G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007 female.

female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, should not be in any way taken against him.
vs. Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would
DECISION bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the
CORONA, J.: realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE.  5

came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.  It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
6

the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals  rendered a decision  in favor of the Republic. It
7 8

changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s
ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.
reconsideration but it was denied.  Hence, this petition.
9

The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
respondent.
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
and RA 9048. 10

Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
The petition lacks merit.
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
registered as "male."
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
sex. As found by the trial court:
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.  Feeling
1

trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
reassignment surgery  in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
2
records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
his sex from "male" to "female."
identification.  A change of name is a privilege, not a right.  Petitions for change of name are
11 12

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
controlled by statutes.  In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
13

newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.  Copies of the
3

order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
of RA 9048 provides:
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision  in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
4

read:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
compatible with his present sex.
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
implementing rules and regulations.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.  It vests the power and authority to entertain
14

has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied.  It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,  form  and procedure. In sum, the
15 16 17
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in
the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24

dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
shall be recorded in the civil register.
community; or
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
status.  RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
18

Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
those that occur after birth.  However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
25

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.  In addition, he must show that he will
19

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.  In this case, he failed to show, or even
20

change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
that serves as a substitute."  The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
26

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
is necessary.
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
Sex Reassignment
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
court must look to the statutes.  In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
21

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial membership. 27

order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.  Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
22
register. 23
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality,
capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.  (emphasis supplied)
28

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
xxx       xxx       xxx
 ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent
of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be
sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician
or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may
be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.  Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
29
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,  is immutable.
30 31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as
used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws)
should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female"  or "the distinction between male and
32
female."  Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"  and male is "the sex that has
33 34
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."  Thus, the words "male" and "female" in
35
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning
are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."  Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s
36
and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something
alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual
to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.  One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
37
be a male and a female.  To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure
38
and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,  certain felonies under the Revised
39
Penal Code  and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
40
Rules of Court,  among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
41
which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret
the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However,
the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
 Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or nickname given to a
14
person which may consist of one or more names in addition to the middle names and
last names. Thus, the term "first name" will be used here to refer both to first name
and nickname.
 The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
15
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. – xxx xxx
xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general, the petitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
 SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any person having direct and
16
personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or
change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified
petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record
being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it
would not be practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and
effort to appear in person before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be
corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar
of the place where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2)
local civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the
petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries  
may file their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be  
processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.  
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or
nicknames may be availed of only once.
 SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition shall be in the form of
17

an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to
administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of
the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the
matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries,
which are sought to be corrected and/or the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the
registry book containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected or
changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or
entries upon which the correction or change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil
registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the
approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported
with the documents mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition,
the petition shall be published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a
certification from the appropriate law enforcement agencies that he has no pending
case or no criminal record.
 This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the Civil
29

Code which authorizes the recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the
correction or change of errors including those that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in
such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected or changed. The
decision of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth
and shall form part of the civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v.
Civil Register of Manila, supra note 24)
 The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male" or "female" but the
30

genitals of the child are that of the opposite sex.

 Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The body that he inhabits is
31

a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
 ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the
office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the
mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person.
The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed
for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio
Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen
each other for almost seven years.   With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
1
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.  2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's
answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony
was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C.
Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.   The affidavit was not issued by the latter
3
judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit,
the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that
she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear
and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in
order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively
dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . .
marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or
vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of
this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case
the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at
the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.  4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of
the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. 
5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of
his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the
basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of
comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.   It is not too much to expect them to
6

know and apply the law intelligently.   Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
7

foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union
and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court
adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law
and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007
GUIDELINES ON THE SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGE BY THE MEMBERS OF THE
JUDICIARY
WHEREAS, marriage under the Constitution, is an inviolable social institution and the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State (Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution);
 WHEREAS, the Family Code likewise provides that the nature, consequences and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to any stipulation (Article 1, Family Code);
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has declared that the State has surrounded marriage with
safeguards to “monitor its purity, continuity and permanence”;1
WHEREAS, for the above purposes, there is a need to lay down rules to enable solemnizing
authorities of the Judiciary to secure and safeguard the sanctity of marriage as a social
institution;
NOW, THEREFORE, the following Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members
of the Judiciary are hereby promulgated:
A. Justices of the Supreme Court and other appellate courts and Judges of the Regional Trial
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Section 1. Authority of solemnizing officer. — a. Incumbent Justices of the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals have authority to solemnize marriages in
any part of the Philippines, regardless of the venue, provided the requisites of the law are
complied with;2 and
b. Judges of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have authority to solemnize marriages
within the court’s jurisdiction.3
Sec. 2. Raffle of requests for solemnization of marriages in multiple-sala courts. — Requests for
solemnization of marriages submitted to first and second level courts in stations with two or
more branches shall be governed by the rules and procedures in the raffle of cases prescribed
by existing resolutions and issuances. Raffle of requests shall be effected upon payment of the
appropriate legal fees.
Sec. 3. Venue of marriage ceremony solemnized by Judges. — As a general rule, a marriage
shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court except in the following
instances:
a. A marriage contracted at the point of death or solemnized in a remote place under Article 29
of the Family Code; or
b. A marriage where both parties submit a written request to the solemnizing officer that the
marriage be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to this
effect.
Sec. 4. Duties of solemnizing officer before the performance of marriage ceremony. — Before
performing the marriage ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall:
a. Ensure that the parties appear personally and are the same contracting parties to the
marriage;
b. Personally interview the contracting parties and examine the documents submitted to
ascertain if there is compliance with the essential and formal requisites of marriage under the
Family Code; and
c. Personally examine the marriage license presented, unless a marriage license is not required
under the relevant provisions of the Family Code, to determine the authenticity, completeness
and validity of the said license;
In the event that either or both of the contracting parties be citizens of a foreign country, the
solemnizing officer shall also examine the certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage
issued by the respective diplomatic or consular officials and attached to the marriage license.
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal
ratification of cohabitation. — In the case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation,
the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties to determine their
qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to the
fact of having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of
any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement showing
compliance with (a) and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Sec. 6. Duty of solemnizing officer during the solemnization of the marriage.– The solemnizing
officer shall require the contracting parties to personally declare before him and in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age that the said parties take each other as husband and
wife.
Sec. 7. Duties of solemnizing officer after solemnization of the marriage. — After performing the
marriage ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall:
a. Ensure that the marriage certificate is properly accomplished and has the complete entries,
i.e., (1) the declaration that the contracting parties take each other as husband and wife; (2) the
true and correct information and statements required under Article 22 of the Family Code; (3) it
is signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses; and (4) it is attested by him;
b. See to it that the marriage is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family
Code, as follows:
(1) By furnishing either of the contracting parties with the original of the marriage certificate
referred to in Article 6 of the Family Code;
(2) By transmitting the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate not later than
fifteen (15) days after the marriage to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage
was solemnized; and
(3) By retaining in the court’s files (1) the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, (2) the
original of the marriage license, and, in proper cases, (3) the affidavit of the contracting parties
regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than the Justice’s/judge’s chambers
or in open court.
Sec. 8. Other duties of solemnizing officer after the solemnization of the marriage where
marriage license is not required. — In cases of marriage in articulo mortis or a marriage in a
remote or distant area referred to under Articles 27 and 28, respectively, of the Family Code, the
solemnizing officer shall prepare an affidavit stating the following:
(a) that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party,
specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there are no means of transportation to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar;
(b) that the necessary steps were taken to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting
parties; and
(c) that there are no legal impediments to the marriage.
The solemnizing officer (a) shall execute the affidavit before the local civil registrar or any other
person legally authorized to administer oaths; and (b) shall file or send the original of the
affidavit, together with a legible copy of the marriage contract, to the local civil registrar of the
municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty [30] days after the performance of
the marriage.
Sec. 9. Recording of marriages solemnized and safekeeping of documents. — a. The
solemnizing officer shall cause to be kept in the court a record book of all marriages solemnized.
Marriages conducted shall be entered sequentially and each entry shall set forth the names of
the contracting parties, their respective nationalities and current actual places of residence, the
date of marriage and the date of the marriage license.
b. The solemnizing officer shall cause to be filed in the court the quadruplicate copy of the
marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license, the certificate of legal capacity when
one or both parties are foreigners or a copy thereof, and, when applicable, the affidavit of the
contracting parties regarding the request for change in the venue for the marriage. All
documents pertaining to a marriage shall be kept in one file which file shall be properly labeled,
catalogued and their integrity and safety secured.
B. Judges of the Shari’a District Courts and Shari’a Circuit Courts
Sec. 10. Authority to Solemnize Marriages. — a. Incumbent Judges of the Shari’a District Courts
and Shari’a Circuit Courts and any person designated by the judge, should the proper wali
(guardian for marriage) refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization, shall
have authority to solemnize marriages within the court’s jurisdiction (Article 18, Code of Muslim
Personal Laws).
Sec. 11. Venue of the Marriage Ceremony. — The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any
mosque, office of the Shari’a judge, office of the District or Circuit Registrar, residence of the
bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties (Article 19, Code of
Muslim Personal Laws).
Sec. 12. Marriages among Muslims without marriage license. — Marriages among Muslims may Sec.23. Posting of the Guidelines. –All Executive Judges/Presiding Judges shall post copies of
be performed validly without the necessity of a marriage license, provided that they are these Guidelines (a) in conspicuous places in their respective Halls of Justice or courthouses;
solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (Article 33, Family Code). and (b) on the bulletin board of each court at the entrance to the courtroom.
Sec. 13. Duties of the solemnizing officer before the marriage ceremony. — Before performing Sec.24. Violations of the Guidelines. — Violations of any of the provisions of the Guidelines shall
the marriage ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall: be ground for the appropriate administrative disciplinary proceedings.
a. Ensure that the parties appearing personally before him are the same contracting parties to Sec. 25. – Repealing clause. — The provisions of administrative orders, circulars and other
the marriage to be solemnized; and issuances of the Supreme Court inconsistent herewith are deemed amended or revoked.
b. Personally interview the contracting parties to satisfy himself that the essential requisites for Sec. 26. Effectivity. –These Guidelines shall take effect immediately.
the marriage prescribed by Article 15, Code of Muslim Personal Laws, are present. August 9, 2007.
Sec. 14. Other duties of the solemnizing officer before the marriage ceremony. –In case where  
one of the contracting parties is a female who though less than fifteen but not below twelve
years of age has attained puberty, the solemnizing officer shall check whether or not, upon  
petition of a proper wali, an order has been issued by a judge of the Shari’a District Court for the  
solemnization of the marriage (Article 16, Code of Muslim Personal Laws).
Sec. 15. Duty of the solemnizing officer during the marriage  
ceremony. –The solemnizing officer shall ensure that the ijab (offer) and the qabul (acceptance)  
in marriage are (a) declared publicly in his presence and of two competent witnesses; (b) set
forth in an instrument (in triplicate) signed or marked by the contracting parties and the said  
witnesses; and that the declaration is attested by him (Article 17, Code of Muslim Personal
Laws).
Sec. 16. Duty of the solemnizing officer after the marriage ceremony. — The solemnizing officer
shall (a) give one copy of the declaration to the contracting parties; (b) sent another copy of the
declaration to the Circuit Registrar; and (c) keep the third copy (Article 17, Code of Muslim
Personal Laws).
C. Miscellaneous Common Provisions
Sec. 17. Cases not covered by the Guidelines. — In all other cases
not covered by the Guidelines, the solemnizing officer shall comply and act in accordance with
the requirements prescribed by the relevant provisions of the Family Code, the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and Sections 37-45, Republic Act No. 3631 or the Marriage
Law Act of 1929.
Sec. 18. Fees for the Solemnization of Marriages. — For the performance of marriage ceremony
and issuance of marriage certificate and subject further to the provisions of AM No. 04-2-04-SC
(16 August 2004) the legal fees in the following amounts shall be collected:
(a) For marriages solemnized by Justices of the Supreme Court and other appellate courts –
Three hundred (P300.00) pesos;
(b) For marriages solemnized by Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and Shari’a District Courts
– Three hundred (P300.00) pesos; and
(c) For marriages solemnized by Judges of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts; Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and
Shari’a Circuit Courts – Three hundred (P300.00) pesos.
All fees collected for the solemnization of marriage shall accrue to
the Judiciary Development Fund.
Sec. 19. Payment of legal fees in Philippine legal tender. — All fees shall be paid in Philippine
currency and such fees collected shall be properly officially receipted.
Sec. 20. Unauthorized demand for and receipt of marriage
solemnization fees. — The demand for or solicitation, collection or receipt of fees for the
solemnization of any marriage in excess of the amounts stated herein shall be considered a
violation of these Guidelines and shall subject the solemnizing authority to administrative
disciplinary measures.4
Sec. 21. Facilitation of marriage ceremony. — Any judge or employee of the court who, alone or
with the connivance of other court personnel or third persons not employed by the court,
intervenes so that the marriage of contracting parties is facilitated or performed despite lack of or
without the necessary supporting documents, or performs other acts that tends to cause the
solemnization of the marriage with undue haste shall be subjected to appropriate administrative  
disciplinary proceedings.  
Sec.22. Reporting of marriages solemnized. –All marriages solemnized shall be duly entered
and indicated in the monthly report of cases to be accomplished by the solemnizing officer.  
 
G.R. No. 167746               August 28, 2007 that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, marriage.
vs. b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified
DECISION and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply
assailing the Decision  of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
1
the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals.
66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
2
(G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax
petition for annulment of marriage. the observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the
The antecedent facts are: party litigants. 14

A petition for annulment of marriage  was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.
3

Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required
We deny the petition.
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated,
arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and
certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.  They got 4

dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them.  The wedding took place at the stairs in
15

married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another
Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the
marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983.
marriage belongs.  He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
16

The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor
alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a
the respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for
Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that "Marriage License
a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave
number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"  but 17

birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.
their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the
ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract  and its entry on file.
5 6

effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s representation,
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)  in relation to
18

respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to
Article 58 of the same Code. 19

another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.  Petitioner has a mistress
7

Article 53 of the Civil Code  which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the
20

with whom he has three children.  Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
8

parties states:
prosecution for concubinage.  Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against
9

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.  Respondent
10

prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
follows: (2) Their consent, freely given;
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows: (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its
(₱20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public
each month; and is interested.
21

3. To pay the costs.11

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground
for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,  the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification
22

His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No.
6 April 2005.12

3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search and
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly
inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil
issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover,
Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
the parties’ marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the
marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 13

Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño,  the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and
23

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract
Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,  the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one
24
year after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the
marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must
be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.  The
25
certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage
license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact
that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License
No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on
December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve. 26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.  The 27
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption
and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in
favor of its lawfulness.  Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a
28
marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite. 29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is
no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license
in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day
period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage.  An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity
30
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the
parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of
the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to
assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage
contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may
read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding
the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,  petitioner cannot
32
pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists
took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took
place because he "initiated it."  Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer
33
by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly
and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be
allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no
longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery.
His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith. 34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one
year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second
wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed
without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.lavvphi1
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de
Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before
the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner’s testimony as follows—
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose
de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I don’t remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don’t
know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you
already a Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the
Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor. 35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took
place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage,
thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. 36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of
the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary.  Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
37
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local
civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by
the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official
has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of
law.38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage.  Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds.
39
The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
Footnotes
 Sec. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the
13
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
18
 (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character.
19
 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.
20
 Now Article 3 of the Family Code.

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.

25
 Article 70 of the Civil Code, now Article 25 Family Code, provides:

The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage
licenses filed with him in a register book strictly in the order in which the
same shall be received. He shall enter in said register the names of the
applicants, the dates on which the marriage license was issued, and such
other data as may be necessary.

 Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – x x x

27

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed. (Rule 131, Rules of Court.)

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Edwin F. Cardenas.  As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued
1
to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was
declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended
to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in
Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was
pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for
four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth.
The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's
efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig,
Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who
were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license no.  3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20,
1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in
order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her
signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition.   It held that the above certification was inadequate to
2
establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage
license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that
the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court.   It declared
3
the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of
Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled
that the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in
their record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the
respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private
respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a
marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void,
respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that
marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject
marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage
license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of
private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision. indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may
have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law   provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
4
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.  5
subject marriage license.

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not committed by respondent appellate court.
adequate to prove its non-issuance.
SO ORDERED.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
 
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer  
having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent  
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is  
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record  
or entry.
 
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a  
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was  
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required
to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.  6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability
to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the
contracting parties.

The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in
itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the
subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject
marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the
relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the
marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held
against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings
and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to
answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence
on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband
Cardenas.

It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that
 
 
G.R. No. 167684             July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision  of the Court of Appeals
1
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision  of the 2
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint  dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that
3
on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were
introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the
said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before
the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for
his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any
Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969,  and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969  at the
4 5
Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil
registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of
marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and
defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of
the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh.
"A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of
defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood
as witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly
issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the
same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon
verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil
Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by
Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were
again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another
marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and
indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception were
jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and
defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was
born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and
defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their
marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he
being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they
underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during
this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned.
Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and
later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his
service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances
of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where
the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request
letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh.
"M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar
of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"),
and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy
Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of
plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994
(Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been
civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No.
2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified
the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued
by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered
(TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic
relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A
model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant
when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio.
Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow
plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the
latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry.
Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla
convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff
and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him
in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p.
4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents.
After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On May
31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and
arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not
participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no
sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when
they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of
their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12
(TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She
found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of
which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with
her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between
them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage,
plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who
breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines,
benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take
barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff
away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home
since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and
during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on and
off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be
studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and
verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned
that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil
wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay
with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife
ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he
has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements
(Exhs. "9" and "10").
 Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was
plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church
wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil
rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents
were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and
defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to
divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the
issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny,
there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license
no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an
essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not
substantiated with facts on record.8

United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of
defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN,
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals
12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent
denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6

In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the
trial court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or
absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the
various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July
25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the
parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption
of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising
solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their
face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity
of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9

office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious.
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the
Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null
xxxx
and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of
Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious
the parties are Articles 53,  58  and 80.
10 11 12

rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of
and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is
Manila be cancelled.
null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries
by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño :
13

in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be
forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information. 7

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court
explained that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San
Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already
retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage
license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the
failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the
marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license.
Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued
by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to
prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have
squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Appeals,  where it was held that:
14
            Local Civil Registrar

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite The third Certification,  issued on 25 July 2000, states:
18

diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.  As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19,
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.) 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as legal intent it may serve.
stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court: San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office             Local Civil Registrar
contain no such record or entry.

We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded
Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from
requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value. the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to
The first Certification  issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated
15
locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work."
11 March 1994. It reads: Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license
was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired.
regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,  we exert all effort but we cannot
16
Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on
find the said number. record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the
above problem. material contents therein, had been exerted.
San Juan, Metro Manila As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
March 11, 1994
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among
other things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19,
            Local Civil Registrar
1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
The second certification  was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
17
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: A No, sir.
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Q Why not?
Office with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
cannot find the said number. Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the your office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil
above problem. Registrar?
San Juan, Metro Manila COURT
September 20, 1994
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
 xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is
the number issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792
the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage." 30

was never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a
ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is
contract of marriage.31

which now, was this issued or not?

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest
sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,  regrettably, there are situations
32

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir. 19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing
the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),  Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty
20
like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.

In one case, it was held:

Footnotes
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be
accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for
which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such 10
 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly with:
performed. x x x. 21
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
22

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome
11
 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
the tenor of the first and second certifications. first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage party habitually resides.
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
12
 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, xxxx
we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
therein. exceptional charater.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the 20
 Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.  The courts look upon this presumption with
23
xxxx
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 24
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any other evidence;
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several (m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
years producing two offsprings,  now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he
26

filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in  
1991.  We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him
27
 
his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 28

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric;
hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. 29

"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of  
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
  
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10354
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A NATIONAL POLICY ON RESPONSIBLE PARENTHOOD AND
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
Section 15. Certificate of Compliance. – No marriage license shall be issued by the Local Civil
Registrar unless the applicants present a Certificate of Compliance issued for free by the local
Family Planning Office certifying that they had duly received adequate instructions and
information on responsible parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition.
 
 
 
 
 
G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision dated October 21, 1999 of the
1  marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment dated August 5, 1996
2  must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court
found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and
sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
3  determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-
1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30,
1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at 4 
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by 5 
the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. 6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo
y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED. 7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage
to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, the trial court ruled
8 
that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a
to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur, which held
9 
that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu, everyone is presumed to
10 
know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law
does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio.
The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is
12 
the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence,
the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in
a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the 13 
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
14 
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction. (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence
doctrine in Mendiola v. People, allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the
15 
of the first.
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. However, the
16 

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No.
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P.
6020, to wit:
Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio,
then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution: on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of
Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED. 21

A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the
22  23 

CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE. dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there
B. was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
BAR. marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that
24 

C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. 17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if
so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce
decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly
and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further
argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case.
The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter
25 

se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He
case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second
marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all
18 
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of
19 
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." 26

nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of
six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared
nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v.
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
20 

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
(1) the offender has been legally married; constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate
court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the
charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
ART. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
12 
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
13 
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
14 
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
19 
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
22 
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
23 
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G.R. No. 182438               July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari  filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
1
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028
2
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that  Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
3
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire,
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was
filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. 5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple
exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.  She heard the petitioner
6
instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the
wedding invitation given to her by Joey. 7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.  Days after the wedding, she went to
8
the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple. 9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. 10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.  It further ruled that in
11
performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated
Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage
Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of
any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the
latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of
₱200.00. 12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act
of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.  The RTC, however, ruled that the
13
basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum
standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses
of legal age.  According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added
14
that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony. 15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
350 of the same Code. 16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of
the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the
Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that
the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
solemnizing officer.  The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that
17
the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife.  Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere
18
in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot
convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony." 19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple. 20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him. 21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is
not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven
by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.
Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony"
and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on
these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55  of the New Civil Code which, in
23
turn, was copied from Section 3  of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article
24
6  of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
25
the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."  Pertinently, Article
26
3(3)  mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
27
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was
clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this
fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails
to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek
to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut
the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one
party. 28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed
been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The
testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear
and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution
witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to
the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code
when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 15  of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
29
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner
may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of
a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence
of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the
couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates
his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article
3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of
the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision
clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law.
The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by
the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof
require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with
section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently
declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act,
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a
fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month,
or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC
that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section
39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present
case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the
provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition
of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this
point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides
for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities;
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such
regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44
of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
 Art. 55. No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties
23
with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other
as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate,
signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and
attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.
 Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but
24
the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take
each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in
triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two
witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.
 Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
25
required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This
declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the
contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.
 This provision was taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which was, in turn, a
26
reproduction of Section 3 of the Marriage Law.
27
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
 Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
29
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
 
 
 
G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
1
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision  of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
2
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from
the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. 3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could
not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,  the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
5
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of
Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the
wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT. 8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment  to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
9
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply  reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
10
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on
the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud
for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.  A common limited purpose
11
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.  Another, which is the subject
12
of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the
intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,  and it attempts to filter out those who use
13
marriage solely to achieve immigration status. 14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,  established the
15
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.  It must be noted, however, that this
16
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein  was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
17
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary
into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary
to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x
x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite
true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to
a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others. 18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,  which declared
19
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."  The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,  further recognized that a
20 21
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.  At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
22
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and
have upheld such marriages as valid. 23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.  Consent must also be
24
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.  Their 25
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any
conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.  It is a pretended marriage not
27
intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence
of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no
real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences,
and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may,
thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.  The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
29
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on.  Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
30
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,  are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
31
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.  It must, therefore, be safeguarded
32
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED
for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY,
Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are
Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B.
Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5,
1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received;
(5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from
exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments.   A 2
Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants.   The case was thereafter referred
3 marriages solemnized and the number of documents notarized.
to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report
and recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge
Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of
respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr.  4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative
matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against
respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient
of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita
Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts
(Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who
prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage
licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the
celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of
the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he
was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she
discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was
Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these
with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in
preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies
of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had
instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage
licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and
Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy
of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so;
that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by
securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with
the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were
not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not
contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the
custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to
solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and
Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the
parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their
marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the
month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and
void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents
for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee
of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to
account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court,
by respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant then turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding
Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire
therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as solemnization to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.
fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is
likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the
alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments
bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to
tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by
do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of
the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court which
is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the 5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that
he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his
house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former
intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived
be based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents
notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners
court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial
and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it
fees because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by
had been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court.
Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the
monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same. 6. Unlawful collection of docket fees

3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and
that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge
the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell
Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court
on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because
because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge. respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from
said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the
Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning
in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that
unit but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she
after the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00
no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The
was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor of
Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona
prepared and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court
with the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are
to the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no
favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and
hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was
evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity
bought from his
reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been
supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the
appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item
material portions thereof.
which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Cash bond issued without a receipt

The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman
Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of
Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond;
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B),
that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh.
to appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the
D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario
money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money
(Exh. G).
was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show
the number of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code
were not filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage
contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except
that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he
claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. In said marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage
certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge
Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo
Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs
taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently
show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they
were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was
solemnized and bring with them their marriage license. In the meantime, they already
started living together as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites of marriage
were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte
because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he
did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the parties and
the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya
and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing
the marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This
happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties that he
consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was
told that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already
invited and the place of the parties where the reception would be held was more than
twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not
sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and
the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by
themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony
cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others,
that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days
with their marriage license and whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the
marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b,
K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a
simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the
explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself
to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person
whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly improper and
unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it
appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not
solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted
that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family
Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint
affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was
stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old.
If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve)
been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and
this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he
solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting
parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage
by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married
again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation
given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the
second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of
the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow
his instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he
solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the
second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first
time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under
exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had
already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage
under exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already
require the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the
second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was
not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage
was solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage
certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37
and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no
one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones
vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from
responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official function
and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a)
copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio
executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A
and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On
cross-examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared their
affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a
certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits
there which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage
contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and
respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by
respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga
allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first
denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she
sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage was
already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the
marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she
wanted to give the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of
Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the
marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the
affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh.
14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative
value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the
contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he
already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing
the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage
contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others.
His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the
rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal,
because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer
and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in
the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage
contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice
and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken
during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of
respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been
to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge
Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really
solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of
cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he
solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of
cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during
the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon
has presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons,
affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-
H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides,
the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is
not charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the
marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report
of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual
number of documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees,
have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases
for July and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both
signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were six (6) documents
notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-
b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that
there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon
for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for
July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as
shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged official
receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the
monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents notarized should not be
based on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of
documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the
correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk
of Court and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the records. He merely
signs the monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have
close supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as
to their correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of his
functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency
or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly
report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only
the monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage contracts,
notarized documents and the notarial register. By her own admission she has assigned to
complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never
bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents
notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to
Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly report
based on the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check whether the
report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable
not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents and other properties of the court (p.
32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was
already in full control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-
93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however,
also shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees
received for those documents notarized during the month of July and September, 1992.
The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she received cash bond
deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she
only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge
Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred
thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there were only
five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial register
show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each
document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy
and Sambo declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy
declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme
Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal
Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for
considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her at her
own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted
for by Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the
marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license the solemnization fees were
not returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge
Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when solemnization fee was
returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the
notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied
it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated
January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that
she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of
legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were
for those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never
was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his
possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the
fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the
court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a
certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her
after she assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh.
Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just
kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case where the
cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February,
1993, after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass
Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch,
only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial
deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the
cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and five months when
she finally deposited it because of the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without
any authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3)
months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent
Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain
Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy
issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this
Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a
bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case
No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or
almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said
cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she
used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and
collections she received. She further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she
issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X
(TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official
receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already
filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court,
Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with
respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for
the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The
same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was
brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still
placed in the same box when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand
(P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt
dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at
a time when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was
eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on
August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet.
The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated
May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily
prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not
testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court.
All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid
such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara
executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a
receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no
probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the
hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been
discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in
his house and one of them escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To
hide this fact, the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon.
The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No.
5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano
and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented
that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused
was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely
testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have
presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out
from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said accused
escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047
archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on
April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the
accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest issued
against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however, show that in fact
there was a return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that
Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases
filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted
in paying filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was deposited by
respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence presented show that
on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection
against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing
filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which
exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money
cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the
Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on
February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid
voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter
to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not
pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent
Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really
exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead
of threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to have them
dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12,
1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable
officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants
sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized
marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage
license, and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely
supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of cases being
submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992
where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified with respect
to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he be imposed
a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or similar
offenses will be more severely dealt with.

Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those
5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be
marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the
accepted because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge
marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not
Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail,
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any
but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did
copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a
not take custody of Alano.
marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for
the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
he heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He liable.
should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should
have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of
explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest.
closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and functions,
It is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered
particularly the preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA
archived. The order archiving this case for the reason that he only heard that Alano
16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of
escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have
court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her,
really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could not present records or
to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not
other documentary evidence to prove the same.
contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
 In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of
court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have
falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with
respect to the number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the notarial
lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all
times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be
beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.   Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity.   It applies, without
5 6

fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the
solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees
were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were
issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the
amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt
(Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993,
qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being
standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein.   Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal
7

or after one year and five months in her possession and after this case was already filed;
requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the
for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993
formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for
without any court order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 
8

cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No.
5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered
temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the
Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed
against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said
amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended
that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law."  This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial
9

agencies of the Government.

It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall
issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent
Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization
Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's
circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his
upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail,
the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of
proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also
provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
be deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City,
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the
Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any
future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
over the subject matter.
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately
disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the
callous unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a
Ombudsman for appropriate action.
clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her
constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of
Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. SO ORDERED.
No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep
funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon
receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular  
Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's
failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct
 
and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam  
was found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
 
 
x x x           x x x          x x x  
 
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
 
  of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
  The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify
  or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18

G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001

Issues
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents. "I
PANGANIBAN, J.: The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our "2
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
law on evidence. voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
The Case "3
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
January 7, 1999 Decision  and the March 24, 1999 Order  of the Regional Trial Court of
1 2 case.
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as "4
follows: The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
"5
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in
and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso
both parties." 3

facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision. judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts." 19

The Facts
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.  They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
4

(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
1989,  a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
5

ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

family court.
The Court's Ruling
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.  Petitioner – a Filipina – and
6

First Issue:
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Cabanatuan City.  In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
7

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
"single" and "Filipino." 8

Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,  petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
20

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
9

itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage  in the
10

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
was performed.
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.  He contended that his first marriage to an
11

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.  A 21

1989;  thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt

12

marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
because of Articles 15  and 17  of the Civil Code.  In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
22 23 24

declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
foreigner, Article 26  of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
25

family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." 13

case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated
remarry."  A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
26

no cause of action.  The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.  The court
14 15

the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

27

marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.  After they submitted their
16

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. 17

be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
Ruling of the Trial Court
law."  Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
28

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis
allowing it.  Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
29
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These
articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall
file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar
which shall specify the following:
x x x     x x x     x x x
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved
or annulled;
x x x      x x x      x x x
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document
– a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.  A divorce
30
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
is the judgment itself.  The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
31
body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested  by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
33
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.  However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
35
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.  The trial court ruled that it
36
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.  Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
37
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.  Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
39
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.  Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
40
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had
tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."  In civil cases, plaintiffs have
41
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.  Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
42
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.  Like
43
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.  The power of
44
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force.  There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
45
was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.
46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior. 47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy." 48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption
or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39  of the Rules of
49
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce
decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;  (b) Exhibit
51
"B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J.
Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;  (c) Exhibit "C" –
52
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian)
on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;  (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of
53
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and
Editha D. Samson was in its records;  and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship
54
of Rederick A. Recto;  (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;  (b) Exhibit "S" –
55 56
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;  (c) 57
Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;  (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree
58
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;  and Exhibit "5" –
59
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995. 60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree
with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that
the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already
in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one
in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
22
 "ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad."
23
 "ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
x x x     x x x     x x x
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and (6),
36, 37, and 38. (71a).  
"Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27, 1987).
30
 "SEC. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
"Public documents are:
"(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a
foreign country.
x x x     x x x     x x x."
31
 Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, Vol. IV, 1926
ed., p. 3511; §3, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides that "when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself."
32
 "SEC. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
"(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a
foreign country.
x x x     x x x     x x x."
33
 "Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer,
if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court."
34
 "Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."
49
 "SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment
or final order is as follows:
x x x     x x x     x x x
"(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or
final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
"In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact."
50
 In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in
complying with the formal requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article
4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated
on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate.
(Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126); Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, 197 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines
Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations
Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).
 g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido; 11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the

G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014
Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942; 12

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by
vs.
Second World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription
DECISION
from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido; 13

PEREZ, J.:
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla; 14

August 2005 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed
1

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and

the 25 March 2003 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a
2

Peregrina. 15

complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took
place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio
when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but
was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.  Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence
16

ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942
in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the
to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract  between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of
17

fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local
marriage on 3 March 1979;
Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed.
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when
Thus, only a Certification  was issued by the LCR.
3

he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely:
one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio,
Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948;
Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido; 18

Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil
1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958,
Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;  and 19

Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the
woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name
of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio. In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,  essentially
4
faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of
averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.
Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision  denying Tecla’s petition, as well as
21

Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she
owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby
DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA
HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED. 22

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the
Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic)
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
Eustaquio;
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,  the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
23

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the
Office of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R.
Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila; 6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages
that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO
Manila, started only in 1932; 7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil
marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina
and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
disregarded.24

Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA
destroyed during the liberation of Manila; 8
to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;
9
General (OSG), in its Memorandum  dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
25

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;

10
 1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to
overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the
best evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value
to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same
being presented to the witness stand. 26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial
proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the
trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing
was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial
court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued
a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila
on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of
1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way
of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage
execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary
evidence of the contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary.
It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to
establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility
of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. 30

between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
Talibon, Bohol. 27

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during
Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said
shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant,
proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4)
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence.
children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same
The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage
Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of
has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented
xxxx
by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,  we said, citing precedents, that:
28

celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of
parents.
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact
disregarded. 31

can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.  Thus: 29

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,  this Court has elucidated on the rationale
32

constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
behind the presumption:
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v.
in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish
priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido
and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario
Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del
Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8).
During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera,
Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named
Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo
also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a
daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had
three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and
Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was
still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the
complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p.
39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate.
Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the
adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the
registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the
above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said
lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to
the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with
Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that,
with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were
deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967
(Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel
Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join
the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and
agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo,
p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on
Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of
action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition
of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in
an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil
Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous application to
this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were
dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or
recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of
children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either
premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp.
67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and
Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate
children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the
third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the
adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually acquired transfer
certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced
otherwise the said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their
shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net
estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding
legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on December 7,
1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred
private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b)
whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able
to prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues hinges,
however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the
private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased
spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had
repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have
continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the
deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are
entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among
others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in
favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally
one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised
only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under
the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to
which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the
relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing
Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children
of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about
1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who
testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his)
mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered
to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo,
133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo
and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc),
Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's
Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985];
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following
rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to
that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be
admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However,
considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided
under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by
events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October
26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children —
legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have
been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established
by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth
certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to
disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two
other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of
the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of
Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance
as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor
details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa
in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be
noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of
Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in
Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription
does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so
long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532
[1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in
absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano their names the lots involved.
vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-
December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved
(Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners
to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in
 
1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private
respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552
[1990]).
 
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except
 
the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their
lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though
denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them.
Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private
respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private
respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since
1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in
the property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario)
not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto
constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
petitioners.

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]),
the Court held:

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have

been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation,
in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other
co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has
been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of

title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not
furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence,  
prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents  
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision  dated May 15, 2002, of the
1
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution  dated July
2
4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is
given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at
5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE 4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.  Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
5
governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply
to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in
the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings  on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
9
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.  The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
10
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
naturalization? remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.  In Quita,
11
only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry. No pronouncement as to costs.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that SO ORDERED.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the Footnotes
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should 7
 Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.
 
12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married  
to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
 
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence. 13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.  Such foreign law must also be proved
14

as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.  Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
15

his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,  
also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
 
G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
1
City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of
2
Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.  On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
3
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.  Due to work and other professional
4
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,  the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that
7
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,  in order for
8
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.  Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
9
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic
v. Orbecido III;  the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
10
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,  Gerbert filed the present petition.
12 13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation
he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the
case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,  both support Gerbert’s position.
14
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of
a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void  and 15
voidable  marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
16
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.  Our 17
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. 18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,  enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to
19
its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.  and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.  In both
20 21
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a
foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse."  The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
23
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.  Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
24
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;  Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
25
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law. 27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country."  This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
28
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.  The recognition may be made
29
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity,  but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
30
on divorce.  Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
31
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata  between the parties,
32
as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition
of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.  We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
34
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."
35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but
also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization
register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian even though living abroad.
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the xxxx
foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,  and Department of Justice Opinion
36
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
No. 181, series of 1982  – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court
37
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, country.
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of
the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
 Parenthetically, we add that an alien’s legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a
26

produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

certificate issued by his or her respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he or
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code). The Filipino
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action for a
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
declaration of authority to remarry.
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or  
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code  
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the  
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,  
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the  
corresponding civil registry is located;  that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
38

 
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;  and that the time and place for hearing
39

must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.  As these basic jurisdictional

40  
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert  
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two  
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for  
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule  
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding  by which the
41

applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

6
 Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:  
It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the
 
Register of Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of  
execution of such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.  
25
 See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:
 
 
 
  
G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order  dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case
1
No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality
of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines  on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
2
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.  On 14 January 2011,
4
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;  and (3) for the RTC to
5
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.  The RTC cited the following
7
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or
in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."  Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband
8
or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"  and not a civil action
9
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong."  In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
10
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of
the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as
void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines  on bigamy and was therefore
11
entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.  Thus, Section
13
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy
would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of
Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."  Fujiki had
14
material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register
Law (Act No. 3753)  in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.  The Civil Register Law imposes
15 16
a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the
final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."  Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry
17
relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.  The petition in the
18
RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC
may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court  which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
19
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case."  Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed"
20
the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the
provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect,
prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.  The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
21
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"  in the proceeding because he
22
"is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now
seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."  On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
23
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a
ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the
Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.  The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a
25
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."  Braza 26
emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.  Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
28
not authenticated as required under Section 5  of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
29
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of
Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.  The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator
30
and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the
case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.  The Solicitor General argued that
32
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-
Llave v. Republic  which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases
33
of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.  In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,  this Court held
35 36
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."  While Corpuz concerned a foreign
37
divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil
status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
status x x x."  The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino
38
citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro  and Niñal v. Bayadog  which declared
39 40
that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them
to comment on the petition.  Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she
42
was previously married to Fujiki.  Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
43
Marinay.  On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.  She
44 45
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki. 46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,  this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
47
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.  Petitioner may prove the Japanese
49
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by
the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition,  the service of summons,  the investigation of the public
51 52
prosecutor,  the setting of pre-trial,  the trial  and the judgment of the trial court.  This is absurd
53 54 55 56
because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."  The interpretation of the RTC is
57
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,  this Court explained that
58
"[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced
back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."
59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.  Article 15 of the
60
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states
that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,  as well as respecting the
61
jurisdiction of other states.
62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,  Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
63
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules
of evidence.  Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
64
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained
a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage,  which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
66
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact." 67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances ) his most
68
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage.  These property interests in marriage include the right to be
69
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"  and preserving the property
70
regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,  but a spouse’s right
72
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.  A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
73
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.  In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
74
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife" —it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
75
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,  which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
76
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.  If anyone can file a criminal action which
77
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,  there is more reason to confer
78
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does
not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.  Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
79
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse."  Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
80
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that
a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.  Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x
81
can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.  The RTC relied on Braza in
82
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,  support pendente lite of the spouses
83
and children,  the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,  and the
84 85
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.  A direct action for declaration of
86
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
"where the corresponding civil registry is located."  In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
87
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,  this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
88
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"  under the
89
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce. questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The 11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of Decision.
the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo  which declared that
90
SO ORDERED.
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice Footnotes
are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a 5
 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended):
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
xxxx
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
xxxx
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
spouse cannot remarry.
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to 8
 Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
constituting the cause of action.
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition
the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property,
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a
verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
the same period.
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
immediate dismissal of the petition.
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 11
 FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
void from the beginning:
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
xxxx
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
xxxx
is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact  that needs to be reflected in
92
13
 FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
only after its solemnization.
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.  The 93
  Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers and priests or
17
ministers authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a copy of each marriage
contract solemnized by them to the local civil registrar within the time limit specified in
the existing Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local civil registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address of each of the
contracting parties, their ages, the place and date of the solemnization of the marriage,
the names and addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address, and relationship of
the minor contracting party or parties or the person or persons who gave their consent
to the marriage, and the full name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the
marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names of the
parties divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of the court,
and such other details as the regulations to be issued may require.
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. —
18
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
 Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:
29
Contents and form of petition. – x x x
xxxx
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The
verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition
may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy
or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
xxxx
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of
49
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be
any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order, is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
60
 Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x
xxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
61
 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as the policy of
preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to
safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and – in a larger sense – to
promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law:
‘rest and quietness.’" (Citations omitted)
62
 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity, utility and convenience
of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries." (Citations
omitted)
65
 FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
66
 Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is established for recording the
civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h)
acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
— Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes
of name.
72
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law x x x."
74
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
76
 Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of
prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
78
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxxx
 Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is
79
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
 FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of
84
adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall
provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common
children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material
welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as
provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
 FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
85
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the
court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced
in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action
without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.

Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are
declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If the court renders a decision granting
the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
 FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
86

marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. — (1) Within
one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8
above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the
parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in
his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion
within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report The court shall set the report for
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case
for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the
pre-trial.
 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In
93

the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — x x x
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
G.R. No. 221029 April 24, 2018 1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in
form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
vs
March 6-12, 2012;
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
RESOLUTION
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
peralta, J.:
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse
Notification of Divorce; and
and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision  and October 12, 2015 Resolution  of the Court
1 2

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce. 5

of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO.
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
SO ORDERED. 3

celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
The facts are undisputed.
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
cancellation of
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
divorce Japanese court.
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita,
the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
et al.  ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
7

newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo
documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of
as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 -
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited
March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional
as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.  where the mariage between a
8

requirements.
foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.  In this
9

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The
jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named 1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx; it.
10

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die 2. Consistent with Articles 15  and 17  of the New Civil Code, the marital bond
11 12

proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained
x x; abroad. 13

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese 3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be
husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
separately from said Japanese former husband; laws. 14

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, 4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to
Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 15

the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she
shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No.
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
1988.  Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.  Aside from amending
16 17

Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.  This 18

decree; [and]
provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.  As 19

marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO. 4

modified, Article 26 now states:

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under
Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.  It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
20
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.  Philippine courts cannot try
21
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.  Under the principles of
22
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. 23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment
is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or national law.  The aim was that it would solved the problem
24
of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their
alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the
husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again. 25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III: 26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became
naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein
hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is
no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage,
but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered
by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry "
in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national
who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she]
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and
to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin  and Van Dorn  already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
28 29
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of
their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce
the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The
trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the
divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The
husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is
void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to
enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron
v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting
of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.
30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by
the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a
business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the
same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred
by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the
motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court
could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction,
the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v.
Marinay, et al.  and Medina v. Koike.
32 33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her
second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the
issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x 34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for
divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must
be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et
al.  and Garcia v. Recio,  the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be
35 36
proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including
the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of
absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live
together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil
status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from
the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is
subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she
obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of
Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention
of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution.
The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the
same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers.  The legislature is presumed to know the
37
meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use
of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if
a statute there should be departure." 38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.  Law have 39
ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes.  As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:
40 41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting
law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may
render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,
resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.  Whether 42
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make
a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article
15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.  The deference stops where the classification violates a
44
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.  When 45
these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations.  If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
46
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial
scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest
and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.  It includes
48
the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and
the right to vote.  On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by
49
the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.  It is akin to the
50
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.  It essentially involves a public
51
right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to
take precedence over the latter. 52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites  of the equal protection clause.  Particularly, the limitation of the provision
53 54
only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married
to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo,
they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a
doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal
systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a
Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against
his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the
foreigner. 55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or
her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos
who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them
are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them
based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or
not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate
against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment
because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his
or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36,
37 and 38 of the Family Code.  In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
56
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should
be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should
be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's
case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All
to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages
Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos
marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support
what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this
jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or
wrong,  that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,  that acquiescence resulted from a
57 59
belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact,   that a man and woman
60
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,  and 61
that the law has been obeyed.  It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral
62
conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a
fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and
affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact
that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more
often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the
motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or
not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is
not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage. 63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.  Nevertheless, it was not meant to
64
be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in
response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.  Their exchange reveal as follows:
65
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot
pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was
primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce.
But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr.
Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you. 66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the
wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.  On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
67
Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of
the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute
divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an
extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.  When
68
the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to
have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.  From August 30, 1950, upon the
69
effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine
society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17  Congress, House
th
Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116  1062  2380  and 6027  were filed in the House of representatives. In
71 72 73 74
substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and
Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by
the House Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading
- with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial
decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended,
as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or
political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;
 f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's
spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a
child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after
being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of
a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one
(1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or
both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree
of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18)
years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without
the consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over
the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband
and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless
the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other
and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the
petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one
sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender
or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of
the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and
traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.
76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely
believes that they are good for country.  While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil
77
and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.  It is in this aspect, bereft of
78
any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.  It is also
79
obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.  To 80
Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss
to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize,
if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-
Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to
value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family
Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but
a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold
a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage
and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. 82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement
of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation
system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.  Living in a flawed
83
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside
the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.  In reiterating that the Filipino
84
spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served, San Luis v. San Luis  quoted:
85
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What
we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as
the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the
facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will
render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. 86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076,
are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings
and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED
Footnotes
 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
11

according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.  A 87

capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
abroad. (9a)
as they come within its spirit or intent. 88

 Art 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments
12

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to
cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. officials of the Republic of the Philippine laws shall be observed in their
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.  The fact of divorce must still first be
89
execution.
proven.  Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
90
Prohobited laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be rendered ineffective by laws or judgements promulgated, or by
be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.(11a)
decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven To be valid, the classification must conform to the following requirements:
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in 1.) It must rest on substantial distinctions.
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper 2.) It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in 3.) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office. 92
4.) It must apply to all members of the same class. 
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the
Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines
54
 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states:
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate
of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's the laws.
judgment decreeing the divorce. 93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.  As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree
94
56
 Art. 35 The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95
even with the consent of parents or guardians;
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their officer had the leagl authority to do so;
answer when they introduce new matters. x x x (3) Those solemnized without a license, except covered by
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like preceding Chapter;
any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriage not falling under
exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the article 41;
negative. 96
 (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as  1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2. This echoed the Family Code
64

to the identity of the other; and provision, which provides:

(6) those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227)
Art 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

 
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.  
 
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for  
reasons of public policy:
 
(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or  
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
 
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;  
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the
 
adopted child;  
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
 
(7) Between the adopted child and a legitimate child of the  
adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
 
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the  
other, killed that other person's spouse or his her own spouse.
(82)
 
 
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has well founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (83a)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage,
the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and he
delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall
not affect third persons.(n)  
Art. 53 Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with
the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the  
subsequent marriage shall be null and void.  
 
G.R. No. 133743             February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029             February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision   of the
1
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995   and January 31, 1996   Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134
2 3
in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution   denying petitioners’ motion for
4
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce   before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
5
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973.  6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.   He had no children with respondent but lived with
7
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration   before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-
8
3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal
and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss   on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
9
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal   of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
10
Order   denying the two motions to dismiss.
11
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition   thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
12
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,   Article
13
26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.  14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.   They asserted that paragraph
15
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256   of the Family Code.
16
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order   denying the motions for reconsideration. It
17
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition
and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot
and academic   because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge
18
Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition   against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
19
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration   from the Order denying their motion for
20
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order   granting the motion for inhibition. The
21
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995,   the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
22
on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested   that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous
23
motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position
papers on June 14,   and June 20,   1995, respectively.
24 25
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It
found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration   and for the disqualification   of Judge Arcangel but said
26 27
motions were denied.  28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.  29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.   and 30
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.   It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
31
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view —
sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the
express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992,   the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
32
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not
be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can
institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration   which were denied by the
34
Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari.   Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
35
granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray   and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,   "residence" is synonymous with
37 38
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo
never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They
argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested
rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the
surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1,   Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
39
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,   we laid down
40
the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.   (Emphasis supplied)
41
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless
to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence"
for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning.   However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
42
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.   Hence, it is possible that a person may have
43
his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale   dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She
44
also presented billing statements   from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
45
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association   and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,   letter-
46 47
envelopes   from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address,
48
and the deceased’s calling cards   stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico,
49
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol,
Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court   which has territorial jurisdiction over
50
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.   Thus, the subject petition was
51
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage
to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.   involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
52
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that
his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to
free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When
the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.   (Emphasis added)
54
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera   where the Court recognized the
55
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,   the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
57
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.   Although decided on December 22,
58
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were
still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law."   In Garcia v. Recio,   the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
59 60
relation to Article 26.  61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,   the historical background and legislative intent
62
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.   (Emphasis added)
63
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one
of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable.   Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
64
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15   and 17   of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
65 66
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the
cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.   In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,   the
67 68
Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the
law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of
its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 
69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio,   the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
70
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. 
71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text   of the Family Law
72
Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the
said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as
they must be alleged and proved.  73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless,
we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties
that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6,   Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to
74
the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.  75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails
to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144   of the Civil Code. This provision governs
76
the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.  77
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x
x. (Underscoring supplied)
65
 ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
66
 Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
74
 SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If x x x a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve; x x x.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 76
 Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.   In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,   we held that
78 79

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
effect, Article 148 governs.   The Court described the property regime under this provision as
80

acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their

follows:
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies
to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
 
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall  
be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x  81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes

 When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
13

a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
 This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
16

vested rights or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
 SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. — If the decedent is an
39

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
 basic "autonomous social institution."  Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
10 

"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the
  State.  This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
11 

  union"  and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 
12  13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
G.R. No. 133778             March 14, 2000
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,  referring to the marriage of a man
14 

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
vs.
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.  To 15 

after his death?

preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."  The only issue that needs to
16 

February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment
Article 47 of the Family Code.
to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
sometime during the cohabitation period?
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
resolve the following issues:
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
Niñal is already dead; immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years
null and void ab initio; and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 
1
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law.
Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
annulment of marriage.  Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
2 

later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
question of law.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's
to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
local civil registrar.  The Civil Code provides:
17 

Rules.  However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
3 

reinstated the petition for review.  4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
effect at the time of their celebration.  A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
5 
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil
Article 53 of the Civil Code,  the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
6 
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
Article 80(3)  in relation to Article 58.  The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
7  8 

State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
of which the general public is interested.  This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
9 

that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a
 Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of
either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.  "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore
24 

thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."  "Under ordinary
25 

concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
void,  subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
18 

no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting
may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
bigamy and concubinage and adultery.  The law sanctions monogamy.
19 

proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have
by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.  But Article 40 of the Family Code
26 

about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage  and such absolute nullity can be
27 

already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
based only on a final judgment to that effect.  For the same reason, the law makes either the
28 

cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.  Corollarily, if
29 

the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
third party as being one as "husband and wife".
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
such element.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
their father's marriage void after his death?
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code  cannot be applied even by
20 

not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
"at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
SO ORDERED.
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
Footnotes
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place  and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
21 

ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the
6 

voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void requisites are complied with:
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.  That is why the action or defense for nullity is
22 

(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
7 

alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,  and its
23 
beginning:
effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article
43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
x x x           x x x          x x x
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
exceptional character.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
x x x           x x x          x x x
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong
premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
8 
Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.
Art. 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
12 
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal or family life. . . .
Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a
14 
man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Art. 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
18 
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years. . . .
Art. 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years. . ."
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons
20 
and within the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose
parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after
attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person
having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached
the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse,
who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian
or person having legal charge of the insane, at anytime before the death of
either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after
regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased;
For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years after the marriage.
 
 
 
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329            March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a
prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent
Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant
Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married
to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.  Four 1
children were born out of that marriage.  On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
2
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.  When respondent
3
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.  According to him,
4
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine
of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in
the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to
two separate affidavits  of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a
5
member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo
Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the  
time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at  
least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and  
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained
the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their  
marriage. 6
 
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.  In fact, in his Comment,
7

he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s
and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage
bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period
of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special
application to judges,  who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
8

embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be

conversant with the law and basic legal principles.  And when the law transgressed is simple and
9

elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez
is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

 
 
 
 
 
 

G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision  of the Court
1
of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay
City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.  In lieu of a marriage license,
2
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,  also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of
3
them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint  for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
4
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa.
He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a
piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the
same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted
Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference.  In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
5
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.  The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
6
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument. 7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision  dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
8
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both
parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the
story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign
a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual,
as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to
sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that
could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her
brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three
months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for
a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D.,
wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he
was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of
Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage
contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the
Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she
answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was
procured through fraud. 10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
87  of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
11
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.
12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. 13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86  of the
14
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground
that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by
said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment
of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of
his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under
Article 76  of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an
16
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76
did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-
faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56  of the 17
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong
to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 7  of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
18
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in
the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa
was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City. 19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,  and reasoned that:
20
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license. 21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution  dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
22
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit,
and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a
separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E. 24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.  She 25
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability.
Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any
liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic
of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling
in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.  To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
26
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of
the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ,
District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife
in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name
as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis
ours.)
Article 58  makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
27
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.  Article 80(3)  of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
28 29
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.  This
is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,  whereby the absence of a marriage license did not
31
make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. 32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,  (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
33
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. 34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,  as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
35
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."  One of the central
37
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly  but reasonably construed.  They
38
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception.  Where a general rule is established by statute
40
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.  For the
41
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of
five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article
76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in
the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes
that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts  in an affidavit before any person
42
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration
of their marriage.  The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced
43
to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.  The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986
44
30
when Jose commenced to live in her house. 45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.  Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
46
this Court’s review.  It is already well-settled that:
47
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence. 48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from
the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.  Restated more explicitly,
49
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.  The present case does not
50
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code  that every intendment of law or fact leans
51
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from
39
the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent
by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.  The protection of marriage as a
52
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
an invalid one as well.  To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
53
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least
five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
14
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four
years after the discovery of the fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four
years from the time the force or intimidation ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight
years after the marriage.

of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
number 4 of the preceding article:
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of (1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. (2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit two years or more;
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room (3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
for application where there is a law.  There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
54
was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
criminal liability.
55
annulment of marriage.
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
16

Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.  Jose and Felisa’s marriage
56

law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
raised any time.
marriage.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
17

cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.  It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
57
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity (2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
that is unbroken. 58
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, (4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to (5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if (6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church,
any. No costs. religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92; and
SO ORDERED. (7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and
vice-consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74 and 75.
Footnotes
18
 ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
 ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties
11

and within the periods as follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose
parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within four years after
attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the
parent or guardian or person having legal charge, at any time before such
party has arrived at the age of twenty or eighteen years;
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has
been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the
subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse,
who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian
of the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil
registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him
by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the
contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious
sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article
31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the
absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32; or
 (5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
10. other x x x."
51
 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility
27
 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
party habitually resides. 55
 Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of the
28
 ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls
Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that "If the parties falsify their affidavit in order to
and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil
have an instant marriage, although the truth is that they have not been cohabiting for
registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration
five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage license, and they will also
of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
be criminally liable." Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code,
29
 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
which reads:

xxxx
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
exceptional character.
and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
 The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the following
31
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
essential requisites: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties; and (2) their mutual state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
consent. parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
 Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code
32

Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.

 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:
33  

ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter

2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.

 In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court articulated the spirit
35

behind Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:

"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein
a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale
why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious
eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy
and exempt them from that requirement."

 The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage license shall be
36

necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years desire
to marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons from legalizing their status," Report of the Code
Commission, p. 80.
 
 The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be necessary when a
42
 
man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried,
G.R. No. 200233               JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.  The CA 1
affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
7232   convicting her of bigamy.
2
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,   Leonila G. Santiago and
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Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information   for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her
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putative husband escaped the criminal suit.  5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2
June 1974,   asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then,
6
married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that
if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility."  7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the
crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they
got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage
to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage
was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for
the prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April
1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner
denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or
after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence
of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.  8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is
an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their
marriage."  Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 
9 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and
one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their
marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as
husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a
marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from
bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:  11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this
court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court
cannot do. The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial
decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their
marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not
known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court
simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in
question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.  12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case,
because she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for
there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara,   she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the
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absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of
those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived
together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in
the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993.
Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is
void.
In the Comment   filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
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argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards
her husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos'
s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion
of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano,   this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
15
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.
It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
(Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr.   instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People
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v. Archilla   likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's
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existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy,
which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each
other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in
Nepomuceno:  18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous
undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.
(Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the
totality of the following circumstances:   (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in
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the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a
learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the
more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former
was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings
of the R TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed,
the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had
the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses
during the trial.  20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was
validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the
principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty
within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla   holds that the second spouse, if
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indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis
B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman,
who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is
guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy."   Therefore, her conviction should only be that
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for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the
crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years.
Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on
her is the penalty next lower in degree,   prision correctional, which has a duration of six months
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and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day
to four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,   petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in
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degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months
imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.   If the accused wants to
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raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the
presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.   In this case, petitioner has
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consistently  questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that
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marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
pass judgment on the validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner
to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts,   and 29
given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review,   this Court now
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resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took
place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in
their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the
Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the
marriage. 31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
1996   and that after six months of courtship,  she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any
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objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in
Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she
was residing in the house of her in-laws,  and her children from her previous marriage disliked
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him.  On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in
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1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets. 36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for
only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at
least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although
the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34
of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each
other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,   in 37
which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary,
because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face
an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not
satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less
than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in
an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.  In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,  we had the occasion to emphasize that the
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State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage
and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a
mockery of the sanctity of marriage.  40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded."   If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
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transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts.   As a result, litigants
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shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest
or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,  petitioner married Santos while
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knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement
under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court
to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the
ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court
found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951,
the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since
the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court
acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate
of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation.
Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner
herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."   It must be safeguarded
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from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.   in keeping therefore with this
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fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of
prision correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes

 REVISED PENAL CODE, Arts. 349-352 .Art. 350 punish the crime of illegal
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marriages as follows: Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. - The
penalty of prison correctional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding
article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal
impediment. If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by
means of violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period
of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.