mind and Cosmos ed. Colodny, Pittsburgh 1966, ‘185, is “demomtrably unsatisfactory". He fails to explain how the application of a “demonstrably unsatisfactory” Tuke can lead to so many satiafactoty resulta which, asve now see, coul: not have been obtained in any other way.KR to retain what one might call the freedom of artistic creation and to use it to the full not just as a road of escape, but as a necessary means for discovering and perhaps even changing the ,woperts of the world we live in. Yor me thie coincidencegof the part (indivi- dual man) with the whole (the world we live in), of the purely sub- jective and arbitrary with the objective and lawful is one of the nost important arguments in favour of a pluralistic methodology. <(3) Philosophical Background: Mill, wegel, The-idea that @ pluralistic aethodology is necessary both for the udvancemcnt of knowledge and for the development of our individuality hes been mactteein by J. St. WALL in hie admirablf essay On Liberty. This eecay, according to mi) ig “a kind of philosophical textbook of a single truth unich the cheng progressively taking place in modern society tend to bring out into we varies stronger relief: the importance, to man and society, of a large Waviet of character and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itse in innumerable and conflicting directions". ‘as variety is necessary for the production of “well developed human beings"( 258] peceekiows £ the improvement of civilization swe. “what has made the Europes soairp of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of mankind: Not any superior exgellence in them which, when it exists, exists as the effect, not as the capse; but their remarkable diversity TB) I shall quote from The ihilosophy of yohn Stuart Mill, marshall Gohen Bd. Modecn Library, New York 1961. Numbers in square brackets fr now on mean pages in this book. (24) autobiography, quoted from Zscentiel Vorks of John Stuart Mill ed! Lerner New York 1961, 149.7 a5 of character and culture, imdividuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another, they h-ve struck out a creat variety of paths, each leading to sonestalk valuabRe; and although in every period those who travelled in different paths would have thought it an excel.ent thing if all the rest would have been compelled to travel this road, their attempt to thwart each others' development have rarely bad @ permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the go: which others have offered. Surope is, in my judrement, wholly indebted to thie plurality of paths for its progressive and many aided develop. nent",268f].“? The benefit to the individual derives from the fact that "(t]he human facult}°8r perception, judgement, discrimination, feeling, mental activity, and even morel preference, are exercised only in making a choice .., the mental and moral, tike the muscular powers, are impro- ved only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more then by believing a thing only because others believe it” 252]. Choice wdwsmenm@ily presup- poses alternatives between which to choose, it presupposes a society which contains, and encoureges "cifrerent opinions" [249], “antagonisti modes of thought"? as well as "different experiments of living" ,249] 80 that the "worth of difzerent nodeg of life is proved not just in the 2 hocener, imagination, but practically"(250].~” “(U]nity of opinion", deddneatente: y» (27) For one particupay element of thie plurality cf. K.R. vopper, "Back to the ?respcratics", Conjectures and Pefutations liew York 1962, 136. 4 (28) iill'e essay on Coleridge, The Philosophy of John Stuart iil] etc., 62. 11( 7) Panetemqupemencets Cf. Wide "utline of a rluralistic Tnebry of knowledge and Action” Planning for Diversity and Choice ed. @. Anderson MIT Pres. 1968 which @Stabdlishes the monnexion with scientif method alluded to towards the end of the last section.a a alle i 28 wait, "unless resulting from the fulleet and frvest comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good."( 249]. Thiskaamany, is twmamupeicaaiggen proliferation is introduced by Mill. It is not the result of a detailed epistemological analysis or, what would be worse, of a linguistic examination of the usage of such words as "to know", “to have evidence for", and the like. Nor is proliferatior proposed as a solution to epistemblogical problems such as iune's problem, or the problem of the testability of general statenents. (the idea that experience might be a basis is at once removed by the For the rejation betvg Tdea and action cf. text to footnote 2L.- Eephasia on abction witha libertarian framework plays sie an important role in Cohn=Bendit, op. cit., eap. Ch. v, 254: “Evey small action commkttee iin the customary politicak lahguage of the West: every in- stitution, however small] no less than every mass movement |evey large institution, including govemment bodies etc.] which seeks to imptove the lives of all men must resolve: (i) to respect and guarantee the plurality and diversity of political currents lin the widest sense, in- cluding acientific theories and ideologies]... It must accordingly grent minority groups the right of independent action - only if the plu relity of ideas is allowed to exprees itself in social practice does the idea have any real mesning". In addition Uohn-=pendit demands flexi- bility and a democratic base for all institutions: “all delegahes.are accountable to, and subject to immediate recall by, those who have elec ed them." For aample, one must “oppose the introduchion of specialists and specialization” and one must "struggle against the formatign of any kind of hierarchy" incluing the hieraechies regress our Aewypen oducational institutions, universities, i of technolo- gy, and so on. As regards knowledge the task is to ensure “a continuous exchange of ideas, and ... [to] oppose any control of information and jmowledge." It seems to me that a combination of iill's’ general ideas and of a practical anarchism such as that of Cohn-sendit which refuses to be intimidated, or restricted by specialist knowledge (including the specialist knowledge diaseminated by our contemporary critical rationa- lists), which tries to reform the corresponding institutions, especiall hose’safe-deposit boxes of wisdom, our universities, and which encour- ages the fre flow of individuals from position to position { "No func- tion must be allowed to petrify or become fixed; ... the commander of yesterday can become a subordinate tomorrow"; Baxunin, quoted after James Jol1 The Anarchists New York 1966, 109] assuring at the same time that every position in society is treated with equal recpect, it seems to me that such an ideology is the best starting point in our attempts to remove the still existing fetters to thoughtsand action. ANd let n nav that acince. mixkmx being purely theoretical, has nothing to do witha le ae 19 remark that "(t]here must be discission, to show how experience is to ve interpreted"[208].) 2roliferation is introduced as the solution to a problem of life : how can we achieve full consdiousness, how can we learn what we are capable of doing, how can we increase our freedom so that we are able to decide (rather than adopt by habit) the manner in which we want to use our talents. Jonsiderations like these were common at times when pexsnoecurs teh yotrsren-mecon-entenonous 6ci— pkipevespabievoP einai the toa ticanpeiytes pan piat i ouleercmetiodiy.siben the connexion between truth and self expression was still regarded as @ problem.and when even the arts were supposed not just to please, but 33 to elevafite and to instruct.°° Today the only question is how science can improve its own resources no matter what the human effect of its methods and of its rearlts. For iiill the connexion still exists. Scien- tific method ie part of a general theory of man, It receives its rules from this theory and is built up in accordance with our ideas of a worthwhile human existence. action and even less with politics. The scientist whose results are received with respect by the rest of the community and whoee methods are eagerly imitated lives in a peculiar and often quite constipated environment that has its own style, its own rules, its own silly jokes, its own standards of “integrity” which are likely to poison the whole republic unless special preventive measures (elimination of speciv lists from a position of power; careful supervision of the educational proceas so that personal’ or group-ideosyncracies do not becoma a national malaise; absolute distrust of expert testimony; and s ion) fre taken. The connexionabetween theory and politice must alwaysbe @on- sidered. tu propagancinc funchion > (33) For oF wedgaeval art cf. Rosario Assunto pie Theorie dee schoenen in Mittelaiter vologne 1963, esp. 21f.20 the peculiar In adcition it can be siiown to lead to the truth:". » evil of silencing the exptession of an opinion is, that it is rob ing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those wo hold it, If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is alnost as great a bene~ fit} the clearer perception anftivelior npression of the truth, pro- ducda@ by its collision with error” (205]. "The beliefs ve have most war for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded"; 209], -f "with every opportu- nity for contesting it [a certain opinion, or a hypotherie] has not been refuted" [207] then we can regard it as better than another opinion that has “not gone through a similar process"(209).°* "If even the (33e) "Tdenlogical c+-uggle” says “ao Tse-"ung ("On the Correct tiandling of Contradictions Among the People” quoted from Four Essays on ;hilosophy Paking 1966, 116) “is not like other forms of struggle. The only a thod to, be used in this struggle is that of painstaking reasoning and not crude coertion.” "...the growth of new things may be hindered in the ab- aence of deliberate suppression simply through lack of discernment. It is therefore neceasary to be careful about questions of right and wrong in the arts and eciences, to encarage free discussion and to avoid hasty cm- clusions. We believe that such an attitude can help to ensure a relatively emooth development of the arts and sciences"(114]. "People may ask, since Harxiem is accepted ae the gpiding ideology by the majority of the people in our country, can it be criticised’ vertainly it can ... Marxists should not be afraid of criticiem from any quarter. Quite the contraryp tha need to temper and dewelop temselves and win new positions in the teeth of criticiem and in the storm and stress of struggle ... What should our poli be towards non-Marxist ideas? ... Will it do to ban such ideas and deny th any opportunity for expression? Certainly not. It is not only futile but very harmful to use summary methods in dealing with ideological questions among the people ... You may ban the expression of wrong ideas, but the ideas will still be there. un the other hand, if correct ideas are pampere in hothouses without being exposed to the elements or imwunized from dis- ease, they will not win out against erroneous ones. Tuerefore, it is only by employing the method of discussion, criticiem and reasoning that we can really foster correct ideas and overcome wrong ones, and that we canEe 20a Teally settle issues"|117f].- It is to be noted that this advice is not put forth generally, but “in the light of China's specific conditions, on the basis of the recognition that various kinds of contraditions still exist in socialist society, and in response to the country’ urgent need to spped up its economic and cultural development"(113; cf. also p 69, i.e "On Contradiction": "... we must make a concrete study of the circumstance of each specific struggle of opposites and should mt arbitrarily apply the formula ... to everything. Contradiction and struggle are universal and absolute, but the methods of resolving contradictions, that is, the forms of struggle, differ according t the differences in the nature of the contradictiona"J. Nor is freedom of discussion granted to everyone: ("he Tar as unmistakable counter-revolutionaries and ssboteurs of the socia list cause are comcerned, the matter is eae: simply deprive them of their freedom of speech" (117; cf. H. Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance” in Wolff-Moore-Marcuse a Gritique of lure Tolerance Boston 1967, 100]. the restriction occurs alreaay in Mili, thoughwth different reasons wweavane expressed ina different terminology: "It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that ,our} doctrine is meant to apply only to human being in the maturity of their faculties ... The early diffimlties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is « legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the nee justified by actyally effecting the end. Liberty, as a princifle, has no pplivagion to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion ..."("0 Liberty", cit., 197f; cf Lenin, op. cit., 40: "We can (and muat) begin to build socialism not with imaginary human material ... but with the huma materia bequeathed to us ..."]. chis insight into the liaitations of free discussion is missing in Popper. A abe fot net 7220% (3@) This and similar remarks make it clear that sill (and Popper, woo tofiowa Mill in all the respects eo far enumeraced) is not "dedicated to a national religion of skeptivism, to the suspension of judgement" ami that he does not "denly] the existence «+ not only of a public truth, but of any truth whatever" us we can read in Willwote Kendall's Loubentic but singularly uninformed essay "The 'Open Society’ and its Follacies” Amsrolesc. Rev. liv (1960), 972ff, quoted from Radcliff (ed) Fes ee or Liberty Belmont valifornia 1966, 38 and 32. 10 refute the charge of suspension of judgement we should also conuides this pa:-sage: crags ov nan over acquired hie wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it the nature offhuman intellect to become wise in any other manner. The eeeany habit bf correcting and completing his own opinion by collating sya th those of othera, so far from causing doubt and hesitalion in garrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for veing cognizant of all that can, at least obvidusly, be said against him, and having taken up,his position agvinat all gain- sayere - knwwing that he has cought for objections ang difficulties, in- severe Or avoiding them, and has shut out no léght which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter - he has @ right to think his judgement eter than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process"{ 209; my italics]. Nor is the insinuation Correct than Mill's society is "so to speak, 2 debating clubd"{Op. cite, 36;-italics in the original] - just think of “ill's insistence on Rhrerent "experiments of living" (249]. Of course, such attention to seetl de notto be expected from a selfriftous conservative for whom any discussion of freedom, and any atteppt to achieve it ig but “evil teaching"[op. oit., 35]-— > Fw an important oLiffirencs babween Mie mel Pappa cf) the ink of Me last Fertnate,21 Newtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind would not feel as complete an as-urance of its truth as they now do" 209]. "So essental is this discipline to the real understanding of moral and human subjects (as well as of natural philosophy - 208] that if opponentaxof all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and to supply them with the strangest argusents wich the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure up"( 228]. There is no harm if such opponents produce positions which sound absurd and eccenttic: "Preeisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make excentri- city a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyrann that people should be eccentric"(267].°> Wor Shoul those who "admit th validity of the argument for free discussion ... object to their being ‘pushed to the extreme’: ... unless the reasons are good for an extrene case, they are not good for any case"|210].7° thus aethodological and humaniterian argunentdare intormixed in every’ part of Hill's treatise and it is on both grounds that a pluralistic epistemology is defended, for the natural as vell as for the social sciences. ”” 35) For -ifferent argument which is entirely in Mill's spirit cf. ny "Problems of Empiricism" op. cit., 185. Today increase of testability can be added to the epistemological reesons presented by Mill , "Probles of Empiricism", section vi]. This is not a real addition, however, but. only @ more detailed and more technical presentation of ideas which are already present in Mill. dor tan ovat (36) This quotation te‘mainly for the benefit of Professor Herbert Peis who keeps criticising me for adopting expreme positions. Extreme posi~ tions are of expreme value. Thq induce the reader to think along dif- ferent lines{ They break his conformist habits. They are strong instrv- ments for the atticism of what is established and well received. On the otheriand the contemporary infatuation with "syntheses" and "dialo- gues" which one hears so often defended in the spirit of tolerance and Gf understanding can only lead to an end of all tolerance and of all understanding. To defend a "synthesis" by reference to tolerance means that one is not prepared to tolerate a view that does not show ang ad— mixture of one's own pet prejud&ces, fo invite to a “dialogue” by refe to tolerance means inviting one to state one's views in a less radical and therefore mostly less clear way. An author who can write,th the spirit of "dialogue" that "Chris. ianity and Marxism aregnot contrary t——that "a well He 22 Thstitute for Harxist Studies Vol. vi/l, Jan;BeB 1969, first page bottom] will hardly be prepared to accept the doctrfnes of a toughmind- ed arxiet who is inturested in progress, ,not in peace of mind. (37) Later in the century proliferation wae defendee by evolutionary argunente: Just as animal species improve by producing variations and weedipe, ont the less competetive imeax variants, in the very same manne: aciencekge thought to improve by proliferation and criticism. Conversly "well established” results of science and even the "laps of thowght" »“ewme now regarded as temporary results of adaptation; they weme not given absolute validity. According to Boltzmann | sopulaere Schriften Leipzig 1906, 398; 318,258f] the latter “error finds its complete expla nation in Darwin's theory. Only what was adequate was also ingerited... In this way the laws of thought obtained an impression of infallibility that was stréng enough to repard them as supreme judges, even of ex- perience ... One believed them to be irrefutable and perfect. In the same way our cyes and ears were once assumda to be perfect, too, for th are indeed most@remarkable. Today we know that we were mistaken - our senses are not perfect.” Concidering the hypothetical status of the laws of thought we must “oppose the tendency to apply them indiscrins- nately, and in all domains"( 401] which means of course, that th.re are circumstances, not factually circumscribed nor determined in any other way when we gust introduce ideas which @ntradict trem. In saort - we must be prepared tointroduce ideas inconsistent with the most fundament assumptions of our science even before these assumptions hive exhibited any weakness. Sven “the facts" are incapable of restricting proliforati for "there ig not a single statement that is but pure experience" { 286; 222]. vroliferation is important not only in science but in other domai foo: “We often regard as ridtdulous the activity of the conservatives, of those pedantic, constipated, and stiff judges of wors}ity and good taste who anxiously insist on the muxxaxkxtaxsax observance of eve y a: + any ancient custom and rule of behaviour; but this activity is benefic. ‘and it must be carried out in order to prevent us from fallin, into > parbarism. Yet petrification does not set in, for there are (those WRO™: are emancipated, relaxed, the hommes sans géne. Both clases of seople fight each other and together thuy achieve a well balanced society." 32 But Joltzmann does not alweys carry his ideas through to the end, Occa- sionally he ¥ a more empiriciam such as when he says ég fact remains unchanged forever"(343] or when he regards "ay waking sensations ,as| the only elements of ay thought"{177 bo that “we infer the existence of objects from the inpressions made or our senses"{19] or when he declares, more then once, that the task of science is "to adapt our thought, ideas, and concepts to the given ra~ ther than subjecting tle given to the judgement of the laws of thourht' [354 - cf. with this the assertion, on p 286, that “the simplest words Such as yellow, aweet, sour, etc, which seem to represent mere sensatic do already atand for concepts which have been obtained by abstrecting from numerous facts of experience"]. He also warns us not to "go too fi peyond experience". This vacillation between a sounc scientific philos and a bad positivistic conscience isécharacteristic of almost al] so— ‘led "realiste” from Boltzmann up to,and including Herbertw cig] (fo:269) pins thought will arrange matcers in a dif.erent way and w 23 une of the consequences of pluralism and proliferation is that stability of knowledge can no longer be guaranteed. However convincing the suyport a theory received from experience, however wellfounded its categories end basic, principles, nowever forceful the impact of ex- perience itself - there is always the’ possibility thatanew forms of 411 lead to a grans- formation even of the most imagdiate impressions we receive from tne world, Considering this possibility we may even say that the longlast he success of our categories, the omnipresense of a certain pointof view is not a sign of excellence, «m indication that the truth or part of the truh has at last been found but that it is rathe failure of reason.to find suitable alteraatives which might be used to transcend an ac idental intermediate stage of our knowlege, This re~ mark leads to an entirely new attitude to success and stability. he customary aim of all methodologies is to find principles and facta vhich, if poseible, are mot subjected to change. 2rinciples which give the impression of stability are of course tested..ne tries to ° refute them, If all atcempts at refutation fail ve have = positive re- sult, nevertheless: we have succeeded in discovering a new stable feature of the world tnat surrounds us. «oreover, the process of refuc Feasons consult Lenin's Hatericlism and Dmpiriocriticism). Here Popper's theo-y of falsification which tells us why we can and should go as far beyond experience as possible as considerably improved the situation. all that is needed now is @ little dialectics and attention to specific historical conditions (cl. B+» footnote 13, 8])24 tation re ts itself on as-umptions which are not further investigated. an “instrumentalist” +ill assume that there ere stable facts, sensations everday situations, classicel states of affair which do not change not even as the result of the most revolutionary dismvery. A "realist" may admit such changes, but ne will insist on the separation between subject and object and will try to restore it wherever research seems to have found fault with it.°© selieving in an “ap roach to the truth" he will even have to set timits to the development of concepts; for examjle, he will have to exclude incom ensvrable concepts from a series of succeeding theories. °? so fir the traditional attitude, up to, and including, Popper's critical rationalism. As opposed to it the at-itude about to be discussed regards any pro- longed stability either of ideas and inpressions which are capable of test,or of background knowledge which one is not willing to give up ) (realiem; comiensurability of concepts) ae an indication of failure, pure and simple. 4@ have failed to transcend an accidental stage of anding. It is even questionable whether we can still clais to possess knowleage. As we become familiar with the existine categorie: and with the alternatives which are being used in the examination of th T38) vopper, for exemple, takes it for granted that the subject can: ot enger the domain of science and he also defends a rather simple form of mechanical materiaAisa in his attack on vohr. For dutails cf. part i of “On a ecent Critique of Complementarity", op. cit. (39) Cf. below, sections 12 amu 13= ae Se received view our tninking loses its spontaneity until @m we are 25 reduced to the "bestial and goggle-eyed contemplation of the world around us’.4° “The aore solid, well defined, and splendid tue wtificie ered@ted by the understanding, the more restless the urge of life to 41 remove itself from it into freedom.” Sach successful refutation, by opening the way to a new and as yet untried system of categories, teapo- ralahy returns to the mind the freedom and spontaneity that is its essential property. But couplete freedom sont achieved. For however lave the change it will lead to a new system of fixed categories; thing: processes, states will be separated from each other, the existence of different elements, of a manifold, will be “exag erated into an opposi- 42 ana this “evil manuer of reflection’, to 44 tion by the understanding’ always work with fixed categories" will be extended to the most widely presup,osed and unanalysed op,osition between a subject and an entirely 45 difrerent world of objects.’? the following assumptioms which are imports for methodology are made in this coniiexion: "the object ... is something finieh:d and perfect that does not necd the slightest amount of thought in order to achieve reality while thought itself is ... something defi- cient that neede ... naberial for its completion®® and must be soft enow to adapt itself to the material in queation".47 tf thought and ap earan. Foy Verhasltnis des Skepcizismus zur ihilosophie" quoted from Hegel, wud ausgabe Vol. 1, 113; cf. alsd 112. Tai) Difveronz dee /ichteschen und Schellingschen systems, 13. (42) Logik, ii, 61. (43) "Reflective reason ... is nothing but the undereta&ding which uses abstraction, separates, and insists that the separation be maintained and taken seriously." Logik i, 26. (44) Logik i, 82. (45) Cf. Differenz, 14. (46) Cf. the Carnap quotation, text to footnote |46- (47) Logik i, 25.on 26 do not completely correspond to each other,has, to start with, a choice the one or the other may be at foult. [Scientific empiriism) blames 48 thought for not adequately mirroring experience ..."*° “These are tue ideas wiich form the core of our customary views concerning tie relation »49 and they are responsible for whatever between eutfyc$ and object immobility remains in science, even at timee of crisis. How can this immobility be overcome? How can we obtain insight into the most fundamental assumption not onlp of science and commonsense, dut of our existence as thinking beings as well? Insight cannot be obtained as long as the assumptions form an unreflected and unchanging part of the mxm world; but if they are allowed to change - does this not mean that we cannot finish the task of cricicising as identically the s. me parsons that startea it? Problems like these are faised not only by the abstract question of critickem but also by more récent discoveres in antaropology, history of science, methouolo,y. ve shall return to them when discussing incommensurable theories. For the moment I would like to indicate, very briefly, how certain ideas of Hegel can be used to get a tentative first answer and thus to make a first step in our attempt to reform the sciences, Science and comuonsense use fixed categories in addition to the many changing views they contain. As a result they are not fully rational. Full rationality can be obtaimd by applying criticiem to the stable (4B) Encyclopaedie der Philosophischen Wis: enschaften ed. Lasson, Leipzig 1920, 72f. In the original the reference is to Kant, not to scientific empiriciem. (499 Logik i, 25.parts also. Tbis presupposed (xk see the preceding section) ar the invention of alternative categories and their application to the whole rich material at our dspogal. vhe categories ani all other stable clements must be set in motion, "Our task ie to meke fluid the petrified material which xe find, and to relight (wieder ent zuenden) the concepta contained in this dead stufty.°° ye aust "aideolve the opsosition of a frozen subjectivity and objectivity and comprehend the oragin of the intellectual and real world as a becoming, we must under— stand their being as a product, as a form of producing".°2 such issolving is carried out by reason which ie "the furce of the nogdtive 52 ang wnich "annihilates"? .bsolute, that is, an abdolute negation" 4 science, com*onsense, aS well as the state of consci ousneds associated vann-bi Lake with doth, this/rs not @ conscious act of a scientist vhb has decided to eliminate some basic distinctions in his field. For ~Lthough he aay wnsciously try to overcome the limitations of a particnl’r stage of knowledge h. may not succeed for want of objective conditions (in his brain, in his social surroundings, in the physical world?) favouring his wish.2> negel's general theory @f development gives an accpunt of such conditions. (50) Logik ii, all. (51) Differeng, 14, Cf. Lenin's comments an @ simpler passage in his notes on Hegel's Logic, quéted from x.I. Lenin Aug dep Philosophiachen Nach~ lass Berlin 1949, 136ff, esp. 142. (2) Cf. aleo "Skepticiamue", op. cit., 117: "that scepticism is intrin- sically connected with every true philosophy". »lso 118: "Where can ve find amore perfect and independent document and system of true scepti— ciam than in Plab's ... Parmenides? which embraces and destroys the wnole Gomain of a knowledgefchieved by the concepts of our understanding.” (53) Differenz, 25. (54) "It is my aim to read degel in a materialistic fashion .. tachlass, 20. The same is true of rrofes:or J. Bohm 55) Cf. the note on tke limit and the ought, uogik i, 121f: "Aven a clone: being something, is differentiated into ite being for itself and its being and so it, too, transcends its limit ... 1f it is dbasis for aci— ification, then it can be oxidized, neutralised, and so |yn. In the pro— cess of oxidation, neutralization etc, its limit, i.e., only to be a basis, is lifted ... and it contains the ought to such an extent that only force can prevent it from ceasing to be a basis..." " Lenin,28 According to this theory every object, every determinate being is related to everything else: "a well determined oeing, a finite entity is one that is related to others; it is a content that stands in the relation of necessity to another content and, in the last resort, to the whole world. Considering this mutual consectedness of the whole metaphysice could assert ... the tautology that the removal of a single grain of duet must cause the collapse of the whole universe".°° she relation is not external but such that the very nature of each process, object, state etc. is affected by and contains (artpf) the nature of every other prowess, object, state, etc.” vonceptually this means that the complete description of an object is self-contradictory. It contains elements which say what it is - these are the elements used in the customary descriptgon provided by science and by commonsense - and int ale & Oe Sther eleaente which say what it is not - these are the elements used by science and comsonsense to describe other things supposed to be completely separated: "all things are beset by an internal contradictior 56) Logik i, 72 (57) ““werything that exists is linked in this way to everything else: to the total prowess of the universe. This linkage is either virect, by means of a single quantum, or else indirect, through a series of such inkages" - this is how Bohm describes \Scientific Change, ed. Cron- pie nondon 1963, 478] the situation created by the quantum theory. The similarity to degel is no accident; Sohm has studied Hegel in detail and he has taken especially the LogicWas the point of departure for som of his ewmesste acientific views: "...may we not try to understand the world as a total process, in which all parts (fr example, the system under observation, observing apparatus, man etc.) are assects, or sides whose relationships are determined by the way in which they are generat in the process’ Of course, in physica, man caf, in an ade.uate ap, oxime tion, probably be left out of the totaldéty, because he obteine his, info: mation from a piece of apparatus on the larre-scale level, whicn ishifluer ced in a negligible way by his looking at it. sut at a quantum mechanic level of accuracy, the apar.ms and the system under observation must | recognised to be ginked indivisibly. Should not the Bheory be formulate so as to say that this is 80 ...? In a total process of the «ind that T29 ‘This contradiction cannot bd eliminated by using different terminoloxy for example, by using the terminology of a process ané ite sodificati ons. cor the proces: will again have to be separated, at least in thopght, from something other tnan itself (otherwise it is pure being which is in no wey difierent from pure nothingness”?), it will contain part of what it is separated from, this part will have to be described by ideas inconsistent with the ideas used for describing the original process 60 which therefore is bound to contain contradictions also.” -iegel himself hes a marvellous talent to make visible the contradictions whici: arise when we examine a concept in detail, wishing to give a complete account of the state of affairs it deacribes. "Concepts which usuallypppear stable unmoved, dead are analysed by him and it becomes evident that they sove". iow this motion - and with this we come to a second princi:le of Hegel's cosmology - is not merely a motion of the intellect whidt, starting the analysis with @ certain determinat ion#noves away from tt she and is led to their gegation. It is an objective development caused by the fact that every finite (well determined, limited) object, proces:, state, etc. has the tendency to aphazise the elements of othefobjects present in it, and to become what it is not. ‘he object "being restless within ite own Limit? "strives not to be what it is”. Calling things am talking about, ‘an observation is regarded as a partacular kind of movement, in which some aspects of the process are, as itwre, 'pro- jected’ into certain large scale results ... This process is projection je... an integral part of the total process that is being projected." Qp. cit., 482, (58) Logik, ii, 53. (59) Logik i, 67. Cf. also the physical model for this identity in i, 78! accordivng to which neither "pure light" nor "pure darkness” give rise tc (the perception of) objec$s which are recognised and "distinguished only in the determined light, ... which is turbid light." (60) Bohm will therefore not be able to keep contradiction out of his ideas as he occasionally seems to believe (e.g. in op. cit., 482, sécond paragraph). He egrees.but tries to circupvemt uny particular contradict ic y moving to a different level of reality. Cf. his Causality and Chance 3 Mddern PRysics Harper Torchboxks 1962.30 “finite we mean that they are not merely determined, have qualities not merely as a real determination, that they are not merely limited ... but rather that the negative is essential to their nature and to their being ... Finite things are but the truth of their being is their ona. 4 What is finite does not merely change ... it passes away; nor is this passing away merely possible, so that the finite thing could be, without passing away; quite the contrary, the being of a finite thing consists in its having.in itself the seed of passing away ... : the hour if ite birth is the hour of ite death."©> "What is finite, therefore, can be set in motion. "6 Moving beyond the limit the object ceases to be what it is and be- comes what it is not - it is negated. The result of the negation - and thie may be regarded as a third prénciple of Hegel's commology - is "not a mere nothing; it has a special content, for ... it is the negation of 67 a determined and well defined thing".°’ Conveptually speaking we arrive at a "new concept which is higher, ribher than the concept that preceded sit, for it has been enriched by its negation or opposition, contains i as well as its negation, being the unity of the original concept and of its oppositiony"™© - an excellent description, for example, of the trans- ition from the Newtonian conception of space to that of Einstein provide @1) Lenin, Nachlass, 27. (62) Logik i, 115. (63) Jenenser Logik, retaphysik und Katurphilosophie ed. Lasson, Hamburg 1923, 31. (64) In German the atatement is more impressive: “Die Wahrheit ides] veins der endlichen Dinge ist inr Ende." (65) Logik i, 117. (66) Jo (67) 68) Loc. cit.31 we make the Zinsteinian nosion contain the unchanged Newtonian concept.©9 "It is clear that no presentation can be regarded ae scien- tific that does not follow the path and eimple rgthm of this method, for this is the path pursued by the things themaaves."/° Conaidering that the motion beyond the limit is not arbigrary, but to Garected "towards its [i.e. the object's] end"”* it follows that not all the aspects of otherkthings which are present in it are realised in the next stage. degation, accordingly, "does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes ... ach class of things ... hus its appropriate form of being negatedin such a way that it gives rise to a development and it is just the same with each class of conceptions or ideas ... This had to be learned, like everything erse."72 what has to be learned, too, is tha the "negation of the negation" does not lead further away from the origin starting point but thet it returns to it.’? Thie is "an extremely general and for this reason oxtremely comprehensive and important - law of devele nent of Nature, history, and thought; a law which .,. holds good in the o Bea animal and plant kingdom, in society, in mattematics, in history, and in phitoBdehy."74 thus for example "a grain of barley , failing under sui- table conditions on suitable soil] ceases to exist - it is negated, and in its place apoears the plant which has srisen from it, the negation of the grain ... (Thi plant] grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally TéS) GF. below, section (as well as footnote 116 of “Problems of Bapiri: iam", op. cit. (79) Logik 1, 36; cf. also ii 54, 58ff. (71) Logik i, 117. (72) ¥. Engels Anti-Duehring New ‘ork 1939, 155. Hy italics.— I am quot i Imgeks, Lenin, Hao and similar thinkers rather tnan the usual bunch of itegelian or anti-ierelian scholare as they have still kept the frevhness of mind that is necessary to interpret and to combetely apply the uegili philosophy. fhe same aplies of course also to such physicists as liohm, Vigiers,even,Bohr who may occasionally be rexarded as an, unconscious Hegelian. (@. a mmarks <> FUbfack cmak object Below) CP arte Cactnale 25%é a 32 once more produces grains of barley, and as so.n as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in ite turn negated. As a result of thia negation of the nogation we have oace azein the original grain of harley, but not ag a single unit, but ten, twenty, or tiirtyfold [and perhaps even] (75 qualitatively better:"/? "It is obvious that in describing [the .rocess as the negation of the negation I do not say anything concerning the particular procesqea] of development, for example, of the grain of barley from germination to the death of the fruitbearing plant ... I (rather bring (all these processes] togetner under this one law of motion and for this reason I leave out of account the peculiarities ofeach separate individual process, Dialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of wotion and development of nature, human aociety, thougnt."76 73) Logik i, 107 (73a)hathematice was for a long time regarded us lying putside the domai of dialsectics. The examples used by Heel and -ngels and especially the example of the difierential calculus, s0 it was thought, only showed the immaturity of the mathematics of the time and the Aimitations of even the greatest philosophers. One should not have been quite to gener— ous, however, What riegel says of mathematics applies to informal mathe- matics and, indofar as informal mathematics is the soyrce of the rest, to all of mathematics. That a dialectical study of mathematics can lead to splendid discoveries, evenkoday, is shown by Lakatos’ Proofs and iefw tations (first published in the british Journal for the ;hilosophy of Science 1963/64). One miet praise Lakatos for having made such excellent use of his Hegelian upbringing. One the other hand one must perhap”s also criticise him for not revealing his source of inspiration in a more straightforward manner but giving the impression that he is indebted to a much less comprehensive and much more mechanical school of thought. Ur has his temporary membefship in this school made hi lose his sense of perspective? So that he prefers werbe,mictaken for a wittgensteinian EE vethorrtmen boing clageified with the didiectical tradition to which he telongs? Cf. also footnote 13,8). (74) Anti-uuehring, 154. (5) MS (76) 154f; my itelica. Spistebologically these laws belong to the arinto: telion rather than to the Kewtonian tradition,So far concepts and real taings vere regarded as separate and certain similarities and coffesgondences were noted: each thing contains in itself elements of everything elee, it devclops, changes, tries to return to itself. The notion of km each thing, accor ingly, comtsins contradictory elements, it is negated, and moves in a way corresponiing to the movement of the thing. This presentation hes one serious dis- advantage: “Thought is here described as a mere subjective and formal activity wawle the world of objects, being situated vis-a-vis thought, ie regarded as something fixed and as having independent existence. This dualigm .., ig not a true account of things and it is oretty thopghtless to simpty take over the said properties of subjeckivity and objectivity without asking for their origin ... Taxing a more realistic view we must say that the subject is only a stage in the dewelopment of being and essence."’’ The concept, too, is then part of the gemeral development of using again a materialistic interpretation of Hegel’ - vature. "Life", for example, "or organic nature is that &¥@%@ of nature when the concept stage as a blind concept t.at does not comprehend itself, i.¢., dees not thinks”> appears on the stage; it enters t Peing part of the natural dehaviour fiest, of an organism, then of a thinking being if not only mmineors Miertwa a nature that “Lies entirely outside of it"”, it ceases to be “something subjective and accidental"©°, “merely a concept"®+, it parti- cipates in the general nature of all things i.e., it contains an element 77) Eneyclopaedie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, ergaenzt durch Vor traege und kollegienhefte, ed. by L. Henning, \. Michelet, and souman Berlin 1840, 395f; cf. also Lenin, Hachlass, 102. Or, to use Hohm's $er- minology: ‘as long ag, by our customary habit of tninking, we try to say that in an experimentsome part of the workd is observed, ,and described, with the help of some other part, we introduce an elen-nt of confusion into our thought process. Indeed, even the very word "observation" is wis leading, as it generally implies a separation between the observing appa- ratus and the object under observation, of a kind that does not actually34 of everything else and ulso has the tendency to be the end result of the development of a specific thing so that, finally, the concept and this thing become one.°? “That real things do not agree with the idea L"read - with the total knowledge of man") constitutes their finitude, their untruth becauge of which they are objects, each determined in its special sphere by the laws of mechanics, chemistry, or by some external 84 purpose". ” In thie atage "there can be nothing more detrimental and more unworthy of a philosopher than to point, in an entirely vulgar fashign, to some experience that contradicts the tdea ... When something does not correspond to its concept, it must be led up to ityn©? until “eoncept and thing have becoue one.°6 exist”. Op. cit., 482f - the reader should go on and consider the beautiful example of the obacrvation of a mirror image. (78) Logik ii, 224. (79) ii, 227. (80) ii, 408. (B1Q ii, 225. (82) ii, 408. (83) Lenin, Nechlass, 114. (84) ii, 410. (85) if, 408f. (86) ii, 228.- "Knowledge is the eternal infinite agroach of thought and object. The mirroring of nature in human thought is not ‘dead’, it is not ‘abstract’, it is not without motion, not without its @ ntradictions but is to be conceived as an eternally moving process that gives rise to contradidions and removed them." Lenin, op. cit., 115. 335 To sum up: knowledge is part of nature and ie subjected to its general laws. Accordiny to trece general laws - the laws of dialectics - which apply to the movion of objects, concepts as well as to the motion of higher units comprising objects and concepts every object participates in every other object and trics to change into its negation. This pro- cess is understood only if we at.end, not to those elements in our sub- jectivity which are still in relative isolation and whose internal contradictions are not yet revealed - most of the customary concepts of science, mathematics and especially the rigid categories used by our modérn axiomaniacs are of this kind - but to those other elements which are fluid, about to turn into'their opposite, and vhica have therefore a change to bring about knowledge, truth, vhich is "the identity of tain and concept.” ‘The identity aust be achieved, not mechanically, i.e. by keeping stable some aspects of reality (which, being in motion, will soon be lost and be replaced by dogmatic opinjons of them, rigid per- Gould ng ecrovndl wilh) ceptions included) and wmaiatng (some Other aspect, or tneory until agreement is achieved, but dialiectically i.e. via an interaction of concept and fact (observation, experiment, basic statement etc.) ‘hat changes both elements. ‘he lesson for methodology is - not to work with atable concepts, nt to eliminate counter induction, nt to be seduced into thinking that one has wt lest found'the correct degcrjption of "ghe facts" when all that has happened is that some new categories have been adapted to some older eategories which are so familiar that we take thei outlines to be the outlines of the world itself. TST) Logik 11, 228. The whole introduction to the Subjective Logic i.e. ii, 213-234 can be waed for actitiviam of what has vecome known as Varski's theory of truth. If/1 remember correctly this criticism is simi lar to a criticism wiced by the late Professor Austin af in hie léctures in Berkcley in 1959: wen am Ovford prilosepher occasienaily slumble pen Hee truth ?36 (4) Counterinduction ii: Sxperimentsp Cbervations, "Facts". Considering now the invention, the use, and the eletoration of theories which are inconsistent, not only with other the@ries, but even with @xperiments, facts, Observations we can start by pointing out tnat not e theory ever e with gli the known facts in its domain. And the disagreement ia nét with romours, or with the remlts of sloppy procedure, but with experiments and observations of the highest precisio and reliability. Thus the Copernican view when it was first introduced was inconsistent with facte so plain and obvious that even Galileo 78 had to call it “eurely falso".? Ln og hore is no limtt to my astonishment" 4 vétes @ntmmmue in a later vork™ "wnen I reflect that Aristarchue and Copernicus were able to make reason 0 conquer sense that, in defiance A of the latter, the former became mistress of their belief. Newton's theory of gravitation was beset, from the very beginning, by a consi- derable number of difficulties which were serious enough to provide material for refutations. évon today, and in the non relativistic domain, there exist "numerous discrepancies between observation and theory". pobre atomic model vas imtroduced, and retained in the face e7) of very preciee and unahakeable contragsmbery evidence.“ The theory of relativity was retained despite D.C. Miller's decisive refutation (1 call the refutation Wecisive” as the experiment was, from the point oc leat ae of view of contemporary opiaten, -t 1 1 22 GY The Age quoted from Drake-0'Malley (eds) The Controversy on the a : tas (20. jon. st as well performed as the t Philadelphia 1960, 184. the Ivo Ciief World systems tr. st. vrake, Berkeley 533, 328. T "4 Se (21) Brower-Clemence, of ele: tial Mechanics New York 1961, v. Cf. aleo R.H. Dicke, cs ate fomal Basis of General Relativity” in . . Chim- Beffmana, Ede. Gravitation gnd Relativity New York 1964, 1-16, ; G1) G. rachen’ 2.2 «f Max Jommer Thy Cancepruar Dinlopmes (1 Qusrive Mechanics Ney Yorte 1966.i i i aL oe aL earlier experiment of Micheleon jnd Kore’ « There is no need to wmntinue this list whose principal content is well know to all philosophers of sciepee. But don't they realise that it plays havock with the rule, sentioned ka/ssotidi’s, that theories are judged and, possibly, refuted by experience and vith the associated rule that experience and theory must alvaye be kept separate? For it now turme owt that theerics are not judged by all relevant oxperi- mente, but only by game. And that the principle of selection is not the reliability of the experiment, or the clarity vs. opaqueness of its relation to the theory but the hope that the theory will prevail. Nor { this.bope always based on wellknown, testable, and highly con- firmed hypotheses whose application ‘to the problematic case is clear and wight bring with it the desired reconciliation. ore often it is not comected with amy existing assumption at all but with the exp ctation that a suitable saving hypéthesia vill some day be found. Mow if it 1a possible to discard contrary facts on the basis of ephysical conjecture of thie kind, then why shpuld we accept, and regard as meapures of excellence, those facts which are in agree- ment with the theery? If, on the other hand, we take all available facts at their face value and exclude any idea that ie not immediately connected with what we Imov, then how shall we be able ever to arrive at any theory at elif These are some of the contredictions created by . teddies ok the clash between practice and gethodology. G3) WA, Yorents studied Miller's work for many years and cpujd not find the trouble, It vas énly in 1955, 25 yeare after HillerYini shed his series, that a batisfactory accpunt of hie resulte vas found. cf. R.3, Shamklaad, *Contersatgons with Einstein", Am, Jdurn. Phys. Vol, 3A (1963), 5}£f ae well as footnote 19 and 34. C%. ten he feemelineg Hscuniens Te ew the acoh Onramtene (128 Gerccterm aval; eA + A, % igs 32 WH; it 16 not immediately obvious how this clash ia to be reaolves, Scientific practice is always influenced by accidental developments evch as the degemeration of schools, the availability of government hidesaphicak are prot Keat funds, thegenvra’ of the times. Theories which to start with are re- garded with supécion amd ere rejected by aciantiata gradually bécome accepted and even turm into presuppositions of research (relativistic invariance!), AB a result the excellent arguments which, paved the vay for their acceptamce are forgotten anc are replaced by a summary, ¢ naive, aad almost ritual reference to “the facts"7* Kethodological 5 Mules, on the other hand, speak of "theories" and "observations" aw if as if these were clear and well defined objects whose properties are ‘ Gasy to evaluate and are underatoof in the same wy by every scieitist while the materfal which a scientist has actually at his disposal - his lave, his experimemtal results, his mathematical techniques, his epiatesologi@al prejudices - is indeterminate in aany ways, ambi- guous, snd gewer fully separated from the historical background. 1th is always contesinated by priaci,les wnich we do not know an. wich, if known, vould be extremely hard to test. Questionable -vicws on cognition euch ae the view that our senses, used in normal circuastan~ ces, give reliable information about the world may inwade th: obser tion lapguage iteelf, cons:ituting the observational terms nd tne distinction betweem veridical and illusors appearances (we shall soon pescnt an example of this situation). as a result observation lanjuage: A, Wheeler OM) Conce rhing quantua theory J Whaler writes as followa: "Yany a young ecitmtiat l@cks conviction about important pointe in wurkaday quantum theory and ie deprived of the deepest insights into tne quentua prisoiple itself, because he does not know the debates tnat settled the iesues firmly for the fathers of quantum tweory. He troubles over the same old is indecisively and ingleriously.” Sources for ibetory of Guantun Paseice, kuhn-ie ilbron-rorman-Allen eds., Philadel- phia y Wie| are bound to older layers of speculation which affect, in this roundabout fashion, even the most progressive cosmology (example: the absolute space-time frase of classical physics wnide was codified, and cont crated, by Kant). The sensory impression itself, however simple, nay contain, and as a matter of fact ot always do: contain a coapo- nent that expresses the reqction of the perceiving subject and nas - no objective correlate whatever, This component often merge: witn -he . rest and foras and unstructured whole which aust be subdivided from the outeide, wi h the help of counterindwtive ,r.cedurea (example: the appearance of a fixed star to the naked eye whicn contains the _aubjective effects of irratiation and diffraction). Finally, there are the auxiliary premises vhich are needed for the derivation of t fe and which oftin form entire auxiliary sciences. able preai In the case of the Copernican hypothesis who -e invention, defence, and partial vindication rune counter to alnost every aetyododorical rule one aigt care to think of these auxiliary sciences consisted of lave describing the properties andthe influence of the terre: trial athaos— phere (meteorology), optical laws dealing with the atruture of the eye, of telescopes, witn tie behaviour of light, dypanical lav: deseribing motion in moving systema and, most: importantly, they con~ tained a theory of cognition that postulated a cergain simple rela- tion between perceptions anu phyrical objects, wot all these auxiliary ilable in explicit form, many of trem merged witn subjects vere the observation language leading to the situation described at the begin-ing of the present section. Considering all these circumstancess sccniiii observation terms, sensory core, aumiliary sciences - we reclise that @ theory may be inconsistent witn the evidence not because it 19 not correat, but because the evidenve is contaminated, that is, because it either contains unanalysed sensations which only partly correspond to extersal processes, or bedause it is prfented in teras of antiquated views, or uecause it ia evaluated withthe help of backvard auxiliary aubjecta (the Copernican theory vas in trouble for all these reasons?) It ie this bistorico-physiological character 9: the evidence, the fact that it expres: atate of affaire but also some subjective, aythical, and lax forzobe: Views conceming this state of afiairs that forces ue to take a fresl not merely some objective look ‘at methodology: in the last analysis our judgement of theories % UES) Por detaile of. again "Problems of tapiriciam, vart 11", op. ¢14 rests (if we take the path of eapiriciem and demand tests by an inde- pemdent experience) upon our particular, ideosyncratic reactions to the outer world (this is the "sensory core” of the test atatemente’”) which are in turn expresed in terms of some deepacated (epistemological, phy- siological, cosmological) beliefs (this constitutes the content of the observational concep$a). ‘the beliefs and the auxiliary sciences which relate observation to a newly inventaa theory (which is the negation of the previous unreflected state of affairs) are usually im earlier in origin, and they are often already half forgotten, A straightforward and unqualified judgement of theoriee by "the facte" is therefore bound to eliminate ideas simply beccuse they do not fit into the framework of some older cosmology. This makes us suspect that theory and "the facts", theory and experiment, theory and observation will have to entel tecte in a symmetrical fashion so that theaies can be criticised and removed by facts and vice versa (considering the antiquarian gharacter of observation concepts I would be prepared to say thet a well thought out new idea should always oe given greater .eight than even the most impressive experinental result. The strength with which such a result, or a more primitive observation impresses itself upon our senses and upon our minds ic, after all, but the strength of a habitual and petri- fied consexion betwe:n concepts and sensations). This finishes the general argument for the second part of the demand for cpunterinduction Counterinduction, therefore, is both a fact, and a legitimate, and much needed nove in the game of science. 195) in what follows the reader is advised always to consult his Hegel and to compare out statemnts with dialectical formulations. [Bagels on)42 (5) The vower Argument Stated. First Steps of the wnalysie, As a con- crete illus$ration, and es a basis for further discussion I shal) now briefly describe the manner in wiich Galileo defused anhaportant counterargument against the idea of the motion of the eargh. 1 say defused", and not “refuted” because we mre deWling with a changing 5 conceptual system we well as with certain attempts at concealment. According to the argument ,wnich convincet Tycho and which i: used ecrt§ in Galileo's own Trattato della sfera ) we see that "heavy bodies ... falling dow from high, go by a streight against the motion of t and vertical lime to the surfa of the earth. This is considered an irrefutable argument for the earth being motionless. Por if it made the diurmal rotation, a fover from those top a rock was let to fakt, being carried bykthe whirling of the earth, vould travel many hundreds of yarda to the east in the time the rock would coneume in its fall, and the rock ought to strike the earth that distancdaway from the base of the rovers 46 (Fe) al us ah ae4 i 4 # Considering the argument Galileo at once admita the correctnes: of the sensory content of the observation made, viz. that “heavy bodies, a6 + falling from a hight, go perpendicular to the surface of the eargh". Considering an author (Chiaramonti) who sete out, vo convert Copernicans Ae "I wish that this author by repeatedly mentioning this fact he says would not pat himself to suc trouble trying to hat 4. understand from o senses that this motion of falling bodies is simple straight aption and no other kind, nor get angry and comphin because such a lear, ob- vious, and sanifest thing should be called into question. For in this way he hinte at believing that to those who say such motton is sot stmight at all, bat rather circular, it seems that they see the stone move visibly in an arc since he calla upon their senses rathe r than (37) Gp ek, Ie, (32) 256,| ee 4 tneir reason to larify the eitect. This is not the case, Simplicio, for juet as I... havehever seen nor ever expect to eee the rock fall any way but perpenicularly, just so do I believe that it appears to tye eyen of everyone else. it is therefore better to pat aside the appearance, on which ve all agree, and to use the power of reason either to confirm its reality, or to reveal ite fallacy." The correct- neas of the observation is not in question. what jg in question is , ite reality" or "fallacy". What is meant by thte expression? The question 1s anavered by/an exemple that occur in the very next paragraph and. "froa which one may learn how easily one aay be deceived by siayle appeamances, or, let us say, by :he iapressions of one’s senses. TRis event is the appearance to those vho travel along a street by night of being followBd by the moon, with stepa equal to theirs, wocn tney see it gliding along the eaves of tne roofs. Then it lo ks to them just as would « cat really running alomg tne tiles and putting them behind its an appearance wnicn, if reagon did not intervene, wiulé only fee obviously deceive the In thie example we start with a sensory impression and consider a . atatement that is forcefully suggested by it (the auggeation 1s 80 stron that it has led to entire systems oB belief and rituals as becomes cleas irom a closer stady of the lunar aspects of witchcraft aid of otaer religions). Now “reesos intervenes": the statement suggested by the other statements in its place. impression is examined and one consid qThe sature of the impression is not chin ed a bit by this activity (thie ie @mly approximately true but we can omit, for our present pur pose, the complivetions arising froa the interaction of inpreasione and propositionp) but it enters new observationgetatements and plays new ~ vetter, or worse - parte in our knovledge. What are the reasons andelo the methods vhich regulate such exchange? | | (4) To atart with we must become clear of the nature of the total phenomenon: appearance plus statement. There are not two acts, the on noticing a phenomenon; the other: expres:ing it with the help of the 2 appropriate statement, but only one viz.: saying, ina certain obser — vational sittation, “the moon ia following me" or, "the stone is falling etraight down", We may of course abstractly subdivide this process into ent and parts, end we may alm try to create a situation where stat : phenomenon seem to be psychologically apart and waiting to be related (thie 16 rabher difficult to achieve and is perhaps entirely impossi- 3T \ vie). But under normal circumstances such a uivision does not occur ano describing a familiar situation is for the speaker an event in which statement and phenomenon are firmly glued together. | Tnie enity is the result of @ process of learning that starte in one’ very childhood. From very early days we learn to react to situations witn the appropriate (Linguistic, or other) womurimen. Th: teaching 4 procedures stmpaxkanicrke botn snape the"appearance” or the "phenomenon" 4 + and eatablish a firm connegion witn words so that final-y the phenomena a to speak for theBselvee, ani without outside help or extrancous knowledge. They just gre what the associated statement accerté them to the Arata be. The language they “speak” ic of wuree infiuenced bg deliefs watch 4 | { annette o been held for mach a long tine that they nb longer appear as sepa t rate principles but enter the very terms of everyday discourse and, a Tne dered bot beaining, Sears his O emerge from the things themselves: we-ebtein the situation that was ribed in the lest seetion, Weauche merging ofabectratron em” apt, LotHy.i, fe 1 Ma- Now at this point we may ‘want .o compare, in our imagination, and quite abstractly, tho results of the teaching of differ nt languages, incorporating different ideologies. «# may even want to consciously change some of these ideologies and adapt them to aore “modern” points of view, It is very difficult to say how thie will changepur situation unlese we make the @erther asoumption that the quality nd structure & sensations (perceptions), or at least the quality and structure of those sensations which enger the body of science is kampuliy independent of their linguistic expression. If am very doubtful (6venlabout] the welds approximate roserbees of this assumption (which can be refuted by simple examples) and I am sure that/We are depriving ourselves of new sucede and qatlorsebyrecmmany discoveries as long as we remain within the lia by it. Yet the present essay will remain quite consciously ehould within these limits. (My first task, if I/ever mukmmmx resume writing, de Making our additional simplifing ascuapt ion (i(/stdr7derwane by car] onpot ete phd templet amber ft ther hest} we can distinguish betw a sensations ‘those “operation.s] of the mind Wich follow! , so] pe wr closely upom the senses" and are so firmly con ected with their reac- defin would be to explore these limits, and to try venturing beyond thu nl tione t.at @ separation is difficult to achieve. Considering the rigin ; and the effect of such operations I shall ca | them natural interpretg- iw Uitheredétary bf Méuginerurst atpePprecatiens have rhsencrt-grdad . oo eo Wovan Oreanua, introduction. a A. ¢| | 4 47 (6) Natural Interpretations. In the history of thought netural inter- pretations have been regarded either as apriori presuppositions of science, or else as prejudices which mat verem-wust be removed before jg] 3rrious examination, The first ascuapt ion 7 is made by Kant and, .in @ very dif eremt manner, on te basis of very difterent talents, by some contemporary linguistic philosophers. The second as:umption ia due to acon (there are however predecessors, such as the Greek skeptics). Galileo is one of those rare thinkers wno ne ither vants to retain natural interpretations, nor wants to altogether elisiné- te-them. Wholesale judgements of this kind are quite alien to his way of tninking. He insiete on a critical aiscussion wich is to decide vbich matural interpretations n be retained and which must be replaced. This does not always become clear from hie writings. Quite tne contrary, the methods of reminiscance to «hich he appeals to freely are designed to oummenate tne impression tai nothing naa changed and that we continue expressing our observations in the old and fawiliar way, Yet nie atti- tude is relatively easy to ascertain: natural interpretation are neces! ‘ry. The senses alone, and without the hulp of reason, caniot give us a Lrue account of natgre. dhat 1s needed for arriving mmpat such a te aio true account are "the ... senses accoapanied by reasoning.” .oreover, in the arguments dealing wits the motion of the earth it is this hos bee content of the loser eaten berm Teasoningand AoE the weavege of the senses, tne appearance, that causes trouble. "It is therefore better to put aside the appearances on wrich we all agree, and to use tne ,ower of reason eéther to confirm , tneir) eee red ity, or to refeal , their] fallacy".** “To confirm the realily or reveal the fallacy of appearances” meana however to efemine tne truth of those natural interpretations wnica in our natural thinking are so inte- Ge) Drare pus, 25¢- (ier) 256.Her mately connected with the appearances tnat we no longer gamit regard False Last at them ae separate assumptions. We now ‘ommine the first natural inver- pretation implicit in the argument from falling stones. fM) According to Copernicus the aotion of a falling stone should be And by the “motion of the stone" “nixed straight-and-circular” a acant not just ite motion relative to some visible mark in the visu field of the observer, or its observed motion but rather its wolion in the solar system, or in (absolute) epace, or its real motion. The femilier racts @p ealed to in the argument assert a different kind of motion, deimple vertical motion. This result refutes the Copernican hy- jothesie only if the concept of motion that occurs in the observation atatement is the same as the concept of motion that occurs in tre Copur nican prediction, ihe observation statement “the stone is faliing stray rr to a movement in (absolute) space. down” must therefore likewise r st must refer to a real gotior. Now the force of am “crgument from observation” derives fron “he fact that the observation statements it involves are firmly conected with the appearances. There is no use appealing to observation if one does not know how to describe what one sees, or if one can ofier one's description with gammb hesitation only, as if one had just 1 arnes the language in which it is formulaged. An observatt onWetatemon( maxrm rges into one two very difierent paychological events, viz. «1) a clear and unambiguous sensation and (2) a clear and unambiguous connex. wa 03)i : i ~*~ Ce ite between thie senaation and part: >f a .angwage, This ie the way in wich the sensation SMa is "\ade Lo speak". Do the sensgtions in tne above argument “speak the lanyuage" of real motion? Tey syenk the langage of re 1 aotion in the antext of 17th, century ever" yday thought - or at least this is what Galileo tells us. 1e tells us that the everyday thinking of tie time entailrd the for character of gl motioM@br, to use well knowa philesophical “operati terms, it entailed a real: with respect to motions except for occasional amd avoidable illusions seen aotion is identical with real Acco. ing te (abeolute) motion. figm/(what has been said in the last section tnis distinct {on-was not explicitly drawn. une did not first Jistin,:uish the seen tion from the real motion and the. conect tne two by a quite the contrary - one des#ribed, perceived, correspondence rul acted towards the seen métion as if it were already the real ining. wor tot Gay Tt.{ i 4 aati te & ow wat ae proceed in tnis manner unfer all circumatances - it is admitted ust tnat objects ay move which are not seen to move; and it +m also ad~ aitted that certain motions are illusory (cf. the example in section 7 above), Seen m&tion and real aotion se not always identi€ied. sioweve: there mee paradigpatic cases in wnich it # psychologically very diffi- ~ult, if not plainly impossible, to admit deception. It 3 trom tnese weit names be oe paradigmatic cases und not from the exceptions that naive realism ierivesl ite strength. These are also the situations in which we firat rn our kinematic vocabulary. rom our very childhood we leern to react to them with concepts whicn have naive realism built right into them and which inextricably connect aovement and the apyrarance of +ovea ent. ami The otiion of the stone in t: argument, or the alleved aotion of the earth is exactly such a paradipmatic care how cpuld one possibily be unaware of the swift motion of a large bulk of aat er such aa the earth 1s supposed to be! sow could one possibly be una vastly ling stone irhcon o smmumdena@y extente® -raieciu e the fact that the f ry tnrough apace!) From tne point# of view of (7tn century “sournt and language the argument is therefore impeccable, and quite forerfol. Nowever we notice again how theories ("operative character" of all “iotior ential correctne: of sense reports) whic are rot formlated ex- plicitly mag enter a debate in tc yuise of observational terms. And we realise again that observational terms are trojan horses whi-h must te watched very carefully. sow i one supposed to proce. d in auch a sticky aituat ton?4 Yy WHYS the argument from fal ips ones see ss Lo ru:ute the Copernican view. This may be due tim to tw inncrent. cigadvantage of Copernicanisa; Fomorg ates oe ine bu* to the exiatence of natura Aonit! bd sg big taprovement, The farst task, them, i¢ to sxgcever gapeUrexam ned ovata cles to progress. ¢ Ge It was Bacon's belief that natural interpretations could be «1sco~ Hat vered by a met od of analysis math peols them off, one after another, interpretations waicn are in need of until the sensory core of every observation is lai@ Bare. Iie act od has £ rious drawback: One: natural interpretations f the xind considered by bacon are not just arced to a previously existing field of sensations, they are instrumental in constituting gamma ficl d. Eléminatéme all anak you the natural interpretatione/aleo eliminates mee ability to think and to per- ceive. Two: disregarding this fundamental functivon of naturak interpre- tations it should etill be cl-ar thit a person who faces a perceptual ficld without a single natural interpretation at hir disposal wo.ld te completely digoriented - he couli not even start tne busine: s of science. Three: the fact that we do start, even arter some Jaconian analysis, shows toat the analysis has stopped prematurely. And it has stoned at Precisely those natural interpr: tations of w'icn we are not awarw nd without which we cannot proceed. It follows that the invention vy start from scratch, after a complete removi.) of all natural interprita ons nas akon place, im self-defesting, . poss.ele lor 19 it ppaabebe to even yartiy inrevel Uw cluster ot nature interpretations. At first sight tne task would se ® vo be Himpie errudh: one tekes observation statements, one after the otner, and analyses their content. Ho-ever conc: pts which are hidsen in observation statement CedénY Hentslles are not likely to secumeupumrbairpcondwaest@y in the more » atect parts{ 1s wee of language. and if they do, 1% will still be difficult to neil them .own (concepte juat as percepts are Mumquend@y ambiguous, “nd dependent om background). Mor:ver, the contemt of @ concept in 'e:«r~ ined also by the say im which it ic r/lated to perception. Yet, ow can thie way be discovered without circularity? Perception aus! 5¢ identified and the identitying mechanisa will contain some of the very. came elements which gowern the use of the concept to be investigated. se never penetrate this concept coapletely, for ve always use part of it in che attempt to find its conatituemts.22 there is only one way to get out of this circle ana it consists in using an external seaaure of couparigan including new ways of relating concepts and prrecpts. Removed from the domain of natural disco urse and from all tnose principles, habits, attitudes waich constitute its “form of life" such an external measure will kook strange indeed. [nis, however, 18 "Ol me an arguaent against ita use. .uite the contrary, such am impression of strangeness reveals that natural interpretations are at vor, ani 10 is a first step towards their discovery, Let us explain this situa: ion ct. Of Emppricism™, op. cit., 204ff. Dobbs cf bapidcrma i. ity the help of our example! The argunent intends to show that the Sopernican view is not in accordance with "the facts", oven from the point of view of these “facts the idee of the motion of the 2arthbagpears to be outlandish, —nsurd obviously false, Lo Wention only some of the cxyressions which were frequently used at the time (and wiich are still heard w ereever profes- sional squares con‘ront a new and counterfactual theory). thi mates us surpect that the Copernican view is an external measure sick of preci- rely the kind described above. #e can now tura the argumeit around end use it as a detecting device that helps vs to discover whe’ precisely it ie that excludes the motion of the earth, furning the areument aroun we firet avsert the motion of tne earth aw Laon ingdire wha* chanzien will remove the contradiction. such «n inquiry my take consideraile time and there is a good sense in which we can say tnat it is not vet finirhed, not even today. the contradiction, therefore, may stay with us for decades, and even centuries. still, it muct be upheld (Herel!) until we have finished our exavination or else the exavination - the attempt to discover the anteviluvian components of our knowlesre ~ once even start. (This, incidentally, is one of the reasons one cen mive for retaining and, erhays, ever, for inventing rneorieduiiich ere in onsinter with the facte). #e conclude, then, that idrological inrrecients of our knowledre ad, more esecially, of our observations, re di covered with the help of theories whicn are refuted by then. they are discovered counterinductively.4 o4 i has been {lt} ut us ret what wlm@ewe uss rted so far. Theories are te:ted and, possibly, refuted, by facts. ‘acts comtain ideological components, oider views which have vanished from sight em were perhaps never foraulated in an explicit manner, These componente are highly suspicious first, be- cause of their age, because of their antediluvian origin, secondly, be- cause their very nature protects them from a criticak ex-mination and always bas projected them from such an examination. Considerinr @ contradiction between a new and intelligent theory .nd @ collection of “firmly established facta" t.e best procedure is, therefore, not to abandon the theory but to use it for the discovery of hid.en principles which are responsible for the contradiction. Counter induction is an essental ,art of this process of discovery. (Zxcellent historical example: the “rvuments ggainst sotion and atomicity of Parmeni@es and Zenon. Diogenes of Sinope, the Cynic, took the simple course that would be taken by many contemporary scientists and all comtemporary philosophers - he refuted the argument by rising and walking up and down. The oppositefourse, recomaended here, led to auch more interesting resulte as is witnessed by the history of the argument. One should not be too hard on Diogenes, however, for it is also reported that be beat up a pupil wh o was content th his refutation clang t he had given reasons whic: the pupil should not accept w:thout additional reasons of his ow.)ce { \ i 4 e le (Mb) Haviay siscov red a particular natural interpretation tue next question ia how it is to be examined and tested. Obviously ve can not pro- ceed in the meual way: derive predictions anc compare them wath he *results of observation". Ihese re ults are no longer avaélable. The ddea that the senses, employed under normal circumstances, produce correct reports of real events ouch as the real motion of physical bodies ential part of the anti~Coper- thir idea which has be-n found to be an o nican argument has now been removed from it and from all observational it statements. gut without/our sensory reactions cease to be relevant for tests. This conclusion has been generalised by some rationalists vno decide pevee@ut to butld their setencdpn reagon only and ascribed to observa- gee ineignificent auddopt thes prrecwclaart- ravanvitlary fanction. ial:leo doe. not pemecnesresanmenep, 1 ont natural interpretation caus-s trouble for un at-ractive view, if xum ite elimingtion removes the view from the aomain of observation, tien the only way out of trouble is to use other interpretations and to se what happene. The interpretation whict jalileo us s restores the senses to their position aa inetrusents of exploration but only #8 T iuidf tne reality of relative motion. botson “among things wich share 1° 4e common" is "non operative" tuat 19, "ib reaaine insensiple, by roc 101 “eo and vithout any effect whatever". G liteo's first step in bie Joint examination of the Copernican doctrine and of @ fami ar, but bidcen ; eanbiaks 5 gesumption of the older point of view en(thérefore rons replaw ot ow ite latuer by a different aseumption or, t» use modern tera nol GY, Ae antre ; ogous duces 4 new vbservation Langue