01 Fundamental Principles and Policies PDF

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LAST-MINUTE
NOTES ON THE 2011 BAR EXAMINATION IN LABOR LAW BASED ON THE
SUPREME COURT-PRESCRIBED SYLLABUS
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Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan
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A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
[These 8-part Notes discuss all topics/sub-topics in the Supreme Court-prescribed Syllabus for Labor Law]
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TOPICS UNDER THE SYLLABUS
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1. Constitutional Provisions
a. Art II, Secs. 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 20.
b. Art III, Secs. 1, 4, 8.
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c. Art. XIII, Secs. 1, 2, 3, 14. n
2. New Civil Code
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a. Article 1700
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3. Labor Code
a. Article 3
b. Article 211
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c. Article 212
d. Article 255
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TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS:
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1. Constitutional Provisions
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
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The following are the provisions of the Constitution mentioned in the Syllabus. The reviewee is advised to
be familiar with the keywords or keyterms found in the provisions which, for purposes of ease and convenience,
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are underlined herein:
ARTICLE II
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DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
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STATE POLICIES
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Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
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prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies
that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and
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an improved quality of life for all.
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Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
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Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.
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Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation‐building and shall promote
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and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well‐being. It shall inculcate
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in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.
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Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation‐building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights
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of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages
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private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
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LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

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ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
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Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
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nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
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Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
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to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
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abridged.
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ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
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and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
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inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
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for the common good.
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To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of
property and its increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
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opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self‐reliance.
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The most important provision that the reviewee should take note of is Section 3 of Article XIII which is the so‐called
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protection‐to‐labor clause in the Constitution. It reads as follows:
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ARTICLE XIII
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LABOR
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Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
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unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
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It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self‐organization, collective bargaining and
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negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
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They shall also participate in policy and decision‐making processes affecting their rights and
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benefits as may be provided by law.
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The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers
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and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and
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shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
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The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of
labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
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returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
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WOMEN
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Section 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working
conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities
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that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of
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the nation.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS NOT APPLICABLE TO LABOR CASES.
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The following constitutional rights and precepts may NOT be invoked in labor cases, particularly in
administrative investigations leading to the termination of employment:
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a. Constitutional Due Process:
i. Serrano v. NLRC case.
In the 2000 en banc decision in the case of Serrano v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000], the Supreme
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Court distinguished denial of due process by the State and denial of due process by the employer. It thus concluded that
the violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process as would result in
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the nullity of the employee’s dismissal or layoff. The following reasons were cited:
1. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not
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apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor
Code.
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2. The notice and hearing required under the Due Process Clause applies before the power of
organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of
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termination of employment under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code because the employee
is not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for the requirement of notice
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and hearing is not to comply with Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and
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hearing is at the trial stage. Then that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of
procedural due process. Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice requirement before he
dismisses an employee does not foreclose the right of the latter to question the legality of his
dismissal.
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3. The notice requirement under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code cannot be considered a
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requirement of the Due Process Clause since the employer cannot really be expected to be
entirely an impartial judge of his own cause.
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ii. Agabon v. NLRC case.
In the 2004 en banc decision in the case of Agabon v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004], the
Supreme Court further expounded on the doctrine laid down in Serrano by making a distinction between constitutional
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due process and statutory due process. Thus:
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“Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in
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criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing
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Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
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Resultantly, where there is just cause for dismissal but due process has not been properly observed by an
employer, it would not be right to order either the reinstatement of the dismissed employee or the payment of
backwages to him. In failing, however, to comply with the procedure prescribed by law (Article 277[b] of the Labor Code)
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in terminating the services of the employee, the employer must be deemed to have opted or, in any case, should be
made liable, for the payment of separation pay. It might be pointed out that the notice to be given and the hearing to be
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conducted generally constitute the two‐part due process requirement of law to be accorded to the employee by the
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employer. Nevertheless, peculiar circumstances might obtain in certain situations where to undertake the above steps
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would be no more than a useless formality and where, accordingly, it would not be imprudent to apply the res ipsa
loquitur rule and award, in lieu of separation pay, nominal damages to the employee.
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b. Right to Equal Protection of the Laws.
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It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or
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those acting under color of its authority. The equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct,
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however, discriminatory or wrongful it may have been.
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Duncan Association of Detailman‐PTGWO v. Glaxo Welcome Philippines, Inc., [G.R. No. 162994, September
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17, 2004].
The employer’s policy prohibiting its employees from any personal or marital relationships with employees of
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competitor companies was held not violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution and not unreasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company.
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Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply therewith.
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Indeed, the application of the said policy was made in an impartial and even‐handed manner with due regard for the lot
of the employee. In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook,
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it is clear that the company does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and
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those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
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choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employees and the company
that may arise out of such relationships.
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Yrasuegui v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., [G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008].
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Petitioner was dismissed because of his failure to measure up to the weight standards set by respondent. His
termination due to obesity was held legal and not violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. The
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High Court observed that the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment which is the
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source of the equal protection guarantee in the 1987 Constitution, is consistent in saying that the equal
protection clause erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful it may be. Private actions,
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no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.
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c. Right to Counsel.
Manuel v. N. C. Construction Supply, [G.R. No. 127553, November 28, 1997, 282 SCRA 326].
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The right to counsel under Section 12 of Article III [Bill of Rights] of the 1987 Constitution is meant to protect a
suspect in a criminal case who is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
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investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who
has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
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statements. It is that point when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon
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the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under said provision of the Bill of Rights of the 1987
Constitution applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
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investigation. Thus, if the investigation conducted by the employer is merely administrative and not criminal in character,
the admissions made during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify dismissal.
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Punzal v. ETSI Technologies, Inc., [G.R. Nos. 170384‐85, March 9, 2007].
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But according to this case, the failure of the employer to inform the employee who is undergoing
administrative investigation of his right to counsel would amount to deprivation of due process. Petitioner’s contention
that she was denied due process was upheld because the records do not show that she was informed of her right to be
represented by counsel during the conference with her employer. The protestations of respondent‐employer that the
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right to be informed of the right to counsel does not apply to investigations before administrative bodies and that law
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and jurisprudence merely give the employee the option to secure the services of counsel in a hearing or conference, fall
in the light of the clear provision of Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code that “the employer xxx shall afford [the worker
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whose employment is sought to be terminated] ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance
of his representatives if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations pursuant to guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment,” and the Supreme Court’s explicit pronouncement that “[a]mple opportunity
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connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for
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his defense including legal representation.” Consequently, the petitioner was awarded nominal damages in the amount
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of P30,000.00 for violation of her right to statutory due process.
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d. Right Against Self‐Incrimination.
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Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, [G.R. No. L‐25018, May 26, 1969]; Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., [G.R. No.
L‐19052, December 29, 1962].
This constitutionally‐guaranteed right which is usually invoked in criminal cases, may be validly invoked in an
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administrative proceeding if it partakes of the character of a criminal proceeding because of the nature of the penalty
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that may be imposed for the offense.
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The right against self‐incrimination was established on the ground of public policy and humanity. Of policy,
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because if the party were required to testify, it would place him under the strongest temptation to commit perjury; and
of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confession by duress.1
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e. Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.
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Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 735].
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The constitutionally guaranteed right against unreasonable searches and seizures may not be invoked against
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the employer. As applied to labor cases, the Supreme Court declared that it finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid
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down in People v. Marti, [G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 57], that the Bill of Rights does not protect
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true that the citizens have
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no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.

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2. New Civil Code

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a. Article 1700
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1. CIVIL CODE PROVISION.
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a. Only Civil Code provision cited in the Syllabus.
The only provision in the Civil Code cited in the Syllabus reads as follows:
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SECTION 2. ‐ Contract of Labor (n)
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Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.
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Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and
similar subjects.
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b. 3 parties to a labor case.
Every labor case always concerns and involves three (3) parties, namely:
1. the worker or his organization which may or may not be a union;
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2. the employer who may be an individual or a corporate person; and
3. the public.
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1 United States v. Navarro, G.R. No. 1272, Jan. 11, 1904, 3 Phil. 143.
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c. Some principles on this provision.
In case there is a clash between labor and management, it is an accepted norm that the rights of the general
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public, represented by the state, are paramount.2
The concern of the law for the workers is further stressed in the provision in the Civil Code which ordains that in
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case of doubt, all labor legislations and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for
the laborers.3

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3. Labor Code
a. Article 3
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b. Article 211
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c. Article 212
d. Article 255
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1. LABOR CODE PROVISIONS.

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The following four (4) provisions of the Labor Code are cited in the Syllabus:
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ART. 3. Declaration of basic policy. ‐ The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
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employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self‐
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
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work.
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Article. 211. Declaration of Policy. ‐ A. It is the policy of the State:
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(a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and
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negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of
settling labor or industrial disputes;
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(b) To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of
democracy and the promotion of social justice and development;
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(c) To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor
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movement;
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(d) To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations
as union members and as employees;
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(e) To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement
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of labor or industrial disputes;
(f) To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and
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(g) To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy‐making processes
affecting their rights, duties and welfare.
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B. To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers
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and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining, no
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court or administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates of pay,
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hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided
under this Code.
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Article. 212. Definitions. –
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(a) "Commission" means the National Labor Relations Commission or any of its divisions, as the
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case may be, as provided under this Code.
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(b) "Bureau" means the Bureau of Labor Relations and/or the Labor Relations Divisions in the
regional offices established under Presidential Decree No. 1, in the Department of Labor.
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(c) "Board" means the National Conciliation and Mediation Board established under Executive
Order No. 126.
(d) "Council" Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration Advisory Council established under Executive
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Order No. 126, as amended.
(e) “Employer” includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly.
The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when
acting as employer.
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(f) “Employee” includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited
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to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall include
any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor
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2 51 CJS, Sec. 1, p. 567.
3 Article 1702 thereof.
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dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially
equivalent and regular employment.
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(g) “Labor organization” means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in
part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms
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and conditions of employment.
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(h) “Legitimate labor organization” means any labor organization duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof.
(i) “Company union” means any labor organization whose formation, function or administration
has been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor practice by this Code.
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(j) “Bargaining representative” means a legitimate labor organization whether or not employed
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by the employer.
(k) “Unfair labor practice” means any unfair labor practice as expressly defined by the Code.
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(l) “Labor dispute” includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of
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employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
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(m) “Managerial employee” is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down and
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execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay‐off, recall, discharge,
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assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is
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not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All
employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank‐and‐file
employees for purposes of this Book.
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(n) “Voluntary Arbitrator” means any person accredited by the Board as such or any person
named or designated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement by the parties to act as their
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Voluntary Arbitrator, or one chosen with or without the assistance of the National
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Conciliation and Mediation Board, pursuant to a selection procedure agreed upon in the
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Collective Bargaining Agreement, or any official that may be authorized by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment to act as Voluntary Arbitrator upon the written request and
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agreement of the parties to a labor dispute.
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(o) “Strike” means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute.
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(p) “Lockout” means any temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an
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industrial or labor dispute.
(q) “Internal union dispute” includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or
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disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by laws of a union, including any
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violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in this Code.
(r) “Strike‐breaker” means any person who obstructs, impedes, or interferes with by force,
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violence, coercion, threats, or intimidation any peaceful picketing affecting wages, hours or
conditions of work or in the exercise of the right of self‐organization or collective bargaining.
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(s) “Strike area” means the establishment, warehouses, depots, plants or offices, including the
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sites or premises used as runaway shops, of the employer struck against, as well as the
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immediate vicinity actually used by picketing strikers in moving to and fro before all points of
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entrance to and exit from said establishment.
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Article 255. Exclusive bargaining representation and workers’ participation in policy and
decision‐making. – The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the
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employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of
the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual
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employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer.
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Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject to
such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to
participate in policy and decision‐making processes of the establishment where they are
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employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For
this purpose, workers and employers may form labor‐management councils: Provided, That
the representatives of the workers in such labor‐management councils shall be elected by at
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least the majority of all employees in said establishment.
2. IN RE: FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 255:
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a. Exclusive bargaining representative; meaning.
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“Exclusive bargaining representative” or “exclusive bargaining agent” refers to a legitimate labor union duly
recognized or certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative or agent of all the employees in a bargaining
unit.
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A labor union certified as the “sole and exclusive bargaining agent” means that it shall remain as such during
the existence of the CBA, to the exclusion of other labor organizations, and no petition questioning its majority status
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shall be entertained nor shall certification election be conducted outside of the sixty‐day freedom period immediately
before the expiry date of the five‐year term of the CBA.
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Once certified, what is represented by the bargaining agent are not only its members but also its non‐members
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who are included in the bargaining unit.
b. Individual employee or group of employees cannot bring grievable issues for voluntary arbitration without
the participation of the bargaining union.
The designation of a bargaining agent, however, does not deprive an individual employee or group of
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employees to exercise their right at any time to present grievances to their employer, with or without the intervention of
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the bargaining union.
Article 255 explicitly provides that an individual employee or group of employees may validly bring grievances
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directly to the employer even if there is an existing exclusive bargaining representative.
Tabigue v. International Copra Export Corporation, [G.R. No. 183335, December 23, 2009].
The Supreme Court, however, clarified in this case of Tabigue that an individual employee or group of
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employees cannot be allowed to submit or refer unsettled grievances for voluntary arbitration without the participation
of the bargaining union. The petitioners in this case are members of INTERCO Employees/Laborers’ Union (the union), the
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bargaining agent in respondent company. Without the participation of the union, petitioners filed a Notice of Preventive
Mediation with the NCMB against respondent for violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and failure to sit on
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the grievance conference/meeting. As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the NCMB, petitioners requested to
elevate the case to voluntary arbitration. However, the president of the union of which petitioners are members wrote a
letter stating that petitioners “are not duly authorized by [the] board or the officers to represent the union, [hence] . . . all
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actions, representations or agreements made by these people with the management will not be honored or recognized
by the union.” The Supreme Court ruled that the right of any employee or group of employees to, at any time, present
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grievances to the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. In this case, petitioners
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have not been duly authorized to represent the union, hence, they cannot present their unsettled grievances for
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voluntary arbitration.4
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Insular Hotel Employees Union‐NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao, [G.R. Nos. 174040‐41, September 22,
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2010].
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This case reiterated the said ruling in Tabigue. In this case, the Davao Insular Hotel Free Employees Union‐
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National Federation of Labor (DIHFEU‐NFL), the recognized labor organization in respondent hotel entered into a
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Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent which superseded the affected provisions of the existing CBA.
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The MOA was executed to effect the re‐opening of the hotel which earlier suspended its operation due to extreme
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business losses. Individual members of another union, the Insular Hotel Employees Union‐National Federation of Labor
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(IHEU‐NFL), petitioner in this case, which claimed to be affiliated also with the same federation, questioned the validity of
the MOA by filing a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the NCMB.
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On the issue of the identity of the duly recognized union, the respondent contended that it is DIHFEU‐NFL which
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is the only recognized bargaining unit in their establishment, the other union named IHEU‐NFL being a non‐entity since, as
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certified by the DOLE, it is not a registered labor organization, It was held, however, that respondent is already estopped
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from questioning the same as it did not raise the said issue in the proceedings before the NCMB and the Voluntary
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Arbitrator. A perusal of the records revealed that the main theory posed by respondent was whether or not the individual
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employees had the authority to file the complaint notwithstanding the apparent non‐participation of the union.
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Respondent never put in issue the fact that DIHFEU‐NFL was not the same as IHEU‐NFL. Consequently, it was declared
already too late in the day to assert the same.
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Resolving the issue raised by respondent of whether the individual members of IHEU‐NFL have the requisite
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standing to question the MOA before the NCMB and the Voluntary Arbitrator, the Supreme Court, invoking its 2009 ruling
in Tabigue [supra] and Section 3, Rule IV of the NCMB Manual of Procedure which provides that only a certified or duly
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recognized bargaining representative which has the right to file a notice or request for preventive mediation, declared
that the individual members of the union have no authority to file the case. Clearly, therefore, the NCMB and the
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Voluntary Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain the Notice of Preventive Mediation and the voluntary arbitration
case, respectively.
c. In order to have legal standing, the individual members should be shown to have been duly authorized to
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represent the bargaining union.
In the same 2010 case of Insular Hotel, [supra], in order to acquire legal standing to initiate the complaint
(Notice of Preventive Mediation), the individual employees should be shown to have been duly authorized to represent
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the bargaining union. Petitioners have not, however, been duly authorized to represent the union.

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4 See also Atlas Farms, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 142244, Nov. 18, 2002, 440 Phil. 620.
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3. IN RE: SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 255:
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a. Participation in Policy and Decision‐Making Processes.
Although the law sets the standard that the participation of the workers in the policy and decision‐making
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processes of the employer is limited to policies and decisions which affect their rights, benefits and welfare, there exists
a question on the extent of such participation that may be afforded to the workers in the said processes. The discussion
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of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the provision granting this right which was ultimately enshrined and
designated as Section 3, par. 2, Article XIII, [Social Justice and Human Rights] of the 1987 Constitution, indicates that it is
only in the area of grievance procedures and voluntary modes of settling disputes, and not in the area of corporate
planning, charting of corporate business, modes and procedures of corporate management and acquisition of property,
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where workers may participate.
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Manila Electric Company v. Quisumbing, [G.R. No. 127598, Jan. 27, 1999, 302 SCRA 173, 213].
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The grant of this right is not an intrusion into the employer’s management prerogative. The mandate of the
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Constitution and the law is complied with when, for instance, the union is allowed to have representatives in the
employer’s Safety Committee, Uniform Committee and other committees of similar nature. Certainly, such participation
by the union in the said committees is not in the nature of a co‐management control of the business of the employer.
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an
What is granted therein is participation and representation. Thus, there is no impairment of management prerogatives.
b. Labor‐Management Councils.
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Under the Rules to Implement the Labor Code, the Department of Labor and Employment is mandated to
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promote the formation of labor‐management councils in organized and unorganized establishments to enable the
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workers to participate in policy and decision‐making processes in the establishment, insofar as said processes will
directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare, except those which are covered by collective bargaining agreements or
are traditional areas of bargaining.
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c. Selection of representatives to labor‐management committees or councils.
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In organized establishments, the workers’ representatives to the committee or council should be nominated
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by the exclusive bargaining representative. In establishments where no legitimate labor organization exists, the
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workers’ representative should be elected directly by the employees at large.
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d. Distinction between Labor‐Management Council and Grievance Committee/Machinery.
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1. Labor‐Management Council is created pursuant to the constitutional right granted to workers to
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participate in policy and decision‐making processes of the establishment where they are employed; while
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a Grievance Committee/Machinery is created pursuant to the constitutional mandate on the preferential
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use of voluntary modes in settling labor disputes;
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2. Labor‐Management Council is more of a preventive measure; while a Grievance Committee/Machinery is
necessary when there is already the occurrence of a grievance ripe for adjudication;
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3. Labor‐Management Council has no adjudicatory power; while a Grievance Committee/Machinery has the
power to adjudicate and resolve grievances.
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END OF DISCUSSION ON
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TOPIC A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

2. New Civil Code

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

TOPIC A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

LABOR LAW: A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

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