Messerschmitt Me 262 Schwalbe: The First Jet Fighter

Messerschmitt Me 262 Schwalbe
1/214
2/214
3/214
4/214
Introduction
THUS far the war has been, in the air, a strange one. It has been strange in
several ways. People had expected the Blitzkrieg to break in full fury in the
west, but as yet no thunderbolt has fallen there. Poland felt its impact and
crumpled under the stroke, though conditions there seemed, prima facie,
unfavorable for the successful conduct of a lightning war. The course of the
conflict has not, in fact, followed the book. There have been a number of
surprises. In the operations at sea, for example, it was confidently expected
that aircraft, not the submarine, would be the chief danger to maritime
commerce. The airplane, we were told, would harry and dragoon bellige-
rent and neutral shipping in the narrow waters into which the busy lanes
of ocean traffic converge. Actually, the air arm has not been particularly ef-
fective at sea, though British aircraft have taken a hand with some success
in hunting the submarine. That, however, had been foreseen.
Certainly the achievements of the German air force in Poland fulfilled the
expectations of the most sanguine adherents of the blue sky school. In con-
junction with the mechanized ground forces it dominated the situation
from the first. The lists were set for a tourney between the old order of war-
fare and the new. Germany's strength lay in her possession of the most mo-
dern instruments of mechanical destruction. Poland was, in comparison, a
nineteenth century Power. Her cavalry was her pride. One could imagine
her gallant horsemen galloping with Jeb Stuart or Sheridan in Virginia. In-
deed, her great masses of cavalry might have thundered their way to vic-
tory in the still more appropriate setting of the mediæval era. As it was,
they were a sheer anachronism. Confronted by armored cars and tanks,
hammered by high explosive from the air, they were only flesh for the
slaughter. The twentieth century won all along the line. The Polish defeat
was a tragedy, but an inevitable one. 1
In the east, the war in the air was practically decided on the first day. On
the morning of September 1, the German bombers made a vigorous attack
on all the air bases in western Poland, as well as on strategic railways and
junctions. The Polish aircraft, caught in their hangars, were destroyed or
seriously damaged. That first sudden blow, delivered treacherously and
without a declaration of war, while the Polish Government thought that ne-
gotiations were still possible, crippled the Polish air arm for the rest of the
war. A gallant fight was still made by the remnant but the odds against it
were too great. In any case the Polish equipment was inferior to the Ger-
man. Germany had the unquestioned mastery of the air.
At first the methods by which she won it were, apart from the fact that the
aggression itself was utterly unjustified, fair enough in themselves. Herr
Hitler had announced to the Reichstag on September 1 that he would not
1 Lo invitamos a nuestro sitio de Historia Militar en www.thegermanarmy.org
5/214
war against women and children. He was speaking, it will be noted, less
than four weeks before the time when women and children were to be
slaughtered and mutilated in Warsaw. "I have ordered my air force," he
said, "to restrict itself to attacks on military objectives." Replying to Presi-
dent Roosevelt's appeal that civilian populations be spared the horrors of
air bombardment, he defined his attitude to this question in terms which,
coming from another, would have presaged the waging of a humane and
chivalrous war: " . . . that it is a humanitarian principle to refrain from the
bombing of non-military objectives under all circumstances in connection
with military operations, corresponds completely with my own point of
view and has been advocated by me before. I, therefore, unconditionally
endorse the proposal that the governments taking part in the hostilities
now in progress make public a declaration in this sense. For my own part, I
already gave notice in my Reichstag speech of today that the German air
force had received the order to restrict its operations to military objecti-
ves."
That the German air force did confine itself more or less to military objecti-
ves in the opening phase of the war is supported by a certain amount of in-
dependent evidence. Mr. H. C. Greene, the correspondent of the London
Daily Telegraph, reported in that journal from Cernaŭti on September 10
that military objectives such as bridges, roads, railways and aërodromes
had been aimed at almost exclusively, though terrible losses had fallen on
the civil population as a result of the attacks. On September 6, Mr. Butler,
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in
reply to a question in the House of Commons that the information in the
British Government's possession showed that the German bombing attacks
had in general been directed against objectives serving a military purpose
and not indiscriminately against the civil population; but he also was care-
ful to add that the latter had at the same time suffered heavy casualties.
Soon, however, evidence began to accumulate that other than military ob-
jectives were being attacked and that, in fact, methods of terrorization we-
re being adopted by the German Luftwaffe.
It is true that one must always accept with caution reports from belligerent
sources concerning excesses or outrages committed by the enemy. There is
inevitably an element of propaganda in such reports. Further, newspaper
correspondents on the spot are apt to be impressed by what is told them
and are not in a position usually to know or state the other side of the case.
Some of the Polish announcements were certainly examples of exaggera-
tion, excusable, no doubt, but still unreliable. For instance, a communiqué
of September 2 stated that individual farms and farmers had been bombed
-- a somewhat improbable occurrence. On the other hand, it is even more
improbable that the reports from many quarters about the ruthlessness of
the German air force were entirely devoid of foundation. We have, in fact,
6/214
unbiased evidence sufficient to convict without any need for dependence

on ex parte testimony.
Unquestionably, there were numerous instances of bombing objectives
which by no possibility could be termed military. Among them was that of
the village of Tomaszow, which was the victim of "a particularly vicious
bombing" according to a message to the Times of September 11 from its
special correspondent on the Polish frontier. Other instances were attested
by Dr. Oskar Zsolnay, a Hungarian official trade delegate who had been in
Lwów and who described in a Budapest paper a large number of bombing
raids on that city, nearly all of them directed against non-military objecti-
ves. Some of the most important evidence was supplied by the American
Ambassador to Poland, Mr. Biddle, who on September 8 furnished the Sta-
te Department with particulars of cases in which non-military targets had
been attacked: they included his own villa, more than ten miles outside
Warsaw, a sanatorium, a refugee train, a hospital train and a hut for Girl
Guides. "It is also evident," he added, "that the German bombers are relea-
sing the bombs they carry even when they are in doubt as to the identity of
their objectives." Again, on September 13, Mr. Biddle reported that the vi-
llage to which he had then moved and which was, he said, "a defenseless
open village" had been attacked by German bombers. On September 20
the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Information said in the
House that reports from the British Ambassador to Poland supported the
evidence of Mr. Biddle on the bombing of open towns.
One may perhaps feel some hesitation in accepting without reservation the
statement in the Polish communiqué of September 15 that the bombard-
ment of open towns by German aircraft had "assumed the character of a
systematic destruction of all built-up areas or cities without any connec-
tion with military operations," but there can be no reasonable doubt about
the fact that a great number of non-military objectives were bombed. Be-
yond question many villages were deliberately attacked and a number of
them destroyed. In Warsaw itself the Belvedere and Lazienki Palaces, the
Seym (Parliament) building, the Soviet and Rumanian Embassies, the Lat-
vian Legation, a number of churches and some hospitals had been wholly
or partly demolished from the air even before the intensive bombardment
from air and ground began on September 25. The final state of the city was
still more tragic. The correspondent of a Danish newspaper who visited it
after the surrender reported that scarcely a house was undamaged and in
several districts, especially the suburb of Praga, not one house was left
standing. The devastation was due in part to artillery fire, but the bombs of
the aircraft contributed very materially. Inevitably the losses suffered by
the civil population were heavy in the extreme. It is perfectly clear that if
the Germans did in fact attempt to bomb only military objectives, they fai-
led in that attempt most lamentably. The more likely explanation is that no
7/214
such attempt was made. The city was bombed indiscriminately, subjected,
in fact, to a display of Nazi Schrecklichkeit. The destruction was intended
as an object lesson. "I should like the gentlemen of London to see what a
city looks like when it has been through what Warsaw suffered," said the
German wireless announcer on October 4. "These gentlemen ought to see
what might happen in their own country if they persist in their mad war-
mongering."
The fiction that only military objectives were bombed was kept up in the
German reports. A communiqué issued by the High Command on Septem-
ber 25 stated: "Important military objectives in Warsaw were successfully
attacked in power-dives by German aircraft." It is a sufficient commentary
upon this to record that when Warsaw asked for an armistice on Septem-
ber 27, 16,000 soldiers and 20,000 civilians lay wounded in the hospitals.
There is little doubt, indeed, that Warsaw was subjected to a bombard-
ment, from ground and air, of which the purpose was psychological, or mo-
re bluntly, to terrorize. That particular type of bombardment is nothing
new in the practice of German arms. It was tried on many occasions in the
Franco-German War of 1870-71. At Strasbourg, for instance, the civilian
quarters of the city were shelled by siege batteries in order to "induce the
inhabitants to compel the governor to surrender the fortress." The effect
was simply to stiffen the determination of the garrison and the inhabitants
to resist.
Exactly the same tactics were employed at Warsaw nearly seventy years la-
ter, and the same effect was produced; the morale of the city was unbro-
ken, for it was lack of ammunition and supplies, not loss of courage, which
finally made surrender inevitable. Methods of frightfulness defeat their
aims when used against a determined people. Herr Hitler announced in
his speech on September 19 that the British blockade might force him to
make use of a "weapon by which we [Germany] cannot be attacked." The
fresh resort to Schrecklichkeit here foreshadowed, whether it referred to
the poison gas or to bacteriological warfare or merely to massed attack
from the air on cities, will not effect its object. On that point there can be
no doubt whatever.
The major rôle which the German air force played in the conquest of Po-
land is no proof that it will achieve similar successes in the west. Poland
was, in comparison with Germany, very weak in the air. That her air force,
after the initial losses which it sustained on September 1, was able to resist
as well as it did testifies to the gallantry of its personnel. It is the more re-
grettable that its achievements were magnified by some absurd propagan-
da. The statement in a communiqué of September 3 that 64 German ma-
chines were brought down on that day for the loss of 11 Polish machines
was entirely unbelievable. The announcement a little later that Berlin had
been bombed was no less unconvincing. There is no escape from the con-
8/214
clusion, on the known facts, that Poland was wholly outclassed in the air.
The position is and will continue to be a very different one in the west. He-
re the German air arm is faced with a far harder task. Neither in numbers
nor in quality will it be able to claim superiority over the Franco-British air
strength. Indeed, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall stated in an interview
in Paris on October 7 that the British and French air forces were already
well on the road to establishing their supremacy in the air. Some 2,000 to
3,000 German aircraft are said to have been employed against Poland. The
total first line strength at Germany's disposal in the west may be 4,000 ma-
chines or more. The Allies' effectives are probably as great. In quality of
matériel there is probably not much to choose between the opposing com-
batants, but what little advantage there is should be on the Allies' side. The
German Heinkel, Junkers, Dornier and Henschel bombers are undoub-
tedly formidable aircraft but they are no better than the Wellingtons, Blen-
heims, Amiots, and Loiré et Oliviers on the other side. No German bom-
ber, so far as is known, carries a bomb-load so large as that of the latest
French heavy bomber, the Farman 223. The French Morane 406 C and
Bloch 151, the British Spitfire and Hawker Hurricane are at least a match,
in the fighter class, for the Messerschmitt 109 or 110 and the Heinkel 112.
Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, declared in the House of
Commons on October 10 that the latest British fighters were "definitely
better than their German counterparts."
The newest French fighters are also fine machines. The French air force is
fortunate in that practically all its equipment is of the latest design and
production. At the time of the Munich settlement the French equipment
was notoriously unsatisfactory; production had fallen to around 50 machi-
nes a month and the flying squadrons were equipped with types which we-
re obsolescent if not obsolete. Now, France has a splendid, modern air for-
ce. Her factories are pouring out machines in an increasing flow and the
supplies received from America help to swell the volume. The American
fighter, the Curtiss P. 36, has already acquitted itself well in action.
It is already evident from the encounters which have taken place that the
fighter is the master both of the bomber and of reconnaissance aircraft.
That is no surprise to those who followed the air operations in Spain, whe-
re -- to quote General Duval -- "the chasse machine considers the bombing
[i]
machine incapable of defending itself." "It is now definitely admitted,"
says Captain Didier Poulain, referring to the air fighting in Spain, " that the
[ii]
bomber is practically without defense against the fighter." In Spain the
bombers could avoid heavy casualties only by protecting themselves with
[iii]
screens of fighters, says F. A. Fischer von Poturzyn. "Whether in indivi-
dual combat or in formation," says M. C. Rougeron, "the bomber in its pre-
[iv]
sent form is no match for the fighter." The evidence so far obtainable in
9/214
the present war confirms that afforded by Spain. When a British bombing
formation made an attack on enemy warships in the Helgoland Bight on
September 29, five out of the six bombers were shot down according to the
German official report, which was not denied on the British side. In the
epic encounter of five British bomber-reconnaissance aircraft with fifteen
Messerschmitts over the western front on September 30, three of the for-
mer were shot down and a fourth made a forced landing. The fifth mana-
ged to reach its own lines after shooting down two German fighters; it had
80 bullet holes in its structure, its ailerons and rudder were damaged, both
its petrol tanks were burst, its retractable undercarriage was jammed. The
British fighters have been even more successful in their encounters with
the German bombers. They shot down 4 out of the 12 or 14 which raided
the Firth of Forth on October 16; and on the next day two bombers which
approached the English east coast were both engaged and shot down. Out
of 12 German bombers which attacked a convoy in the North Sea on Octo-
ber 21, 4 were shot down by British fighters, and 3 more, it was subse-
quently ascertained, failed to reach Germany. Two more bombers were
brought down on October 22 and 28.
The operations in Poland confirmed another lesson of the Spanish civil
war -- the importance of the air arm as a tactical weapon when used in con-
junction with ground forces. In Spain the technique of air support in the
assault was successfully developed by the Nationalists. An American offi-
cer has described this method from personal observation. Bombing aircraft
with small bombs and machine guns would fly in single file -- la cadena, it
was called -- over the trenches and rake them while the tanks and infantry
[v]
deployed into assault formation and moved up to the attack. According
to a British officer, General Beauman, the principal tactical lesson of the
Spanish civil war -- one which will be taken to heart by the great continen-
tal armies -- is that aircraft must be used if an attack is to make headway
[vi]
against modern defensive weapons. In Poland the same method was
adopted in a bigger theatre of war. First, aircraft bombed and machine-
gunned the enemy's positions, then the armored cars and tanks drove ho-
me the initial attack, to be followed in turn by the columns of infantry,
whose task was immensely lightened by the preliminary work of the aërial
and mechanized spearheads. When the major operations begin on the wes-
tern front, the use of aircraft to open the way for the ground assault is li-
kely to be a prominent feature of the tactical program.
Another lesson learnt in Spain was the increased effectiveness of the mo-
dern anti-aircraft gun as compared with its predecessor of twenty years
ago; and here again experience in Poland and on the present western front
seems to support the teaching of Spain. The German 88-mm. gun proved
itself extraordinarily effective in Spain. Before it arrived, the losses of the
10/214
Republican bombers from gunfire were almost nil. After its arrival they be-
came severe. "By their anti-aircraft artillery," writes M. Rougeron, "the Na-
tionalists succeeded in protecting their rear areas," the Republican aircraft
[vii]
venturing within range of it only at their peril. The British 3.7-inch gun
is the counterpart of the German 88-mm. gun and is at least as formidable
a weapon; the 4.5-inch gun has a still greater range and muzzle velocity,
but is fixed whereas the 3.7-inch gun is mobile. Britain, declared Sir Sa-
muel Hoare, the Home Secretary, at Swansea on January 26, 1939, has the
most modern and effective types of anti-aircraft guns in the world. Their
effectiveness is due largely to the fact they are used in conjunction with the
predictor, an instrument which enables its crew, using a telescopic eyepie-
ce, to set it so that it can calculate with great precision the point at which
the shell and the flying target will collide in space if level flight is maintai-
ned by the latter. The information so calculated is transmitted electrically
to a dial on the gun, whose crew can then train their weapon at the indica-
ted spot. Another instrument, the height-finder, is used with the predictor.
Altogether, anti-aircraft artillery is today something which cannot be mo-
cked by the pilot as was the "Archie" of the last great war.
Naval anti-aircraft gunnery has been improved to at least a corresponding
degree. When introducing the Navy Estimates in the House of Commons
on March 16, 1939, Mr. Shakespeare, the Parliamentary Secretary to the
Admiralty, told his audience that if he had the choice between being in a
battleship which was being bombed and in the aircraft which was bombing
it, he would choose the former every time. His words were borne out on
September 26 by the result of an attack by about twenty German aircraft
on a squadron of British capital ships, with an aircraft carrier and destro-
yers, in the North Sea. Not a single hit was scored by the aircraft, not a sin-
gle casualty caused on the warships; the attack was beaten off without diffi-
culty and two of the aircraft were shot down. The Germans claimed that an
aircraft carrier -- subsequently stated to be the Ark Royal -- was destroyed,
that a battleship was badly damaged, and that no loss was sustained by the
German aircraft, which returned safely to their base. There was no truth in
any of these statements. Again on October 9 German aircraft made both le-
vel and dive bombing attacks on British warships in the North Sea, but sco-
red no hits and inflicted no casualties. Two of the bombers, one with a
wounded man on board, made forced landings on the same day in Den-
mark, and a third in Norwegian waters. The presumption is that all three
had been damaged by the warships' fire. The effectiveness of the German
anti-aircraft guns had already been demonstrated during the raid of Sep-
tember 4 by British bombers against the German fleet at Wilhelmshaven
and Brunsbüttel; it was claimed by the German and not denied in the Bri-
tish official report that five of the twelve attacking bombers were brought
down by the anti-aircraft batteries. On this occasion, however, the raiders
11/214
had something to show for their losses, for they scored a direct hit with a
heavy bomb upon a German battleship.
The greatly increased strength of the active defense, in the air and on the
ground, has doubtless been one reason why there has been a certain
shyness about beginning the long-range raiding attacks which had been ex-
pected. Against well-defended areas such raids must be, by day, very peri-
lous adventures. The raiders are certain to be forced to pay heavily for any
successes they may achieve. They have to run the gauntlet of the outer gun
zone, the zone of the interceptor aircraft, and then the inner gun zone, be-
fore they can reach their objective, and they have to clear the same hurdles
on their homeward run. By night the chances of the bombers' coming
through are better; but even then they will probably find their task no light
one. Blinded by the searchlights, they will be a fairly easy mark for the in-
terceptors, and in clear weather the anti-aircraft guns should be able also
to claim some victims. When they do get through they will then have to
find their objectives -- and this will often be difficult. The "blackout" is now
so effective that there is little apparent difference, from the air, between
the built-up areas and the open countryside. Night-flying raiders groping
for a particular factory or military establishment will probably have to plas-
ter the whole area with bombs in which the objective is supposed to be.
That is a costly method of trying to hit a target, costly in petrol as well as in
high explosive. Most of the bombs would probably fall on empty ground.
Even if London as a whole were the objective, the odds are, as Major Gene-
ral Foulkes has pointed out, that only one bomb in ten, on the average,
would hit a building, for 90 percent of the whole area is open space. "In the
area within fifteen miles of Charing Cross, containing a population of eight
and a half millions, the odds against a bomb falling within fifty feet of any
[viii]
particular spot is two and a half millions to one."
The indiscriminate bombing which such a method of trying to hit a given
objective would involve is hardly a practice which either side will be eager
to initiate. Not only would the effect upon neutral opinion be unfavorable
to the belligerent who began it, but the result would inevitably be to stiffen
the determination of the nation which figured as the first victim of such an
attack. Moreover, the belligerents in the west are too evenly matched in the
air to make it safe for the one to expect the other not to make a strong
counteroffensive. Even if the initial stroke were confined strictly to military
objectives, the reply to it might not be similarly restricted. Perhaps -- one
cannot tell -- it was for this reason that the French and British air forces re-
frained from trying to smash up the German troop concentrations and the
trains carrying men and matériel from Poland to the west. The very fact
that bombing raids into the interior of the enemy country had been begun
might be the signal for resort to la guerre totale in the air, with all its ho-
rrors. That may come yet, but one harbors a faint hope that behind the re-
12/214
luctance to begin long-distance raiding attacks there may be, as a cons-

cious or subconscious influence, the idea that bombing should be confined
to the zones of active operations and their immediate vicinity. Some vague
suggestions for an agreement to limit bombing in this way were indeed put
forward by Herr Hitler in 1935 and 1936. In any case, it is evident -- whate-
ver be the reason -- that neither side has desired to be the first to bomb ob-
jectives far behind the other's lines.
Long-range raids there have been, but their purpose has been primarily re-
connaissance and secondarily the distribution of literature, not of high ex-
plosive. Some surprise has been expressed that the first task of the British
Air Force should have been to disseminate propaganda in this way; but, in
fact, it is not in the least a novel task either for the British or other air servi-
ces. Raids for such a purpose were frequent in the last great war. The Ger-
mans, for instance, dropped leaflets among the Indian troops in France in
November 1914, urging them to revolt; the flaw in the plan was that the
language used was Hindi, whereas the particular troops to whom the ap-
peal was made spoke Urdu. Attempts to seduce the Senegalese troops in
Gallipoli were similarly made by the Germano-Turkish air force in October
1915. French airmen, on their side, dropped leaflets on many occasions,
notably in May 1915, to inform the German people of Italy's participation
in the war on the Franco-British side. British aircraft dropped an enor-
mous number of notes during 1917 and 1918. America's entry into the war
was made known in this way, as was also President Wilson's message to
Congress early in 1918. So great was the effect of this propaganda that
Field Marshal Hindenburg thought it necessary to issue a proclamation in
September 1918, urging the people to pay no attention to "leaflets intended
to kill the soul."
The recent flights made into Germany by the Royal Air Force for reconnais-
sance and the distribution of leaflets (dropped in the form of "bricks"
which broke up in the air) were carried out at a great height and encounte-
red very little opposition. That these raids are, from the German point of
view, anything but a joke, is evident from the severe penalties threatened
against any inhabitants found reading the leaflets. How great will be the ef-
fect of such propaganda it is impossible as yet to say. It may well be that in
retrospect it will be seen as no less important than if an equivalent weight
of bombs had been dropped. The British flights had another effect, too.
They demonstrated beyond possibility of doubt that all northern, western
and even central Germany lay within the range of British aircraft. They
showed the true value of Field Marshal Göring's assurance that if an
enemy machine crossed the German frontier it would be at once brought
down.
The demonstration of Britain's ability to carry the war into Germany con-
tributed, no doubt, to the latter's hesitation to launch air attacks upon Bri-
13/214
tain in the early days of the war. Whatever the cause, the thunderclap for
which all ears were straining was not heard. The result was something of
an anticlimax. The whole country had braced itself for the worst. Measures
of passive defense had been organized on a colossal scale. Millions of chil-
dren, invalids and expectant mothers had been evacuated from the danger
areas on or before the outbreak of war. Hundreds of thousands of hospital
beds had been earmarked for air raid casualties. Doctors, nurses, air raid
wardens, auxiliary firemen, decontamination squads, dispatch riders were
all standing by and waiting for their services to be needed. And then, lo
and behold -- nothing happened. People began to ask: Will nothing happen
at all? That question has not been answered yet. But it may be answered at
any time. Devastating air attacks may have been launched on London and
other cities before these words appear in print. They may be simultaneous
with a great thrust on the western front, the object being to pin down in
England fighter squadrons which would otherwise be available for reënfor-
cing the units in France. If the Maginot Line is to be smothered by high ex-
plosive bombs, preparing the way for an onset by giant tanks, all the figh-
ter aircraft which can possibly be assembled by the Allies will be needed to
beat off the German bombers and their escorting fighters.
Whether the raiders come to London and Paris or not, whether they cause
destruction on a widespread scale or not, they cannot decide the issue of
the war. That will be decided by sea power. Admiral Mahan's doctrine that
the belligerent who holds command of the sea can never be beaten in the
end will again be proved true. Air power cannot prevail against sea power,
regardless of the methods of Schrecklichkeit it uses. And the result must be
the same whether it comes soon or late. Germany will be beaten; the only
question is how long it will take. The collapse of Germany may come soo-
ner than any man could now surely predict; it may come within the three
years for which the British Government is laying its plans; or perhaps we
may have to wait until grass has long been growing in the streets of Ham-
burg.
[i]
"Les Leçons de la Guerre d'Espagne." Paris: Plon, 1938, p. 154.
[ii]
Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, August 1938, p. 582.
[iii]
"Luftmacht." Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1938, p. 85.
[iv]
"L'Aviation de Bombardement," I. 36.
[v]
"The Aëroplane's Rôle in Battle in Spain," by Brig. Gen. H. J. Reilly, in
The Aëroplane, April 29, 1939.
[vi]
Brig. Gen. A. B. Beauman: "A Short Outline of Modern Tactics." Lon-
don: Rees, 1939, p. 46.
[vii]
"Les Enseignements Aériens de la Guerre d'Espagne," 1939, p. 105.
14/214
[viii]
"Commonsense and A.R.P." London: Pearson, 1939, p. 32.
Second Phase
ONE lesson taught by the second phase of the air operations in the present
[i]
European war is that superior strength on the land and in the air can
produce a decision far more quickly than in the days before the air was
conquered. This was the lesson taught by the German triumphs in Norway,
Holland, Belgium and France. It was taught, too, more clumsily, by the
Russians in Finland. Even if a belligerent makes almost every possible tac-
tical error in land operations, predominance in the air will enable him to
blind and overwhelm an opponent whose air arm is inadequate and whose
army, even though well directed and, indeed, superior in fighting quality,
is numerically inferior. Such, at least, was the lesson of the mid-winter
campaign in Finland.
In the air, as on land, Russia had an immense superiority of strength. Fin-
land had probably less than 100 first-line planes; her total strength in ser-
viceable aircraft can hardly have exceeded 150. What Russia's first-line
strength was is uncertain, but it was undoubtedly immense. The estimate
[ii]
of "Max Werner," 10,000 to 12,000 first-line aircraft, was certainly ex-
[iii]
cessive; that of M. Laurent Eynac, 3000 aircraft, was probably too low.
M. Pierre Cot placed the figure at 4500-5000 machines, and General Si-
[iv]
korski at 5000, with an equal number in reserve. The figure of 4200 to
[v]
4500 was suggested in 1938 in a French publication and was probably
not far wrong. In the fighting in the Karelian Isthmus on February 15,
1940, more than 500 machines were reported to have been in the air, and
on a later day in February at least 1000 were flying in all the Finnish thea-
tre.
The Russian machines were on the whole of poor quality. The I-16 single-
seater fighter had a maximum speed of only 248 miles per hour and a com-
paratively poor armament. The standard bomber, the S.B., had a top speed
of no more than 250 miles per hour and a range of only 620 miles. Another
bomber, the Ts.Kb.26, had a range of 1300 miles, with a similar maximum
speed. Both would have been shot to pieces by modern fighters. The qua-
lity of the Finns' aircraft was not, however, much better. Their machines
were a scratch collection. The fighters were largely Bristol Bulldogs, long
discarded in Great Britain. Better machines were gradually acquired. Gla-
diator fighters and Blenheim bombers were obtained from Britain and a
number of modern aircraft were also supplied from France and the United
States. Altogether, 101 planes were sent from Britain during the war, as
[vi]
well as 15,700 aircraft bombs. By the end of the war Finland had pro-
15/214
bably more and certainly better aircraft than she had had at the beginning.
She was still, however, woefully inferior to Russia in the air.
How ruthlessly Russia exploited her superior strength is notorious. It is
true that the Red Army Command issued at the beginning of March 1940 a
categorical denial of the charges that the air arm had bombed non-military
objectives and machine-gunned civilians. The evidence in support of the
charges is too strong. Photographs of the destruction wrought at Helsinki,
[vii]
Viipuri, Hanko and other places were published in many newspapers.
The verdict of Sir Walter Citrine, who, with Mr. Philip Noel Baker and Mr.
John Downie, visited Finland in January 1940, on behalf of the National
Council of Labor, is quite uncompromising. He and his colleagues most
certainly had no bias against Russia and their condemnation of her acts is
accordingly the more impressive. Of Turku (Aabo) he wrote that "by far the
vaster proportion of the damage was utterly without military importance"
[viii]
and that "it was certain that the bombing was indiscriminate." Of the
destruction of Hanko he wrote: "It seemed diabolical to me that a country
which only a couple of years ago was denouncing to the world the German
and Italian bombing in Spain should now be resorting to this means of
[ix]
trying to terrorise the Finnish people."
So flagrant were the Soviet attacks on hospitals that the Finnish medical
authorities abandoned the use of the Red Cross as a protective emblem.
Before they did so it was reported that a couple of Russian prisoners captu-
red in the Isthmus protested against being taken to a Red Cross hospital.
[x]
"That," they said, "is the kind of house our airmen bomb." Some terrible
photographs of the devastation caused by bombs in the hospital at Rova-
niemi, where the operating theatre and a ward were hit, five nurses and
[xi]
many patients being killed, were published in a British newspaper.
The ruthless bombing undoubtedly had its effect. A well-known war corres-
pondent, who followed the operations in Finland, has stated that "Russia's
air supremacy was really the deciding factor." The advantages which it ga-
ve were, he states, that it prevented all counter-bombing by the. Finnish
air force; it allowed the Russian aircraft to observe all that occurred on the
other side; it stopped the flow of Finnish munitions and food to the front;
[xii]
and, above all, it deprived the exhausted Finnish soldiers of rest.
It is nevertheless open to question whether the Soviet authority in the air
would have sufficed to quell the Finnish resistance except in combination
with a vast superiority on the ground. It was the "Russian steam-roller" be-
low that made the assault from above so effective. All that one can say as a
result of the campaign in Finland is that predominant air power plus pre-
dominant land power is decisive today in war, in circumstances in which
sea power cannot be brought into play. There is not sufficient evidence that
16/214
the first without the second would have succeeded in forcing Finland to ca-
pitulate.
Meanwhile in the western theatre of war the strange lull in the air which
marked the first phase of the conflict continued. The fact that no attempt
was made on either side to carry the war into the enemy's country during
the first eight months of hostilities was the cause of surprise and bewilder-
ment alike in Britain and in Germany. In Britain, it had been expected that
terrific attacks would be made on London. In Germany, it was expected
that they would be made against Berlin. Referring to the British declara-
tion of war, Dr. Goebbels said in a speech at Poznan on 19 January, 1940:
"One would have expected that on the afternoon of that very day their
much-vaunted bombers would have appeared over Berlin." In both capi-
tals a measure of relief was felt that the bombing had not started at zero
hour -- or before it.
What was still more extraordinary was the failure of the Luftwaffe, on one
side, and of the British and French air forces, on the other, to interfere
with the great troop concentrations which took place in September 1939
and thereafter. As long ago as 1927 Lord Thomson, the former Secretary of
State for Air, had written that "should such a calamity as another world
war occur, hostilities will begin at once, there will be no breathing space of
ten days or a fortnight for mobilization. . . . In these circumstances the em-
barkation of the British Expeditionary Force would have been hampered, if
not prevented, and a number of our warships would have been disabled be-
[xiii]
fore they could put to sea." Yet the British Expeditionary Force of 1939
had been able to embark, to cross to France, to disembark there and to mo-
ve up to the line, without let or hindrance. There might have been no Ger-
man air force whatever for all that that great army, moving with its impedi-
menta, knew about it in September 1939, or in the following months when
reënforcements for it crossed to France.
A still greater surprise, to the well-informed, was the abstention of the Bri-
tish and French bombers from interfering with the huge concentration of
the German forces in the west. Britain had sent a strong "Advanced Air
Striking Force" to France in the first days of the war; and the French had
their striking force, too. Neither struck. Division after division moved from
the east to the west of Germany. They did so in perfect peace. "The extraor-
dinary thing," wrote Mr. E. Coleston Shephard, "is that while they held the
initial command of the air in the west, the French and British Air Forces
did not attempt to prevent the swift transfer of troops by concentrated
bombing on railway junctions, roads and aerodromes up to a hundred mi-
les or more behind the German lines. The bombing fleets had been built
[xiv]
for just such a purpose."
Not until after the end of the war shall we know, probably, the full reasons
17/214
for the strange quiescence in the air in its early stages. Prima facie it ap-
pears as if each side lost a golden opportunity. It is evident that none of the
belligerents was inclined to initiate air attack upon the enemy's territory.
Why each of them held back is not entirely clear, though many different
reasons could be suggested for the mutual restraint. At the back of all the
reasons there was, one must surmise, the working of the balance of air po-
wer. Each feared the other's riposte.
In a speech at the Rheinmetal-Borsig armament factory on September 9,
1939, Field Marshal Göring said: "If the British aeroplanes fly at tremen-
dous heights at night and drop their ridiculous propaganda in German te-
rritory, I have nothing against it. But take care if the leaflets are replaced
by one bomb. Then reprisals will follow as in Poland." (Later, the propa-
ganda film, "Baptism of Fire," was made in Germany to show what this
threat of frightfulness meant in practice.) "We shall return blow for blow,"
said M. Daladier on November 30. "If the destructive fury of the enemy
falls upon our villages we shall strike back at him with the same harsh-
ness." When in a raid upon Scapa Flow on March 16, 1940, bombs were
dropped on Orkney Mainland and one civilian was killed and seven were
wounded, the Royal Air Force promptly retaliated, on March 19, by bom-
bing the German air base at Hörnum in the island of Sylt. About three
months earlier the German official news agency had alleged that bombs
had been dropped on Hörnum and another small town in Sylt (Rantum).
This was at once denied by the British Air Ministry, and a similar denial
was issued on February 10, 1940, when it was again alleged in Germany
that Hörnum and Rantum had been attacked. Not until after the invasion
of Norway was Sylt again bombed; the aerodrome at Westerland was hea-
vily raided on the night of April 23-24. That the raid was not intended to
mark a departure from the general policy was implied in the Air Ministry's
announcement that it (as well as the raid on Aalborg aerodrome in Den-
mark) was directed "against air bases available to the enemy for use in the
invasion of Norway."
Norway itself was not included in the unexpressed ban, and that unfortu-
nate country experienced the full measure of German Schrecklichkeit from
the air. Not only towns like Namsos, Aandalsnes, Elverum and Stenkjer,
but many villages were largely destroyed, and peaceable inhabitants were
machine-gunned on various occasions. The Germans had a marked supe-
riority in the air and exploited it to the full. It was, indeed, that superiority
which forced the Allies to abandon the idea of capturing Trondheim. "In-
tense and continuous bombing of the bases at Aandalsnes and Namsos pre-
vented the landing of any large reinforcements," said Mr. Churchill in the
House of Commons on May 8, 1940, "and even of artillery for the infantry
already landed, and of many supplies. It was therefore necessary to with-
draw the troops or leave them to be destroyed by overwhelming forces."
18/214
It was Germany's superiority in the air which brought Britain's interven-

tion in Central Norway to a premature and unsatisfactory end, and it was
the same superiority which deterred the Allies from taking the initiative in
raiding military objectives in Germany. There were hundreds of objectives
there simply shrieking for attention from their long-range bombers. There
were the oil-fuel installations, for instance. Yet it was not until May 17 that
any attempt was made to destroy these vital sources of Germany's armed
strength. On that night British bombers attacked the petrol storage tanks
at Hamburg and Bremen; they repeated the operation on later occasions
and included the tanks at Hannover also, for luck, and by the end of Sep-
tember the oil refineries at Hamburg, Bremen and Hannover had been
bombed no less than 36, 31 and 19 times respectively. The Germans at on-
ce complained that the Royal Air Force had killed 29 people and injured 51
in the raid on Hamburg. Possibly they had, but then civilians are likely to
suffer if they are in the vicinity of military targets. In subsequent communi-
qués the German High Command charged the British Air Force with ma-
king "random attacks" on non-military objectives. That allegation was only
to be expected; it was a good opening for propaganda. What is quite cer-
tain is that British airmen did not deliberately attack noncombatants. They
aimed solely at military objectives.
The policy of waiting before carrying the war into Germany was defended
by Mr. Churchill in a speech at Manchester on January 27, 1940. He asked,
Ought we to have begun bombing? No, he said, our policy was right. We
were not as well prepared as Germany. We were now much better organi-
zed and stronger in defences than at the beginning of the war. There had
been, he said, a great advance in the protection of the civil population and
in the punishment which would be inflicted upon the raiders. There were
others who took a different view, but the question was a very difficult one.
Many prominent people were far from satisfied with Britain's policy of res-
traint. Mr. Amery and Mr. Duff Cooper, both out of office at the time but
soon to become ministers again, pleaded in public for the adoption of
much sterner methods. The view of the aeronautical world was reflected in
The Aeroplane, which kept hammering away at the same point. Why on
earth, the editor, Mr. Colston Shephard, asked in effect, were we not hit-
ting at Germany's strength at its source and bombing Dessau, Bremen,
Rostock and Oranienburg, where dozens of new aeroplanes were being
produced every week to be used against us? Lord Trenchard, the greatest
figure in British military aviation, added his powerful support to their plea.
In the House of Lords on May 8, 1940, he asked why we waited, and said
that if it was because we had promised not to bomb "open towns," this
meant that Germany need not retain any defences at home. Nobody, he ad-
ded, wanted to kill civilians, but the British people would not shrink from
facing whatever risk was necessary to bring the war to a successful conclu-
19/214
sion. "Make no mistake about it," he said. "When it suits Germany's book
she will hit open towns and all, mercilessly and thoroughly. Why should we
await her convenience before striking at German military might in Ger-
many?"
Lord Trenchard's words were prophetic. It suited Germany's book to begin
bombing the homelands of the western Allies in the second week of May,
when she attacked Holland, where a whole district of Rotterdam was prac-
tically wiped out, and Belgium, where the cities of Tournai, Louvain, Nive-
lles and Namur were savagely bombed. German bombers also attacked
aerodromes and railway stations at a large number of French towns --
Nancy, Lyon, Lille, Colmar, Luxeuil, Pontoise, Béthune, Lens, Hazebrouck,
Abbeville and Laon. Some 44 bombs were dropped, too, by a German air-
craft in a wood in Kent where they did no damage; they were probably jetti-
soned. The Allies on their side bombed aerodromes, troop concentrations,
mechanized columns on the move, bridges, and roads behind the German
lines. The war in the air was thus carried for the first time into the enemy's
country.
Since then the incursions of the Royal Air Force into Germany and of the
Luftwaffe into Britain have steadily increased in frequency and vigor. Tho-
se of the British airmen have been aimed exclusively at impairing Ger-
many's military strength. Oil refineries, synthetic oil plants and petrol sto-
rage depots have been among the chief targets. Not only in western Ger-
many but also as far away as at Leuna in central Germany, at Pölitz (near
Stettin) on the Baltic, and at Regensburg on the Danube have Germany's
oil fuel installations been raided with damaging effect. Other objectives of
importance for the German war effort have also been attacked unremit-
tingly. The aircraft factories in which the Focke-Wulf, Dornier, Fieseler,
Junkers, Gotha and Messerschmitt machines are constructed or assembled
have been bombed. So have the aero-engine works of the B.M.W. and
Daimler-Benz firms. The great Fokker factory at Amsterdam was heavily
raided as soon as it had been brought into operation for German purposes.
The rail and canal communications of western Germany have been repea-
tedly bombed. The great railway centre of Hamm, which serves as a clea-
ring house for the whole of the goods traffic of western Germany, was atta-
cked no less than sixty times in the three months which ended on Septem-
ber 30. The aqueduct of the Dortmund-Ems canal, which carries the equi-
valent of 400 train-loads daily and serves as the chief link between the Rhi-
neland and northwest and central Germany, has been put out of action, re-
paired, and put out of action again. The naval dockyards and ports of Ham-
burg, Bremen, Wilhelmshaven, Kiel and Cuxhaven have been the objecti-
ves of recurrent attacks.
Indeed, the whole of Germany's industrial and economic system has been
seriously affected by the incessant blows rained upon it by the Royal Air
20/214
Force. These have ranged as far afield as Pilsen, in Czechoslovakia, where

the great Skoda armament works were successfully bombed on the night of
October 27 -- a feat eclipsed by the British Bomber Command four days la-
ter, when oil plants and military objectives at Naples were attacked by air-
craft starting from England.
So great, indeed, was the effect of those blows that the menace to the effec-
tiveness of Germany's war machinery was already becoming evident in the
summer. Something had to be done to bring the activities of the British
bombers to an end. The obvious course was, if possible, to invade and ove-
rrun Britain just as France and the other victims of Germany's armed
might had been invaded and overrun, or, if that was not possible, at least
to drive the British Air Force out of the sky. Invasion was the solution --
preferably by sea, land and air; but by air alone, if the other alternatives
could not be achieved. So in the autumn of the year all the necessary prepa-
rations were put in hand for loosing a combined attack upon southeast En-
gland and, as a preliminary to that attack, for overwhelming the Royal Air
Force in that corner of the country.
There is reason to believe that first one and then another date was fixed for
the launching of the grand assault. The first was in mid-August. To gain
command of the air, an essential condition for the success of the invasion
by sea and land forces, a mass attack was launched against the air bases in
southern England on August 15. A veritable armada of bombers and figh-
ters came over the coast. The bombers were largely Junkers 87 dive-bom-
bers, "Stukas," as they are called, the machines which, in combination with
mechanized columns and tanks, had enabled the Germans to smash their
way through northern France in May and June. There were thousands of
these machines in the Luftwaffe, and thousands more of the Junkers 52
troop-carrier, which had also played a prominent part in Germany's suc-
cesses, notably in Norway and Holland. The stage was never reached at
which the Ju-52's could be used against Britain. The Ju-87's were used --
and the tale was a sorry one for their pilots and crews.
Already the dive-bombers had been handled roughly by the Spitfires, Hu-
rricanes and Defiants of the Royal Air Force over the beaches of Dunkirk.
When they ventured over the English coast they suffered more severely
still. Nine of them were shot down in a few minutes by a Spitfire squadron
near Southampton on August 13, but it was on August 15 that they were ve-
ritably massacred. On that day the Luftwaffe lost 180 aircraft over and
around southern England; the slaughter of the Stukas really sealed the fate
of the first project of invasion.
The August plan had come to naught. The next attempt was more carefully
planned. It was fixed, apparently, for mid-September. Early in that month
the Germans began to concentrate barges, shipping and light naval forces
in the ports along the Dutch, Belgian and northern French coasts, with the
21/214
intention of making a sudden dash across the English Channel. The Royal
Air Force foiled that plan, too. It struck again and again at the concentra-
tions of light craft, first at the mouth of the Scheldt and at Ostend, then,
when they were moved westward, at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne and Le Ha-
vre, and finally even at Lorient in the Bay of Biscay. One particular ons-
laught was a veritable disaster for the would-be invaders. It coincided with
a dress-rehearsal for the invasion; on that night the barges were packed
with fully equipped troops, who were caught unawares by the British bom-
bers. Many were killed, many drowned, others burnt by the blazing oil
which covered the sea after incendiary bombs had been dropped and the
tanks of the barges had been set on fire. To that disaster in the tidewater
was added another, which befell the Luftwaffe about the same time. On
September 15 a second mass attack was made on southern England in the
air and routed even more decisively than that of a month before. The defi-
nitely confirmed losses of German aircraft on that day amounted to 185; it
is highly probable that in reality not less than 232 machines were destro-
yed. No such destruction of aircraft in one day has been known in the an-
nals of war.
It was undoubtedly the inability of the German air force to penetrate the
British defence by day which inspired the savage attacks by night upon
London and other cities in Britain. Those attacks were a confession of failu-
re. The Luftwaffe had not been trained for night operations. It was in this
respect both technically and professionally far inferior to the Royal Air For-
ce. The latter, as a result in part of the "leaflet raids" carried out during the
winter of 1939-40, knew the darkened face of Germany as well as it knew
that of England. Its personnel was highly skilled in night flying. Its maté-
riel was, for this purpose, superior to Germany's. The pilots and bomb-ai-
mers had been trained to a pitch not even approached by those of the Luft-
waffe. Precision of aim was inculcated and practised. Long periods were
spent in the search for and exact location of targets. If the designated ob-
jective could not be found, and if no alternative target could be bombed
with reasonable precision, no attack was launched. Bombs cost money and
it is folly to dump them where they can do no harm. Frequently a full
bomb-load has been brought home because it could not be dropped on a
military objective. There is nothing of blind or indiscriminate bombing in
the work of the Royal Air Force. A similar statement cannot be made of the
Luftwaffe, as those who, like the present writer, reside in the outskirts of
London far from any military objective, and whose houses have suffered
from the incompetence -- it was that, probably, rather than malice -- of the
German airmen, have practical reason for affirming without any hesitation
whatever.
While these words are being written, the callous, ham-fisted bombing of
London continues. Defence in the air has proved to be more effective by
22/214
day, less effective by night, than had been expected. In time, no doubt, a
solution of the problem of the night bomber will be found. That time may
possibly be soon. Meanwhile we have to grin and bear our adversity, and
that is what in fact we are doing. There is no likelihood whatever that the
random, indiscriminate attack to which the once-chivalrous German air
force is subjecting the civilian population of London and other cities will
break their spirit. Rather, it is steeling them to a grimmer determination to
put an end to the régime which can slaughter women and children as a me-
re incident of its march to world-domination, to stop the wheels of the Na-
zi juggernaut for all time. It will do something more, too: it will give British
air power a freer hand when the day of reckoning comes. There will be lit-
tle mercy then for the butchers of the air.
The day of reckoning is coming. The air strength of Britain and the Empire
is being marshalled. The Luftwaffe is still numerically stronger than the
Royal Air Force. Mr. Churchill stated, however, in his speech in the House
of Commons on August 20, that the new production of aircraft in Britain is
already considerably larger than Germany's, and, he added, the American
production was then only beginning to flow in. Soon it will be a flood. So-
me 500 aircraft are believed to be coming each month from the United Sta-
tes. The number will increase to 700 by the end of the year and to 1000 by
the early summer of 1941. Canada, we know from statements by two of her
ministers, Mr. Power and Mr. Gibson, will be sending 360 aircraft a month
by then. Britain expects to overtake the German lead in 1941, Mr. Churchill
stated on October 8. In his broadcast to the French people on October 21
he was still more definite and said that in 1941 Britain would have com-
mand of the air.
The British Air Force, already qualitatively superior to the German, will
soon be better still. Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert stated in a broadcast on
October 24 that the new machines soon to come into operation will be as
distinct an advance upon the existing ones as they were upon their prede-
cessors. New American aircraft of very high performance are also under
construction. The Bell, Brewster, Curtiss and Lockheed fighters, the Doug-
las, Boeing and Martin bombers, will be a most important supplement to
the new and improved types of both classes now on the stocks in Great Bri-
tain. The Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force knows, from its expe-
rience with the Lockheed Hudson, about the quality of American machi-
nes; and the new Lockheed Vega is understood to be a super-Hudson. The-
re will be advances in German quality, too, no doubt; but Britain, with
American help, should be well able to keep her lead. When it is a quantita-
tive lead also, then the end of this great struggle will be near at hand.
The first lesson of the second phase of the air warfare has been, as stated at
the beginning of this article, the swiftness and decisiveness with which the
combination of superior strength on the ground and in the air became ef-
23/214
fective. What was involved there was the overrunning of a weaker bellige-
rent whose land frontier marched with that of a more powerful neighbor.
What of belligerents separated by the sea? Will sea power plus air power
be able to bring about a decision? This lesson remains to be learned. Al-
ready it has been established that sea power has not been materially affec-
ted by the coming of the aeroplane. Destroyers, sloops, minesweepers have
been sunk by air action. Larger warships have, in general, been immune.
Usually, it has been the aircraft and not the ship which has had to lick its
wounds after the encounter. What has not yet been proved is whether sea
power and air power can overcome land power and air power. That is
really the crux of the matter as between Britain and Germany.
There will be encounters, no doubt, on land. In the Middle East there will
be a clash of armies. The war will not be decided there, however, though it
appears probable that the result of Mussolini's attack on Greece will be to
give British sea and air power alike footholds from which shattering blows
can be aimed at Italy's naval and air bases and her maritime communica-
tions with her expeditionary forces. The success of the fleet air arm at Ta-
ranto may be the first of a series of strokes which will end in knocking Italy
out of the ring. Unfortunately, Germany may not be the weaker on that ac-
count.
The vital theatre will still be in the west of Europe. No triumphs elsewhere
will profit Germany -- or Italy -- if the island of Great Britain remains in-
violate and defiant. If that outpost of the British Empire still holds out, and
if British strength on the sea and in the air is unbroken and increases -- as
increase it will -- the Axis cannot win this war, however far it extends its
conquests elsewhere. Given the achievement of the task which the British
nations have undertaken -- to mass overwhelming strength in the air -- the
Axis must lose. It will be crushed in the grip of two mighty forces, sea po-
wer and air power, against which land power, backed by air power that is
outmatched, will find it useless to struggle. That, one makes bold to pre-
dict, will be the lesson of the third phase of the war.
Notes
[i]
Editor's Note: See "The War in the Air: First Phase," by J. M. Spaight,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1940.
[ii]
"The Military Strength of the Powers," New York, 1939, p. 61.
[iii]
In L'Air, July 1939.
[iv]
Articles in Sunday Times, April 8, 1939, and June 4, 1939.
[v]
"L'Aviation Soviétique," 1938, p. 7.
[vi]
Statement by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons, March 19,
1940.
24/214
[vii]
See, e.g., The Times, December 8, 1939.
[viii]
"My Finnish Diary," 1940, p. 42.
[ix]
Ibid., p.56.
[x]
The Times, January 30, 1940, report from correspondent at Stockholm.
[xi]
See the Daily Telegraph of February 10, 1940.
[xii]
Article by G. L. Steer on "Looking Back on the Reasons for Finland's
Heroic Failure," Daily Telegraph, February 8, 1940.
[xiii]
"Air Facts and Problems," 1927, pp. 21-22.
[xiv]
The Aeroplane, October 5, 1939.
Third Phase
VIEWED in the perspective of history, the year 1941 will probably be jud-
ged to have reserved its most important event, vitally affecting the fortune
[i]
of war by air, land and sea, until near its close. That event was the entry
of the United States into the conflict as a full belligerent. The casus belli
was itself an act of air warfare -- as treacherous an act, and as effective for
the moment, as Germany's blow at Poland on September 1, 1939. Japan's
sudden stroke from the air at the American naval and air forces at Pearl
Harbor on December 7 was a crime. It was also a blunder. The losses inflic-
ted, grievous as they were, were perhaps the lowest price necessary for
bringing the vast American nation as a grimly determined unit into the
struggle for freedom. The tremendous tidings from the west in the fateful
days from December 7 to 11 were dimmed for British ears by the shattering
reverberation of the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse on De-
cember 10 -- again an epochal event of the war in the air. But it was not
that disaster which even then mattered most. The far greater event was the
crossing by the United States of the last interval between peace and war.
The year 1941 had already been notable in the annals of air warfare. The
one before had had as its outstanding feature the defeat of the Luftwaffe
by the Royal Air Force over and around Great Britain in the months of Au-
gust and September. The next phase of the war in the air opened with
another triumph. It was won far from the scene of the first, in the northeas-
tern corner of Africa and over the eastern Mediterranean. There, in the pe-
riod from November 1940 to February 1941, the British, South African,
Australian and Rhodesian airmen practically drove the Italian airmen out
of the sky. Never has any air force of an important Power been so roughly
handled as was the Regia Aeronautica. Alike in personnel and matériel the
British and Dominion Air Forces were definitely superior to the Italian,
and this was the more remarkable because, so far as equipment went, it
25/214
was the second string of the Royal Air Force that was entered for the con-
test. The British fighter machines then in the Middle East were Gladiators,
and though they were practically obsolescent they quickly mastered the
Italian fighters, most of which were Fiat CR.42's, with some Macchi
C.200's and Fiat G.50's. During the winter, Hurricane fighters were recei-
ved, and at a later date Curtiss Tomahawks. Both proved even more clearly
the masters of the Italian fighters than the Gladiators had been. The best
British fighter, the Spitfire, was not used in the Middle East.
That was the first round in the contest for supremacy in the sky of North
Africa. The second was fought when General Auchinleck's forces invaded
Libya on November 18, 1941. By then the Italian air force had been stiffe-
ned by detachments of the Luftwaffe, and the British and Imperial airmen
had a much stiffer time of it than they had had during General Wavell's in-
vasion. There was hard fighting in the air, but the Tomahawks, Hurricanes
and Beaufighters operating with the British troops soon showed that they
had little to fear from the opposing Me.109 and Macchi C.200 and C.202
fighters; and the Curtiss Kittyhawks which came into action in the opening
days of 1942 at once established their mastery also. "The Royal Air Force
are definitely on top," the Cairo correspondent of The Times reported on
December 6. The communiqués issued by British General Headquarters re-
ferred repeatedly during December to the powerful support given by the
air to the ground forces. As the British columns advanced, tangible eviden-
ce of the effect of the bombing and machine-gun attacks was afforded in
the shape of wrecked lorries and aircraft littering the route and the landing
grounds. More than once the official reports referred to the devastation
caused by the low-flying aircraft among the retreating Axis forces. In their
operations the Imperial troops were also assisted materially by such raids
as those of January 5 on Castel Vetrano aerodrome in Sicily, where some
44 German and Italian aircraft were destroyed and many others damaged
by Blenheims in the afternoon and then by Wellingtons after nightfall.
The eclipse of the Regia Aeronautica at the beginning of 1941 was the mo-
re clearly displayed in the light of the better showing made by the Luftwaf-
fe when it, too, appeared in the Mediterranean. The Germans gained a no-
table success on January 10, 1941. They sent their dive-bombers, recently
arrived in Sicily, to attack a British convoy in the Sicilian Channel, with the
result that the cruiser Southampton was so damaged that she had to be
sunk by the other British warships. The aircraft carrier Illustrious only na-
rrowly escaped a similar fate. Though crippled, she reached Malta, and the-
re, as she lay in the Grand Harbor while makeshift repairs were being ef-
fected, she was repeatedly attacked by the German dive-bombers. She sur-
vived the onslaught and was able, after a few days, to make her way to Ale-
xandria under her own power. Thence she was taken to the United States,
where the major repairs that were necessary were carried out, and she was
26/214
ready for service again in August 1941.

The German air force did not have matters all its own way. Of about 150
German aircraft based on Sicily at this time, nearly 90 were destroyed, so-
me in the air, by British fighters, by the defenses of Malta and by naval
gunfire, and some on the ground, by British bombing attack. Nevertheless,
the continued presence of a German contingent made the part of the Medi-
terranean between Tunisia and Sicily unhealthy for British convoys. They
were still able to pass through the Sicilian Channel, but only under power-
ful escort. The British fleet's own aircraft, on the other hand, enabled it a
little later to bring off a brilliant stroke in the central Mediterranean.
This occurred towards the end of March 1941, when an Italian naval force
was sighted to the east of Cape Passero in Sicily. It was pursued by British
warships, but might have escaped -- as Italian warships had done more
than once before -- if naval aircraft had not slowed up its speed by scoring
direct hits with torpedoes upon the largest of the Italian vessels, a battles-
hip of the Littorio class. Blenheim bombers of the Middle East Command
of the RAF also obtained hits. Aircraft thus played an important part in the
practical annihilation of the Italian formation which the British naval ships
thereupon carried out.
Two months later, at the end of May, the Fleet Air Arm had a similar suc-
cess. Aircraft from the carrier Victorious and Ark Royal scored hits with
torpedoes upon the fleeing Bismarck, and the second of these attacks, deli-
vered on the evening of May 26, had the effect of reducing the speed of the
German battleship and allowed the heavy ships of the Royal Navy to bring
her to battle and to sink her on the morning of May 27. The pursuit of the
Bismarck furnished evidence also of the great value of longrange flying
boats in the tracking and shadowing of elusive enemy warships. It was a
Catalina, built in California by the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation,
which found the Bismarck on the morning of May 26, and another Catali-
na which shadowed her when the first had to turn back to its base.
Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe had been accomplishing a remarkable feat of
arms in the Mediterranean. This was the capture of Crete in the teeth of
the British command of seas lying between the island and Greece. Already
in Greece the German dive-bombers had inflicted serious losses both on
the British aircraft at their bases at Larissa and elsewhere, and on the wars-
hips which evacuated the expeditionary force after the collapse of the Grae-
co-British resistance in Macedonia; two destroyers and four transports we-
re sunk as the result of air action in the evacuation. They followed up these
successes by simply blasting the British garrison off Crete. It was the con-
centrated attack from the air rather than the landing of air-borne troops
that led to the capture of the island. The parachute troops played an unim-
portant part in the whole operation; and the landing of soldiers from
troop-carrying aircraft which made crash-landings became possible only
27/214
because the dive-bombers had already done their work.

It was a very notable achievement. One must not forget, however, that it
was accomplished in circumstances in which air defense was almost non-
existent. The arrangements for protecting the aerodrome at Maleme were
far from satisfactory. An attempt was made to cope with the German bom-
bers by flying Blenheim fighters and Hurricanes, equipped with extra fuel
tanks, from Egypt. It was a makeshift arrangement and failed completely
to save the situation. The British Navy lost three cruisers and six destro-
yers in connection with the defense and evacuation of Crete. All were vic-
tims of air attack.
How vastly different the position would have been if the air attack on the
island could have been met by fighter aircraft operating from adequate lo-
cal bases is shown by the successful defense of Malta against incessant at-
tacks by both Italian and German bombers. "The brilliant defense of the is-
land by the Hurricanes" was given place of honor in the message of congra-
tulation which Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, sent to Air
Vice-Marshal H. P. Lloyd, commanding the Royal Air Force there, on Au-
gust 20, 1941. Mention was made in the same message of the fine work do-
ne by the Beaufighters in attacking enemy bases, by the Wellington bom-
bers in their "steady and deadly slogging," by the (American) Marylands in
their "daring and dexterous reconnaissances," by the Blenheims of the Ro-
yal Air Force and the Swordfishes of the Fleet Air Arm in their "tremen-
dous onslaught" on Axis shipping. "You are draining the enemy's strength
in the Mediterranean," the message said. Air Vice-Marshal Lloyd in his
reply said that "the hunting is certainly good, and hounds are in excellent
fettle."
The German raids on that other and more important island, Great Britain,
had meanwhile diminished in volume. In the early part of the year the
towns of South Wales, of Merseyside and of Clydeside were the chief suffe-
rers, while London, too, had one or two unpleasant experiences. However,
the combined casualties in January and February 1941 amounted only to
about 5,350 civilians killed and seriously injured, as compared with a
monthly average of 13,000 during the period September 1-December 31,
1940. In March there was a marked increase in the figures, which rose to
nearly 10,000, largely as the result of two heavy raids on Clydeside on suc-
cessive nights. Merseyside, Bristol, Hull, London and Plymouth also suffe-
red. The battle of the Atlantic had started and the British ports were there-
fore a main objective. The toll of life and limb rose again in April, when the
total amounted to about 13,000 -- mostly in Bristol, Coventry, Birming-
ham, Belfast, London and Plymouth (raided on five nights). May opened
with severe attacks on Merseyside and Clydeside. London had one of its
heaviest raids on the tenth. The experience gained during the incendiary
attack of the preceding December 29, when a considerable section of the
28/214
City of London was burnt out, enabled the fire-fighters to cope more ade-
quately with the attacks of April and May. The casualty list for May amoun-
ted to approximately 10,500.
June witnessed a substantial diminution in the weight of the onslaught,
and the succeeding months saw a still further reduction. This was due
mainly to the shifting of the chief theatre of air warfare from the west to
the east. Germany was preparing for the treacherous blow which she
struck at Russia on June 22. The improvement in the British defenses pro-
bably contributed, to a minor extent, to the slackening of the German at-
tack. During May, 156 German bombers were destroyed at night, and it is
fairly certain that many more, though not claimed as losses, never reached
home. In April, which was the next best month, 87 had been destroyed.
Thus the toll of the night-raiders for two months was nearly 250 aircraft.
In one night (May 10-11) the number destroyed was 33, all but two of them
by night-fighters. Two-seater twin-engined fighters had been brought into
use for defense at night, and these, with the Hurricane single-seater single-
engined fighters, soon proved their worth. One was the Defiant, which had
first been employed as a day-fighter in the operations preceding the eva-
cuation of Dunkirk at the end of May 1940, when it had destroyed 37 Ger-
man aircraft on a single day. Its signal success on that occasion was due to
the element of surprise; the German airmen had not expected to encounter
a fighter whose armament could be swivelled on the beam. Its four-gun re-
tractable turret was an innovation in fighter aircraft. Afterwards, the ab-
sence of a forward-firing gun made it a less formidable opponent for
enemy pilots who had been warned of its limitations, and it was restricted
mainly to night-fighting. The other and still more dangerous night-fighter
was the Bristol-Beaufighter, which was a modification of the Beaufort, the
torpedo-bomber used with great success against enemy shipping by the
Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force. The Beaufighter has more po-
werful engines (Hercules) than the Beaufort (Taurus), and an extremely
formidable armament, which consists of four 20 mm. shell-firing guns un-
der the fuselage and six Browning machine guns in the wing.
Another twin-engined aircraft also proved a distinct acquisition to the RAF
for defense at night. This was the American Douglas DB-7 medium bom-
ber, which, as adapted for night-fighting, was renamed the Havoc. Its spe-
cialty is the "picketing" of enemy aerodromes at night. Its long endurance
enables it to "sit over" the enemy bombers' base and to attack them when
they try to land or take off. It secured many victims in this way in the
spring of 1941 -- certainly more than the Junkers 88, used by the Germans
for a like purpose, obtained in England.
Both the night-fighter pilots and the anti-aircraft gunners were indebted to
the operators of the radiolocators for a substantial part of their successes.
Radiolocation is a means of ascertaining the presence and locality of air-
29/214
craft by utilizing the reflection of electro-magnetic waves from solids (con-

ductors or insulators) upon which the waves make impact; the great value
of the new system is that it is not dependent on emission of waves from the
body to be located. The waves go out from and return to the operator. The
necessity still remains, of course, for the pilot or the gunner on the ground
to be informed of the location of the object -- the enemy aircraft -- and
then to hit it, and that is not easy in moonless and cloudy nights.
Meanwhile the British counter-offensive had been proceeding and in June
it took on a new intensity. Daylight raids, by Blenheim and Fortress bom-
bers, were interspersed among the nightly attacks carried on by the Bom-
ber Command. The daylight sorties were shared in by the fighters of the
Royal Air Force, which accompanied the Blenheims in their raids upon ob-
jectives in the occupied countries across the English Channel and the sout-
hern waters of the North Sea, and also conducted independent sweeps over
northern France and the Low Countries. The Blenheims usually carried out
their raids at extremely low altitudes; in those directed against shipping at
Rotterdam, for instance, on July 16 and August 28, the pilots flew at roof-
top, or mast-top, level. The former of these two raids was particularly profi-
table. Seventeen ships, totalling nearly 100,000 tons, were sunk or put out
of action for a long time, and five more, totalling 40,000 to 50,000 tons,
were damaged. This was the return obtained for the cost of four Blenheims
lost.
The inauguration of the daylight offensive did not slow up the tempo of the
Bomber Command's other operational program -- the attacking of Ger-
many's industries and communications on every possible night. On the
contrary, the night-raiding increased in intensity after the invasion of Rus-
sia, the object being to compel the German High Command to retain in the
homeland fighters which might otherwise have been used in the east, as
well as to interrupt the communications essential for the reinforcement of
the German armies in Russia. The bombers used were the Wellingtons,
Hampdens and Whitleys. Hitherto these had been the instruments of the
long-range offensive of the Royal Air Force; now, with their performance
improved, they could carry both larger and more destructive loads, weight
for weight, than in 1940. To these fine bombers, all twin-engined, there we-
re added another twin-engined one, the Avro Manchester, and two four-en-
gined bombers, the Short Stirling and the Handley Page Halifax. All these
were employed in the raids of the summer and autumn of 1941. The dama-
ge which they were able to inflict upon their targets was immensely greater
than that caused in the raids of the preceding year. This was the result not
so much of the heavier weights carried as of the greater blasting power of
the heavier bombs dropped. The effect, it was officially stated, was five ti-
mes as devastating as that of the bombs of similar size previously dropped.
The new and more powerful bombs were dropped for the first time on the
30/214
night of March 31, 1941, at Emden. A pilot who had taken part in thirty
raids stated next day that he had never seen such an explosion -- it was like
"a gigantic arc-welding flash, blinding white." A little later great devasta-
tion was caused by the new bombs in Hamburg and Mannheim. At Ham-
burg a blast damaged an area of 75,000 square yards, and industrial buil-
dings covering a space of 20,000 square yards were completely demolis-
hed. At Mannheim one area of devastation covered four-and-a-half acres.
The German propaganda service, apparently to reassure the populace, sta-
ted that the British had taken to dropping land-mines because they were
short of bombs.
There was evidence in the summer that the Germans had strengthened
very considerably the anti-aircraft defenses at all their important centres.
Bomber crews reported a great increase in the numbers of searchlights and
of guns. Night-fighters were also more active and numerous. On some
nights the losses of British bombers were substantial. Weather conditions
were responsible in part for the increased casualties in one or two instan-
ces, as, for example, on the night of June 27, when twelve aircraft were
missing after a raid on Bremen and other towns in northwest Germany.
The raids of the nights of August 12 and 14 cost the Bomber Command
thirteen and twelve aircraft respectively, and that of the night of Septem-
ber 7 cost twenty aircraft, but these were all very heavy raids and the per-
centage of loss was never as high as that suffered by the Luftwaffe in some
of its raids on Britain during May (more than ten percent on some nights).
On the night of November 7 there were 37 British bombers missing after
raids which embraced Berlin, Cologne and Mannheim. This serious loss
was due mainly to the very bad weather which the raiders encountered on
their homeward flight. Again the percentage of loss, though substantial,
was not catastrophic.
The second German air fleet which, commanded by Field Marshal Kessel-
ring, had been stationed in northern France, was transferred to the eastern
theatre of war when Russia was invaded, and squadrons from Field Mars-
hal Sperrle's third air fleet appear also to have been moved to the east. At
any rate the offensive against Britain was reduced to almost negligible pro-
portions during the remainder of the year. On some nights, though the
weather was not such as to deter the raiders, none came at all, and on
many others only one or two made a fleeting appearance. For that respite
the people of Britain had to thank the gallant airmen of the Soviet Union.
Before the German attack on Russia there had been a tendency to underra-
te, one might almost say to disparage, the value of the Red Air Force. Appa-
rently that tendency was shared by the heads of the German Army and air
service. Their assertion in the early days of the fighting in the east that
Russian resistance in the air had already been shattered by the all-conque-
ring Luftwaffe reflected, one may surmise, the Higher Command's initial
31/214
conception of the Russian strength in the air rather than the stern actua-
lity. In one week of war, it was claimed, 4,107 Soviet aircraft had been des-
troyed; in eight weeks that figure had risen to 11,250; and by the beginning
of December, according to Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on December
11, 1941, to 17,323. This last figure could safely be halved to arrive at somet-
hing near the truth. It is impossible, however, to give any close estimate of
the real losses. The published figures, which were clearly exaggerated for
the purpose of propaganda, included admittedly a large proportion of air-
craft destroyed on the ground, and precise information on this point can-
not have been available to the attackers. No doubt many were so disabled;
the dive-bombers -- the Junkers 87's on one side and the Stormoviks on
the other -- put a large number of machines out of action on the landing
grounds and aerodromes. The Stormovik was one of the Soviet air force's
surprises, and another was the M.I.G.3 fighter, which took a heavy toll of
the Luftwaffe. The Hurricanes of the British Air Force contributed their
quota also. The Russians probably lost the more heavily, since their oppo-
nents had the great advantage of initiative and surprise. They still had a
formidable air force in being at the end of the year, however, and in some
areas were superior to the Germans. There is no doubt that in 1941 the
Luftwaffe received in the east a hammering at least as damaging as that to
which it had been subjected in the west in 1940. The effect of it was to be
discerned in Mr. Churchill's statement in London on November 10, 1941,
that the British Air Force was now "at least equal in size and numbers, not
to speak of quality, to the German air power."
The resistance put up by the Red Air Force was, indeed, an extraordinarily
fine performance in the circumstances. It must have suffered severely in
the first stage of the Blitzkrieg in the east; but it never cracked, and it came
back at the assailant, resilient and full of offensive capacity. The effective
defense of Moscow was proof that the Germans were far from having the
complete ascendancy in the air which they claimed; if that claim had been
true, the city would have been dealt with as mercilessly as were Warsaw,
Rotterdam and Belgrade. In Russia, as in the west and in the Balkans, the
Luftwaffe played a very important part in the successes achieved by the
German mechanized forces, but it never dominated the air in the east, and
at the end of the year Russia's air fleet was helping her armies roll the Ger-
mans back along almost all the immense battle front. It was not only shoo-
ting down German aircraft but destroying hundreds of tanks and thou-
sands of lorries as well as other equipment on the ground.
As on land, so on sea the intensity of the German attempt to smash or star-
ve Britain into surrender diminished to some extent during the summer.
The battle of the Atlantic continued, but the rate of sinking of British and
Allied shipping decreased, especially in July and August. While a variety of
causes contributed to the improvement, including the patrolling by Ameri-
32/214
can naval forces of the waters between Greenland and Iceland, the recu-
rrent visits of the Royal Air Force to certain bases of vital importance on
the German plan of blockade had an undoubted effect upon the situation.
At Brest lay two powerful warships, the Gneisenau and the Scharnhorst,
and from the end of May a third, the Prinz Eugen. Had these vessels been
free to operate they might well have turned the vital war upon maritime
commerce in Germany's favor. They were prevented from doing so by the
Royal Air Force. The repeated attacks from the air upon the berths which
they occupied and the ships themselves, while not putting them completely
out of action, rendered them unfit for service at the time when the battle of
the Atlantic was at its height. When the Scharnhorst slipped out of Brest
and took refuge at La Pallice, further south in the Bay of Biscay, she was at-
tacked there by Stirling bombers on July 23, while the Gneisenau was atta-
cked at Brest by Fortress bombers. The attacks were renewed on the same
night and on the next day and had the effect of immobilizing the two wars-
hips for a further period. Other raids on the docks at Brest, where they and
the Prinz Eugen were lying, were made at later periods. There were three
within 36 hours on December 18-19, including a daylight raid by Stirling,
Halifax and Manchester bombers, escorted by fighters. Another daylight
raid was carried out on December 30 by Halifaxes, again escorted by figh-
ters.
Raids on the bases used by the U-boats and on the yards in which they we-
re constructed or repaired was a further contribution made by the Bomber
Command to the defense of Britain's Atlantic life line. Meanwhile, that
Command and the Coastal Command, and in the autumn the Fighter Com-
mand also, were waging war with great success upon Germany's shipping
in the North Sea and the English Channel, while in the Mediterranean the
bombers of the Royal Air Force of the Middle East Command and the
torpedo carrying aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm were inflicting heavy losses
upon Italian shipping and making the reinforcement and supply of the
Axis forces in Libya increasingly difficult. The Beauforts of the Coastal
Command and the Swordfishes of the Fleet Air Arm accomplished some
particularly brilliant exploits with their torpedoes in the North Sea and the
Mediterranean respectively.
The air warfare of 1941 was conducted, it is to be noted, with machines
which were still of prewar design. The experience gained since the out-
break of hostilities was utilized to the extent that various improvements
and modifications were embodied in existing types, but the need for rapid
and large-scale construction precluded a breakaway to new lines from the
models which had been in service at the beginning of the war. Both figh-
ters and bombers were equipped with engines which had been "boosted
up," and with more formidable armament, but they were substantially the
old machines rejuvenated. It was only in 1941 that the change-over to the
33/214
production of machines of wartime design was begun in the factories; and

only in 1942 will the new models be seen in service in the squadrons. Even
the Hawker Typhoon fighter, which is a type not yet available in quantity,
was designed before the outbreak of war.
In the air fighting of 1940 the British Spitfire and Hurricane established
their claim to be the two best fighter aircraft in action. The improved ver-
sions of both these fighters again showed in 1941 that they had the whip-
hand of the (also improved) German fighters. The Heinkel 113, the diminu-
tive fighter on which, it seems, German hopes of securing ascendancy in
air combat had been placed, was apparently a disappointment. It was not
encountered in numbers, and the German fighters seen in action were al-
most wholly Messerschmitt 109's and 110's. The Me.109F, the improved
edition of the fighter so roughly handled by the pilots of the Fighter Com-
mand in 1940, differed from its predecessor mainly in having a higher cei-
ling and a greater rapidity of fire. Its armament was not, however, so for-
midable as that of the Spitfire Mark V and Hurricane Mark II, in which
again the Royal Air Force could claim to possess the two best fighters in
service. The shattering effect of the new Spitfire's cannons was to be seen
in the frequent references in the British pilots' reports to enemy fighters
blowing up or disintegrating in the air. The firepower of the new Hurricane
has been found to be no less overwhelming; it has as alternative armament
either four 20 mm. cannon or twelve machine guns, as compared with the
two 20 mm. cannon and four machine guns in each of the new Spitfires.
Hurricanes carrying two 250 pound bombs also came into use in the au-
tumn of 1941.
In 1942 the weight and range of the British air offensive will be greatly in-
creased and the losses sustained by both sides will be heavier than in the
past. They will be made good, one can confidently predict, more easily by
Britain than by Germany. The enormous production of the British and
American factories (the latter had not in 1941 nearly approached the peak
of their output), and the increasing flow of flying personnel trained under
the Empire Air Training scheme, should together result by the autumn of
1942 in the assembly in Britain and the Middle East of an air strength so
massive that Germany and Italy will not be able to muster an adequate de-
fensive force against it. The first momentous American move in the strug-
gle against totalitarian aggression -- adoption of the Lend-Lease Act in
March 1941 -- has now been followed by the next logical step, the entry of
the United States into the war as a full belligerent. With this the eventual
defeat of the three Axis Powers becomes certain even though it may still be
deferred. We know from President Roosevelt's own words that the change
of the United States to full belligerency will not cause its aid to the Allies to
flag. His message to Congress of January 6, 1942, announcing a program
of production of 60,000 aircraft in 1942 and 125,000 in 1943, was in effect
34/214
a further assurance to that end. Given the continuance of that aid, virtual
command of the air in western Europe and in the eastern Mediterranean
should have passed to Britain by the close of 1942. And in the Far East, the
powerful air arm of the United States Navy, working in partnership with
the British and Australian Air Forces, should have established an ascen-
dancy over Japan's naval and military air arms.
Creating the Operational Air War
The Lessons of World War I

During the First World War, air power came of age. Although it was not yet
a weapon that was capable of achieving decision on the battlefield, be-
tween 1914 and 1918 it became, at the very least, an important weapon
used in a variety of ways by all the major combatants. During the First
World War, the German Imperial Air Service, the Luftstreitkrafte, fash-
ioned an extensive air theory and air doctrine. Even before the start of
World War I, however, Germany had become a serious air power, and had
already laid the foundations for an air doctrine. The important weapon
that the air service had become by 1918 had already been fashioned prior
to 1914. Before 1914, the German army had established a methodology,
and laid down some basic principles that would govern the development of
German air power in a unique way. In this chapter, I will examine the foun-
dations of German air theory and doctrine from the early years through
World War I.
Pre-World War I
Prior to World War I and during most of the war, the primary missions of
the aircraft, airship, and stationary balloon were reconnaissance and artil-
lery spotting. Making reconnaissance the top priority mission of the air
arm was based on an accurate understanding of the nature of warfare and
technology of that time. The Franco-German War of 1870 had been
studied in minute detail by the French and German general staffs, as well
as by the militaries of the other major powers. One of the most notable les-
sons of the Franco-German War was the vital importance of good intelli-
gence and reconnaissance. Most of the early battles of the 1870 war—Spi-
cheren (6 August), Froschwiller (6 August), Beaumont (29-30 August)—
were unplanned battles, instances when the French and German armies
simply blundered into each other. The result was a series of bloody slug-
ging matches in which the Germans prevailed more by luck and by the mis-
takes of the French commanders than by any operational finesse. "The
fighting at Spicheren, Froschwiller, Colombey, and Vionville had come as a
surprise to the high command on both sides as an interruption and distrac-
tion to totally different plans." After the 1870 war, both the French and
35/214
German general staffs therefore placed a high priority on improving their

long-range operational reconnaissance. 2
Another lesson from the Franco-Prussian War was the significance of the
new, rapid-firing, rifled-steel, breech-loading Krupp guns. Artillery as-
sumed greater importance on the battlefield, and the longer range of the
rifled guns required more precise observation at greater distances than the
bronze muzzle-loaders that were used for most of the nineteenth century.
In the decades following the war of 1870, both the German and French ar-
mies emphasized reconnaissance in their general staff education and their
war games. Both the French and the Germans looked to fixed hydrogen
balloons as part of the solution for better reconnaissance and artillery
observation. The Franco-Prussian War was scarcely over when both sides
created committees that undertook experiments with balloons. By 1884,
the Prussian army had created its first permanent balloon unit. The French
had established their first balloon units in 1879.
The French/German rivalry and arms race prior to World War I was a
primary factor in driving the development of aviation in both countries.
2 The Luftwaffe C-in-C, with Gen Lorzer at his side, addresses officers of the
Nachtjagd at the ceremony marking Falck's award in Berlin on 7 October 1940.
The group includes pilots Falck (second from left), Groth, Makrocki, (unknown)
and Streib. Despite his widely quoted belief that the Luftwaffe would never need a
night fighter arm, Goring gave full backing to the force in its early, formative,
months I Falck)
36/214
After creating stationary observation balloon units in the 1880s and 1890s,
both countries turned their attention to powered airship flight. By July
1900, Count Zeppelin was able to fly his dirigible airship, powered by gaso-
line engines turning propellers, over the Bodensee. German officers were
on hand to observe the first flight.6 The general staff showed great interest
in the development of the powered airship. One of General Helmuth von
Moltke's first acts as new chief of the general staff in January 1906 was to
advise the inspector of the transport troops to study the use of the airship
as a weapon.7 By 1906, the Prussian war ministry was providing 550,000
reichsmarks a year for development of powered airships. From 1906 to
1910, the war ministry, navy ministry, and general staff put considerable
effort into developing airships as weapons. In 1908, the army paid
225,000 reichsmarks for one airship, the P-1. In 1909, the first real air ma-
neuvers took place, with four airships participating.
The development of the airship provided the impetus for the army and war
ministry to begin thinking about the missions and capabilities of the air
weapon. With their long range, airships were first considered for a strate-
gic reconnaissance role, but by the 1909 maneuvers the possibility of devel-
oping the airship to drop bombs on military and transportation targets was
considered. However, despite the great public enthusiasm for the Zeppelin
dirigi-
bles and other powered airships of pre-World War I Germany, the general
staff quickly lost its enthusiasm for the airship. Airships were expensive,
difficult to build and maintain, required special docking and hangar facili-
ties, and were extremely vulnerable to accidents in winds over 25 knots.
The airship's only real advantages were its range and load-carrying ca-
pacity.
In 1908, the army high command had recommended acquiring fifteen air-
ships, but the airship and army maneuvers of 1909 and 1910 showed that
the airships were unable to meet the standards set by the army. Trials in
1910 proved that the airship was extremely vulnerable to fire from howit-
zers and rapid-fire antiballoon guns. Europe's first great air show at
Rheims in 1909, moreover, dramatically changed the air power paradigm
by demonstrating the capabilities of a new invention: the airplane.
Although the German war ministry—which controlled army spending—re-
mained enthusiastic about the airship, the general staff, under the direc-
tion of von Moltke, turned its attention to the airplane as being a more
fruitful means of developing the potential of military aviation.
In January 1908, the general staff assigned Captain von der Lieth-Thom-
sen the duty of following domestic and foreign aviation development.
Lieth-Thomsen's study section was assigned to Captain Erich Ludendorff's
mobilization branch of the general staff in October 1908, and both officers
37/214
became enthusiasts for, and advocates of, the airplane. By 1912, von
Moltke was pushing the war ministry for funds and personnel for airplane
units, arguing that the French were far ahead in heavier-than-air aviation,
and were spending far more money on aviation than the Germans.
Under the pressure of the French/German arms race, the Prussian army
airplane budget grew from 36,000 reichsmarks in 1909 to 25,920,000
reichs-marks in 1914 out of a total aviation expenditure, including airships,
of 52,525,950 reichsmarks. The Bavarian army created its own air service,
and developed a Bavarian aircraft industry as well. On the other hand, the
German navy lagged behind in developing the airplane, due to its reliance
on the ;ong-range airship. Between 1911 and August 1914, only thirty-nine
airplanes seaplanes) had been acquired. By the start of World War I, army
aviation had passed out of its infancy to become a considerable force, while
naval aviation remained in the experimental stage.
By 1909, at the urging of the general staff, the war ministry decided to di-
rectly subsidize civilian aviation companies to produce airplanes. By 1910,
the army was committed to developing airplane technology through subsi-
dies to the new airplane companies, purchases of airplanes, and contract-
ing to train officers as pilots and observers. In 1910, Germany's first mili-
tary pilot training began at Doberitz, near Berlin. By 1911, an organization-
al framework had been developed, and a flight command created and
placed under the direction of the inspectorate of transport troops.
After 1910, the airplane program of the German army gained momentum.
Eight army aircraft flew in the Kaiser's maneuvers of 1911, and performed
well. The inspector of military transport, Colonel Messing, reported that
"Outstanding progress has been made in the construction of airplanes in
the last year, although the airplane is not yet a truly effective reconnais-
sance and observation machine." Henceforth, the army was committed to
the rapid development of an aviation branch.
Aviation and the German General Staff

Military aviation in Germany was very much a child of the general staff,
which spurred its development prior to World War I. The Prussian war
ministry, however, had more direct control of the aviation force—it con-
trolled the military budget, procurement of weapons, and the organization
of the army. Even though it commanded army operations in wartime, the
general staff had less control of the army in peacetime. In peacetime, the
general staff was responsible for army training and education, doctrine,
and most important, war planning. While the general staff could not order
the creation of an air force or directly procure aircraft, it did advise the war
ministry on such matters.23 The prestige of the general staff prior to World
War I was such that its advice was usually taken with a great deal of re-
spect by the war ministry.
38/214
The general staff had rightly earned its prestige. Although the modern
Prussian general staff was a product of the era of General Scharnhorst's re-
forms in the early 1800s, it was scarcely noticed until the dramatic victo-
ries of 1866 and 1870 showed that Germany's general staff system gave it a
decisive edge in war planning, and command and control. The general
staff, as developed by the most famous chief of the general staff, Count
Helmut von Moltke, was an impressive institution and a true meritocracy.
Once admitted to the general staff, an officer was transferred to a separate
branch of the army, and his career was carefully managed. Officers of this
general staff corps, identified by the carmine stripes on their uniform trou-
sers, received preference for promotion and command, and had greater op-
portunities to reach senior command positions than the average line offi-
cer.
Admittance to the general staff was earned. About ten years into their ca-
reers, officers—usually, as senior first lieutenants—could take the examina-
tion for admittance to the general staff school (Kriegsakademie). About
forty officers a year were selected and underwent an intensive course at the
Kriegsakademie in Berlin. The three-year course emphasized military
planning, war gaming, and the study of military theory and history. In the
exercises, originality was encouraged. No rigid "school solutions" were
taught, and a high standard of clear and logical thought was expected in
war games, oapers, and exercises. After a thorough professional grounding
of ten years in regimental service, the general staff students learned to
think at the operational level of war military operations at the division,
corps, and army level. The Prussian Kriegsakademie, open also to officers
of the Sachsen, Wurttemberg, and Bavarian armies, provided the most
thorough advanced military education in the world prior to World War I.
Of the approximately 29,000 officers in the German army in 1914, there
were 622 officers (2.14 percent of the active officer corps) who were mem-
bers of the General Staff Corps. One advantage of this elite group of offi-
cers was :ts size. Officers of the general staff corps knew each other well.
Intimacy bred debate and discussion, but also some tolerance for views
outside the mainstream. Erich von Ludendorff's pre-World War I views on
total war were considered extreme by most of his colleagues of the general
staff, but his undoubted brilliance as a thinker and tactician kept him in in-
fluential positions on the greater general staff, while such views would
have earned Ludendorff at least exile to provincial postings in other ar-
mies. Another advantage that accrued thanks to the prestige of the general
staff corps was that even junior captains and majors were given positions
of real responsibility, and lower-ranking members of the general staff
could be assured of a serious hearing at ihe highest levels of the army. This
fostered discussion, and the flow of accurate information to the top that
other armies of the time could not equal.
39/214
In contrast to the images of the reactionary and intellectually stagnant offi-

cer corps of the pre-World War I era, the German general staff and its
chief, General Helmut von Moltke (nephew of Generalfeldmarschall von
Moltke), took a lively interest in technological developments. Under his
tenure, the general staff assumed a leading role in developing military avia-
tion as rapidly as possible. In early 1911, von Moltke advised the war minis-
try that the nine airships assigned to the army were sufficient, and re-
quested that the requirement for fifteen airships set in 1908 be reconsid-
ered. In the meantime, the general staff would study the degree to which
airplanes could carry out reconnaissance. After some serious study, by
1912, von Moltke had come down firmly on the side of the airplane, and
made the following recommendations:
• The creation of a separate inspectorate of aviation troops, and the re-
lease of aviation from the transportation inspectorate;
• An increase in aviation organization, assigning aircraft units to corps and
developing antiaircraft guns.
While the aircraft's role remained primarily that of reconnaissance, de-
veloping the airplane as an offensive weapon was urged. In March 1912,
von Moltke questioned the inspectorate of transport on the following
points:
1. With what firing weapons should airplanes be equipped, and are there
difficulties in mounting these weapons?
2. What weights have been dropped from our planes up to this time, and
what was the degree of accuracy?
I would recommend that, by dropping bombs during flights on main and
secondary roads, the accuracy of aircraft against these targets at wartime
altitude be determined.
A month later, von Moltke recommended equipping aircraft with machine
guns, and requested a report on the Euler machine-gun mount. He also re-
quested information on the largest weights that could be dropped from air-
planes to recommend procurement of aerial bombs for the aviation force.30
By September 1912, von Moltke proposed that an aviation organization be
created by 1914, which would consist of air detachments for each army and
cavalry corps, as well as aviation detachments for border fortresses. The
aircraft units would be available for reconnaissance and artillery spotting,
and would comprise a force of 388 aircraft—not including aircraft in air
parks or replacement units. The recommended air units were, moreover, to
be highly mobile, with motor vehicles, motorized workshops, tents, spare
parts, and fuel supplied to the air units so they could operate closely with
the army. A standard air detachment would consist of eight aircraft.31 Von
Moltke noted his belief that the French were superior in aviation and pro-
posed creating a reserve force of civilian pilots who could be quickly mobi-
lized by the army in wartime. While the aircraft was still seen primarily as
40/214
a reconnaissance weapon, von Moltke concluded, "The practice and experi-

ments using the aircraft as a fighting machine, such as those being con-
ducted at Doberritz ... need to produce practical results as soon as possi-
ble."
By 1913, Ludendorff, who enjoyed flying as a passenger in airplanes and
visited aviation units at every opportunity, had revised the general staff's
plans for aviation. He proposed to the war ministry that by 1914, the army
should have 528 airplanes and by April 1916, an air service with 1,796 air-
planes. Von Moltke's and Ludendorff's interest in aviation reflected the
development, at an early date, of an enthusiasm for the airplane within the
general staff and the officer corps. The new aviation arm tended to attract
many of the army's best officers. In 1911—right after the army's first air-
craft fatalities—more than 900 line officers applied for flight training. It
took a considerable degree of courage to apply for aviation training at this
time because the fatality rate for pilots was horrendous. In 1911 three mili-
tary pilots died hi air accidents. In 1912 thirteen died and this figure in-
creased to more than thirty in 1913. Prior to the outbreak of World War I
more than seventy German army and navy personnel had been killed in
aviation accidents. This figure amounted to about a 20 percent death rate
for military aviators. Yet, the new aviation branch had no problem in re-
cruiting personnel.
Within the general staff, several officers already had experience with avia-
tion. Major Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen had served with airships,
and Major Wilhelm Siegert had paid out of pocket in 1910 to learn to fly.
Both would hold senior positions in early German aviation. In 1911, four
general staff captains, Buckrucker, von Stulpnagel, Wiirtz, and Zimmer-
man, underwent pilot training. First Lieutenant Helmuth Wilberg received
his pilot's license in 1910, after beginning the Kriegsakademie course, and
after completion in 1913, he was assigned as adjutant of the air service. Be-
tween 1910 and 1914, general staff officers Wilhelm Haehnelt, Hugo
Sperrle, and Helmuth Felmy transferred to the aviation branch. By the out-
break of the war in 1914, two to three dozen general staff officers had
undergone pilot and observer training. The small new service had suc-
ceeded in attracting a disproportionate share of the army's best talent.
The aviation forces were organized into the Prussian Fliegertruppe (Flying
Troops) in 1912, and became a separate inspectorate in October 1913, un-
der the command of Colonel Walter Eberhardt. The general staff had rec-
ommended in 1912 that each corps have its own air detachment, and by
1913 this was becoming a reality. As the force grew, several corps air de-
tachments "A'ere combined under a senior air commander—equivalent to
a battalion commander—who was responsible for training, administration,
and logistics. By 1913, four aviation battalions existed in the Prussian air
service and one in the Bavarian air arm. In March 1913, even before the
41/214
creation of the new inspectorate, the first doctrine manual for the new
force was published. Guidelines for Training the Troops about Aircraft
and Means of Resisting Aircraft described the missions of aircraft (bal-
loons, airships, and airplanes) as "strategic and tactical reconnaissance, ar-
tillery observation, transmission of orders and information, transport of
people and objects, dropping bombs, fighting aircraft." The doctrine pro-
vided descriptions of the aircraft types in common use, provided advice on
the tactics of conducting air reconnaissance, and advised ground troops on
methods of camouflage and dispersal to protect themselves against enemy
reconnaissance. The latter part of the manual provided firing tables for ma-
chine guns and artillery to shoot down aircraft. The army had been experi-
menting with specially designed antiaircraft guns for several years and
conducted its first antiaircraft exercises in 1910. The army recognized that
an antiaircraft artillery force was required, and by 1914 a small number of
motorized antiaircraft guns had been procured.
Maneuvers and other studies were important in moving the air service to a
more detailed tactical and operational doctrine. The airplane played an
important role in the 1913 army maneuvers with six air detachments with a
total of thirty-six aircraft participating. For the first time in maneuvers, the
air units conducted night flights. In early 1914, working with the experi-
ence of the maneuvers and exercises, the evaluation board for the transpor-
tation inspectorate of the army wrote a memo listing nine specific roles for
the airplane in military operations:
1. Strategic reconnaissance
2. Tactical reconnaissance
3. Artillery observation
4. Reconnaissance for cavalry divisions
5. Fighting enemy airplanes
6. Fighting ground troops
7. Destroying enemy installations
8. Liaison (carrying messages)
9. Transporting troops
The German army was moving quickly to develop specialized types of air-
craft and specialized units that could most effectively carry out each of
these missions.
In January 1914, Wilhelm Siegert wrote a memorandum to the general
staff in which he referred to the Italian use of aircraft in bombing opera-
tions in Libya in 1911-1912. He asserted that the airplane was now more
than a reconnaissance machine—it was a fighting machine. "It will not be
possible to operate without weapons. Every reconnaissance flight will re-
sult in an encounter with enemy aircraft... It is likely that an aircraft which
is capable of shooting an enemy will have the advantage ... The most suit-
able weapon is a light, air-cooled machine gun. The army which succeeds
42/214
in knocking the enemy's aerial reconnaissance system out of operation ...

will have the advantage. With these facts in mind, it is essential that air-
craft are designed which permit the use of weapons in the widest possible
sector above, below, and on both sides of the airplane."
When World War I began in August 1914, only France and Germany could
be considered serious air powers. Both nations had well developed air
arms with over 250 operational front aircraft each, and reserves of both
airplanes and pilots. After mobilization in August 1914, the German flying
forces had the following units and equipment available: thirty-three field
aviation detachments, with six aircraft each; eight fortress detachments,
with four aircraft each; eight rear depots, with three aircraft each (reserve);
twenty-four balloon detachments; twelve airship units; and eighteen
antiaircraft units. From 1909 to 1914, the German general staff—notably
its chief, General Helmuth von Moltke—showed considerable foresight and
innovation in developing an air arm. Germans entered the war with a ra-
tional organization, and a well-trained cadre of senior and junior officers
for its air arm, an aviation industry, and most important a doctrine that
was workable and effective for the era, and which foresaw the evolution of
the aircraft from the reconnaissance and artillery-spotting role to a genu-
ine combat weapon.
The Outbreak of war: The Airplane proves decisive

In the first months of World War I, the airplane proved its worth in the
reconnaissance and spotting roles. In August and September of 1914, Ger-
man aircraft units flew extensive reconnaissance over the Russian offen-
sive into East Prussia, and kept the German Eighth Army informed of Rus-
sian troop movements. The good intelligence thus provided enabled the
German Eighth Army to encircle and destroy the Russian Second Army at
the Battle of Tanaenberg. As to the worth of the aircraft, Eighth Army
Commander General von Hindenburg remarked, "Without the airplane,
there is no Tannenberg." On the western front, the aircraft proved a worthy
support weapon for the Allies, when Allied aircraft spotted the gap be-
tween the German armies before Paris, allowing the French army to coun-
terattack and drive the Germans back at the "Miracle of the Marne" in Sep-
tember 1914. Once the battle lines were stabilized in late fall 1914 and
trench warfare became the norm, the reconnaissance mission of the air-
craft became less urgent, and both sides looked for means to best employ
their aviation arms. In late fall 1914, the Germans created a special bomb-
ing unit in Ostend, Belgium, with the mission of attacking deep behind en-
emy lines. Already, at the very start of the war, both sides had carried out
limited bombing attacks against targets behind each other's lines. The new
German bombing unit, given the cover name Carrier Pigeon Detachment
Ostend, began to prepare itself for a unique mission: the Germans planned
43/214
a strategic bombing campaign against the British home isles.

In, early 1915 German army and navy airships began direct attacks on Lon-
don. These attacks continued sporadically throughout 1915. The material
effect of bombing London was actually fairly minimal: The casualties were
low, and the material damage slight. The first strategic bombing attacks
were, however, remarkable for the psychological effect they had on the
British population. There were instances of panic in London, and wide-
spread absenteeism in the munitions plants for a time.To deal with flag-
ging civilian morale, the British military began a crash program of building
up defenses for Great Britain as a reaction to the German attacks. Despite
the impressive psychological effect on its enemies, the first German strate-
gic bombing offensive can be considered a failure. Zeppelin airships, for
the reasons noted earlier, were not particularly suitable as bombing air-
craft. In the 1915-1916 campaign, German losses of Zeppelin airships—pri-
marily from operational accidents caused by weather and wind conditions
rather than by any enemy resistance—were relatively high. The Germans'
first strategic bombing offensive confirmed their general staffs' prewar dis-
like of the Zeppelin airship. Zeppelin construction was nevertheless
stepped up after the outbreak of the war, and Zeppelins were employed as
strategic bombers, because they were the only aircraft available with the
necessary range and carrying load for bombing targets at a significant
range.
In 1915 and 1916 a wide range of new aircraft models and technologies was
developed on both sides, to meet new combat needs on the western front.
The most significant innovation of the era came in 1915, with the develop-
ment of the single-seat fighter aircraft by both sides. Single-seat fighter
aircraft were primarily defensive weapons, developed for the sole purpose
of attacking other aircraft. They had limited range and firepower, but the
necessary speed and maneuverability to gain the advantage in aerial com-
bat. The fighter plane was the result of an understanding that, for aircraft
to operate in their primary roles—that is, as reconnaissance aircraft and as
bombers, air superiority must be won and maintained. Reconnaissance
and bombing aircraft needed to be protected from other enemy airplanes.
The next major step in the development of German air doctrine came in
early 1916, with the planning for the great German army offensive at Ver-
dun. At Verdun, the German army planned to use its fighter force in an air
superiority campaign, so that German artillery-spotting aircraft could
freely conduct observation flights and then assist German artillery to de-
stroy the French army. In this instance, aircraft were a support weapon,
but a very important support arm for the German army. If the German
plan was to work effectively, control of the air would have to be main-
tained, or else accurate artillery fire could not be sustained. To control the
air, the Germans placed a major proportion of their air power on the Ver-
44/214
dun front, and organized their fighters to fly a pattern of patrols along the
front lines to protect German observation craft against French fighters and
to prevent French fighters and observation planes from carrying out artil-
lery spotting against the German army. The German air campaign at Ver-
dun was the first major failure for the Luftstreitkrafte. Noting the rigid pat-
tern of German patrols, the French could wait and amass their aircraft,
and simply break the German air barrier at a time and place of their own
choosing. As the battle over Verdun continued, the Germans lost air supe-
riority over their front, which inhibited their artillery-spotting aircraft con-
siderably.
Reorganization of the German Air Force

The year 1916 saw a massive restructuring of the German aerial arm and
was a decisive period for the development of German air doctrine. In
March 1916, Lieutenant Colonel Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen, chief of
field flying forces, proposed that the German air service, including the na-
val air arm, ought to be combined, and given the status of a separate and
independent branch of the armed forces, coequal with the army and navy,
and with its own general staff and commander. The German airmen ar-
gued that air power had come of age, and had proven its importance on the
battlefield as a decisive arm of battle. The Prussian war ministry and the
general staff of the army supported the proposal to create an air force as a
separate and independent branch of the armed services and called for the
"free development of the whole arm." The debate bogged down, however,
because of strong opposition to an independent air force from the German
navy. The navy ostensibly opposed the move because naval aviation was a
specialized branch of the navy and its development would not be handled
effectively in a service dominated by land pilots,59 The navy, arguing that
such a force would be against the imperial constitution, placed sufficient
roadblocks in the way of the army and war ministry to prevent the estab-
lishment of an air force in early 1916. The navy's true opposition to an inde-
pendent air force was based on service politics: the creation of an inde-
pendent air force, as a coequal branch of the military, would require the es-
tablishment of a new ministry of defense to serve as the cover ministry for
all services. This would reduce the influence of the navy, and give the army
a greater voice on the defense councils of the empire. 3
3 Apart from the aircraft that Nachjagd painters had had time to mark up with
unit identity, US troops found hundreds of new aircraft, fresh from their delivery
flights. These 'clean' Ju 88G-6s greeted men of the 6th Armored Division as they
investigated Langensalza on 7 April 1945. The machine on the left had its Werk-
Nummer stencilled on the undercarriage leg (Craiv)
45/214
The argument for an independent air force did, however, result in a new
organization for the German air arm. In October 1916, the German air ser-
vice was granted its own commander in chief, its own general headquar-
ters, its own general staff, and effective centralized control of most aviation
assets of the German army. The principle of centralized control meant that
all aspects of aviation—from production of aircraft to the training of air-
men, to the disposition of air logistics units, to civil air defense, to army
flak units— now came under the single direction of the air service. The
Luftstreitkrafte headquarters had staff sections for operations, weather,
flak, home air defense, and medical services as well as the logistics and ad-
ministrative sections. An army air commander had a staff with communi-
cations, operations, intelligence, personnel, airfield engineers, transport,
and equipment sections. A commander of flak served under the direction
of the army commander. While the Luftstreitkrafte operated under the
command and direction of the army high command, its senior air officers
operated at the direction of the air service commander. Units attached to
an army reported to a single air commander for that army, and squadron
commanders no longer reported, or were directly subordinate to, the
army's lower echelon ground commanders. By the end of 1916, the air serv-
ice had complete control of its own weather service, communications net-
work, flak units, and the entire infrastructure necessary for a modern air
force.
46/214
The first commander in chief of the German air service was General der
Kavallerie Ernst Hoeppner. Though not an airman, Hoeppner was a highly
experienced general staff officer who had proven himself as a division
commander, and who had long been an advocate of a strong air arm. The
commander of the field flying force—that is, the commander of the Ger-
man air units serving at the front, was the experienced airman, Colonel
Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen. Chief of staff of the air service was Colo-
nel Wilhelm Siegert, an experienced airman who served brilliantly as direc-
tor of procurement and air service logistics.
With the creation of a central headquarters and an air general staff in 1916,
the Luftstreitkrafte had a mechanism by which it could effectively evaluate
and create air doctrine. In early 1917, numerous new manuals and regula-
tions appeared, including Instructions on the Mission and Utilization of
Flying Units Within an Army. The new doctrine manuals provided the air
service with clear guidelines for operational doctrine. The early doctrine of
the air service provided the air arm with a set of clear doctrinal principles
for the execution of an air campaign. These principles were essentially the
traditional principles of war of the German army, adapted to aerial condi-
tions and technologies. For example, the new air doctrine emphasized the
importance of troop leadership, and stressed that the principles of com-
mand and leadership were inherently no different in the air than they were
for the ground. As in the case of the ground forces, while realizing the
power of the defense, the experience of Verdun had taught the Luftstreitk-
rafte that a purely defensive battle could not lead to decisive results. To
gain a notable effect and keep the initiative, the air force needed to conduct
an offensive, including an air superiority battle, in which the fighter planes
would conduct sweeps and offensive operations to control the air over the
battlefield. The 1917 doctrine of the air service also stressed, as in the case
of the army ground force doctrine, the importance of using air power in
mass, and preventing the piecemeal dispersion of air units. German air
doctrine, following the army tradition, stressed the importance of main-
taining a reserve, and employing the reserve in mass at the decisive point
of the battle.
The German general staff system, the foundation for the general staff of
the new Luftstreitkrafte headquarters, gave the Germans an advantage
throughout the war, by enabling them to react quickly to technological and
operational changes on the battlefield. Although German technology was
generally equal to that of the Allies, the Luftstreitkrafte was often able to
employ its more limited resources more effectively and more decisively
than the Allies. In the Luftstreitkrafte, commanders were granted greater
authority and responsibility for the operational employment of their units
than in the Allied air arms. The air general staff officers serving with every
army on the eastern and western fronts constantly reported to the com-
47/214
mander in chief of the air service, and made recommendations for chang-
ing doctrine and technology. The status and prestige of the general staff of-
ficer in the Imperial army meant that even such relatively junior officers as
captains were granted more consideration, and were listened to more
closely, than company-grade officers in the British, French, and American
armies. The Luftstreitkrafte also made a practice of obtaining reports from
successful squadron commanders on the front. Commanders such as Ritt-
meister Baron Manfred von Richthofen, a squadron commander in 1916
and 1917 and a wing commander from 1917 until his death in 1918, pro-
vided the air service commander with numerous critical reports detailing
the state of German equipment and tactics, as well as his evaluation of Al-
lied technology and operational methodology. Von Richthofen's reports
were so highly valued that the acceptance of the Fokker D-7 fighter plane
in late 1917 was primarily due to von Richthofen's advice.
Another German air service advantage in conducting the air war in 1917
was the thorough training customarily provided for the German army. By
1916, German pilots underwent an extensive training program that in-
cluded roth short-range and long-range flying, night flying, and day and
night landings. In 1916, by the time a German pilot had his wings, he had
flown approximately sixty-five hours. That amount of training did not,
however, qualify a pilot for combat duties. New German pilots were sent to
a special training .enter at Valenciennes, in occupied France. There, the
fledgling airmen were given an intensive, one-month course in combat
techniques, taught by experienced airmen who had just completed tours of
several months flying in the front lines. The thorough training that was
provided to the German pilots gave them a distinct edge over the battle-
field. Throughout 1916 and 1917, the pilots of the Royal Flying Corps, Brit-
ain's air service, commonly entered combat with no more than seventeen
total flying hours, only a few of them solo. At this stage of the war, British
losses of pilots, flying against the more experienced German pilots, were
horrendous. During the air battles of "Bloody April" in 1917, the Royal Fly-
ing Corps lost aircraft at a more than 3:1 ratio when opposing the Luft-
streitkrafte.
Flanders Air Campaign

3erman historians writing after World War I have argued that the Luft-
nreitkra'fte had reached its highest point of combat efficiency in the air
over Flanders during the campaign from May to November 1917. In May
1917, the British army began its major offensive in Flanders, which was to
last for six months, petering out in the mud of a Belgian autumn. For both
the Allies md the Germans, Flanders can be regarded as the first truly com-
prehensive modern air campaign. The air over Flanders saw all aspects of
modern aviation incorporated: an integrated air defense air network on
48/214
the German side; interdiction bombing against enemy transport and logis-
tics targets carried rut by both the British and the Germans; air superiority
and fighter superiority campaigns conducted against enemy aircraft and
airfields; and, on the oerman side, extensive use of close air support in de-
fensive and offensive rattles.
When the British offensive began in the early summer of 1917, the Ger-
man air units under the Fourth Army in Flanders consisted of approxi-
mately 300 aircraft. The Luftstreitkrafte quickly reinforced the sector. By
the end of July 1917, 600 aircraft were operational, under the command of
Captain Helmuth Wilberg, commander of aviation forces for the Fourth
Army. At this point, by July 1917, the Germans were opposing approxi-
mately 840-plus Allied aircraft in the area with about 600 of their own.
The ratio of fighter aircraft was approximately 350 Allied fighters against
200 German fighters.
The Flanders campaign saw some distinctive innovations in aerial warfare.
The Germans formed Jagdgeschwader I (Fighter Wing 1) in June 1917. The
Luftstreitkrafte had formed a provisional wing organization in April by
putting four squadrons together as an operational unit under one com-
mander. Once the concept was proven in combat, the Luftstreitkrafte re-
acted quickly, forming other fighter wings as well as JG 1. Now, several
fighter squadrons would be formally organized as a consistent tactical and
operational unit. Rittmeister Baron Manfred von Richthofen was named as
the first commanding officer of JG 1. The fighter squadron organization
was also reorganized in the spring of 1917, and the German Jagdstaffel
now consisted of twelve aircraft and fourteen pilots. The fighter wings
would now have approximately fifty aircraft and were made highly mobile
with motorized transport and the ability to move quickly from one section
of the front to another. The appearance of such a large tactical unit over
the air in Flanders meant that it soon became common for the Air Service
to conduct aircraft sweeps of fifty aircraft, whereas before 1917, an aircraft
mission of even ten aircraft at a time was considered exceptional. The bat-
tle in the air over Flanders in 1917 proved the effectiveness of using aircraft
in mass. 4
4 Halberstadt CL II, two seat observer and ground attack plane, 1917
49/214
Another innovation of the Flanders air battle was Wilberg's organization of

the two-seater observation plane squadrons into two- and three-squadron
groups, and their employment as specialized close air support craft during
the battle. The German two-seater observation aircraft of World War I,
such as the Hannoveraner and the Halberstadt CL IV, were fast, well
armed, and rugged. Provided with a small load of hand-droppable bombs,
they became an effective weapon in providing support to German ground
forces. While ground attack missions had been conducted regularly before
1917, the air campaign in Flanders saw the first use of specialized close air
support craft employed in mass.
In early 1917, the first doctrine manual for the ground attack squadrons
was issued by the high command. The normal squadron size for the ar-
mored two-seaters was six aircraft. Three squadrons were combined to
operate as a group. The ground attack squadrons would normally come
under the operational control of an infantry division, and squadrons would
be attached to divisions based on the army and army aviation
commanders' assessment of support requirements. However, as it was
understood that the division commander would only be interested in com-
bat to his immediate front, the army aviation commander was enjoined to
keep some of the ground attack squadrons under army headquarters con-
trol as an operational reserve that could be available to attack lucrative tar-
gets found well behind the enemy's front lines. The high command placed
a great deal of hope in the new ground attack branch of the aviation forces.
The morale effect of low-level bombing and strafing attacks on enemy in-
fantry and artillery was seen as especially important—"the object of the
battle flights is to shatter the enemy's nerve by repeated attacks in close
formation."
The British approach to the same issue was very different. The Royal Fly-
ing Corps employed unmodified single-seat fighters and sent them singly
or in small flights over the front to find and attack any suitable targets they
50/214
found. The British pilots had no specialized training for the role; it was just
another duty of a fighter pilot. The German air service set up a training
program for the ground attack pilots behind the front and exercised them
in group attacks on simulated targets. The Luftstreitkrafte found the idea
of small harassment raids as wasteful of scarce airmen and aircraft. One or
two aircraft hitting random targets in the rear were unlikely to have any
real impact on troop morale. The Germans preferred to mass their forces
and wait to attack a specified target. It was believed that a large number of
aircraft attacking one target would have far greater effect than a series of
small attacks on dispersed targets. The German approach proved to be
much more effective on the battlefield. Wilberg and his Fourth Army avia-
tors massed their ground attack squadrons and then flung them at the Brit-
ish front lines and reserve positions in support of major counterattacks. A
strong German counterattack on 10/11 July was preceded by squadrons of
ground attack Halberstadts and Hannoveraner pinning down British
troops and artillery. Under cover of their aircraft, the German army made
some rapid gains and virtually destroyed two battalions of British troops.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Flanders air campaign was the
antiair campaign conducted by the Luftstreitkrafte. During the summer
and fall of 1917, German heavy bombers carried out a series of raids
against British and French airfields and air depots supporting the Allied of-
fensive in Flanders. The German bombers attacked by night and dropped
parachute flares to illuminate their targets. The airfield raids turned out to
be surprisingly successful. On one raid the night of 6/7 July against the
British airfield at Bray Dunes, the Luftstreitkrafte damaged twelve British
aircraft. The German bombers struck the British airfield and depot at St.
Pol on the night of 24 September and caused heavy damage to the base.
One hundred forty aircraft engines were destroyed by a German bomber
hit on a hanger. On the night of 1/2 October, the German night bombers re-
turned to St. Pol and destroyed twenty-nine British aircraft and seven
French aircraft, and caused heavy damage to hangers and the depot. In
several attacks, the Luftstreitkrafte was able to destroy a considerable
number of Allied aircraft on the ground with negligible losses, mostly land-
ing accidents, to their own forces.
An important feature of the 1917 air battles was a major interdiction cam-
paign conducted by both sides against targets in their enemy's rear. The
British bombers concentrated on bombing German rail yards, and the
Germans hit French rail yards supporting the British army and made nu-
merous night attacks on the ports that supplied the British Expeditionary
Force i BEF)—especially Calais and Dunkirk. Both sides hoped to interrupt
the logistics flow to the other. Neither the British nor the Germans were
able to seriously disrupt their opponent's supply lines, but serious damage
was indicted and the bombing was a major inconvenience. In June and Ju-
51/214
ly 1917, the German First and Fourth Bomber Wings were assigned to sup-
port the Fourth Army's campaign in Flanders, and they quickly mounted a
program of night raids on the enemy Channel ports. Throughout August
the British munitions dumps at Dunkirk were attacked with severe dam-
age. The attacks on rail yards and ports were almost a nightly occurrence
and, after a particularly devastating attack on Dunkirk on 3 October, it
took four days to put out the fires. Just as fighter aces were being made
heroes, some bomber commanders were gaining renown. Captain Alfred
Keller, commander of Bomber Wing 1 and a specialist in night bombing,
was awarded the Pour le Merite by the Kaiser after his unit dropped
100,000 kilograms of bombs on Dunkirk. On the whole, the German
bombers on the Flanders front dropped 300,000 kilograms of bombs on
the British during the 1917 campaign.
The 1917 campaign in Flanders saw several other important innovations m
air warfare. The Luftstreitkrafte was ahead of the Allied powers in applying
radio technology to the air war. By early 1917, the Germans had radios
small and rugged enough so that they could be mounted in two-seater
observation planes used for artillery spotting. The Luftstreitkrafte saw the
potential that immediate communication between the aerial spotters and
the artillery could have for combat efficiency and quickly developed a for-
mal system of radio nets and simple codes for the aircraft observers. The
aircraft radios of the time used Morse code, and a two- or three-letter mes-
sage to the battery would tell the artillerymen the target location and help
adjust fire. Some radios were also mounted in the ground attack aircraft,
and Captain Wilberg used the radio to direct his ground attack squadrons
at the height of the battle. The German Schutzstaffel were able to react
quickly, and the employment of his ground attack squadrons at Messines
Ridge on 6-14 June, helped slow and control the British offensive.93 Wil-
berg also used his artillery observation aircraft to support the ground bat-
tle by dropping ammunition, food, and medical supplies on forward Ger-
man infantry units that were hard-pressed by British attacks and unable to
get ammunition forward. Captain Wilberg gained a reputation as the Luft-
streitkrafte's premier expert on ground attack aviation. General Freiherr
von Billow described Wilberg as "having the deepest understanding of the
employment of the aircraft in the ground battle." The German army and
air service came out of the Flanders campaign deeply impressed with the
value of ground attack aviation. The tactics that the Germans had devel-
oped for their ground attack squadrons and groups in Flanders were sum-
marized in a detailed manual that was published by the Luftstreitkrafte
staff circulated to the air units in September 1917.
Messerschmitt Me 262
Thanks mainly to its Bf110G-4 night fighter, developed out of the original
52/214
Zerstorer, the south-German company already had vast experience in the

production and building of such specialised aircraft. At the same time the
inherent inadequacies of the Bf 110 meant that Messerschmitt had to con-
tend at first hand with all the problems and the ever rising demands of the
night fighter war.
The attempt to use the Bf110's successor, the Me 410 Hornisse (Hornet), in
the night fighting role foundered on the latter's unsatisfactory perform-
ance; only a few examples of the type being employed on long range night
fighter operations.
The Augsburg team had considered a night fighter version of the Me 262
as early as 1943 but expensive trials to develop and perfect an audio search
system came to nothing. In May 1943, as part of his effort to create a true
multipurpose aircraft, Messerschmitt himself had put a proposal before
the RLM outlining the P.1092E (P - Projekt, project), a specialised jet-pow-
ered night fighter based upon the Me 262. In this he was unsuccessful.
Recognising the urgency of the situation, Messerschmitt did not let it rest
there. In February 1944 his project bureau came up with the P. 1099, an
Me 262 with an enlarged fuselage. As well as heavy fighter and Zerstorer
variants, they proposed a night fighter model which would have more than
double the fuel capacity of the Me 262. But this too was to remain just a
project. It was not until six months later that Berlin finally began to apply
the sort of pressure that had long been called for.
As already described, Messerschmitt - like Arado and Dornier - intended to
create his short range night fighter in two stages.
Stage 1: Production of the Me262B-1a/U1 auxiliary night fighter, an air-
craft which was to see operational service in limited numbers with 10/NJG
11 mainly in the Berlin area during the closing weeks of the war. Oberleut-
nant Kurt Welter, the Kommandeur of this unit, had already demonstrated
almost single-handedly that even a minimally modified Me262A-la could
be turned into a useful night fighter. In December 1944 Welter had
started to fly the day fighter version on Wilde Sau (Wild Boar) sorties
(Short range night fighter missions devoid of any radar aids and relying
solely on visual target contact in collaboration with ground searchlights.)
He achieved considerable success; his victims including several Mosquitos.
The conversion of the Me262B-la two-seat trainer into an auxiliary night
fighter was carried out by the Lufthansa facility at Berlin-Staaken, whose
engineers were soon offering their own suggestions on how best to adapt
the aircraft to take the then latest in electronic equipment.
Stage 2: Designing and building the 'definitive' Me262B-2 night fighter.
Externally this differed from its predecessor in its lengthened fuselage, re-
designed centre section and aerodynamically refined cockpit canopy. In
terms of performance it possessed, above all, an increased range and incor-
porated the option of fitting oblique upward-firing Schragc Musik arma-
53/214
ment.
Even while the first prototype was under construction, this aircraft too
underwent further development; its performance being up graded by the
installation of two Hi\S 011 turbojets and 'Bremen 0' radar.
The Messerschmitt Me 262 Schwalbe (English: "Swallow"5) was the
world's first operational jet-powered fighter aircraft.6 Design work started
before World War II began, but engine problems prevented the aircraft
from attaining operational status with the Luftwaffe until mid-1944. Com-
pared with Allied fighters of its day, including the British jet-powered7
Gloster Meteor, it was much faster and better armed. One of the most ad-
vanced aviation designs in operational use during World War II, the Me
262 was used in a variety of roles, including light bomber, reconnaissance
and even experimental night fighter 8 versions.
Me 262 pilots claimed a total of 542 Allied kills (although higher claims are
5 The swallows and martins are a group of passerine birds in the family Hirundini-
dae which are characterised by their adaptation to aerial feeding. Swallow is used
colloquially in Europe as a synonym for the Barn Swallow.
6 Hecht, Heinrich. The World's First Turbojet Fighter – Messerschmitt Me 262.
Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing, 1990.

7 A jet aircraft (or simply jet) is an aircraft (nearly always a fixed-wing aircraft)
propelled by jet engines. Jet aircraft generally fly much faster than propeller-po-
wered aircraft and at higher altitudes – as high as 10,000–15,000 metres
(33,000–49,000 ft). At these altitudes, jet engines achieve maximum efficiency
over long distances. The engines in propeller-powered aircraft achieve their maxi-
mum efficiency at much lower altitudes. Some jet aircraft can move faster than
sound. Frank Whittle, an English inventor and RAF officer, developed the con-
cept of the jet engine in 1928, Hans von Ohain in Germany, a decade later develo-
ped the concept independently at the end of the 1930s. He wrote in February
1936 to Ernst Heinkel, telling him of the design and its possibilities. However, it
can be argued that the English engineer A. A. Griffith, who published a paper in
July 1926 on compressors and turbines, also deserves credit.
8 A night fighter (also known as all-weather fighter or all-weather interceptor for a
period of time post-World War II) is a fighter aircraft adapted for use at night or
in other times of bad visibility. Night fighters began to be used in World War I
and included types that were specifically modified to operate at night. During
World War II, night fighters were either purpose-built or "day" fighters modified
to be effective night fighting combat aircraft, often employing radar or other
systems for providing some sort of detection capability in low visibility. As the si-
ze of these systems fell in relation to the size of the average fighter, the need for a
separate aircraft to fill this role generally disappeared. In the immediate post-
World War II era, night fighters were redesignated as "all-weather" combat air-
craft. Modern multirole fighters are capable of filling the night fighter role with
no modifications.
54/214
sometimes made).9 The Allies countered its potential effectiveness in the

air by attacking the aircraft on the ground and while taking off or landing.
Engine reliability problems and attacks by Allied forces on fuel supplies
during the deteriorating late-war situation also reduced the effectiveness
of the aircraft as a fighting force. In the end, the Me 262 had a negligible
impact on the course of the war as a result of its late introduction and the
consequently small numbers that were deployed in operational service.
The Me 262 influenced the designs of post-war aircraft such as the North
American F-86 Sabre and Boeing B-47 Stratojet 10
Fig 1 The Me 262 V3 lands after its first flight at Leipheim on 18 July 1942
Origins
Several years before World War II, the Germans foresaw the great poten-
tial for aircraft that used the jet engine, constructed by Hans Joachim
9 According to Morgan and Weal, estimates that jet fighters of all types produced
745 victories
10 The Me 262 V3 lands after its first flight at Leipheim on 18 July 1942. The
smoke was caused by unburned fuel igniting in the jet pipes as it dripped out on-
to the runway. This was the first flight of the Me 262 using turbojet power
alone, the first prototype having also had a nose-mounted piston engine.
55/214
Pabst von Ohain11 in 1936. After the successful test flights of the first jet of
the world, the Heinkel He 178, they adopted the jet engine for an advanced
fighter aircraft. As a result, the Me 262 was already under development as
Projekt 1065 (P.1065) before the start of World War II.
Plans were first drawn up in April 1939, and the original design was very
similar to the aircraft that eventually entered service. The progression of
the original design was delayed greatly by technical issues involving the
new jet engine. Funding for the jet engine program was also initially la-
cking as many high-ranking officials thought the war could easily be won
11Hans Joachim Pabst von Ohain (14 December 1911 – 13 March 1998) was a Ger-
man engineer, and designer of the first operational jet engine. His first design ran
in March 1937, and it was one of his engines that powered the first all-jet aircraft,
the prototype of the Heinkel He 178 in late August 1939. In spite of these early
successes, other German designs quickly eclipsed von Ohain's, and none of his en-
gine designs entered widespread production or operational use. Von Ohain inde-
pendently developed the first jet engine during the same period that Frank Whit-
tle was doing the same in the UK, and the two projects were often within weeks of
meeting the same milestones. von Ohain's Heinkel HeS 1 ran only weeks before
Whittle's WU, but did not run on its own power until six months later. von
Ohain's design flew first in 1939, followed by Whittle's in 1941. Operational jet air-
craft from both countries entered use only weeks apart. After the war the two men
met, and became friends.
56/214
with conventional aircraft. Among those were Hermann Göring 12, head of
the Luftwaffe, who cut the engine development program to just 35 engi-
neers in February 1940; Willy Messerschmitt,13 who desired to maintain
mass production of the piston-powered Bf 109 and the projected Me 209;
and Major General Adolf Galland,14 who supported Messerschmitt through
the early development years, flying the Me 262 himself on 22 April 1943.
By that time, problems with engine development had slowed production of
12 Hermann Wilhelm Göring (12 January 1893 – 15 October 1946), was a German
politician, military leader, and leading member of the Nazi Party (NSDAP). A ve-
teran of World War I as an ace fighter pilot, he was a recipient of the coveted
Pour le Mérite, also known as the "Blue Max". He was the last commander of
Jagdgeschwader 1, the fighter wing once led by Manfred von Richthofen, the
"Red Baron". A member of the NSDAP from its early days, Göring was wounded
in 1923 during the failed coup known as the Beer Hall Putsch. He became perma-
nently addicted to morphine after being treated with the drug for his injuries. He
founded the Gestapo in 1933. Göring was appointed commander-in-chief of the
Luftwaffe (air force) in 1935, a position he held until the final days of World War
II. By 1940 he was at the peak of his power and influence; as minister in charge of
the Four Year Plan, he was responsible for much of the functioning of the German
economy in the build-up to World War II. Adolf Hitler promoted him to the rank
of Reichsmarschall, a rank senior to all other Wehrmacht commanders, and in
1941 Hitler designated him as his successor and deputy in all his offices. Göring's
standing with Hitler was greatly reduced by 1942, with the Luftwaffe unable to
fulfill its commitments and the German war effort stumbling on both fronts.
Göring largely withdrew from the military and political scene and focused on the
acquisition of property and artwork, much of which was confiscated from Jewish
victims of the Holocaust. Informed on 22 April 1945 that Hitler intended to com-
mit suicide, Göring sent a telegram to Hitler asking to assume control of the
Reich. Hitler then removed Göring from all his positions, expelled him from the
party, and ordered his arrest. After World War II, Göring was convicted of war
crimes and crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg Trials. He was sentenced
to death by hanging, but committed suicide by ingesting cyanide the night before
the sentence was to be carried out.
13 Wilhelm Emil "Willy" Messerschmitt (June 26, 1898 – September 15, 1978) was
a German aircraft designer and manufacturer. He was born in Frankfurt am

Main, the son of Baptist Ferdinand Messerschmitt (1858–1916) and his second
wife, Anna Maria née Schaller (1867–1942). Probably Messerschmitt's single
most important design was the Messerschmitt Bf 109, designed in 1934 with the
collaboration of Walter Rethel. The Bf 109 became the most important fighter in
the Luftwaffe as Germany re-armed prior to World War II. To this day, it remains
the most-produced fighter in history, with some 35,000 built. Another Messersch-
mitt aircraft, first called "Bf 109R", purpose-built for record setting, but later re-
designated Messerschmitt Me 209, broke the absolute world air-speed record and
held the world speed record for propeller-driven aircraft until 1969. His firm also
produced the first jet-powered fighter to enter service — the Messerschmitt Me
262, although Messerschmitt himself did not design it.
57/214
the aircraft considerably. One particularly acute problem arose with the
lack of an alloy with a melting point high enough to endure the high tempe-
ratures involved, a problem that by the end of the war had not been ade-
quately resolved.
The project aerodynamicist on the design of the Me 262 was Ludwig
Bölkow15. He initially designed the wing using NACA airfoils modified with
an elliptical nose section. Later in the design process, these were changed
to AVL derivatives of NACA airfoils, the NACA 00011-0.825-35 being used
at the root and the NACA 00009-1.1-40 at the tip. The elliptical nose deri-
vatives of the NACA airfoils were used on the horizontal and vertical tail
14 Adolf "Dolfo" Joseph Ferdinand Galland (19 March 1912 – 9 February 1996)
was a German Luftwaffe General and flying ace who served throughout World
War II in Europe. He flew 705 combat missions, and fought on the Western front
and in Defence of the Reich. On four occasions he survived being shot down, and
he was credited with 104 aerial victories, all of them against the Western Allies.
Galland, born in Westerholt (now Herten), Westphalia was a glider pilot in his
youth, joined the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic later in 1932. In 1937, du-
ring the Spanish Civil War, he volunteered for the Condor Legion and flew ground
attack missions in support of the Nationalists under Francisco Franco. After finis-
hing his tour Galland was employed writing doctrinal and technical manuals
about his experience and served as an instructor for ground-attack units. At the
outbreak of World War II he again flew ground attack missions before he persua-
ded his superiors to allow him to become a fighter pilot. Galland flew in the Battle
of France and the Battle of Britain fighting the Royal Air Force (RAF) over the En-
glish Channel and Northern France. By November 1941 his number of aerial victo-
ries claimed stood at 96, which earned him the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross
with Oak Leaves and Swords. In November 1941 he replaced Werner Mölders,
who was killed in a flying accident, as Germany's commander of the Fighter Force
(General der Jagdflieger), staying in this position until January 1945 when he
was relieved of his command because of his constant criticism of the Luftwaffe se-
nior leadership, climaxing in the Fighter Pilots Conspiracy. As General der Jagd-
flieger Galland was forbidden to fly combat missions. For commanding Jagd-
geschwader 26 (JG 26—26th Fighter Wing) with distinction, he earned the cove-
ted Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds.
15 Ludwig Bölkow (June 30, 1912 – July 25, 2003) was one of the aeronautical pio-
neers of Germany.Born in Schwerin, in north-eastern Germany, in 1912, Bölkow

was the son of a foreman employed by Fokker, one of the leading aircraft cons-
tructors of that time. Bölkow’s first job was with Heinkel, the aircraft company,
before studying aero-engineering at the Technical University in Berlin. On gra-
duation, in 1939, he joined the project office of Messerschmitt AG in Augsburg,
where he served initially as a clerk, later as a group leader for high-speed aero-
dynamics, especially for the Messerschmitt Me 262 and its successors. In January
1943, he was appointed head of the Messerschmitt Me109 development office in
Vienna. A year later, Bölkow returned to the Messerschmitt project office, which
had meanwhile moved to Oberammergau. There he set up a program for the deve-
lopment of the Messerschmitt MeP1101 jet fighter.
58/214
surfaces. Wings were of single-spar cantilever construction, with stressed

skins, varying from 3 mm (0.12 in) thick at the root to 1 mm (0.039 in) at
the tip. As a conservation measure, late in the war, wing interiors would
not be painted. The wings were fastened to the fuselage at four points,
using a pair of 20 mm (0.79 in) and 42 8 mm (0.31 in) bolts. 16
Fig 2 Me 262 V3 was the first prototype to fly on turbojet power alone
In mid-1943, Adolf Hitler envisioned the Me 262 as an offensive ground-
attack/bomber rather than a defensive interceptor. The configuration of a
high-speed, light-payload Schnellbomber ("fast bomber") was intended to
penetrate enemy airspace during the expected Allied invasion of France.
His edict resulted in the development of (and concentration on) the Sturm-
vogel variant. It is debatable to what extent Hitler's interference extended
the delay in bringing the Schwalbe into operation. Albert Speer, then Mi-
nister of Armaments and War Production, claimed in his memoirs that Hi-
tler originally had blocked mass production of the Me 262 before agreeing
in early 1944. He rejected arguments that the aircraft would be more effec-
tive as a fighter against the Allied bombers that were destroying large parts
of Germany, and wanted it as a bomber for revenge attacks. According to
Speer, Hitler felt its superior speed compared to other fighters of the era
meant it could not be attacked, and so preferred it for high altitude straight
flying.
16Me 262 V3 was the first prototype to fly on turbojet power alone, the date being
18 July 1942 and was transfered to the German Aviation Experimental Estableshi-
ment (DVL) in April 1944 for high speed flight testing.
59/214
Although the Me 262 is often referred to as a "swept wing"17 design, the

production Me 262 had a leading edge sweep of only 18.5°, too slight to
achieve any significant advantage in increasing the critical Mach number.
Sweep was added after the initial design of the aircraft, when the engines
proved to be heavier than originally expected, primarily to position the
center of lift properly relative to the center of mass. On 1 March 1940, ins-
tead of moving the wing backward on its mount, the outer wing was reposi-
tioned slightly aft; the trailing edge of the midsection of the wing remained
unswept. Based on data from the AVA Göttingen and wind tunnel results,
the middle section's leading edge was later swept to the same angle as the
outer panels.
Test flights
The first test flights began on 18 April 1941, with the Me 262 V1 example,
bearing its Stammkennzeichen radio code letters of PC+UA, but since its
intended BMW 003 turbojets were not ready for fitting, a conventional
Junkers Jumo 210 engine was mounted in the V1 prototype's nose, driving
a propeller, to test the Me 262 V1 airframe. When the BMW 003 engines
were installed, the Jumo was retained for safety, which proved wise as
both 003s failed during the first flight and the pilot had to land using the
nose-mounted engine alone.
The V3 third prototype airframe, with the code PC+UC, became a true jet
when it flew on 18 July 1942 in Leipheim near Günzburg, Germany, pilo-
ted by Fritz Wendel. This was almost nine months ahead of the British
17A swept wing is a wing planform favored for high subsonic and supersonic jet
speeds, and was first investigated in Germany from 1935 onwards until the end of
the Second World War. Since the introduction of the MiG-15 and North American
F-86 which demonstrated a decisive superiority over the slower first generation of
straight-wing jet fighters during the Korean War, swept wings have become al-
most universal on all but the slowest jets (such as the A-10). Compared with
straight wings common to propeller-powered aircraft, they have a "swept" wing
root to wingtip direction angled beyond (usually aftward) the spanwise axis. This
has the effect of delaying the drag rise caused by fluid compressibility near the
speed of sound as swept wing fighters such as the F-86 were among the first to be
able to exceed the speed of sound in a slight dive, and later in level flight. The
term "swept wing" is normally used to mean "swept back", but other swept va-
riants include forward sweep, variable sweep wings and pivoting wings. Swept
wings as a means of reducing wave drag were first used on jet fighter aircraft, alt-
hough many propeller-driven aircraft now also use the wing plan. The angle of
sweep which characterizes a swept wing is conventionally measured along the
25% chord line. If the 25% chord line varies in sweep angle, the leading edge is
used; if that varies, the sweep is expressed in sections (e.g., 25 degrees from 0 to
50% span, 15 degrees from 50% to wingtip). Angle of sweep equals 1/2[180 deg -
(nose angle)].
60/214
Gloster Meteor's first flight on 5 March 1943. The conventional gear — pro-
ducing a pronounced tail-down attitude on the ground — of the Me 262 V3
caused its jet exhaust to deflect off the runway, with the wing's turbulence
negating the effects of the elevators, and the first takeoff attempt was cut
short.
On the second attempt, Wendel solved the problem by tapping the air-
craft's brakes at takeoff speed, lifting the horizontal tail out of the wing's
turbulence. The first four prototypes (V1-V4) were built with this configu-
ration. Changing to a tricycle arrangement (initially a fixed undercarriage
on the fifth prototype (V5), with fully retractable on V6 (with Stammkenn-
zeichen code VI+AA) and subsequent aircraft) corrected this problem.
Test flights continued over the next year, but engine problems continued
to plague the project, the Jumo 004 being only marginally more reliable
than the BMW 003. Airframe modifications were complete by 1942 but,
hampered by the lack of engines, serial production did not begin until
1944, and deliveries were low, with 28 Me 262s in June, 59 in July, but
only 20 in August. This delay in engine availability was in part due to the
shortage of strategic materials, especially metals and alloys able to handle
the extreme temperatures produced by the jet engine.
Even when the engines were completed, they had an expected operational
lifetime of approximately 50 continuous flight hours; most 004s lasted just
12 hours, even with adequate maintenance. A pilot familiar with the Me
262 and its engines could expect approximately 20–25 hours of life from
the 004s. Changing a 004 engine was intended to require three hours, but
this typically took eight to nine due to poorly made parts and inadequate
training of ground crews. With one engine out, the Me 262 still flew well,
with speeds of 450–500 km/h (280–310 mph; 240–270 kn), but pilots we-
re warned never to fly slower than 300 km/h (190 mph; 160 kn) on one en-
gine, as the asymmetrical thrust would cause serious handling problems.
Due to their low compression ratios, early turbojet engines developed less
thrust at low speed than contemporary propeller powered aircraft, and as a
result, low-speed acceleration was relatively poor. This was particularly no-
ticeable in the Me 262, since early jet engines (before the invention of af-
terburners) also responded slowly to throttle changes. The introduction of
61/214
a primitive autothrottle 18 late in the war helped only slightly. Conversely,

the superior power of jet engines at higher speeds meant the Me 262 enjo-
yed a much greater rate of climb. Used tactically, this gave the jet fighter
an even larger speed advantage in climb than in level flight at top speed.
Operationally, carrying 2,000 lts(440 imp gal; 530 US gal) of fuel in two
900 lts (200 imp gal; 240 US gal) tanks, one each fore and aft the cockpit,
and a 200 l (44 imp gal; 53 US gal) tank beneath, 19 the Me 262 would have
a total flight endurance of 60 to 90 minutes. Fuel was usually brown coal-
derived J2, with the option of diesel oil or a mixture of oil and high octane
B4 aviation petrol. Consumption was double the rates experienced upon
typical twin-engine fighter aircraft of the era; as such, this led to the insta-
llation of a low-fuel warning indicator in the cockpit to notify pilots when
the remaining fuel fell below 250 l (55 imp gal; 66 US gal).
Unit cost for an Me 262 airframe, less engines, armament, and electronics,
was RM20 87.400. 21 To build one airframe took around 6.400 man-hours.
Early development
Heinkel had already turned to twin engines with the development of the
promising He 280 series powered by the six-stage axial-flow BMW P 3302
engines, and Germany's first definitive jet fighter, the Heinkel He 280 V2
18 An autothrottle (automatic throttle) allows a pilot to control the power setting
of an aircraft's engines by specifying a desired flight characteristic, rather than
manually controlling fuel flow. These systems can conserve fuel and extend engi-
ne life by metering the precise amount of fuel required to attain a specific target
indicated air speed, or the assigned power for different phases of flight. A/T and
AFDS (Auto Flight Director System) work together to fulfill the whole flight plan
and greatly reduce pilots' work load. There are two parameters that an A/T (auto-
throttle) can maintain, or try to attain: Speed and Thrust. In Speed mode the
throttle is positioned to attain a set target speed. This mode controls aircraft
speed within safe operating margins. For example, if the pilot selects a target
speed which is slower than stall speed, or a speed faster than maximum speed,
the autothrottle system will maintain a speed closest to the target speed that is
within the range of safe speeds. In Thrust mode the engine is maintained at a fi-
xed power setting according to the different flight phases. For example, during
Takeoff, A/T maintains a constant Takeoff power until Takeoff mode is finished.
During Climb, A/T maintains a constant climb power; in Descent, A/T retards the
throttle to IDLE position, and so on. When A/T is working in Thrust mode, speed
is controlled by pitch (or the control column), and NOT protected by A/T. A Ra-
dar Altimeter feeds data to the autothrottle mostly in this mode.
19 According to Stapfer, the smaller fuel tank had a capacity of up to 237.75 ga-
llons
20 The Reichsmark ((literally in English: Reich's mark) was the currency in Ger-
many from 1924 until June 20, 1948. The Reichsmark was subdivided into 100
Reichspfennig.
21 By comparison, a new Volkswagen Type 1 was priced at RM990
62/214
prototype, lifted off from Rostock-Marienehe's runway at 15.18 on 30

March 1941 with Fritz Schafer at the controls. (Within six weeks of this
maiden flight, the UK, too, flew its first jet aircraft: powered by a Whittle-
designed W1X centrifugal-type turbojet of 3.82-kN (860-lb) thrust, the
Gloster E.28/39 took to the air on 15 May.) At Augsburg, -work had pro-
ceeded slowly on the design of what at first bore none of the hallmarks that
graced the Heinkel product, or gave any hint of the fineness of line that
was a characteristic of Messerschmitt's piston-engined fighters. The design
was termed the Messerschmitt P 1065 VI and, in the absence of its twinjet
engines, was fitted with a 545-kW (730-hp) Junkers Jurno 210G driving a
two-bladed propeller. This ugly duckling was then renamed the Messersch-
mitt Me 262 VI, and -was taken into the air for the first time on 18 April
1941. Test pilots Karl Baur and Fritz Wendel reported no vices on subse-
quent flight programmes.
No urgency was attached to the flight development of the Me 262 VI dur-
ing that summer, for little priority had been assigned. Of far greater import
for the Messerschmitt concern were the improvements to the Bf 109 and Bf
110 combat types, and the development of their replacements. The engines
for the Me 262 VI eventually arrived from Spandau in mid-November
1941, being BMW 003s each of 5.39 kN (1,213 lb) static thrust. On his first
flight with the BMW 003s, Wendel suffered a double flame-out shortly
after take-off and was forced to put PC+UA down with some damage.
Fortunately, an alternative to the touchy BMWs -was available. This •was
the Junkers Jumo 004 which had been developed by Dr Anselm Franz's
team since its award of a contract in July 1939 for a development specifica-
tion. In their adherence to axial compressors, German engine designers
showed much courage and foresight. This type of compressor was difficult
to construct and balance, and was susceptible to vibration and could be
damaged far more easily than the tough centrifugal type of compressor. It
became apparent that the acceleration rates, fuel efficiency, power output,
and drag coefficients of axial-flow turbojets far exceeded the figures pro-
duced by the tougher, and sometimes more reliable, centrifugal types. By
August 1941, the Jumo 004 was giving 5.88 kN (1,323 Ib) static thrust, and
many of the earlier problems had been cured. Jumo 004s were installed on
the Messerschmitt Me 262 V3 (PC+UC), and this aircraft, bereft of the pis-
ton engine and still with tailwheel landing gear, left Leipheim's runway on
the morning of 18 July 1942 in Wendel's experienced hands. It looked cor-
rect in everyway, and it flew beautifully, and henceforth the fortunes of the
Messerschmitt Me 262 were to rise at the expense of its nearest rival, the
Heinkel He 280, which suffered a series of setbacks until its eventual can-
cellation in March 1943.
63/214
In the Luftwaffe's interest

Service test pilots of the Erprobungsstelle (test establishment) at Rechlin
showed interest in the Me 262 from its earliest days. It was largely at their
instigation that Messerschmitt received contracts to produce a number of
prototypes for weapons and engine tests. The experienced Major Wolfgang
Spate 22 had already reported his enthusiastic findings when the General
der Jagdflieger,23 Adolf Galland, flew the Me 262 V4 on 22 May 1943 and
become unequivocal in his constant praise for this revolutionary aircraft.
At a conference in Berlin on 25 May, it was suggested that the piston-en-
gined Messerschmitt Me 209A be cancelled and that all efforts be directed
22 Major Wolfgang Späte (1911-1997) was a German World War II Luftwaffe flying
ace. He was also a recipient of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Lea-
ves (German: Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub). The Knight's
Cross of the Iron Cross and its higher grade Oak Leaves was awarded to recognize
extreme battlefield bravery or successful military leadership - for the fighter pi-
lots, it was a quantifiable measure of skill and combat success. He is attributed by
some, for an early, 1938 version of the speed to fly theory, usually attributed to
Paul MacCready. Already a talented glider pilot before the war, he went on to be-
come of the Luftwaffe's foremost test pilots. He was born on 8 September 1911 in
Podersam. Before World War II Späte was a well-known and award-winning gli-
der pilot and a student of the TH Darmstadt. In 1939 he was a Leutnant in the
army, and then for the first year of the war flew as a reconnaissance pilot. Howe-
ver, by the start of 1941, as an Oberleutnant, he had converted onto fighters and
was serving with 5./JG 54 - the 5th Staffel (squadron) of Jagdgeschwader 54
(54th Fighter Wing). Sent along with JG 54 to cover the German invasion of the
Balkans and Greece, he scored his first victory (a Yugoslav Bristol Blenheim, near
Pecs in Hungary) on 7 April 1941. Returning to the eastern frontier for Operation
Barbarossa, he shot down two SB-2 bombers on 23rd June, the second day of the
invasion. Victories came regularly, and he was awarded the Ehrenpokal, for 25
victories, on 9 August. Soon after, on 10 September, he was promoted to Staffel-
kapitän of 5./JG 54. Then on 5 October, he became the 10th member of JG 54 to
be awarded the Ritterkreuz (Knight's Cross), after reaching 45 victories. His unit
withdrew to the Reich at the end of the year for rest and refit, and Späte was pro-
moted to Hauptmann on 1 January 1942. Success continued upon returning to
the north of the Eastern Front as the Soviets desperately tried to raise the siege of
Leningrad. This culminated with the award of the Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross
on 23 April 1942 when he had 72 victories. However, with the award, he was orde-
red back to the Reich to set up a top-secret unit: Erprobungskommando 16, EKdo
16 - to test-fly the revolutionary new rocket-fighter, the Messerschmitt Me 163
"Komet".
23 Inspector of Fighters (German language: Inspekteur der Jagdflieger redesigna-
ted to General der Jagdflieger (General of Fighters)) was not a rank but a leading
position within the High Command of the German Luftwaffe in Nazi Germany.
The inspector was responsible for the readiness, training and tactics of the fighter
force. It was not an operational command.
64/214
to the produc-lion of the Me 262; a production order for 100 followed in

three days.
Other events then took a hand. On 17 August 1943 the US 8th Air Force at-
tack on Regensburg destroyed much of the embryonic Me 262 production
lines, forcing Messerschmitt AG to move its jet developtments centres to
Oberammergau, near the Bavarian Alps. The delay occasioned by the move
was increased by a chronic shortage in the supply of skilled labour, and
production slipped by many months. In the meantime, the Me 262 V5 in-
troduced the tricycle landing gear that was to become standard, only on
this prototype the nose gear was fixed. The definitive Me 262 V6 (Jumo
004Bs) flew on 17 October 1943: VI+AA featured a retractable tricycle
landing gear, gun bays and blast ports, electrically operated tailplane, and
a highspeed wing with automatic leading-edge slats and trailing-edge
flaps. 24
Fig 3 In the quest for maximum rates of climb for point-defence work
Operational
Young German gunners, huddled around their light 20-nim and 37-mm
flak -weapons, could be excused for a slight lack of attention to their task
at their first sight of the Messerschmitt Me 262s on the snow-covered ex-
panses of Kheine-Hopsten air base in 1944. In every sense the sleek, shark-
like fuselage, mottled ochre and olive green and beset with razor wings
from, which hung the huge turbojets, was a portent of the future. The
noise, the high-pitched whine and howl of the Jumo 004B-1 turbines, the
swirls of snow, the hot paraffin-tainted blast: all were of a different time.
This was the present, however, and, beset by Allied air superiority on all
sides, the skies over Westphalia were dangerous elements for operations of
the Luftwaffe's dwindling strength. Black-helmeted pilots, crouched for-
ward in the narrow cockpits of their Messerschmitt Me 262A-2a fighter-
24 In the quest for maximum rates of climb for point-defence work, some Mes-
serschmitt Me 262s were modified for development programmes with liquid-fu-
elled Walter rockets. Illustrated is the Me 262C-1a first flown by Gerd Under on
27 February 1945, The type arrived too late to enter service, although Major
Heinz Bur of III/EJG 2 claimed a P-47 in this Me 262C-1a in the spring of 1945.
65/214
bombers, anxiously scanned the overcast skies for the first signs of the div-
ing Hawker Tempests, North American P-51s or Supermarine Spitfires, as
they coaxed throttles and jabbed brakes prior to take-off. Flak gunners
trained their pieces along the approach paths, watched for the red Very
lights that would bring them to instant action, and heard the thunder of
the departing jets. 25 With such machines, how could Germany lose the war
in the air? Such a thought must have raced through minds. The job of a
flak gunner is humble, and he and his comrades could have had no insight
into the extraordinary train of events and decisions that were instrumental
in the denial in quantity of Germany's most potent air weapon of World
War II. In the heady days of 1941, when the Messerschmitt Me 262 series
was born, not one person in the Third Reich could foresee the desperate
need for an outstanding aircraft with which to wrest air supremacy from
the hands of the enemy.
Fig 4 This Messerschmitt Me 262B-1a/U1 under test at Wright Field in

1946
The Heinkel concern was already deeply involved in the development of a
fighter powered by the new reaction-turbine engines when, on 4 January
1939, the Augsburg-based Messerschmitt AG received orders from the Ger-
man air ministry (RLM, or Reichsluftfahrtministerium) to produce specifi-
cations for a similar type of aircraft. Two plans were drawn up by a team
25This Messerschmitt Me 262B-1a/U1 under test at Wright Field in 1946 wears

the USAAF codes ofFE (Foreign Evaluation)-610. The aircraft was captured by
the British following possible service with 10./NJG 11. The armament installed
was two 30-mm MK 10SA-3s and two 20-min MG 151/20 cannon, and Al radar
was an FuG 218 (Neptun V).
66/214
led by Dipl Ing Waldemar Voigt,26 one for a twin-boom configuration and
the other for a pod-and-boom design. Neither of the two then-existing tur-
bojet designs was considered to be powerful enough for a single-engined
fighter, and as a result Voigt was forced to resort to the design of a twin-en-
gined aircraft conversion work completed within two weeks per unit. So,
from that day the Messerschmitt Me 262 was destined to play a dual role,
that of a fighter-bomber and that of a pure air-superiority fighter. Neither
the role nor the aircraft could by then have had any influence on the out-
come of the war. It was too late to start a major production scheme, as oil
and aviation kerosene, precious alloys, and skilled airframe and engine
specialists were all at a premium. The Messerschmitt Me 262 had been rec-
ognised in its full potential, but too late in the war.
Service conversion of the Me 262 was placed under Hauptmann Werner 27
Thierfelder's Erprobungskommando 262 at Lechfeld, to where the unit
moved on 21 December 1943, with pilots drawn from 8. and 9./ZG 26. The
EKdo 262 was given a batch of pre-production Me 262A-0 aircraft, and fi-
nally got into the swim of operations in the early summer of 1944. Thier-
felder was killed in combat with 15th Air Force Mustangs over Bavaria on
18 July, and his place was taken by Hauptmann Neumeyer.
On 19 April 1944, Erprobungskommando 262 was formed at Lechfeld just
south of Augsburg, as a test unit (Jäger Erprobungskommando Thierfel-
der, commanded by Hauptmann Werner Thierfelder) to introduce the 262
into service and train a core of pilots to fly it. On 26 July 1944, Leutnant
26 Waldemar Voigt (aerospace engineer): Chief designer at Messerschmitt's Obe-

rammergau offices and pioneer of the Me 163 and Me 264, project leader of the
development of Me P. 1101, Me P. 1106, Me P. 1110, Me P. 1111, Me P. 1112 and Me
P. 1116.
27 Werner Thierfelder (24 December 1915 – 18 July 1944) was a German Luftwaffe
ace and recipient of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross during World War II. The
Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross was awarded to recognise extreme battlefield bra-
very or successful military leadership. Werner Thierfelder was killed on 18 July
1944. Unit commander of Erprobungskommando 262, out of Lechfeld, he was
lost in crash of a Me 262A-1a under unclear circumstances. Luftwaffe records in-
dicate that he was shot down but U.S. and British records show no comparable
engagement. A possible cause is that Thierfelder exceeded the airframe's limiting
Mach number in a dive, perhaps while pursuing an Allied reconnaissance aircraft,
leading to an irrecoverable dive. During his career he was credited with 27 aerial
victories, 6 on the Western Front and 21 on the Eastern Front.
67/214
Alfred Schreiber with the 262 A-1a W.Nr. 130 017 damaged a Mosquito 28
reconnaissance aircraft of No. 540 Squadron RAF PR Squadron, which was
allegedly lost in a crash upon landing at an air base in Italy.
Other sources state the aircraft was damaged during evasive manoeuvres
and escaped. It was the first victory for a turbojet fighter aircraft in avia-
tion history. Major Walter Nowotny was assigned as commander after the
death of Thierfelder in July 1944, and the unit redesignated Kommando
Nowotny. Essentially a trials and development unit, it holds the distinc-
tion of having mounted the world's first jet fighter operations. Trials conti-
nued slowly, with initial operational missions against the Allies in August
1944 allegedly downing 19 Allied aircraft for six Me 262s lost, although
these claims have never been verified by cross-checking with USAAF re-
cords. The RAF Museum holds no intelligence reports of RAF aircraft en-
gaging in combat with Me 262s in August, although there is a report of an
unarmed encounter between an Me 262 and a Mosquito.
Despite orders to stay grounded, Nowotny chose to fly a mission against an
enemy bomber formation flying some 30,000 feet above, on 8 November
1944. He claimed two P-51Ds destroyed before suffering engine failure at
high altitude. Then, while diving and trying desperately to restart his engi-
nes, he was attacked by other Mustangs, and forced to bail out. Historians
Morgan and Weal proposed Nowotny's victor was P-51D pilot Lt. Robert
W. Stevens of the 364th Fighter Group. The exact circumstances surroun-
28 The de Havilland DH.98 Mosquito was a British multi-role combat aircraft,

with a two-man crew, that served during the Second World War and the postwar
era. The Mosquito was one of the few operational, front-line aircraft of the World
War II era to be constructed almost entirely of wood and, as such, was nicknamed
"The Wooden Wonder". The Mosquito was also known affectionately as the "Mos-
sie" to its crews Originally conceived as an unarmed fast bomber, the Mosquito
was adapted to many other roles during the air war, including: low- to medium-
altitude daytime tactical bomber, high-altitude night bomber, pathfinder, day or
night fighter, fighter-bomber, intruder, maritime strike aircraft, and fast photo-
reconnaissance aircraft. It was also used by the British Overseas Airways Corpora-
tion (BOAC) as a transport. When the Mosquito entered production in 1941, it
was one of the fastest operational aircraft in the world. Entering widespread servi-
ce in 1942, the Mosquito first operated as a high-speed, high-altitude photo-re-
connaissance aircraft, and continued to operate in this role throughout the war.
From mid-1942 to mid-1943 Mosquito bombers were used in high-speed, me-
dium- or low-altitude missions, attacking factories, railways and other pinpoint
targets within Germany and German-occupied Europe. From late 1943, Mosquito
bomber units were formed into the Light Night Strike Force and used as pathfin-
ders for RAF Bomber Command's heavy-bomber raids. They were also used as
"nuisance" bombers, often dropping 4,000 lb (1.812 kg) "cookies", in high-altitu-
de, high-speed raids that German night fighters were almost powerless to inter-
cept.
68/214
ding the death of Walter Nowotny remain uncertain to this day. It is also
possible he was hit by "friendly" flak. The Kommando was then withdrawn
for further training and a revision of combat tactics to optimise the 262's
strengths. By January 1945, Jagdgeschwader 7 (JG 7) had been formed as
a pure jet fighter wing, although it was several weeks before it was opera-
tional. In the meantime, a bomber unit—I Gruppe, Kampfgeschwader 54
(KG 54)—had re-equipped with the Me 262 A-2a fighter-bomber for use in
a ground-attack role. However, the unit lost 12 jets in action in two weeks
for minimal returns. Jagdverband 44 (JV 44) was another Me 262 fighter
unit, of Staffel (squadron) size given the low numbers of available person-
nel, formed in February 1945 by Lieutenant General Adolf Galland, who
had recently been dismissed as Inspector of Fighters. Galland was able to
draw into the unit many of the most experienced and decorated Luftwaffe
fighter pilots from other units grounded by lack of fuel. During March, Me
262 fighter units were able, for the first time, to mount large scale attacks
on Allied bomber formations. On 18 March 1945, 37 Me 262s of JG 7 inter-
cepted a force of 1,221 bombers and 632 escorting fighters. They shot down
12 bombers and one fighter for the loss of three Me 262s. Although a 4:1
ratio was exactly what the Luftwaffe would have needed to make an im-
pact on the war, the absolute scale of their success was minor, as it repre-
sented only one per cent of the attacking force. In 1943 and early 1944, re-
gardless of the presence of the small numbers of Me 262s, the USAAF was
able to keep up offensive operations at loss ratios of roughly 5%. Several
two-seat trainer variants of the Me 262, the Me 262 B-1a, had been adap-
ted through the Umrüst-Bausatz 1 factory refit package as night fighters,
complete with on-board FuG 218 Neptun high-VHF band radar, using
Hirschgeweih ("stag's antlers") antennae with a set of shorter dipole ele-
ments than the Lichtenstein SN-2 had used, as the B-1a/U1 version. Ser-
ving with 10 Staffel, Nachtjagdgeschwader 11, near Berlin, these few air-
craft (alongside several single-seat examples) accounted for most of the 13
Mosquitoes lost over Berlin in the first three months of 1945. However, ac-
tual intercepts were generally or entirely made using Wilde Sau methods,
rather than AI radar-controlled interception. As the two-seat trainer was
largely unavailable, many pilots made their first jet flight in a single-seater
without an instructor.
Despite its deficiencies, the Me 262 clearly signaled the beginning of the
end of piston-engined aircraft as effective fighting machines. Once airbor-
ne, it could accelerate to speeds over 850 km/h (530 mph), about
150 km/h (93 mph) faster than any Allied fighter operational in the Euro-
pean Theater of Operations.
The Me 262's top ace was probably Hauptmann Franz Schall with 17 kills,
which included six four-engine bombers and 10 P-51 Mustang fighters, alt-
hough night fighter ace Oberleutnant Kurt Welter claimed 25 Mosquitos
69/214
and two four-engine bombers shot down by night and two further Mosqui-
tos by day flying the Me 262. Most of Welter's claimed night kills were
achieved in standard radar-less aircraft, even though Welter had tested a
prototype Me 262 fitted with FuG 218 Neptun radar. Another candidate for
top ace on the aircraft was Oberstleutnant Heinrich Bär, who claimed 16
enemy aircraft while flying the Me 262.
Anti-bomber tactics
The Me 262 was so fast that German pilots needed new tactics to attack
American bombers. In the head-on attack, the closing speed, of about 350
yd per second (320 m), was too high for accurate shooting. Even from as-
tern, the closing speed was too great to use the short-ranged 30 mm can-
non to maximum effect. Therefore, a roller-coaster attack was devised. The
262s approached from astern and about 6,000 ft higher (1,800 m) than
the bombers. From about 3 mi behind (4.8 km), they went into a shallow
dive that took them through the escort fighters with little risk of intercep-
tion. When they were about 1 mi astern (1.6 km) and 1,500 feet (460 m) be-
low the bombers, they pulled up sharply to reduce their excess speed. On
levelling off, they were 1,000 yd astern (0.91 km) and overtaking the bom-
bers at about 100 mph (160 km/h), well placed to attack them.
Since the 30mm MK 108 cannon's short barrels and low muzzle velocity of
540 m/s (1,800 ft/s) rendered it inaccurate beyond 650 yd (590 m), cou-
pled with the jet's velocity, which required breaking off at 200 yd (180 m)
to avoid colliding with the target, Me 262 pilots normally commenced fi-
ring at 550 yd (500 m). Allied bomber gunners found their electric gun tu-
rrets had problems tracking the jets. Target acquisition was difficult becau-
se the jets closed into firing range quickly and remained in firing position
only briefly, using their standard attack profile, which proved more effecti-
ve.
Captain Eric Brown, Chief Naval Test Pilot and C.O. Captured Enemy Air-
craft Flight Royal Aircraft Establishment, who tested the Me 262 noted:
"This was a Blitzkrieg aircraft. You whack in at your bomber. It was never
meant to be a dogfighter, it was meant to be a destroyer of bombers... The
great problem with it was it did not have dive brakes. For example, if you
want to fight and destroy a B-17, you come in on a dive. The 30mm cannon
were not so accurate beyond 650 yards. So you normally came in at 600
yards and would open fire on your B-17. And your closing speed was still
high and since you had to break away at 200 yards to avoid a collision, you
only had two seconds firing time. Now, in two seconds, you can’t sight. You
can fire randomly and hope for the best. If you want to sight and fire, you
need to double that time to four seconds. And with dive brakes, you could
have done that."
Eventually, German pilots developed new combat tactics to counter Allied
70/214
bombers' defenses. Me 262s, equipped with R4M rockets, approached

from the side of a bomber formation, where their silhouettes were widest,
and while still out of range of the bombers' machine guns, fired a salvo of
rockets with Hexogen-filled warheads. One or two of these rockets could
down even the famously rugged B-17 Flying Fortress.
Though this tactic was effective, it came too late to have a real effect on the
war, and only small numbers of Me 262s were equipped with the rocket
packs. Most of those so equipped were Me 262A-1as, members of Jagd-
geschwader 7. This method of attacking bombers became the standard
until the invention and mass deployment of guided missiles. Some nickna-
med this tactic the Luftwaffe's Wolf Pack, as the fighters often made runs
in groups of two or three, fired their rockets, then returned to base. On 1
September 1944, USAAF General Carl Spaatz expressed the fear that if
greater numbers of German jets appeared, they could inflict losses heavy
enough to force cancellation of the Allied bombing offensive by daylight.
Fig No 5 Hans Guido Mutke's Me 262A on display at the Deutsches Mu-

seum
Counter-jet tactics
The Me 262 was difficult for its opponents to counter because its high
speed and rate of climb made it extremely hard to intercept. As with all ot-
her early jets, the Me 262's engines did not provide a lot of thrust at low air
speeds (a key criterion for good turn performance at low speeds), and
throttle response was slow. Another disadvantage all early jet engines sha-
red was a relatively high risk of flameout if the pilot used the throttle too
aggressively (as is common in a dogfight). Pilots were instructed to operate
the throttle gently and avoid quick changes. German engineers introduced
an automatic throttle regulator later in the war but it only partly alleviated
the problem. On the plus side, thrust at high speed was much greater than
on propeller-driven aircraft.
71/214
The plane had, by contemporary standards, quite a high wing loading

(60.2 lbs/ft2, 294.0 kg/m2) and its turn radius at low speeds was therefore
correspondingly wide. This, coupled with the low thrust at slow speeds and
high chance of a flameout if the throttle was worked too aggressively, resul-
ted in Me 262 pilots being told to avoid low speed dogfights with the Allied
piston-engine fighters. The high speed of the Me 262 also presented pro-
blems when engaging enemy aircraft, the high-speed convergence allowing
Me 262 pilots little time to line up their targets or acquire the appropriate
amount of deflection. This problem faces any aircraft that approaches
another from behind at much higher speed, as the slower aircraft in front
can always pull a tighter turn, forcing the faster aircraft to overshoot. The
Me 262 faced this problem frequently as its cruising speed alone was up to
200 km/h (120 mph) faster than that of any piston-engine fighter of the
period.
"I passed one that looked as if it was hanging motionless in the air (I am
too fast!). The one above me went into a steep right-hand turn, his pale
blue underside standing out against the purple sky. Another banked right
in front of the Me's nose. Violent jolt as I flew through his airscrew eddies.
Maybe a wing's length away. That one in the gentle left-hand curve! Swing
her round. I was coming from underneath, eye glued to the sight (pull her
tighter!). A throbbing in the wings as my cannon pounded briefly. Missed
him. Way behind his tail. It was exasperating. I would never be able to
shoot one down like this. They were like a sack of fleas. A prick of doubt: is
this really such a good fighter? Could one in fact, successfully attack a
group of erratically banking fighters with the Me 262?" Johannes Stein-
hoff, Luftwaffe fighter ace.
Luftwaffe pilots eventually learned how to handle the Me 262's higher
speed, and the Me 262 soon proved a formidable air superiority fighter,
with pilots such as Franz Schall managing to shoot down 12 enemy fighters
in the Me 262, 10 of them American P-51 Mustangs. Other notable Me 262
aces included Georg-Peter Eder, also with 12 enemy fighters to his credit
72/214
(including 9 P-51s), Walther Dahl 29 with 11 (including three Lavochkin La-

7s and six P-51s) and Heinz-Helmut Baudach with 6 (including 1 Spitfire
and 2 P-51s) amongst many others.
Pilots soon learned that the Me 262 was quite maneuverable, despite its
high wing loading and lack of low-speed thrust, especially if attention was
drawn to its effective maneuvering speeds. The controls were light and ef-
fective right up to the maximum permissible speed and perfectly harmoni-
zed. The inclusion of full span automatic leading edge slats,30 something of
a "tradition" on Messerschmitt fighters dating back to the original Bf 109's
outer wing slots of a similar type, helped increase the overall lift produced
by the wing by as much as 35% in tight turns or at low speeds, greatly im-
proving the aircraft's turn performance as well as its landing and take off
characteristics. And as many pilots soon found out, the Me 262's clean de-
sign also meant that it, like all jets, held its speed in tight turns much bet-
ter than conventional propeller-driven fighters, which was a great poten-
tial advantage in a dogfight as it meant better energy retention in maneu-
vers. Luftwaffe test pilot and flight instructor Hans Fey stated, "The 262
29 Walther Dahl (27 March 1916 – 25 November 1985) Walther Dahl was born in
Lug near Bad Bergzabern, son of a teacher who was killed in action in 1918 on the
Western Front of World War I. He joined the army in 1935, initially serving in In-
fantry Regiment 119 in Stuttgart, before transferring to the Luftwaffe and beco-
ming a fighter pilot. By May 1941 Dahl was part of the Geschwaderstab of Jagd-
geschwader 3 (JG 3—3rd Fighter Wing) and claimed his first victory on 22 June
during the first day of the invasion of Russia. In July Dahl transferred to II. Grup-
pe of JG 3. By the end of October Dahl had 17 claims. He was then transferred to
4 staffel, JG 3 in December 1941 before the unit was posted to the Mediterranean
theatre. He claimed a Spitfire over Malta on 1 April 1942 and on 10 April 1942
Dahl was made Staffelkapitän, Ergänzungsgruppe, JG 3. In April 1943, Dahl was
transferred to the staff of the General der Jagdflieger. In August, Dahl was next
appointed Geschwaderadjutant, JG 3 on the Eastern front where he had raised
his total to 51, being awarded the German Cross in Gold in December 1942. He
was a German Oberst Luftwaffe fighter ace and recipient of the Knight's Cross of
the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves (German: Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit
Eichenlaub) during World War II. The Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and its
higher grade Oak Leaves was awarded to recognise extreme battlefield bravery or
successful military leadership. A flying ace or fighter ace is a military aviator cre-
dited with shooting down five or more enemy aircraft during aerial combat. Dahl
claimed some 128 enemy aircraft shot down in 678 missions, including about 300
ground-attack missions.
30 The leading edge slats, manufactured by Arwa Strumpfwerke of Auerbach, were
divided into three unconnected sections on each wing and each was fastened to
the wing by two hinges. The slats lowered the stalling speed of the aircraft to
roughly 160 to 170 km/h (86 to 92 km; 99 to 110 mph) depending on load out.
They deployed automatically below 300 km/h (160 km; 190 mph) on takeoff or
landing and at 450 km/h (240 kn; 280 mph) in turn or climb.
73/214
will turn much better at high than at slow speeds and, due to its clean de-
sign, will keep its speed in tight turns much longer than conventional type
aircraft."
Too fast to catch for the escorting Allied fighters, the Me 262s were almost
impossible to head off.31 As a result, Me 262 pilots were relatively safe
from the Allied fighters, as long as they did not allow themselves to get
drawn into low-speed turning contests and saved their maneuvering for
higher speeds. Combating the Allied fighters could be effectively done the
same way as the U.S. fighters fought the more nimble, but slower, Japane-
se fighters in the Pacific.
Allied pilots soon found the only reliable way of dealing with the jets, as
with the even faster Me 163 Komet rocket fighters, was to attack them on
the ground and during takeoff or landing. Luftwaffe airfields identified as
jet bases were frequently bombed by medium bombers, and Allied fighters
patrolled over the fields to attack jets trying to land. The Luftwaffe counte-
red by installing extensive flak alleys of anti-aircraft guns along the ap-
proach lines to protect the Me 262s from the ground—and by providing
top cover during the jets' takeoff and landing with the most advanced Luft-
waffe single-engined fighters, the Focke-Wulf Fw 190D and (just beco-
ming available in 1945) Focke-Wulf Ta 152H. Nevertheless, in March–
April 1945, Allied fighter patrol patterns over Me 262 airfields resulted in
numerous jet losses.
31According to aviation historian Mike Spick, it could take eight Mustangs to neu-
tralize a single Me 262, by continually cutting across the circle inside it. Against
multiple jet attackers, effective defense was simply impossible
74/214
Fig No 6 Me 262 A, circa 1944

The British Hawker Tempest scored a number of kills against the new Ger-
man jets, including the Messerschmitt Me 262. Hubert Lange, a Me 262 pi-
lot, said: "the Messerschmitt Me 262's most dangerous opponent was the
British Hawker Tempest — extremely fast at low altitudes, highly-manoeu-
vrable and heavily-armed." Some were destroyed with a tactic known to
the Tempest 135 Wing as the "Rat Scramble":Tempests on immediate alert
took off when an Me 262 was reported to be airborne. They did not inter-
cept the jet, but instead flew towards the Me 262 and Ar 234 base at Rhei-
ne-Hopsten.32 The aim was to attack jets on their landing approach, when
they were at their most vulnerable, travelling slowly, with flaps down and
incapable of rapid acceleration. The German response was the construc-
tion of a "flak lane" of over 150 quadruple 20 mm (.79 in) guns at Rheine-
Hopsten to protect the approaches. 33 After seven Tempests were lost to
flak at Rheine-Hopsten in a single week, the "Rat Scramble" was disconti-
nued
32 Other aircraft based there included Bf 109 and Fw 190 day fighters and Bf 110
and He 219 night fighters. The base is closer to the town of Hopsten than the city
of Rheine, and is still used by the Luftwaffe.
33 As well as the flak guns, there were several piston engine fighter units based in
the area which were tasked to cover the jets as they were landing.
75/214
High-speed research
Adolf Busemann had proposed swept wings as early as 1935. Messersch-
mitt researched the topic from 1940. In April 1941, Busemann proposed fit-
ting a 35° swept wing (Pfeilflügel II, literally "arrow wing II") to the Me
262, the same wing sweep angle later used on both the American F-86 Sa-
bre and Soviet MiG-15 Fagot fighter jets. Though this was not implemen-
ted, he continued with the projected HG II and HG III (Hochgeschwindig-
keit, "high-speed") derivatives in 1944, which were designed with a 35°
and 45° wing sweep, respectively.
Interest in high-speed flight, which led him to initiate work on swept wings
starting in 1940, is evident from the advanced developments Messersch-
mitt had on his drawing board in 1944. While the Me 262 HG I actually
flight tested in 1944 had only small changes compared to combat aircraft,
most notably a low-profile canopy (tried as the Rennkabine (literally "ra-
cing cabin") on the Me 262 V9 prototype for a short time) to reduce drag,
the HG II and HG III designs were far more radical. The projected HG II
combined the low-drag canopy with a 35° wing sweep and a butterfly tail.
The HG III had a conventional tail, but a 45° wing sweep and turbines em-
bedded in the wing roots.
Messerschmitt also conducted a series of flight tests with the series produc-
tion Me 262. In dive tests, they determined that the Me 262 went out of
control in a dive at Mach 0.86, and that higher Mach numbers would cause
a nose-down trim that the pilot could not counter. The resulting steepe-
ning of the dive would lead to even higher speeds and the airframe would
disintegrate from excessive negative g loads.
The HG series of Me 262 derivatives was believed capable of reaching tran-
sonic Mach numbers in level flight, with the top speed of the HG III being
projected as Mach 0.96 at 6,000 m (20,000 ft) altitude. Despite the neces-
sity to gain experience in high-speed flight for the HG II and III designs,
Messerschmitt made no attempt to exceed the Mach 0.86 limit for the Me
262. After the war, the Royal Aircraft Establishment, at that time one of
the leading institutions in high-speed research, re-tested the Me 262 to
help with British attempts at exceeding Mach 1. The RAE achieved speeds
of up to Mach 0.84 and confirmed the results from the Messerschmitt dive
tests. The Soviets ran similar tests. No one tried to exceed the Mach limit
established by Messerschmitt. 34
34This airframe, Wrknr. 111711, was the first Me 262 to come into Allied hands
when its test pilot defected in March 1945. It was subsequently lost in August
1946, the US test pilot parachuting to safety
76/214
Fig No 7 This airframe, Wrknr. 111711, was the first Me 262

After Willy Messerschmitt's death, the former Me 262 pilot Hans Guido
Mutke claimed to have exceed Mach 1, on 9 April 1945 in a Me 262 in a
"straight-down" 90° dive. This claim is disputed because it is only based on
Mutke's memory of the incident, which recalls effects other Me 262 pilots
observed below the speed of sound at high indicated airspeed, but with no
altitude reading required to determine the actual speed. Furthermore, the
pitot tube used to measure airspeed in aircraft can give falsely elevated rea-
dings as the pressure builds up inside the tube at high speeds. Finally, the
Me 262 wing had only a slight sweep, incorporated for trim (center of gra-
vity) reasons and likely would have suffered structural failure due to diver-
gence at high transonic speeds. One airframe (Me 262 HG1 V9, Werknum-
mer 130 004, with Stammkennzeichen of VI+AD) was prepared with the
low-profile Rennkabine racing canopy and may have achieved an unofficial
record speed for a turbojet-powered aircraft of 975 km/h (606 mph), alti-
tude unspecified.
Production
About 1,400 Me 262s were produced, but a maximum of 200 were opera-
tional at the same time. They destroyed about 150 enemy planes, but the
Allies destroyed about 100 Me 262s in the air. While Germany was bom-
bed intensively, production of the Me 262 was dispersed into low-profile
production facilities, sometimes little more than clearings in the forests of
Germany and occupied countries. Through the end of February to the end
of March 1945, approximately 60 Me 262s were destroyed in attacks on
77/214
Obertraubling and 30 at Leipheim; the Neuberg jet plant itself was bom-
bed on 19 March 1945.
Large, heavily protected underground factories were constructed to take
up production of the Me 262, safe from bomb attacks, but the war ended
before they could be completed. Wings were produced in Germany's oldest
motorway tunnel at Engelberg to the west of Stuttgart. At B8 Bergkristall-
Esche II at St. Georgen/Gusen, Austria, forced laborers of Concentration
Camp Gusen II produced fully equipped fuselages for the Me 262 at a
monthly rate of 450 units on large assembly lines from early 1945.
Postwar history
After the end of the war, the Me 262 and other advanced German technolo-
gies were quickly swept up by the Americans (as part of the USAAF's Ope-
ration Lusty), British, and Soviets. Many Me 262s were found in readily-re-
pairable condition and were confiscated. Both the Soviets and Americans
desired the technology to serve as a basis for their own jet fighters.
During testing, the Me 262 was found to have advantages over the early
models of the Gloster Meteor. It was faster, had better cockpit visibility to
the sides and rear (mostly due to the canopy frame and the discoloration
caused by the plastics used in the Meteor's construction), and was a supe-
rior gun platform, as the early Meteors had a tendency to snake at high
speed and exhibited "weak" aileron response. The Me 262 did have a shor-
ter combat range than the Meteor.
The USAAF compared the P-80 Shooting Star and Me 262 concluding,
"Despite a difference in gross weight of nearly 2,000 lb (900 kg), the Me
262 was superior to the P-80 in acceleration, speed and approximately the
same in climb performance. The Me 262 apparently has a higher critical
Mach number, from a drag standpoint, than any current Army Air Force
fighter."
The Army Air Force also tested an example of the Me 262A-1a/U3 (US
flight evaluation serial FE-4012), an unarmed photo reconnaissance ver-
sion, which was fitted with a fighter nose and given an overall smooth fi-
nish. It was used for performance comparisons against the P-80. During
testing between May and August 1946, the aircraft completed eight flights,
lasting four hours and 40 minutes. Testing was discontinued after four en-
gine changes were required during the course of the tests, culminating in
two single-engine landings. These aircraft were extensively studied, aiding
development of early U.S. and Soviet jet fighters. The F-86, designed by
engineer Edgar Schmued, used a slat design based on the Me 262.
The Czechoslovak aircraft industry continued to produce single-seat (Avia
S-92) and two-seat (Avia CS-92) variants of the Me 262 after World War
II. From August 1946, a total of nine S-92s and three two-seater CS-92s
were completed and test flown. They were introduced in 1947 and in 1950
78/214
were supplied to the 5th Fighter Squadron, becoming the first jet fighters
to serve in the Czechoslovak Air Force. These were kept flying until 1951,
when they were replaced in service by more advanced jet fighters of Soviet
origin. Both versions are on display at the Prague Aviation museum in
Kbely.35
Fig 5 This Messerschmitt Me 262A-2a - 9K+FH (Nr 111625)
Flyable reproductions
In January 2003, the American Me 262 Project, based in Everett, Wash-
ington, completed flight testing to allow the delivery of near-exact repro-
ductions of several versions of the Me 262 including at least two B-1c two-
seater variants, one A-1c single seater and two "convertibles" that could be
switched between the A-1c and B-1c configurations. All are powered by Ge-
neral Electric J85 engines and feature additional safety features, such as
upgraded brakes and strengthened landing gear. The "c" suffix refers to the
new J85 powerplant and has been informally assigned with the approval of
the Messerschmitt Foundation in Germany (the Werk Number of the re-
productions picked up where the last wartime produced Me 262 left off – a
continuous airframe serial number run with a 50 year production break).
Flight testing of the first newly manufactured Me 262 A-1c (single-seat) va-
riant (Werk Number 501244) was completed in August 2005. The first of
these machines (Werk Number 501241) went to a private owner in the
southwestern United States, while the second (Werk Number 501244) was
delivered to the Messerschmitt Foundation at Manching, Germany. This
aircraft conducted a private test flight in late April 2006, and made its pu-
blic debut in May at the ILA 2006. The new Me 262 flew during the public
35This Messerschmitt Me 262A-2a - 9K+FH (Nr 111625) - belonged to 1,/KG 51.

Command of Kampfgeschwader 51 came to Major Wolfgang Schenk in November
1944; during the summer of that year, Schenk took his Kommando into action
with Me 262s on the Normandy war front.
79/214
flight demonstrations. Me 262 Werk Number 501241 was delivered to the

Collings Foundation as White 1 of JG 7. This aircraft will be offering ride-
along flights starting in 2008. The third replica, a non-flyable Me 262 A-1c,
was delivered to the Evergreen Aviation & Space Museum in May 2010.
RAF discovers the Schwalbe

The RAF brought back its first confirmation of the Me 262's existence on
25 July, when a de Havilland Mosquito of No. 544 (PR) Squadron was in-
tercepted near Munich, Flight Lieutenant A. E. Wall and his navigator Fly-
ing Officer A. S. Lobban escaping with difficulty. Equipped with Mes-
serschmitt Me 262A-2a fighter-bombers, the Einsatzkommando Schenk
(Major Wolfgang Schenk) "was formed at Lechfeld in July, before posting
to the Normandy invasion front. The unit was based at Chateaudun,
Etampes and Creil, before pulling back to Juvincourt, near Reims, in late
August. It was on 28 August 1944 that Allied fighter pilots downed the first
Me 262 to be lost in combat near Brussels, Major Joseph Myers and his
wingman, Lieutenant M. D. Croy Jr, of the US 78th Fighter Group bounced
Oberfeldwebel Lauer's Me 262 to force it down in a field. Operations by
Einsatzkommando Schenk continued in a desultory manner until its incor-
poration into I Gruppe of Kampfgeschwader 51, which began combat oper-
ations from Rheine-Hopsten under Major Unrau in October 1944. The val-
ue of the Me 262 as a reconnaissance aircraft was soon recognised, and a
few went to the Einsatzkommando Braunegg, and to Nahaufklarungsgrup-
pen 1 and 6. 36
Fig 6 Although many Me 262s wore unit insignia

Hitler's firm insistence on the Messerschmitt Me 262 being :h± property of
the General der Kampfflieger (Marienfeld) denied Galland the opportunity
36Although many Me 262s wore unit insignia, photos of such aircraft are very ra-
re, and the majority of the German jets were extremely anonymous. These Me
262A-1as served with Kommando Nowotny.
80/214
of forming the first fighter unit until September 1944. One of Germany's
finest fighter pilots, Major Walter Nowotny 37 formed the Kommando Now-
otny based at Achmer and Hesepe near Osnabriick, to fly its first mission
against Allied bombers and fighrerf on 3 October 1944. The Messerschmitt
Me 262A-la (two Jumo 004B-1 turbojets) formed the establishment of
around 30. The armament was exceptionally potent and consisted of four
Rheinmetall-Borsig MK 108A-3 30-mm cannon; the pilot was protected by
9-mm back armour, and a 90-mm armour-glass windscreen. With a
maximum speed of 855 km/h (531 mph) at 8000 m (26.245 ft), the Me
262A-la could outrun anything that the Allies had in their inventory, but
proved to be vulnerable in the circuit pattern. Thus several Me 262s suc-
cumbed to bold Allied fighter attacks during the approach and shortly after
37Major Walter "Nowi" Nowotny (7 December 1920 – 8 November 1944) was an

Austrian-born German fighter ace of World War II. He is credited with 258 aerial
victories—that is, 258 aerial combat encounters resulting in the destruction of the
enemy aircraft—in 442 combat missions. Nowotny achieved 255 of these victories
on the Eastern Front and three while flying one of the first jet fighters, the Mes-
serschmitt Me 262, in the Defense of the Reich. He scored most of his victories in
the Focke-Wulf Fw 190, and approximately 50 in the Messerschmitt Bf 109. No-
wotny joined the Luftwaffe in 1939 and completed his fighter pilot training in
1941, after which he was posted to Jagdgeschwader 54 "Grünherz" (JG 54) on the
Eastern Front. Nowotny was the first pilot to achieve 250 victories – 194 in
1943 alone – earning him the coveted Ritterkreuz mit Eichenlaub, Schwertern
und Brillanten (Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and
Diamonds) on 19 October 1943. For propaganda reasons, he was ordered to cease
operational flying. Reinstated to front-line service in September 1944, Nowotny
tested and developed tactics for the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter. He was cre-
dited with three victories in this aircraft type before being killed in a crash follo-
wing combat with United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) fighters on 8 Novem-
ber 1944. After his death, the first operational jet fighter wing, Jagdgeschwader 7
"Nowotny", was named in his honour
81/214
take-off. Initially, the Kommando Nowotny 38 was given cover by III/JG 54

(Focke-Wulf Fw 190D-9s) from Varelbusch. but later some 120-140 Mes-
serschmitt Bf 109G-10s and Bf 109K—-and Focke-Wulfs were needed to
protect I/KG 51's missions in the Rheine area, in addition to very strong
flak defences. 39
Fig No 10 An Me 262A-2a of1./KG 51, during March 1945

Kommando Nowotny disbanded shortly after the death of its leader on 8
November 1944. The potent jet, the presence of which thoroughly alarmed
Allied intelligence in the west, continued to be usei in penny packets on
38 Kommando Nowotny was formed on 26 September 1944 in Achmer and Hesepe
with Stab/Kommando Nowotny from Stab III./Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26),
1./Kommando Nowotny from 9./ZG 26, 2./Kommando Nowotny from 8./ZG 26
and 3./Kommando Nowotny (new). Thus its strength was 3 Staffeln and a Stab
flight.
On 3 October it attained operational status with a complement of about 40 Me
262A-1a jet interceptors. Over the next month and a half the unit operated
against allied aircraft, while at the same time trying to establish proper tactics for
a jet fighter unit. It also had to deal with many technical problems plaguing the
unproven Me 262. The unit was the first to realise that a dedicated protection-
squadron of single piston-engined, single-seat fighters like the Bf 109G and Fw
190 were a necessity for the jets, as the Me 262 could not manoeuvre or accelerate
well at low speeds, and thus was a sitting duck for any allied fighters nearby du-
ring take-off and landing. Due to the experimental nature of the unit, and the
technical difficulties in operating the jet fighters, the unit had a less than illus-
trious record. A total of 22 enemy aircraft were claimed for a loss of 26 Me 262s.
Shortly after Walter Nowotny's death on 8 November, the unit was redesignated
III./Jagdgeschwader 7 (JG 7) on 19 November, and therefore ceased to exist as an
independent unit.
39 An Me 262A-2a of 1./KG 51, during March 1945, carrying underfuselage bombs.
A detachment of KG 51, operating as Kommando Schenck, began operations dur-

ing August 1944, and the remainder of the Geschwader quickly began conversion
to the new jet, with I and II Gruppen and the Geschwader Stab operational on the
new type by the winter of 1944. Hitler himself was keen that the Me 262 be used
in the bomber role.
82/214
bombing attacks (with AB 250 containers) on Allied front lines, reconnais-

sance missions, and an occasional forr. against enemy fighters. In mid-No-
vember, Oberst Johannes Steinhoff 40 formed the nucleus of Jagdgesch-
wader 7 at Brandenburg-Briest: III Gruppe was formed from the survivors
of Kommando Nowotny while I/JG 7 41 was later formed at Parchim. Four
additional bomber units were formed on 30 January 1945, these compris-
ing KG(J)6, KG(J)27, KG(J)54 and KG(J)55. Of these, only I/KG(J) 54 at
40 Johannes "Macki" Steinhoff (15 September 1913 – 21 February 1994) was a Ger-
man Luftwaffe fighter ace of World War II, and later a senior West German Air
Force officer and military commander of NATO. He played a significant role in re-
building the post war Luftwaffe, eventually serving as chief of staff from 1966 –
1970 and then as chairman of NATO's Military Committee from 1971 – 1974.
Steinhoff was one of very few Luftwaffe pilots who survived to fly operationally
through the whole of the war period 1939–45. He was also one of the highest-sco-
ring pilots with 176 victories, and one of the first to fly the Messerschmitt Me 262
jet fighter in combat as a member of the famous aces squadron Jagdverband 44
led by Adolf Galland. Steinhoff was decorated with both the Oak Leaves and
Swords to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. He played a role in the so-called
Fighter Pilots Conspiracy when several senior air force officers confronted Her-
mann Göring late in the war.
41 Jagdgeschwader 7 (JG 7) Nowotny was a Luftwaffe fighter-wing of World War
II and the first operational jet fighter Gruppe in the world.

It was created late in 1944 and served until the end of the war in May 1945, and it
operated the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter exclusively. JG 7 was formed un-
der the command of Oberst Johannes Steinhoff, with Kommando Nowotny (the
initial Me 262 test wing ) renumbered III./JG 7. Under the command of Major
Erich Hohagen III./JG 7 was the only element of JG 7 ready to operate against
the Allies. Throughout its existence JG 7 suffered from an irregular supply of new
aircraft, fuel and spares. With such a radically new aircraft, training accidents we-
re also common, with 10 Me 262s being lost in six weeks. The technical troubles
and material shortages meant initial tentative sorties were only in flight strength,
usually no more than 4 or 6 aircraft. Flying from Brandenburg-Briest, Oranien-
burg and Parchim, the Geschwader flew intermittently against the huge USAAF
bomber streams. On 3 February JG 7 intercepted USAAF bomber formations and
5 bombers were claimed shot down. By the end of February 1945 JG 7 had clai-
med around 45 four-engined bombers and 15 fighters, but at this stage of war this
success rate had no effect whatsoever on the Allied air offensive. During March
JG 7 finally began to deliver larger scale attacks against the heavy bomber
streams. 3 March saw 29 sorties for 8 kills claimed (one jet was lost). On 18
March III./JG 7 finally managed their biggest attack numerically thus far, some
37 Me 262s engaging a force of 1,200 American bombers and 600 fighters. This
action also marked the first use of the new R4M rockets. 12 bombers and 1 fighter
were claimed for the loss of 3 Me 262s. The total numbers of aircraft shot down
by JG 7 is difficult to quantify due to the loss of Luftwaffe records, but at least 136
aircraft were claimed, and research indicates as many as 420 Allied aircraft may
have been claimed shot down.
83/214
Giebelstadt, II/KG(J) 54 at Kitzingen and III/KG(J) 6 at Prague-Ruzyne

played any part in operations, usually at reasonably high loss. The only oc-
casions on which Jagdgeschwader 7 made any impact were during the bat-
tles of 18-21 March 1945 when, using Oranienburg and Parchim, a daily
average of some 40 or more sorties was put up against American bombers.
A new unguided air-to-air weapon, the R4M rocket, was used for the first
time on Me 262A-la fighters during these encounters. Final day operations
fell to Generalleutnant Adolf Galland's Jagdverband 44 42 (JV44) at
München-Riem, to the afore mentioned units, and to the night-fighting
Messerschmitt Me 262B-1a/U1 aircraft of 10./NJG 11 at Burg.
Over the period March 1944 to 20 April 1945, the Luftwaffe took delivery
of 1.433 Me 262s, but for the Allies the impact of this ' aircraft was largely
psychological. On inspection after the war’s end it was acknowledged that
in design of airframe and engine the Messerschmitt Me 262 was years
ahead of aircraft of other nations, its secrets permitted the Russians and
the Anglo-Americans to accelerate development of jet fighter and bomber
aircraft to the magic of Mach 1.0 and beyond over the ensuing years.
42 Jagdverband 44 (JV 44) was a special fighter unit of top German fighter ace pi-
lots in the Luftwaffe during the last months of World War II. The main aircraft
used by the unit was the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter. They were known by
various nicknames, including "Der Galland-Zirkus" (The Galland Circus). The
commander of JV 44 was General Adolf Galland (103 victories) the former Gene-
ral der Jagdflieger (General of Fighter pilots) who had recently been sacked from
his staff post by Hermann Göring for relentlessly criticizing the operational poli-
cies, strategic doctrine, and tactics mandated by the Luftwaffe High Command. It
was hoped by Galland's superiors that his return to combat-flying in a front-line
command would result in his death in action. Galland was charged with setting
up a small Me 262 unit of staffel strength to demonstrate that the jet could be de-
veloped into the superior fighter it promised to be. The unit was to be indepen-
dent of all other Luftwaffe commands, including division, corps or air fleets. Ga-
lland inspected a number of facilities, and eventually settled on Brandenburg-
Briest airfield, west of Berlin for its initial base. In late February, Galland discus-
sed his personnel and logistical requirements with the Luftwaffe Chief of General
Staff. The staff approved the establishment of JV 44, with its cadre of pilots provi-
ded through the normal channels, and ground personnel provided from 16 Staf-
fel, JG 54. Col. Johannes Steinhoff was also recruited as Operations Officer, who
had just been replaced as Kommodore of JG 7. Galland also compiled a list of ex-
perienced pilots whom he considered to be competent enough to convert quickly
to the Me 262. The list included some of the Jagdwaffe's most skilled and success-
ful formation leaders. Thus JV 44 eventually comprised a core of highly experien-
ced pilots chosen from Galland's former staff or otherwise recruited from units
which had been disbanded or were being re-equipped. It had relatively few opera-
tional planes available for any single sortie and was repeatedly forced to relocate
due to the approach of Allied ground forces. At war's end the unit was disbanded
and its brief history came to an end.
84/214
Specification
Messerschmitt Me 262A-1a
Type: single-seat air-superiority fighter
Powerplant: two Junkers Jumo 004B-1, -2 or -3 axial-flow turbojets
each rated at 8.83 kN (1,984 Ib) static thrust
Performance: maximum speed 827 km/h (514 mph) at sea level, 852
km/h (530 mph) at 3000 m (9,845 ft), 869 km/h (540 mph) at 6000 m
(19,685 ft) and 856 km/h (532 mph) at 8000 m (26,245 ft); initial climb
rate 1200 m (3,937 ft) per minute; service ceiling above 12190 m (40,000
ft); range 1050 km (652 miles) at 9000 m (29,530 ft)
Weights: empty 3795 kg (8,378 Ib); empty equipped 4413 kg (9,742 Ib);
maximum take-off 6387 kg (14,080 Ib)
Dimensions: span 12.5 m (40 ft 11 in); length 10.58 m (34 ft 9 in); height
3.83 m (12 ft 7 in); wing area 21.73 m2 (234 sq ft)
Armament: four 30-mm Rheinmetall-Borsig MK 108A-3 cannon with
100 rounds per gun for the upper pair and 80 rounds per gun for the lower
pair, and aimed with Revi 16.B gunsight or EZ.42 gyro-stabilised sight,
plus provision for 12 R4M air-to-air rockets under each wing.
ME 262 Variants
Messerschmitt Me 262 variants
Me 262 V1: first prototype (PC+UA) with single Junkers Jumo 21OG pis-
ton engine; later fitted with two BMW 003 turbojets
Me 262 V2: test airframe for fitment of two BMW 003 turbojets
Me 262 V3: test airframe (PC+UC) with two Junkers Jumo 004 turbojets;
first prototype to be flown by service test pilots
Me 262 V4: (PC+UD) fourth prototype of similar configuration
Me 262 V5: fitted with two Jumo 004s, PC+UE differed in having a fixed
nosewheel, whereas previous prototypes had conventional tail wheels
Me 262 V6: definitive prototype (VI+AA) with lighter Jumo 004B-1 tur-
bojets, and retractable tricycle landing gear; the Me 262 V7 (VI+AB) was
similar but with redesigned cockpit canopy and cockpit pressurisation;
many subsequent Versuchs prototypes evolved for testing of engines, ra-
dio, radar, and weapons systems
Me 262A-0: pre-production airframes based on the Me 262 V7 configura-
tion; 23 produced; passed to test centre at Rechlin and to service trials de-
tachment (EKdo 262) in late April 1944
Me 262A-1a: standard interceptor-fighter configuration with twin Jumo
004B-1 turbojets, four Rheinmetall-Borsig MK 108A-3 30-mm cannon, Re-
vi 16.B gunsight, and FuG 16zY radio; the Me 262A-1a/U1 designation
covered three trials units with two MG 151, two MK 103 and two MK 108
cannon
85/214
Me 2G2A-2a: standard fighter-bomber configuration, similar to Me

262A-1a but with two Schloss 503A-1 bomb racks for two 250-kg (551-Ib)
bombs, and armament normally reduced to two 30-mm MK 108 cannon;
the Me 262A-2a/U2 was a trials development with Lotfe 7H bomb sight,
glazed nose, and accommodation for prone bomb-aimer 43
Me 262A-3a: trials models intended for close-support role
Me 262A-5a: reconnaissance-fighter with either twin nose-mounted Rb
50/30 oblique cameras, or single Rb 20/30 or Rb 75/30 ; adapted to the
reconnaissance role, the Me 262A-1a/U3 was used by a number of units
Me 262B-1a: conversion trainer with dual flight controls under rede-
signed canopy; deletion of rear main fuel tank necessitated carriage of two
300-litre (66-lmp gal) drop tanks on Schloss 503A-1 Wikingschiff racks
Me 262B-1a/U1: interim two-seat night-fighter with FuG 218 IMeptun V
airborne interception radar and FuG 350 ZC (Naxos) passive homer; fewer
than a dozen in service by 1945
Me 262B-2a: definitive night-fighter with lengthened fuselage to contain
additional fuel tanks; two produced
Me 262C-1a: point-defence interceptor-fighter with twin Jumo 004B-1 s
supplemented by tail-mounted Walter R 11-211/3 (HWK 509) bi-fuel rock-
et motor to give outstanding rates of climb; one trials aircraft produced
Fig 7 Me 262A-1 was experimentally flown with a 50-mm Rheinmetall BK

5
Me 262C-2b: point-defence interceptor; twin BMW 003R power units
each consisting of a BMW 003A turbojet and a BMW 718 bi-fuel rocket, fit-
ted in place of conventional motors; one produced
Me 262 C-3a Never-completed concept design for a Heimatschützer III
prototype of rocket-boosted interceptor with Walter rocket motor in belly
43This Me 262A-1 was experimentally flown with a 50-mm Rheinmetall BK 5 can-

non and was intended as a heavy bomber-destroyer. The modification was not
adopted for production aircraft.
86/214
pack.
Me 262 D-1 Proposed variant to carry Jagdfaust mortars.
Me 262 E-1 Proposed variant based on A-1a/U4 with a Mk 114 cannon.
Me 262 E-2 Proposed rocket-armed variant carrying up to 48 × R4M ro-
ckets.
Me 262 S Zero-series model for Me 262 A-1a
Me 262 W Provisional designation for Me 262 with pulse jet engines
Messerschmitt Me 262B-2a
The project bureau passed their drawings !<> the assembly shop on 8th
October 1944, only days after delivering those for the auxili.ny night Fight-
er. On 7th December the mock-up was ready for inspection by representa-
tives of the TLR, of the Rechlin and Wemeuche-n tosl centres and by the
one 'practical' expert, Kurl Welter. Only a few minor alterations were re-
quested.
On 22nd January 1945 the Technische Amt (RLM Technical Office) com-
mented apropos the use of FuG 218, 'The intention to use the FuG 218 as
an interim solution on an aircraft with a maximum speed approaching
800km/h is not justifiable.' In autumn 1944 Messer-schmitt had already
carried out trials with this nose antenna array on the Me 262 V056. There
had been no stability problems and by profiling the antennae support rods
the loss of speed had been kept down to just 20km/h (12.4mph). At any
higher operating speeds the use of such an array would be unacceptable
and the aerodynamicists in particular -always mindful of the smallest per-
centage drop in performance - preferred to see a reflector antenna con-
tained entirely within the contours of the fuselage.
(In a development report prepared for the Americans in June 1945 the Me
262B-2 was declared 'ready for take-off. No maiden flight ever took place;
nor even any further testing.) Prior to this, back in January 1945 official
circles had expressed great interest in improving the performance of the
Me 262 night fighter. Even at that late stage of the war, development of
new engines, equipment and armament had been proceeding at breath-
taking speed and Messerschmitt's 'Upper Bavarian Research Institute' was
continually trying to improve the 'immediate solution' night fighter, even
to the extent of attempting to comply with the new specifications issued on
27th January 1945. As before, Messerschmitt's aim was to avoid as far as
possible unnecessary parallel developments and to achieve quick results by
making extensive use of existing components.
87/214
Fig 7 Messerschmitt Me 262B-2a

In February 1945 Messerschmitt proposed equipping the Me 262B-2 with
Daimler-Benz DB 021 turboprop engines. These promised a shorter take-
off run and extended endurance.
88/214
89/214
But this powerplant was also still in its infancy and so, on 17th March 1945
- just four weeks before his offices and workshops were occupied by the Al-
lies - Messerschmitt submitted details of an improved version powered by
HeS011 turbojets.
90/214
91/214
Junkers Jumo 004

The Junkers Jumo 004 was the world's first turbojet engine in production
and operational use, and the first successful axial compressor jet engine
ever built. Some 8,000 units were manufactured by Junkers in Germany
92/214
during late World War II, powering the operational Messerschmitt Me 262
fighter jet and the Arado Ar 234 reconnaissance / bomber jet, along with
prototypes including the Horten Ho 229 aircraft. Variants of the engine
were produced in Eastern Europe for years following the war.
Design and development

The feasibility of jet propulsion had been demonstrated in Germany in
early 1937 by Hans von Ohain working with the Heinkel company. Most of
the Reich Air Ministry (RLM) remained uninterested, but Helmut Schelp
and Hans Mauch saw the potential of the concept and encouraged Ger-
many's aero engine manufacturers to begin their own programmes of jet
engine development. The companies remained skeptical and little new de-
velopment was carried out.
In 1939 Schelp and Mauch visited the companies to check up on progress.
Otto Mader, head of Junkers Motoren (Jumo), stated that even if the con-
cept was useful, he had no one to work on it. Schelp responded by stating
that Dr Anselm Franz, then in charge of Junkers' turbo- and supercharger
development, would be perfect for the job. Franz started his development
team later that year, and the project was given the RLM designation 109-
004 (the 109- prefix, assigned by the RLM was common to all reaction en-
gine projects in WW II Germany, and was also used for German WW II ro-
cket engine designs for manned aircraft).
Franz opted for a design that was at once conservative and revolutionary.
His design differed from von Ohain's in that he utilised a new type of com-
pressor which allowed a continuous, straight flow of air through the engine
(an axial compressor), recently developed by the Aerodynamische Ver-
suchsanstalt (AVA - Aerodynamic Research Institute) at Göttingen. The
axial-flow compressor not only had excellent performance, about 78% effi-
cient in "real world" conditions, but it also had a smaller cross-section, im-
portant for high-speed aircraft.
On the other hand, he aimed to produce an engine that was far below its
theoretical potential, in the interests of expediting development and sim-
plifying production. One major decision was to opt for a simple combus-
tion area using six "flame cans", instead of the more efficient single annu-
lar can. For the same reasons, he collaborated heavily on the development
of the engine's turbine with Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG -
General Electric Company) in Berlin, and instead of building development
engines, opted to begin work immediately on the prototype of an engine
that could be put straight into production. Franz's conservative approach
came under question from the RLM, but was vindicated when even given
the developmental problems that it was to face, the 004 entered produc-
tion and service well ahead of its more technologically advanced competi-
93/214
tor, the BMW 003. 44
Technical description and testing

The first prototype 004A, which was constructed to run on diesel fuel, was
first tested in October 1940, though without an exhaust nozzle. It was
benchtested at the end of January 1941 to a top thrust of 430 kgf (4,200 N;
950 lbf), and work continued to increase the output, the RLM contract ha-
ving set a minimum of 600 kgf (5,900 N; 1,300 lbf) thrust.
Vibration problems with the compressor blades delayed the program at
this point, until a new stator design by Max Bentele solved the problem.
The original alloy compressor blades were replaced with steel ones and
with the new stators in place the engine developed 5.9 kN (1,300 lbf) in Au-
gust, and passed a 10-hour endurance run at 9.8 kN (2,200 lbf) in Decem-
ber. The first flight test took place on March 15 1942, when a 004A was ca-
rried aloft by a Messerschmitt Bf 110 to run up the engine in flight.
On July 18, one of the prototype Messerschmitt Me 262s flew for the first
time under jet power from its 004 engines, and the 004 was ordered into
production by the RLM to the extent of 80 engines.
The initial 004A engines built to power the Me 262 prototypes had been
built without restrictions on materials, and they used scarce raw materials
such as nickel, cobalt, and molybdenum in quantities which were unaccep-
table in production. Franz realized that the Jumo 004 would have to be re-
designed to incorporate a minimum of these strategic materials, and this
was accomplished. All the hot metal parts, including the combustion cham-
ber, were changed to mild steel protected by an aluminum coating, and the
44Cutaway example of a Junkers Jumo 004 jet engine at the National Museum of
the U.S. Air Force, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.
94/214
hollow turbine blades were produced from folded and welded Cromadur
alloy (12% chromium, 18% manganese, and 70% iron) developed by
Krupp, and cooled by compressed air "bled" from the compressor. The en-
gine's operational lifespan was shortened, but on the plus side it became
easier to construct.
The first production model of the 004B weighed 100 kg (220 lb) less than
the 004A, and in 1943 had passed several 100 hour tests, with a time bet-
ween overhauls of 50 hours being achieved.
Later in 1943 a series of engines suffered vibration problems which drag-
ged on. Eventually, in December, blade-vibration specialist Max Bentele
was once again brought in during a meeting at the RLM headquarters, and
the problem was solved by raising the blades' natural frequency by increa-
sing their taper, shortening them by 1 millimeter, and reducing the opera-
ting speed of the engine from 9,000 to 8,700 rpm.
It was not until early 1944 that full production could finally begin. These
setbacks were the principal factor delaying the Luftwaffe's introduction of
the Me 262 into squadron service.
Given the lower-quality steels used in the 004B, these engines typically
only had a service life of some 10-25 hours, perhaps twice this in the hands
of a skilled pilot. Another shortcoming of the engine, common to all early
turbojets, was its sluggish throttle response. Worse, it was fairly easy to in-
ject too much fuel into the engine by throttling up too quickly, allowing
heat to build up before the cooling air could remove it. This led to softe-
ning of the turbine blades, and was a major cause for engine failures. Ne-
vertheless, it made jet power for combat aircraft a reality for the first time.
The exhaust area of the 004 featured a variable geometry nozzle, which
had a special restrictive body nicknamed the Zwiebel (German for onion,
due to its shape when seen from the side) which had roughly 40 cm (16
inch) of fore-and-aft travel to vary the jet exhaust's cross-sectional area for
thrust control, as the active part of a pioneering "divergent-convergent"
nozzle format.
One interesting feature of the 004 was the starter system, which consisted
of a Riedel 10 hp (7.5 kW) 2-stroke motorcycle engine hidden in the intake,
and essentially functioned as a pioneering example of an APU for starting
a jet engine. A hole in the extreme nose of the intake diverter body contai-
ned a pull-handle for the cable which "turned-over" the piston engine,
which in turn spun up the turbine. Two small gasoline/oil mix tanks were
fitted within the upper perimeter of the annular intake's sheet metal hou-
sing for fueling the Riedel two-stroke mechanical APU unit.
The Jumo 004 could run on three types of fuel:
J-2, its standard fuel, a synthetic fuel produced from coal.
Diesel oil.
Aviation gasoline; not considered desirable due to its high rate of con-
95/214
sumption.
Postwar production
Following World War II, Jumo 004s were built in small numbers by Male-
šice in Czechoslovakia, designated M-04, to power the Avia S-92 which
was itself a copy of the Me 262. Jumo 004 copies were also built in the So-
viet Union as the RD-10, where they powered the Yakovlev Yak-15 as well
as many prototype jet fighters.
In France, captured 004s powered the Sud-Ouest SO 6000 Triton and the
Arsenal VG-70.
A number of more advanced versions were in development at the end of
the war. The 004C included an afterburner for increased thrust, but was
not built. The 004D improved fuel efficiency with a two-stage fuel injector,
and introduced a new throttle control that avoided dumping too much fuel
into the engine during throttle-ups. The 004D had passed testing and was
ready to enter production in place of the 004B, when the war ended. The
004E was a 004D model with an improved exhaust area for better altitude
performance.
A much more advanced model based on the same basic systems was also
under development as the Jumo 012. The 012 was based on a "two-spool"
system, in which two turbines, spinning at different speeds, drove two se-
parate sections of the compressor for more efficiency. In a jet engine the
compressor typically uses up about 60% of all the power generated, so any
improvements can have a dramatic effect on fuel use. Plans were also un-
derway to use the 012's basic concept in an engine outwardly identical to
the 004, known as the 004H, which improved specific fuel consumption
from the 004B's 1.39 kg/(daN*h) to a respectable 1.20 kg/(daN*h), a de-
crease of about 15%.
96/214
Variants table
Layout: ax=axial flow compressor stages, in=individual combustion

chambers, tu=turbine stages.
Applications
Apart from the Me 262 and Arado Ar 234, the engine was used to power
the experimental Junkers Ju 287, and prototypes of the Horten Ho 229
and Heinkel He 280. There were plans to install the Jumo 004D variant in
the Heinkel He 162 in its proposed A-8 version, as well as the Focke-Wulf
Ta 183, Henschel Hs 132 and Blohm & Voss P.188 then under develop-
ment.
Luftwaffe Weapons
The Automatic Upward-firing Twin MG FF/M

Commonly known as the 'Schrage Musik' (Jazz Music), this oblique up-
ward-firing weapon developed in 1942 is reported to have been based upon
a suggestion by night-fighter pilot Major Rudolf Schoenert and approved
by General Kammhuber. Reflected light beams from an enemy aircraft,
captured by a caesium photocell in the infra-red 'Zossen A', activated the
twin 20mm MG FF/M weapons when flying beneath the enemy aircraft.
Jointly developed by the AEG and Carl Zeiss firms, only a few examples of
the “Zossen A2” were used operationally. This infra-red sensor was also
considered at one stage for installation in the Me 163B.
The MG FF was a drum-fed, 20 mm aircraft autocannon, developed in
1936 by Ikaria Werke Berlin of Germany. It was a derivative of the Swiss
Oerlikon FF F cannon, itself a development of the German World War I
97/214
Becker 20 mm cannon, and was designed to be used in fixed or flexible

mountings, as both an offensive and a defensive weapon. It saw wides-
pread use in those roles by the German Luftwaffe, particularly during the
early stages of World War II, although from 1941 onwards it was gradually
replaced by the 20 mm MG 151/20.
Compared to rival designs, such as the Hispano-Suiza HS.404 - which had
been developed from the larger Oerlikon FF S - the MG FF had some disad-
vantages, such as low rate of fire and low muzzle velocity, as well as limited
ammunition storage in its drums. On the other hand, it was much lighter
and shorter. Wing installation on the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Focke-
Wulf Fw 190 fighters was not easy, as the drum required substantial space,
and as a consequence the ammunition storage was initially reduced to 60
shells per drum. An ammunition drum of 90-round nominal capacity was
developed for the Fw 190 A-5, and retrofitted to some earlier variants. The-
re were also experiments with belt feedings.
The MG FF was adapted to fire a new type of high-capacity, high-explosive
mine shell, called Minengeschoss that featured a projectile with thinner
walls that allowed increased explosive charge. This projectile was lighter
and generated less recoil than earlier projectiles requiring a modification
of the recoil mechanism. With this modification it could fire the new mine
shell, but accidentally using the heavier MG FF ammo could damage the
gun. The now-called MG FF/M was introduced with the Bf 109 E-4 and Bf
110 C-4 in Summer 1940.
The MG FF and FF/M saw widespread use in fighters such as the Bf 109 E-
3 to F-1, Bf 110 C to F, and Fw 190 A-1 to A-5. The Fw 190 was typically fit-
ted with an inboard pair of MG 151 and an outboard pair of MG FF, alt-
hough the MG FF were sometimes removed in the field in order to save
weight.
98/214
The cannon was also fitted to bombers such as the Do 217, Ju 88, He 111,
Do 17, as well as many other aircraft. Although the MG FF was often repla-
99/214
ced with the 20 mm MG 151/20 from 1941 onwards, it saw a come-back in

1943 as the primary Schräge Musik gun in the Bf 110 night fighters, as it fit
perfectly into the rear cockpit.
The MG FF fired a 134 g projectile with a muzzle velocity of some 600 m/s
and a rate of fire of about 520 rounds per minute. The MG FF/M fired a
90 g HE/M (high explosive mine shell) projectile with a muzzle velocity of
c. 700 m/s and a rate of fire of c. 540 rounds per minute. AP, HE and in-
cendiary projectiles were also available (115 to 117 g projectiles, 585 m/s, c.
520 rpm) because the mine-shot was not capable of holding incendiary or
tracer parts.
Technical data
Weight : 26.3 kg
Length : 1.37 m
Muzzle velocity : 600 m/s (MG FF), 585 m/s (FF/M with AP or HE), 700
m/s (MG FF/M with mine shell)
Rate of fire : 520 rpm (MG FF, FF/M with AP or HE), 540 rounds per mi-
nute (MG FF/M with mine-shot)
Round types: armor-piercing (AP), high-explosive (HE), incendiary, all
with or without tracer; high-explosive mine-shot (HE(M)) (only MG
FF/M)
BK 3.7 Bordkanone
Developed by the Rheinmetall-Borsig AG, this fixed forward-firing cannon,
also known as the Flak 18 when used by ground anti-aircraft batteries,
.was a recoil-loading automatic weapon with a sliding barrel and a central
locking mechanism. When installed in an aircraft, the 6-round clip was
turned through 90° to the right in a weapons bay. In the Mel 10G-2/R1, it
was installed in a gondola beneath the fuselage.
Loading of the weapon in flight was performed by the radio operator. Fir-
ing followed electro-pneumatically after the pilot activated the safety
switch on the SKK safety switch console via the B-button on the KG 13E
control column. Target sighting was by the Revi C/12D. Although the BK
3.7 was a very effective weapon against four-engined bombers, it achieved
100/214
wide success when used against Russian tanks.
101/214
102/214
As mentioned earlier in this volume, its initiator, the Stuka-Ace and 'tank-
buster' Hans-Ulrich Rudel, equipped with two of these weapons beneath
the wings of his Ju 87D-3 and G-2, was able to destroy over 500 Russian
tanks. The BK 3.7 was also fitted to the Hsl29B-2/R3 (12-round clip), the
Me 110G-2/R1, R3 and R4 (two 6-round clips), and the Ju 88P-2 and P-3.
The Bordkanone BK 3,7 (onboard cannon 37) was a 37mm anti-tank/bom-
ber autocannon based on the earlier 37 mm Flak 18 made by Rheinmetall.
It was mounted on World War II Luftwaffe aircraft such as the anti-tank or
bomber-destroyer versions of the Junkers Ju 87D-3 and G-2, Henschel Hs
129B-2/R3, Messerschmitt Bf 110G-2/R1-3, and others. The cannon could
be attached under the wings or fuselage of the aircraft as a self-contained
gun pod with a 12-round magazine. It fired APCR (Tungsten hard core)
ammunition or high explosive shells in 37x263B mm caliber at 160 rounds
per minute.
BK-37 equipped ground attack aircraft were developed for use in the anti-
tank role on the Eastern Front in a somewhat desperate effort to blunt the
massive numerical superiority of the Soviet T-34 as the war turned against
Germany. The concept was rather rudimentary, suffered from various is-
sues (primarily poor accuracy, severe weight penalty making the craft vul-
nerable to fighters, and a low ammunition capacity), but could be extre-
mely effective when operated by a sufficiently skilled and practiced
ground-attack pilot (Hans-Ulrich Rudel in his BK-37 armed Stuka being
the ultimate example).
The heavy caliber autocannon-armed series of Ju 88P twin-engined attack
aircraft series used twin BK 3,7 cannon, mounted side-by-side in a confor-
mal ventral fuselage gun pod, in its Ju 88P-2 and P-3 versions. The P-3
version only differed through the addition of extra defensive armor. As
with other examples of the P-series, the Ju 88P-2 and P-3 were perceived
as failures in both anti-tank and bomber destroyer role.
In contrast to the previous method (bombs delivered by dive bombing),
when the BK-37 was employed in a top attack profile against the especially
thin upper turret and engine compartment armor of a tank, kills could be
achieved with a relatively light and cheap armor piercing projectile that
could be carried in much greater quantities than bombs, but would be in-
sufficient to penetrate if fired horizontally from the ground in the normal
method. This was the first known implementation of a medium airborne
cannon in the top down anti-tank role, and was the direct inspiration for
later designs such as the 30mm GAU-8/A Avenger equipping the A-10
Thunderbolt II. Although revolutionary, the concept was implemented too
late and in too few numbers to appreciably impact the course of the war for
Germany.
103/214
One of the two surviving Junkers Ju 87s is a G-2 model displayed at the
Royal Air Force Museum London. The aircraft's wings have the attachment
points for BK 37 gun pods, but it is not displayed with them fitted.
Specifications
Type: single-barrel automatic cannon
Caliber: 37 mm (1.46 in)
Cartridge: 37 mm x 263
Operation: Short Recoil
Length: 3.63 m (11 ft 11 in)
Weight: 295 kg (650 lb)
Rate of fire: 160 rpm
Muzzle velocity: 1,170 to 780 m/s (3,836 to 2,557 ft/s)
Projectile weight: APCR 380 g, HE 640 g, AT 685 g
Bordkanone BK 5 Cannon
Also developed by Rheinmetall-Borsig in response to the demand for a
heavier-calibre weapon for anti-tank use on the Eastern Front in 1943, the
BK 5 stemmed from the KWK 39 Kampfwagenkanone (armoured-car or
104/214
tank cannon). For effective use against enemy bombers, the BK5 was in-
stalled on the Me410A-2/U4 operated by Zerstorer squadrons.
In order to modify the KWK 39 into an aircraft weapon, the most signifi-
cant alteration was the provision of an automatic cartridge feed which
formed a circular belt at the rear. Since the BK 5 did not have a reciprocat-
ing belt to feed the cartridges, a compressed air-driven rammer was built
onto the rear of the gun, the rammer driving a 50mm cartridge out of the
feed belt into the gun breech and ramming it into the chamber for firing.
Weapon reload was possible during flight it the crew when installed in the
Ju 88. On other types of aircraft, a pre-loaded quantity ol ammunition was
carried: on the Me410A 2/U4 (with a 22-round magazine) it weighed
650kg (l,4331b). The BK5 was also installed in the Ju88P-4 and for the Me
262, was lo have been overcome by use of a 22-round magazine.
Air-firing trials against a ground target in 1944 were highly successful, but
plans lo equip two other Me 262s were not carried out. For attacking heav-
ily armoured targets, the BK 5 was also planned for installation in the
Hel77A-3, Jul88S and Ju 288 bombers. A single hit with a c. 1.6kg (3.51b)
weight projectile was sufficient to bring down a four-engined heavy bomb-
er. At a greater range, the trajectory of the heavy cannon shell fell off ap-
preciably. After the war, a captured BK5 was put on display in the USAF
Museum in Dayton, Ohio.
The Bordkanone 5, or BK 5 for short, was a 50 mm autocannon intended
primarily for use against Allied heavy bombers, especially the United Sta-
tes Army Air Forces's (USAAF) Boeing B-17. The large calibre shells had
very high momentum, allowing them to be accurately fired from long ran-
ges, well outside the range of the defensive guns mounted on the bombers.
Rheinmetall was given a contract in 1943 to adapt the 50 mm KwK 39 tank
gun, from the Panzer III tank, for aerial use in the twin-engined Me 410
Hornisse bomber destroyer. They were installed as Umrüst-Bausätze (Fac-
tory Modification) 4 in the Me 410 A-1/U4, and experimentally, in two Me
262 A-1a/U4 jet fighter prototypes (though these were not used operatio-
nally), as the MK 214 cannon of similar caliber was not yet available. The
semi-circular magazine held 21 rounds.
Approximately 300 were produced and it saw only limited action, most no-
tably in the Me 410 A-1/U4 aircraft that served with the II. Gruppe of
Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26). It was also mounted on the Junkers Ju
88 P-4 night attack aircraft. Intended for long-range shots, the cannon was
given a telescopic sight in addition to the Me 410's standard Revi C12C
gunsight. This proved to be more of a hindrance than a help in the turning
fights in which the Me 410s often found themselves, as the maneuvering
targets easily escaped from the telescopic sight's small field of view.
As installed in the Me 262, the cannon was found to be prone to jamming,
and if fired at night the BK 5's muzzle flash tended to temporarily blind the
105/214
pilot's night vision.
According to the account of the engagements against the USAAF by

II./ZG 26 from late February through mid-April 1944 mentioned at a Ger-
man language website, the 53 Me 410 Hornissen of that Zerstörergruppe
equipped with the BK 5 - as the Umrüst-Bausätze factory modification de-
signated /U4 for the Me 410 series of aircraft - were said to have to shot
down a total of 129 B-17 Flying Fortress and four B-24 Liberator heavy
bomber aircraft, distributed over a series of five or six interceptions, all
while losing only nine of their own Me 410
106/214
BK 5 Bordkanone - data
5cm Mauser MK 214A Bordkanone

The Rheinmetall-Borsig BK 5 and the Mauser MK214 were being devel-
oped in parallel. Because of the excessively high 990kg (2,183 Ib) installa-
tion weight of the 55mm Rheinmetall-Borsig MK114, the two firms were
given contracts to produce an improved and lighter weapon. The BK 214A
weapon demonstrated by Mauser at the end of 1944 represented largely a
further development of the BK 5, but due to its 390 individual parts and
various alterations to the locking and loading procedures, became too com-
plex for aircraft installation. The 3.500kg (7.716 Ib) recoil force was ab-
sorbed by a hydraulic braking system. 45
The second prototype of the MK 214A was installed in the Me262A (Werk
Nr. 111899), first flown by Karl Baur in late February 1945,
and both ground and air firing trials were conducted during March 1945.
Another Me 262A (Werk Nr. 170083) was equipped with the third proto-
type MK214A, but although both machines were captured by US Forces, it
is not known if the latter aircraft was flown with the weapon.
Prior to installation in the Me262As, the MK 214A had only been test-
flown in a Ju 88. Proposals also existed for its installation in the Dornier P
252/3, Heinkel Hel62A, Messerschmitt Me262A-la/U4 and Me262E-l. As
1 indicated in the data table, work on an improved fully-automatic
MK214B of 55mm calibre of lower weight and higher rate of fire was under
45Two views of the 5cm Mauser MK 214A Bordkanone, a further development of

the BK 5.
107/214
way in April 1944, but had not been tested up to the end of the war.
Mauser MK 214 Bordkanone
7.5cm BK 7.5 Bordkanone

From 1942 onwards, German fighter pilots increasingly established that
the Allied bombers sported stronger armour protection and increased ar-
mament positions. The 13mm MG131 and 20mm MG151/20 weapons were
bordering on their limits insofar as the enemy forced the fighter pilots to
open fire from long range and remain 'on the ball' until the enemy was de-
stroyed. Fast-firing Bordkanone of heavier calibre and armour-piercing
shells were already under development in 1942, but were not yet ready for
service use. To overcome this desperate situation, the German weapons ex-
perts sought after solutions. 46
46 Junkers Ju 88P-1 “Flying Flak” with the 7.5cm Bordkanone
108/214
In the summer of 1942, the first trials were undertaken by Junkers with a
7.5cm (2.95in) -anti-tank projectile - the Pak 40L equipped with a 10-
round magazine, and especially suited for the anti-tank role. The weapon
was housed in a ventral gondola beneath a Ju 88A-4 fuselage, and in an
emergency, could be completely jettisoned. Production aircraft so
equipped bore the RLM designation Ju 88P-1. From its 3.625m (lift
10%in) long container, the Pak 40 gun barrel projected 85cm (33 1/2in)
ahead of the aircraft nose, ending in the over-dimensioned VI3 muzzle
brake which deflected the gas pressure and together with the sliding bar-
rel, captured the recoil force. The projectile could be fired singly or in ser-
ies. After each firing, the barrel travelled
back 90cm (35 1/2in), opening the seal and ejecting the spent cartridges,
manual loading being undertaken by the crew mechanic. The weapon was
centred for a target distance of 650m (711yds) ahead, with sighting by the
Revi C12D. Besides Sprenggranate (high-explosive shells), the Pak 40L
and the improved BK7.5 fired the Panzergranate 39 (armour-piercing
shell) that could pierce 13cm (Sin) thick armoured steel at a 90° angle at
1.000m (1.093yds).
Only four Ju88P-ls were equipped with this weapon as its rate of fire was
too low, and in practice was limited to only a few rounds capable of being
fired during a single target approach. For day-fighting purposes, the Ju
88P-1 was too slow, especially when it had to escape from enemy fire and
was therefore only used in the anti-tank role.
In addition to the Ju 88P-1, the Pak 40L was fitted beneath the nose of the
Hel77A-l/Rl. The BK7.5 was installed in some 20 Hsl29B-2/R4 aircraft
and the Me 41OA-2. After only five Hel77A-3/R5s had been so fitted, the
109/214
plan to equip further examples was abandoned on account of strong vibra-

tions. The Me 262 'Schnellbomber II' and Ju388J were also planned to be
fitted with this weapon. Because of its limited possibilities of installation
and use by the end of 1944, less than 30 examples of the BK7.5 were com-
pleted.
BK7.5 Bordkanone - data
MG 17 Machine Gun
The MG 17 was a 7.92 mm machine gun produced by Rheinmetall-Borsig
for use at fixed mountings in many World War II Luftwaffe aircraft.
A mainstay fixed machine gun in German built aircraft (many of which we-
re sold to other countries) well before World War II, by 1940 it was star-
ting to be replaced with heavier caliber machine gun and cannons. By 1945
very few if any aircraft mounted the MG 17.
The MG 17 was installed in the Messerschmitt Bf 109, Messerschmitt Bf
110, Focke-Wulf Fw 190, Junkers Ju 87, Junkers Ju 88C Nightfighter,
Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17/215 Nightfighter, Focke-Wulf Fw 189 and
many other aircraft. Many MG 17s were later modified for infantry use as
heavier weapons replaced them on Luftwaffe aircraft. Official numbers of
conversions was about 24,271 by January 1, 1944, although additional con-
versions may have been done as well.
Specifications
Calibre: 7.9 +/- .04 mm
Cartridge: 8x57 mm IS
110/214
Round weight: 35.5 grams (cartridge 24 grams, bullet 11.5 grams)

Muzzle velocity: from 855 m/s (Phosphor "B" round ) to 905 m/s (Armor
Piercing Tracer "SmK L'spur" round)
Dimensions
Length: 1175 mm
Weight: 10.2 kg
Action: Recoil
Feed system: Belt magazine
Sights Remotely located, various types
MG 151 Cannon
The MG 151 (MG 151/15) was a 15 mm aircraft-mounted autocannon pro-
duced by Waffenfabrik Mauser during World War II. It was the prototype
for the 20 mm MG 151/20 cannon widely used on German Luftwaffe figh-
ters, night fighters, fighter-bombers, bombers and ground-attack aircraft.
Salvaged guns saw post-war use by other nations.
Development and wartime history (MG 151/20)

The pre-war German doctrine for arming single-engine fighter aircraft mi-
rrored that of the French. This doctrine favored a powerful autocannon
mounted between the cylinder blocks of a V engine and firing through the
propeller hub, known as a moteur-canon in French (from its first use with
the Hispano-Suiza HS.8C engine in World War I, on the SPAD S.XII) and
by the cognate Motorkanone in German by the 1930s. The weapon prefe-
rred by the French in this role was the most powerful 20mm Oerlikon of
the time, namely the FFS model, but this proved too big for German engi-
nes. Mauser was tasked to develop a gun that would fit, with a minimum
sacrifice in performance. (As a stop-gap measure, the MG FF cannon was
developed and put in widespread use, but its performance was lackluster.)
Production of the MG 151 in its original 15 mm calibre format began in
1940. After combat evaluation of the 15 mm cartridge as the main arma-
ment of early Messerschmitt Bf 109F-2 fighters, the cannon was redesig-
ned as the 20 mm MG 151/20 in 1941 to fire a 20 mm cartridge. 47
A handful of Ar 234Bs were fitted with cannon in a ventral tray and FuG 218
47
Neptun radar for night fighting
111/214
The combat experience showed that a more powerful explosive shell was
preferable to a higher projectile velocity. The MG 151/20 cartridge was
created by expanding the neck of the cartridge to hold the larger explosive
shell used in the MG FF cannon, and shortening the length of the cartridge
case holding the longer 20 mm shell to match the overall length of the ori-
ginal 15 mm cartridge. These measures simplified conversion of the 15 mm
to the 20 mm MG 151/20 simply by changing the barrel and making other
small modifications. A disadvantage of the simplified conversion was re-
duction of projectile muzzle velocity from 850 metres per second
(2.800 ft/s) for the 15 mm shell to 700 metres per second (2.300 ft/s) for
the larger and heavier 20 mm shell. With an AP projectile the new 20mm
cartridge could only penetrate around 10-12mm of armor at 300m and at
60 degrees, compared to 18mm penetration for its 15mm predecessor in
the same conditions, but this was not seen as a significant limitation. The
20 mm version thus became the standard inboard cannon for the Bf 109F-
4 series onwards. The 20 mm MG 151/20 offered more predictable trajec-
tory, longer range and higher impact velocity than the 580 metres per se-
cond (1,900 ft/s) cartridge of the earlier MG FF cannon. The MG FF was
retained for flexible, wing and upward firing Schräge Musik mounts to the
end of the war.
The German preference for explosion rather than armor penetration was
taken further with the development of the Minengeschoß ammunition,
first introduced for the MG FF (in the Bf 109 E-4), and later introduced for
the MG 151/20 as well. Even this improvement in explosive power turned
out to be unsatisfactory against the four-engine bombers that German figh-
ters were up against in the second part of the war. By German calculations,
it took about 15-20 hits with the MG 151/20 ordnance to down a heavy
bomber, but this was reduced to just 3-4 hits for a 30 mm shell, from the
shattering effects of the hexogen explosive in the shells used for both the
long-barreled MK 103 and shorter barreled MK 108 cannon. (Only 4-5 hits
with 20 mm calibre ordnance were needed for frontal attacks, even on B-
17s, but such attacks were difficult to pull off.) The 30 mm MK 108 cannon
thus replaced the MG 151/20 as the standard, engine-mount Motorkanone
center-line armament starting with the Bf 109 K-4, and was also retrofitted
112/214
to some of the G-series.

Eight hundred MG 151/20 exported to Japan aboard the Italian submarine
Cappellini in August 1943 were used to equip 388 Japanese Ki-61-I Hei
fighters. The 20 mm MG 151/20 was also fitted on the Macchi C.205, the
Fiat G.55 and Reggiane Re.2005 of the Regia Aeronautica and IAR 81C of
the Romanian Royal Air Force.
The original 15 mm cartridge is similar to a 14.5mm round developed in
World War 2 for the Soviet PTRD and PTRS antitank rifles and used in
post-war heavy machine guns.
Postwar Use
After WWII, numbers of ex-Luftwaffe MG 151/20 cannon were removed
from inventory and from scrapped aircraft and used by various nations in
their own aircraft. The French Air Force and French Army aviation arm
(ALAT) utilized MG 151/20 cannon as both fixed and flexible armament in
various aircraft, including helicopters. The FAF and ALAT jointly develo-
ped a rubber-insulated flexible mount for the MG 151/20 for use as a door
gun, which was later used in combat in Algeria aboard several FAF/ALAT
H-21C assault transport helicopters and on HSS-1 Pirate gunship helicop-
ters. French Matra MG 151 20mm cannons were used by Portugal and Rho-
desia fitted to their Alouette III helicopters, while Denel designed its own
variant for the South African Air Force.
Recent developments of 14.5mm High Explosive Incendiary rounds may
be regarded as a revival of the 15mm cannon concept.
MG 151 specifications
Caliber: 15 mm x 96
Operation: Recoil-operated; short recoil
Length: 1916 mm
Barrel length: 1254 mm
Rifling: 8 grooves, right hand twist, 1 turn in 16"
Weight (complete): 38.1 kg (84 lb)
Effective range: 1000 m
Muzzle velocity: 850 m/s (AP-T); 960 m/s (HE-T, HEI-T); 1030 m/s
AP(WC)
Projectile types:
AP-T weighting 72 g
HE weighting 57 g. HE filler: 2.8 g
AP(WC) weighting 52 g
113/214
MG 151/20 specifications
Two versions of the 20 mm MG 151 were built. Early guns used a percus-
sion priming system, and later E-models used electrical priming. Some
rounds were available with a timer self-destruct and/or tracer (or glowtra-
cer). There were also different types of high explosive shell fillings with eit-
her standard PETN, a mixture called HA41 (RDX and aluminium), and a
compressed version where more explosives were compressed into same
space using large pressures (XM).
Caliber: 20 mm x 82
Operation: Recoil-operated; short recoil
Length: 1766 mm
Barrel length: 1104 mm/55 calibers
Rifling: 1 turn in 23 calibers
Weight (complete): 42.7 kg
Effective range:800 m
Muzzle velocity: 805 m/s (M-Geschoss); 705 m/s (HE-T, AP)
Round types:
114/214
Ammunition specifications
The R4M 'Orkan' Bordrakete

Development of this 55mm calibre rocket-propelled unguided folding-fin
air-to-air rocket projectile was begun by the Deutsche Waf-fen- und Muni-
tionsfabriken (German Ordnance & Ammunition Factories) in Liibeck-
Schlutup upon a development proposal of the Kurt Heber firm in Oster-
ode/Harz under the designation R4M, where R = Rakete (rocket), 4 = its
weight in kilograms, and M = Minenkopf (high-explosive warhead). De-
signed as simply as possible for mass-production, it consisted of a nose im-
pact fuse, an HA 41 warhead (75% Hexogen, 20% aluminium and 5% Mon-
tan wax) enclosed in a Nitropenta shell, and a diglycol-dinitrate solid-fuel
rocket cylinder 37.4cm (14 1/2in) in length and 44mm (1/2in) in diameter,
exhausting through the thrust nozzle 12mm in length that expanded from
115/214
10mm to its final 25mm diameter.
For launching from beneath the wings of aircraft, the R4M 'Orkan' (Ty-
phoon or Hurricane) was attached to a wooden rack in multiples of 6 or 12
fired at intervals of 0.07 sees. At a distance of 1.000m (1.093yds), its dis-
persion covered an area 15m (49ft) high by 30m (98ft) wide, the 8 folding
fins opening immediately after launch.
Initial trials were undertaken with a Bf 110 and an Me 163A, the R4M and
EZ 42 gunsight fitted in 1945 to about 60 examples of the Me 262A-lb. Op-
erational use of this weapon brought about a dramatic increase from 1:1 to
a 7:1 ratio of kills in the Luftwaffe's favour. On one occasion, Me 262s
equipped with R4Ms reportedly destroyed 25 B-17s out of a total of 425
bombers. Enclosed in various designs of honeycomb containers for fuse-
lage nose installation, the R4M was studied for use by the Ba349, BVP212,
He 162, HsP136 and other projects. Of the initial order for 20,000 rockets,
some 2.500 examples of the c. 12.000 built had been fired off. One post-
war development of the R4M was the US 'Mighty Mouse' rocket projectile.
116/214
R4M 'Orkan' - data
The RZ 65 Tohn' Bordrakete

This solid-propellant rocket-propelled projectile had been initiated and
tested as early as 1937 by Rheinmetall-Borsig for the HWA (Army Ord-
nance Office). With an improved propellant charge, dispersion was re-
duced from 7m (23ft) at 100m (109yds) distance to a rectangle of 2.6m (8ft
6 in) height and 3.6m (12ft) width at this distance by 1939. 48
Developed under the leadership of Dr-Ing Heinrich Klein from November
48 Twelve RZ 65s in two rows beneath an Me 110F-2 fuselage
117/214
1941, the improved RZ 65A, which stood for Rauch-zylinder (smoke cylin-
der) and 65mm (2 in) body diameter, was succeeded soon afterward by the
RZ 65B. Maximum diameter was 73mm (2 1/2in) at the warhead and car-
tridge base. Like the R4M, it also had an HA 41 warhead and the WASAG
R 61 diglycol-dinitrate rocket charge, the projectile being stabilised in
flight through its high rotational speed. By increasing the thrust nozzles
from 15 to 20, dispersion was reduced from a 2 x 1.65m (6ft 6 1/2 in x 5ft
1/2 in) rectangle to only 1.65 x 1.25m (5ft 1/2in x 4ft 1/4in).
118/214
Several alterations were necessary during the course of development to

turn it into a viable aircraft weapon. Upon detonation, the 130gm (0.291b)
explosive warhead generated a gas cloud that set alight everything within a
radius of 6m (19ft 8 1/4in). The fragmentation effect can be likened to that
of a circular saw which shattered everything into minute particles.
119/214
Despite favourable judgements passed on it, the RZ 65 Riistsatz (equip-

ment set) did not enter series production and only a small number of
Zerstorer (heavy fighters), Jager (fighters) and Schlachtflugzeuge (ground
attack aircraft) were equipped with this and the essentially similar RZ 73
weapon.
Flight trials were undertaken with Individual examples of the Me109F-2,

Me110G-4, Hel 11, Ha137, Me 210 V4 and Ju 88A-2 in various wing-
mounted and ventral fuselage multi-round arrangements. It was also
planned for installation on the Ju 88P-4, Me 210, Ar 240 and the Me163B
but were never fitted.
120/214
RZ 65 Tohn' (Warm Wind) - data
The RZ100 Bordrakete

One of the oft-cited German artillery weapons of First World War vintage
was the 'Dicke Berta' (Big Bertha) mortar shell built by the Krupp firm.
With a calibre of 42cm (16.54in) and total weight 922kg (2.035 lb) of
which 106.25kg (234 lb) comprised the warhead, it had an initial velocity
of 452m/sec (1.483ft/sec) and attained a range of 14.250m (15.580yds). In
1914 it played a special role in the destruction of Belgian fortifications. 49
49The airborne “Dicke Bertha”. Heaviest aircraft weapon ever developed, the
RZ100 is seen here on an experimental launching ramp beneath the dummy Mes-
serschmitt Me 210 fuselage nose.
121/214
The aim behind development of this rocket-propelled shell of the same

calibre by Rheinmetall-Borsig in 1941 was to achieve maximum destructive
effect from fragmentation of a powerful warhead within a bomber forma-
tion even when accuracy to be imparted was not high. Nicknamed the
'Dicke Berta zur Luff (Aerial Big Bertha) in association with its forbear, two
variants of the RZ100 were developed. The first, 1.474m (4ft 10in) in
length, was propelled by a solid-propellant diglycol rocket charge weighing
82kg (181 lb) having 18 discharge nozzles distributed over two concentric
rings each of 9 nozzles, inclined at an angle to provide spin stabilisation. In
the second, of slightly increased length and diglycol weight, the propelling
nozzles were divided for spin stabilisation into a larger ring of 12 angled
nozzles and 45 smaller ones inset within the outer ring. This 730kg
(1.6091b) shell-the heaviest Bordwaffe (airborne weapon) ever developed,
was planned to be carried by a Messerschmitt Me 210 in a specially-de-
signed launching trough having guide rails. Ground firing tests were con-
ducted by Erprobungskommando
(Test Detachment) EK 25 at the E-Stellen (Test Centres) Rechlin and Tar-
newitz. As a result of a decision taken by the RLM Department GL/C-E6,
trials were stopped at the end of 1944. Among the reasons given was the in-
ability to steer the weapon via its thrust nozzles.
It was probably also due to the extensive damage caused to the Me 210
ground-test fuselage that would have adversely affected the aircraft's flying
capabilities after an air firing. Two other projectiles under development by
122/214
Rheinmetall-Borsig were the RZ73 (an improved RZ 65) with a propellant

thrust of 680kg (1.499lb) for 0.18 seconds which gave the 3.2kg (7 lb)
weight shell a maximum velocity of 360m/sec (1.181ft/sec) and an effective
range of 400m (437yds), and the RZ15/8 based on experience with the
RZ73. The 25 angled diglycol rocket nozzles provided spin stabilisation for
this weapon of 158mm (6.22in) calibre, length 85cm (33 1/2in) and weight
50kg (10lb), of which 5.8kg (12.8lb) was the propellant charge. Some ex-
amples were tested on a Bfl 10 but did not pass the experimental stage.
RZ100 Bordrakete - data
The X7 “Rotkâppchen” Bordrakete

As early as 1941, BMW proposed a guided rocket-powered anti-tank mis-
sile. As there was no real need for such a weapon at the time, the sugges-
tion was not pursued. In 1943, Dr Max Kramer at the DVL Berlin-Adler-
shof commenced work on development of a small winged fighter rocket,
the X7, which with a 2.5kg (5.5lb) warhead, was more suited as an anti-
tank artillery weapon fired from a dissectable take-off ramp similar to a
machine-gun mount.
In 1944, the Luftwaffe became interested in the X7 'Rotkâppchen' (Little
Red Riding Hood) as an anti-tank weapon for ground attack aircraft.
Launching trials took place with the X7 mounted beneath the wings of a
Henschel Hs 129 in Tarnewitz at the beginning of 1945. Guidance was by
means of the 'target-cover' or dog-leg curve method, commands being
transmitted by electrical impulses along the cables spooled out from bob-
bins at the wingtips.
123/214
As can be seen from the three-view drawing, the main body of the X7 had
an impact fuse projecting from the missile nose ahead of the hollow-charge
warhead, the WASAG rocket motor consisting of two concentric cylinders.
The initial high-thrust stage was separated from the second by a Polygan.
124/214
layer - a mixture of asbestos, graphite and calcium silicate. Upon develop-

ing a sufficient thrust, the missile was released from its mounting and ro-
tated twice per second around its longitudinal axis to compensate for pro-
duction inaccuracies. Directional corrections for the rear spoiler to keep it
on a collision course by the missile controller with the aid of the tail flare
were transmitted over the wire spools to the 0.9kg (1.98 lb) control system
in the missile, for which various proposals had been made by the FGZ, the
RPF and the Askania firms. The hollow-charge warhead was claimed to be
able to penetrate all types of tank armour plating, including 20cm (5in) at
a 30° angle of impact.
Another variant of the X7 built had a body diameter of 14cm (5 1/2in),
overall length 75.8cm (29 3/4in) and height 30cm (11 3/4in), the 60cm (23
1/2in) span wings having outward-curved elliptical leading and trailing
edges. The main data table represents the status as of September 1944.
In all, some 300 examples were manufactured by the Ruhrstahl AG in
Brackwede and the Mechanischewerke in Neubranden-burg. A few firing
trials were conducted with the Fwl90, but due to stability problems, did
not see operational use. For anti-tank use, effective range lay between
1.000-1.500m (1.090-1.640yds) and for air-to-air use, was 2.500-3.000m
(2.735-3.280yds). It was still planned in 1945 to use the X7 as a surface-to-
air weapon against low-flying aircraft, but the generally chaotic conditions
in the last few months prevented any such proposals being realised. To
date, no photographs of the X7 appear to have been discovered.
X7 'Rotkappchen' - data
Powerplant
A two-stage WASAG109-506 diglycol rocket motor.
1st stage thrust: 68kg (150 Ib) for 2.5 sees; fuel weight 3.0kg (6.6 lb). 2nd
stage thrust: 5.5kg (12.1 lb) for 8 sees; fuel weight 3.5kg (7.72 lb).
The 21cm 'Wurfgranate 42' Bordrakete

The 21cm (8.27in) Wurfgranate 42/Spreng (Mortar Shell 42/high-explo-
125/214
sive) counts as one of the most successful rocket projectiles used against
air targets from 1943 onwards. One need only recall here the air battle over
Schweinfurt on 14th October 1943 when, of 228 Boeing B-17 bombers, no
less than 62 were shot down, 17 others crash-landed in England and a fur-
ther 121 others were so heavily damaged that they also had to be con-
sidered as losses.50 Exactly how many could be attributed to this 21cm
weapon in retrospect, is a matter of conjecture. 51
The fact is that the 21cm 'Wurfgranate' (usually abbreviated to Wfr.Gr. 42)
initially acquired a name for itself as the ammunition for the 21 cm Nebel-
werfer 42 (smoke-thrower) rocket launcher used by the Army. The five-
tube Raketenwerfer (barrage rocket), an example of which is currently on
display at the Militarhistorisches Museum in Dresden, fired high-explosive
and Flammol (napalm) projectiles at distances ranging from 500m
(547yds) to 7.850m (8.585yds). Altogether, the Maschinenfabrik Donau-
worth is reputed to have produced 1.487 examples of the Nebelwerfer 42
as well as 17.000 individual firing tubes for the Luftwaffe, which mounted
the dreaded single-round Wfr.Gr. tubes as auxiliary armament beneath the
wings of the Bf 109 and Fw190 fighters. Because of its high drag, it was lat-
er replaced by a salvo-type drum magazine or rectangular box similar to
the Nebelwerfer 42 used by the Army, enabling several rounds to be fired
in succession. Designated as the BR-Gêrat Drehring (BR rotatable cham-
ber apparatus), this 6-round nose-mounted weapon was experimentally fit-
50 According to Allied figures, 186 German fighters were also lost.

51 Heinkel He177 firing a battery of Wfr.Gr 42 projectiles from its oblique upward-
firing fuselage array
126/214
ted to an Me 410A-2. Ground trials with the weapon took place at the E-
Stelle Tarnewitz but due to damage suffered by the airframe, were not con-
cluded at the end of the war.
In April 1944, the weapon was also fitted to the Ju 88 for use against naval
targets. Due to the trajectory drop with increasing distance, the firing
tubes were aligned at 7° to the fuselage longitudinal axis and centred for a
range of 1.400m (1.530yds). Installed as Rûstsatze on the Me 109G-6/R2,
Me 110F-2/R2, Me 110G-2/R2 and Fw190A-4/R6.
21cm Wurfgranate 42/Spreng - data

Powerplant 7-hole diglycol solid-fuel rocket charge with 21 nozzles in-
clined at 14° producing 1,720kg (3-792 lb) thrust x 2 sees. Max diameter
was 14.5cm, length 55cm (21 1/2in) and weight 18.4kg (40.56 lb)
The Wfr.Gr. 42 as a Special Air Combat Weapon

The success of the Wfr.Gr. 42/Spreng in the air battle over Schweinfurt on
14th October 1943 motivated the OKL (Luftwaffe Supreme Command) to
employ the weapon in a further tactical variation, namely, in multi-tube
ejectors as oblique upward-firing weapons when flying beneath bomber
formations. Accordingly, a Ju 88A-5 was experimentally fitted with a mul-
ti-round 'Rohrbatterie' on 19th October 1943. Following the successful con-
clusion of initial trials, further testing was conducted by the newly-estab-
lished Erprobungskommando 25 (Test Detachment 25) with multi-round
containers in which trajectory measurements and fuse timings were car-
ried out at the E-Stelle Tarnewitz with three He 177s assigned by the Gen-
eral der Jagdflieger. The weapon containers, aligned at 60° forward and
upward, were located roughly at the centre of the fuselage. In order to pro-
vide space for the 33 tubes, each of 2.3m (7ft 6 1/2 in) length and 24cm (9
1/2in) diameter, the forward fuel tanks and the three bomb bays had to be
removed. The 15mm (1/2in) space between the projectile and firinig tube
wall served to house the guide rails. The projectiles protruded about 10cm
(4in) above and below the fuselage contours to protect the skinning from
the hot exhaust gases.
Measurement results showed that the barrage arrangement was eminently
127/214
suitable for combating large-area targets when fired both singly or in sal-
voes. On receipt of an order from Luftgaukommando IX (Air /one Detach-
ment IX), the He 177 and Ju 88 contingent moved on 2nd April 1944 to the
E-Slcllr Udetfeld, where firing trials in conjunction with the FuG 217 sight-
ing equipment I'm height determination took place. Availablr documents
do not indicate how the test firings progressed and whether operational
use of the obliquely-mounted weapon with live ammunition actually oc-
curred.
The 28/32cm Wurfkorper as a Bordwaffe

Among the most powerful close-combat weapons fitted to ground attack
aircraft for use against surface area-targets and fortified bunkers were the
28cm (11in) and 32cm (12.6in) calibre Wurfkorper (high-explosive mortar
shells). Stemming from the Army's 21cm (8.27in) Wfr.Gr. 42/Spreng de-
scribed earlier, they were fired from the 28/32cm Nebelwerfer 41. On the
southern sector of the Eastern Front, especially at Kertsch in May 1942
and in the capture of Sevastopol - the world's largest naval fortress - in
June 1942, the 28/32cm Nebelwerfer 41 was employed on a massive scale
with considerable success. By reason of its enormous effect, it was referred
to by the troops as the 'Stuka on Foot'. The Luftwaffe mounted them as sin-
gle-round units, one beneath each wing, on the Fw190A-5/U4 ground at-
tack aircraft, firing them in low-level flight. 52
52Sectional drawings of the 28cm Wurfkôrper/Spreng (left) and the 32cm Wurf-
kôrper/Flamm (right)
128/214
The 28cm Wurfkorper was activated via a press-button fuse primer and at-
tained a speed of 145m/sec (476ft/sec). Propulsion was from a diglycol sol-
id-fuel charge exhausting from the propelling nozzles at the base of the
projectile. Its range lay between 750m (820yds) and 1.225m (1.340yds),
the bomb body holding 50kg (110 lb) of TNT. On detonation at impact, it
generated pressure waves that destroyed everything within a circle of
2.000m (2.187yds). Overall length was 1.26m (4ft 1/2in) and external base
diameter 15.6cm (6in).
The 32cm (12.6in) Wurfkorper Flamm (combustible) was an incendiary
projectile of equally enormous destructive effect. Its 50 litre (11 gallon)
warhead, consisting of an oil mixture and other additives, set fire on im-
pact to an area of over 200m (656ft) radius. An auxiliary explosive load of
1kg (2.2 lb) of TNT in conjunction with the oil mixture had an enormous
destructive effect over a wide area, and at the centre of the conflagration.
there was a tremendous air suction. The 32cm projectile used the same di-
glycol rocket propellant and fuel quantity as the 28cm projectile. Approxi-
mately 160m (175yds) after launch, the 79kg (174lb) weight projectile
reached a speed of 145m/sec (476ft/sec) and had a range of up to 2,500m
(2,734yds). Overall length was 1.3m (4ft 3 1/4in), maximum diameter (at
the surrounding. bands) of 33.7cm (13 1/4in) and base diameter 15.8cm
The Gerat 104 'Mûnchhausen' Bordwaffe

Christened 'Munchhausen' after the fabled Baron of that name - usually
pictured riding a cannonball, the Rheinmetall-Borsig firm had begun de-
129/214
sign of the Gerat 104 as early as 1939, intended by the RLM to be carried
by an aircraft for use against fortified bunkers and naval targets. The RLM
had specified that a shell of 700kg (1.543 lb) weight be capable of penetrat-
ing deck armour up to an angle of 60°. The recoil problem of firing a large-
calibre heavy shell was overcome by propelling a counterweight of equal
mass in the opposite direction simultaneously along the barrel. As shown
in the illustration, this recoilless weapon was to have been mounted be-
neath the Dornier Do 217. 53
Due to the weight of the shell and the counterweight, re-loading in flight
was not possible. Initial velocity to the shell was imparted by a black pow-
der charge contained in the counterweight, which was propelled out into
the airstream. A ground static test-firing with a Do 217 mounted on a mov-
able trolley was carried out in 1941, but although the weapon functioned as
planned, the aircraft suffered heavy damage to the rear fuselage and eleva-
tors from the exhaust gases. Improvements in the form of additional pro-
tection for the skinning and side openings for the gas exhaust showed no
acceptable results.
The RLM had ordered three examples of the Gerat 104 in 1939, intended
to be retracted hydraulically into the ventral fuselage of the Do 217 and
Ju288G. In all, 14 rounds were fired, but the installation of an additional
110kg (242 lb) of extra strengthening to the Do 217 airframe was never car-
ried out before the weapon was cancelled in 1941. The recoilless Gerat 104,
however, did serve as a useful forerunner for smaller and lighter weapons
working on the same principle - the Sondergerate (special devices) SGI 13
'Forstersonde', SGI 16 'Zellendusche', SGI 17 'Rohrblock', SGI 18 'Rohr-
block' and the SGI 19 'Rohrbattserie'.
53 Dornier Do 217 with Gerât 104 “Mûnchausen”
130/214
Gerat 104 'Mûnchhausen' - data
Dûsenkanone Dûka 88 Bordwaffe

Preceded by the Diisenkanone (jet cannon) Diika 75 used by mountain
troops and paratroopers, this recoilless weapon lent itself to the develop-
ment of heavier calibre Bordwaffen (aircraft weapons). The Dûka 75, devel-
oped by Rheinmetall-Borsig in 1936, had a calibre of 75mm (2.95in) and
barrel length 3.067m (10ft 1/2in. Installed beneath a Bf 110 fuselage, in
static tests it fired a 2.4kg (5.29 lb) warhead in the 6.5kg (14.33 lb) pro-
jectile at an initial velocity of 540m/sec (1.771ft/sec) from the 4.85m (15ft
11 in) long weapon. Despite 3mm thick additional protective plating, the
Bf110 fuselage suffered considerable damage from the exhaust gases of this
650kg (1.4331b) weight article. As it was not of the highest priority, devel-
opment was passed to the Skoda firm in Prague where it was modified to
have two 30° angled exhaust gas channels to exhaust above and below the
fuselage, and with its 6-round magazine, paved the way for design of the
Diika 88 and Dûka 280. 54
The Dûka 88, of 88mm (3.46in) calibre, was likewise developed at Rhein-
metall-Borsig by a team headed by Dipl. lng A Kleinschmidt in 1944. The
54 Junkers Ju 88 with the Dûka 88 Bordwaffe
131/214
non-automatic 10-round magazine was reloaded in flight by the air gun-

ner, ignition taking place electrically. For test purposes, an experimental
installation was made in a Junkers Ju 88A-5 (Werk Nr. 2079) where static
firings with 20 rounds were conducted at Unterlilss. In this instance, the
exhaust tubes were inclined at 51° to the weapon longitudinal axis, the
upper tube being relatively long as it had to pass through the aircraft's fu-
selage structure. Although firing trials were regarded as satisfactory, the
Diika 88 was removed from the weapons development programme. The
Diika 88 had also been proposed for use in the Me 262 'Schnellbomber H'
project.
Dûsenkanone Dûka 88 - data
Dûsenkanone Dûke 280 Bordwaffe

Experience gained wilh the Dûka 75, Dûka 88 and the Dûsenkanone-Ma-
rine (Navy) DKM 280 for naval use, led to the development under Dipl.
Ing A Kleinschmidt of a heavy, large calibre weapon whose barrel could be
extended and retracted telescopically in its housing in the lower fuselage of
a Junkers Ju 288 provided with lateral openings in the fuselage sides to
lead away the exhaust gases. This 400kg (882 lb) weight 'one-time shot'
was designed to penetrate up to 20cm (Sin)armoured steel, and when fired
in a dive from an altitude of 2.000m (6.560ft) with an initial velocity of
560m/sec (1.857ft/sec), was calculated to have an impact velocity on the
target of 530m/sec (1.739ft/sec = 1.186mph) after a 3.7 second trajectory.
Corresponding figures for its release in horizontal flight and from 4.000m
(13.120ft) altitude, and initial and impact velocities are shown in the ac-
companying table. 55
Dûka 280 equiped Junkers Ju 288 with its projecting gun barrel and lateral ex-
55
haust ports
132/214
The resulting recoil was to have been considerably reduced by the diverted
gases and a pneumatic brake. A prototype Dûka 280 installation, however
did not take place due to the calculated high stresses imposed on the air-
frame, not to mention the need for a fuselage length of 8.5m (27ft 10 1/2in)
required for its installation. Theoretical studies by the Rheinmetall-Borsig
WKU-Gruppe (Ballistics, Ammunition & Gun Design) headed by Dipl. Ing
Kleinschmidt had calculated the physical requirements for weapons with
calibres ranging from 210mm (8.27in) to 305mm (12in) and correspond-
ing projectile weights from 105kg (231 lb) to 700kg (1.543 lb). For a calibre
of 300mm (11.81 in) and projectile weight 425kg (937 lb), the weapon re-
quired a barrel length of 6.1m (20ft), a tube weight of 4.600kg (10.414lb)
and an impossibly high length of 14.7m (48ft 2 3/4in) to absorb and deflect
the recoil in an aircraft fuselage, so that such weapons were understand-
ably not pursued by the RLM for aircraft installation.
The 'Tonne-Seedorf TV Guidance System

During the last months of the war, the development of remote control sys-
tems had made considerable progress, manifested in high performance
and small dimensions. Between 1943 and 1945, the Fernseh GmbH (Tele-
vision Co Ltd) of Darmstadt had developed the 'Tonne' (Cask or Barrel) TV
transmitter and 'Seedorf (Sea or Lakeside Village) TV receiver with an op-
erating range of 150km (93 miles) for installation in explosive-laden
guided missiles. The TV camera and transmitter worked on a frequency of
400 MHz (megacycles), a scan of 441 lines at 25 pictures/second and a
power of 20 Watts, transmitting the target image over a Yagi antenna to
the controlling aircraft. The 'Tonne' equipment was housed in the nose of
the missile with the Yagi antenna attached to the fuselage tail. In addition
to the standard FuG 203 'Kehl'/FuG 230 'Strassburg' radio-command
equipment, the target image was viewed in the controlling aircraft on the
'Seedorf TV screen measuring 8 x 9cm (3 1/4 x 3 1/2in), enabling the
appropriate course-correction commands to be given to the missile.
As well as the 'Tonne' and 'Seedorf, the Fernseh GmbH had also developed
the 'Adler' (Eagle) and 'Sprotte' (Sprat) TV cameras - to mention but a few,
that enabled missiles to be guided to the target with greater precision.
The high standard of German technology at that time was confirmed by
133/214
further development and manufacture of these German devices by the for-

mer opponents after the end of the war.
Not mentioned in the author's narrative is that the 'Tonne-Seedorf equip-
ment was flight-tested exclusively in the Henschel Hs 293D missile. This
consisted of a standard Hs293A-l where the 'Tonne' TV equipment was in-
stalled in the fuselage nose ahead of the warhead, behind which was an ad-
ditional fuselage collar, with the horizontal Yagi antenna at the rear of the
missile just beneath the tailplane and elevators. TV guidance thus allowed
the con-"troller to guide the missile without needing to actually see the tar-
get from the aircraft. The pilot was hence able to keep at a longer distance
and take evasive action or hide in cloud, the target image increasing in size
on the TV screen the closer the missile approached its target.
Whereas the German commercial TV broadcasting system prior to the Sec-
ond World War was based on a scan of 441 lines and 25 pictures per sec-
ond, the 'Tonne' TV camera developed by the Fernseh GmbH in co-opera-
tion with the German Post office, operated on 224 lines at a frequency of
50 pictures per second because of the fast-moving missile. Since the (ship)
target presented its main dimension horizontally, after some tests the lines
were posed vertically for better resolution. The optical lens was the Zeiss
'Biogon' of focal length 35mm with an image angle of +/-130. The 'Tonne'
chassis measured 17 x 17 x 40cm (6 3/4 x 6 3/4 x 15 3/4 in) and only two
types of valve were used. The camera was enclosed in a frame of cast mag-
nesium alloy, replacing the trim weight formerly installed and had an anti-
dim glass, battery-heated to avoid condensation and icing. Missile length
at the nose was increased by 45cm (17 3/4in). To accommodate the DEAG
battery, Osmig converter and TV transmitter, the centre section was
lengthened by 23cm (9in). The Yagi antenna was positioned where the rear
guide flare was normally located.
The 'Seedorf cathode-ray TV receiver tube had a diagonal of 13cm (Sin),
the chassis measuring 17 x 22 x 40cm (6 3/4 x 8 3/4 x 15 3/4in). The whole
conver-. sion added about 130-150kg (287-331 lb) to the missile weight.
The Blaupunkt firm was given a contract to build 1,000 sets but this was
later cancelled. During the missile guidance phase, only three picture ad-
justments were necessary: to the screen brightness, contrast, and picture
phase. For the 70 flight trials, two He 11 Is had been converted, followed
later by a Do 217. Prior to actual airborne tests, the missile controller re-
ceived training on a ground simulator developed by the DPS Ainring.
In addition to the above equipment, in co-operation with the Telefunken
firm and the Reichspost Forschungsanstalt research institute, the Fernseh
GmbH had developed the 'Sprotte' TV camera which contained a miniature
iconoscope with a reduced number of lines and smaller dimensions, in-
tended for installation in anti-aircraft rockets, but did not reach the flight-
test stage. Another development by the Fernseh GmbH was the FB 50 of
134/214
even less weight. It used a 50-line scan with a picture frequency of 25 per
second, but likewise did not reach the testing stage. One other TV camera
was the 'Falke' (Falcon) designed by the Loewe-Opta company of Berlin-
Steglitz. Simple in design, it used a spiral scanning system but was given
up when the 'Tonne' was adopted instead. The Goll-now & Sohn firm of
Stettin had also developed a missile bomb which was to guide itself onto a
ship target with its built-in TV camera which utilised spiral scanning. A
prototype TV set with 100-200 spiral lines was developed for Gollnow &
Sohn by the Fernseh GmbH. The firm itself had built another camera with
improved characteristics and tested it with satisfactory results in 1942 in a
sea-and ship-model test, but this was also dropped in favour of the Tonne'.
The British H2S Panoramic Radar

From the wreckage of a downed British bomber, German troops in Febru-
ary 1943 captured the damaged British H2S radar equipment working on
the 9cm (3 1/2in) wavelength which displayed an electronic image of the
land and sea features beneath it in flight. Named the 'Rotterdam' after the
location where it was captured, despite extensive damage it was subse-
quently brought to functioning order in the Telefunken AG laboratories as
a model for the manufacture of German centimetre-wave equipment based
on this find. Up to that point, the German military leadership had consis-
tently advocated the necessity to use cm-wave technology, but those re-
sponsible in the RLM had rejected these demands since authoritative
personalities in the economics and technology sector represented the view-
point that centimetric-wave systems were of no significance as in their
character, bore too great a similarity with light waves and upon impact
with the target, produced scattered reflections. Comprehensive laboratory
tests with the captured 'Rotterdam', however, showed that the advantages
of cm-wave technology were much greater than envisaged. For this reason,
the head of radar development at that time, Dipl. Ing Brandt, proposed
that all German radar sets be converted to centimetre wavelengths.
The first German unit working on the centimetre wavelength was devel-
oped by Telefunken in 1943 as the FuG 240 'Berlin A' and experimentally
installed in a Junkers Ju88G-6 night-fighter. Despite its purely experimen-
tal nature, the 3.300 MHz device was smaller and lighter than the cap-
tured British H2S and showed a noticeable improvement in performance.
The parabolic reflector dish, similar to that used in the H2S, had a diame-
ter of 70cm (27 1/2in)enclosed beneath a casing on the Ju 88G-6. The
common dipole for the sender and receiver was rotated by a means of a
motor. Connected to the motor drive was the adjustment switch for the an-
tenna dish, which transmitted the programmed values to the receiver exit
that channelled the signals to the deflector plate of the indicator tube of
135/214
the sighting device. The antenna dish reflector thus gave the same picture
on the approach of the aircraft to its target as with the FuG 220 'Lichten-
stein SN-2'. The successor model of the "Berlin A" experimentally intro-
duced into operational service bore the designation 'Berlin N la" and was
successfully employed for the first time in March 1945 with NJG 1 based in
Guterstah. Its target-recognition range was 4-5km (2.5-3.1 miles) with a
near-resolution of 350m (1.150ft). Out of the 350 sets ordered. 25 exam-
ples had been delivered by March 1945 of which ten came to be installed in
night-fighter aircraft. The 'Berlin X Ia' was suceeded by the FuG 244 'Bre-
men O" night-fighter radar working on the 9cm wavelength at 3.300 mega-
cycles at a power of 10 kilowatts. The search range was 5km (3.1 miles),
with near resolution improved down to 200m (656ft). The parabolic reflec-
tor, the rotating system and the indicator screens were identical to the
'Berlin N 1a', the armament activated by the EG3 'Elfe 3'. The entire 'Bre-
men O' equipment was smaller and lighter than the initial 'Bremen' model.
Only one 'Bremen O' had been delivered and was undergoing trials at the
E-Stelle Diepensee at the end of the war. The codename 'Elfe" (elf) applied
to the weapon activator which, on receipt of a target echo, automatically
fired the aircraft's armament.
Neptun Radar
Neptun was the code name of a series of low-to-mid-VHF band airborne
intercept radar devices developed by Germany in World War II and used
as active targeting devices in several types of aircraft. They were usually
combined with a so-called "backwards warning device", indicated by the
addition of the letters "V/R". Working in the metre range, Neptun was
meant as a stop-gap solution until scheduled SHF-band devices became
available (for instance the FuG 240/E cavity magnetron-based Berlin AI
radar).
Transceiving antennas used for the Neptun on twin-engined night fighters
usually used a Hirschgeweih (stag's antlers) eight-dipole array with shor-
ter elements than the previous 90 MHz SN-2 radar had used, or as an ex-
perimental fitment, the 90º-crossed twin-element set Yagi based Morgens-
tern single-mast-mounted array.
FuG 216
Experimental series to plan the further development
Installed in Fw 190 A-6/R11 and Bf 109 G-6
The aircraft were used by NJGr 10 until March 1944, after which some ma-
chines of 6./JG 300 (Kommando Plöger) were equipped.
Manufacturer: Flugfunkforschungsinstitut Oberpfaffenhofen (FFO, Ger-
man for "airborne radio research institute" in Bavaria)
R1 version (backwards warning device)
Frequency: 182MHz
136/214
Power: 1.0kW
Transmiting and reveiving antennas each consist of twin dipoles, mounted
under and above the wings, respectively
Single display device with distance readout
V version (for single engined night fighters)
Frequency: 125MHz
Power: 1.2kW
Range: 500 to 3,500m
Antennas in the form of spikes or (Fw 190) as "antlers" on right and left
wings
FuG 217
Installed mainly in Ju 88 G-6, only a few Bf 110 G-4, He 219 or Me 262 re-
ceived the Neptun. It could be combined with the additional Elfe device to
automatically measure the target distance and fire the guns at a pre-set
range.
Manufacturer: FFO
R2 version (backward warning device)
J2 version (for single-engined night fighters)
Ausführung V/R (combined night fighter and backward warning device for
two-engined fighters)
Two switchable frequencies: 158 and 187MHz
Search angle: 120°
Spike or "antler" antennas
FuG 218
Mass-produced
Manufacturer: Siemens / FFO
R3 version (backward warning device)
J3 version (for single-engined night-fighters)
V/R version (combined night fighter and backward warning device for
Six switchable frequencies: 158 to 187MHz
Search angle: 120°
Weight: 50kg
R3 and J3 with spike antennas and V/R with "antler" antennas.
G/R version (combined night fighter and backward warning device for
Only one single device built, replacing the 2kW transmitter with a 30kW
transmitter. Range increased to up to 10km. This device was intended for
the Dornier Do 335. "Antler" antennas.
137/214
Freya Radar
Freya was an early warning radar deployed by Germany during World War
II; it was named after the Norse Goddess Freyja. During the war, over a
thousand stations were built. A naval version operating on a slightly diffe-
rent wavelength was also developed as the Seetakt. 56
First tests of what would become the "Freya" were conducted in early
1937, with initial delivery of an operational radar to the Kriegsmarine in
1938 by the GEMA company. Freya supported an early version of Identifi-
cation friend or foe (IFF). Aircraft equipped with the FuG 25a "Erstling"
could be successfully queried across ranges of over 100 km.
56 Freya (right) and Würzburg-Riese, date and place unknown
138/214
The "AN" version gained a switchable phasing line for the antenna. Swit-
ching in the phasing line led to a phase displacement of the antenna's ra-
diation pattern and with that, a "squinting" to the left or right. This ena-
bled the system in effect to switch from the rather broad "scanning for ma-
xima" to narrow lobe switching. In that mode, a skilled operator could
achieve an angular resolution of 0.1°.
The Freya radar was more advanced than its British counterpart, Chain
Home. Freya operated on a 1.2 m (3.9 ft) wavelength (250 MHz) while
Chain Home used 12 m. This allowed Freya to use a much smaller antenna
system, one that was easier to rotate, move and position. It also offered
higher resolution, allowing it to detect smaller targets. Because of its com-
plex design, only eight Freya stations were operational when the war star-
ted, resulting in large gaps between the covered areas. The British Chain
Home radar, although less advanced and more prone to errors, was sim-
pler, which meant that the complete Chain Home network was in place in
time for the Battle of Britain.
Variants
FuMG 450 Freya AN, initially called FuMG 41G (range increased to
120 km)
FuMG Freya LZ (could be disassembled for airlift)
FuMG 480
FuMG 44 "Drehfreya" (German: "rotating Freya"), transitionary model
to FuMG 44/404 (navy: FuMO371), "Jagdschloss" PPI radar
FuMG 451 "Freiburg", 162–200 MHz
FuMG 321-328 (German naval designation)
Deployment and operation

Freya was often used in concert with the primary German gun laying ra-
dar, Würzburg Riese ("Würzburg Giant"); the Freya finding targets at long
distances and then "handing them off" to the shorter-ranged Würzburgs
for tracking.
Later in the war, Freya operated in the band from 2.5 to 2.3 m (8.2 to
7.5 ft) (120 to 130 MHz), with a pulse width of three microseconds, a peak
power output of 15 to 20 kW, and a pulse repetition frequency of 500 Hz.
It had a maximum range of only 160 kilometers (99 mi), making it inferior
to Chain Home, nor could it accurately determine altitude, but it was a
fully steerable and semi-mobile system.
Freya was first successfully used on December 18, 1939 when two stations
detected an approaching daytime raid by 22 RAF Vickers Wellington bom-
bers at a range of 113 km and guided fighter planes toward them via radio.
Only half of the Wellingtons returned to Britain undamaged, but the Ger-
man fighters only reached the bomber after they had made their bombing
139/214
run on ships in harbor. Three German fighters had been shot down and a
further 12 had received damage in the battle. The performance of Freya left
the Luftwaffe so impressed that by the Spring of 1940, eleven Freya sta-
tions were installed to guard Germany's western border. After the invasion
of France in 1940, additional Freya stations were built along the Atlantic
coast. When Britain started its bombing raids, Hermann Göring ordered
colonel (later General) Josef Kammhuber to install an efficient air defense.
This led to the so-called Kammhuber Line into which then more Freya sta-
tions were integrated. In the later course of the war, Freya devices turned
out to be vulnerable against chaff, along with other countermeasures,
which meant they could still be used for early warning but no longer for
guiding fighter planes. British bombing raids could also be organized such
that the Kammhuber Line could be overwhelmed in massed raids.
British intelligence
One of the first to give British intelligence any details about the Freya Ra-
dar was a young Danish Flight Lieutenant, Thomas Sneum, who, at great
risk to his life, photographed radar installations on the Danish island of
Fanø in 1941. He brought the negatives to England in a dramatic flight
which is fictionalized in Ken Follett's novel Hornet Flight. Sneum's deed is
also mentioned in R. V. Jones's Most Secret War as a 'most gallant ex-
ploit'.
Further development
FuMG 401: For experiments with beam reflection on the ground, lea-
ding to a change in elevation angle, a Freya antenna array was installed
on a wooden support so it could slide up and down. This enabled Freya
to detect the target's altitude without the aid of other devices (such as
Würzburg radars).
FuMG 41: In an attempt to increase the range without changing the
transmitter, several Freya antenna arrays were switched together. The-
se installations, called "Wassermann" (German: Aquarius), not only
had greater range but were also more accurate.
Countermeasures
To counter Freya, the British used equipment called 'Moonshine'. Carried
by Boulton Paul Defiant aircraft of the Special Duties Flight (later No. 515
Squadron RAF), a single set retransmitted a portion of the Freya signal
amplifying the apparent return. Eight planes with 'Moonshine' could mi-
mic a force of 100 bombers. A second countermeasures system, "Mandrel"
was a noise jammer which overwhelmed the signals from Freya. Indivi-
dual aircraft were sent to orbit fixed positions 50 miles (80 km) off the
enemy coast. By using nine airplanes, a 200-mile (320 km) gap could be
140/214
knocked into the German's radar coverage, while further jammers were ca-
rried in the bomber stream to counter the inland Freya network.
Annexes
Deutsche Luftstreitkräfte
The Deutsche Luftstreitkräfte, known before October 1916 as Die Flieger-
truppen des deutschen Kaiserreiches ("Imperial German Flying Corps"), or
simply Die Fliegertruppen, was the air arm of the German Army during
World War I (1914–1918). In English language sources it is usually refe-
rred to as the "Imperial German Air Service", although that is not a literal
translation of either name. German naval aviators remained an integral
part of the Imperial German Navy. Both military branches, the army and
navy, operated conventional aircraft, balloons and Zeppelins.
The first military aircraft to be acquired by the German Army entered ser-
vice in 1910 - forming the nucleus of what was to become the Lufts-
treitkräfte in October 1916. The duties of such aircraft were initially inten-
ded to be reconnaissance and artillery spotting in support of armies on the
ground, just as balloons had been used during the Franco-Prussian War of
1870–1871 and even as far back as the Napoleonic Wars. For comparison,
France's embryonic army air service (Aviation Militaire), which eventually
became the Armée de l'Air, was instituted later in 1910 - the Air Battalion
of the Royal Engineers (later re-organised as the Royal Flying Corps) was
not formed until November 1911.
Organisation
The initial units of the Luftstreitkräfte, dedicated to observation, were
known as Feldflieger Abteilungen (Field Flier Detachments), and had an
official establishment of six two-seat aircraft apiece, with each "FFA" unit
assigned to an army unit in their local area.
The Luftstreitkräfte organisation changed during the war substantially to
accommodate the new types of aircraft, doctrine, tactics and the needs of
the ground troops, in particularly the artillery. During this time evolved
the system of organisation and unit designations that would form the basis
of those used in the Luftwaffe in 1933.
During 1916, the German High Command, in response to the then current
Allied air superiority, reorganised their forces by creating several types of
specialist units, most notably single seat fighter squadrons, or Jastas as
the contraction of Jagdstaffel (literally "hunting squadron"), in order to
counter the offensive operations of the Royal Flying Corps and the French
Aviation Militaire.
The Jagdstaffeln, or hunting squadrons, established by the reorganization
that started by the late summer of 1916 were fielded by four kingdoms of
141/214
the German Empire. The Kingdom of Prussia was predominant, with a for-
ce eventually comprising 67 Jastas. However, the Kingdoms of Bavaria, Sa-
xony, and Württemberg had their own fighter squadrons: Bavaria had ten;
Saxony, seven; and Württemberg, four.
On 24 June 1917, the Luftstreitkräfte formed its first fighter wing, Royal
Prussian Jagdgeschwader I, incorporating Jastas 4, 6, 10, and 11, and set
the pattern for using Roman numerals in the Luftstreitkräfte for designa-
ting such units. Manfred von Richthofen was moved up from command of
Jasta 11 to command JG I. After his death in action, it would be renamed
to honor him by order of the Kaiser.
The Prussians would follow up by establishing three more Jagdgeschwa-
ders. On 2 February 1918, JG II formed from Jastas 12, 13, 15, and 19, and
placed Adolf Ritter von Tutschek in command. On the same day, JG III
consolidated Jasta 2 Boelcke, and Jastas 26, 27, and 36 under Bruno Loer-
zer. Finally, on 2 September 1918, the Royal Prussian Marine Jagdgesch-
wader was formed from Marine Feld Jastas I through V, and placed in
charge of Gotthard Sachsenberg.
Bavaria also established their own Royal Bavarian Jagdgeschwader IV on 3
October 1918. It consisted of Jastas 23, 32, 34, and 35 under Eduard Ritter
von Schleich.
The Luftwaffe
The Luftwaffe was the aerial warfare branch of the German Wehrmacht
during World War II. After the German Empire's World War I-era army air
force, the Luftstreitkräfte, and the Kaiserliche Marine naval air units had
been disbanded by May 1920 under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles,
the Luftwaffe was reformed on February 26, 1935 and grew to become one
of the strongest, most doctrinally advanced, and most battle-experienced
air forces in the world when World War II started in Europe in September
1939. After the defeat of the Third Reich, the Luftwaffe was disbanded in
1946.
Luftwaffe is also the generic term in German speaking countries for any
national military aviation service, and the names of air forces in other
countries are usually translated into German as "Luftwaffe" (e.g. Royal Air
Force is often translated as "britische Luftwaffe"). However, Luftstreitkräf-
te, or "air armed force", is also sometimes used as a translation of "air for-
ce". And because "Luft" means "air" and "Waffe" may be translated into
English as either "weapon" or "arm", "Air Arm" may be considered the
most literal English translation of Luftwaffe (cf. Fleet Air Arm).
One of the forerunners of the Luftwaffe, the Imperial German Army Air
Service, was founded in 1910 with the name Die Fliegertruppen des deuts-
chen Kaiserreiches. It was renamed Luftstreitkräfte by October 1916. The
142/214
air war on the Western Front received the most attention in the annals of
military aviation, since it produced aces such as Manfred von Richthofen,
popularly known as the Red Baron, Ernst Udet, Hermann Göring, Oswald
Boelcke, Werner Voss, and Max Immelmann, many of whom would later
serve in the Luftwaffe.
After the defeat of Germany, the service was dissolved on 8 May 1920 un-
der the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, which also mandated the des-
truction of all military aircraft of Germany.
Interwar period
Since the Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany to have an air force, Ger-
man pilots trained in violation of the treaty in secret. Initially, civil aviation
schools within Germany were used, yet only light trainers could be used in
order to maintain the façade that the trainees were going to fly with civil
airlines such as Deutsche Luft Hansa. To train its pilots on the latest com-
bat aircraft, Germany solicited the help of its future enemy, the Soviet
Union, which was also isolated in Europe. A secret training airfield was es-
tablished at Lipetsk in 1924 and operated for approximately nine years
using mostly Dutch and Russian, but also some German, training aircraft
before being closed in 1933. This base was officially known as 4th squa-
dron of the 40th wing of the Red Army.
The first steps towards the Luftwaffe's formation were undertaken just
months after Adolf Hitler came to power. Hermann Göring, a World War I
ace with 22 victories and the holder of the Orden Pour le Merite, became
National Kommissar for aviation with former Deutsche Luft Hansa direc-
tor Erhard Milch as his deputy. In April 1933 the Reichsluftfahrtministe-
rium (RLM – Reich Air Ministry) was established. The RLM was in charge
of development and production of aircraft, and soon afterwards the test si-
te or Erprobungsstelle at Rechlin became its testing ground, a military air-
field that had been first established in August 1918. Göring's control over
all aspects of aviation became absolute. On 25 March 1933 the Deutschen
Luftsportverband (DVLA) (German Air Sport Association) absorbed all
private and national organizations, whilst retaining its 'sports' title. The
merging of all military aviation organizations in the RLM took place on 15
May 1933, which became the Luftwaffe's official 'birthday'. Many members
of the Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps (National Socialist Flyers
Corps – NSFK) transferred to the Luftwaffe. As all such prior NSFK mem-
bers were also Nazi Party members, this gave the new Luftwaffe a strong
Nazi ideological base in contrast to the other branches of the German mili-
tary. Göring had played a leading role in the build up of the Luftwaffe in
1933–1936, but played little further part in the development of the Luft-
waffe until 1936, and Milch became the "de facto" minister until 1937.
The absence of Göring in planning and production matters was fortunate.
143/214
Göring had little knowledge of current aviation, had last flown in 1922, and
had not kept himself informed of latest events. Göring also displayed a lack
of understanding of doctrine and technical issues in aerial warfare which
he left to others more competent. The Commander-in-Chief left the organi-
sation and building of the Luftwaffe, after 1936, to Erhard Milch. However
Göring, as a part of Hitler's inner circle, was to provide enormous financial
materials for rearming and equipping the Luftwaffe.
Another prominent figure in German air power construction this time was
Helmuth Wilberg. Wilberg was to play a large role in the development of
German air doctrine. Having headed the Reichswehr air staff for eight
years in the 1920s, Wilberg had considerable experience and was ideal for
a senior staff position. Göring considered making Wilberg Chief of Staff
(CS). However, it was revealed Wilberg had a Jewish mother. For that rea-
son Göring could not have him as CS. Not wishing his talent to go to waste,
Göring ensured the racial laws of the Third Reich did not apply to him.
Wilberg remained in the air staff and helped draw up the principle doctri-
ne "The Conduct of the Aerial War" and its "Regulation 16" under Walther
Wever.
Mobilization, 1938 – 1941

By the summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe had nine Jagdgeschwader (fighter
wings) mostly equipped with Messerschmitt Bf 109, four 'Zerstörergesch-
wader (destroyer wings) equipped with the Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy
fighter, 11 Kampfgeschwader (bomber wings) equipped with mainly the
Heinkel He 111 and the Dornier Do 17Z, and four Sturzkampfgeschwader
(dive bomber wings). The Junkers Ju 88 had encountered design difficul-
ties, as a result only 12 were available when hostilities commenced. The
Luftwaffe's strength at this time stood at 373,000 personnel (208,000 pa-
rachute troops, 107,000 in the Flak Corps and 58,000 in the Signals
Corps). Aircraft strength was 4,201 operational aircraft; 1,191 bombers, 361
dive bombers, 788 fighters, 431 heavy fighters, and 488 transports. Despi-
te deficiencies it was an impressive force.
However, even by the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe still had not mobilized
fully. Despite the shortage of raw-materials Generalluftzeugmesiter Ernst
Udet, had increased production through introducing a 10 hour working
day for aviation industries and rationalizing of production. During this pe-
riod 30 Kampfstaffeln and 16 Jagdstaffeln were being raised and equip-
ped. A further five Zerstorergruppen were created (JGr 101, 102,126,152
and 176), all equipped with the Bf 110.
The Luftwaffe also greatly expanded its aircrew training programs by 42%,
to 63 flying schools. These facilities were moved to eastern Germany, away
from possible Allied threats. The number of aircrew reached 4,727, an in-
crease of 31%. However, the rush to complete this rapid expansion scheme
144/214
resulted in the deaths of 997 personnel and another 700 wounded. 946 air-
craft were also destroyed in these accidents. The number of aircrew com-
pleting their training was up to 3,941, The Luftwaffe's entire strength was
now 2.2 million personnel.
From 1920s to 1941, hundreds of Luftwaffe pilots and technical personnel
visited, studied and were trained in the Soviet Union at Russian air force
schools in several locations in Central Russia. Goering was at these Rus-
sian air force training schools several times during the 1930s, he flew Rus-
sian airplanes, had a Russian girlfriend and was engaged in numerous
drinking parties while living in a suburb of Lipetsk. Roessing, Blume, Fos-
se, Teetsemann, Heini, Makratzki, Blumendaat and many other Luftwaffe
aces were trained in Russia in joint Russian-German schools that were set
up under patronage of Ernst-August Köstring. German-Soviet collabora-
tion was facilitated, besides Goering, by Brauchitsch, Guderian, Model,
Keitel, Krause, Adam, and Mannstein, all of whom studied and visited So-
viet Russia prior to the beginning of WWII.
In April and May 1941, Udet headed the Luftwaffe delegation inspecting
Soviet aviation industry in compliance with Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.
Udet informed Goering that Soviet air force are very strong and technically
advanced. Goering decided not to report the facts to Hitler hoping that a
surprise attack will quickly destroy Russia. Udet realized that the upco-
ming war on Russia may cripple Germany. Udet, torn between truth and
loyalty, suffered a psychological breakdown and even tried to tell all the
truth to Hitler, but Goering told Hitler, that Udet was lying, then took Udet
under control by giving him drugs at drinking parties and hunting trips.
Udet's drinking and psychological condition became a problem, but Goe-
ring used Udet's dependency to manipulate him.
German Night Fighter

Low-key Germany experiments into the visual night interception of enemy
bombers had been conducted during the latter stages of World War 1.
These were resurrected after the formation of the Luftwaffe in 1935, and a
series of tests using single-engined fighters -notably the Arado Ar 68,
Heinkel He 112 and Messerschmitt Bf109 -showed encouraging, but incon-
clusive, results. If co-ordinated well with searchlights, and enjoying reli-
able radio communications, pilots were able, with some ease, to catch up
with slow bombers, close with them and more often than not show that in
a real combat situation they could have shot them down. Flak units, as part
of the Luftwaffe, would, it was felt, play a significant co-operative part in
destroying night raiders. Not that many Luftwaffe officers from Reich-
smarschal Hermann Goring down believed this would really be necessary.
This thinking overlooked an international pre-war preoccupation with the
bomber - air forces were built around offensive striking forces, the Royal
145/214
Air Force and the Luftwaffe, being no exception. While the German air arm
opted to build a force of short-range medium bombers, Britain's bombers
were designed with a greater emphasis on range and the capability to reach
targets in Germany. They were also as modern - particularly in their
power-driven defensive gun turrets - as similar types anywhere, and on 3
September 1939, Bomber Command had 23 frontline squadrons with
about 280 aircraft. 57
The RAF began attacking selected targets in daylight from the outbreak of
hostilities, the Germans reacting with an integrated defence network of ra-
dar detection, fighters and guns, which resulted in some successful inter-
ceptions of bombers, usually in conditions of poor visibility during daylight
hours rather than at night. Losses led to a British policy of night rather
than daylight bombing, although 'cloud cover' operations would continue
for some time.
German fighter defence in the early months of the war was vested in the Bf
109, and outstanding day fighter though it was, it was hardly the most reli-
able aircraft for night interception sorties. Operating in conjunction with
searchlights, the flat perspex panels of the cockpit canopy would reflect
glare so effectively that the unfortunate occupant could hardly see out. Pi-
lots were obliged to remove the side-opening canopy section in order to
have any visibility at all on some sorties.
With all the emphasis placed on attack, the Luftwaffe had reserved few air-
craft to undertake a night fighter role on the outbreak of war. Extensive
pre-war reorganisation had seen a number of fighter units with some prac-
tical experience of nocturnal interception reduced to a single Gruff e,
namely IV.(Nacht)IJG 2 equipped with the Bf 109D. A Staffel of this unit
57Fitted with SN-2 and FuG 212 aerials on the centreline, the Bf 110 was almost as
numerous on the last day of the war as it was on the first -but a few significant
changes had been made to the last wartime versions. Among them was the re-
placement of the 'double pipe' exhaust flame damper with a straight pipe (Price)
146/214
moved into Aalborg airfield on completion of the invasion of Denmark in

April 1940 in order to share the facilities with the Bf 1 lOCs of I./ZG 76 and
Wolfgang Falck's I./ZG 1. The airfield was soon subjected to attacks by
RAF bombers, and these units flew interceptions during the early morning
and late evening hours when natural light prevailed.
Falck found that fighters with positive GCI instructions resulting from
plots on ground radar could be vectored accurately onto enemy bombers.
The few RAF aircraft caught and shot down by what was basically an air-
field defence force were enough to convince Falck and other pilots such as
Werner Streib, Walter Ehle and Martin Lutz, that the Bf 110 could become
an effective night fighter. Falck had scant little time to prove his theories as
ZG 1 was transferred to Gutersloh in May, but he took the time to prepare
a comprehensive report. This was well received and unwittingly marked
out Falck as a leading authority on night fighting.
Despite a considerable effort on the part of Bomber Command crews, early
flights into Germany were largely of the 'nuisance' variety. They served as a
boost to British morale, proof that the nation was striking back at the ene-
my in virtually the only way possible on a regular basis at that time. The
Germans themselves, previously amazed at the British showering the coun-
try not with bombs but propaganda leaflets, were nevertheless aware that
enemy aircraft were able to penetrate their airspace with impunity. But a
small-scale raid by 37 aircraft on Monchengladbach on 11/12 1940 May
had seen high explosives aimed at a German town for the first time.
Then on 15/16 May the RAF carried out the first strategic bomber opera-
tion against German industry. Sixteen targets in the Ruhr were targeted by
99 bombers, the number despatched exceeding 100 (also for the first time)
as 12 aircraft were also briefed to attack enemy communications points in
Belgium. Little damage was done, and no bombers were brought down by
hostile action.
In those days there was little attempt to send Blenheims, Hampdens, Whit-
leys and Wellingtons over Germany in formations, waves or streams.
Crews tended to work individually, little knowing that they were making
themselves ideal, albeit quite random, targets for night fighters. From their
viewpoint the threat was perceived as minimal, and it was widely believed
that losses were almost entirely due to flak.
Early German night interception doctrine, such as it was, followed more or
less the broad parameters established in World War 1, and enforced during
the pre-war experiments. As searchlights had then been a 'traditional' part
of the night interception process, there appeared little need to change it in
1940. Consequently, when the first night fighter unit was formed, a search-
light regiment was concurrently allocated to it, along with a Geschwader
headquarters. Ground radars were being produced at a steadily increasing
rate and being installed to cover all the approaches to Reich territory likely
147/214
to be taken by enemy bombers.

Bavarian-born Oberst Josef Kammhuber was chosen to oversee the estab-
lishment of Nachtjagdgeschwader 1, OKL (Oberkommando der Luft-
waffe) having formerly created the post of 'Air Officer for Night Fighters'
on the Luftwaffe General Staff. This carried far more responsibility than
the title might imply. It meant that the officer was responsible for materiel
procurement, pilot training, ground control, personnel and so forth.
Kammhuber, who had been a Ju 88 pilot and Kommodore of KG 51, shoul-
dered this additional responsibility with few qualms. He was a brilliant or-
ganiser and a good staff officer, used to reporting directly to (and dealing
with) Reichsmarschall Goring.
Kammhuber's initial night fighter crews and aircraft would be drawn from
the Zerstorergeschwader, which meant that the Bf 110 almost coinciden-
tally became the primary night fighter type. There really was little else with
anywhere near the performance required, although in mid-1940 this did
not need to be exactly outstanding to catch the intended prey. For the re-
cord, the principal RAF bombers of that period could achieve the following
maximum speeds in loaded condition: 235 mph for the Wellington, 192
mph for the Whitley and 254 mph for the Hampden. Of these the Welling-
ton, considered Britain's most capable bomber, carried the largest bomb
load and had the best service ceiling at 18,000 ft.
By contrast, the Bf HOC was capable of a maximum speed of 349 mph and
a ceiling of 32,811 ft - so it can be seen that the interception of enemy
bombers was not overly difficult if the searchlight batteries could follow
them, and the night fighter was rapidly guided to the right sector to bring
it within visual range. Not that the Bf 110 was the only choice of aircraft for
the night fighter arm. Once the broad parameters had been established,
numerous tests were conducted, not only of equipment with which to ease
the crews' task, but other aircraft that could be adapted to the nocturnal in-
terception role. Variants of the standard Dornie/ bombers were selected
for conversion for a night role, these initially being the Do 17Z and Do
215B.
Bomber types, while large enough to house a four- to five-man crew, bulky
radio equipment and ample guns and ammunition in new 'solid' nose sec-
tions, were considered to be too slow to be effective night interceptors, as
they also lacked manoeuvrability and were excessively heavy. Neverthe-
less, the earlier Dorniers became useful workhorses and testbeds for equip-
ment, as well as filling an operational need on a limited basis.
Much better all round was the Ju 88C-2, which was reckoned to be gener-
ally good for night interception because of its five-hour endurance - the
fact that it could be crewed by up to four men, one of whom could act as a
specialised radio operator, was another major consideration. In this latter
respect it was superior to the Bf 110, which although it could, and did, ac-
148/214
commodate a third man, became very crowded as a result. Also, an extra

pair of eyes very usefully multiplied visual observation, which the Germans
put great faith in for night fighting throughout the war.
Some crews did, however, resent changing over from the Bf 110 to the Ju
88, as the latter was a heavier aircraft lacking the performance of the light-
er Messerschmitt 'twin' - in the main it came to be regarded as the second
standard night fighter type after the Bf 110. Many embryo night fighter
crews already knew the Zerstôrer intimately, had flown it on daylight oper-
ations, and were thoroughly versed in its characteristics - most of which
they found favourable.
The Bf 110 was endowed with a good rate of climb, being fast enough to
catch any of the British night raiders and bring them down with its formi-
dable cannon and machine gun armament, grouped in the nose to give an
excellent concentration of fire. All German night fighters were well armed
with a combination of cannon and machine guns, and while there were few
complaints about firepower, individual crews showed preferences in the
number of guns they wanted, and the type of ammunition to use.
Opinions understandably varied, particularly as to the effectiveness of
heavy versus lighter cannon and the minimum number of such guns re-
quired. An important factor was to avoid the pilot's night vision being
ruined by extensive flash when the guns were fired.
The early individualistic approach to night fighting tended to endure
throughout the war despite new weapons installations. These inevitably
led to the adoption of differing gunnery techniques, a fact that would later
have a detrimental effect on the development of the Heinkel He 219. Hav-
ing quizzed crews on their armament preferences in the 'ideal' night fight-
er, manufacturers had to cope with numerous conflicting requirements
that could not always be easily reconciled.
The Bf 110s flown by NJG 1 were virtually standard aircraft, simply re-
marked and repainted black for their nocturnal sorties. Black paint was al-
so applied to Nachtjagdju 88s and Do 17s for in 1940 a dark colour was in-
ternationally believed to offer the best camouflage for aircraft operating at
night, although this was later found not to be as effective as shades that
were almost the complete opposite — light greys and white. But until 1943,
the Nachtjagd would fly generally black-painted aircraft.
To engender esprit de corps, the Nachtjagd required an appropriate badge
of identity. Wolfgang Falck was instrumental in getting this organised;
'While I was Gruppenkommandeur I./LG 1 in the spring of 1940, my idea
was to have an emblem which should be a symbol - something to give
crews the feeling that they were members of a special unit. There was a de-
sign competition, and I got several proposals. In my opinion the best one
was submitted by Oberleutnant Victor Molders, brother of the famous
Werner. It showed the silver falcon taken from my family coat of arms with
149/214
sky background that was then blue. Since we flew only against the RAF,
Molders included a red lightning flash pointing at London, the badge
showing the section of the globe over which we were flying. A short time
after this, I got the order to organise NJG 1, and I took the new badge with
me. For the night mission, we changed the sky blue background to black.
That was the origin of the Nachtjagd-Abzeichen, which was used by all the
night fighter units, including the Flakschweinwerfer Regimenter, the Luft-
nachrichten-Regimenter and all staff echelons, with a few changes to dem-
onstrate their special task.'
The 'England blitz' badge was very widely applied to Nachtjagd aircraft,
and even when fresh Staffeln formed, or new Geschwaderen and individu-
al emblems were applied, the badge remained predominant. In this small
way the force indeed stood a little apart from other Luftwaffe formations,
as was Falck's original intention for his unit, albeit one that had changed
from day to night operations. The badge was also painted on equipment
and vehicles as well as aircraft, including training gliders.
The importance of searchlights in successful night fighting was reflected in
the addition of three white beams to the Nachtjagd badge by the search-
light units. This adapted emblem was painted on aircraft, notably Dor-
niers, flown by the Nachtjagd general staff, as frontline night fighters ap-
pear to have carried a badge without searchlights.
With the Luftwaffe high command recognising the urgent need for a night
fighter force, Wolfgang Falck and others set about honing the necessary
technique needed to bring down enemy bombers - not that destruction was
initially the only option. It was thought, somewhat optimistically, that it
might be possible to drive the bombers away from their intended objective.
This quickly proved to be unrealistic.
Falck's earlier experiments into the feasibility of night interception, and
his subsequent report, proved useful — and positive to the young Haupt-
mann's career, as he was appointed Kommodore of NJG 1 on 26 June. It
was the first time that anyone of that rank had been given such responsibil-
ity. Falck, universally known by the shortform 'Wolf, did not minimise the
difficulties facing Nachtjagd crews. Asked to make a parallel as to how the
early pre-airborne radar interception sorties were conducted - one that
might be readily understood by the layman - he said, 'Switch off all the
lights in the room and try to catch a fly with your hands'.
And that report he wrote had its repercussions. His rueful comment was,
'Of course when the first raids on Germany occurred it was my fault, you
see!' Falck had previously discussed the outline requirements of a night
fighter force with Goring, State Secretary Erhard Milch, Ernst Udet (rhc
chief of Luftwaffe Supply) and Albert Kcsselring. The latter had apparently
demanded such a force be established forthwith when he had witnessed
RAF bombers passing over his headquarters while he was C-in-C of Luft-
150/214
flotte 2 for the assault on England.

To enable the various elements of a night defence system to be properly or-
ganised, a Night Fighter Division was set up on 17 July 1940 with Oberst
Kammhuber in command. On the 23rd a Divisional HQ had been estab-
lished at Brussels, and a command post was operational at Zeist, near
Utrecht, by 1 August.
The first Gruppe of NJG 1 was officially formed on 22 June with Falck in
command. The basis was 2. and 3./ZG 1 and IV./ZG 26, and over the re-
maining months of 1940, the Nachtjagdgcew rapidly. A second Gruppe of
NJG 1 had originally been formed from IV.(N)/JG 2 on the same day in
June, but in July this unit became III./NJG 1.
A second formation of II Gruppe was created from (Z)./KG 30 in July, and
when this became I./NJG 2 in September, a third formation of NJG 1 was
concurrently organised that from elements of I./ZG 26. A typical example
of the Luftwaffe system whereby experienced elements were transferred to
create new units, this process was continued throughout the existence of
the Nachtjagd. As all the Zerstorer formations, with the exception of KG
30, flew the Bf 110, this became NJG 1's standard aircraft, although its
overall Geschwader inventory, in common with most of the Nachtjagd,
would eventually include examples of all the leading night fighter types.
The Zerstorer Staffel of KG 30, in common with the rest of the Kampf-
geschwader, was equipped with the Ju 88. When it moved to Dusseldorf
to become 4./NJG 1 it set something of a precedent in that the Staffel
thereafter operated a mix of Ju 88s, Bf 110s and Dorniers.
When NJG 2 was created in September 1940 its primary type was the Ju
88C, but the inventory also included the single Do 17Z-6 Kaus (Screech
Owl) I fitted with a Ju 88C solid nose section, plus several Do 17Z-10 Kaus
Us. The designation Kaus identified aircraft as carrying the Rohr infra-red
sighting device known as 'Spanner', which was intended to enhance the pi-
lot's night detection of targets by reflecting the light from bomber ex-
hausts. It was only partially successful, and was soon dropped from front-
line aircraft.
The original II./NJG 1 which became III. Gruppe had been equipped with
the Bf 109, single-seaters being officially regarded as useful night fighters
throughout the conflict. It was, incidentally, a Bf 109 that is generally cred-
ited with achieving the first Luftwaffe night fighter victory on 8/9 July
1940. Flying with IV.(N)/JG 2, Oberfeldwebel Paul Forster intercepted a
Whitley V of No 10 Sqn caught by searchlights and shot it down into the
sea off Heligoland. Forster stated that he merely happened to be in the
right place at the right time, with no special equipment to assist his kill.
A Whitley V was also the first victim to fall to NJG 1. Flying a Bf 110 over
the Ruhr on the night of July 20/21, Werner Streib spotted what he ini-
tially took to be another Bf 110. Having correctly identified the British
151/214
bomber the German pilot closed to 300 yards, his Bordfunker (radio oper-
ator), Unteroffizier Lingen, keeping a close watch on the raider. Opting for
a beam attack, Streib pressed to 250 yards before he was seen, whereupon
the tail gunner of the Whitley sent a stream of Browning machine gun fire
in his direction. Now there was no doubt. The Messerschmitt turned to
starboard to position itself below and astern of the bomber and Streib
opened fire with cannon and machine guns. Flames were observed from
the Whitley' s starboard engine and the crew were apparently seen to bale
out as the aircraft dropped away. RAF records confirmed the loss of two
Whitley Vs, one each from Nos 58 and 78 Sqns, on that particular night,
but in both cases the entire crew perished.
The broad operational parameters under which the Nachtjagd was estab-
lished would be modified to meet continuing commitments. Much would
depend on what the enemy did, for a defensive force must perforce await
developments. At the outset no set 'tours of duty' were established for
night fighter crews, and in general, single enemy aircraft were left alone,
night fighters not being scrambled unless there was a likelihood of inter-
cepting multiple targets.
Gruppe establishment would vary at different times and for a variety of
reasons, but it was stipulated that a minimum of 30 aircraft would be
needed for a unit to operate effectively from a forward area - i.e. away from
more elaborate servicing facilities. This point last lay at the heart of deploy-
ment plans for the Luftwaffe in general, fighter forces being provided with
a support infrastructure to enable them to operate from a network of air-
fields - some of them only basically - equipped - all over Germany. And the
entire Nachtjaggd would move around constantly during the war years.
Positive identification of airborne targets was necessary at all times, and
ctews understood that only two categories of victory claim -destroyed or
probable - would be allowed. 'Damaged' claims were not considered. For a
kill to be confirmed, the tatget aircraft had to be seen to be (a) on fire or
(b) to explode on impact with the ground. If night fighter crews observed
fire, but no evidence of the bomber striking the ground or disintegrating, it
would be categorised only as a probable.
A system similar to that introduced for the day fighter Geschwader was
used to calculate the scores of individual Na.chtja.gd pilots, who would ul-
timately be recommended for the award of medals as they accumulated
sufficient points. As an example, 500 points were required for the award of
the Iron Cross (First Class). This system did not, however, endure, being
replaced by one based on the number of 'war flights' made by an individu-
al, and his length of service in the Staffel I. There was no automatic award
for the destruction of a set number of aircraft, although it was generally
considered that the value of a victory for a night fighter was three times
that of a day fighter.
152/214
Night fighters would take off in virtually all weather conditions if multiple
enemy bombers were detected, but in time it was realised that their efforts
were pointless if there was thick fog or cloud that reduced the ceiling to
less than 250 ft, if there was 10/10th overcast up to 20,000 ft and if visibil-
ity was reduced to less than 800 yards. Individual crews would not be pe-
nalised if they chose to brave the elements and attempt to get above the
weather, where they could play a 'lone wolf role, often with success,
Considerable help was provided to the airmen by searchlights, although
the enthusiasm of the crews manning the batteries was occasionally coun-
ter-productive. They were instructed not to cone a bomber with more than
six searchlights when working with night fighters, this number being con-
sidered adequate for a Nachtjagd crew to pick up their target, and more
beams tended to blind both the attacker as well as the pilot and gunners in
the target bomber. Inevitably, though, larger cones were formed due to the
fact that the men on the ground all wished to share in the victory. In the
far from unusual event of night fighters themselves being picked up by
their own searchlights, an ample number of Very cartridges were carried.
These would be fired to alert searchlight and gun crews that friendly air-
craft were airborne in their sector.
Fighter’s Night
Each morning after operations, the aircraft were checked over and re-
armed. Between 1700 and 2100 hours at the evening briefing, the Gruppe
was given a meteorological report for the area that it was to cover, and if
the weather was favourable to bomber attacks, the unit had to notify its
available operational strength to the fighter control centre before dusk.
The Gntppe was provided with information as to the runway to be used,
the chosen orbiting point and alternative aerodromes, whilst a W/T brief-
ing was also given by the signals officer.
In the Himmelbett zone of operations, two aircraft were sometimes sent up
into each box during the afternoon to carry out vectoring and interception
practice for the purpose of helping train ground and air personnel, whilst
at the same time making a final check on equipment.
Aircraft to be used for the forthcoming night's operations were lined up be-
fore dusk at each side of the runway after having been re-serviced by the
ground staff. At Grove, for example, there were usually ten machines
parked on the apron at the end of the runway, spaced at intervals of 180 ft.
In case of enemy intrusion, these undisperscd aircraft would take off so as
not to present easy targets.
The balance of the unit's aircraft, including those making up the second
alert, were dispersed on, or near, the airfield, camouflaged where possible
with tree branches and netting. Care was taken to wipe out all traces of
taxy tracks from dispersal points to the aerodrome.
153/214
When operating under Himmelbett control, two aircraft of each operation-

al StaffelweK placed at immediate readiness of five minutes. If one aircraft
was scrambled, the second was to stand by to take the place of the first if
the latter should encounter any last minute trouble such as engine failure.
The crew of the second fighter remained in their aircraft for possible imme-
diate take-off until the airborne fighter was known to have reached its as-
signed box, after which the second crew could return to the dispersal, but
were to remain alert for a further call.
Under the ' Wilde Sau system, the single-engined fighters of an entire Staf-
fel or a particular Gruppe were readied. Typically, the first Staffilwas at
immediate readiness, with the third at 15 minutes' stand by. This proce-
dure varied according to the tactical disposition: on 'Wilde Sau operations
I./JG 301, when charged with defending its allocated area of northern
France, divided into two sections. The first comprised 60 per cent of
Gruppe strength and the second 40 per cent.
When Allied aircraft were expected over northern France the first section
would take off within 15 minutes and be followed, if necessary, by the re-
mainder. However, in protracted operations the second section would take
off two hours after the first, by which time the first aircraft would be re-
turning to refuel.
In general ' Wilde Sau pilots were divided into three 'weather grades': (a)
those with most experience, who were expected to fly in any weather; (b)
those with limited experience, only ordered up in certain conditions; and
(c) newcomers who would fly in only the best conditions. Pursuit night
fighting, particularly when the RAF night offensive was at its peak, often
demanded that the entire Staffel, or even Gruppe, was kept available for
immediate use. Major Ruppel, air operations officer for the middle Rhine
area, divided his pilots into two categories - those who could get off the
ground in three minutes, and those who took five minutes.
NJG 6, based in southern Germany, had four readiness states:
(1) - 80 minutes: operations not expected. Crews were allowed to remain
in their quarters and sleep.
(2) - 30 minutes: crews were to stay in their quarters, but dressed and
ready for flight, with the possibility of take-off within 30 minutes.
(3) - 15 minutes: crews were to be in the 'ready room' near their allocated
aircraft's hardstands, ready for flight.
(4) - immediate: crews were to sit in their aircraft, to be ready for takeoff
within two minutes.
154/214
Any changes or updates in the prevailing situation were relayed to the

crews by loudspeakers in the dispersals and hangars. Very signals from the
control tower told pilots to start their engines and taxy to the end of the
155/214
runway. Actual take-off was usually ordered over the R/T . for the twin-en-
gined fighters operating under the Himmelbett or Pursuit systems, while '
Wilde Sau aircraft usually took off on Very light signal.
A one-minute interval was allowed for each twin-engined aircraft to take-
off, 30 seconds for single-seaters. It was therefore possible to have, if nec-
essary, the entire nightfighter force airborne within 30 minutes.
In NJGs 2 and 6, an entire Gruppe would be airborne in 20-24 minutes,
with the first one getting all its aircraft away within eight minutes of the in-
itial warning being received.
In the event of double sorties 58 being flown by individual crews, those
who returned to their base airfield would resume the original state of readi-
ness. Should they have cause to divert to an alternate airfield, they would
be temporarily attached to the unit they had Visited', and be briefed as
though they belonged to that unit.
Under the Himmelbett system, the night fighter would normally patrol the
searchlight belt to which it had been assigned - it would fly continually be-
tween two given points at altitudes between 12,000 and 18,000 ft. In areas
were RAF bombers were expected to be encountered, standing patrols
would be maintained in the Himmelbett boxes from dusk onwards. Dura-
tion of patrols depended on the aircraft type, Ju 88s and Do 217s typically
remaining airborne for three hours and the Bf 110 for two. Patrols would
be flown at altitudes roughly similar to those adopted by the enemy bomb-
er stream, both to avoid any conflict with the smooth operation of local fly-
ing in training areas at lower altitudes, and to evade intruders.
When the Himmelbett system was changed, standing patrols were largely
abandoned, these being further curtailed as petrol shortages took effect.
Fighters were generally scrambled on warnings received, but as the Luft-
waffe lost its early warning coverage as the Allies captured more territory,
the retreat into Germany reduced the standing patrol until it was a thing of
the past. An additional hazard at that time were enemy intruders. This was
where the pursuit system came into its own, as aircraft would take-off and
make for a particular beacon shortly before receiving orders to proceed to
the operational area.
The risk of collision was reduced by all aircraft making a left hand orbit of
the beacon at different altitudes - stepped up to 9800 ft (3000 m), with
each crew maintaining 100 m (160 ft) separation - which meant that as
many as 30 machines could be in a small area at one time without running
the risk of collision. The Gruppe commentary would then pass a bearing
for interception. Searchlights continued to play their part in night intercep-
tions throughout the war, and under the pursuit system, they were some-
times used as controlling aids in locating the bomber stream — lights
would be dipped to point the fighters in the right direction.
58 The Schrâge Musik type installation.
156/214
Following standard operating procedure, interception tactics depended on

the type, and capability, of the equipment used, and weather conditions,
particularly the extent and altitude of any cloud.
The fundamental aspects of target approach using Lichtenstein BC, FuG
218 and FuG 220 saw the attacker come in from directly behind and
slightly below the bomber at a controlled speed, closely co-ordinated with
that of the 'bogey'. The logical exception would be in the event of an illumi-
nated layer of cloud forming a background below, in which case the fighter
approached from above to avoid detection by his own silhouette. Speed
control was important, both for recognition purposes and to allow the pilot
to set up an attack of his own choosing.
During a target approach using radar, the fighter had to modify its speed
to the decreasing distance between the two aircraft so that at the moment
of visual pick up (depending on the prevailing visibility), both were flying
at approximately the same speed.
In most cases of approach using AI equipment, it was the responsibility of
the Bordfunker to pass the necessary changes of direction to the pilot. One
exception to this general rule occurred when the FuG 240 Berlin equip-
ment was used. In that case the Bordfunker merely had to centre the target
on his CRT and the target direction would register on an indicator in the
pilot's cockpit. Thus, the pilot himself analysed the target's relative posi-
tion, and manoeuvred his aircraft accordingly.
The time at which the Bordfunker would turn on his equipment was en-
tirely dictated by circumstances. As one operator stated: 'The SN-2 was
switched on for short periods when the operator, either from data from the
ground or visual observation of flares, believed that he was near the bomb-
er stream. There were no orders governing the length of time it was to be
switched on. It was general policy, nevertheless, to turn on the low tension
(circuit-heating) when the night fighter received its original vector from
around control — not before.'
Ground control aimed to place the fighter immediately behind the enemy
aircraft, but the pilot could request that he be positioned to port or star-
board, dependent on the available light conditions and the source of such
light. Night fighters were normally vectored to the same height as the hos-
tile aircraft or, by request, to heights decreasing to 490 ft (150 m) below it.
When the night fighter was within about 6500 ft (4062.50 m) of the target,
the transformer (high tension) of the Lichtenstein was switched on. In
some cases it was switched on at up to 9800 ft (6125 m) away, but only an
exceptional operator could obtain satisfactory contact at more than 6500 ft
distance.
As soon as contact had been established the Bordfunker gave the codeword
'Emil-Emil' ('I have made contact'). The code for being within visual and
firing range was 'Ich Beruhre'. Ground control could always be called back
157/214
in case the target was lost through taking evasive action. It usually took be-
tween six to ten minutes to secure a contact after receiving the first vector
from ground control. On occasion, a fighter with a radar, or good visual
contact, would be instructed to chase the enemy aircraft beyond GCI range
- for example, fighters based in Holland sometimes followed RAF bombers
as far north-west as the English coast.
The Naxos homer, which was standard in the Ju 88, and fitted to many
night fighters in conjunction with SN-2, led to the adoption of an original
night interception technique. Limited in that it could be used effectively
only against aircraft transmitting radar or navigational data, Naxos was
widely used and proved very successful. It was able to detect H2S transmis-
sions as far away as 60 miles, and this capability all but precluded the par-
ticipation of GCI in the aerial kill. The British radar set was highly direc-
tional and created a 'cone' of detectable energy below the transmitting
bomber, and German night fighters strove to keep within this area, but low
enough to maintain CRT contact.
To find a suitable target the German pilot received a Naxos blip, checked
the bearing and aligned his course. He then nosed upwards to pull clear of
the H^S cone. The night fighter levelled out when the blip disappeared
from the Naxos scope, and the pilot would climb in a series of 'steps' to
check his position relative to the H2S cone. By repeating this procedure
the fighter avoided detection by any IFF device carried by the bomber.
Naxos was not intended for final approach purposes, but rather to bring
the German fighter within range of its SN-2 - although there were some pi-
lots who used the device right into the final phases of interception. At that
point the night fighter would open fire without question if the target was
identified as a four-engined bomber. The problem came if a twin-engined
type was in the sights. In that case the target's identity had to be estab-
lished before attacking, and in the event that there was insufficient light
from flares or searchlights, the quarry had to be followed until its behav-
iour gave away its nationality.
This sounds vague but it often worked, for there were few Allied pilots who
did not adopt some form of evasive action if they were being followed.
However, if a. twin-engined type could not be visually identified, and it
took no evasive action, there was little more that the German crew could
do. Exhaust patterns were not much help, as all operational 'twins' on both
sides had some form of flame-damping, but under such circumstances
both the Mosquito and Black Widow tended to give away their identities by
their respective speeds — although a degree of doubt would still remain as
the Me 410 also had a high top speed. A German aircraft would, however,
be expected to fire a Very light signal if it was being followed.
In the final analysis, a Nachtjagd crew was wiser to break off the pursuit if
any doubt still remained. There were cases of pilots being court-martialled
158/214
for shooting down friendly aircraft through failing to make visual confir-
mation.
On clear nights contrails assisted the night fighter crews, these being use-
ful in estimating the approximate distance of the bombers ahead by the
density of the trails. Having flown to the end of the contrail, the fighter
would weave from side to side to pick up individual aircraft, for it was al-
most impossible to see the actual bomber creating a trail.
“Wilde Sau” operations brought their own recognition problem in an arena
where single-seat fighters had not generally operated. In their early opera-
tions, ' Wilde Sau pilots would briefly flash their navigation lights seconds
before delivering an attack to warn other night fighters of their presence.
When the RAF began using Mosquitos over Germany, this practice was for-
bidden as being too dangerous.
Technically, the German were hampered by not developing a reliable form
of IFF (Identification: Friend or Foe). Other than the standard airborne
responder IFF set, the FuG 25a, which was installed in most operational
aircraft from 1942 onwards and was used by ground stations for recogni-
tion purposes throughout the war. The FuG 25a worked well enough in
conjunction with Freya ground stations and Egon control, but it could not
operate with the Wurzburg ground set without a supplementary attach-
ment in the form of an interrogator.
A secondary method of identification from the ground did exist. This was a
system whereby a red light flashed on the control panel of the night fighter
when in the beam of a Wurzburg. The pilot would depress a switch upon
instructions from the ground and reply simply 'yes' or 'no' according to
whether or not the light flashed to indicate his position within the beam. If
ground control was uncertain as to the identity of the fighter, the latter
would be asked to make alternate left or right turns to cause a blip on the
Wurzburg presentation screen.
Intruding Allied night fighters adversely effected the tactical use of IFF,
just as they did most other phases of Luftwaffe night fighting procedure.
For some time there was a popular belief that the enemy was able to home
onto FuG 25a transmissions, despite being officially told that this was not
the case, and that the equipment should be left on at all times during op-
erational flights. Circumventing their orders, many crews still switched off
their FuG 25a for fear that they would otherwise be detected. In fact crews
were generally wary of any IFF device -they lost faith in such equipment
after being continually fired upon by their own flak with the FuG 25a
switched on or off! It became standard procedure — if no intruders were
reported — to switch on FuG 25a at the point of take-off, and to keep it op-
erating until well clear of the airfield. During intercepts the instrument
would be turned off, but on return to base, again providing that no warn-
ing of intruders was in effect, the set would be switched on shortly before
159/214
reaching the airfield.

The fact that British aircraft usually left their IFF sets turned on was a mys-
tery to German crews insomuch as it allowed their own early warning and
airborne radars to trip the enemy transmissions for homing and warning
purposes. Alternatively, much faith was placed in tail warning equipment
— it was known that many crews, contrary to orders, hugged the ground
while orbiting a beacon in order to avoid Allied intruders, corkscrewed
throughout the course of an interception and, in some cases — particularly
with the Ju 88 — carried an extra crewman whose job it was to keep rear-
ward observation, and act as a gunner. Knowing they had a tail warning de-
vice relieved tension among crews, and it was generally felt that such pro-
tection was both necessary and effective for the prosecution of night fight-
er tactics.
Tail warning was not infallible, and most crews accepted that a percentage
of incomplete interceptions would occur through false warnings being re-
ceived. All involved agreed, however, that the safety factor more than com-
pensated for this drawback, and that only a small proportion of contacts
were lost to this cause. Much depended on the type of tail warning fitted -
most sets designed for that purpose merely indicated a target to the rear
and gave the range only. In this case the overtaking speed of the pursuing
aircraft was taken into account as an aid to determining the character of
the pursuit - whether accidental or deliberate. If a moderate but definite
rate of closure was noticed, the German fighter would take violent evasive
action when the would-be attacker reached a position within 1500 ft,
although sometimes the critical closing range was allowed to reduce to
much less than 1300 ft, this factor depending upon the individual crew's
nerves!
Evasive action in such an instance was recommended as a 180° hard turn
to port or starboard. It the pursuing aircraft could be seen by the crew, the
turn would be made in accordance with its position. In the days when ene-
my intruders were still relatively rare in German skies the night fighters
were briefed to peel off towards an aircraft following them, but this ma-
noeuvre resulted in a loss of 5000 to 6500 ft in height, which took about
ten minutes to regain.
Naxos could also indicate (in azimuth only) the presence of an Allied fight-
er using its 10-centimetre SCR 720 radar, and it had the advantage of pick-
ing up such a signal from as far away as 50 miles - providing that the ene-
my aircraft was somewhat above. Naxos could therefore act as a tail warn-
ing aid by supplementing the much shorter range of the radar's purpose-
built for tail warning.
Once enemy aircraft had been identified as hostile there were several
standard procedures designed to destroy them, and their use depended on
prevailing orders and individual crew experience. In some units the tactics
160/214
preferred by the commanding officer would be followed by the crews under

his command. The actual method of approach was usually left to each
crew, night fighting having always been more of a 'lone wolf method of at-
tack than other forms of aerial warfare, dictated both by the situation they
found themselves in and the type of armament fitted to their aircraft.
With normal fixed forward-firing guns, attacks were nearly always from as-
tern and below, owing to the fact that most German night fighter types had
bad downward visibility. British bombers were generally poorly defended
from below, and they were usually seen more clearly when silhouetted
against the sky.
The usual attack was proceeded by throttling back at the limit of visual
range. Then, after deciding on his particular type of pass, the pilot would
open up to full throttle and close to firing range. A type of attack favoured
by IV./NJG 1 was for the fighter to make a slow approach until it was about
150 ft immediately beneath the target bomber, and then fly along at a
synchronised speed until the pilot was ready to fire. It was claimed that in
this position, the fighter could not be seen by the bomber's crew and was
not covered by any of its guns. The actual attack was made by pulling up al-
most vertically and sending a burst of fire along the underside of the bomb-
er's wings. Although this method was very popular in IV./NJG 1, it was ap-
parently regarded as dangerous by other units, who stressed the danger el-
ement of the bomber diving or releasing its load just as the night fighter
was about to fire
Two other methods were; (1) the pilot aimed ahead of the bomber and
fired as he pulled up from below so that the bomber flew into the stream of
shells which sprayed along the length of the fuselage; and (2) a tactic gen-
erally confined to the lighter Bf 110 was to pull up perpendicularly and
turn away in either direction while delivering a burst which raked the
bomber's wings from tip to tip. 59
With Schrage Musik installations the approach was identical, but slightly
lower. This armament was not universally popular, particularly with older
pilots who preferred to use the fixed forward-firing guns they had trained
with and become accustomed to. It was the younger crews who favoured
Bf 110G-2 2Z+AC Hauptmann Rolf Leuchs, Gruppenkommandeur II./NJG 6.

59
Echterdingen, March 1944
161/214
the newer upward firing guns, as some of them tended to open fire with
conventional weapons from beyond maximum range, thus giving their po-
sition away, and allowing the target to take evasive action. One disadvant-
age with Schrâge Musik was that if the target bomber exploded, the night
fighter was in danger of being right in the path of burning debris.
On the other hand, it was extremely difficult to stay below a bomber that
was taking diving evasive action. The new armament rapidly gained in fa-
vour despite the prejudice of the old hands, and Schnaufer for one esti-
mated that in the latter stages of the war, 50 per cent of night fighter at-
tacks were carried out with upward-firing guns. 'Wilde Sau attacks were
commonly delivered in a steep climb after a dive from a height of 1300 ft
(400 m) above the bomber.
At night fighter schools pilots were taught to aim at the undersides of the
bomber, between the engines and wing roots, in the hope of setting the fuel
tanks on fire, and a number of Experten were indeed skilled enough to be
this exacting. In actual combat the less experienced crews foreswore trying
to hit vulnerable spots, as they often found it hard enough to hit the enemy
aircraft at all.
Average range for opening fire was about 400 ft, although the more experi-
enced pilots would narrow the gap down to around 200 ft. Breakaway,
once a kill was certain, was in a diving turn to avoid any falling debris.
Crews showed a marked preference for attacking four-engined aircraft. For
one thing, they were (compared to 'twins' such as the Wellington) faster,
and therefore easier for the night fighter to synchronise speeds. When in-
tercepting a Lancaster or Halifax, there was rarely any necessity for the
fighter to lower the flaps in order to avoid overshooting.
For their part, the RAF bomber crews employed passive defence against
German fighters, using the highly effective corkscrew and, to a lesser ex-
tent, weaving. The latter tactic was reported as early as 1943 not to have
been so effective, as bomber crews generally followed too shallow a flight
path (probably for fear of collision) while it was being executed. Sideslip-
ping in a semi-stall and losing height rapidly could also shake off a night
fighter.
Nachtjagd crews reported that bombers returning from "the Ruhr adopted
another tactic that could frustrate them. After clearing the target area, the
bombers tended to reduce height steadily until reaching the Dutch coast at
about 300 ft. This caused them not only to pass through the night fighter
control areas at the greatest possible speed, but also to be low enough to
render attacks from below difficult. When the bombers opened fire on at-
tacking night fighters, the use of tracer rounds had a definite deterrent ef-
fect on the majority of German crews, as did the rarely-used ploy of explod-
ing a flash bomb to the rear of the bomber under attack. Both kinds of
reaction temporarily blinded the night fighter pilot long enough for him to
162/214
lose sight of the target, and in many cases for the bomber to escape.
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen

Dates: 10 October 1895 in Gut Barzdorf, Silesia; died 12 July 1945 in Bad
Ischl, Austria)
Born in 1895 to Prussian nobles, Wolfram grew up in wealthy surroun-
dings. After attending school, he opted to join the German Army at the age
of 18, rather than choose an academic career. He joined the army's Cavalry
arm in 1913. 60
On the outbreak of the First World War, he fought on the Western Front,
winning the Iron Cross Second Class. He was redeployed to the Eastern
60 Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram von Richthofen
163/214
Front in 1915, where he stayed until 1917. The von Richthofen family pro-
duced several notable personalities that would become famous during the
First War. His cousins, brothers Lothar and Manfred von Richthofen, both
became flying aces and they encouraged him to join the Luftstreitkräfte
(German Imperial Air Service). He did so, and joined Manfred's Geschwa-
der (Wing), Jagdgeschwader 1 (Fighter Wing 1). Manfred, known as the
Red Baron, was the highest claiming ace of the war with 80 victories. On
his first mission with his cousin, Manfred was killed in April 1918. Wol-
fram continued flying, and went on to claim eight aerial victories before
the armistice in November 1918. His other cousin, Lothar, survived the
war, but was killed in a flying accident in 1922.
After the war Richthofen resumed civilian life and discharged himself from
the army. He studied Engineering at University before rejoining the
Reichswehr, the German armed forces in the Weimar Republic era. In
1933 Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party seized power in Germany, and the
Reichswehr was formed into the Wehrmacht. Wolfram joined the new
Luftwaffe. He served as part of the Condor Legion which supported the
Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War. During this time, he recognised the
need for close air support in military campaigns. He championed the dive
bomber, particularly the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka. He also believed in impro-
ving ground-air communications, which was put into effect in the Second
World War, after his experiences in Spain and Poland. The combination of
effective air-ground communications, and powerful concentrations of dive
bombers would lead to personal success for Wolfram in the first half of the
war. By 1941, a high standard of air to ground communications became a
uniform facility in the Luftwaffe.
When the Second World War broke out in September 1939, he comman-
ded a specialised ground-attack air unit Fliegerkorps VIII (8th Air Corps),
first as a small action unit in the Polish Campaign, and then as full-sized
Air Corps in Western Europe, from May to June 1940. The effectiveness of
his units proved decisive at certain points in the French Campaign, particu-
larly covering the German thrust to the English Channel. He was awarded
the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross on 23 May 1940, in view of his achieve-
ments. He continued in frontline service during the Battle of Britain and
Balkans Campaign in 1940 and 1941.
Richthofen achieved his greatest success on the Eastern Front. In particu-
lar, he achieved notable success in the Crimean Campaigns during 1942.
Despite offering vital tactical and operational support to Army Group
South, after the defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad he was moved to the Me-
diterranean Theatre of Operations, where he commanded Luftwaffe forces
in the Italian Campaign. He remained in active service until late 1944,
when he was retired on medical grounds. Soon after the capitulation of
Germany in May 1945, he was taken prisoner by the United States Army,
164/214
but died in captivity of a brain tumor on 12 July that same year.

Richthofen was born on 10 October 1895, at the von Richthofen Barzdorf
estate (Gut Barzdorf), near Striegau, Lower Silesia to an aristocratic fa-
mily. His father, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen (1856–1922), and mot-
her, Therese Gotz von Olenhusen (1862–1948) were of Silesian nobility,
and the family had been nobles for 350 years prior to Wolfram's existence.
Von Richthofen was second child and oldest son of four children. His older
sister, Sophie-Therese was born in 1891 (and died in 1971). His brother
Manfred was born in 1898 and Gerhard in 1902. He was the fourth cousin
of the German World War I flying ace Manfred von Richthofen, popularly
known as the "Red Baron," and the baron's younger brother Lothar von
Richthofen. As the son of a noble, he enjoyed a life of privilege. The fa-
mily’s noble status dated back to the 1500s, and by the 1700s the Richtho-
fens owned 16 estates in Lower Silesia. When Frederick the Great annexed
Silesia in 1740, he personally granted the title of Baron (Freiherr) to one of
Richthofen’s ancestors. The family continued on in Silesia for a further
three generations.
Richthofen’s home, an eighteenth century estate, was only one of 25 Richt-
hofen-owned properties totalling 140 square kilometres (35,000 acres;
54 sq mi). Barzdorf, where he lived, was a modest 350 hectares (860 acres;
1.4 sq mi), of which 269 was cropland and the rest forest. Interestingly
Wolfram, as the oldest son did not inherit the estate. Instead, on the death
of his father in 1922, it was given to his younger brother, Manfred. Some
years before, Wolfram’s uncle General of Cavalry Manfred von Richthofen,
his father’s brother, had asked him to inherit his estate to keep it in the fa-
mily, as he himself had no children. Wolfram inherited the estate after
Manfred legally adopted him. The General did not die until 1939, having li-
ved long enough to see his nephew win success in the Spanish Civil War
and in the Polish Campaign.
He had a distant relationship with his youngest brother, but a close one
with Manfred. Unlike most Prussian nobles Richthofen went to the local
Gymnasium (academic high school) and did not have private tutors at ho-
me. He attended school in Striegau. His grades at Mathematics and Ger-
man language were good, but he did not excel at foreign languages (in
which he scored average to poor results). He found studying language to be
boring, but did learn Italian and could converse competently in it in later
life.
165/214
He became good friends with his cousins, Lothar and Manfred von Richt-
hofen, and he hunted game at the estate with them regularly. By the end of
his teens he had become an established hunter and horse rider – interests
which remained with him for the rest of his life. He enjoyed being outdoors
and, while still at school, opted to apply for a commission in the German
Army (rather than choose an academic career).
In 1913, at the age of 18, he joined the army and took the officer course in
Berlin. The Cavalry was the most prestigious arm, and he applied to join
the 4th Hussars which belonged to the 12th Cavalry Brigade of the Sixth
Army Corps in Breslau. He did not have much time to experience peaceti-
me military service. In August 1914 the First World War began.
On 18 September 1920, he married Jutta von Selchow ( March 1896 –
1991) at a Lutheran church Breslau (now the city of Wrocław in Poland).
They had been introduced by her brother Gunther. Jutta was also of Sile-
sian nobility, and had moved in the same circles. She had served as a nurse
in the war. They lived in an apartment in Hanover while Wolfram restarted
his academic career in Engineering. During their marriage they rarely tra-
velled abroad in the 1920s. In the 1930s they took skiing holidays in Swit-
166/214
zerland. The couple had three children; Wolfram (born 25 May 1922), Götz
(27 November 1925) and Ellen (15 February 1928).
First World War
Fighting in the Army

The Hussars of the 12th Cavalry Brigade were attached to the 5th Cavalry
Division, which was subordinated to the First Cavalry Corps. It formed
part of the German Third Army that enacted the attack on France and Bel-
gium in August 1914 as part of the pre-war Schlieffen Plan. He crossed the
Meuse river at Dinant. It was involved in heavy action against the French
VIII Cavalry Corps and fought in Belgium at Namur on 23–24 August and
again at St. Quentin. The 5th Cavalry continued its drive into France after
the Battle of the Frontiers, but was stopped at the First Battle of the Marne
in September. In recognition for bravery in combat, Wolfram was awarded
the Iron Cross Second Class (1914) on 21 September 1914. The modern
combat environment damaged the effectiveness of cavalry, and thus Richt-
hofen’s division was transferred to the Eastern Front, in Poland that No-
vember
On the Eastern Front, the Cavalry Division was mostly deployed in the
south. Little combat took place, as the German army did not use cavalry as
frequently. The division was kept mainly in reserve. Richthofen’s brigade
served near Pinsk in 1916, and the division would spend late 1915 to Ja-
nuary 1917 of defensive operations in the Pripet Marshes. Richthofen was
made commander of the horse depot of the Brigade in the autumn, 1916
and was promoted to Squadron Commander, with 160 men under his com-
mand. This was never going to garner him the level of fame his cousins,
Lothar and Manfred, were now achieving in the Luftstreitkräfte (Imperial
Air Service). They personally encouraged him to join as an airman. He fi-
nally did so in June 1917.
Transfer to the Luftstreitkräfte

Before his joined the Air Service, Wolfram took leave in Germany until he
reported to the 14th Flying Replacement Regiment based at Halle, one of
several large flight schools. At this point in the war, German training was
more thorough and longer than the British’ Royal Flying Corps (RFC), and
at least equal to that given by Armee de l'Air and United States Army Air
Service (USAAS). His training lasted three months, and he was assigned to
the 11th Flying Replacement Battalion for advanced training in March
1918. He reported to his cousin Manfred’s unit, Jagdgeschwader 1 (JG 1)
on 4 April 1918. On his first mission with his cousin, Manfred was killed in
April 1918. Wolfram continued flying, and went on to claim eight aerial vic-
tories before the armistice in November 1918.
167/214
Between the wars
Academia and Reichswehr

Von Richthofen studied aeronautical engineering from 1919 to 1922 at the
Technical University of Hanover. He served in Rome in 1929–1931 as an
"informal" air attache in violation of the disarmament clauses of the Ver-
sailles Treaty.
Wehrmacht
In 1933 von Richthofen joined the Luftwaffe, commanded by his former
commanding officer at JG 1, in 1918, Hermann Göring. By 1934 he was in
charge of developing and testing new aircraft in the Technisches Amt, un-
der the overall direction of Ernst Udet. Although Richthofen had known
Göring, having served under him in the First World War in JG 1, the two
did not get along. They both came from aristocratic backgrounds, but
Richthofen was a Silesian from Lower Silesia, a drive commander, a good
and hard working staff officer who enjoyed the company of engineers and
like-minded men. Göring was a Bavarian, and a playboy who enjoyed tal-
king about First World War stories and his time as an ace while he enjoyed
the trappings of power. Göring preferred men like him, and promoted
them on that basis. He overlooked the more qualified Richthofen in favour
of Udet, a hard drinker and playboy, who like Göring had grown up in Ba-
varia, to head the Technisches Amt.
Richthofen's role was mainly concerned with aircraft procurement pro-
grams for the fledgling Luftwaffe. He was involved in the development of
types such as the Dornier Do 23, Heinkel He 111 and Junkers Ju 86. In the
event, only the He 111 would make a real impact during the war. Richtho-
fen was following a considerably difficult assignment, stemming from a di-
rective issued to the Reichswehr before Hitler's rise to power. In July 1932,
the Reichswehr had been pursuing the Schnellbomber (fast bomber) con-
cept. The need for modern and fast bombers was to meet the future vision
of air warfare for bombers that were faster than fighter aircraft. 61
61Von Richthofen flew in the Fi 156 Storch during the campaign, to see the battle-
field for himself.
168/214
As the 1930s progressed the He 111 was refined, and the Dornier Do 17
Schnellbomber entered planning, production and service in 1936–37. Even
so, Göring as still interested in the heavy bomber program, which would gi-
ve the Luftwaffe a firm strategic bombing capability. Richthofen was du-
bious about the employment of heavy bombers, and wanted the projects
developing types like the Dornier Do 19 cancelled. Unfortunately for Richt-
hofen, for the time being, the Luftwaffe's first Chief of the General Staff,
Walter Wever, did believe in the heavy bomber program. The development
of what Wever called the "Ural bomber" designs continued. At the time,
Göring and Wever also required a long-range fighter escort design for pro-
tecting the bombers over Britain and the Soviet Union, Germany's expec-
ted enemies. Richthofen joined Wever in moderating some of the design
requests of Göring, who insisted on a fast, fighter, bomber, ground attack
and reconnaissance aircraft rolled into one design. However, Richthofen
used his position to split the specification into separate designs on 22 Ja-
nuary 1935, viewing the request as impossible.
Wever was killed in an air accident in June 1936 and the emphasis shifted
back to more affordable (in manpower and material terms) medium bom-
bers. After Wever's death, Göring and Ernst Udet became more active in
the development programs. Udet favoured the close support designs, such
as the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bomber, while Göring favoured having
more medium bombers rather than a small number of heavy bombers.
Richthofen did not get along with Udet, and did not believe in his ideas
about dive bombing. Udet, much like Göring, favoured combining the qua-
169/214
lities of aircraft. Udet sought out a design that could dog fight, dive bomb
and carry out level bombing, much like Göring had requested. This was at
odds with Wolfram's fundamental desire for aircraft that were easy to
mass produce and designed for, and to excel at, specialised tasks.
Although Richthofen had managed to prevent aircraft design from heading
into mediocrity, and kept them specialised for particular tasks, Udet still
influenced the selection of the multi-purpose Messerschmitt Bf 110 and the
Schnellbomber designed Junkers Ju 88 by the end of 1936. With the Ju
88, he insisted it have a dive bombing capability, though it was more sui-
ted to, and ideal for, the level bombing Schnellbomber concept. By the au-
tumn, 1936, Richthofen decided he had had enough of working with Udet,
whose ideas he thought were totally wrong. With an expanding Luftwaffe
and a civil war starting in Spain, an opportunity came for a field command.
Spanish Civil War
Innovation and experiences

In November 1936, Richthofen left the staff to take a field command in the
Condor Legion, a Luftwaffe contingent sent to support General Francisco
Franco's Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War. Udet continued with the di-
ve bomber concept and the Ju 87 first saw action under Richthofen's com-
mand in Spain. Wolfram retained his position as Head of Development,
but he was now tasked with the evaluation of aircraft under operational
conditions. His role expanded in January 1937, and he became Chief of
Staff to Hugo Sperrle, who was to command the Legion.
Richthofen's experiences were to serve the Luftwaffe well in the long-term.
His own learning curve in the war highlighted several issues that a modern
air force would have to overcome. The most important issues concerned
tactical and operational level warfare. Unlike the Italian officers from the
Regia Aeronautica, the Germans put a great deal of effort into developing
close support doctrine. Tactically, Richthofen found little need to retain
anti-aircraft artillery to defend airfields. He pushed Flak units into the
frontline to bolster the artillery units. Rapid fire 20 mm calibres and
88 mm weapons were first used in Spain. Their effectiveness was reported
to Berlin. Soon this tactic became part of Luftwaffe doctrine. Richthofen
was pleased with his idea, and the knowledge the "Flak" theorists in Berlin
were not happy about using air defence artillery in the ground battle.
Another tactical consideration led to operational innovation. Richthofen
adopted the shuttle air tactic. In order to maximise support over the fron-
tline, aircraft operated from bases near the front to keep and gain an ad-
vantage. It was very successful in the 1937 battles. Aircraft were sent in
small formations to bomb frontline positions, while other groups of
ground attack aircraft were en route and refuelling. This way a constant air
170/214
presence was maintained over the battlefield which eroded the effective-
ness and morale of the enemy. In order for this to able to work effectively,
three or more sorties needed to be flown per day. This required a large
number of personnel to set up and man forward airfields. The Luftwaffe's
logistics units had to be completely motorised to bring in fuel, ammunition
and spare parts. The logistics units had the opportunity to be tested under
tough conditions.
These tactics and operational methods were employed during Battle of Bil-
bao, which defeated the Republican forces in the north of Spain. The moto-
rised logistics also helped during the rapid redeployment to the south, af-
ter the surprise Republican offensive at Brunete in July 1937. The air sup-
port was vital in defeating the offensive, which was supported by modern
aircraft sent to the Republicans from the Soviet Union. German types like
the Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter, which replaced the Heinkel He 51, the
Do 17 and He 111 helped win and hold air superiority and interdict the bat-
tlefield, which decisively stopped the attack. The Republican's had spent
most of their Gold reserves on buying Soviet equipment. With most of that
equipment used up, the Condor Legion and Nationalists would have the
technological edge.
The most difficult aspect of close support was communication. Air-ground
liaison officers had been used since 1935, when the Luftwaffe first set up a
training program for this purpose. By 1937, precise procedures had yet to
be worked through for air to ground coordination. Staff officers were trai-
ned to solve operational problems, and the lack of doctrine and reluctance
of the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL = High Command of the Air
Force) to micromanage gave Sperrle and Richthofen a free hand to devise
solutions. Aircraft could not communicate with the frontline. Instead they
could communicate via radio with each other and their home base. One of
the first innovations was to prepare signals staff on the frontline in the re-
gion of any planned air strikes, and equip them with telephones. The for-
ward officers could telephone the base with updates, who in turn could ra-
dio the aircraft. It became an important standard operational practice.
Liaison officers were attached to the Nationalist Army, and improved coor-
dination continued in the second half of 1937 despite occasional friendly-fi-
re incidents. In the Second World War, the Luftwaffe air units and liaison
officers at the front could communicate directly with updated radios.
German air doctrine also led the way in transportation capability. The Con-
dor Legion, with the chief of staff's input, had proven logistics could be hel-
ped using air transports. By 1939, it would have the largest, and most capa-
ble transport service in the World.
The Luftwaffe entered the Second World War with high standards of trai-
ning. Although other air forces also had training programs and pilots equal
to the Germans, the Luftwaffe emphasised trainings its large units, the
171/214
Geschwader (Wings), Corps and Luftflotten (Air Fleet) staffs in large-scale

manoeuvres with the army in the pre-war years. War games, communica-
tion exercises in a different variety of combat operations allowed the offi-
cers to familiarise themselves with mobile warfare, and it gave way to pro-
ficient doctrine and better prepared operational methods than most of its
opponents. With notable exceptions, such as RAF Fighter Command, most
of the Allied air forces did not conduct large-scale unit and staff exercises,
testing tactics and doctrine. Given the slight numerical and technological
advantage of the Luftwaffe over its enemies in 1939–1941, its success du-
ring these years can largely be attributed to extensive officer and staff trai-
ning programs along with the experiences of the Condor Legion in Spain.
Bombing of Guernica
During the Spanish Civil War the Condor Legion bombed Guernica. Soon
afterwards, and even in modern day studies, historians referred to it as a
deliberate act of terror bombing designed to break civilian morale. Yet the-
re is no evidence in German air doctrine, or in German battle plans to sug-
gest Guernica was targeted to break Basque civilian morale. Richthofen,
who planned the raid, did not know much about Guernica. He was unawa-
re there were Basque parliamentary buildings in the city, a fact which he
did not know until he toured the city on 30 April, after Franco's Nationa-
lists captured it.
There is much debate as to why it was bombed. One simple, and possible
reason for Richthofen sanctioning the bombing, was that two main roads
were being used to supply 23 Basque battalions at Bilbao intersected at
Guernica. At least the 18th Loyala and Saseta battalions were stationed in
the city at the time, making it a legitimate target. If the town was fortified
(which it was not), it would have made a major obstacle to the Nationalist
advance, which would be unable to pass beyond the town. If Guernica was
levelled, the roads and train lines, as well as the bridges, would deny the
enemy an escape route and also deny them the ability to evacuate heavy
equipment. Another mitigating factor was the alleged "poor accuracy" of
German bomb sights (which were the best in the world at that time) in
early 1937. On that basis, unable to hit targets with precision, apologists ar-
gue, carpet bombing was the only realistic option. In the event, from a pu-
rely military perspective, it was a success, closing the city to traffic for 24
hours. Richthofen regarded at a "technical success", but was disappointed
the Nationalists did not follow it up quickly, missing a chance to cut off lar-
ge portions of the enemy forces. The casualty rates among modern sources
suggest the civilian deaths were between 200–600, not the 1,600-2'000 as
claimed by the Basque and German Governments.
While there is no documentary evidence to show that Richthofen ever
adopted "terror bombing" against cities, he was a ruthless commander who
172/214
never expressed any sympathy or concern for civilians who might be loca-
ted in the vicinity of the military target. Richthofen's attitude on this sub-
ject did not change throughout the Second World War.
Richthofen and Sperrle made an effective team in Spain. Sperrle was an ex-
perienced officer, and was intelligent with a good reputation. Richthofen
was considered a good leader in combat. They combined to disagree with
Franco on a number of topics and debates could become heated. Both men
were blunt, and although the Germans and Spanish did not like each other,
they had a healthy respect which translated into an effective working rela-
tionship. Richthofen even learned a little Spanish and Italian, an effort ap-
preciated by Nationalist officers.
After Sperrle returned to Germany, Richthofen assumed command of the
Condor Legion. Helmuth Volkman assumed his place, but his pessimistic
reports to Berlin, continued demands for support and resources, and disa-
greements with Richthofen meant he was replaced by von Richthofen in
October 1938, possibly at the request of the Nationalists. Richthofen was
promoted to the rank of Generalmajor on 1 November 1938. He oversaw
the final stages of the war, as the Nationalists defeated the Republican Spa-
nish in early 1939. By this time, his belief in the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka was
cemented. His earlier views about low-flying aircraft suffering unaccep-
tably high losses were ill-founded. It had proved highly successful in its li-
mited role and air superiority had contributed much to the success of the
final battles
Second World War
Polish Campaign
Von Richthofen commanded Fliegerführer z.b.V. (zur besonderen Ver-
wendung—for special deployment) during the Invasion of Poland, which
began on 1 September 1939, starting the war in Europe. This unit was a
tactical formation, and was attached to 2nd Fliegerdivision, under the
joint command of Bruno Loerzer and Alexander Löhr. The operational goal
of Fliegerführer z.b.V., was to support the German Tenth Army, under the
command of anglophile Walter von Reichenau, who von Richthofen met
shortly before the campaign. The army contained the majority of the moto-
rised and armoured units and was to form the focus point, or Schwerpunkt
of the offensive against Poland.
Von Richthofen's order of battle included a powerful concentration of stri-
ke aircraft. The formation had its headquarters at Birkental-Oppeln, but its
units were spread out. Schlosswalden was home to 1.(F)/AufklGr 124, a re-
connaissance unit which operated Dornier Do 17P aircraft. Lehrgeschwa-
der 2 (Learning Wing 2), was based at Nieder-Ellguth, while the bulk of
Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 (Dive Bombing Wing 77 or StG 77), which ope-
173/214
rated the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka, was based at Neudorf. Von Richthofen also
commanded Slovak Air Force units (Slovenske Vzousne Zbrane); the 38th
and 48th Fighter Squadrons and 16th Corps Squadron.
On the first day of the offensive StG 77 was committed to counter-air ope-
rations, striking Polish Air Force (PAF) bases. The need for counter-air
operations left only Major Werner Spielvogel's II.(Schlacht)/LG 2 to close
support operations. The unit supported the German mechanised XVI
Army Corps. Along with other units, von Richthofen's I./StG 77 decimated
a Polish Cavalry Brigade of Armii Łódź during the Battle of Łódź.
Only eight days into the campaign, on 8 September, the Tenth Army had
advanced so far into Poland, von Richthofen was obliged to move Gesch-
waderkommodore (Wing Commander) Günter Schwartzkopff's StG 77 in-
to Polish airfields while von Reichenau closed in on Warsaw. Richthofen
was able to keep logistical elements functioning, which kept units flying
three sorties per day. At the end of the first week of September, Richtho-
fen's battle group was transferred to Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4) without any
problems. The supply of spare parts, ammunition and fuel were flown in
by a large transport fleet of Junkers Ju 52s. Richthofen had practiced with
air transport extensively in peacetime.
The fast moving frontline meant that army headquarters lost touch with
their forward units. The collapse of communications deprived comman-
ders and squadrons of orders, a situation exacerbated by the lack of a com-
mon radio frequency and over-stretched logistics, which also forced them
to scavenge enemy supply depots. Richthofen was the most effected. As
early as the 3 September, he noted in his diary that the army headquarters
had ceased to know where the frontline was, and he refused to respond to
army requests of air support. Instead he responded according to his own
interpretation of the situation. This method did cause friendly fire inci-
dents. On one occasion, Ju 87s knocked out a bridge across the Vistula ri-
ver when a Panzer Division was about to cross.
The air-ground coordination was the responsibility of Kolufts, who synthe-
sised data from their own aerial reconnaissance and forward units, but
they were only advisors, and had little experience in air warfare. They were
controlled by the army (Nahaufklarungsstaffeln). The depended on the
Luftwaffe's Air Liaison Officer (Fliegerverbindungsstaffeln or Flivo) for
fighter or bomber support. However, Flivo units were responsible to the
Luftwaffe, not the army, and their role was to keep air commanders infor-
med of the situation through the use of radio-equipped vehicles.
Loerzer confessed he was out of contact with Reichenau's command post
for three days, while von Richthofen was soon complaining to Löhr about
the former's ignorance. Because he was impetuous and wanted to be in the
thick of the action, von Richthofen began flying around over the frontline
in a Fieseler Fi 156 Storch as air-ground liaison collapsed. His claims were
174/214
not always believed, and these personal operations were a waste of time,
which needlessly exposed him to danger. Indeed, Major Spielvogel was
shot down over Warsaw in his Storch on 9 September, and killed. While
the operational situation was not good, Löhr took command of Fliegerfüh-
rer z.b.V. giving the unit virtual autonomy and allowing von Richthofen to
build a personal empire of six Gruppen (Groups).
By 11 September, the fuel situation was acute and logistics failed. On the
first day his units were flying three missions every day, now it was reduced
to one per day. Despite the problems, by 8 September von Richthofen was
preparing an assault on Warsaw for which he received Heinrich Seybald's
Kampfgeschwader 77 (KG 77). The raids had barely begun when a major
threat developed behind him. A Polish counter offensive engaged the Ger-
man Eighth Army, in an attempt to reach the Vistula river. Von Richthofen
joined the assault and counterattack from the air. For three days the Ger-
mans bombed Polish forces. In the resulting Battle of Radom and Battle of
the Bzura, which further Polish attacks were made, were won. Von Richt-
hofen sent his air units up under orders to spend only 10 minutes over the
battlefield, and to expend all ammunition. Polish forces sought refuge in
the forests nearby, but were smoked out by incendiaries. Richthofen's men
flew 750 sorties and dropped 388 tons of bombs. The air action destroyed
remaining resistance, allowing the army to mop up.
The threat from the Polish generated calls for attacks on Warsaw. This had
been planned for the first day, codenamed Wasserkante, or Operation Sea-
side. Just after midnight on 12/13 September, the Luftwaffe chief of staff
Hans Jeschonnek, ordered Löhr to prepare to attack Ghettos in northern
Warsaw, in retaliation for unspecified war crimes against German soldiers
in recent battles. Richthofen's airmen flew 183 to 197 sorties, dropping a
50/50 mixture of high explosive and incendiaries. Some bombs fell close to
German forces, conducting the Siege of Warsaw, while smoke made impos-
sible to assess damage. Richthofen confronted Hermann Göring over the
need for a united air command for the Warsaw campaign, and hinted he
was the man for the job. He did not get his way until the 21 September.
Weather delayed the attack, which began on 22 September. Richthofen did
not get the aircraft he wanted for the operation, in particular the Heinkel
He 111, and instead was handed old Junkers Ju 52 transports, which deli-
vered bombs by airmen throwing them out of the doors. His Ju 87s were
also banned from using bomb loads greater than 50 kg. On 22 September,
Richthofen's command flew 620 sorties. German air units dropped 560
tonnes of high explosive and 72 tonnes of incendiaries. The bombing did
great damage, causing 40,000 casualties and destroying 10 per cent of
buildings in the city. Only two Ju 87s and a Ju 52 was lost. The army com-
plained near friendly fire incidents and smoke made life difficult for Ger-
man artillery. Hitler, despite the complaints, ordered the bombing to conti-
175/214
nue. Richthofen's force flew 450 against Modlin, securing its surrender on
27 September after 318 tonnes of bombs been dropped on it in two days.
Warsaw surrendered soon afterwards, and the campaign was declared over
after the Polish surrender on 6 October 1939.
Western Europe
Planning
The invasion of Poland prompted the United Kingdom and France to de-
clare war on Germany. Through the winter, 1939–40, the Wehrmacht be-
gan preparations to invade the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and
France. The basic plan called for an invasion of the Netherlands, by Army
Group B, and Belgium by Army Group B and Army Group A. The opera-
tion, Case Yellow, was designed to suck in the Allied armies into the Low
Countries, and then breakout through the Ardennes in southern Belgium
and Luxembourg, and advance to the English Channel to encircle and des-
troy them.
Originally, Richthofen's force had retained its original name, Fliegerfuhrer
zbV, after Poland, but then was renamed Fliegerdivision 8 (Flying Division
8) on 1 October, but days later, it was given Corps status. Richthofen was
given command of the unit, now a specialist ground-attack Corps, VIII.
Fliegerkorps (8th Flying Corps). Most of the Geschwader involved were
based at Cologne and Dusseldorf. Included in the order of battle, was
Jagdgeschwader 27 (JG 27), equipped with Messerschmitt Bf 109s; KG 77,
equipped with Dornier Do 17s; Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 (StG 2) and StG
77, equipped with Ju 87 Stukas; and LG 2, equipped with Ju 87s, Bf 109s,
Ju 88s and He 111s. The Corps was a purpose-built ground attack organisa-
tion. By 10 May, the order of battle had changed. Only one gruppe (group)
of LG 2 remained, III.(Schlacht). IV.(St)./Lehrgeschwader 1 (LG 1), with
Ju 87s were added, as was I.Sturzkampfgeschwader 76 (StG 76).
The task of Richthofen varied. He was to support von Reichenau's German
Sixth Army in Belgium and Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist's XXXXI and
XIX Corps. During the Phoney War period he established his headquarters
at Koblenz on 18 October 1939 and thereafter, his Corps steadily rose in
strength, from 46 Staffeln (Squadrons), 27 of them Ju 87 units, to 59 by
the end of the month. In December, he was first assigned to support Rei-
chenau. Attacks on enemy air bases were only to be carried out if Allied air
power attempted to interdict the German ground forces. Ground support
was the first priority. This was reflected in Fliegerkorps VIII order of battle
which contained six Ju 87 Gruppen (Groups, of 30 aircraft). Fliegerkorps
V had the primary counter-air role and was positioned close to the front to
provide air superiority support. But when a breakthrough took place, it
was to exchange airfields with Fliegerkorps VIII, to allow for effective air
support to the army. However, the Corps' war diary and Richthofen's per-
176/214
sonal diary make no mention of this order, which may indicate a break-
down in staff work at some level.
What did not breakdown was communication. Operationally, the air divi-
sion and corps headquarters were placed alongside, and moved with, army
equivalents. The air liaison teams attached to the corps and Panzer Divi-
sions were directed to report the battle situation at the front, but were for-
bidden to advise the army, or request air support. The army sent separate
reports, under the same conditions. The reports were digested by Kleist
and Richthofen's chiefs of staff, and action was or was not taken with mu-
tual agreement. Attack orders could be delivered in minutes to air units. A
Guppe (Group) of Ju 87s and Bf 109s was ready in reserve to respond, and
could do so within 45 to 70 minutes. Fliegerkorps VIII and Richthofen we-
re led to believe they would spend the entire campaign supporting Reiche-
nau in northern Belgium, but the OKL did not inform the Corps that it was
going to be used in a Meuse river breakthrough.
Richthofen knew Reichenau, and they had a close working relationship.
During the planning for the Sixth Army's operations, Reichenau seemed to
display a lack of interest when the subject turned to the capture of the brid-
ges at Maastricht, in the Netherlands, and Fort Eben-Emael in Belgium.
The defeat and or capture of these objectives were essential for the Sixth
Army to advance into the Low Countries. So unenthusiastic was Reichenau
by the suggested airborne operation by glider troops against the fort, he re-
fused to allow the diversion of any artillery. Richthofen supplied a Flak
battalion, Flakgruppe Aldinger, for the task of supporting them.
Battle of the Netherlands
Richthofen found himself under pressure in other sectors on the 10 May,
the first day of the offensive. In the early phase of the Battle of the Nether-
lands, the Fallschirmjäger (paratrooper) forces had been tasked with cap-
turing The Hague and the Dutch Royal Family. In the subsequent Battle
for The Hague, German forces met heavy resistance. The French Seventh
Army was also advancing through Belgium into the Netherlands near the
Hague, increasing the threat in a situation which was getting out of con-
trol. Richthofen was ordered to throw in half of his force in the Hague bat-
tle and attack the Scheldt estuary, near Antwerp, Belgium, on the Dutch
border to stop the French Army before it took up position on the Dutch
Moerdijk bridgehead. Despite thick cloud, I. and III./Kampfgeschwader 4
(KG 4) and Kampfgeschwader 54 (KG 54), along with Richthofen's Ju 87s,
drove the French back preventing them from supporting the Dutch at The
Hague.
Battle of Belgium
Fliegerkorps VIII had to turn its attention to supporting Reichenau, in the
Battle of Belgium. Richthofen provided direct and indirect support to the
177/214
German Sixth Army, in particular, to Erich Hoepner's XVI Army Corps,

part of the Sixth Army. His losses were light. Just 12 Ju 87s were lost, anti-
aircraft fire accounted for six I./StG 76 machines. His support operations
were usually 65 kilometres ahead of the forward edge of the battlefield,
with even reconnaissance aircraft pressed into service as bombers. Army
units carried flares and Swastika flags to prevent friendly fire incidents. A
major battle took place on 12 May 1940. Hoepner's Corps confronted René
Prioux's Corps de Cavalerie during the Battle of Hannut. Richthofen's for-
ces proved effective against French armour during the battle. Richthofen
also provided much needed support for the 3rd Panzer Division and 4th
Panzer Division, which were heavily engaged on the 13 and 14 May. He al-
so supported the German divisions a day or so later, at the Battle of Gem-
bloux Gap.
For the cost of 12 aircraft (four Ju 87s), he helped attack French communi-
cation and supply positions, and supported Reichenau as he reached the
Dyle river. At that time, he had moved into the Netherlands, at a Hotel,
near Maastricht. He had a basic room, with a bath that did not work. In the
afternoon, he received an order to cease operations in Belgium, and send
all he had to support Georg-Hans Reinhardt's XLI Corps, north of Sedan.
Von Richthofen was incredulous, and he had to move his entire infrastruc-
ture 100 kilometres to the south. The failure of the OKL to inform him he
was to support the breakthrough is difficult to explain. He later noted in
his diary that it was a major oversight for the OKL not to have informed
him of his expected input, but his diary also suggests he relish the fog of
war and the unknown. His forces were split, with LG 1 and StG 2 conti-
nuing support in Belgium, while most were moved south. During the win-
ding down of operations in the north, his units did help the Sixth Army
capture Liege in Belgium on 17 May.
Battle of France
The most notable actions of his Corps took place during the Battle of Se-
dan. By this time, Richthofen had moved into St. Trond-Liege in Belgium.
The heavy German air assaults on French positions included 360 by his
medium bombers, although his Ju 87 units could only fly 90 owing to the
difficulties he had moving his Corps around. The Germans captured Sedan
and crossed the Meuse river, which would enable Army Group A to conti-
nue to the English Channel. On 14 May Richthofen's JG 27 helped defend
the bridgehead from Allied air attacks. Allied bomber strength was decima-
ted. During the battle Richthofen suffered a personal blow. Günter
Schwartzkopff, Geschwaderkommodore of StG 77, was killed when his Ju
87 was hit by ground fire. Schwartzkopff was one of the founding members
of the German dive-bomber arm and had specialised knowledge on the
method of attack. He had been ordered not to engage in combat, as he was
178/214
too valuable to lose, but on 13 May he ignored orders. He was one of the
very few German aerial casualties over Sedan.
Thereafter, events move quickly. After the German breakthrough at Sedan
von Richthofen asked that Fliegerkorps VIII be allowed to support Kleist
to the sea. One of the motivating reasons for this was the gap which had
developed between the Panzer Divisions and infantry divisions struggling
to catch up. Army Group A had wanted the Panzers to slow down, to allow
the infantry to cover their flanks and rear, but Guderian ignored orders
and continued on to the Channel under the pretext of a "reconnaissance in
force". Von Richthofen convinced Göring to help press for the Panzers to
continue, while his air Corps provided an aerial flank. It proved a wise de-
cision. StG 2 and 77 Ju 87s broke up attacks on the flanks of Army Group
A, most notably combining to repulse Charles de Gaulle's Fourth Armou-
red Division on 16 and 19 May, at Montcornet, Aisne and Crécy-sur-Serre.
This effectively decimated the remaining core of the French Ninth Army,
through air power. Excellent ground-to-air communications throughout
the campaign. Radio equipped forward liaison officers could call upon the
Stukas and direct them to attack enemy positions along the axis of advan-
ce. In some cases the Luftwaffe responded to requests in 10–20 minutes.
Oberstleutnant Hans Seidemann (Richthofen's Chief of Staff) said that
"never again was such a smoothly functioning system for discussing and
planning joint operations achieved".
Still, for him personally, there were problems. He moved his HQ to
Ochamps to keep up with events, while he gambled on German air superio-
rity holding out to fill forward airfields up with aircraft leading to over-
crowding. He also had communication difficulties, and flew around in his
Storch to organise air support for the army. Hugo Sperrle, chief of Luftflot-
te 3 (Air Fleet Three) arrived at the same HQ, disrupting staff work and
leading Richthofen to explode with rage. The pressures compelled him to
risk being shot down in order to pass on orders, and while flying on 22
May he was forced to land owing to a fractured fuel tank. He organised
support for Reinhardt and covered Heinz Guderian's Corps, with KG 77,
StG 77 and JG 27. While he complained about communication, by the stan-
dards of the day, it was efficient. The radio-equipped forward liaison offi-
cers assigned Fliegerkorps VIII new targets, while leaving less important
orders to land line officers. The Ju 87s were on 20-minute alert, and wit-
hin 45 to 75 minutes they were diving onto their targets. In some cases,
they were able to respond in 10 minutes. By 21 May, with his fighters based
at Charleville-Mézières, Ju 87s at Sint-Truiden, and his Do 17s back in Ger-
many, Richthofen's logistics were overstretched and his fuel was running
out.
By 21 May the Allied armies were encircled and counterattacks had been
repulsed at Arras. The Allies were evacuating the ports of Dunkirk and Ca-
179/214
lais. During the Battle of Dunkirk and Siege of Calais (1940), Richthofen
supported the advance of Army Groups A and B. However, they were fre-
quently meeting Royal Air Force (RAF) fighters, flying across the Channel.
Richthofen noted RAF Fighter Command and its No. 11 Group RAF were
responsible for 25 per cent of German losses. On 22 May, StG 77 lost five
Ju 87s, indicating increased difficulty. Sperrle asked for support and Richt-
hofen helped capture Calais and was awarded the Knight's Cross of the
Iron Cross on 23 May. Richthofen was ordered to support the German
Fourth Army, though he showed little interest in the Dunkirk battles. He
regarded them as a waste of time, and they disrupted preparations against
southern France (Case Red). He believed the attempt to destroy Allied for-
ces, or prevent the evacuation with the Luftwaffe was unrealistic. Over
Dunkirk, losses were heavy and progress slow. On 26 May, Richthofen ma-
de a special effort to gain and hold air superiority. Overall, German air po-
wer failed to prevent the evacuation.
After the expulsion of the British Army and the surrenders of the Dutch
and Belgians, von Richthofen was ordered to support the German Ninth
Army, containing Guderian's Corps. The battles were swift. The French
lost their most capable formations in the encirclement, and they capitula-
ted on 22 June 1940, after the capture of Paris on 14th, and the encircle-
ment of the Maginot Line on 15 June.
Battle of Britain
Channel battles
Richthofen continued, after the French capitulation to command VIII. Flie-
gerkorps during the Battle of Britain. The British refusal to reach a com-
promise with Germany forced the OKL to prepare a plan for attaining air
superiority, codenamed Operation Eagle Attack. Should this have been
successful, the Wehrmacht may have launched an invasion of Britain, co-
denamed Operation Sea Lion.
For the first time, the Luftwaffe was engaged in an offensive air war wit-
hout the support of the German Army. Despite Richthofen's Corps being
primarily a specialist ground assault organisation, which supported
ground forces, he was expected to help lead the assault over Britain. His
Stuka units were the best precision attack aircraft in the Luftwaffe and
their 500 kg bombs were capable of sinking merchant shipping, and or se-
riously damaging warships. In June 1940, Richthofen and his Corps' speci-
fic mission was to establish air superiority over the southern part of the
English Channel (near France) and to clear British shipping from the strip
of sea altogether, particularly from the region between Portsmouth and
Portland. Fliegerkorps VIII had a particular advantage; British fighters did
not have enough radar warning and were operating at the limits of their
180/214
range. This gave his Ju 87s a near-free hand in operations.

In July 1940, skirmishes took place, between Luftflotte 2, under Albert
Kesselring and Hugo Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 on one side, and Group Captain
Keith Park's No. 11 Group RAF of Fighter Command on the other. The ini-
tial battles revolved around the British southern coast. Attempts by Ger-
man air fleets to interdict British shipping in the English Channel were
met with a significance response from the RAF, and many air battles en-
sued over the Channel. They were referred to by the Germans as "the Chan-
nel battles". Richthofen made use of his Do 17P reconnaissance aircraft to
locate convoys. When located, he usually dispatched a Gruppe (30 aircraft)
to engage the convoy, holding other Stuka Gruppen back for repeat at-
tacks. The campaign was complicated by the weather, which grounded the
Corps for long periods, and while the Ju 87s proved effective, they proved
vulnerable to RAF fighters. On 17 July 1940, Richthofen was promoted to
the position of General der Flieger in recognition of his service.
Operations over the Channel were successful. Although von Richthofen's
force severely over-claimed the number of ships sunk, they did succeed in
forcing the Royal Navy to suspend convoys through the Channel tempora-
rily, as well as forcing it to abandon Dover as a base. On 8 August 1940, du-
ring one of the last operations against shipping, his airmen claimed 48,500
tons of shipping sunk in one operation. The actual number was just 3,581
tons.
Campaign against the RAF

In mid-August, the Luftwaffe was ready to begin the main assault over Bri-
tain proper. The campaign opened on 13 August 1940, christened Adlertag
(Eagle Day), by Hermann Göring. The entire day met with repeated Ger-
man failures, in communication, intelligence, and coordination. The objec-
tive of the raids, Fighter Command's airfields, remained unscathed. von
Richthofen's Ju 87s were involved over the Portland area, and in actions
against RAF Warmwell and RAF Middle Wallop. Cloudy skies were largely
responsible for the failure of the raids. The campaign did not get much bet-
ter for von Richthofen, on 15 August, known as the The Greatest Day. On
16 August, elements of StG 2 had success against RAF Tangmere, in which
they destroyed 15 aircraft (seven Hawker Hurricanes and six Bristol Blen-
heim night fighters. Damage was done to buildings and workshops, but for
a loss on nine Ju 87s and three severely damaged. Three days later, the Ju
87s suffered their greatest defeat. On 18 August, a large group of air battles
led the day to be called "The Hardest Day". On that day, Richthofen sent
his units against airfields in southern England. Faulty intelligence meant
all those hit by his units were unimportant. StG 77 struck at Fleet Air Arm
bases, which had little to do with Fighter Command. In the process, the
Geschwader took heavy losses.
181/214
Richthofen was not so much shocked by total Ju 87 losses, which were run-
ning at a bearable 15 per cent, assuming the raids were getting results and
the battle short, but he was alarmed at the near destruction of entire Grup-
pe, a loss rate which ran at 50 per cent. It required a rethink of the types
use in the campaign. The Battle of Britain amounted to a defeat for the Ju
87. The Ju 87s were removed from the battle, and were limited to small-
scale attacks on shipping until the spring, 1941, by which time the Battle of
Britain was over and the air war over Britain (The Blitz) was winding
down. Richthofen's force flew 100 sorties in October, compared to the 100
per day in July 1940. In December 1940, Fliegerkorps VIII ended its Ju
87s operations and entered intensive winter training to be ready for the re-
sumption of operations in the spring.
Balkans Campaign
Battle of Yugoslavia
In April 1941 VIII. Fliegerkorps were tasked with supporting the German
invasion of Yugoslavia and the German Army in the Battle of Greece and
the Battle of Crete. The failure of the Italian Army in the Greco-Italian
War, Hitler was forced to intervene to secure the Axis flank, close to the
Romanian oilfields. He approached Yugoslavia, and asked them to join the
Axis powers in order to facilitate a quick victory in Greece. Initially the of-
fer was accepted, only later to be rejected after a pro-Allied government as-
sumed power. Operation Marita was expanded to involve the invasion of
both countries.
Preparations began in early 1941, as Richthofen moved his units into Bul-
garia via Romania. He found the country primitive, and resolved to impro-
ve the infrastructure, particularly communications, for the invasion of Yu-
goslavia. He intended to operate 120 aircraft from Bulgarian airfields and
moved them into place on 1 March. While preparations were taking place
he indulged in hunting and horse riding expeditions as a guest of the Bul-
garian Royal Family. With Boris III of Bulgaria, he discussed dive-bom-
bing techniques and the Corps' new aircraft, such as the Junkers Ju 88.
Richthofen's Corps was given two wings of Ju 87s for the task; Sturz-
kampfgeschwader 2 (StG 2) and Sturzkampfgeschwader 3 (StG 3), based
in Bulgaria. With reinforcements, the German air contingent, under Luft-
flotte 4, would have a total of 946 combat aircraft supported by hundreds
of transport machines. This force outnumbered the Greek, Yugoslav and
RAF forces combined. Richthofen arranged to have the German Twelfth
Army's air reconnaissance units cooperate with his own formations
through the use of a liaison.
The Corps' operations supported the German Twelfth Army in southern
Yugoslavia, which cut the Yugoslav Army off from Greece and the Allied
182/214
forces there. The victory in Yugoslavia was complete with the bombing of
Belgrade, which facilitated a rapid victory by destroying command and
control centres. Moreover, by adding Yugoslavia to its list of enemies, the
Axis' operations were eased. Instead of attacking strong Greek fortifica-
tions on the Yugoslav-Greek border, the Germans could break through the
weak southern Yugoslav defences, and then outflank the elite Greek forces
defending the Metaxas Line.
Richthofen's force did not participate in the bombing of Belgrade, but were
engaged in attacking Yugoslav reinforcements, concentrated on the Aus-
trian and Hungarian borders in the north, that were streaming south to
block the break through. Mass columns of Yugoslav forces were caught in
the open and decimated. The bombing of the capital disabled the com-
mand and control function of the Yugoslav Army, but it also convinced tho-
se in the government that further resistance would meet with even more
destruction. Yugoslavia surrendered on 17 April.
Battle of Greece
Operations shifted to Greece. The Axis success in the Battle of the Metaxas
Line allowed them to outflank the main Greek Army position and encircle
the most effective Greek force. Richthofen's units supported the attack
against the Line, without much interference from Allied air forces. Just 99
RAF aircraft (74 bombers) and 150 Greek aircraft opposed Richthofen's
500. By 15 April, the RAF had withdrawn. From this date, Fliegerkorps
VIII's main targets were Allied ships cramming the evacuation ports. Unli-
ke the gross over claiming against British shipping in the English Channel
in 1940, the claims of 280,000 tons of shipping (60 vessels) destroyed up
until 30 April 1941 were approximately correct.
Allied forces withdrew down the east coast of Greece, where the Royal
Navy and Greek Navy began evacuating them from ports around southern
Greece, including the capital, Athens. Ju 87 units from von Richthofen's
Corps inflicted high losses on shipping, eliminating the small Greek Navy
and causing damage to British shipping. In two days, the Greek Naval base
at Piraeus lost 23 vessels to Stuka attack. From 21 to 24 April 43 ships we-
re sunk on the southern coast. Total Allied shipping losses amounted to
360,000 tons.
Battle of Crete
The end of the campaign on the mainland meant the sole remaining objec-
tive was the island of Crete, which lay off Grecce' southern coastline. Du-
ring the Battle of Crete Richthofen's Ju 87s also played a significant role.
The operation came close to disaster on the first day. Most of the airborne
forces that landed by Gilder or parachute lost most of their radios, which
meant von Richthofen reliant on aerial reconnaissance aircraft. The Ger-
183/214
man parachute troops were pinned down on the island, on the Cretan air-
fields they were supposed to capture. The level of effort Richthofen direc-
ted at relieving the pressure on them quite possibly saved the German
units from destruction.
On 21–22 May 1941, the Germans attempted to send in reinforcements to
Crete by sea, but lost 10 vessels to "Force D" under the command of Rear-
Admiral Glennie. The force consisting of the cruisers HMS Dido, Orion
and Ajax forced the remaining German ships to retreat. The Stukas were
called upon to deal with the British Naval threat. On 21 May, the destroyer
HMS Juno was sunk, and the next day, the battleship HMS Warspite was
damaged and the cruiser HMS Gloucester was sunk with the loss of 45 offi-
cers and 648 ratings. The Ju 87s also crippled the cruiser HMS Fiji that
morning, (she was later finished off by Bf 109 fighter bombers) while sin-
king the destroyer HMS Greyhound with a single hit. As the Battle of Crete
drew to a close the Allies began yet another withdrawal. On 23 May the Ro-
yal Navy also lost the destroyers HMS Kashmir and Kelly sunk followed by
HMS Hereward on 26 May; Orion and Dido were also severely damaged.
Orion had been evacuating 1,100 soldiers to North Africa and lost 260 of
them killed and another 280 wounded during the attacks. Around eight
British destroyers and four cruisers were sunk (not all by air attack), along
with five destroyers of the Greek Navy.
Eastern Front
Operation Barbarossa
On 22 June 1941 the Wehrmacht launched Operation Barbarossa, the in-
vasion of the Soviet Union. Richthofen continued his command of Flieger-
korps VIII which contained JG 27, StG 2, StG 3, 10./LG 2, and II.(S)./LG
2. Added to this force was II./Jagdgeschwader 52 (JG 52), I./Kampfgesch-
wader 2 (KG 2), III./Kampfgeschwader 3 (KG 3) and Zerstörergeschwa-
der 26 (ZG 26). Initially his force supported Army Group Centre, under the
command of Kesselring's Luftflotte 2.
The Luftwaffe was numerically weaker than had been in May 1940, posses-
sing 1,000 fewer aircraft. It had only 838 operational bombers, as opposed
to double that number the previous spring. Whereas in France, it had to
conduct operations 200 miles deep, it had to do this on a front six times as
long, many times deeper, and with fewer aircraft. The failures of produc-
tion aside, the Luftwaffe had made improvements on its operational orga-
nisation. The Flivos that Richthofen had championed in 1939 became a
uniform facility throughout the Luftwaffe. Each Panzer and Motorised di-
vision, now had air liaison officers attached to them to allow for effective
air support. The experiments in France and the low countries had paid off.
By the summer, 1941, the Luftwaffe and its land-air liaison teams would
184/214
dramatically reduce the number of friendly-fire incidents, as German as-

sault aviation would have detailed knowledge of friendly and enemy dispo-
sitions. It would not be until the beginning of 1943, when the Western
Allies began adopting the same methods. In the opening phase of Barba-
rossa, Richthofen's units were able to perform very well. The response for
air support did not usually exceed two hours.
In the opening rounds, Richthofen was involved in large pre-emptive stri-
kes against the Red Air Force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily, or VVS) air-
fields. The Luftwaffe lost 78 aircraft on 22 June, but destroyed 1,489 air-
craft on the ground, though further research indicates the number excee-
ded 2,000 destroyed. It is likely that 1,800 aircraft were destroyed in the
first strike (for two losses), and 700 in the second (for 33 losses). The VVS'
officer corps had been decimated in the Great Purge and although it pos-
sessed a large aviation industry, and large reserves, its modern aircraft we-
re not up to the technical standards of the Luftwaffe. Around 91 percent of
units’ commanders had been in their post less than six months. Most of the
Soviet aircrews were poorly trained, and lacked radio communication bet-
ween pilots, much less air to ground liaisons or effective ground support
methods. The Soviet air forces in the Western Soviet Union were largely
destroyed. In July, waves of unescorted Soviet bombers tried in vain to
halt the German advance, only to suffer extremely high loses. Within three
days, the close support units of Kesselring's Luftflotte 2, including Richtho-
fen's Corps, were able to revert to close support and interdiction opera-
tions largely unhindered.
On 23 June, his Corps decimated the Soviet Western Front's 6th Cavalry
Corps when they attempted a counterattack near Grodno. Richthofen
threw all available aircraft at the thrust and played a vital role in its defeat.
The Soviet Corps suffered 50 per cent casualties, mostly from air attack.
Richthofen's Corps claimed 30 tanks, and 50 motor vehicles in 500 sorties.
Army Group Centre continued to advance, reaching Vitebsk. Fliegerkorps
VIII supported the army in the Battle of Smolensk only days later. In this
phase he was also moved south, to support Panzer Group Guderian, which
succeeded in supporting the capture of Orsha. The encirclement of Soviet
forces at Smolensk was complete on 17 July 1941. Three weeks later, the
last Soviet forces in the pocket were eliminated. Fliegerkorps VIII's achie-
vements were important in defeating Soviet counterattacks and attempted
breakouts. Richthofen was awarded the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross
for an impressive performance. Results from the battles, and in particular
the defeat of the Soviet counterattacks by the Soviet 13th and 24th Armies,
were impressive. Richthofen's forces were credited with disrupting reinfor-
cements and destroying 40 motor vehicles on 24 July alone.
However, logistically, the Germans were starting to suffer serious pro-
blems in supplying their frontline just four weeks into the campaign. Wol-
185/214
fram von Richthofen lamented, "the Germans are good at fighting but
weak at logistics". While German production could make up for losses at
the front, it took time to get aircraft to the sector. The common operating
strength by late summer was 50 to 60 percent, including Fliegerkorps
VIII. Between 19 July and 31 August, the Luftwaffe had lost 725 aircraft.
Before the operations in the Soviet Union, scant attention had been made
to logistical operations in the east, primarily because of German over-con-
fidence.
The victories had been hard won, but growing Soviet resistance, increased
counterattacks brought the front on the Smolensk-Moscow front to a stale-
mate. Hitler wavered, and on 30 July ordered Army Group Centre to assu-
me the strategic defensive. In Directive 34, he refocused the main effort of
Barbarossa on Leningrad because of strong concentrations of enemy for-
ces west of Moscow. To this end, Wolfram von Richthofen and his Flieger-
korps was assigned to Luftflotte 1 (Air Fleet 1). During July 1941, the Ober-
kommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, or German High Command) displayed
a lack of coherent strategy. It shifted from pursuing one objective to the
next. It first wanted to advance to Moscow, then Leningrad, before shifting
operations further south.
Richthofen took almost all of his units, except JG 52, to support Army
Group North. In heavy combat, working with Fliegerkorps I, Richthofen's
fleet flew 1,126 sorties on 10 August, supporting the German army's advan-
ce on Narva. They claimed 10 tanks, more than 200 motor vehicles and 15
artillery batteries. Owing to increased Soviet aviation activity, Richthofen
directed ZG 26 against Soviet airfields, with success. Further support was
rendered to the German Sixteenth Army at Novgorod near Lake Ilmen. Ex-
perienced crews from Richthofen's Corps, flying He 111s from KG 4, atta-
cked railways near Leningrad to disrupt reinforcements. Fliegerkorps
VIII's airmen noted Soviet resistance was far harder in the Lake Ilmen area
than they had previously experienced. On 15 August, a major effort by StG
2 succeeded in softening up Soviet defences and destroying the main So-
viet supply bridge over the Volkhov river. The fortress of Novgorod was
destroyed by Richthofen's Ju 87s, and was thus abandoned. The city fell on
16 August. Just 24 hours later, a major Soviet counter offensive by the So-
viet Northwestern Front attempted to recapture the city. Richthofen, in
conjunction with Fliegerkorps I destroyed the attackers almost completely
near Staraya Russa. KG 4 and KG 2 in particular were successful. The lat-
ter wing knocked out 18 Soviet tanks in a single mission, despite the pre-
sence of strong Soviet fighter forces. Bf 110s from Richthofen's ZG 26 were
directed to deal with Soviet aviation on the ground. On 19 August, for the
cost of just three Bf 110s, they destroyed 40 Soviet aircraft on the ground
and three in the air, easing the pressure on German air units which were
meeting numerically superior numbers of the enemy.
186/214
The German Eighteenth Army and the Sixteenth Army successfully con-
quered the remaining parts of Estonia, seizing Chudovo, north of Novgo-
rod, which severed one of the two main supply lines from Leningrad to
Moscow. In support of these operations, von Richthofen's Corps dropped
3,351 tons of bombs in 4,742 attacks from 10 to 20 August 1941. On 20 Au-
gust von Richthofen moved strike and fighter aircraft to Spasskaya Polist,
40 ki. north-east of Novgorod, to support an attack that would encircle Le-
ningrad, and cut it off from Murmansk. German XXXXI Panzer Corps sea-
led in Soviet forces in the Lake Ilmen-Luga-Novgorod sector. The Lenin-
grad Front attempted to relieve them, and von Richthofen was ordered to
blunt the attack. The Soviets were supported by strong air units, and large
air battles broke out. During the course of them Fliegerkorps VIII lost one
of its most able Stuka aces, Anton Keil. The Germans succeeded in main-
taining their lines, and could now turn to capturing Leningrad.
Before a main assault could be launched, Leningrad needed to be comple-
tely cut off from the Soviet hinterland which led to the Siege of Leningrad.
This was achieved by Fliegerkorps VIII, which supported the German
Eighteenth Army in forcing the Soviet 54th Army from the shores of Lake
Ladoga and Leningrad was isolated. Thereafter, Fliegerkorps VIII and I
concentrated on a 16 square kilometres of front over Leningrad, achieving
numerical superiority. Richthofen's bombers participated in great efforts
to destroy Leningrad from the air, some crews flying two missions per
night. On 8 September, 6,327 incendiaries alone were dropped causing 183
fires. The German Army advanced into the breaches created by the Luft-
waffe. However, by committing their last resources and reinforcing their
54th Army (later renamed the 48th Army), the Soviets stalled the German
advance on 25 September. With the offensive stopped, Hitler returned
Richthofen to Luftflotte 2. Operations had been expensive. In August Flie-
gerkorps VIII had lost 27 aircraft destroyed and 143 damaged.
Frustrated in the north, Hitler turned to Moscow. On 2 October 1941 he
enacted Operation Typhoon, an offensive aimed at capturing Moscow via a
pincer movement. It much early success and succeeded in enveloping con-
siderable Soviet forces at Vyazma and Bryansk by 10 October. However,
the initial success gave way to a grinding battle of attrition. By 11 Novem-
ber the situation in the air was also changing from a position of initial pa-
rity. Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 and the Headquarters of Fliegerkorps I were
moved to the Mediterranean Theatre. This left von Richthofen's Flieger-
korps VIII in control of all Axis aviation supporting Army Group Centre
against Moscow. The Soviet opposition was growing in number and qua-
lity. By 10 November, 1,138 aircraft (738 serviceable) including 658 figh-
ters (497 serviceable) were defending Moscow. The weather slowed down
operations until the 15 November, when the mud and rain water froze and
mobile operations became possible. Richthofen threw all available aircraft
187/214
into the Battle for Moscow whenever conditions permitted. Fliegerkorps

VIII flew 1,300 sorties from the 15 to 24 November.
One last attempt to capture Moscow was made on 2 December, but lack of
fuel and ammunition and increasingly stiff resistance prevented its suc-
cess. By this time, the Soviet air forces had gained air superiority. By 5 De-
cember, when the counteroffensive drove Army Group Centre back, they
could muster 1,376 aircraft against just 600 German. The Germans posses-
sed just 487 fighters (200 serviceable) on the entire Eastern Front. There
were 674 Soviet fighters (480 serviceable) on the Moscow front. When the
Soviet offensive began it quickly gained ground. German morale sank and
Army Group Centre, overstretched and exhausted, was threatened with co-
llapse. Richthofen's forces, despite enemy air superiority, did all they could
to blunt the attack. The effectiveness and determination of German air
units improved the morale of the army. Concentrating aviation against So-
viet ground forces, the Luftwaffe delivered a series of attacks that took the
wind out of the Soviet offensive within two weeks. Richthofen's forces bore
the main burden of the air defence against the Soviet attack, and had been
reinforced with four Kampfgruppen. Hitler had forbidden a retreat, and
Richthofen endorsed this view. His refusal to give ground and his tenacity
saw him become one of Hitler's favourites. Hitler gave him a further five
transport guppen to keep his Corps effective. Fliegerkorp VIII would say
on the front until April 1942, fighting a series of Soviet counter offensives.
The Crimean campaign: Kerch

In the winter, 1941–1942, the stalemate on the north and central sectors
was not mirrored in the south. Army Group South had overrun the Ukrai-
ne, were outside Rostov, considered the gate to the Caucasus and its rich
oil fields, and had occupied most of the Crimea. However, in December the
Soviets made an amphibious landing at the Kerch Peninsula, on the extre-
me east coast of the Crimea. The landing threatened to cut off the German
Eleventh Army commanded by Erich von Manstein, which were engaged
in the siege of Sevastopol on the southern-central tip of the Crimea. Mans-
tein called off the siege and prepared, though outnumbered and refused
army reinforcements by Hitler who was building Army Group South for a
different operation (Case Blue), to repel the danger. On 31 March, he laid
down his plans and called his offensive Operation Trappenjagd (Bustard
Hunt).
On 17 April, he demanded massed close support aviation for his offensive.
Manstein turned to Richthofen and Fliegerkorps VIII, which had returned
to the front after resting and refitting in Germany. Hitler encouraged the
reinforcement of German aviation in the area, regarding Manstein's opera-
tion of great importance. The Soviets not only had the chance to relieve Se-
vastopol, which would allow the Black Sea Fleet to continue operating
188/214
against Axis shipping in the Black Sea, it would also provide air bases for
the VVS to attack the Romanian oil fields. Thus Hitler called for the grea-
test possible concentration of air power to support the operation.
Richthofen had arrived in Luneberg on 12 April, ready for a four-week pe-
riod of leave. On 18 April he received a call from the Luftwaffe's Chief of
the General Staff Hans Jeschonnek informed him he was to leave for Kerch
immediately. He commented in his diary, "By order of the Fuhrer, I must
immediately leave again, to work at Kerch. Get there quickly and get
everything started! Formal orders still to come". After meeting Hitler he
wrote, "The Fuhrer insisted in a very respectful manner that I should take
part at Kerch, because I'm the only person who can do the job". Hitler
clearly had a high opinion of von Richthofen and believed the Corps' re-
cord, as a specialised close-support force, was unparalleled and would gua-
rantee success. He was right. Richthofen was arrogant, aggressive and
harsh, but he was a driven, pro-active, successful and influential tactical
air commander.
His Corps had been resting in Germany, rebuilding after the winter battles.
This was still in progress when Richthofen landed at Luftflotte 4's head-
quarters at Nikolayev on 21 April. The discussion that Richthofen had with
Löhr, the air fleet's commander, was unique in Luftwaffe history. For the
first time organisational custom, which was to place Corps level units un-
der the command of an air fleet in whatever region the Corps was deplo-
yed, was abandoned. Richthofen was allowed to operate independently
alongside Luftflotte 4. Fliegerkorps VIII was under his command at all ti-
mes and would provide the lion's share of close support operations. All of-
fensive air operations were the responsibility of Richthofen, and he was
only answerable to Hermann Göring. This news was not received well by
Löhr or his chief of staff at Luftflotte 4, Günther Korten. Korten demanded
that he should be given command of the Corps. His request was ignored,
though he later fulfilled some of his ambitions by succeeding Hans Jes-
chonnek as Chief of the General Staff after the latter’s suicide.
Von Richthofen met with von Manstein on 28 April, and largely got on
with von Manstein. Despite being conceited personalities, they both genui-
nely respected each other. Though on one occasion Richthofen claimed in
his diary to have taken great delight in beating Manstein in a debate over
tactical differences. Manstein and Richthofen determined that the limited
land forces available meant communication between land and air forces
were critical. The main points of effort were discussed and each man's staff
was ordered to deal directly with each other to facilitate rapid cooperation.
Von Richthofen was incredibly pro-active. He flew in his Storch around the
front, often coming under enemy fire and on occasion force-landing. He
urged his Corps to speed up preparations and openly criticised his supe-
riors, including Löhr of Luftflotte 4, over what he considered to be "infe-
189/214
rior" preparations. The difficulty in getting units out of Germany quickly,

where they were refitting, prompted Richthofen, in consultation with Jes-
chonnek and Manstein, to ask for a postponement of the offensive for two
days until they could be brought in. His request was granted, and the offen-
sive was moved to the 7 May 1942. When the reinforcements arrived, he
had 11 bomber, three dive-bomber and seven fighter Gruppen at his dispo-
sal.
The ensuing operation led to the Battle of the Kerch Peninsula. Richtho-
fen's forces quickly established air superiority, destroying 82 enemy figh-
ters within the first day. Richthofen arrived at his command post as the
bombs first fell. He was impressed with the 2,100 sorties flown on 7 May.
Inter service communication was facilitated by Fliegerverbindungsoffizier
(air liaison officers or Flivos), specially trained air force officers attached to
ground units. They advised the air Corps on the situation and intentions of
the ground forces and also advised the army of the best use of air power.
This operational style was effective against fixed targets in slow-moving
operations, but was more difficult in fast-moving operations such as Bus-
tard Hunt. The advance meant Richthofen had to keep moving forward.
He complained bitterly about the inability of his signals teams to set up
new telephone and radio communications quickly enough.
Operations were successful. The Corps flew 1,700 missions on the 9 May,
destroying 42 enemy aircraft for two losses. On 10 and 11 May, bad weat-
her prevented large-scale operations, but on the 12 May they flew 1,500
sorties. On this day, the Soviet line in the Crimea collapsed. Enjoying air
supremacy, they Wehrmacht made large gains. Near the Sea of Azov, So-
viet infantry, massed and unprotected, suffered heavy losses to Richtho-
fen's units which were using Cluster bombs. Richthofen was delighted at
the "wonderful scene"; "we are inflicting the highest losses of blood and
material". He was amazed at the scale of destruction; "Terrible! Corpse-
strewn fields from earlier attacks....I have seen nothing like it so far in this
war". He was so shocked, he felt compelled to show the Luftwaffe's signals
officer, Wolfgang Martini, the carnage.
However, that same evening, Richhofen received bad news. He was orde-
red to send one fighter, one dive-bomber and two bomber Gruppen to help
contain a Soviet breakthrough in the north, and the developing Second
Battle of Kharkov. Richthofen complained in his diary, claiming success
was now in question at Kerch. The statement was likely hyperbole. By this
time the Soviets had collapsed in the Crimea, and were streaming back to
the port of Kerch. Kerch fell on 15 May. Richthofen then complained he did
not have the adequate forces to stop the Soviets evacuating by sea, but Axis
aviation did inflict considerable attrition on Soviet units on the beaches
and sank a number of vessels. German artillery and air attack brought the
Dunkirk-style evacuation to an end on 17 May. Manstein praised Richtho-
190/214
fen's support, describing his air operations as decisive in the Kerch victory.
The Corps had flown between 1,000 to 2,000 missions per day before the
Kharkov withdrawal, and 300 to 800 afterwards. It effectively decimated
Soviet air power in the region, reducing it to barely 60 aircraft from over
300 in 10 days. Other sources give a total of 3,800 sorties flown in support
of Trappenjagd.
The Crimean campaign: Sevastopol

On 20 May, Richthofen met Manstein again to discuss preparations for
overcoming the fortress port of Sevastopol. It was emphasised that the sa-
me level of air support offered at Kerch was needed. On 22 May, Richtho-
fen had the chance to meet with Hitler, who once again flattered the Luft-
waffe commander and his abilities, referring to him as "his specialist". The
aim of the discussion as far as Richthofen was concerned, was to impress
upon Hitler the importance of not diverting forces away from the front as
had been done at Kerch. Hitler listened closely and agreed.
Hitler and the Luftwaffe Chief of the General Staff Hans Jeschonnek inten-
ded to promote Richthofen to command Luftflotte 4, while sending Alexan-
der Löhr to the Balkans. Göring wanted Bruno Loerzer, his friend and com-
mander of Fliegerkorps II to take the job, but Hitler wanted a hands on
commander. Jeschonnek agreed that the higher command of the air force
was lousy, and needed a competent combat leader. On 25 May he flew the
six-hour flight back to Simferopol.
During the planning phase he ordered anti-shipping operations to cease in
the Black Sea and ordered Admiral Schwarzes Meer (Admiral Black Sea)
to stay in port. Richthofen feared that the coming operations would mean
friendly fire incidents against Axis shipping near Sevastopol. Admiral
Götting and Fliegerführer Süd (Flying Leader South) Wolfgang von Wild,
responsible for all naval aviation in the region, ignored the request as they
saw it as absurd. It was only necessary to abandon operations in the Cri-
mean shipping lanes, not the whole expanse of the Black Sea.
Richthofen pooled his resources with von Wild and Kurt Pflugbeil's Flie-
gerkorps IV. This gave the Luftwaffe some 600 aircraft to support Mans-
tein. Richthofen scrapped all the forces he could for the assault, getting
three dive-bombers, six medium bomber and three fighter Gruppen for the
operation. He was not overly concerned with his fighter strength, as his
fighters outnumbered the 60-odd aircraft of the Soviet air defence. He
could begin close support operations immediately and did not have to wait
to conduct time-wasting battles for air superiority. So confident was Richt-
hofen that the VVS posed no threat, he lent his Flak forces to the army,
though he retained operational control.
The stages of the air campaign were managed into three; attacking Soviet
reserves beyond German artillery; raids against harbour facilities, airfields,
191/214
fortresses and shipping; cooperating with German artillery to cancel out

Soviet mortar and gun batteries. Richthofen acknowledged that not all of
these components could be conducted simultaneously. He chose shattering
the fortifications through relentless air bombardment as the most impor-
tant tactic.
Richthofen garnered most of the air units into supporting the land opera-
tions. His view of anti-shipping operations, and von Wild’s conduct of
them, was scathing. However, he did not take into account the systemic
technical problems with German U-Boat and aerial torpedoes which were
unreliable, and blamed von Wild and the air units instead for failing to
achieve much success.
When the operation, Sturgeon Catch, began on 2 June 1942, von Richtho-
fen watched it all unfold. He awoke at 03:30 and by 05:45 was watching
the first waves of bombers hit Sevastopol from his own Storch, in company
with his chief of staff. The air units of Fliegerkorps VIII were positioned
close to the front, some 70 kilometres away. The aircraft barely had time to
reach altitude before reaching the target, but the close proximity of the
front allowed for short flights and low fuel consumption which eased logis-
tics. Richthofen's forces flew 723 sorties and dropped 525 tons of bombs.
The bombs included the fortress busting 1,400, 1,700 and 1,800 kg bombs.
Between the 3 and 6 June, 2,355 missions showered 1,800 tons of bombs
and 23,000 incendiaries. On 7 June 1,300 tons of bombers were dropped
in 1,368 air attacks and were followed on 8 June by another 1,200 sorties.
The mechanics were working around the clock to keep the aircraft opera-
tional in sweltering heat (up to 105 °F). On 9 June 1,044 sorties and 954
tons of bombs were dropped, followed by 688 sorties and 634 tons the
next day. Richthofen's logistics were stretched after a week of action. On 11
June another effort dropped 1,000 tons of bombs in 1,070 sorties. Richtho-
fen noted that he now had only enough supplies for 36 hours of operations.
He ordered only important and fewer targets attacked, ordering aircraft to
attack in columns to reduce the wastage of bombs and keep the pressure
up on the fortifications. It failed to solve the "bomb calamity", Richthofen
noted on 14 June and three days later he could only drop 800 of the plan-
ned 1,000 tons.
Richthofen's participation on the operation came to an abrupt end on 23
June 1942. Having been informed by Jeschonnek and Hitler that he was to
assume command of Luftlfotte 4 after the fall of Sevastopol earlier, they de-
cided not to wait. They ordered him to Kursk in order to take up his com-
mand, leaving his Corps behind, and Sevastopol air operations under the
command of von Wild. Richthofen was disgusted. He felt it was ridiculous
to move him mid-operation, and he had wanted to be there when the for-
tress fell. He wrote, "It is a pity that one can never finish what one starts in
the east. After a while, it takes away all the pleasure".
192/214
Without von Richthofen, Fliegerkorps VIII continued to contribute to the

successful but costly operation. The Corps flew 23,751 sorties and dropped
20,000 tons of bombs, losing just 31 aircraft. The Axis finally achieved vic-
tory on 4 July 1942, when the last defenders were routed. The Luftwaffe’s
close support arm reached a peak over Sevastopol. From then on, it would
be dispersed over the Eastern Front.
Case Blue
On 28 June 1942 the Axis began their major summer offensive, Case Blue.
Army Group South's objective was to advance towards the Stalingrad and
Caucasus regions. Now commanding Luftflotte 4, Generaloberst Richtho-
fen was one of the largest commands supporting the effort. The Luftwaffe
concentrated its largest single force since Barbarossa. Of the 2,690 air-
craft supporting Case Blue, 52 per cent (1,400) were under the command
of Richthofen. A further 265 Romanian, Hungarian, Italian and Slovak air-
craft were also present. Opposing them were 2,800 aircraft (900 in reser-
ve) including 1,200 fighters of the southern VVS front. To the north, the
Soviets had been convinced the main attack was to come against Moscow
owing to the German deception plan Operation Kremlin.
The offensive opened on 28 June, and the Red Army put the German for-
ces on the boundary of Army Groups Centre and South under severe pres-
sure in the belief the main thrust to Moscow would emanate from that re-
gion. The battles of Voronezh cost the Soviets 783 aircraft by 24 July, but it
meant Richthofen had to divert Fliegerkorps VIII, now under the com-
mand of Martin Fiebig, north to deal with the threats while Pflugbeil's Flie-
gerkorps IV covered the advance into the Caucasus. On 18 July Richthofen
moved Luftflotte 4 and its head quarters to Mariupol on the Sea of Azov.
On 2 August Richthofen created the Gefechtsverband Nord under the com-
mand of Alfred Bulowius Nahaufklarung, Jadg, Kampf and Stuka grup-
pen and combined these groups on an ad-hoc basis to support the hard-
pressed Heer. Hungarian and Italian air units also assisted. Within six
weeks, Richthofen had lost 350 aircraft and objected to Hitler's directive
splitting the two armies (Army Group A and B) to pursue the capture of
Stalingrad and the Baku oilfields at the same time, as he now had to sup-
port two lines of logistics which he could ill-afford. Nevertheless he com-
mitted himself to his task, and ordered Feibig to destroy rail links around
Stalingrad, where the German Sixth Army, despite having 1,000 aircraft
supporting its drive to the city, were struggling to make rapid headway.
On 3 September, the Luftwaffe began it major effort against the city by be-
ginning several destructive raids. The Battle of Stalingrad initiated a re-
gression in air tactics back to the First World War, where a few flights of
aircraft made pin-point attacks against enemy infantry and acted as an ex-
tension of the infantry. The Ju 87 units usually flew four sorties per day.
193/214
Their bombing was so accurate that Richthofen commented in his diary

that they dropped bombs within hand-grenade distances. In October, the
Romanian Air Corps arrived (180 aircraft) which attacked rail targets
north east of Stalingrad and eased the air situation. Logistics were stret-
ched and the front in Stalingrad formed into a stalemate, with the Ger-
mans having taken central and southern Stalingrad. With no reinforce-
ments, and having lost 14 percent of his strength, Richthofen turned to
support the German Army in the Caucasus. Göring ordered him to concen-
trate on Stalingrad, but Richthofen refused to return. This prompted a
meeting between Hitler, Jeschnonnek and Göring on 15 October. Hitler
was in a good mood, and he had taken personal command of Army Group
Bs operations in the Caucasus on 9 September. He supported Richthofen
and gave him the authority to continue, partly in the belief that the battle
in Stalingrad was nearly over.
This had not always been the case. Most of German aviation had been con-
centrated on the Stalingrad Front in August, on Hitler's orders. Pflugbeil's
Fliegerkorps IV was over-stretched for over a month from 28 July. Richt-
hofen had wanted to support Army Group B in the south, but despite the
Caucasus oilfields being the primary target for German strategy, the Army
Group received poor air support. Richthofen's arm-chair general tactics
were important in deciding where air power was to be used, and would be
done so only if he rated the army's chances of success as reasonable. He
allowed some raids against Grozny's oilfields and close support operations,
but the mountain terrain in the region made it difficult for the Panzer Divi-
sions to exploit the actions of his air units. In a fit of pique at the army's
failures, Richthofen refused to provide support for the Caucasus front. This
remained the situation until mid-October. For a few days, a concentrated
effort was made in the Caucasus. Hitler's realisation that the oilfields at Ba-
ku could not be captured meant that he was forced to order the Luftwaffe
to eliminate them. The operations had limited success.
In the winter, Richthofen was forced to reshuffle his units around to meet
threats and offer support. By 7 November, he had helped the German Sixth
Army eliminate nearly all of the Soviet forces in Stalingrad. But the effort
created a supply crisis. The Luftwaffe's railheads 100 kilometres west of
Stalingrad, and regardless of the army's difficulties, his units got logistical
priority. Richthofen recommended this be amended. The battle in Stalin-
grad had meant, in Richthofen's view, that air units could not be effective
in close-quarter combat. Until this point, Richthofen had received 42,630
tons of supplies and 20,713 tons of fuel while the army received 9,492 tons
of fuel. Richthofen rationed his own fuel stocks which allowed him to crea-
te a reserve but also increased, by air lift, the tonnage from 2,000 to 5,000
tons.
194/214
Disaster at Stalingrad
On 19 November the Red Army began a counter offensive, named Opera-
tion Uranus. Within days, the Soviets had encircled some 300,000 Ger-
man, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers in the city of Stalingrad. It
was decided by Hitler and the OKL to supply the Axis forces by air. Richt-
hofen was horrified. He telephoned Berchtesgaden and tried to get
through to Hitler, but none of his aides would put him through. He tried to
convince Göring that his air fleet did not have the resources to sustain an
air lift, and that the best option would be to attempt a breakout before the
Soviet forces entrenched. He flew to von Manstein's head quarters, and the
Field Marshal agreed a breakout must take place. With the Sixth Army pre-
served, the initiative could be regained later. He made this request to Hi-
tler. The Soviet divisions were smaller than their German counterparts,
but they had 97 of them. Holding Stalingrad was now impossible.
In the event, Hitler chose to continue with the airlift, perhaps influenced
by the Luftwaffe's success in the Demyansk Pocket. Luftflotte 4 failed to al-
ter the situation. The best air lift operation took place on 7 December 1942,
when 363.6 tons was flown in. However, the concentration of Soviet avia-
tion disrupted the intended supply operations and German transport los-
ses were heavy. Some 266 Junkers Ju 52s were destroyed, three quarters
of the fleet's strength on the Eastern Front. The He 111 gruppen lost 165
aircraft in transport operations. Other losses included 42 Junkers Ju 86s,
nine Fw 200 Condors, five Heinkel He 177 bombers and a Junkers Ju 290.
The Luftwaffe also lost close to 1,000 highly experienced bomber crew per-
sonnel. So heavy were the Luftwaffe's losses that four of Luftflotte 4's
transport units (KGrzbV 700, KGrzbV 900, I./KGrzbV 1 and II./KGzbV 1)
were "formally dissolved". In the air, the Luftwaffe had sustained its hea-
viest defeat since the Battle of Britain. The remnants of the German Sixth
Army surrendered on 2 February 1943.
A complete disaster was averted by Army Group South, largely thanks to
Richthofen's Luftflotte 4 and his former Fliegerkorps VIII, under his ove-
rall command. The loss of Stalingrad left Rostov-on-Don the only bottle-
neck supplying Army Group A in the Caucasus. In December 1942, Luft-
flotte 4 was still one of the most powerful single air commands in the
world. On 15 January 1943, 1,140 of the 1,715 aircraft on the Eastern Front
were under Richthofen's command. Its attacks on the Soviet Southwestern
Front prevented the Soviets from achieving the goal of isolating the Army
Group in the Caucasus. Its air operations proved decisive in this regard.
Although defeated, Luftflotte 4 had flown 24,760 wounded and 5,150 tech-
nical personnel out of Stalingrad, which was 11 per cent of the total Ger-
man manpower. It delivered only 19 per cent of the required supplies. It
had four fewer transport groups than at Demyansk, so failed in its overall
task despite Feibig ordering his bombers onto transport operations. They
195/214
managed an average of 68 sorties per day, delivering 111 tons of supplies

against the requirement of 300 tons for the Sixth Army.
After the defeat, Richthofen travelled to see Hitler on 11 February. He first
met with Göring, who was worried that Richthofen would use the opportu-
nity to criticise his leadership. In the event he did not, but Richthofen did
criticise Göring's reluctance to disagree with Hitler and attacked his wi-
llingness to allow him to receive what he considered to be faulty advice.
When Richthofen did meet Hitler he criticised him openly for micromana-
gement, though he did insist he had been let down by his advisors. Hitler
took all of this calmly, and admitted (as he had done to Erhard Milch) that
he bore the ultimate responsibility for the air lift fiasco. Richthofen argued
commanders needed more tactical and operational freedom, as had Mans-
tein. Hitler agreed. Richthofen was probably helped, regardless of his criti-
cism, by the fact that Hitler genuinely liked him, and believed him to be lo-
yal. Four days later Richthofen was promoted to the rank of Generalfeld-
marschall.
Recovery at Third Kharkov

The frontline threatened to collapse altogether in the east, but the Red
Army had not yet learned the full lessons of manoeuvre warfare. At Stalin's
behest, it attempted to cut off the Axis forces in the Caucasus by advancing
to Rostov, using Kharkov and Belgorod as a springboard. It strained the lo-
gistics of Soviet forces and presented an ideal chance for von Manstein to
counterattack. Radio intercepts suggested the Soviets were low on fuel, for
their ground forces and the VVS, giving more urgency for a counter stroke.
It would lead to the Third Battle of Kharkov, where von Manstein would
win a major victory.
To support his attack Richthofen sent eight of his weakest Gruppen home
to rest and refit, which allowed the machines left to be redistributed
among stronger units. With congestion eased the infrastructure could cope
with serviceability, which improved dramatically. The Luftwaffe was also
now back near to pre-prepared air bases, near logistical railheads at Niko-
laiev and Poltava which enabled accelerated rates of re-equipment. After
allowing his forces to re-equip near Rostov, he moved his units on 18 Fe-
bruary. Richthofen moved his forces closer to the front; Fliegerkorps I,
now under Günther Korten was moved from Boryspil, near Kiev to Poltava,
Fliegerkorps IV under Feibig was moved to the Kuban and Fliegerkorps V
under Pflugbeil was moved to Dnepropetrovsk in the centre of the German
offensive thrust. These forces were to support the First Panzer Army and
the Fourth Panzer Army. Korten began his support for the Fourth Panzer
Army on 19 February 1943. By 21 February 1,145 sorties had been flown,
and another 1,486 were flown the following day. With the offensive going
well, Richthofen took the time to rest. The Luftwaffe flew a daily average
196/214
of 1,000 sorties, with total air superiority owing to the absence of the VVS.
In the event Manstein encircled and destroyed a large number of enemy
forces, stabilising the front, but leaving a bulge in the east, around the city
of Kursk.
Throughout the spring and early summer, 1943, von Richthofen began pre-
paring his air fleet for Operation Citadel, and the Battle of Kursk, the ma-
jor summer campaign which was supposed to repeat the Kharkov victory
on a larger scale, and turn the tide in the east back in the Axis favour.
Richthofen did not take part. Third Kharkov proved to be his last battle in
the Soviet Union, and he was transferred to the Mediterranean to begin
operations there.
Death
Von Richthofen was suffering from headaches and exhaustion and was
diagnosed as having a brain tumor. He was sent on medical leave to the
Luftwaffe hospital for neurological injuries at Bad Ischl. On 27 October
1944, Von Richthofen was operated on by chief brain surgeon Professor
Dr. Wilhelm Tönnis. Tönnis, a former professor at the University of Würz-
burg, was one of the most noted German specialists. Initially it was
thought that the operation was successful, but the tumor had only been slo-
wed. In November 1944 von Richthofen was officially relieved of his com-
mand in Italy and transferred to the Führerreserve. His condition declined
steadily in early 1945. It is thought likely that Professor Tönnis attempted
a second operation but the tumor had progressed beyond hope for reco-
very. Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945. The hospital was taken over by
the American Third Army and von Richthofen became a prisoner of war.
Wolfram von Richthofen passed away on 12 July 1945.
Colonel General Ernst Udet

Dates: 26 April 1896 – 17 November 1941
He was one of the youngest aces and was the highest scoring German ace
to survive the war (at the age of 22). His 62 victories were second only to
Manfred von Richthofen, his commander in the Flying Circus. Udet rose to
become a squadron commander under Richthofen, and later, under Her-
mann Göring.
197/214
Following Germany's defeat, Udet spent the 1920s and early 1930s as a
stunt pilot, international barnstormer, light aircraft manufacturer, and
playboy. In 1933, he joined the Nazi Party and became involved in the
early development of the Luftwaffe. He used his networking skills to get
himself appointed director of research and development for the burgeo-
ning air force. He was especially influential in the adoption of dive bom-
bing techniques as well as the Stuka dive bomber. By 1939, Udet had risen
to the post of Director-General of Equipment for the Luftwaffe. However,
the stress of the position and his distaste for administrative duties led to
an increasing dependence on alcohol.
When World War II began, the Luftwaffe's needs for equipment outstrip-
ped Germany's production capacity. Udet's old comrade in arms Hermann
Göring first lied to Adolf Hitler about these material shortcomings when
the Germans lost the Battle of Britain, then deflected the Führer's wrath
onto Udet.
198/214
Operation Barbarossa, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union to begin

war on a second front, may have been the final straw for Udet. On 17 No-
vember 1941, he committed suicide by shooting himself in the head.
From motorcycling to flying

Born in Frankfurt am Main, Udet was known from early childhood for his
sunny happy-go-lucky temperament. He grew up in the Bavarian city of
Munich. He was fascinated with aviation from early childhood and hung
out at a nearby airplane factory and an army airship detachment. In 1909,
he helped found the Munich Aero-Club. After crashing a glider he and a
friend constructed, he finally flew with a test pilot in the nearby Otto
Works, which he often visited, in 1913.
He tried to join the army on 2 August 1914, but was only 160 cm (5 ft
3.0 in) tall and did not qualify. In August, when the Allgemeiner Deutscher
Automobil-Club appealed for volunteers with motorcycles, Udet applied
and was accepted. Udet's father had given him his motorcycle when Ernst
passed his first year examination. Along with four friends, Udet was posted
to the 26. Württembergischen Reserve Division as a "messenger rider." Af-
ter injuring his shoulder when his motorcycle hit a shell hole, Udet went to
a military hospital, and his bike went for repair. When he tried to track
down the 26th Division, he was unable to locate it and decided to serve in
the vehicle depot in Namur. During this time, Udet met officers from the
Chauny flying sector who advised him to be transferred as an aerial obser-
ver. However, before he received his orders for Chauny, the army dispen-
sed with the volunteer motorcyclists, and he was sent back to recruiting of-
ficials.
Udet tried in vain to return to the fighting, but was unable to get into the
pilot or aircraft mechanic training offered by the army. He soon learned
that if he were a trained pilot, he would be immediately accepted into the
air force. Through a family friend, Gustav Otto, owner of the aircraft fac-
tory he had haunted in his youth, Udet received private flight training. The
training cost 2,000 marks and new bathroom equipment from his father's
firm. Udet obtained his civilian pilot's license at the end of April 1915 and
joined the German Army Air Service.
Military life
Artillery ranging
Originally, Udet flew in Feld Flieger-Abteilung 206 (FFA 206)—an obser-
vation unit—as an Unteroffizier (Staff Sergeant) pilot with observer Leut-
nant Justinius. He and his observer won the Iron Cross 2nd and 1st class
respectively for nursing their Aviatik B.I two-seater back to German lines
after a shackle on a wing-cable snapped. Justinius had climbed out to hold
199/214
the wing and balance it rather than land and accept capture. As a result of
the structural failure of the Aviatik that caused Udet and Justinius to go
down, and a similar incident that cost Leutnant Winter and Vizefeldwebel
Preiss their lives, the Aviatik B was retired from service.
Later, Udet was court-martialed for losing his aircraft in an incident the
flying corps considered a result of bad judgment. The aircraft—overloaded
with fuel and bombs—stalled after a sharp bank and plunged to the
ground. Miraculously, both Udet and Justinius survived. Udet was placed
under arrest in the guardhouse for seven days.
On his way out of the guardhouse, he was asked to fly Leutnant Hartmann
to observe a bombing raid on Belfort. A bomb thrown by hand by the leut-
nant became stuck in the landing gear. Udet performed some aerobatics to
shake it loose. As soon as the Air Staff Officer heard about it, he was trans-
ferred to fighter command. That was in early 1916.
Fighter pilot
Udet was given a new Fokker to fly to his new unit—FFA 68—at Habsheim.
Mechanically defective, it crashed into a hangar on takeoff. An older Fok-
ker was then sent to Udet. At Habsheim, his first aerial combat was a near
disaster. Lining up on a French Caudron, he found he could not bring him-
self to pull the trigger and was subsequently strafed by the Frenchman. A
bullet grazed his cheek and smashed his goggles.
From then on, he learned to attack aggressively and made a number of
kills, downing his first French opponent on 18 March 1916. On that occa-
sion, he scrambled to attack two French aircraft; instead, he found a for-
mation of 23. He dived in from above and behind, giving his Fokker E.III
full throttle, and opened fire on a Farman F.40 from close range. He pulled
away, leaving the flaming bomber trailing smoke, only to see the observer
fall from the rear seat of the stricken craft. As Udet described it, "The fuse-
lage of the Farman dives down past me like a giant torch...A man, his arms
and legs spread out like a frog's, falls past--the observer. At the moment, I
don't think of them as human beings. I feel only one thing--victory,
triumph, victory." The fiery kill won Udet the Iron Cross First Class.
That year, FA 68 morphed into Kampfeinsitzer Kommando Habsheim be-
fore finally becoming Jagdstaffel 15 on 28 September 1916. It was in the
latter unit that Udet would claim five more victims, before transferring to
Jasta 37 in June 1917. The first of these—on 12 October 1916—had its co-
mic opera aspects. Udet forced a French Breguet to land safely in German
territory, then landed nearby to prevent its destruction by its crew. The bu-
llet-punctured flat tires on Udet's Fokker tipped the German plane forward
over onto its top wings and fuselage. Victor and vanquished eventually
shook hands next to the latter's functional plane.
In January 1917, Udet was commissioned as Leutnant der Reserve (lieute-
200/214
nant of reserves). That same month, Jasta 15 re-equipped with Albatros

D.IIIs, new fighters with twin synchronized Spandau machine guns.
It was during his service with Jasta 15 that Udet wrote he had encountered
Georges Guynemer, the French ace, in single combat at 5,000 m
(16,000 ft). Guynemer preferred to hunt alone; by this time, he was the lea-
ding French ace, and one of the war's leading aces, with more than 30 vic-
tories.
Udet saw him coming and the two circled each other looking for an ope-
ning. They were close enough for Udet to read the "Vieux" of "Vieux Char-
les" on Guynemer's Spad S.VII. The two opponents tried every tricky aero-
batic they knew; the Frenchman ripped a burst of fire through the upper
wing of Udet's plane. Udet evaded him and maneuvered for advantage. For
an instant, Udet had him in his sights, but his guns jammed. While preten-
ding to dogfight, he worked to unjam them. Guynemer saw his opponent's
predicament, waved, and flew away. Udet wrote of the fight, "For seconds,
I forgot that the man across from me was Guynemer, my enemy. It seems
as though I were sparring with an older comrade over our own airfield."
Some experts say that Guynemer spared Udet because he wanted a fair
fight. He was also likely impressed with Udet's skills in their battle and ho-
ped that they would fight again someday.
Eventually, all the pilots of Jasta 15 were killed except Udet and his com-
mander, Gontermann. Gontermann became somewhat gloomy, and remar-
ked to Udet, "the bullets fall from the hand of God ... Sooner or later they
will hit us."
Udet applied for a transfer to Jasta 37. Gontermann fell three months la-
ter, by accident, when the wing of his new Fokker Dr1 Triplane came off.
He lingered for 24 hours without awakening, and Udet later remarked, "It
was a good death."
On 19 June, Udet transferred to Prussian Jasta 37.
By late November, Udet was a triple ace and Jastaführer. He modeled his
attacks after those of Guynemer, coming in high out of the sun to pick off
the rear aircraft in a squadron before the others knew what was happe-
ning. His commander in Jasta 37—Kurt Grasshoff, witnessing one of these
attacks—selected him for command over more senior men when Grasshoff
was transferred. Udet's ascension to command on 7 November 1917, was
followed six days later by award of the Royal House Order of Hohenzo-
llern.
Despite his seemingly frivolous nature, drinking late into the night and wo-
manizing, he proved an excellent squadron commander. He spent many
hours coaching neophyte fighter pilots, with an emphasis on marksmans-
hip as being essential for success.
201/214
In the Flying Circus

Udet's success attracted attention for his skill, earning him an invitation to
join the Flying Circus, Jagdgeschwader 1 (JG 1), an elite unit of German
fighter aces under the command of the famed Red Baron Manfred von
Richthofen. Richthofen drove up one day as Udet was trying to pitch a tent
in Flanders in the rain. Pointing out that Udet had 20 kills, Richthofen
said, "Then you would actually seem ripe for us. Would you like to?"
Of course, Udet would. After watching him down an artillery spotter by
frontal attack, Richthofen gave Udet command of Jasta 11, von Richtho-
fen's own former squadron command. The group commanded by Richtho-
fen also contained Jastas 4, 6 and 10. Udet's enthusiasm for Richthofen
was unbounded. Richthofen demanded total loyalty and total dedication
from his pilots, cashiering immediately anyone who did not give it. At the
same time, he treated them with every consideration. When it came time
to requisition supplies, he traded favors for autographed photos of himself
that read: "Dedicated to my esteemed fighting companion." Udet remarked
that because of the signed photographs, " ... sausage and ham never ran
out."
One night, they invited a captured English flyer for dinner, treating him as
a guest. When he excused himself for the 'W.C.', the Germans fell over
themselves trying to hide from him that they were watching to see if he
would try to escape. On his return the Englishman said, "I would never for-
give myself for disappointing such hosts." However, the English flyer did
escape later from another unit.
Udet considered Richthofen as scientific in battle and cold in his combats,
describing his blue eyes and the sun shining off his blonde hair. Richthofen
liked to strafe enemy columns in squadron formation, both guns firing, ki-
lling large numbers. He was the first to implement the concept of the for-
ward base. While the enemy could mount three missions a day, Richthofen
could mount five. In dogfights the head-on attack found favor.
Richthofen fell in April 1918, and Udet was not at the front. He had been
sent on leave due to a painful ear infection, which he avoided having trea-
ted as long as he could. While at home, he reacquainted himself with his
childhood sweetheart, Eleanor "Lo" Zink. Notified that he had received the
Pour le Mérite, he had one made up in advance so that he could impress
her. He painted her name on the side of his Albatros fighters and Fokker D
VII. Also on the tail of his Fokker D VII was the message "Du doch nicht" -
"Definitely not you."
Of Richthofen, Udet said, "He was the least complicated man I ever knew.
Entirely Prussian and the greatest of soldiers." Udet returned to JG 1
against the doctor's advice and remained there to the end of the war, com-
manding Jasta 4. He scored 20 victories in August alone, mainly against
the British. Udet would become a national hero with 62 confirmed kills to
202/214
his credit. But he did not enjoy Richthofen's successor, Hermann Göring,
and, later, privately, he would question Göring's own achievements during
the war.
Udet was one of the early fliers to be saved by parachuting from a disabled
aircraft. On 29 June 1918, he jumped after a clash with a French Breguet.
His harness caught on the rudder and he had to break off the rudder tip to
escape. His parachute did not open until he was 250 ft (76 m) from the
ground, causing him to sprain his ankle.
On 28 September 1918, Udet was wounded in the thigh. He was still reco-
vering from this wound on Armistice Day, November 11, 1918, when the
war ended.
Between the wars

The adventure of Udet's life continued without pause after the war. On his
way home, he had to defend himself against a Communist who wished to
rip the medals off his chest. Udet and Ritter von Greim performed mock
dogfights at weekends for the POW Relief Organization, using surplus air-
craft in Bavaria. He was invited to start the first International Air Service
between Germany and Austria, but after the first flight the Entente Com-
mission confiscated his aircraft.
He married "Lo" on February 25, 1920; however, the marriage lasted less
than three years and they were divorced on February 16, 1923. (It has been
said that Udet had many lovers on the side.) His talents were numerous -
juggling, drawing cartoons, party entertainment, etc.
During the inter-war period, Udet was known primarily for his work as a
stunt pilot and for playboy-like behavior. He flew for movies and for airs-
hows (e.g. picking a cloth from the ground with his wingtip). He appeared
with Leni Riefenstahl in three films: Die weiße Hölle vom Piz Palü (1929),
Stürme über dem Montblanc (1930), and S.O.S. Eisberg (1933). Udet's
stunt pilot work in films took him to California. In the October 1933 issue
of New Movie Magazine, there is a photo of Carl Laemmle, Jr.'s party for
Udet in Hollywood. Laemmle was head of Universal Studios which made
SOS Eisberg, a US-German co-production. Udet was invited to attend the
National Air Races at Cleveland, Ohio. In 1935 he appeared in Wunder des
Fliegens: Der Film eines deutschen Fliegers (1935; 79 mins.) directed by
Heinz Paul. His co-star Jürgen Ohlsen, who had previously starred (uncre-
dited) in the extremely popular Nazi propaganda film Hitlerjunge Quex:
Ein Film vom Opfergeist der deutschen Jugend, played a youth who lost
his pilot father in World War I and was befriended and encouraged by
Udet, his idol.
These efforts were good publicity for Udet. An American, William Pohl of
Milwaukee, telephoned him with an offer to back an aircraft manufactu-
ring company. Udet Flugzeug was born in a shed in Milbertshofen. Its in-
203/214
tent was to build small aircraft that the general public could fly. It soon ran
into trouble with the Entente Commission and transferred its operations to
a beehive and chicken coop factory.
The first aeroplane that Udet's company produced was the U2. Udet took
the second model, the U4, to the Wilbur Cup race in Buenos Aires at the
expense of Aero Club Aleman. It was outclassed, and the club wanted him
to do cigarette commercials to reimburse them for the expense, but he re-
fused. He was rescued by the Chief of the Argentinian Railways, a man of
Swedish descent named Tornquist, who picked up the tab.
In 1924, Udet left Udet Flugzeug when they decided to build a four-engine
aircraft, which was larger and not for the general population. He and
another friend from the war, Angermund, started an exhibition flying en-
terprise in Germany, which was also successful, but Udet remarked, "In ti-
me this too begins to get tiresome. ... We stand in the present, fighting for
a living. It isn't always easy. ... But the thoughts wander back to the times
when it was worthwhile to fight for your life."
Udet's war time friends were in seemingly inexhaustible supply. He and
another—Suchocky—became pilots to an African filming expedition. The
cameraman was another veteran, Schneeberger, whom Udet called "Flea,"
and the guide was Siedentopf, a former East African estate owner.
Udet described one incident in Africa in which lions jumped up to claw at
the low-flying aircraft, one of them removing a strip of Suchocky's wing
surface. Udet and his crew also ventured across the Figtree Hotel, built by
Lord Lovelace, and went hunting with an American named Sullivan.
Building the Luftwaffe

Though not interested in politics, Udet joined the Nazi party in 1933 when
Göring promised to buy him two new U.S.-built Curtiss Hawk II biplanes
(export designation of the F11C-2 Goshawk Helldiver). The planes were
used for evaluation purposes and thus indirectly influenced the German
idea of dive bombing aeroplanes, such as the Junkers Ju 87 (Stuka) dive
bombers. They were also used for aerobatic shows held during the 1936
Summer Olympics. Udet piloted one of them, which survived the war and
is now on display in the Polish Aviation Museum (pictured).
After Ju 87 trials (although the Ju 87 had been awarded top marks and
was about to be accepted) a confidential directive issued on 9 June 1936 by
Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram von Richthofen called for the cessation of
all further Ju 87 development. However, Udet immediately rejected von
Richthofen's instructions and Ju 87 development continued.
Udet became a major proponent of the dive bomber, taking credit for ha-
ving introduced it to the Luftwaffe, which was already interested in such
designs. By 1936 he had (due to his political connections) been placed in
command of the T-Amt ( the development wing of the Reichsluftfahrtmi-
204/214
nisterium) (Reich Air Ministry). He had no real interest in this job, espe-
cially the bureaucracy of it, and the pressure led to his addiction to alcohol
(brandy and cognac).
In January 1939, Udet visited Italian North Africa (Africa Settentrionale
Italiana, or ASI). He accompanied Maresciallo dell'Aria (Marshal of the
Air Force) Italo Balbo on a flight. In early 1939 there were distinct signs of
German military and diplomatic co-operation with the Italians. In Fe-
bruary 1939 Udet became Generalluftzeugmeister (Luftwaffe Director-Ge-
neral of Equipment).
In April and May 1941, Udet was in charge of a German delegation inspec-
ting Soviet aviation industry in line with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.
Udet informed Goering that Soviet air force and aviation industry are very
strong and technically advanced. Goering decided not to report the facts to
Hitler hoping that a surprise attack will quickly destroy Russia. Udet reali-
zed that the upcoming war on Russia may destroy Germany, and torn bet-
ween truth and loyalty, suffered a psychological breakdown and even tried
to tell all the truth to Hitler, but Goering had Udet under control by giving
him drugs at drinking parties and hunting trips. Udet's drinking and
psychological condition became a problem, but Goering used Udet's depen-
dency to manipulate him.
When World War II began his internal conflicts grew more intense. Air-
craft production requirements were much more than the German industry
could supply (given limited access to raw materials such as aluminium).
Göring responded to this problem by simply lying about it, which further
upset Udet. After the Luftwaffe's defeat in the Battle of Britain, Göring
tried to deflect Hitler's ire by blaming Udet. Hitler's attack on the Soviet
Union drove Udet further into despair.
Suicide
On 17 November 1941 Udet committed suicide, shooting himself in the
head while on the phone with his girlfriend. Evidence indicates that his un-
happy relationship with Göring, Erhard Milch, and the Nazi Party in gene-
ral was the cause of his mental breakdown.
According to Udet's biography, The Fall of an Eagle, he wrote a suicide no-
te in red pencil which included: "Ingelein, why have you left me?" and
"Iron One, you are responsible for my death." "Ingelein" referred to his
girlfriend, Inge Bleyle, and "Iron One" to Hermann Göring. The book The
Luftwaffe War Diaries states something similar, that Udet wrote "Reichs-
marschall, why have you deserted me?" in red on the headboard of his
bed. 62
62 Ernst Udet's grave in Invalidenfriedhof Cemetery, Berlin
205/214
It is possible that an affair Udet had with Martha Dodd, daughter of the
U.S. ambassador to Germany and Soviet sympathizer, during the 1930s
might have had some importance in these events. Records made public in
the 1990s confirm Soviet security involvement with Dodd's activities.
Udet's suicide was concealed from the public, and at his funeral he was lau-
ded as a hero who had died in flight while testing a new weapon. On his
way to attend Udet's funeral, the World War II fighter ace Werner Mölders
died in a plane crash in Breslau. Udet was buried next to Manfred von
Richthofen in the Invalidenfriedhof Cemetery in Berlin. Mölders was bu-
ried next to Udet.
206/214
Walther Wever
Dates: 11 November 1887 – 3 June 1936

He was an early proponent of the theory of strategic bombing as a means
to wage war, supporting the theories of Giulio Douhet. He died in an air
crash in 1936, and German efforts to build a strategic bomber force died
with him.
Walther Wever was born on 11 November 1887 in Wilhelmsort in the
county of Bromberg (now in north-central Poland). He was the son of Ar-
nold Wever, the one-time director of a Berlin bank and the grandson of the
Prussian Prosecutor-General Dr. Carl George Wever. After his final secon-
dary examinations, he settled in Schweidnitz where he trained as an offi-
cer. Wever saw action in World War I and served as a staff officer for the
OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung, Army High Command).
Luftwaffe
Wever became the Commander of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium on 1
207/214
September 1933. On 1 March 1935, Wever became Chief of Staff of the

Luftwaffe shortly after its creation on 26 February 1935, a post he held up
until his death. Wever was a supporter of the Strategic bomber and recog-
nised its importance as early as 1934. He supported the aviation compa-
nies like Junkers and Dornier, in their respective projects to produce the
Ju 89 and Dornier Do 19 competitors for the Ural Bomber production con-
tract competition. Wever outlined five key points to air strategy:
1. To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft facto-
ries, and defeating enemy air forces attacking German targets.
2. To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive
areas by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels,
which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces
3.To support the operations of the army formations, independent of rail-
ways, i.e, armoured forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy
advance and participating directly in ground operations.
4. To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Ger-
many's naval bases and participating directly in naval battles
5. To paralyze the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the arma-
ments factories. 63
However after his death, other strategists, like Ernst Udet and Hans Jes-
63 Walther Wever funeral
208/214
chonnek favoured smaller aircraft as they did not expend as much material
and manpower. They were proponents of the dive-bomber (Junkers Ju 87)
and the doctrine of close support and destruction of the opposing airforces
on the 'battle-ground' rather than through attacking enemy industry. As a
result, high-speed medium-bombers like Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17,
Junkers Ju 88 were developed, with much initial success.
On 3 June 1936 Wever flew from Berlin to Dresden, to give a lecture at the
Luftkriegsschule Klotzsche to a gathering of Luftwaffe cadets. When he re-
ceived the news of the passing of a World War I German hero, he immedia-
tely set off for Berlin. On his return journey, the Heinkel He 70 Blitz that
he was flying had not been properly examined during preflight checks, and
the aileron gust locks were not removed. The aircraft was airborne when
the wing dipped, and the Heinkel stalled and went into a horizontal cartw-
heel (akin to a ground loop, but at low altitude). It crashed and exploded in
flames, killing Wever and his flight engineer. That same day, the RLM is-
sued the Bomber A heavy bomber specification and design competition for
what would become the Luftwaffe's only wartime heavy bomber in produc-
tion and frontline service, the Heinkel He 177.
After Wever's death, a Luftwaffe bomber wing, Kampfgeschwader 4 Gene-
ral Wever was named after him, which fittingly enough in the later war
years, would be equipped with and using the one aircraft created for the
design competition that started on the day of General Wever's death, the
Heinkel He 177A in combat. His son, also named Walther Wever, was a
fighter pilot who was killed in action in April 1945.
Glossary
Abteilung 'L' - Department 'L', the Lippisch design department within
the
Messerschmitt company.
APZ Automatischer Peilzusatz - automatic supplementary direction find-
ing equipment.
AVA Aerodynamische Versuchsanstalt - Aerodynamic Experimental In-
stitute.
AWG Auswertegerat - plotting device.
BK Bordkanone - fixed aircraft cannon.
BMW Bayerische Motorenwerke - Bavarian Engine Works.
DFS Deutsches Forschungsinstitut fur Segelflug - German Research Insti-
tute for Sailplanes.
Dipl-Ing Diplomingenieur - literally diploma-ed engineer, equivalent to
Diploma of Engineering.
Doppelreiter Literally 'double-rider', wing fuel fairings.
DVL Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fur Luftfahrt-German Aviation Experi-
mental Institute.
209/214
E Entwurf-project.
EF Entwicklungsflugzeug - development aircraft.
EIV Eigenverstandigungsanlage - crew intercom.
EHK Entwicklungshauptkommission - Main Development Commis-
sion.
ESK Entwicklungssonderkommission - Special Development Commis-
sion. ETC Elektrische Tragervorrichtung fur Cylinderbomben - electri-
cally-operated carrier device for cylindrical bombs.
EZ Einheitszielvorrichtung - standard sighting device.
FDL Ferngerichtete Drehringlafette - remotely controlled barbette.
FHL Ferngerichtete Hecklafette - remotely controlled tail barbette.
Fl-E Flugzeugentwicklung - AircraftDevelopment Department within the
TLR.
Flitzer Literally Dasher or Whizzer, single-seater jet fighter.
FuBl Funk-Blindlandeanlage - radio blind-landing equipment.
FuG Funkgerat - radio or radar set.
FZG Fernzielgerat - remote aiming device/bombsight.
General der Jagdflieger Air Officer Commanding fighters.
Generalleutnant Luftwaffe equivalent to Air Vice Marshal (RAF) or
Major General (USAAF).
Generalmajor Luftwaffe rank equivalent to Air Commodore (RAF) or
one-star General (USAAF).
Generalstab General Staff.
GM-1 Nitrous oxide.
Gruppe Luftwaffe equivalent to Wing (RAF) or Group (USMF).
IFF Identification, friend or foe.
Jagerstab Fighter Staff
Jumo Junkers Motorenbau
LFA Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt-Aviation Research Institute.
MG Maschinengewehr - machine gun; later also cannon.
MK Maschinenkanone - machine cannon.
MW 50 Methanol-water mixture.
NJG Nachtjagdgeschwader - night fighter group.
Obergruppenfûhrer SS rank, equivalent to Lieutenant General.
Oberleutnant Luftwaffe rank equivalent to Flying Officer (RAF) or 1st
Lieutenant (USAAF).
Oberstleutnant Luftwaffe rank equivalent to Wing Commander (RAF)
or Lieutenant Colonel (USAAF).
OKL Oberkommando der Luftwaffe - Luftwaffe High Command.
OMW Otto Marder Works
'Otto-Jager' Piston-engined fighter.
P Projekt- project.
PeilG Peilgerat - direction finding set.
210/214
Pulk Luftwaffe term for USAF bomber box.

Pulkzerstorer Heavily armed anti-bomber aircraft.
Rb Reihenbildkamera - automatic aerial camera.
RfRuK Reichsministerium fur Rûstung und Kriegsproduktion - Reich's
Ministry of Armament and War Production.
RLM Reichsluftfahrtministerium - Reich's Air Ministry.
Rûstsatz Field conversion set.
SC Splitterbombe — fragmentation bomb.
Schrage Musik Luftwaffe term for oblique upward-firing armament (lit-
erally oblique or jazz music.
SD Splitterbombe, Dickwand - fragmentation bomb, thick-walled.
Technisches Amt Technical Office (of the RLM).
TL Turbinenluftstrahl-Triebwerk - turbojet engine.
TLR Technische Luftrustung - Technical Air Armaments Board.
UKW Ultrakurzwellc-VHF. Volksflugzeug People's (\e the Nation-Slate)
Aircraft.
Volksjager People's Fighter.
Volkssturm Germany's equivalent to the British home guard
WNF Wiener Neustadter Flugzeugwerke - aircraft works.
W/nr Werk nummer - construction (or airframe serial) number.
Zerstôrer Heavy fighter, literally destroyer.
ZVG Zielflugvorsatzgerât - homer attachment device.
Bibliography
Clark, Alan (1973). Ace High: The War in the Air over the Western Front
1914-18. Putnam & Company. ISBN 978-0-399-11103-7.
Grey & Thetford (1962-70). German Aircraft of the First World War (2nd
ed.). Putnam & Company.
Bekker, Cajus (1964), Angriffshohe 4000, Germany.
Bergström, Christer (2007), Barbarossa – The Air Battle: July–December
1941, London: Chervron/Ian Allan. ISBN 978-1-85780-270-2.
Bergstrom, Christer (2007), Stalingrad – The Air Battle: November 1942
– February 1943, London: Chervron/Ian Allan. ISBN 978-1-85780-276-4 .
Bergström, Christer (2007), Kursk – The Air Battle: July 1943, London:
Chervron/Ian Allan. ISBN 978-1-903223-88-8.
Bergstrom, Christer; Pegg, Martin (2003), Jagdwaffe: The War in Russia:
January–October 1942, London: Classic Colours. ISBN 1-903223-23-7.
Buckley, John (1999), Air Power in the Age of Total War, West Midlands:
UCL Press. ISBN 1-85728-589-1
Bergstrom, Christer; Mikhailov, Andrey (2003), Black Cross/Red Star-
Vol. 1, Operation Barbarossa 1941, London: Classic Colours. ISBN 978-0-
935553-48-2 .
211/214
Bowmen, Martin; Boiten, Theo (2001), Battles with the Luftwaffe: The Air
War Over Germany 1942–1945, London: Collins. ISBN 978-0-00-711363-
7
Bungay, Stephen (2000), The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the
Battle of Britain, London: Aurum Press. ISBN 1-85410-721-6.
Caldwell, Donald; Muller, Richard (2007), The Luftwaffe over Germany:
Defense of the Reich, London: Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0
Cooper, Mathew (1981), The German Air Force 1933–1945: An Anatomy
of Failure, New York: Jane's Publishing Incorporated. ISBN 0-531-03733-
9
Corum, J.F. (1999), "Staerken und Schwaechen der Luftwaffe", in Mueller,
R. & Volkmann, H.E., Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realitaet, Muenchen:
Oldenbourg Verlag
Corum, James. 'The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941' in The
Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 53–76
Corum, James. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Mili-
tary Reform. Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
1992. ISBN 0-7006-0541-X.
Corum, James. The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–
1940. Kansas University Press. 1997. ISBN 978-0-7006-0836-2
Crawford, Steve (2006), Eastern Front, Day by Day, London: Spellmount
Publications. ISBN 1-86227-359-6.
Drabkin, Artem (2007), The Red Air Force at War :Barbarossa and the
Retreat to Moscow: Recollections of Soviet Fighter Pilots on the Eastern
Front, Pen & Sword Aviation Publications.ISBN 978-1-84415-563-7
Dressel&Griehl, Joachim and Manfred (1994), Bombers of the Luftwaffe,
London: Arms and Armour:DAG Publications.ISBN 1-85409-140-9
Dye, Peter J. (Winter 2000), "Logistics in the Battle of Britain", Air Force
Journal of Logistics.
Faber, Harold (1979), Luftwaffe: An analysis by former Luftwaffe gene-
rals, London: Sidgwick & Jackson. ISBN 0-283-98516-X
Goss, Chriss (2005), Dornier 17: In Focus, Red KiteISBN 0-9546201-4-3.
Goss, Chriss (2000), The Bombers'Battle: Personal Accounts of the Battle
of Britain by Luftwaffe Bomber Crews July–October 1940, Crecy Publis-
hingISBN 978-0-947554-82-8
Hayward, Joel S. (2001), Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hi-
tler's Defeat in the East 1942–1943, University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-
7006-1146-0
Hall, Steve; Quinlan, Lionel (2000), KG55, London: red Kite. ISBN 0-
9538061-0-3.
Hess, William N. (1994), B-17 Flying Fortress: Combat and Development
History, St. Paul, Minnesota: Motorbook International. ISBN 0-87938-
881-1
212/214
Holmes, Tony (2007), Spitfire vs Bf 109: Battle of Britain, St. Oxford, Lon-
don: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84603-190-8.
Homze, Edward (1976), Arming the Luftwaffe, Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska. ISBN 0-8032-0872-3
Hooton, E.R. Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe.
Brockhampton Press, London. 1994. ISBN 1-86019-964-X
Hooton, E.R. The Luftwaffe: A Study in Air Power, 1933–1945. Classic Pu-
blications, London. 2010. ISBN 978-1-906537-18-0
Hooton, E.R (2007), Luftwaffe at War; Gathering Storm 1933–39: Volu-
me 1, London: Chervron/Ian Allan. ISBN 978-1-903223-71-0.
Hooton, E.R (2007), Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West: Volume 2,
London: Chervron/Ian Allan. ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6.
Hooton, E.R (1997), Eagle in Flames: The Fall of the Luftwaffe, Weiden-
feld Military. ISBN 978-1-85409-343-1 .
Irving, D (1974), The rise and fall of the Luftwaffe;: The life of Field Mars-
hal Erhard Milch, London: Little, Brown. ISBN 978-0-316-43238-2
Just, Gunther. J (1986), Stuka Pilot Hans Ulrich Rudel, Connecticut:
Schiffer Military History. ISBN 0-88740-252-6 * Stalin's Missed Chance
(study)- Mikhail Meltyukhov
Kaplan, Philip (2007), Fighter Aces of the Luftwaffe in World War 2, Pen
& Sword Aviation. ISBN 1-84415-460-2 * Ketley, Barry, and Rolfe, Mark.
Luftwaffe Fledglings 1935–1945: Luftwaffe Training Units and their Air-
craft. Aldershot, GB: Hikoki Publications, 1996. ISBN 0-9519899-2-8.
Manrho, John; Putz, Ron (2004), Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Ho-
pe–The Attack on Allied Airfields, New year's Day 1945, Hikoki Publica-
tions. ISBN 1-902109-40-6
Macksey, K (2006), The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, London:
GreenhillBooks. ISBN 978-1-85367-287-3
Nowarra, Heinz. J (1990), The Flying Pencil, Connecticut: Schiffer Military
History. ISBN 0-88740-236-4
Neitzel, Söhnke (1995), Der Einsatz der Deutschen Luftwaffe über der
Nordsee und dem Atlantik: 1939–45, Bonn: Bernard & Graefe.
Pegg, M (2007), Transporter Vol. 1: Luftwaffe Transport Units 1937–
1943, London: Classic Publications.
Price, Alfred (2001), The Last Year of the Luftwaffe: May 1944 – May
1945, London: Greenhill.
Probert, H. A. The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945
(1987), analytic history by the British RAF
Ruffner, Kevin (1997), Luftwaffe Field Divisions, 1941–45, London: Os-
prey. ISBN 1-85532-100-9
Scutts, J. (1994), Mustang Aces of the Eighth Air Force, Oxford: Osprey
Publishing. ISBN 1-85532-447-4
Scutts, J. (1994), Bf 109 Aces of North Africa and the Mediterranean, Ox-
213/214
ford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-85532-448-2.

Smith, Peter (1998), Luftwaffe at War: Defeat in the West 1943–
1945(Luftwaffe at War, Vol. 6), London: Greenhill ISBN 978-1-85367-
318-4
Stenman, K. (2002), Luftwaffe Over Finland (Luftwaffe at War Series,
Vol. 18), London: Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1-85367-469-3
Smith, Peter (2001), Luftwaffe at War – The Sea Eagles: The Luftwaffe's
Maritime Operations, London: Greenhill ISBN 978-1-85367-442-6
Smith, Peter (1999), Luftwaffe at War: Stukas Over Steppe, Blitzkrieg in
the East 1941–1944 (Luftwaffe at War Series, Vol. 9), London: Greenhill
Books ISBN 978-1-85367-355-9
Smith, R.J; Creek, E.J (2004), Kampfflieger: Bombers of the Luftwaffe:
1942–1943, London: Classic Publications. ISBN 978-1-903223-49-9
Mayer, SL; Taylor, AJP (1974), History of World War II, London: Octopus
Books. ISBN 0-7064-0399-1 & ISBN 978-0-7064-0399-2
Tooze, Adam (2006), The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Brea-
king of the Nazi Economy, London: Allen Lane. ISBN 0-7139-9566-1
US Air Force, Air University Press (1987), US Strategic Bombing Survey,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press. Reprint of the
Summary Reports (Europe and the Pacific) of the strategic bombing sur-
veys conducted near the close of World War II.
Vasco, John (2005), Zerstorer: Luftwaffe Fighter Bombers and Destro-
yers 1939–1945: Volume 1, Classic Publications. ISBN 978-1-903223-57-4
van Creveld, M.; Cranby, S.; Brower, K. (1994), Airpower and Maneuver
Warfare, Air University Press.
Weal, John (1997), Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader 1937–41, Oxford: Os-
prey. ISBN 1-85532-636-1
Weal, John (1998), Focke-Wulf Fw 190 Aces of the Russian Front, Oxford:
Osprey. ISBN 1-85532-518-7.
Weal, John (1999), Messerschmitt Bf 110 Zerstörer Aces World War Two,
Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 1-85532-753-8.
Weal, John (2003a), Bf109 Aces of the Russian Front, Oxford: Osprey.
ISBN 1-84176-084-6
Weal, John (2003), Jagdgeschwader 27 'Afrika', Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 1-
84176-538-4.
Weal, John A. (2003b), Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader of North Africa
and the Mediterranean, Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-84176-538-4
Weal, John (2006), Bf109 Defence of the Reich Aces, Oxford: Osprey.
ISBN 1-84176-879-0
Williamson, Murray (1983), Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933–
1945, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, ISBN 978-1-58566-010-0
de Zeng IV, Henry L.; Stankey, Douglas G. (2007), Bomber Units of the
Luftwaffe 1933–1945: A Reference Source: Volume 1, Midland Publishing.
214/214

Messerschmitt Me 262 Schwalbe: The First Jet Fighter

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Messerschmitt Me 262 Schwalbe: The First Jet Fighter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Messerschmitt Me 262 Schwalbe

1 Lo invitamos a nuestro sitio de Historia Militar en www.thegermanarmy.org

unbiased evidence sufficient to convict without any need for dependence

luctance to begin long-distance raiding attacks there may be, as a cons-

It was Germany's superiority in the air which brought Britain's interven-

Force. These have ranged as far afield as Pilsen, in Czechoslovakia, where

ready for service again in August 1941.

because the dive-bombers had already done their work.

craft by utilizing the reflection of electro-magnetic waves from solids (con-

production of machines of wartime design was begun in the factories; and

Creating the Operational Air War

The Lessons of World War I

German general staffs therefore placed a high priority on improving their

Aviation and the German General Staff

In contrast to the images of the reactionary and intellectually stagnant offi-

a reconnaissance weapon, von Moltke concluded, "The practice and experi-

in knocking the enemy's aerial reconnaissance system out of operation ...

The Outbreak of war: The Airplane proves decisive

a strategic bombing campaign against the British home isles.

Reorganization of the German Air Force

Flanders Air Campaign

Another innovation of the Flanders air battle was Wilberg's organization of

Zerstorer, the south-German company already had vast experience in the

Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing, 1990.

sometimes made).9 The Allies countered its potential effectiveness in the

a German aircraft designer and manufacturer. He was born in Frankfurt am

neers of Germany.Born in Schwerin, in north-eastern Germany, in 1912, Bölkow

surfaces. Wings were of single-spar cantilever construction, with stressed

Although the Me 262 is often referred to as a "swept wing"17 design, the

a primitive autothrottle 18 late in the war helped only slightly. Conversely,

prototype, lifted off from Rostock-Marienehe's runway at 15.18 on 30

In the Luftwaffe's interest

to the produc-lion of the Me 262; a production order for 100 followed in

Fig 4 This Messerschmitt Me 262B-1a/U1 under test at Wright Field in

25This Messerschmitt Me 262B-1a/U1 under test at Wright Field in 1946 wears

26 Waldemar Voigt (aerospace engineer): Chief designer at Messerschmitt's Obe-

28 The de Havilland DH.98 Mosquito was a British multi-role combat aircraft,

bombers' defenses. Me 262s, equipped with R4M rockets, approached

Fig No 5 Hans Guido Mutke's Me 262A on display at the Deutsches Mu-

The plane had, by contemporary standards, quite a high wing loading

(including 9 P-51s), Walther Dahl 29 with 11 (including three Lavochkin La-

Fig No 6 Me 262 A, circa 1944

Fig No 7 This airframe, Wrknr. 111711, was the first Me 262

Fig 5 This Messerschmitt Me 262A-2a - 9K+FH (Nr 111625)

35This Messerschmitt Me 262A-2a - 9K+FH (Nr 111625) - belonged to 1,/KG 51.

flight demonstrations. Me 262 Werk Number 501241 was delivered to the

RAF discovers the Schwalbe

Fig 6 Although many Me 262s wore unit insignia

37Major Walter "Nowi" Nowotny (7 December 1920 – 8 November 1944) was an

take-off. Initially, the Kommando Nowotny 38 was given cover by III/JG 54

Fig No 10 An Me 262A-2a of1./KG 51, during March 1945

A detachment of KG 51, operating as Kommando Schenck, began operations dur-

bombing attacks (with AB 250 containers) on Allied front lines, reconnais-

II and the first operational jet fighter Gruppe in the world.

Giebelstadt, II/KG(J) 54 at Kitzingen and III/KG(J) 6 at Prague-Ruzyne

Me 2G2A-2a: standard fighter-bomber configuration, similar to Me

Fig 7 Me 262A-1 was experimentally flown with a 50-mm Rheinmetall BK

43This Me 262A-1 was experimentally flown with a 50-mm Rheinmetall BK 5 can-

Fig 7 Messerschmitt Me 262B-2a

Junkers Jumo 004

Design and development

tor, the BMW 003. 44

Technical description and testing