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Humanismo 3.0
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JHPXXX10.1177/0022167819831526Journal of Humanistic PsychologyPeters
Radical Humanistic
Approach
Shannon M. Peters1
Abstract
An entrenched assumption in the mental health field is that if left “untreated”
the aftermath of sexual assault will inevitably lead to some diagnosable form
of emotional distress. This assumption has focused the search for pathology
on individual survivors rather than systems and led to societal pressure
for medical or psychotherapeutic treatment following unwanted sexual
experiences in the United States and globally. Humanistic psychology is
grounded in an existential phenomenological approach that privileges agency
and a sociopolitical context of lived experience. As such, it has great overlap
with the social justice mission of liberation psychology and is well equipped
to respond to sexual assault survivors and the oppressive and patriarchal
systems that perpetuate gender-based violence. This article explores the
rising use of neoliberal medicalized frameworks to respond to sexual assault
in therapy, analyzing both positive and negative aspects of medicalization.
Implications for responses to the global prevalence of sexual violence are
discussed. Suggestions for alternative epistemic and therapeutic approaches
that can be used by humanistic psychologists and that aim to enhance an
appreciation for the context of survivor’s experiences are provided.
Corresponding Author:
Shannon M. Peters, Department of Counseling and School Psychology, University of
Massachusetts Boston, 100 Morrissey Boulevard, Boston, MA 02125, USA.
Email: shannon.peters001@umb.edu
2 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0)
Keywords
sexual assault, trauma, posttraumatic stress disorder, gender-based violence,
medicalization, neoliberalism, social justice, liberation psychology
Medical Neoliberalism
Medicalization refers to the increasingly popular, fundamental belief that the
complex human experience of distress is best understood as a disease or dis-
order (Conrad, 1992). Although medicine is traditionally thought to address
solely illness, injury or pathology, society has increasingly called on medi-
cine to improve human’s well-being and “happiness” (e.g., sexual function,
infertility, alcoholism, old age; Rose, 2007). Thus, “medicine is inextricably
intertwined with the ways in which we experience and give meaning to our
world” (Rose, 2007, p. 701). Concerns about the medicalization of “normal”
human experiences have been raised for decades (e.g., Jacobs & Cohen,
2010; Szasz, 2007; Ussher, 2010) and attributed to the field of psychiatry’s
movement to have more human behavior fall under its purview, thereby
securing more patients and the field’s future (Summerfield, 2004). Dominant
discourses can be used to exert social control by establishing norms and
accepted truths (Foucault, 1972), and when medical institutions have the
authority to respond to sexual assault, survivors may be led to interpret their
behaviors and emotions in terms of “symptoms.” In turn, pharmacological
and psychotherapeutic interventions are privileged. This medical gaze
4 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0)
(Foucault, 1973) may affect how survivors, and providers, view or react to
post-sexual assault experiences.
The ways in which a medical model is used to exert social control may be
best understood through philosopher Michel Foucault’s (1976/1990) concept
of biopower, which he defined as “techniques for achieving the subjugation
of bodies and the control of populations” (p. 140). Biopower is how a nation
state can coopt the human body and with the subtle development of social
expectations use individuals within the society to hold other individuals—
and themselves—accountable to those social norms, thereby regulating
human behavior through self-surveillance, without any obvious presence of
the nation state (Foucault, 1976/1990). When responding to survivors of sex-
ual assault, a medical model may promote biopower and further scrutinize
and regulate survivors’ behaviors, rather than address systemic issues.
Medicalization has not occurred in a vacuum; it has been facilitated in the
United States by a culture that esteems neoliberal values of self-responsibil-
ity, independence, and productivity (Sugarman, 2015). In turn, neoliberalism
is reinforced via the medical model’s intraindividual, biological explanations
of distress because they perpetuate the idea that individuals are responsible
for their own recovery. Neoliberalism is reinforced through what Foucault
(2008) termed governmentality—“the way in which one conducts the conduct
of men” (p. 186), or the ways in which sociopolitical institutions police
human behavior. Foucault’s (2008) concept of neoliberal governmentality
reveals that the values of individualism and competition are not inherent in
individuals; rather they come to be instantiated at all levels of society through
social practices, programs, and techniques (Rose, 1999). Because of this,
Foucault (1976/1990) described biopower as “an indispensable element in
the development of capitalism” (pp. 140-141). The result of this interdepen-
dency is “a subject at once required to make its own life and heavily regulated
in this making—this is what biopower and discipline together accomplish,
and what neoliberal governmentality achieves” (Brown, 2006, p. 705).
Many scholars have addressed the ways neoliberalism has affected ther-
apy. Sugarman (2015) described the way humanistic therapy, and many other
psychotherapies, ascribe to neoliberal goals of autonomy, self-responsibility,
and self-actualization. Neoliberalism has also created an audit culture that “is
undermining our therapeutic relationships with patients; it’s undermining our
professional motivation and sense of vocation; and it’s undermining the pub-
lic’s trust in mental health professionals” (Rizq, 2014, p. 211). The rise in a
neoliberal agenda in Western society therefore presents new challenges for
clinicians, especially for those working with survivors of sexual assault.
Neoliberalism began affecting the women’s movement in the 1970s
(Knight & Rodgers, 2012). Like medicalization, neoliberalism can impede
Peters 5
change at the societal level and hinder the ability to end sexual violence.
The increase of neoliberal governance, with its “glorification of individual
self-help and responsibility” (Beres, Crow, & Gotell, 2009, p. 142), is repri-
vatizing sexual assault and undoing previous feminist work to have sexual
violence conceptualized as a social problem. In neoliberalism, people are
considered fully responsible for their success and happiness (Sugarman,
2015), which also implies that people are responsible for their failures and
distress. The cause of problems is not in the sociopolitical realm but solely
within the individual. In this way, neoliberalism perpetuates victim blam-
ing—people are responsible for what happens in their lives and therefore
survivors are partially or fully at fault for their assault. This message can
have significant negative consequences, leading many survivors to feel
intense shame and self-blame (Ahrens, Cabral, & Abeling, 2009).
Not only does a neoliberal agenda make it difficult to end sexual violence,
but it also makes it more difficult for recovering survivors. For example,
productivity is highly valued in neoliberalism. Yet sexual assault survivors
who are experiencing great amounts of distress often struggle to be produc-
tive. Insofar as Western trauma theory compares the brain after trauma to a
broken machine (Summerfield, 1999), it runs the risk of reducing humans to
their output ability. Also, in a neoliberal culture, sociability, confidence, and
ingenuity are prized (Sugarman, 2015), but these traits may be very difficult
for sexual assault survivors to exude, making it harder for them to be accepted
and valued. In addition, neoliberalism disregards the value of interdepen-
dence and collectivism (Sugarman, 2015), and therefore survivors may try to
rely solely on intraindividual resources at the expense of community or cul-
turally based resources that may be helpful.
The medicalization of post-sexual assault experiences—experiences that
disproportionately affect women and other marginalized populations—occurs
when providers, clinicians, and survivors themselves view experiences in the
aftermath of sexual assault as disordered (e.g., distressing emotions and
behaviors are seen as “symptoms”) and requiring treatment (e.g., pharmaco-
therapy—psychotherapy for symptom reduction) to “fix” the distress. With
sexual assault, a biopsychiatric framework individualizes the problem so that
survivors are held accountable for their recovery, and societal forces contrib-
uting to sexual violence are ignored. Survivors may begin to identify the
locus of the problem within themselves and become discouraged if they con-
tinue to live in fear and are unable to “feel better” and regain a sense of con-
trol over their lives. When survivors of sexual assault view their reactions as
symptoms and adopt an injured identity (Gilfus, 1999), they are robbed of the
opportunity not only to be agents of change in their own life but also to be
involved in greater social change.
6 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0)
liable to a psychiatric condition which only in 1980 had been fully discov-
ered and named” (p. 1450).
Today, PTSD—a common diagnosis for survivors of sexual assault—is
the epitome of the medicalization of trauma. PTSD was originally conceptu-
alized as a “normal” response to “abnormal” events (Herman, 1997).
However, since the rates of sexual assault are so high—more than 40% for
women in the United States (Breiding et al., 2014)—these events cannot be
considered abnormal, and therefore, PTSD may be better conceptualized as a
normal response to normalized events. Likewise, 24% to 58% of women
sexual assault survivors in the United States are diagnosed with PTSD (Walsh
et al., 2012). These incredibly high rates alone make one wonder about the
validity of PTSD as a “mental illness.”
Researchers are increasingly focused on trauma’s neurobiological effects
(Miller, Wolf, & Keane, 2014), and medication is used more and more as a
first-line treatment. There has also been a proliferation of short-term, evi-
dence-based practices to treat PTSD, with a focus on randomized control
trials and brain imaging to demonstrate efficacy (a literature search in
PsychINFO for PTSD and evidence-based practice yields more than 1,900
results). Lafrance and McKenzie-Mohr (2013) recognize the value in a diag-
nostic classification system that can validate people’s suffering but contended
that this validation is an illusion: “The biomedical discourse dominates, not
because it reveals ‘truth’, but due to its ability to construct a particular ver-
sion of reality” (Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013, p. 120). In addition, the
validity, reliability, and utility of the DSM, including the diagnosis of PTSD,
have been questioned by many humanistic and feminist scholars (e.g.,
Burstow, 2005; Georgaca, 2013).
In much the same way that humanistic psychologists have critically
assessed diagnosis, medical anthropologists approach psychiatric diagnostic
categories, such as PTSD, with “skepticism,” acknowledging them as human
inventions that may be reductive and absent of cultural validity (Jenkins,
2014). From this perspective, diagnosis can be seen as a starting point that
aids in providing a shared language and framework for research in Western
contexts but is insufficient for fully understanding the complexity of human
experience. Acknowledging that trauma is often not a one-time event but may
be repeatedly experienced in an oppressive environment, Jenkins (2014)
questions if the “vast range of nosological and therapeutic application is
called for in light of the reality of the broad range of all-too-common human
suffering, or if the diagnosis simply misses or is inadequate to the task of
defining and healing” (p. 53). This question is especially relevant when con-
sidering a diagnosis of PTSD for sexual assault, since sexual violence is so
commonly experienced by marginalized groups.
8 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0)
Rape Crisis Centers (RCCs) have played a vital role in supporting indi-
viduals who have experienced sexual violence since they were first estab-
lished in the 1970s (Campbell & Martin, 2001). Today, RCCs are an
invaluable resource to survivors of sexual assault with almost a quarter of
female survivors accessing their services (Planty, Langton, Krebs,
Berzofsky, & Smiley-McDonald, 2013). RCCs, founded via grassroots
efforts during the second-wave feminist movement to combat an oppres-
sive culture that facilitated sexual violence and originally staffed by vol-
unteer peer counselors, were at the forefront of developing alternatives to
the medical model (Maier, 2011). Yet, in a neoliberal society, rape crisis
services have undergone “professionalization” (i.e., services are provided
by professional staff rather than volunteers) and have been increasingly
pressured to adapt to a medical model (e.g., use diagnostic labels). Funding
agencies want RCCs to demonstrate the effectiveness of their services,
often based on non–client-centered outcomes or the number of client hours
(Maier, 2011). Durazo (2007) warned strongly against becoming reliant on
external funding because she believes that “funding, whether government
or foundation money, emerges from the deepest ravages of capitalist
inequality . . . it will not fund the movement to end violence against
women” (p. 126). It has been questioned whether professionalization has
been beneficial and necessary for the survival of RCCs (Campbell, Baker,
& Mazurek, 1998) or damaging to the antirape movement (Beres et al.,
2009). Regardless, research is showing that RCCs are shifting toward
more medicalized frameworks (e.g., diagnosing clients, using symptom-
based language, brief treatment models; Peters, 2018).
insufficient for fully explaining the lived experience of those diagnosed with
it, and no clear biomarkers for diagnosis have been found (Fotuhi, Hachinski,
& Whitehouse, 2009). Whitehouse’s (2013) refusal to accept solely intraindi-
vidual, biological explanations for Alzheimer’s disease, and instead focus on
descriptions that honor a person’s full experience, can be used as a model for
combating a reductionist medicalized explanation for distress post–sexual
assault. The push to conceptualize the aftermath of sexual assault as a disorder
fails to capture a survivor’s strength and resilience and obscures relational
struggles or sociopolitical issues that may be better described with an ecopsy-
chosocial model (e.g., Campbell, Dworkin, & Cabral, 2009; Neville &
Heppner, 1999). An important aspect of Whitehouse’s (2013) work is that he
does not ignore the real and debilitating cognitive decline that many experi-
ence with aging. Likewise, questioning a medicalized conceptualization of
distress post-assault should not deny the very real suffering of trauma survi-
vors; rather, it can help contextualize that distress.
As Michel Foucault (1984) astutely noted, it is “not that everything is
bad, but that everything is dangerous” (p. 343). This aptly applies to the
partnership between medicine and psychology. The medicalization of sex-
ual trauma has positive and negative effects, and rather than viewing it
from a dichotomous perspective—either one is “pro” or “anti” medicaliza-
tion—it would be helpful to have a more informed discussion about when
a medical discourse is useful or harmful. Gender-based violence was ini-
tially medicalized by emphasizing physical problems (e.g., sexually trans-
mitted diseases) and mental health problems as a way to decrease stigma
and provide survivors with more access to services (Lamb, 1999; Ticktin,
2011). There have been numerous benefits to a biopsychiatric model of
trauma, such as advancing knowledge about PTSD symptoms and provid-
ing more access to treatments by having an alternative diagnosis to BPD or
major depressive disorder (MDD; both commonly assigned to individuals
who have experienced trauma) that can be used for third-party reimburse-
ment. And, despite the focus on pathology, a medical model does not have
to be disempowering; many are finding ways to use neuroscience and
other medical frameworks in validating and affirmative ways (e.g., scien-
tifically authenticating the negative mental and physical effects of poverty
or discrimination; Ivey & Zalaquett, 2011). For example, a survivor who is
concerned she is going “crazy” because she is in incredible distress may
benefit from psychoeducation about PTSD symptoms of hyperarousal and
flashbacks. This information could make her feel less alone because many
others experience the same symptoms. Having a list of symptoms also
provides names for her experiences, which the survivor may choose to
incorporate in her self-narrative. In addition, the survivor and clinician
10 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0)
now have a shared language to talk about the survivor’s distress, and treat-
ments can be directly tied to those experiences (e.g., trauma-based cogni-
tive behavioral therapy to manage flashbacks). As this example shows, a
medicalized discourse of sexual trauma is a tool that can be used to frame
a survivor’s experience. The problem arises when it is the only tool a clini-
cian is aware of, and is used indiscriminately, without space to accommo-
date alternative models that better fit an individual survivor’s experiences
or address the larger social structures and environment.
A danger of medicalization is that it may further broaden what behaviors
or experiences are defined as symptoms versus typical distress (Jacobs &
Cohen, 2010). In addition, stark gender differences were found in the years
following the inclusion of PTSD in the DSM, with women more likely than
men to be assigned a diagnosis of BPD over PTSD (Becker & Lamb, 1994).
And for many women, understanding their experience as a “disorder,” regard-
less of the diagnosis, is neither accurate nor helpful. Clinicians are primed by
the dominant discourse of the medical model to understand the aftermath of
sexual assault as PTSD, without thinking about alternative perspectives or
explanations. This raises the question, “Is this diagnosis truly honoring survi-
vors’ experiences or is it pathologizing them in a way that fails to appreciate
the complexity of their lived experience?” May it do both simultaneously? In
fact, the discourse of PTSD has been called “one of the worst thieves” (Lamb,
1999, p. 111) of survivor agency and resiliency.
As an illustration, imagine a woman who has experienced childhood
sexual abuse and has faced systemic racism throughout her life. She experi-
ences extreme sadness and self-hatred, has difficulty maintaining relation-
ships, and engages in self-harm to relieve the significant pain she feels.
After a clinical interview, this individual may be given a diagnosis of PTSD,
MDD, and/or BPD, and if so, a manualized treatment, such as prolonged
exposure therapy or dialectical behavior therapy, may be recommended.
Additionally, she will likely be prescribed a psychotropic medication. In
fact, the DSM-5 not only primes clinicians to think about distress in terms
of a disorder but for MDD makes the explicit note that “recovery may be
facilitated by antidepressant treatment” (American Psychiatric Association,
2013, p. 155). Even before the DSM-5 was published, Sturza and Campbell
(2005) found 38 out of 102 women survivors were prescribed either seda-
tives or antidepressants. In this example, the diagnosis and treatment stems
from a reductionist medical model that focuses on symptom-based diagno-
sis and treatment aimed at symptom reduction. Moreover, the survivor is
given the message that her distress, while perhaps perpetuated by negative
life experiences of oppression and abuse, is ultimately caused by a biologi-
cal malfunction within her.
Peters 11
individuals who have experienced sexual assault make sense of those expe-
riences and how hegemonic discourses and practices affect their under-
standing and meaning making. Language shapes self-understanding, and
the language and terminology used in survivor narratives will have a pro-
found effect on their sense of self, relationship to the world, and future.
Survivors differ in the language they use. For example, some survivors
prefer the term recovery over healing because it holds a less medical con-
notation (Anderson & Hiersteiner, 2008), which matches language used by
consumers of psychiatry and substance abuse services. Not only should
clinicians mirror clients’ language and explicitly ask survivors what lan-
guage they would like to use to refer to their distress post assault, but clini-
cians should also aid clients in exploring sociopolitical factors that influence
the terminology they choose.
The average person’s perceptions of sexual assault predominantly
include assumptions that it is always traumatic and that professional sup-
port is very important to recovery (Gavey & Schmidt, 2011). These rigid,
pathologizing understandings of sexual assault could dictate limited paths
for recovery and restricted ways for survivors to describe the impact of
their assault. And yet these assumptions could also be validating for many
survivors and mean that there is reduced stigma around the incredibly dis-
tressing experiences many survivors have post assault. How do clinicians
balance supporting survivors who identify as traumatized or symptomatic,
while also providing space for survivors whose experiences do not fit a
medical model? And for survivors who value a biopsychiatric model, how
does one know if it is because it truly matches their experiences or simply
that it is the only discourse provided to them to understand their emotions
and experiences?
Humanistic psychologists remain attuned to their clients’ narratives as
a way to understand their histories and relational patterns (Bland &
DeRobertis, 2017). It is often beneficial for survivors to examine the nar-
ratives they tell both to themselves and to others and to have a space to
separate themselves from their stories and re-author their stories in more
empowering ways (e.g., narrative therapy; White & Epston, 1990).
Survivor narratives often involve a great deal of discontinuity (Harvey,
Mishler, Koenen, & Harney, 2000; Riessman, 1989), and this discontinuity
can be difficult for listeners, even postmodern feminist clinicians, to toler-
ate as they may be tempted to impose a rational narrative (see Cosgrove,
2007, for a critique of how rationality becomes naturalized in humanistic
psychology). Survivors may find a narrative approach limiting if there is
not space for contradiction and especially when a focus on individual nar-
ratives ignores racial and social inequities and does not facilitate social
Peters 13
Conclusion
It is time for a paradigm shift toward the demedicalization of post-sexual
assault experiences in therapy, and humanistic psychology is primed to lead
this movement. During this shift to address neocolonialism in psychology
(e.g., Washington, 2006), the field must resist the temptation to adopt a
dichotomy that vilifies medicalization and ignores the historical context
within which medicine became a valuable authority on general well-being in
Western society. Rose (2007) suggests, “The term medicalisation might be
the starting point of an analysis, a sign of the need for an analysis, but it
should not be the conclusion of an analysis” (pp.701-702).
A neoliberal, biopsychiatric model may undermine important conversations
around social inequities, pathologize survivors’ experiences, and lead to an
overemphasis on medication as the dominant treatment. However, a medical
model has also benefited survivors by reducing stigma and facilitating access
to services, as well as providing explanations and validation for many survi-
vors’ experiences. In addition, the important work done by feminist activists
and victims’ rights advocates since the 1970s to support survivors of sexual
assault by harnessing the power of a medical model should not be discounted.
More research is needed on the effects of a biopsychiatric model on the thera-
peutic process with sexual assault survivors. This includes transdisciplinary
partnerships, PAR, and qualitative studies directly exploring both the positive
and the negative effects of the medical model on survivors’ narratives and their
experiences of citizenship, as well as clinicians’ case conceptualizations and
treatment methods. With more research, there can hopefully be a deeper under-
standing of the impact of medicalization, which can inform new approaches to
recovery. Also, humanistic psychology’s emphasis on agency (Cosgrove, 2007)
can be harnessed to empower survivors and facilitate social change work.
Abraham Maslow (1966) perceptively stated, “I suppose it is tempting, if
the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail”
(p. 15). Indeed, when clinicians’ main tool is a medicalized framework that is
reinforced by dominant psychiatric taxonomy (i.e., the DSM-5), they are
bound to see “symptoms” and “disorders” in their clients and may inadver-
tently perpetuate oppressive, patriarchal systems. In turn, their clients may be
left with an impoverished sense of self, focusing predominantly on ways in
which they are damaged or deficient. Survivors of sexual assault cannot be
free to fully explore their experiences until their therapists are encouraged to
put away the hammer.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Dr. Lisa Cosgrove for her support and helpful feed-
back on earlier drafts of this article.
Peters 17
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.
Note
1. The author recognizes that the use of the term survivor upholds the dichotomy
of victim/survivor that imposes a certain meaning on someone’s experience that
may or may not be valid. However, working within the limitations of the current
discourse, survivor is considered the more respectful and empowering label and
therefore will be used throughout this article.
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Author Biography
Shannon M. Peters is a fifth-year doctoral candidate in
counseling psychology at the University of Massachusetts
Boston. She is engaged in research on institutional cor-
ruption and how medicalization and neoliberalism influ-
ence our understanding of distress and recovery. She has
also been volunteering on rape crisis hotlines for the past
9 years. Her clinical interests include emerging adult-
hood, feminist therapy, LGBTQ identity development,
and sexual trauma.