Brito, Karen Daryl L.

SSS Law
Agrarian Law and Social Legislation / 2C Republic Act No. 1161
Case Digest Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS

G.R. No. 15045, 20 December 1961

FACTS:
On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila filed with the Social
Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable
institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic
Act No. 1161 (Social Security Law of 1954). It was based on the claim that the said Act is a
labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and
activities organized for profit. The Social Security Commission denied the request. The Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request,
however, was denied by the Commission.
Section 9 of the Social Security Law provides that coverage "in the System shall be
compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty years inclusive, if they have
been for at least six months a the service of an employer who is a member of the System,
Provided, that the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System
unless he shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if
admitted for membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees,
and if admitted for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six
employees x x x."
The term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical,
domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or
activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards
the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government", while an
"employee" refers to "any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which either or both
mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services".
"Employment” covers any service performed by an employer except those expressly
enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the
Government, domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.
From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security
Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less
permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded.
Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should — following the
principle of ejusdem generis — be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities
which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the
phrase, activity of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business,
industry, undertaking."

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Catholic Churches and all charitable and religious institutions
operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila shall be covered by the Social
Security Law.
2. Whether or not the term “employer” following the principle of ejusdem generis be limited
to those who carry on activities which are pursued for profit or gain.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Social Security Law was enacted in pursuant to the policy of the country to
develop a social security system that will cater the needs of the citizen and protect employees
against the hazard of sickness, old age, disability and death. This Act is a legitimate exercise of
police power. It guards labor, especially to working women and minors, in accordance with the
constitutional provision of promoting social justice to keep the safety of the citizen’s well-being
and economic security of the people. The petitioner cannot arbitrarily restrict the extent of its
provisions to relations between labor and capital in industry and agriculture.
There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the
coverage of R.A. No. 1161 violates the constitutional prohibitions against the application of
public funds for the use, benefit, or support of any priest who might be employed by the
petitioner. In fact, the funds that are being contributed to the system are not for the purpose of
public funds, but it belongs to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government.
The payment for benefits made by the priest does not constitute any violation to the Constitution
because such payment shall be made for he is an employee.
All that is required of appellant is have monthly contributions to the system for covered
employees in its employ. These are not in nature of taxes in employment. They are made for the
purpose of protecting the employees against hazards of sickness, old age, disability and death

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Brito, Karen Daryl L. SSS Law
Agrarian Law and Social Legislation / 2C Republic Act No. 1161
Case Digest Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS

and in connection to the provision of the Constitution of promoting social justice and economic
security.
2. No. The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. In the case at
bar, the definition of the term "employer" is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious
and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its
meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said
institutions or entities are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really intended to limit
the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an
"employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of
it.
It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the
employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions
of said Act excluded from coverage thereof. That portion of the law, however, has been deleted
by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication
that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of
the law.
Appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in
those discussions touching upon the question of whether the law should be limited to
organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt at length upon the need of
a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who
fails to make a profit. Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law
following the rule laid down in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos and other
cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The cases cited,
however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its
application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises
Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the
Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system
which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide
protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2,
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police
power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full
accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with
the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant cannot
arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry
and agriculture.
There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of
the Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public
funds for the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The
funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to
the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said
funds are impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or
disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution,
since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an
employee.
Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs
appellant's right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to make
monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions,
contrary to appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with
the
contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the
protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in
line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people.

DISPOSITION:
Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of 1958, of the Social Security Commission are
hereby affirmed. Ordered with costs against the petitioner.

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Brito, Karen Daryl L. SSS Law
Agrarian Law and Social Legislation / 2C Republic Act No. 1161
Case Digest Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS

CMS Estate, Inc. vs. SSS

G.R. No. 26298, 28 September 1984

FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation organized primarily for the purpose of engaging in
the real estate business. On December 1, 1952, it started doing business with only six (6)
employees. It's Articles of Incorporation was amended on June 4, 1956 in order to engage in the
logging business. Petitioner likewise obtained an ordinary license from the Bureau of Forestry to
operate a forest concession of 13,000 hectares situated in the municipality of Baganga,
Province of Davao.
On January 28, 1957, petitioner entered into a contract of management with one
Eufracio D. Rojas for the operation and exploitation of the forest concession. The logging
operation actually started on April 1, 1957 with four monthly salaried employees. As of
September 1, 1957, petitioner had 89 employees and laborers in the logging operation. On
December 26, 1957, petitioner revoked its contract of management with Mr. Rojas.
On August 1, 1958, petitioner became a member of the Social Security System with
respect to its real estate business. On September 6, 1958, petitioner remitted to the System the
sum of P203.13 representing the initial premium on the monthly salaries of the employees in its
logging business.
However, on October 9, 1958, petitioner demanded the refund of the said amount,
claiming that it is not yet subject to compulsory coverage with respect to its logging business.
The request was denied by respondent System on the ground that the logging business was a
mere expansion of petitioner's activities and for purposes of the Social Security Act, petitioner
should be considered a member of the System since December 1, 1952 when it commenced its
real estate business.
On November 10, 1958, petitioner filed a petition with the Social Security Commission
praying for the determination of the effectivity date of the compulsory coverage of petitioner's
logging business. The Commission denied the petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied.
Petitioner submits that respondent Commission erred in holding (1) that the contributions
required of employers and employees under our Social Security Act of 1954 are not in the
nature of excise taxes because the said Act was allegedly enacted by Congress in the exercise
of the police power of the State, not of its taxing power; (2) that no contractee — independent
contractor relationship existed between petitioner and Eufracio D. Rojas during the time that he
was operating its forest concession at Baganga, Davao; (3) that a corporation which has been in
operation for more than two years in one business is immediately covered with respect to any
new and independent business it may subsequently engage in; (4) that a corporation should be
treated as a single employing unit for purposes of coverage under the Social Security Act,
irrespective of its separate, unrelated and independent business established and operated at
different places and on different dates; and (5) that Section 9 of the Social Security Act on the
question of compulsory membership and employers should be given a liberal interpretation.
Respondent, on the other hand, advances the following propositions, inter alia: (1) that
the Social Security Act speaks of compulsory coverage of employers and not of business; (2)
that once an employer is initially covered under the Social Security Act, any other business
undertaken or established by the same employer is likewise subject in spite of the fact that the
latter has not been in operation for at least two years; (3) that petitioner's logging business while
actually of a different, distinct, separate and independent nature from its real estate business
should be considered as an operation under the same management; (4) that the amendment of
petitioner's articles of incorporation, so as to enable it to engage in the logging business did not
alter the juridical personality of petitioner; and (5) the petitioner's logging operation is a mere
expansion of its business activities.

ISSUE:

1. (DISCUSSION) Whether or not the CMS estate shall begin their compulsory covered
on September 1, 1957, as said by the Commission
2. W/N the contributions required of employers and employees are in the nature of
excise taxes.
3. W/N the petitioner’s logging business, while of a different, distinct, and separate
nature from its real estate business, should be considered as an operation under the
same management.
4. W/N the compulsory coverage shall take effect after the two-year stabilization period

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Brito, Karen Daryl L. SSS Law
Agrarian Law and Social Legislation / 2C Republic Act No. 1161
Case Digest Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS

5. W/N a contractee-independent contractor relationship existed between petitioner and

Eufracio Rojas

RULING:

1.
2. NO. The Social Security Law implements the general welfare mandate of the
Constitution and constitutes a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. Membership
in the SSS is a legal imposition on employers and employees, designed to provide social
security to the workingmen. The taxing power of the State is exercised for the purpose of raising
revenues. However, under our Social Security Law, the emphasis is more on the promotion of
the general welfare. The Act is not part of out Internal Revenue Code nor are the contributions
and premiums therein dealt with and provided for, collectible by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The funds contributed to the System belong to the members who will receive benefits, as a
matter of right, whenever the hazards provided by the law occur.
All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for
covered
employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's contention, are not 'in the
nature of taxes on employment.' Together with the contributions imposed upon employees and
the Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.
3. YES. If the intention of the legislature was to consider every venture of the employer
as the basis of a separate coverage, an express provision to that effect could have been made.
Unfortunately, however, none of that sort appeared provided for in the said law. In the absence
of an express provision for a separate coverage for each kind of business, the reasonable
interpretation is that once an employer is covered in a particular kind of business, he should be
automatically covered with respect to any new name. Any interpretation which would defeat
rather than promote the ends for which the Social Security Act was enacted should be
eschewed.
4. NO. The amendatory law, RA 2658, which was approved on June 18, 1960,
eliminated the two-year stabilization period as employers now become automatically covered
immediately upon the start of the business. It is the intention of the law to cover as many
persons as possible so as to promote the constitutional objective of social justice. It is axiomatic
that a later law prevails over a prior statute and moreover the legislative intent must be given
effect.
5. NO. Petitioner submits that Eufrancio Rojas is an independent contractor who
engages in an independent business of his own consisting of the operation of the timber
concession of the former. Rojas was appointed as operations manager of the logging
consession; He has no power to appoint or hire employees; as the term implies, he only
manages the employees and it is petitioner who furnishes him the necessary equipment for use
in the logging business; and he is not free from the control and direction of his employer in
matter connected with the performance of his work. These factors clearly indicate that Rojas is
not an independent contractor but merely an employee of petitioner; and should be entitled to
the compulsory coverage of the Act.

DISPOSITION:

The appeal is dismissed. Ordered cost against the petitioner.

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Brito, Karen Daryl L. SSS Law
Agrarian Law and Social Legislation / 2C Republic Act No. 1161
Case Digest Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS

SSS vs. Aguas,

G.R. No. 165546, 27 February 2006

FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on
December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for
death benefits on December 13, 1996. She indicated in her claim that Pablo was the father of
Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Her claim for monthly pension was settled on
February 13, 1997.
In April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s
sister, questioning Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned
the family abode approximately more than six years before and lived with another man on whom
she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children with
Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a certain Romeo dela Peña. In support of
her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the original birth certificate of one Jefren H.
dela Peña, showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez
and Romeo C. dela Peña, and that the two were married on November 1, 1990.
SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension in September
1997. Upon investigation, the commission found out that the deceased had no legal children
with Rosanna; Jenelyn and Jefren were Rosanna’s children with one Romeo C. dela Peña and
Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with Romeo while she was still
pregnant with Jenelyn, who was born on October 29, 1991. It was also confirmed that Pablo
was not capable of having a child as he was under treatment.
On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr. Manuel
Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile, the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume the payment
of their pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within 30 days the amount of
₱10,350.00 representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn from December
1996 to August 1997 at ₱1,150.00 per month.
Rosanna and Jeylnn requested for a reconsideration of the said decision. However, the
SSS denied the claim. This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the
Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC). Janet H. Aguas,
who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant.
The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the following: (1)
Pablo and Rosanna’s marriage certificate; (2) Janet’s certificate of live birth; (3) Jeylnn’s
certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablo’s certificate of death. In its Answer, the SSS averred that,
based on the sworn testimonies and documentary evidence showing the disqualification of the
petitioners as primary beneficiaries, the claims were barren offactual and legal basis; as such, it
was justified in denying their claims.
In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that: 1) Jeylnn was a legitimate child of
Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature as Jeylnn’s father; 2)
Rosanna never left Pablo and that they lived together as husband and wife under one roof; 3) In
support thereof, they attached a Joint Affidavit executed by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla and
Carmelita Yangu, where they declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and
wife until the latter’s death. 4) In Janet’s birth certificate, which was registered in the Civil
Registry of San Fernando, it appears that her father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna.
5) As to the alleged infertility of Pablo, the claimants averred that Dr. Macapinlac denied giving
the opinion precisely because he was not an expert on such matters, and that he treated the
deceased only for tuberculosis. The claimant likewise claimed that the information the SSS
gathered from the doctor was privileged communication.
On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit
and ordering Rosanna to immediately refund to the SSS the amount of ₱10,350.00 erroneously
paid to her and Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the deceased. The SSC likewise directed the
SSS to pay the death benefit to qualified secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their
absence, to his legal heirs.
The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but their motion was
denied by the SSC for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time. The claimants then
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the SSC decision and
favored the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to SSS death benefits of Pablo.

RULING:
Only Jeylnn is entitled to death benefits. At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing law
was Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law
enumerates those who are entitled to death benefits. The Court has reviewed the records of the
case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.

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Brito, Karen Daryl L. SSS Law
Agrarian Law and Social Legislation / 2C Republic Act No. 1161
Case Digest Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS

Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of
Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that
she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were
married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December
8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is
a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is
no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s
status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet
because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only
upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally
married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. It
should be noted that respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth
certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as
Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. It stands as a mere
photocopy, without probative weight. The witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was
not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janet’s
adoption did not undergo any legal proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under
Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted" children are
considered dependent children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the
Court cannot consider her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary
beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the
employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is
the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support. In this case,
Rosanna presented proof to show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of
their marriage
certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But whether or not Rosanna
has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death
remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, but
whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is something that has to be
shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. It should be noted that the GSIS
law likewise defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon
the member or pensioner." The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated
de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband,
absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were
still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent
on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have been complied
with, particularly her dependency on her husband for support at the time of his death. Aside
from her own testimony, the only evidence adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo
lived together as husband and wife until his death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and
Carmelita Yangu where they made such declaration. Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and
Carmelita and their testimonies before the SSC will not prevail over the categorical and
straightforward testimonies of the other witnesses who testified that Rosanna and Pablo had
already separated for almost six years before the latter died.
On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that Rosanna was no longer living at
Pablo’s house even before he died, and that she is still living with Romeo dela Peña up to the
present.
In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to the
SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his
legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the
spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary
beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified
as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his
death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.

DISPOSITION:
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared entitled to
the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.

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Brito, Karen Daryl L. SSS Law
Agrarian Law and Social Legislation / 2C Republic Act No. 1161
Case Digest Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS

Bartolome vs. SSS

G.R. No. 192521, 12 November 2014

John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he
was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately,
on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina
P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for
death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La
Union.
However, the SSS La Union office denied the claim stating that she is no longer the
parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol based on the documents submitted
to them. The denial was appealed tot he Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their
great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the
Decision in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated
February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality. Consequently, as argued by
the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
Neither would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it were proven
that Cornelio has already passed away.

Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the
"dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed
on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are
qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent
of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the status as the legitimate parent of the
deceased.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by
the ECC. Hence, the instant petition.

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