1. Tano vs Socrates
Franklin Bautista, then
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997
FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted
an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto
Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling,
and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying
that the court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional
on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of
law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article
XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?
HELD:
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation
of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to
effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light
of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and
the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the
exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be
doubted.
2. MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS represented by its CHAIRMAN ATTY. SIXTO
BRILLANTES JR. and the PROVINCIAL ELECTION
OFFICER OF DAVAO DEL SUR, represented by ATTY. MA.
FEBES BARLAAN
FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative
district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon.
representative of the second legislative district of the same province,
House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of
Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic
Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of
Davao Occidental.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of
a plebiscite.
Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be
created, as provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the
majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a
plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the
effectivity of this Charter.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
10360, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a
matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013
National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July
2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation
of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013
Barangay Elections to save on expenses.
Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the
COMELEC is without authority to amend or modify section 46 of
RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only Congress who can
do so thus, COMELEC's act of suspending the plebiscite is
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Was COMELEC's act unconstitutional?
HELD: The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. The text and
intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."
The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling
mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites.
The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and
effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled with the
subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 May
2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the
holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No.
10360. We also take judicial notice of the COMELEC's burden in the
accreditation and registration of candidates for the Party-List
Elections. The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a
plebiscite so close to the National and Local Elections is unforeseen
and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and
administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. The
COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse of
discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation
of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to
synchronize it with the Barangay Elections.
To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as
insisted, petitioner would have the COMELEC hold off all of its
tasks for the National and Local Elections. If COMELEC abandoned
any of its tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable for the
accomplishment of these tasks then it could have put in serious
jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013 National and Local Elections.
The COMELEC had to focus all its attention and concentrate all its
manpower and other resources on its preparation for the May 2013
National and Local Elections, and to ensure that it would not be
derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all plebiscites including that
of R.A. No. 10360.
DENIED
3. SOLICITOR GENERAL V METROPOLITAN MANILA
AUTHORITY (1991)
Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon.
Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates
of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that
could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was
permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of
stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that
even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not
directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be
imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that Traffic
Enforces continued with the confiscation of driver’s licenses and removal of
license plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court
that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of
illegally parked vehicles.
Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11,
authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/
unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the
flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a resolution requiring the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments
in light of the contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The
MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to
the power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation
of resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null
and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative
power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically
PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of
license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged
impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal
challenge to its validity.
Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare
Clause embodied in the LGC
Held: No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of
legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the
requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the
completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a
sufficient standard.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as
agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must
reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such
acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a
valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal
corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not be partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general
and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under
consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to
existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either
the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the
following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila
Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the
imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission
was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only
"in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is,
by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly
imposed by thedecree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by
the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case
of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These
restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other
local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including
the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal
enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation
of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents
vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates
of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey
at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in
question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree,
which has the force and effect of a statute. To sustain the ordinance would be
to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national
laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed
imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to
prevent bigamy; the registration ofvehicles, to minimize carnapping; the
execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter
imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on.
The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra
vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD
1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact
actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in
effect partially repeal the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong
case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is
an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules
elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those
here questioned. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances
wereenacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the
public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila
through the imposition andenforcement of more deterrent penalties upon
traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings
over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding
the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate,
the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is
a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the
Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be
impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated
legislative powers. It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its
owndiscretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly
through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local
governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains
effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of
motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of
driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
4. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION VS.COMMISSION ON
AUDIT (1991)
Facts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the
Cordillera Peoples LiberationArmy (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong
Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall notundertake their
demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as
politicalnegotiations.A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the
two parties. Such agreement states that theyare to:Par. 2. Work together in
drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that couldperform
policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and
studiesleading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.Par. 3. Have
representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P.
Panel indrafting the Executive Order.Pursuant to the above joint agreement,
E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine governmentand of the
representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by
President CorazonAquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating
the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR],which covers the provinces of
Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and theCity
of Baguio.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary
ground that by issuing the said order,the President, in the exercise of her
legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task
of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras
Issue: Constitutionality of EO 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the
Cordillera Administrative Region - assailed on the primary ground that the
President pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by Congress and the
approval of such act through a plebiscite.
Held: EO 220 envisions the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of
services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the
areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant
of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures
in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does
not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the
creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras which undoubtedly, will
take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the
first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures
to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime the organic act
had not yet been passed. Petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the
CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the
provinces composing it. It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee
of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. On the other hand,
the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,
which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political
autonomy, not just administrative, to these regions. As said earlier, the CAR
is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the
process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
politicalsubdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into
an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
5. Bacani Vs Nacoco [G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956
Facts:  Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No.
2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut
Corporation, AssistantCorporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for
Defendant ,requested said stenographers for copies of thetranscript of the
stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied
with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their billsfor the
payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of
P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacaniand P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript
at the rate of P1 per page the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to
reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of
Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the National Coconut
Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the
fees in question.
Issue  : WON NACOCO is a Government Entity
Held:   They do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they donot
come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for
instance the National CoconutCorporation. While it was organized with the
purpose of ³adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States´ and of providing ³Facilities for the better
curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products´, a
function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote thecoconut
industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
our government, for it wasmade subject to the provisions of our Corporation unconstitutional and
Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it mayexercise void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs)
are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue of 1999, 2000, and
and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the
sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court hasaptly amount of P5billion
for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service
said, ³The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority
Equalization Fund
stockholder does not make it a public. the term ³Government of the Republic
(LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.
of the Philippines´ used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code ISSUE:
refers only to that government entity through which the functions of Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
thegovernment are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are OCD resolutions
included those arms through which political authority is made effective infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. HELD:
These are whatwe call municipal corporations. They do not include Yes.
government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation resolutions constitute
Law. Their powers, dutiesand liabilities have to be determined in the light of a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they effectively encroach on the
that law and of their corporate charters. They do not thereforecome within fiscal autonomy
the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the
Court
local autonomy
Province of Batangas vs Romulo of local governments“. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the
429 SCRA 736 Constitution
FACTS: confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision,
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program which has been
for Devolution interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes
Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the supervision from
discharge of the control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has
functions and services devolved to them through the LGC. the discretion to
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself;
passed Resolutions No. supervision merely sees
OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. to it that the rules are followedbut has no authority to set down the rules or
Estrada on October the discretion to
6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the modify/replace them.
LGUs to identify The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the constitutionally
project proposals impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in
and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee the national
serves notice to the taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall be
DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds. automatically
released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t
required to perform any
act to receive the “just share” – it shall bereleased to them “without need of
further action“. To
subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules &
regulations as
6. Province of Batangas vs Romulo
429 SCRA 736
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program
for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of
LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which
were approved by Pres. Estrada on October6, 1999. The guidelines
formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the
project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the
Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they
uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitutea “withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they
effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be
struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the
local autonomy of local governments“. Consistent with the principle of local
autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to
one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power
of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays
down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has the discretion to order
his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision
merely sees to it that the rules are followedbut has no authority to set down
the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share”
of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates
that the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the
release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to receive
the “just share” – it shall bereleased to them “without need of further action“.
To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules
& regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-
2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.The
only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA
is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less
than 40% of the collectionsof the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception
does not apply in this case.The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to
the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same,
and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a
separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot
include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is
limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a
separate fiscal unit –any provision therein
which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate
provision“. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991
are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to
undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the
fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.The value of LGUs as institutions of
democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national
officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are
based.
7. Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649) - Digest
Facts:
Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary
to morals, public policy and order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a
right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived
the Manila Cit government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the local
government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.
Ruling:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent
right to impose taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to
tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having
been passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.”
The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed
that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the
power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general
legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over the
Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power
to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back
the power.
2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long
been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National
Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the power to
issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.
3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with
an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by
the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to
regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in
the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is
exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened,
impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution
will be violated by P.D. No. 1869. 
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines
and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent  with the basic policy
on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local government.”
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to
“impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations” which Congress
may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

8. Ganzon v. Court of Appeals
GRN 93252, Aug. 5, 1991
FACTS:
A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed before the
Department of Local Government against petitioner Mayor Rodolfo T.
Ganzon by various city officials sometime in 1988 on various charges,
among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, etc. Finding
probable grounds, the respondent Secretary of the Department of Local
Government Luis T. Santos issued successive suspensions. The petitioner
then instituted an action for prohibition against the secretary in the RTC of
Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction.
He also instituted actions for prohibition before the Court of Appeals but
were both dismissed. Thus, this petition for review with the argument that the
respondent Secretary is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and
remove local officials as the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President
to exercise said power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President, acting thru the Secretary of Local Government,
has the power to suspend, remove, or both, local officials.
HELD:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation
authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to
proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains
no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts
of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to
suspend/remove) it was not because that the President cannot exercise it on
account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the
Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary
of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the
Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to
say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a
remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him
spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.
Yes. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change
in the Constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right-or the President of her prerogative as conferred by
existing legislation to provide administrative sanction against local officials.
The Constitution did not…intend
9. MONDANO VS SILVOSA
G.R. No. L-7708 May 30 1955
FACTS:
The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and
concubinage against Mondano, duly elected and qualified mayor of Mainit,
Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor of Suriga, for immediate
investigation, appropriate action and report. Silvosa issued an Administrative
Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano filed a petition for
prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.
RULING:
Yes.  The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for
in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the
same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and
offices under his jurisdiction  and does not extend to local governments over
which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided
by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC are to be construed as
conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction,
and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in subordinate officers perform their duties.
office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec
Control -  power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If “general supervision over all local
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
governments” is to be construed as the same power granted to the
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import
Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a
of the provisions of section 79 (c) of RAC.
distinction or difference between the power of control and that of
supervision.