epistemic authority — ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological
and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:
epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current
political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre
sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility
with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au
tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso
phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if
it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that
the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as
the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu
mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational
schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves
within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,
however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history
and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism
in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.
We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and
environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy
to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that
have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if
it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that
the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as
the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu

mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued becauseepistemic authority —
ideology as a threat to human life and science as

the enemy of ideology. The sort of pluralism that seems to raise current

political - cum - scientifi c ire is motivated not so much by an external threat

from metaphysics or ideology or politics to science or to life, but, as we

argued above, a hegemonic or imperialist threat to some scientifi c ways

forward at the hands of others — let us not forget the social factors in au

tism

in a mad rush to a genetic explanation — or even, at times, a worry

that science has hegemonic dominance over other ways of knowing that

have not been given a chance to express their insights. This is to say that

the global epistemic situation has changed — science is less challenged by

non scientifi c rivals than it is, at least in part, in danger of losing its hu
mility

with respect to other aspects of human life and belief. So we can

become explicit in our anxieties about hegemonic stances within science.

Moreover, we may wish to borrow not merely from our friends in history

and sociology of science but also from our friends in Continental philoso

phy

to help us theorize knowledge as power.

4. I have, at last, used a phrase that I have felt the absence of so far:

epistemic situation. One of the authors in the Encyclopedia, John Dewey,

offered a form of pragmatism that relativized knowledge and methods

to situations. Pluralism seems often presented in the spirit of situational

pragmatism. We might wish to know the causal pathways internal to the

individual that put the individual at risk for breast cancer. We ought not,

however, lose sight of other, equally valid, questions: what environmental

factors put women at risk for breast cancer, when might the individual and

environmental risks properly lead to radical prevention including the psy

chological

and physical trauma of prophylactic mastectomy, and so on. In

other words, pluralism is not simply a reminder that there are many repre

sentational

schemes and many things to know, but an effort to remind our

selves

within a scientifi c culture that there are many different actions we

might seek to take, many ways we might wish to intervene in the world.

We might wish to object to a theory of truth that says that belief is true if

it satisfi es us, but doctrines and methods are very often pursued because