Abstract

The Supreme Court in the recent judgement of Mukesh Kumar & Anr. v. The State
of Uttarakhand & Ors, observed that the State is not bound to provide
reservations, need not collect quantifiable data to justify its decision to not
provide reservations in state services, the matter being within the subjective
satisfaction of the state. This case comment seeks to analyse this judgement on the
touchstone of right to substantive equality, duty of the State to consider claims
and interests of members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the
power of the courts to review the opinion of the State. The case comment evinces
that, while the judgement lacks adequate rationale, the citizen’s right to
substantive equality and corresponding duty on the State make it obligatory to
scrutinise quantifiable data that would act as a basis of forming an opinion under
Article 16(4) of the constitution. In this regard, a writ of mandamus can be
issued. Furthermore, the judgement was erroneous as the court has the power to
review the opinion of the state to strike at the arbitrariness.

1. Introduction
2. Behind the Scenes-
2.1 The Judgement of Uttarakhand High Court
2.2 The Apex Court Judgement
3. The Debate
3.1. Interplay of A. 16(1) and 16(4) and Substantive Right to Equality
3.1.1 The Right to Substantive Equality
3.2 State’s discretionary power coupled with “constitutional duty” u/A. 16(4)
3.2.1 The concept of Discretion
3.2.2 Directive to the State under Article 46
3.2.3 The rationale of Article 335
3.3 Judicial Review of the “Opinion” formed by State u/A. 16(4)
4. Conclusion
1. Introduction
The Right to Equality is one of the most celebrated rights conferred by Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, to which Article 16 provides a concrete form. The Supreme Court has
adopted the stance that it acts as the 'sentinel on the qui vive' vis-a-vis fundamental rights 1. Being
the interpreter of the Constitution and the protector of rights of the people, the Supreme Court is
called upon to determine the content of the constitutional provision and the notion of equality to
which the constitution commits us to. The colour-blind vision of equality prohibits any
classification of groups even for remedial purposes in contrast to group-subordination vision that
calls for affirmative actions to uplift the subordinated groups. The position has shifted from the
colour-blind view to group subordination view of equality, having reservations at the centre of
the argument. The court is often called upon to decide the validity of the executive order
concerning reservations.
One such instance is that of Mukesh Kumar & Anr. v. The State of Uttarakhand & Ors 2. In the
epoch-making judgement, dated 7th February 2020, the Supreme Court laid the decision to not to
provide reservation under A.16(4) and A.16(4A) purely on the discretion of the state
government. The judgement arose out of an appeal of Gyan Chand v. State of Uttarakhand 3,
decided by Uttarakhand High Court (HC). The HC, in a progressive judgement, ordered the state
government to collect data on the adequacy of representation of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribes in the state services, considering which the state government may decide on providing
reservation.
There is an inherent contradiction in the judgement of the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Court
failed to provide well-founded reasons for overruling the judgement of the HC. The judgement
tends to divert from the precedents, without justifying such diversion, granting unrestricted
discretion to the state government. The judgement has again ignited the debate of whether
reservations is a matter of fundamental right or a matter of discretion of the State.

2. Behind the Scene-

It would be instructive to discuss the judgement of the HC before looking into the legal issues
involved.

1 State of Madras v VG Row, 1952 SCR 597

2 Mukesh Kumar & Anr. v. The State of Uttarakhand & Ors, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 148.
3 Gyan Chand v. State of Uttarakhand, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 1160.
2.1 The Judgement of Uttarakhand High Court
The case of Gyan Chand v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors. 4 aroused due to Uttarakhand
Government notification dated 05.09.2012, where, it was decided to fill up promotional posts or
vacancies without providing reservations to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. The HC,
through its judgement, dated 01.04.2019, struck the notification and held that A. 16(4A) is an
enabling provision conferring power on the state government to provide reservation to Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribes even without collecting data regarding their inadequacy of
representation in state services.
A review petition against this judgement was filed. The HC soon realised the mistake it has
committed and, in its judgement of 15.11.2019, upholding the discretionary power of the state,
directed the state government to collect quantifiable data, regarding the inadequacy of
representation of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes in state services, that may help the state
government to take a considered decision5.

2.2 The Apex Court Judgement

It was against this judgement that a Special Leave Petition under A. 136 of the constitution was
filed by Mukesh Kumar in the Supreme Court. The crucial questions raised before the court were
whether the state is duty-bound to provide reservation and whether the state needs to justify its
decision to not provide reservation on the basis of quantifiable data regarding the adequacy of
representation of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes.
The apex court answered in the negative. The court held that there rests no duty on the part of the
state to provide reservations and the state cannot be called upon to justify its decision. Instead,
the matter is within the “subjective satisfaction” of the state. The state government is required to
collect data only to justify the reservations provided and not when it decides to not to provide
reservations.
“16. .... As such, collection of data regarding the inadequate representation
of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as noted above, is
a prerequisite for providing reservations, and is not required when the State
Government decided not to provide reservations. Not being bound to provide
reservations in promotions, the State is not required to justify its decision on
4 Gyan Chand v. State of Uttarakhand 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 233.
5
 the basis of quantifiable data, showing that there is an adequate
representation of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in
State services.”
The Supreme Court accordingly overruled the HC judgement.
On scrutiny of the judgement, it becomes evident that the Supreme Court has accorded arbitrary
power in the hands of the state at the cost of substantive equality. The court failed to observe
various precedents wherein State was directed to collect quantifiable data to showcase the
adequacy of representation.
The constitution, through its various provisions, imposes a duty on the state to consider the
interest of members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes u/A. 16(4). Moreover, A.16(1)
endows a substantive right to equality. A right whose enforcement is left at the complete
discretion of the state is no right at all. Therefore, the State is accountable to justify its opinion,
based on data, of providing or not providing reservation. The further part of the case comment
revolves around the above mentioned legal issues.

3. The Debate

3.1. Interplay of A. 16(1) and 16(4) and Substantive Right to Equality

Since the inception of our Constitution, the relation between reservation and constitutional ideals
have been in question. The vision of Ambedkar has been interpreted by courts in different ways.
Earlier views confirmed that the constitution is dedicated to individual equality. To put it simply,
the constitution adopted colour-blind vision of equality6 which perceives individuals as
individuals and not as members of a group. This can be deduced from a reading of A. 16(1).

“There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or
appointment to any office under the State”

The use of the words ‘all citizens’ depicts that citizens are labelled as equal individuals without
acknowledging their affiliation to a class, depicting that classification based on caste, race,

6 See Fisher V. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Harlan, J., ¶44: “In the view of the
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is
no caste here. Our Constitution in color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”
gender, etc., although for affirmative action, is forbidden. Going further, A.16(4)7 provides
reservations in state services to the citizens of backward class, who in the opinion of the state,
are not adequately represented.
Clause 4 of A.16 exhibits group-subordination notion of equality. Group-subordination view
holds that members of a group were disadvantaged due to their affiliation to caste, race, gender,
etc8. These groups will remain backward due to structural inequalities. Equality, in a practical
sense, cannot be achieved until the state takes affirmative actions to promote the interests of the
members of these groups, remedying the historical wrong. Affirmative actions call for
classification of groups to uplift the backward ones.
Holding A.16(1) to be colour-blind simultaneously with A.16(4) which imparts group-
subordination vision, seems paradoxical. This inconsistency was solved by perceiving A.16(4) as
an exception to A.16(1)9. Meaning, that the notion adopted by the constitution is colour-blind
and group-subordination is only an exception, limited by the elements of A.16(4)10.

This analysis did not survive long. In the State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas 11, the notion of
equality changed drastically. The Supreme Court observed that the source of affirmative actions
is A.16(1) and A.16(4), instead of an exception, is an ‘emphatic way of putting’ the notion of
equality12. This view has been followed consistently in later cases 13. Therefore, the notion of
equality embodied in A.16(1) is group-subordination.

7 INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 4.

8 Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
9 M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, (1963) Supp. 1 SCR. 439, P.B Gajendragadkar, J., ¶37 "Article 15 (4) like Article
16 (4) is an enabling provision. It does not impose an obligation, but merely leaves it to the discretion of the
appropriate Government to make suitable actions, if necessary". See also, State of Madras v. Champakam
Dorairajan, 1951 SCR 525; The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, 1962 SCR (2) 586; T.
Devadasan v. Union of India, 1964 SCR (4) 680; C. A. Rajendran vs Union Of India, 1968 SCR (1) 721.
10 M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, (1963) Supp. 1 SCR. 439, P.B Gajendragadkar, J., ¶31 "... it must not be ignored
that the provision which is authorised to be made is a special provision, it is not a provision which is exclusive in
character, so that in looking after the advancement of those classes, the State would be justified in ignoring
altogether the advancement of the rest of the society. It is because the interests of society at large would be served
by promoting the advancement of weaker elements in the society that Article 15 (4) authorises special provision to
be made. But a provision which is in the nature of an exception completely excludes the rest of the society, that
clearly is outside the scope of Article 15 (4)"
11 State of Kerala V. N.M. Thomas, AIR. 1976 S.C 490.
12 Id., see, Krishna Iyyer, J., ¶136 "To my mind, this sub-article serves not as an exception but as an emphatic
statement, one mode of reconciling the claims of backward people and the opportunity for free competition the
forward sections are ordinarily entitled to’’. K.K. Mathew, J., ¶78 "If equality of opportunity guaranteed under
Article 16 (1) means effective material equality, Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16 (1)".
13 See Indra Sawhney Etc. v. Union Of India And Others, 1992 Supp 2 SCR 454; Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of
U.P., (1997) 5 SCC 201; M.Nagaraj v. Union Of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212.
3.1.1 The Right to Substantive Equality
A.16(1) thrives to achieve substantive equality. A.16(4) is a ‘facet’ whose source is ‘equality of
opportunity’ under A.16(1). The implication of the changed notion can be seen in Dhananjay
Verma v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors14 where court deduced that-
“Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India is exhaustive of all forms of
reservation, is not good law; and reservation in favour of categories, other than
those in whose favour reservation is provided under Articles 16(4), (4A) and
(4B), can be extended under Article 16(1), provided such reservation satisfies the
test of a valid and reasonable classification.”
There is no right to reservation under A.16(4) but the Constitution guarantees the right to
substantive equality under A. 16(1) of which A. 16(4) is a facet. Right to substantive equality is a
fundamental right that cannot be dealt airily. It could be fairly deduced that to claim their
substantive right to equality, the citizens have a right to get quantifiable data collected by the
state that would show their backwardness. Collection of quantifiable data to classify backward
classes is a prerequisite to ensure equality of opportunity. This, in turn, means that there is no
fundamental right to reservation, but there is a right contingent upon findings of the research,
that is to get quantifiable data collected by the State to ascertain backwardness of a certain class
of people so one may secure equality of opportunity.

3.2 State’s discretionary power coupled with “Constitutional duty” under A. 16(4)
The Supreme Court, in Mukesh Kumar, opined that the wordings of A. 16(4) makes reservations
a matter of subjective satisfaction of the state, holding the state to be free from any duty. In
circumstances where the opinion to not to provide reservation is formed without collecting any
data, the order of the court, advising, collecting such data is not going to make any difference as
the opinion has already been formed, implying that the court need not issue any direction to the
state to collect data.
The author would like to the restate that, collection of quantifiable data to ascertain
backwardness and adequacy/inadequacy of representation in state services is a constitutional
requirement15. The ‘discretion’ of the State is, however, subject to the existence of
14 Dhananjay Verma v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 373
15 M.Nagaraj v. Union Of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212.
‘backwardness’ and ‘inadequacy of representation’ in public employment. Backwardness has to
be based on objective factors whereas inadequacy has to factually exist 16. The discretionary
power conferred by A. 16(4) is coupled with a constitutional duty on the state. It would not be
wrong to say that power is granted to enable the State to perform its duty effectively, levelling
duty prior to power.

3.2.1 The concept of Discretion

The concurrence of power and duty was uncovered in the case of Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia
Bahadur v. Union of India17, where, the court held
“… In my opinion Article 366(22) imposes a duty on the President and for that
purpose has conferred on him certain powers. In other words, the power conferred
on the President under that provision is one coupled with duty. Under Chapter XVI of
the Constitution certain special provisions were made for the benefit of the Scheduled
Castes and certain Scheduled Tribes. It is clear that a constitutional duty was
imposed on him to specify which castes were Scheduled Castes and which tribes were
Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of the Constitution.”
The court, in Indra Sawhney18, accepted this line of reasoning and held-
“The exercise of power to reserve is coupled with duty to determine the backward
class of citizens and if they were adequately represented. If the Government failed
to discharge its duty then the exercise of power stands vitiated.”

3.2.2 Directive to the State under Article 46

A.46, a Directive Principle of State Policy (DPSP), is intended for the State to adopt necessary
measures to remove inequalities. One may argue that DPSP are mere direction to the state and are
not enforceable. But in the words of Dr. Ambedkar, DPSP are ‘Instrument of Instruction' '
directed towards the State to fulfil the duty cast upon it by the constitution. They are the "essence
of the Constitution" and are fundamental in the governance of the country. The matter is not of

16 Supra no. 14, ¶51. “The discretion of the State is, however, subject to the existence of "backwardness" and
"inadequacy of representation" in public employment. Backwardness has to be based on objective factors whereas
inadequacy has to factually exist. This is where judicial review comes in…”
17 Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85.
18 Indra Sawhney Etc. v. Union Of India And Others, 1992 Supp 2 SCR 454, Para 695.
choice but of duty imposed on the state compelling it to apply the principles embodied in DPSP to
the laws framed.
Further, fundamental rights and DPSP are “complementary and supplementary” to each other 19. It
is remarkable to note that, J. Bhagvati in his dissenting opinion in Minerva Mills 20, instilled the
importance of DPSP over fundamental rights, holding that DPSP, ‘imposing an obligation on the
State’, stands at a higher pedestal than fundamental rights.
By virtue of A.46, the state is duty-bound, to extend its care to promote the people belonging to
the weaker section of the society, in particular, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to
protect them from social injustice and all other forms of exploitation21.

3.2.3 The rationale of Article 335

This article enunciates that “ The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration…”22.
To consider every aspect of claims made, the state is required to collect data based on which an
opinion can be formed while exercising discretionary power under A. 16(4). The state has to form
its “opinion” on the quantifiable data regarding adequacy or inadequacy of representation 23.
Forming an opinion without considering any material amounts to neglect of the duty encompassed
under A.46 and infringement of A.16(1), a constitutional mandate, for which a writ of mandamus,
directing the government to perform its duty, can be issued either by the High Court or the
Supreme Court.
The power of the court to interfere in the matter is made visible in the case of Comptroller and
Auditor General of India v. K.S. Jagannathan 24, where the High Court held that they had the
power to issue directions or orders where the public authority had failed to exercise or had
wrongly exercised the discretion or had exercised the discretion in a mala fide manner or upon
irrelevant consideration or by ignoring relevant considerations.

19 Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State Of Mysore, (1969) 3 SCC 84.
20 Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union Of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.
21 Supra note 18.
22 INDIA CONST. art. 335. “The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes shall
be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of
appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State.”
23 Supra note 14.
24 Comptroller and Auditor General of India v. K.S. Jagannathan, (1986) 2 S.C.C. 679.
The Court was emphatic that the discretion was to be exercised to discharge the constitutional
duties imposed by Articles 335 and 34625. This line of reasoning was later accepted in P & T. SC-
ST Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union of India26.

3.3 Judicial Review of the “Opinion” formed by State under A. 16(4)

After noticing that due to substantive right to equality, citizens have a right to get quantifiable
data collected to showcase the backwardness, and the state has a constitutional duty to collect the
same, an important legal issue that confronts is whether the ‘opinion’ formed by the state is
judicially reviewable. Accordingly, the holding of the court, in the case at hand, that the opinion
rests completely at the discretion of the state is questionable.
In the present case, the state had formed an opinion and denied reservations without any material
to consider. The Supreme Court of India, in varied judgement 27, unanimously held that the State
cannot act arbitrarily and it must respect the rule of law. Decision taken without any principle or
any rule is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance
with the rule of law28. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. J. Pasayat minces no
words when he says,
“The expression ‘arbitrarily’ means: in an unreasonable manner, as
fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining
principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or
acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone.”29

25 id. Madon, J., ¶30 : "The treatment meted out to the members of the Scheduled Castes throughout the ages was
an affront to Human Rights. It was in a spirit of atonement for the wrongs done to them and to make restitution for
the injury and injustice inflicted upon them that the framers of the Constitution enacted Article 16(4) placing them in
a separate class in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State, formulated the
Directive Principles embodied in Article 46, and proclaimed the great constitutional mandate set out in Article 335."
26 P. & T. SC/ST Employees Welfare Assocn v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 147. E.S. Venkataramiah. J., ¶4
said: "While it may be true that no writ can be issued ordinarily compelling the Government to make reservation
under Article 16 (4) which is only an enabling clause, the circumstances in which the members belonging to
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Post and Telegraph Department are deprived of indirectly the advantage
of such reservation which they were enjoying earlier while others who are similarly situated in the other departments
are allowed to enjoy it make the action of government discriminatory and invite intervention by this Court".
27 See, R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489, P.N. Bhagwati, J., ¶21: “The principle of
reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-
arbitrariness is protected by Article 14 and it must characterise every State action, whether it be under authority of
law or in exercise of executive power without making of law”; E P Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3;
Chiranjit Lal v Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41; Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, (1959) SCR 279 [12].
28 Hayek Fredrich, “The Constitution of Liberty” p. 205-214, 1960.
29 Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P, (2002) 2 SCC 188
The discretionary power given to the executive should be exercised in a just, reasonable and fair
way30. A.14 professes right to equality and A.16 is only an instance of it. Arbitrary actions are
violative of A.14, and in matters of state services, of A. 16 as well. The state is required to base
its actions on some valid principles rather than on ‘extraneous or irrelevant consideration’ to
ensure fair and equal treatment31.

In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India32, it was held that-

“If the opinion suffers from the vice of non-application of mind or formulation of collateral
grounds or beyond the scope of Statute, or irrelevant and extraneous material then that opinion
is challengeable.”
Further, the Right to Equality under A.14 is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution whose
violation invites judicial intervention33. Arbitrarily denying the equality of status and
opportunity, which is part of Basic Structure 34 under A.16, is a violation of A.14 as well. Articles
14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment35.
The extent of Judicial review is best summarised by J. Sabyasachi Mukharji, in Dwarkadas
Marfatia36:
"......Where there is arbitrariness in State action, Article 14 springs in
and judicial review strikes such an action down. Every action of the
executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed
by reason. So, whatever, be the activity of the public authority, it should
meet the test of Article 14…”

30 See Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722, P.N. Bhagwati, J., ¶16 “If the classification is
not reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions referred to above [(i) that the classification is founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the
group; and (ii) that differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned legislative
or executive action], the impugned legislative or executive action would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of
equality under Article 14 would be breached”; Aeltemesh Rein Vs. Union of India, 1988 SCR Supl. (2) 223.
31 E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3.
32 Supra note 18.
33 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
34 Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC .
35 See State Of Punjab v. Shri Amar Singh, General, (1998) 119 PLR 498, G.S. Singhvi, J., ¶37 “Article 14 is the
genus while Article 16 is the species. It gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public
employment. The wide sweep of Articles 14, 15 and 16 takes within its fold not only the legislative instruments and
all executive/administrative actions of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities but also contractual matters. Every
State action must be informed by reasons. It must be fair, reasonable and in public interest and must be free from
arbitrariness.”
36 Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board Of Trustees Of The Port of Bombay, 1989 (3) SCC 293.
The opinion of the state, based on no material, under A.16(4) is arbitrary and can be challenged
as violative of the right to substantive equality under A.16(1), A.14 and basic structure of the
constitution. No doubt that the formation of opinion is subjective but the existence of
circumstances/data relevant to the inference is the sine qua non for the opinion formed by the
State37. The judiciary, by provisions of the constitution attracted, has the power to review such
opinions. Also, if some material is shown, to check that the opinion is justified on the proposed
material, the judiciary needs to take the matter into consideration and ensure that the state fulfils
its duty. Therefore, the judiciary has the power to review the opinion in every circumstance.
The case at hand is highly criticized on the ground that even though the opinion of the state to
not to provide reservations was not based on any material, and thus, was arbitrary and violated
the substantive right of equality. The Supreme Court refused to issue any directions to the state
and gave it a free hand to act in the manner it wants.

4. Conclusion

The judgement, in Mukesh Kumar, is not a compelling example of how the judiciary should
address the questions of reservations. The Supreme Court did consider the right to substantive
equality before resting the decision to not provide reservation on the sole discretion of the state.
Additionally, arbitrary actions of the state without any basis are against the rule of law and
invites judicial intervention which, in this case, the judiciary refused to, making the judgement
controversial.
Through this case comment, the author[s] has sought to show that the state is answerable for its
decision to not provide reservations in the court of law. Specifically, the emphasis was placed on
three legal points. First, there is a fundamental right to substantive equality under A.16(1) that
guarantees citizens equal opportunity. Second, a duty is placed on the state to consider claims
and interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. For ensuring that the above two are

37 Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Co. Law Board, 1966 Supp SCR 311, Hidayatullah, J., ¶28“No doubt the formation of
opinion is subjective but the existence of circumstances relevant to the inference as the sine qua non for action must
be demonstrable. If the action is questioned on the ground that no circumstance leading to an inference of the kind
contemplated by the section exists, the action might be exposed to interference unless the existence of the
circumstances is made out. Since the existence of "circumstances" is a condition fundamental to the making of an
opinion, the existence of the circumstances. if questioned, has to be proved at least prima facie. It is not sufficient to
assert that the circumstances exist and give no clue to what they are because the circumstances must be such as to
lead to conclusions of certain definiteness.”
complied with, collection of quantifiable data to ascertain backwardness and inadequacy of
representation in state services under A. 16(4) becomes necessary. The above two grounds invite
the judiciary to issue a writ of mandamus when, in case, the state refuses to collect quantifiable
data. Third, the judiciary has the power to review the ‘opinion’ of the state, formed under
A.16(4), to strike at arbitrariness and secure substantive equality.

The Apex Court by delivering this judgment has once again started the debate as to whether
the Indian Constitution is devised, by the forefathers, on the principles of colour blind or does
it lead towards making subordinating groups in order to achieve the desired state of affairs.

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