Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 195432               August 27, 2014

EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the Orders dated 14
January and 8 February 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (R TC), Third Judicial Region, Branch 45,  City of
1

San Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which dismissed the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed therein.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE

The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:

3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil wedding
solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex 'A'
and made an integral part hereof.

4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted under
Japaneselaws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly
issued by the Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Manila, is heretoas Annex ‘B’ and made an integral part hereof. 5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly
registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. A copy of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is
hereto attached as Annex ‘C’ and made an integral part hereof.

6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she reverted to her
single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in
Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex ‘D’ and made an
integral part hereof.

7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005. A copy of the
JapaneseFamily Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the divorce he obtained and his remarriage with
Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by the Consulate-General of Japan and the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Manila, is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ and made an integral part hereof.

8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname withher
husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be
issued to her until she can prove bycompetent court decision that her marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.

xxxx

12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner’s marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando
musttherefore be honored, considered and declared valid, until otherwise declared by a competent court.
Consequently, and until then, petitioner therefore is and must be declared entitled to the issuance of a
Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina Ando y Tungol.’ Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court.2
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which was later raffled off to
Branch 46. She impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as respondent and prayed for the following
reliefs before the lower court:

WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that after proper proceedings, judgment be
rendered, as follows:

(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner Edelina T. Ando and her husband
Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise declared by a competent court;

(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport under the name "Edelina Ando y
Tungol"; and

(c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor petitioner’s marriage to her husband Masatomi Y.
Ando and to issue a Philippine Passport to petitioner under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol".

Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs. 3

On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause and action, as well as jurisdiction, the
RTC held thus:

Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioner’s marriage to Masatomi Y. Ando, herein petitioner was
married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on September 16, 2001, and that
though a divorce was obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to the their (sic) marriage, there is no showing
that petitioner herein complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is obtaining a
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.

It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein petitioner does not have any causeof action
and/or is entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In the same vein, though there is
other adequate remedy available to the petitioner, such remedy is however beyond the authority and jurisdiction of
this court to act upon and grant, as it isonly the family court which is vested with such authority and jurisdiction.
4

On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 15 November 2010.
In anOrder dated 14 December 2010, the RTC granted the motion in this wise:

WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in her petition and the instant
Motion for Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Family Court of this jurisdiction and for the
interest ofsubstantial justice, the Order of the Court dated November 15, 2010 is hereby reconsidered.

Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the Clerk of Court for proper endorsement to
the Family Court of this jurisdiction for appropriateaction and/or disposition.  Thereafter, the case was raffled to
5

Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the trial court dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner
had no cause of action. The Order reads thus:

The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as valid is already her second marriage,
a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Codeconsidering that the first one, though allegedly
terminated by virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never recognized by a Philippine court, hence,
petitioner is considered as still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the second marriage with Ando cannot be
honored and considered asvalid at this time.

Petitioner’s allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The fact that no judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Ando was rendered does not make the same valid because such declaration under
Article 40 ofthe Family Code is applicable onlyin case of re-marriage. More importantly, the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is not even a requisite to make a marriage valid.

In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative. 6

On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 14 January 2011. The
motion was denied by the RTC in open court on 8 February2011, considering that neither the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) nor respondent was furnished with copies of the motion.

On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the sole issue of whether or not the RTC
erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.

Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even allowed to filea direct petition for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage,with even more reason can it not collaterally attack the
validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief. Further, petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage
– even one that is void or voidable – shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial decree of divorce is required under
Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license.
Any irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, such as with respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect the
legality of the marriage. Petitioner further claims that all the requisites for a petition for declaratory relief have been
complied with.

With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration to the OSG and the DFA,
petitioner avers that at the time of the filing, the RTC had yet to issue a summons to respondent; thus, it had yet to
acquire jurisdiction over them.

Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The latter raised the following arguments:
(1) the Petition was improperly verified, as the juratin the Verification thereof only stated that the affiant had
exhibited "her currentand valid proof of identity," which proof was not properly indicated, however; (2) prior judicial
recognition by a Philippine court of a divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is required before a Filipino
spouse can remarry and be entitled to the legal effects of remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show that she had first
exhausted all available administrative remedies, such as appealing to the Secretary of the DFA under Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, before resorting to the special civil action of declaratory
relief; and (4) petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap of paper and did not toll the
running of the period to appeal. Hence, the RTC Order dated 14 January 2011 is now final.

On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment, addressing the issues raised therein.

THE COURT’S RULING

The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.

First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her
ultimate entreaty was toquestion the DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husband’s name.

Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was adopted on 25 February 1997, the
following are the additional documentary requirements before a married woman may obtain a passport under the
name of her spouse:

SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall be made inaccordance with
the following provisions:

a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname of her husband pursuant to
Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the original or certifiedtrue copy of her marriage contract,
and one photocopy thereof.
 In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a foreigner, shall be required to
present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counselling Seminar conducted by the CFO when
applying for a passport for the first time.

b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true copy of her annotated
Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the Court Order effecting the annulment.

c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must present a certified true copy of the
Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post which has jurisdiction over
the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the
Philippines.

When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree or a certified
true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the Shari’ah Court or the OCRG. d) In the event that marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband, the applicant must present the original or certified true copy of the Death
Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shari’ah Court, in which case the
applicant may choose to continue to use her husband’s surname or resume the use of her maiden surname. From
the above provisions, it is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all she
needed to present were the following: (1) the original or certified true copyof her marriage contract and one
photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a
certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has
jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission
in the Philippines.

In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine passport under her second
husband’s name.  Should her application for a passport be denied, the remedies available to her are provided in
1âwphi1

Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:

Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of this Act of the implementing rules
and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose
decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due course.

The IRR further provides in detail:

ARTICLE 10
Appeal

In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one cancelled or restricted, the applicant or
holder thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to the Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial,
cancellation or restriction.

Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the denial of her application for
a passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioner’s argument that her application
"cannot be said to havebeen either denied, cancelled or restricted by [the DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved
party entitled to appeal",  as instead she "was merely told"  that her passport cannot be issued, does not persuade.
7 8

The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event of the denial of her application.

Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed,
instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.

In Garcia v. Recio,  we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
9

provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like
any other fact.10
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court actually constitutes a
petition for declaratory relief,  we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears
11

to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and
of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law.  Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce
12

can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her
alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's recourse to the proper remedies
available.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA*
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July
1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On
23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to
a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.
Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children)
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of
his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children
and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed
period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño   which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens
1

sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"   disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
2

Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither
did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval.   On 3

the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and
Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased
as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November
1987   only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
4

adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.  5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the
recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as
his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988   partial 6

reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half
of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half.   Private respondent was
7

not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of
Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to
who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the
trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.   On 18 April 1996 it
8

denied reconsideration.  9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no
need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan
children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent
is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on
establish facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit
from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner
herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;   nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
10

controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties
other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for
immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission
of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or
without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to
whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce
in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule.   To this,
11

petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the
divorce they obtained.   Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a
12

Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct
a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in
issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by
merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed
that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.   that aliens
13

may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing.   Petitioner opposed the motion
14

but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship.   The trial court did not grant private
15

respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner
and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines."   It maintained that their divorce
16

obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce
that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted
as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time
of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;   it did not merit enlightenment
17

however from petitioner.   In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by
18

private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May
1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as
the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was
an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954.   Significantly, the decree of divorce of
19

petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue
requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err
in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the
right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was
already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the
beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.  20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt of
court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,   the same lacks merit. For forum
21

shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and
circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue.   The present
22

petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial
courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding
petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate
court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan
children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all
surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of
petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition
for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167109             February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August 6,
2004, which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No.
D-10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the
ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution 3 dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. 4 Thereafter,
they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of
marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. 5

Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with
Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan
City7 against Orlando and Merope.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real
party-in-interest, but it was denied. 9 Trial on the merits ensued.

On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against defendants Orlando B.
Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:

1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null and void ab initio;

2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral damages the amount of
P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of
P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and

3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property donated is ordered
awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.

Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.

SO ORDERED.10

Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE
the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising the following
issues:

I.

WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;

II.

WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED MARRIAGE VOID
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12

Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her
children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family
from further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not
declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral
marriages.13

The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However, this issue may not be resolved without first
determining the corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become
naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.

While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, 14 there are, however, exceptions to this
rule, like when the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. 15

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando were naturalized American
citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, after a careful review of the records, we
note that other than the allegations in the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of
competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.

The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:

In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and testimonial evidence she presented, we
deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American citizens and had this citizenship status when they
secured their divorce decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing in this case with Filipino citizens whose
marital status is governed by the Family Code and our Civil Code, but with American citizens who secured their
divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x 16

Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or contest the allegation in
respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in
April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and divorce. 17 We note that it was the petitioner who
alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial
divorce decree.18 It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.19

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 20 A
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according
to the national law of the foreigner. 21 However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 22

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether
petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the
personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign
law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. 23 In such case, the RTC would be
correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated
December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope, 24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan
dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents. 25

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando, does not
restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a
petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have
the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another
perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any
defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x 26

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest 27 and must be based
on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.1awphi1.net

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:

SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —

(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of
the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from
₱300,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages from ₱200,000.00 to ₱25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss
the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133743             February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029             February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s
place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of
the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna,
he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime
in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from
the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a
motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state
the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues
of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid
in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate
children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that
the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo
was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par.
2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express
mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between
the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant
case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has
the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence,
it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City
as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must
first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of
the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage
was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had
no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married
to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot
be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers
codified the law already established through judicial precedent. 1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar
as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino
spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the
law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."

xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one
his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to
it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the
co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect
or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil
Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February
28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by
1

Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios.

2
 Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

3
 Id. at 391-393.

 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by
4

Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.

5
 Records, p. 125.

6
 Id. at 137.

7
 Id. at 116.

8
 Id. at 1-5.

9
 Id. at 10-24.

10
 Id. at 30-35.

11
 Id. at 38.

12
 Id. at 39-138.

 When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
13

validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

14
 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

15
 See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.

16
 This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

17
 Records, p. 259.

18
 Id. at 260.

19
 Id. at 262-267.

20
 Id. at 270-272.

21
 Id. at 288.
22
 Id. at 301.

23
 Id. at 302-303.

24
 Id. at 306-311.

25
 Id. at 318-320.

26
 Id. at 339-349.

27
 Id. at 350-354.

28
 Id. at 391-393.

29
 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.

30
 Supra note 14.

31
 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

32
 Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken finding of fact because
the records clearly show that the divorce was obtained on December 14, 1973 (not December 14, 1992) and
that the marriage of Gov. San Luis with respondent was celebrated on June 20, 1974. These events both
occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.

33
 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.

34
 See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.

35
 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.

36
 Id. at 75.

37
 52 Phil. 645 (1928).

38
 G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.

 SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
39

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

40
 G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.

41
 Id. at 199-200.

42
 Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.

 See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R.
43

No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.

44
 Records, pp. 76-78.

45
 Id. at 60-75.
46
 Id. at 79.

47
 Id. at 80.

48
 Id. at 81-83.

49
 Id. at 84.

 The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this case because the
50

value of Gov. San Luis’ estate exceeded ₱200,000.00 as provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).

51
 SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the Executive Order
issued by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983, declaring the reorganization of the
Judiciary, the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial
Region are hereby defined as follows:

xxxx

5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati – over the municipalities of Las Pinas,
Makati, Muntinlupa and Parañaque. x x x

52
 Supra note 14.

53
 Id. at 139, 143-144.

54
 Id. at 144.

55
 Supra note 31.

56
 Id. at 664.

57
 G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.

58
 Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 121.

 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990
59

ed., p. 263.

60
 G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.

61
 Id. at 447.

62
 Supra note 58.

63
 Id. at 119-121.

64
 Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).

 ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
65

are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
  Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
66

object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

67
 Supra note 14 at 144.

68
 G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.

69
 Id. at 264-265, 268.

70
 Supra note 60.

71
 Id. at 448-449.

72
 Records, pp. 118-124.

73
 Supra note 60 at 451.

 SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If x x x a person dies intestate,
74

administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.

75
 Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).

76
 Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

77
 Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).

 Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005, 451
78

SCRA 494, 506.

79
 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

80
 Id. at 686.

81
 Id. at 679, 686-687.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 155635             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979             November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances
handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify
the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002, 3 granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the
CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside
certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its
face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen 7 born in Agaña, Guam,
USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then
on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican
court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry
after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the
same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement 10 they
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired
during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the
Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment 15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen;
that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and
entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256
of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support
for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss 17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of
her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal
complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on
the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting
Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's
Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby
ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month
to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente
lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving
legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on
a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution,
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order
dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on
May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but
the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition
for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No.
01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA
Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the
Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil
Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action. 27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union
having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's
capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree
was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that
her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the
Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and
having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b)
when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18,
1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case
No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus
soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign
divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under
G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of
which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would
have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

I
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A
QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN
RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS

ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY
VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON
THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE. 30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the
petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a
Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a
Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in
this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of
the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996;
and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an
American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle
of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American
citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3)
when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC
9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8,
2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition
issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed
hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth:     Guam, USA       Date of Birth:     March 5, 1953

Sex:     female                              Civil Status:     married       Color of Hair:    brown

Color of Eyes:     brown               Distinguishing marks on face:    none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the
1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated
October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1 st Indorsement dated June
8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost
five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October
11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11,
1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for
this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1 st Indorsement by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January
22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the
Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code,
specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization
regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an
official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification
Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date
of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after
then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation
or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that
no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore,
the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1 st Indorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days
later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it
was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly,
the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex
"A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on
October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the
question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted
of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her
Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No.
RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to
motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she
was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At
the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil
Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason
of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States
nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,
Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN
OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married
and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the
19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized
and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case. 37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly
affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio  that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. 39 Be this as it may,
the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And
neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true
with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly
represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and
Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation
by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to
nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we
stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's
policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained. 42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after
completing the legal requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil
Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. 44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as
follows:

Art. 26. x x x x
 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. 45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their
citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14,
1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502
Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M.
Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce
decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between
the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by
reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every
provision of said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of
action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations
in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause
of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and
Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. 50 With the valid foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be
dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their
daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support
given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the
majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She
would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is
best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be
proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente
owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is,
Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her
petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the
CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the
petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and
June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 139868             June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,
vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in
the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey
died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. 1 The
will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N.
Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his appointment. 2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q.
Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator. 3

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely,
Kimberly and Kevin.

On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 4 As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the
Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real
estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00
(Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares
of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. 6 The will was also admitted to probate
by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor,
who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law
Offices, as ancillary administrator.

Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as
Special Proceeding No. M-888. 7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986. 8

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs
of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being
apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48
from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G
Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10

The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12,
1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT
No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾
undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333
shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the
amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs. 12

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the
Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of
Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to
Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of
Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the
legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.

The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the
project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾
undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent. 15

On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of
the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No.
9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of
the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that
since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him,
and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in
submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of
the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the
"best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares."
Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set
aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated February 12,
1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 17 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu
thereof, a new one is entered ordering:

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard
Guersey; and

(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the issuance of
a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999. 19

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely
erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625
"IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY
GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND
HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO
LONGER BE ANNULLED.

B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD,
EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO
FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID
ORDERS.20

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no
longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters
involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the
proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has already been executed. 21

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He
maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of
Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge
on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised
respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided. 22

Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate
amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of
Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior
partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she was not a
party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after
Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate.

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees,
which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other
judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for
lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control
or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. 26

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for
want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. 27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment
of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual, 28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud. 29

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s failure to
follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA
ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner
should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner
was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and
Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.

Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent
was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will, 30 and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the
other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts
since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of
partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted
to seek another counsel to protect her interest.31

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences
to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will
is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in
evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to
have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of
respondent’s discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, and the
order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in
1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through
Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously,
respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for
annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.

Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 33 the Court stated
that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which
prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there
is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has
been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.
Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise;
or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or
where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that
there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be
sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. 34

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.35

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and
confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of
that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet
the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in
similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged. 36

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as
dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of
her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was
residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972
was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated
and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was
admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the
Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is
governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent."

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and
Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters
of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the
estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons
who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in
evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland. 38

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts,
and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus,
the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious
result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the
evidence presented.

Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioner’s
protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of
Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in
the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big
legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent
upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust
reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law
when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as
Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This
eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake of
counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief
enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court
has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate.
The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom
petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts,
thus:

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the
principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in
the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending
his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his
primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of
Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was
also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill Guersey
during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject estate in
accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a
portion of his direct examination, to wit:

xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was prompted by
defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle
Guersey.

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his duties and
responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be
considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s
position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance
that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the
decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair
submission of the real issues involved in the case.41 (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result
of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which
law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from
enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was
beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was
belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In
cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their
rights.42

The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates
and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall
pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while
Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to
the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title
7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under
the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the
estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances".43

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in the
Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will,
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares,
which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to
respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to
pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was
sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view
of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to
prove the same. The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing
on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law,
especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as
Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was
presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on
January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of
the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of
Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us,
without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the
trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project
of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not
dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to
their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire
Makati property belongs to respondent.

Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang, 45 wrote:

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate
court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in
the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted
them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over Audrey’s and
Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended
to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. 47

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned
real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati
property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public
domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and
entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment
of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the
public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does
not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private
lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private
lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as
provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly
prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by
way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee
is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino,
then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now
inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27,
1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.