1. Magallona vs Ermita (G.R. No.

187167)

Facts: On March 2009, R.A. No. 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baseline of the Philippines was enacted – the
law is known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984. Professor Merlin
Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 _______as they contend, among others, that the law decreased
the national territory of the Philippines hence the law id unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as
follows: a. The law abandoned the demarcation set by the treaty of paris and other ancillary treaties – this also
resulted to exclusion of our claim over sabah; b. The law, as well as UNCLOS itself, described the Philippine waters
as “archipelagic” waters which, in international law, opens our water landward of the baselines to maritime passage
by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight),undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant provision; c.
The classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the scraborough shoal(bajo de masinloc0, as a
“regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss od a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Issue:

1. WON RA No. 9522 is unconstitunal?

2. WON the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable?

Ruling:

1. No, RA No. 9522 is not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not
a means to acquire or lose territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory
is the international law principle of occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and not the execution of
multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to
delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact is increased it. Under the old law amended by RA
9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The are that it covered 440,994
square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under RA 9522, and with the inclusion of exclusive economic zone, the
extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq.na.mi.

If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which state parties exercise treaty-based rights.

2. Anent the particular issues

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522: Section 2.
The definition of the territorial sea of the Philippine archipelago as provided in the act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which
the Republic of the Philippines has acquired sovereignty and dominion.

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the
bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that.
However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent
passage. No modern state can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised
in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.

c. The classification of the KIG, as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our
maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regime of islands, they generate their
own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the
Philippines Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger are which would already
depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.

Nevertheless, we still continue to claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.

2. Oposa vs Factoran (G.R. No. 101083)

FACTS: Petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. They instituted the
present complaint, in behalf of their generation as well as generations yet unborn, as a taxpayers’ class suit, alleging
that they are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical forests.

Sec. Factoran moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that: 1) Oposa, et al., has no cause of action against
him and that 2) the issue raised is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches
of the government. The motion to dismiss was granted. Plaintiff thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent judge gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUE: Should the complaint be given due course?

HELD: YES, the complaint should be given due course.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental right – the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation – aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners—the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitution. Xxx the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come --- generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

Thus, the right of OPOSA, et al., (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR’s duty --- to protect and advance the said right.

3. Cariño vs Insular Government

Facts:

On February 23, 1904, Cariño filed his petition in the Court of Land registration for a title to a parcel of land
consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet. This was heard with a
petition for a title for a portion of land. The Insular Government opposed the granting to these petitions, because
they alleged that the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was never
acquired in any manner or through any title of egression from the State.
According to Cariño, in 1984, he erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to the north of
that property now in question. They said that during the year 1893, Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos,
who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim. Cariño abandoned the house and lived on the land in question. The
court of land registration denied the petition. They also ruled that the land was “used for pasture and sowing” and
belongs to the class called public land.

Issue: WON the court erred in finding that Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had possessed the lands
in question since time immemorial.

Ruling:

No, the court did not err in finding that Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had possessed the lands in
question since time immemorial.

Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively belonged to the State
during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was
necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title
of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory information
equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. The possessory information filed herein is not the title to
property authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last
law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands: First,
for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions
required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation
during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of
twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the three years
immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a
period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the
testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason: Second, because the
possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title
or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish
Government and required and necessary at all times until the publication of said royal decree was limited in time to
one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to
verify the possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of
the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together
with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and
cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the
land is sold within a period of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under
this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with
common law."

4. Cruz vs Secretary of Environmental and Natural Resources (G.R. No. 13538)

Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a case for prohibition and mandamus, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) and its implementing rules on
the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over the lands of public domain and
minerals and other natural resources in violation of the regalia doctrine. They likewise contend that providing an all-
encompassing definition of “ancestral domain” and “ancestral lands” which might eve include private lands within
the areas violated the rights of the private land owners. Petitioners likewise contend that the provisions of the IPRA
defining the jurisdiction and powers of the NCIP violate due process of law. Lastly, they assail the validity of the
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1 which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
the President as lateral and autonomous relationship for purposes of policy coordination, thereby infringing upon the
president’s power of control over the executive department.

A group of intervenors, including Senator Flavier, one of the authors of IPRA and 112 members of indigenous
peoples groups prayed for the dismissal of the petition. The CHR likewise asserts that IPRA is an expression of the
principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect the rights of the indigenous people.

Issue: WON the petition should be granted?

Ruling: No, the petition should not be granted. The votes of the Court are split, where 7 voted to dismiss and 7 voted
to grant. It held that as the votes were equally divided and the necessary vote was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56
of Sec 7 of Rules of Civil Procedure, petition should be dismissed.

5. Republic vs Naguiat (G.R. No. 134209)

Facts: Celestina Naguiat applied for registration of title to 4 parcels of land located in Botolan, Zambales with RTC
Zambales. She claimed to have acquired it from LID Corporation, who in turn had acquired it from Calderon,
Moraga and Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession for more than 30 years. Republic
of the Philippines through the OSG filed an opposition to the application. They claim that neither Naguiat nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession since June 12, 1945, that the muniments of title and tax payment
receipts aren’t sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands, that Naguiat’s Spanish title can no longer
be availed of and finally, that said lands are part of the public domain and not subject of private appropriation.

RTC rendered a decision in favour of Naguiat and decreed the registration of said lands in her name. Petitioner,
brought the case to the CA. Then, CA affirmed that RTC decision.

Issue: WON the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public
domain.

Ruling:

No, the areas in question have not ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.
Public forest land or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the government so that they
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation. As
to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State – the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Under
Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public
domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the
government and not the court. Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.

In the case at bar, the CA only granted the petition because it assumed that the lands in question are already
alienable and disposable, which is found by the SC to not be in this case.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.
6. Menguito vs Republic (G.R.No. 134308)

Facts: On November 10, 1987, in RTC of Pasig, an application for registration of the title was filed by herein
petitioners. The petitioners sought to have parcels of land, situated in Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila, be brought under the operation of Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration
Decree No. 1529 and to have their title thereto registered, conformed and be declared as owners in fee simple of said
parcels of land. The petitioners also asked the Court to declare that they acquired the said parcels of land through
inheritance and that said lands were occupied by applicants and their predecessors-in-interest in actual, open,
peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. Petitioners, in their
application, opted to apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, should the
Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case.

Earlier or on March 30, 1989, the OSG filed its opposition thereto contending that neither the applicant nor his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant,
according to the Solicitor General, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the lands applied for and the said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended
possession of applicant to be of recent vintage. The Solicitor General further contends that  the claim of ownership
in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file
an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on July 31, 1990. The
Solicitor General claimed that the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation and thus, prayed for the the denial of the application for registration
and for the declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.

At the initial hearing, a certain Jose Tagco, Jr. appeared and filed his opposition to the registration. The RTC
rendered its decision confirming the registrable title of the applicants. The OSG moved for reconsideration but was
denied for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and agreed with the respondent
that the lower court had failed to consider the legal requisites of imperfect titles.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the court erred in reversing the finding of facts of the trial court.

Ruling:

No, the court did not err in reversing the finding of facts of the trial court.

Sec 48 of the Commonwealth Act provides that citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act to wit: (a) x x x,

(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this Chapter."
Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: (1) the land
applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and
possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945.

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners
relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No.
27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E"
(Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x." (Emphasis supplied.)

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.12 Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
"occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title."13 To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.14 Absent such
evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the
land in question has been declared alienable.

7. Mesina vs Sonza (G.R. No. L-14722)

Facts: Sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor of the defendants
and as a consequence of which a certificate of title was issued in their name by the register of deeds. The decree of
registration or issuance of patent over the property was issued "sometime on September 12, 1953 ", while the
transfer certificate of title covering the same was issued on September 16, 1953. On March 25, 1958 plaintiff
brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that Original Certificate of Title No. P-
1137 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be ordered cancelled and that the registration case pending before the
same court covering the property described therein be given due course. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
sustained defendants motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of
limitations. The present action has been filed after the elapse of more than four years, and the title has already
become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court sustained this motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence the
present appeal.

Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of the said subject lot. He claims that he has been in actual
possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world and up to the present time.
The said lot is also the subject of registration proceedings pending in the same court known as Registration Case No.
N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238. The Director of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor of the
defendants but did not exercise due care, in spite of his knowledge that defendants had not complied with the
requirements set forth in Commonwealth Act No. 141. Plaintiff claims that the title was procured by defendants
was through frauds, deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff.
Issue:

Did the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright and was the requirements been complied with?

Held:

Yes. Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 (amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act
141), provides:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceeding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

In the case of Susi vs. Razon, all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly. The possessor is deemed to have already
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government.

Plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant of the State, it follows that the same had ceased to be part of
the public domain and had become private property and, therefore, is beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, the homestead patent and the original certificate of title covering said lot issued by the Director of
Lands in favor of the defendants can be said to be null and void, for having been issued through fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation.

Considering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that
plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which in theory does not apply here because the
property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain, The court ruled that
the lower trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. It
would have been more proper for the court to deny the motion on the ground that its object does not appear to be
indubitable, rather than to have dismissed it, as was done by the trial court.

8. Repubic vs Naguiat (G.R. No. 144057)

Facts: On January 5, 1993, Naguit a Filipino Citizen filed with the MCTC of Inaja-Nabas,Aklan , a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nablas, Aklan. The application seeks judicial
confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title over the said land. The public prosecutor representing the heirs of
Rustico Angeles opposed the petition. The evidence on records reveals that the subject parcel of land was orginially
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favour of the
heirs of Honorato Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights and confirmed the sale to Maming. Subsequently,
the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale to Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She
constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her atty-in-fact and administrator. Blanco introduced improvements, planted trees,
and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old and paid the
corresponding taxes. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of
owner without objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application. At the
hearing the public prosecutor did not present evidence while Jose Angeles failed to appear. Thus, the MCTC
rendered a decision granting the petition. The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The OSG
appealed to the RTC, but the appeal was dismissed. The OSG appealed the case to the CA, but it was denied .
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:  whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could
even start.

Ruling:

No, it is not necessary. It held that here are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of
title under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that
the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

9. Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic (G.R. No. 179987)

Facts:On February 2, 1998 , applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,
filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City,
Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
Malabanan presented during the trial a certification issued by the CENRO to prove that the property was alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. After the trial, RTC granted his application. The OSG appealed the same
to the CA contending that Malabanan failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision. Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise, his heirs
elevated the CA’s decision but was denied. Hence, this Motion for reconsideration.

Issue: WON the registration of the property should be allowed?

Ruling:

No, the registration of the property should not be allowed.

Court held that Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands
of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption
that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is
placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

, The petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration
of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to
be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a
law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.1âwphi1

10. G.R. No. 146459             June 8, 2006

HEIRS OF DICMAN, namely: ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL DICMAN, FLORENCE DICMAN FELICIANO
TORRES, EMILY TORRES, TOMASITO TORRES and HEIRS OF CRISTINA ALAWAS and BABING
COSIL, * Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CARIÑO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

Facts:

On March 14, 1916, H.C. Heald sold the buildings to Sioco Cariño, son of Mateo Cariño and grandfather of private
respondent Jose Cariño. Sioco Cariño then took possession of the building and the lands on which the buildings
were situated. Petitioners had been employed by Sioco Cariño as his cattle herder within the city of Baguio but
located at some distance from the land in controversy. On advice of his lawyers, because there were already many
parcels of land recorded in his name, Sioco caused the survey of the land in the name of Ting-El Dicman. Ting-EL
Dicman executed a public instrument with Sioco. After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco, who had been in
possession of the land in controvesty since 1916, continued to stay thereon.

Then, Sioco executed a deed of absolute sale covering the subject land and its improvements with his son, Guzman
Cariño, who had been in possession of the subject land and building. Guzman resurveyed that land and it was evenly
divided between petitioners and him, Lot-B and Lot-a respectively.

Guzman filed a Free Patent application over the land in question but it was withdrawn. Instead, he filed his
opposition to the petition later filed by petitioners. Trial court rendered a partial judgment and confirming the Lot-76
A to Guzman. But on Lot-76 B found it necessary for hearing.

Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was pending in the trial court, President Carlos P.
Garcia issued Proclamation No. 628 "excluding from the operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain
parcels of public land known as ‘Igorot Claims’ situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to
disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land Act." The Proclamation further provided that the
"Igorot Claims" enumerated therein shall be "subject to the condition that except in favor of the government or any
of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired by virtue of this proclamation shall not be encumbered or
alienated within a period of fifteen years from and after the date of issuance of patent." One such claim pertained to
the "Heirs of Dicman," Before the trial court could dispose of the case, the Supreme Court promulgated Republic vs
Marcos which held that CFI of Baguio have no jurisdiction to reopen judicial proceedings on the bsisi of RA 931.
As a consequence, on July 28, 1978, the trial court dismissed the petition to reopen the civil case insofar as Lot 76-B
was concerned and the certificate of title issued pursuant to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was invalidated.
After dismissal of the case, Guzman was left undisturbed in his possession.

Petitioners revived the case by filing a complaint for recovery of possession with a prayer for damages with the
RTC. RTC rendered its decision in favour of private respondent. Petitioners moved for MR, but was denied. They
then appealed the case but was denied. They moved for MR but the same was denied. Hence this petition.

Issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF LITIGATION AND
OVER WHICH RESPONDENT’S IMPROVEMENTS ARE BUILT BELONGS TO RESPONDENT
NOTWITHSTANDING UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS’ PREDECESSOR-IN-
INTEREST PING-EL DICMAN HAD APPLIED FOR FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT AREA AND HAD
BEEN ISSUED PLAN SWO-37115 IN HIS NAME BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS IN 1954 AND HAD BEEN IN
ACTUAL, OPEN, PEACEFUL, ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SINCE
THE EARLY 1900s UNTIL HIS DEATH WHEN HIS GRANCHILDREN AND SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST,
THE PETITIONERS, TOOK OVER AND CONTINUED THE POSSESSION OF THEIR GRANDFATHER,
PING-EL DICMAN.

Ruling:

No, the CA did not err.

The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the possession of Guzman Cariño,
predecessor-in-interest of private respondent, continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good
faith with just title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the period
required under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case, is 10 years. The findings of fact of
the lower courts, and which this Court has no reason to disturb, inescapably point to this conclusion: immediately
after the "Deed of Absolute Sale," a public instrument dated January 10, 1938, had been executed by Sioco Cariño
in favor of his son, Guzman Cariño (the father of private respondent), the latter immediately occupied the property;
the 1940 directory of Baguio Telephones lists his residence at Camp 7, Baguio City along with his telephone
number; his permitting the use of portions of the property to various third parties; his introduction of improvements
over the land in controversy; the testimonial accounts of his neighbors; and that it was Guzman Cariño alone who
declared for tax purposes both the land and the improvements thereon in his name, while the tax declarations of the
other claimants made no reference to the subject property. Although arguably Sioco Cariño may not have been the
owner of the subject property when he executed the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in 1938 in favor of his son, the
requirement of just title is nonetheless satisfied, which means that the mode of transferring ownership should
ordinarily have been valid and true, had the grantor been the owner. By the time the successors-in-interest of Ting-el
Dicman sought to establish ownership over the land in controversy by filing their "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to
Reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211" on April 24, 1959 with the trial court, and which Guzman
timely opposed, more than 20 years had already elapsed. Thus, the 10-year period for acquisitive prescription is
deemed satisfied well before Guzman’s possession can be said to be civilly interrupted by the filing of the foregoing
petition to reopen. After the dismissal of that case on July 28, 1978, Guzman Cariño was left undisturbed in his
possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His remains are buried on the land in question.
Thereafter, Guzman’s widow and son, herein private respondent, continued possession of the subject property in the
same manner. When petitioners, heirs of Ting-el Dicman, tried to revive the case on April 20, 1983, they had, far
before that time, lost all rights to recover possession or ownership.

11. G.R. No. 79538October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:
On October 13, 1965, Petitioner entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources in Maddela, Province of Nueva Vizcaya. On August 18, 1983 the
director of Forest development issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nuvea Vezcaya and
Quirino provinces and cancelling all logging concessions of petitioner and nine others, pursuant to presidential
instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources. On August 25, 1983,Petitioners
received a telegram from the bureau requesting to stop operations. After cancellation of its TLA, it immediately sent
a letter addressed to President Marcos which sought reconsideration of the bureau’s directives but no operations was
taken on the letter. One year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by
TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under TLA No. 356, while the
other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc, without benefit of a formal award or license. The
MNR through Minister Maceda denied petitioners request. A MR was filed but was denied. Petitioner also filed a
supplemental MR but was also denied. Petitioner then, appealed to the Office of the President but was denied for
lack of merit as it was prematurely filed and MR was also filed but was denied.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: WON the petition is meritorious.

Ruling: No, the petition is not meritorious.

While the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of
these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies More so where,
as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the
pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion
possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural
resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources.

Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber
license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires. The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's
timber resources, if done in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue
influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to
regulate the use and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred
individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant
mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the
appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and
related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public policy, the Court will not hesitate to step in and
wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution

12. G.R. Nos. 186739-960               April 17, 2013

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioner was the Mayor of General Nakar, Quezom from 2001-2004. He organized a Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly with the end view of regulation and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forests
products within the vicinity of General Nakar. During the assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the
salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue permit to transport after payment of
corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer. From 2001-2004, 221 permits to transport salvaged products were
issued to various recipients, of which 43 bore the signature of Ruzol while 118 were signed by his co-accused
Guillermo Sabiduria,then municipal treasurer.

On June 2006 on the basis of the issued permits, informations were filed against them for violation of ART 117 of
the RPC or Usurpation of Authority. Ruzol contended that as Chief Executive he is authorized to issue permits to
transport forest products, that RA 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities of the DENR to the LGU.
That th DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of 221 transport permits. That accused
cannot be convicted of usurpation of authority since they did not act under the pretense of official position.

The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty.

Issue: WON the authority to monitor and regulate transportation of salvaged forests solely with the DENR and no
one else.

Ruling: No, it is not. The LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations
and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set forth by law for
their enactment have been faithfully complied with. While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government
instrumentality charged with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the
environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such
authority. While the law has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not
the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in
ordinary or in legal parlance, the word “primary” can never be taken to be synonymous with “sole” or “exclusive.”
In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall
exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs. On the contrary, the
claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991.

The requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s
authority but rather an additional measure which was meant to complement DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor
forest resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction. This is consistent with the “canon of legal hermeneutics
that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every
effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the
government.” Hence, if there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes, rules or regulations
issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to immediately uphold one and annul the
other, but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Accordingly, although the DENR requires a
Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its power under the
general welfare clause, complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of
salvaged forest products.

13.
G.R. No. 211356               September 29, 2014

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BA
YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN
AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE
OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF, BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented
by NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE, and JOHN and JANE DOES, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioner is the President and Chief Executive Officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management Phil. Inc.
(Bora West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal
government of Malay, Aklan. While the company was already operating a resort in the area, the application sought
the issuance of a building permit for the construction 3-storey building which is covered by Forest Land Agreement
for tourism purposes issued by the DENR, infavor of Boracay West Cove. The Municipal Zoning Admin denied the
application on ground that the site was within the “no build zone”. Petitioner appealed to the Office of the Mayor,
but not action was taken. However, he received a Notice of assessment for unpaid taxes and liabilities. Petitioner
expressed willingness to settle the company’s obligations but the Municipal treasurer refused to accept the tendered
payment. Meanwhile, Petitioner continued with the construction, expansion and operations of the resort hotel. On
March 28, 2011 a ceists and desists order was issued by the Municipal government ordering the closure and
demolition of Boracay West Cove’s Hotel. The order was practically implemented. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with a prayer for injunctive relief with CA. CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground.
Petitioner moved for MR was denied. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue: WON the order of the Municipal government was proper.

Ruling: Yes, it was proper.

Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this case that the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general
welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their
local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not
only relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear
issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.
Pertinent herein is Sec. 444(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of
illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. In the case at bar, petitioner
admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and exemptions before the construction, expansion,
and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel in Malay, Aklan. To recall, petitioner declared that the application for
zoning compliance was still pending with the office of the mayor even though construction and operation were
already ongoing at the same time. As such, it could no longer be denied that petitioner openly violated Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131.