Reddendo Singula Singulis - “referring each to each; referring each phrase or

expression to its appropriate object,” or “let each be put in its proper place,
that is, the words should be taken distributively.”

People vs. Tamani, 55 SCRA 153, [Nos. L-22160 & L-22161], January 21, 1974

Aquino, J. :

The lower court’s decision convicting defendant Tamani was

promulgated on February 14, 1963. A copy thereof was served on his counsel
on February 25, 1963. On March 1, 1963 a motion for reconsideration was
filed. It was denied. A copy of the order of denial was served by registered
mail on July 13, 1963 on defendant’s counsel through his wife. He had eleven
days or up to July 24, 1963 within which to appeal (if the reglementary
fifteen-day period for appeal should be computed from the date of notification
and not from the date of promulgation of the decision). He filed his notice of
appeal only on September 10, 1963 or forty-eight days from July 24th.

Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.—An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from.
This period, for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a
motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion
shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.

The government opposed arguing that the 15 day period should be counted
from February 25, 1963 when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on
appellant’s counsel by registered mail,

Issue : When should the fifteen period to file Notice of Appeal be counted ?

Ruling :

It should be counted from the date the Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration was received or on July 13, 1963.

In section 6, there is the phrase “promulgation or notice of the judgment or

order.”
The word “promulgation” in section 6 should be construed as referring to
“judgment” (see section 6 of Rule 120), while the word “notice” should be
construed as referring to “order”.

That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis:

“referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate
object”, or “let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be
taken distributively” (76 C. J. S. 175).

The order denying Tamani’s motion for reconsideration was served by

registered mail on July 13th on appellant’s counsel, he had only one (1) day
within which to file his notice of appeal and not eleven days. That construction
is an application by analogy or in a suppletory character of the rule governing
appeals in civil cases which is embodied in section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.

Tamani’s notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was fifty-eight days
late counted from July 13th.

{Pls note that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration on March 1 stopped
the period - 4 days . When the Order denying was received, the fifteen day
period resumed at 4 days from July13. July 13 plus 11 days is July 23. )
Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est
A case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.” It is a rule of statutory
construction. If a person, object, or thing is omitted from being enumerated in
a statute, it must be held or considered to have been omitted intentionally

People vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, No. L-14129 July 31, 1962

Regala, J.

Manantan, a Justice of the Peace, was charged with violation of Section 54 of

the Revised Election Code. Manantan moved to dismiss the charge that as
justice of the peace, he is is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code. Accused further added a Court of Appeals decision
where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

Section 54 of the said Code reads:

"No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or

employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal
or rural police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall
aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in any election or take
part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if
he is a peace officer."

Manantan argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the
officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits
that the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which provided the following:

"SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections.—No judge of the

First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any
Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or
exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise
than exercising the right to vote."
Manantan further invokes the rule of statutory construction of “casus omisus
pro omisso habendus est." A case omitted is to be held as intentionally
omitted.” It is a rule of statutory construction. If a person, object, or thing is
omitted from being enumerated in a statute, it must be held or considered to
have been omitted intentionally. When, therefore, Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission revealed
the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its
operation.

Issue :Whether or not a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of

Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?

Ruling :

Yes, it justices of the peace are included.

The rule of “casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" relied by the accused is
not applicable.

The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that

under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was
modified or qualified by the phrase "of First Instance", while under Section 54
of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words,
justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified,i.e.,
judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however,
there was no necessity anymore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and
broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and
was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of
First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts
of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as
"judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a
judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier
Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide
litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term
includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that
capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are
judges of facts."

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" can operate and apply
only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar,
the Legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term—"judges." The
rule, therefore, has no applicability to the instant case
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
Express mention of one person, thing or consequence is tantamount nto an
express exclusion of all others.

Catu vs. Rellosa, 546 SCRA 209, A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

CORONA, J.:

Rellosa was a lawyer and the Baranggay Chairman in Manila.

Rellosa presided over a complaint for possession of a lot and building by Catu
against Pastor within his baranggay. However, the parties failed to amicably
settle.

Thereafter, Catu filed an ejectment case against Pastor.

Rellosa entered his appearance as counsel for Pastor.

Catu filed an administrative complaint against Rellosa.

Issue : Whether or not Rellosa as Baranggay Chairman can still practice his
profession as a lawyer.

Ruling :

Yes, a Baranggay Chairman is allowed to practice his profession as a lawyer.

Certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board

members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation.

No such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the
sangguniang barangay.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded from any
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve
full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular
sessions only twice a month. Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent
was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department,
as required by civil service regulations.
Law of the Case or Case Law

Noscitur a Sociis – Associated Words

Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247, No. L-19650 September
29, 1966

CASTRO, J.:

Caltex conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme

calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest,” it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period.

Caltex wrote a letter to Postmaster General Palomar, of its intention to

avail of the services of the Philippine Post Office and that the contest does not
violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.

Unimpressed, Acting Postmaster General Palomar opined that Caltex

scheme is a form of lottery and use of the Postal services is prohibited under
the Postal Law. Thus, denying the request of Caltex to use the postal services
for its “Hooded Pump Contest.”.

Caltex filed a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General

Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering
Palomar, in his capacity as Postmaster General , to allow Caltex the use of the
mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public".

The trial court ruled in favor of Caltex.

Palomar appealed the decision of the trial court questioning among

others the propriety of the declaratory petition of Caltex as it did not have a
cause of action and that the Hooded Pump Contest of Caltex violated the
Postal Law as it as a lottery.
Issue : A) Whether or not it was proper for the Court to consider the Trial
Court’s grant of declaratory relief; and

B) Whether or not the contest is considered lottery and violates the

Postal Law.

Ruling :

A) Yes, because of the doctrine of law of the case.

"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of

the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect/judicial
decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those
called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our
resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.

B) Under the Postal Law the term "gift enterprise" is used in association
with the word "lottery." Consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, it is only logical that the term be accorded no
other meaning then that which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed.
Significantly, there is not the slightest indicium in the law of any intent to
eliminate the element of consideration from the "gift enterprise” therein
included.

The term 'lottery' extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by
chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs,
etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery
are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance.

Words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus – When the law does not
distinguish. Courts should not distinguish

Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430, G.R. No. 104988,
G.R. No. 106424, G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996

Davide, J.

Facts :

Mustang Lumber owned by Ri Chuy Po was charged by the DENR for

violation Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or the Forestry Code

Violation thereof included seizure of the illegal goods and criminal

charges were filed against the owner and other persons.

Mustang Lumber questions the seizure and the criminal charges,

arguing among others, that possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not
penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

DENR, on the other hand, contends otherwise referring to DENR

Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and
lumber. Further, the exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the
very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has
resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources.

Issue :

Whether or not the word “timber” includes lumber” in contemplation of

the cited provision of the Forestry Code.

Ruling:

Yes, lumber is included in the word timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary,

words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber.
 The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or
lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in
paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) xxx
Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into
lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products. This simply means that lumber is a processed
log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in
its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as “timber or
logs after being prepared for the market.” Simply put, lumber is a processed
log or timber.

Also. Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction

between raw or processed timber. Neither should the court distinguish. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

Ejusdem Generis
General terms following Special Terms

Philippine Basketball Association vs. Court of Appeals, 337 SCRA 358, G.R. No.
119122 August 8, 2000

Purisima, J.:

Facts :

The PBA received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue for the payment of deficiency amusement tax.

The PBA questions the assessment arguing that the PBA games are not
subject to national tax but to lacal tax invoking the Local Tax Code.

Issue : Whether or not the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games
is a national or local tax? If national tax, it should pay to the BIR or the
National government.

Ruling :

The amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games is a National tax.

Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions “other places of amusement,”

professional basketball games are definitely not within its scope. Under the
principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned.

Thus, in determining the meaning of the phrase “other places of amusement,”

one must refer to the prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert
halls and circuses with artistic expression as their common characteristic.
Professional basketball games do not fall under thesame category as theaters,
cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter basically belong to
artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming.