The Political System of Pakistan

(A Constitutional Study)

DR Arshad Javed Rizvi

A book Published by paramount publishers Karachi

Dedication
This book is dedicated to my father
Syed Anis Ahmad Rizvi (late) who
defined the way and then steered me
through it. His political insight
ignited the first flame of curiosity,
which led me to writing a PhD thesis
and eventually converting it into a
book.
 Dr Arshad Jawaid
Rizvi – a profile
Mr. Arshad Rizvi is PhD in social
sciences and has been associated with
teaching profession for several years.
He is currently an associate professor at
Sir Syed University of Engineering and
Technology in Karachi. He has particular
interest in constitutional history, and
keeps an eye on the social and cultural
developments taking place in the
country. Rizvi has been attending
conferences and workshops on such
issues.
He is a keen observer of political and
social developments, and believes in
working as an active agent of change.
He is a short story writer and his
collection of short stories “Aik Sa
Mausam” has achieved popular acclaim.

This book, which is based on his PhD

thesis “Political System of Pakistan: A
constitutional Study” takes into account
the pros and cons of different
constitutions and the balance of power
among different institutions in the
country. It also provides an insight into
the ongoing power struggle among the
pillars of state in the country.
PREFACE

It will perhaps be generally admitted that the

neutrality and objectivity are a key to address any
question in history, particularly when the question
is dynamic and is related to contemporary issues.
This needs a kind of environment, which is
conducive for challenging the existing notions and
introducing alternative ideas to address similar
problems. There is hardly any achievement in the
history of the country, which can make politicians,
bureaucrats, generals, and economists proud in
their role in running the country.
The ruling class has always had wrong perceptions
and self-centered thinking and has never been
reluctant in affecting the settled issues in the
Constitution. The political actors acted in an
immature manner and orchestrated wrong ideas
that were quite attractive for a predominant
majority of the country. The book under review is a
result of the efforts to carry out thorough probe into
the factors shaping the current situation and
developing rational understanding of the
constitutional development in the country.
It will be recalled that the first military dictator,
General Ayub Khan termed people as "wild horse
that had been captured, but not yet tamed." The
attitude that has been prevalent among successive
rulers resulted in an ambitious power struggle in
addition to promoting authoritarianism and religious
extremism, and did not allow constitutional
democracy to properly function in the country.
True, M.A. Jinnah, who was the founder of the
nation, had promoted and pronounced clear
constitutional norms and imperatives in
accordance with international standards, the
constitution had been undergoing several
experiments as it could not be drafted or finalized
in his life.

It will be recalled that the first military dictator,

General Ayub Khan termed people as "wild horse
that had been captured, but not yet tamed." The
attitude that has been prevalent among successive
rulers resulted in an ambitious power struggle in
addition to promoting authoritarianism and religious
extremism, and did not allow constitutional
democracy to properly function in the country.
True, M.A. Jinnah, who was the founder of the
nation, had promoted and pronounced clear
constitutional norms and imperatives in
accordance with international standards, the
constitution had been undergoing several
experiments as it could not be drafted or finalized
in his life.

A good and workable political system performs two

functions -- setting up of a constitutional
government, which in turn promotes civil society
structured by laws. It helps in nurturing happiness
among citizens. The political system empowers
citizens and protects them from rapacious
governments. However, the self-interests of the
ruling class have always ruled the political system
and governments in Pakistan. The old feudal
aristocracy, in collaboration with army, and
technocrats have developed an "alliance --
defensive and offensive -- against the interests of
people; of the ruling one and the sub-ruling few
against the subject many." (Bentham)
Political commentators have failed to properly
address the relationship between the political and
constitutional systems in the country. The western
authors have addressed the issue in the backdrop
of constitutional developments and focused on the
specific period, between 1947 and 1973. They
failed to properly investigate the subsequent
developments. Therefore, there is need to carry
out fresh investigations in order to find political
solutions in the backdrop of constitutional
variations.
The objective of the book is to document the
research work of a PhD thesis in order to establish
a relation between constitutional development and
political instability in Pakistan. Contemporary
researchers have failed to understand the political
factors at work, which resulted in several flaws in
their research work. These may be listed as below:

1. The lack of understanding of the political

realities in the constitutional devel-
opment.
2. The extra-constitutional and extra-
political institutions could not be
discussed properly.
 3. The research work lacks the
understanding of the socio-cultural
background, which resulted in failure of
different political experiences.

4. The research work does not cover the

political development after 1973.

The political dilemma of Pakistan can be described

in terms of domestic political developments such as
the struggle for constitutional democracy and the
repeated imposition of martial laws. Though,
Pakistan was achieved through a political and
constitutional struggle, the tussle among powerful
army generals, bureaucrats and feudal politicians
never allowed the constitution to take roots in the
country. However, the politicians merely played a
secondary role, resulting in a fragile political culture
since beginning of the political history of Pakistan.
Pakistan chose to follow the British parliamentary
system as its future political system. The Act of 1935
became the interim constitution of Pakistan, providing a
parliamentary form of government both at the Centre
and the provincial levels. It was later adopted in the first
constitution of 1956. The constitution came under bitter
criticism by constitutional experts, who indicated
numerous anomalies in the constitution. Seven prime
ministers were the products of the "palace intrigues,”
which became the dominating feature of politics in
Pakistan after Jinnah’s death and first Prime Minister
Liaquat Ali Khan. Meanwhile, religious scholars started
their campaign for a theocratic state. They believed that
the presidential system was closer to Islam. However,
the urban elite criticized the presidential system, which
was first introduced in 1962 Constitution, accusing the
system of devoid of proper checks and balances. They
viewed the system suitable for a developing country like
Pakistan, but the presence of a military man at the
helms of affairs raised suspicions about the system.
General Ayub Khan Ayub argued that the presidential
system was more akin to the genius of the people, and it
can help in overcoming instability in the country. The civil
and military bureaucracy termed controlled democracy
as the best system for the country. On the contrary, the
system resulted in reaction against the center. Mujibur
Rehman presented his six-point programme for the then
East Pakistan and Z.A. Bhutto announced a revolt
against the military government in West Pakistan. The
reaction shook the very foundations of the state in the
late 1960s. Bhutto later introduced the idea of civilian
democracy with parliamentary form of government in the
1973 constitution after the break up of East Pakistan.
Under the new system, the prime minister enjoyed all
powers, and the president had a ceremonial role. After
Bhutto, General Ziaul Haq introduced his own
constitutional reforms, and termed Bhutto’s comments
on the parliamentary form of government, as a “luxury”
in Pakistan.
Democracy emerged as a popular choice once
again after General Zia died in a plane crash.
However, it did not come up to the expectations of
the people. The politicians suffered from greed and
personal vendetta, and played havoc with the
national interests in the country. Political instability
marred the political scene between October 1988
and October 1993, during which three national
provincial elections were held and eight successive
governments were formed. Many and varied have
been the reasons for the political instability in the
country. The politicians who introduced
parliamentary or presidential form of government
failed to run the system effectively. They failed to
introduce necessary safeguards for the successful
functioning of the constitutional democracy in
Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan failed to follow the
Constitution due to faulty democratic political
system in the country.
Jinnah dreamt Pakistan as a federal democratic state
and pre-independence documents vindicate this point.
The idea developed during Muslims’ struggle for a
separate homeland and provincial autonomy. True,
Jinnah opposed federalism in the united India, but he
considered the system suitable for independent
Pakistan. In 1945, Jinnah maintained: "Our Pakistan
government will probably be a federal state, modeled on
the lines of autonomous provinces, with the key powers
in matters of defense and foreign affairs etc. at the
Centre."
Different complications vitiated the politics of
federalism in Pakistan after independence. The
politics between the center and the provinces
orchestrated conflicts, anarchy and political
upheavals, which ultimately led to the creation of
Bangladesh in 1971. There is need to understand
the regional and provincial diversities in order to
understand the causes of failure of federalism in
Pakistan. It is imperative to understand the nature
of provincial diversities and the resultant
impediments in implementing a federal constitution
in the country.
The ideology, which is determined by it culture and
ideological feelings, represents its ideals and aspirations.
Pakistan is an ideological state. It can be derived from
Jinnah’s statements that Pakistan was never meant to
be a theocratic state. However, the constitution states
that "sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to
Almighty Allah alone, and the authority exercisable by
the people within the limits prescribed by Him is sacred
trust." Further, "the Muslims of Pakistan should be
enabled, individually and collectively, to order their lives
in accordance with the full-fledged Islamic State.”
Meanwhile, the Muslim intelligentsia wants to
interpret Islamic ideology in a dynamic manner. It
believes that Islamic ideology provides Muslims an
opportunity to establish a model welfare state.
History shows that Muslims succeeded in
establishing such state in the early days of Islam.
Addressing in the Constituent Assembly, Khwaja
Nazimuddin, second prime minister of Pakistan,
maintained: "The principles enunciated by Islam
have to be interpreted in terms of democratic
constitutional practice." Nazimuddin’s views were
similar to that of Jinnah in this regard. Therefore,
the demand for an Islamic state existed in the roots
of the movement for Pakistan. A majority of the
people is likely to support an “Islamic” state in
Pakistan. However, the intelligentsia has been
trying to interpret Islamic ideology in a dynamic
manner, which means introducing the principles of
equality, brotherhood, and social justice in
Pakistan. The principles of Islam are compatible
with the ideals of democracy in the western world.

Meanwhile, the extremist religious scholars vowed

that Pakistan would not be a western democracy,
adding that Islamic Shari’ah laws would be
imposed in Pakistan. However, Islamic modernists
argued to incorporate the character of Islamic
polity into the preamble of constitutional set-up.
There is a general feeling that orthodox religious
scholars are leading the country toward becoming
a theocratic state. Pakistan's modernists knew that
Islam had been the real cause behind the struggle
of Muslims in the sub-continent. They knew the
importance of Islam for maintaining unity between
the two wings of the country – East Pakistan and
West Pakistan, but they opposed the kind of
Islamic state that orthodox religious scholars had
envisioned.

The two-nation theory, which led to the creation of

Pakistan, came under question soon after the
independence of Pakistan. There is need for
thorough investigations in order to understand why
religious and politically orthodox parties opposed
the partition of India. Modernists, western
educated, political and constitutional leaders
struggled for independence, but the orthodox
elements, which lacked the support of the masses
joined hands with the military and civil elite and
started playing a dominant role in the history of
Pakistan.

Periodic political and ideological changes have

marred the constitutional evolution in Pakistan from
1947 to 197l, during which the country faced four
martial laws and three constitutions. Several draft
proposals were prepared during the period, but the
political and ideological rivalries did not allow them
to be implemented. Former president Zia and
former Prime Minister Sharif introduced a few
widely controversial amendments in 1985 and 1997
in the 1973 constitution. The amendments
diminished an era of smooth democratic process in
the country. General Pervez Musharraf took over in
1999 and promised to introduce grassroots
democracy in the country. He ruined the entire
democratic process on the pretext of making robust
economic progress and carrying out across-the-
board accountability. The exercise had been
repeated several times in the history of Pakistan.
Viewed in the context of the above debate, the
book will broadly address the following questions:-

1. What factors contributed to the idea of

Islamic republic of Pakistan?
2. Why did Pakistan fail to frame a
constitution after independence?
3. How Islamic ideology makes Pakistan's
constitutional system unique?
4. What constraints countries with colonial
past face in framing the constitution?
5. How western and religious environment
influences the process of framing the
constitution in Pakistan?
6. How critical study can help in promoting
rational understanding of the constitution
and its relations with internal political
system?
 7. How the executive and legislature
differed in the making of the constitution?
8. What are the issues of the distribution of
power between the federal government
and the provinces?

I gratefully acknowledge the role of Mr Abuzar Wajidi,

Dr Jaffer Ahmad, Dr S. M .Saeed for their invaluable
input in providing direction and purpose to my
random thoughts and views. I would also like to thank
Mr Naseer Turabi, famous poet and intellectual, for
his consistent encouragement and help in writing this
book. It would have been impossible to even think
about it without his moral and intellectual backup.

I would also like to thank Mr Asad.j. Rizvi, Shahid

Hamid, Mrs Ishart Rizvi, Maha Batool, Nida Batool for
their invaluable support in the arrangement, selection,
and editing of the material of the book.

Arshad jawaid Rizvi

PHd

An evening of April 2013

Index

> Chapter 1: Introduction

Pakistan: 'a Legacy of Constitutional Strife’

> Chapter2: The Testament Of The

Independence Movement
A Constitutional Study

> Chapter 3: Incipient Constitutionalism (1947-

1956)
> Chapter 4: Constitutional Development &
Political Consequences (1956-1958)

> ChapterS: Ayub Khans’s Political

Constitutionalism: 1958-1969
(The Story of Constitutional Megalomania)

> Chapter 6: Bangladesh: Clash of constitutional

and
Political disparity (1947-1969)

> Chapter 7: Bhutto: the Dilemma of

“Uncontrolled” Constitutional Democracy

> Chapter 8: “Constitutional Marshal Law”:

Reiigio-Poiitical Study
> Chapter 9: Amid Hopes and Changes-1

> Chapter 10: Amid hopes and Challenges-2

> Notes

> Bibliograph
Chapter — 1

INTRODUCTION
PAKISTAN: ‘A LEGACY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL STRIFE’

"All existing states have a fictitious air of individuality about them. Because they
exist it is assumed they were meant to be and will always be. History, however,
challenges these assumptions. States that once were no more, and it is beyond
questt6ff#iS^currently recognized states would in time join those that have gone
before them. Despite their pretensions about morality, states and nations reveal
cycles that takes them from one stage to another, ultimately causing them to
disappear from the active world".
Lawrence Ziring , Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development
(Dowson: Westview, 1980) 248.

Pakistan is indeed a resilient polity: since as far back as anyone remember, failure
and new hope have gone hand in hand. Since independence, political and
constitutional desires of the people in the corridors of power and in the political life
have bemoaned the failure of the existing governance structure at every level from
the local bodies to the federal. Compressing the political and constitutional history of a
state like Pakistan into a single argument is a difficult task.
One could not ignore the ’dilemmas of Pakistan's emergence as an Independent
nation-state’ nor can one avoid the ambitious personalities who used the state to
overthrow nascent democratic establishment. Pakistan has been a theater where the
political actors "succumbed to the scramble for power and privilege’, and in so doing,
they did great damage to the nation, and especially, to the constitution and
democracy from the Harvardian Group to Islamisational Majlis-i-Shoora. Another
twenty years down the road, General Musharraf took over on October 12, 1999, and,
as could have been expected, did exactly as his predecessors did in the fractured
Pakistan's history. They all worked to ’constitutionalise their personal positions and
their immediate requirements of power contributed to exacerbating this sad state of
affairs’ {1}. The political story riddled with the overriding role of constitution making,
and its negation in unstable political system. It is the story of a country in which with
the constitution and without the constitution, no norms were followed and the major
part of governance collapsed due to the introduction of different, overriding constitu-
tional experiments.
On August 14 1947, the British transferred power to an independent, Islamic
Republic of Pakistan. The legal basis for this new nation was the Government of India
Act of 1935 and the Indian Independence Act of 1947. The 1935 act was lengthy
document, which has since been governed by a series of detailed basic laws, none of
which has been given proper effect. For example, the Simon Report, the basement of
the Act, proposed federal system, which did not handle properly. The Founder of the
nation, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah became the governor-general. The
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was born without the formal design of law." Its con -
ception lay in the British Cabinet Plan of May 1946 and the Viceroy’s statement of
June 3, 1947, which announced the agreement to partition the sub-continent. The
1946 Plan envisioned a single Constituent Assembly for undivided India. This was to
be an assembly of representatives chosen by the elected members of the provincial
 Legislative Assemblies with the addition of delegates from the princely states." { 2 } .
the polity of Pakistan with interim constitution and the powerful governor-general
started its so-called independent political path. After the death of the founder and the
'personification of the state', an out standing lawyer, Pakistan faced several factors
militated against constitutional democratic governance. Some political authors
described it the political decay, which started from the early years of Pakistan. In fact,
from the beginning, several antis -political forces were arrayed against the
development of constitutionally based political system, which gripped the new country
just after independence.
During the early period, the new country also faced innumerable problems of
governance and survival. It was thus understandable that the task of constitution
making was not its first concern .But a sense of responsibility towards the
constitutional governance was lacking in the people and the leaders, which
succumbed the country to malevolent acts of abrogating, holding in abeyance, and
violating various constitutions in the history of Pakistan. The civil and military despots
created fragmentation in the weak political culture. A serious political void developed
which could not be effectively filled either by the new group of national leaders or by a
stable party system. The nation adopted the first constitution in March 1956. The
eleven years without constitution means no national election and no elected leaders.
There was only the high political drama played in the corridors of powers, and the
acts of omission and commission committed by those who came to invite after the
death of Jinnah.
A good political system, with the help of good leadership, is required to do two
things in particular: to bring about governments which introduce happy citizens by
means of a civil society structured by the constitution, and to save citizens from
rapacious regimes. The political system and the framing of the constitution are bound
to work together. They develop their sound relation with the citizen and the state. If
the constitutional process were not attached with political instruments, the result
would be an invitation to social strife, political tension, and civil war in a state.
The absence of one disturbs the other; if one progresses, the other also flourishes, and
vices versa. However, in Pakistan the search for suitable constitution has become an end
in itself. The political leaders, far from looking to the needs of the future constitution, have
always constitutional seed their position of power.
Pakistan at present is like a rudderless ship tossing about in high waters. Beside
the economic crises, the political chaos, and atmosphere of insecurity, sectional fighting
and social disarray, Pakistan has lost its moorings of constitutionalism and is at present
a country without a stable identity of its own constitution and 'must be classified with the
weaker political entities. It is true that ever since its creation; Pakistan has been ruled by
a coterie of rich and influential power seekers. All power and prestige is monopolized by
elite of landlords, jagirdars, waderas and industrialists and, above all, by senior army
and civilian bureaucrats. These elite constituted small fraction of the
population,inheritingthelegacy of power politics from their outgoing masters. This clique
has literally stepped into the shoes of the former British rulers and to trying to maintain
the status quo. That display of authoritarian pride and socio-political disequilibrium has
dented the country's constitutional democratic objectives. Although, the country have
laced by 'Controlled Democracy,' Basic Democracy' ’Public Democracy' and 'Islamic
Democracy', "the experiments have neither bridged essential differences, nor reduced
hostility between rulers and ruled, or between those in power and those aspiring to
replace them.' Frankly speaking, the system hanged the country "in the balance
between orderly procedures of constitutional democracy and the arbitrariness of growing
authoritarianism." {3}
The painful story started in 1954, when the governor-general Ghulam Mohammed
with the help of West Pakistan officials, trained in the autocratic bureaucratic traditions
of British India, dissolved the assembly and created the smooth path for the military’s
 domination which has characterized much of Pakistan's history. The dissolution of the
assembly ended the existence of dominion constitution, which had served as the basis
for governing since independence. Though Pakistan was achieved on the basis of
constitutional and democratic process, after the sudden death of its founder, the
bureaucratic clique disfigured it. Despotism of this kind - 'the thirst for arbitrary power' -
could be checked, as had happened already in most of the democratic countries, by
mechanisms of constitutional supremacy, secret ballots and frequent elections, without
continues elections one can not consider free and effective expressions of the voter's
wishes. But in Pakistan the elections also created political configuration and
manipulation of public power because they are infrequent because the institutional
underpinnings for such experience are lacking. The first real election that Pakistan has
experienced prompted a civil war and the second cost Prime Minister Life and plunged
the-country into deeper problems. Knowing about these problems one can stated that
Pakistan's political history is indeed little more than a register of the despots, and their
follies and mis -fortunes of their sickness.
Although, Jinnah was a constitutionalist yet the hurried to adopt the powers of the
governor-general, laid down the Government of India Act, 1935. Under the Act, " the
governor-general ’in his discretion’ was empowered to choose and appoint his Council
of Ministers and he could dismiss them also acting under his discretion. Those functions
of the governor-general with respect to Defense, Ecclesiastical, and External Affairs,
and those in relation to the Tribal Areas were to be exercised under his discretion.
Those function and powers which the governor-general was to ’exercise under his
individual judgment' were defined by the Act as his special responsibilities."} The powers
and the responsibilities of governor-general were coercive and the institutions were
weaker than the personality who introduced his power under the coercive act of 1935.
The authority could be matched with the founder, but not suitable for the later elite. The
governor-general was the successor of British Viceroy, also elected by the proletariats.
A constitutionalist who fought for the partition and altered the geographical and
ideological entity of the subcontinent. The adoption and the modification of the interim
constitution, along with the Indian Independence Act, 1947, had some guidance to
structure the governance of a new country.
But after the death of the founder, the aristocracy, in collaboration with the army and the
provincial leadership, wrecked constitutional democracy hijacked political aspirations of
the people. The power-hungry men conspired against constitution and a stable political
system.
The ugly politics of feudal-turned politicians opened the path and intervention by martial
law develops the causation for the birth of various governments and constitutional ad-
hocism in Pakistan. On the other side, India was successive in drafting its own
constitution by 1950- 51. Constitution -making in Pakistan became a unique record of
constitution breaking. The interim constitution was adopted to survive till a new
constitution was framed by the constituent assembly of Pakistan. "Pakistan's
constitutional tragedy is that not a single constitution has been allowed to out live the
stipulated tenure of the government of its founding father. This is understandable,
because not even the founding fathers of various 'late' constitutions in Pakistan had any
respect for their own products. They found excessive faults with their own brainchild and
finally mutilated the creation of their own constitutional engineering." {5}

In the civilised society, the people want to protect their fundamental rights and to
promote common interests for the betterment of an orgnised political entity. For the
successful evolution of political entity to suppress anarchy they use some a set of
principles, which is called constitution. A country's constitution is a body of laws,
customs and conventions that define the composition and powers of the organs of the
state, and that regulate the relations of the various state organs to one another and to
the private citizens and the regulatory interface between the citizens and their
governments. Constitutions are just like a supreme instrument by which government can
be controlled and ensured stability, social justice, and welfare of the citizens and to set
limits on the arbitrary powers of levers of the state. Constitution expresses the supreme
will of the people and for its continuity, emotional attachment of the society is most
essential, the judiciary, the government instruments, and the citizens are the parts of a
socio-political community where constitution prevails. Having systematic quality,
constitution of the country gives effect to its various parts and tries to harmonise them,
so as to make it an effective and efficient instrument for the governance of the state.
However, in Pakistan the search for a constitution is the search of personal liking and
disliking. The constitution-making in Pakistan is a long ’transparent garment clinging to
the body politics’ {6} or the constitutions are like spider’s webs which stand firm when
any light, yielding object falls upon them, while a larger thing breaks through them and
escapes. The socio-political virtues, which should be essential for the country's
leadership, completely lacked in their stature. Though the constitution is the full and free
political expression of an organized society yet in Pakistan's political course, it became
the tortuous and chequered type of document which can be tom.

The problem of constitutional governance in Pakistan is closely inter-related with

the question that runs the country. Its political history like many of its neighbors is one of
frequent crises and incomplete resolution, woven into the texture of its history. 'For
almost five decades, conflicts over the role of religion in society, democracy in the polity
and the transformative capacities of state institution in the economy have been the
underpinnings for a politics of unique opportunity and often, profound division and
dismay.' Though, the country was achieved after the long political and constitutional
struggle. But its political and constitutional virtue imbalance due to its internal power
structure conflicts. The three pillars of powers in the country - army generals, bureau-
crats and feudal politicians developed 'an alliance defensive and offensive against the
interest of the people; of the milling one and the sub-ruling few against the subject
many.'{7} though, parliamentary democracy introduced after the implementation of
Indian act 1935, the politicians played a secondary role and the generals, and
bureaucrats largely controlled the state with the help of judiciary. The authority, which
was introduced after the emergence of governor-general's powers, which could
manhandle the Prime Minister, is the starting point of the chequered role of history of
primeministership in the country. For the Pakistani politics, a constitutionally elected
representative seems to be a product that could be easily flexible for every ruling elite.
The identity of the Machiavellian art of power have always destroyed the values of
legitimacy and introduced outstrip personal rivalry, internecine strife, and regional or
professional arrogance.
The non-representative institutions, not familiar for country's independence started
struggle for their own needs. In the 1954, 1958, 1969, 1980s, and in the 1999, the army
generals with the help of bureaucracy and feudal politicians, in the name of the
development, Islamisation and for the engineering of the political, constitutional norms,
manipulated politicians and democratic principles. From General Ayub Khan to General
Pervaiz Musharraf, the successive military governments bypassed the constitutional
system. "Even the elected regimes, largely motivated by personal whim, occasionally
used authoritarian method or simply became paralysed - to the detriments of the
democratic process. Whereas generals and civil servants have played havoc with
national institutions, politicians have fluctuated between greed and vendetta, which also
dented national cohesion."{8}. The authoritarian nature of that system was laced with
popular tradition, which is Islam. The 'Great Leaders' used Islamic divine right theory like
bougainvillea-covered for their personal prerogative walls, which seemed as 'surrogates
for the real thing.'
Pakistan has been the focus of a historiography with reference to its struggle
because the Muslims enjoyed the advantage of being a developed society based
culturally on Islam. Islamic ideology is the motivating factor for the development of
conflict between the Hindu-Muslim populations. The Muslims accepted its political,
bureaucratic, and religious leaders because they were trying to create Pakistan in the
name of Islam for the legitimacy of their cultural and socio-political rights. Islamisation of
the country, however, whose immediate past had been a long period of colonial rule, in
which westranisation had penetrated deep into the mind and thought of the educated
classes, was an uphill task. The inheritance of two different political traditions created
the problems like delay in the making of the constitution. Due to the experience of
colonial democratic theory and Islamic ideology, the constitution-makers wanted to
make a draft in which they could maintain Western parliamentary government with the
Islamic principles. The moderate leadership was argued the synthesis of democratic
theory and Islamic principle on the other hand Islamic theologians wanted to establish a
puritanical Islamic state based on the traditional interpretations of Islam. There were
also political experts who were talking for a secular state, which required total
mobilisation of the liberal resources of the country. It required tremendous amount of
determination among the leaders. John Esposito has explained Pakistan's religions
dilemma in these words.

“The crux of the problem was that unless one was prepared to simply opt for a
revivalism that called for a classical Islamic state or to advocate his adoption of a
modem secular state, Pakistan Muslims faced a formidable task. Theirs would not be
the path of simple adaptation of on model but adaptation, not a mere following or
imitation of a past Islamic ideal of a present secular reality but a breaking of new ground
- creative construction of a blueprint for a modem state and society which incorporated
and realised the Islamic sentiments, ideals, and values upon which mass support or
Pakistan's independence was based from."{9}.
In September 1948, just about a year after the new state came into existence, it
was deprived of the leadership of the Quaid-e-Azam. The leaders of the Muslim League
were politically weak, and their modernist tendencies, awakened the religious circles of
the country to a realisation that if they did not use the current popular fervor and
enthusiasm for an Islamic state, the whole meaning and purpose for which Muslims
fought and made countless sacrifices would be lost. Even the Objective Resolution was
criticised by different sections as it was developed partly from colonial legacy and partly
from reaction to it.
The Objectives Resolution was the first constitutional step by Liaquat Ali Khan,
passed in March 1949,based on the word of sovereignty as it was opined that the
'Resolution had made 'God sovereign, the people sovereign, the people sovereign,
parliament sovereign, and the state sovereign in Pakistan’. {10} The Resolution was
packed with such in built contradictions, perhaps the answer of ’the early
accomplishment of the task of constitution-making by the Indian assembly in 1948 put
an obligation on the people of Pakistan to exert pressures on their government and the
constituent assembly to evolve their own Constitution as well’} The Ulema and the
levelheaded politicians were availing opportunity for their slogan-mongering campaign.
The Resolution started to satisfy the Ulema and declared that the Sovereignty over the
entire universe belonged to God, and the state of Pakistan had been delegated through
its people, to enable the Muslims to order their lives in accordance with Islam. It was
also stated that in the absence of new constitution the Objectives Resolution would
guide the activities of the government. Though the Resolution was not secular but it
could not gain the appreciation of the people and the religionists.
The Resolution, entitled' Aims and Objectives of the Constitution’, Though it was
declared that Islam would be the foundation stone of the new state yet the heated
debates started for the polarisation of constitution. Far from serving any national or
constitutional purpose, the Resolution generated many fundamental queries such as
how the injections of Shariah should be incorporated in the country's non-theocratic
political framework. ‘The second draft Constitution submitted in 1952, after the death of
Liaquat Ah Khan, extended the promise by incorporating in it the so-called ’repugnancy
clause' in order to make sure that no laws were repugnant to Islam. {12} The Ulema of
were against this Islamic-coated process of constitutionalism. On the other hand the
secularists intended to create a constitutional .democracy fashioned on the Western
model. In fact as Aziz Ahmad says they created a, “state of the Muslims, not an Islamic
state". {13} this was something, which the religious leaders were not prepared to accept.
The creation of Pakistan was an almost unique experiment in nation building: Here was
a country, created on the basis of Islamic ideology but after the creation, Pakistan faced
the most serious ideological crises in its early life. In the course of constitutional
debates, the political elite were divided into warring factions, and these factions delayed
the process of constitution- making in the early years of independence.
These ideological complications, were the mattes that feaase kept not only
academics but the whole country was busy in speculation and discussions because the
religion became a program to structure the constitutional government? Although "it was
not a program but a slogan during three years of the growth of Pakistan movement
between 1940 and 1949". {14}

The Ulema who were formidable, "had little notion of the structure of government,
allocation of powers, decision making by discussion and majority vote. They, however,
understood their Islam well in which there is but one right answer and politics becomes
an endeavor to find that right answer which must conform to the will of God". {15} It was
the era of ideological confusions, which re-maintained when the failure of Objectives
Resolution, and the Interim Report to satisfy the ulema, made the political climate in the
country very tense. The political situation in Pakistan continued to deteriorate. The
opposition from the religious groups at this time led by Jamat-i-Islami. The Jamat
perhaps was the only religious party, which had not openly denounced the Objective
resolution and their attitude towards the politicians was somewhat conciliatory. “For the
first time, also, Maudodi began to make appeal to the masses as well as to the educated
classes, sending preachers and spreading literature in the villages of West Pakistan’s
countryside. There was no group in Pakistan at the time so unified, disciplined, or sure
of what it wanted, certainly not the Muslim League. The Government soon found itself
bombarded with demands for the creation of an Islamic state, and the Jamaat-i-Islami
emerged as a genuine political party in opposition to the Muslim League government,
and with the Islamic state as it platform." {16}
The country was confused, the government was highjack by the external factors
when a new drama was witnessed and wrote in the pages of the history when in the
process of making constitution, governor-general, Ghulam Mohammed, 'backed by
Choudhry Mohammed Ali,' remove Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin, a Bengali and
dissolved the assembly in October 1954. The dissolution of assembly was an
unconstitutional act. It was 28 October 1954, Ghulam Mohammed also ordered the
police to bar the members of the Constituent Assembly from entering their meeting- hall
in Karachi. ” This was the first step towards ultimate bureaucratisation and consequent
militarisation of Pakistan’s political system. This political development understandably
created legal, political, constitutional and administrative crises."! 17} Despite the political
and constitutional handicaps, however, a new Constitution was adopted by the second
Constituent Assembly and promulgated in 1956. The Constitution of 1956 provided for a
federal system of government based on two units, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, in
which were merged all the former provinces and states of the western wing of the
country. It incorporated a new clause in the preamble {the Objective Resolution}
referring to the declaration by the 'Founder of Pakistan’ that 'Pakistan would be a
democratic State based on Islamic principles of social justice’ {Pal, Pakistan, Islam, and
Economics. P5} Due to the bureaucratic maneuvering of the politicians and ’the political
instability that had plagued the country from 1948’, {18} the Constitution, 1956 remained
in operation for only about two years and died in its infancy.
The second attack on the constitutional process was on October 7, 1958, when
General Iskander Mirza with the support of the military abrogated the Constitution and in
the turn was he removed by military. And, on October 27, 1958 General. Ayub Khan
assumed the powers of President same day. This act marked the transformation of a
bureaucratic state system into a military regime in which the bureaucrats came to play a
complimentary rather than a dominant role.
The causation of this action was the failure of the old Constitution. It was argued
that the abrogation of the Constitution was necessary for the nation’s aspirations. The
President said on one occasion. “As you know, the constitution which came into force,
this day in 1956 did not work at all. It was an amorphous document without a hard core
and a solid base." M. Ayub Khan also emphasized; “we are not going to make this
mistake again. What we must have is a constitution which is sensible, workable, and
suits the genius of our country" {19} Such autocratic views about constitutions have
been expressed by the different leaders at different times.

It is an essential component of the constitutional crises that the Pakistani State has
endured through most of its life span. An important reason of this political and
constitutional decay was the imbalance experiments with various constitutions and
political structures. For instance, the 1956 were a blend of the presidential and
parliamentary forms of government. There was no provincial autonomy. It was overly
centralised and no respect for bicameralism. The President in the new constitution was
to a figurehead, but his powers and privileges were curbed considerably by spelling out
the details of the working of the constitutional machinery exhaustively with parliament
being reduced to an ineffective entity which could not even elects Prime Minister. These
blended principles were abrogated when military argued that these parliamentary
democratic set-up is not ’sensible, workable’, and against the genius of the society.
However, the old constitution was successful and was inspiring for the demand of an
Islamic state and the western political democracy. It was complete document for the
development of political under standing between the demands of regional autono my and
that of a strong central government. It was not the failure of constitutional democracy; it
was the failure of leadership, which could not overcome the disintegration of a strong
national party and the emergence of parochial political factions. After Jinnah "all wielded
significant powers but their capabilities were linked to mundane activities, not to
charismatic charm.”{20}.
They only recognised their personal seeking, introduced that kind of political
friction. The old Constitution was reversed when the military with the collaboration of
civilian constitutionalist intelligentsia drafted the new one. In 1962, the new document
came into existence and imposed a unitary, presidential system of government, with
President Ayub Khan. A new experiment in ’controlled democracy’ started in the country.
Ayub Khan convinced and tried to convince the people that democracy was not suited to
the ’genius' of the people of Pakistan. His solution to that was 'the Basic Democracy',
which ostensibly sought to introduce democracy at the grass roots level but was actually
another name for the local bodies system. "This new Constitution was not drafted by any
elected Constituent Assembly, as had been done in the past, promulgated by one man,
and perhaps designed for one man” {21}. The constitution was different from the 1956
constitution in that it was presidential in form and all powers were concentrated in the
hands of the President. After the constitution was promulgated, political parties were
revived and now a new faction of the Muslim League, the Convention Muslim League
came into being with General Ayub as its head. Ayub also won the elections by a
landslide, with the votes of the Basic Democrats. But the victory has continued to grope
through a series of diverse crises during the era of its political existence. Khalid Bin
Sayeed observed about the era in these words: "President Ayub and his government
take great pride in having created a political system which has ensured both political
stability and economic development. But one still wonders whether the unabsorbed
regional and other political demands and the new forces generated by economic
development will dislocate the existing system". {22}
The last days of Ayub’s regime were gloomy and beclouded and confusion and
restlessness prevailed in the country. Urban-based demonstrations involving student
and other against the government and culminating in a general strike caused one
Western journalist to write: “The fact remains that in four short months, an inchoate
popular uprising had brought down an entrenched regime and not even the armed
forces dared to intervene .... After a decade of army coups in the developing nations,
military regimes have been forced to give way to democracy and there could be little
doubt that this was what Pakistanis wanted," {23} Joseph Lelyveld, The End of Ayub -
And An Era," The New York Times, February 23, 1969. Bhutto, who praised Ayub Khan
on different occasions and advised him for his unconstitutional steps, bitterly accused
Ayub and exploited Tashkent Declaration to its limit. However, the succession in
Pakistan was orderly one, passing from one military official to another. Ayub's
successor, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, Commander-in Chief of the
Pakistan army, accepted Ayub's resignation.
Almost immediately, Yahya abrogated the 1962 Constitution, banned all political
activity, and dismissed the national and provincial assemblies, issued martial law
regulations and finally (April 1, 1969 retroactivity proclaimed himself President of
Pakistan. The change of guard was unconstitutional act. The people who were caged in
Ayub's dictatorial devil house, found themselves in the damaging grip of 'Yahya Khan's
Legal framework Order (LFO). General Yahya Khan held election on the basis of one-
man- one-vote and in the result, the two triumphant political parties were the Awami
League in the East Pakistan and Pakistan’s people Party - PPP in West Pakistan. The
Awami League of Shaikh Mujibur Rehman captured the majority of seats in the National
Assembly (160 out of 300) of Pakistan on the basis of Six Points Program which
contemplated a confederation between the two wings of the country with maximum
autonomy, leaving only three subjects with centre. The demand for provincial autonomy
cried against the insensitive centre and became the vital root for separation. It is argued
that "neither Ayub nor Yahya had the statesmanship or political skill required resolving
the East Pakistan crises in accordance with the aspirations of the people of East
Pakistan. They filed to comprehend the rising tide of Bengali nationalism and failed to
meet it challenges in a realistic and flexible manner, with disastrous consequences for
Jinnah’s Pakistan. "{24}
The elections of 1970, created law and order situation on the matter of transfer of power.
Of course, the general elections of 1970 produced a new political configuration with
three distinct centers of power: The hawkish generals and their wounded spokesman,
Yahya Khan, indulged in the basic problem " to whom should they hand overpower in
view of the fact that there were two major claimants - Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto? The problem was further complicated because of a clash of
personalities as well as by the divergence in their political views regarding the future
constitution of Pakistan. Among the generals there appeared to be serious differences
over the question of the transfer of power."{25}This political confusion created law and
order situation in East Pakistan for which a military rather than a political solution was
sought, and in the result, India intervened and supported the demand of Shaikh Mujibur
Rehman for separation and independence. War was fought between India and Pakistan
and finally East Pakistan emerged as independent Bangladesh. The hawkish generals
and personal were taken as prisoners of war on December 16, 1971. The background
was a civil war in 1971, which resulted in partition and the formation of Bangladesh. It
was the culmination of political conflicts that had raged since Pakistan’s founding, and
that linger in Pakistan today. The ambition of Z. A. Bhutto’s was fulfilled when he rose to
the ultimate political height, to lead what remained of Pakistan.
 Such was the unfortunate politico-constitutional background of events against
which Bhutto era of Pakistan's political history began on December 20, 1971. The
remaining Pakistan under the leadership of Bhutto picked up the threads of political and
constitutional evolution. "There is now a people's government, and the people are the
ultimate masters" President Bhutto proclaimed. He also denounced that "a liar, a
drunkard, and a fraud" general conspired against the nation. The constitution of 1973
was framed with the consensus of political parties represented in the National Assembly
in which the autonomy of the remaining provinces was guaranteed but when it came to
the practical mechanics of managing centre-province relations, the Bhutto Government
demonstrated visible inability 1 to comprehend the need for a stable federal system and
democracy, preferring to rule by edicts.’ His style of authority and exercitation against
the Governments of NWFP and Baluchistan started like centre lover than a man of a
people, which caused considerable trouble to him throughout his tenure.

"It is interesting to observe that Bhutto assumed authority during a state of acute
crisis after the tragic dismemberment of Pakistan and was ultimately forced to quit the
seat of power, leaving the country in a still more acute political crises. Another common
element in the dramatic appearance and still more grotesque exit of Bhutto from the
Pakistani political scene was the fact that he assumed power from one general and
finally lost it to another one" {26 } who after suspending the 1973 Constitution imposed
martial law in the country.
In 1977, General Zial-ul-Haq, who was Chief of Army Staff, promulgated martial
law after suspending the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and fired all
federal ministers, ministers of state, advisers of the prime minister, and provincial
governors and chief ministers. Yet now he told the nation that * neither have I any
political ambitions nor does the Army want to be distracted from its profession of
soldiering.... My sole aim is to organise free and fair elections which would be held in
October this year...After the polls, power will be transferred to the elected
representatives of the people. I give a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this
schedule.’ This was for the first time that the Constitution was suspended and not
abrogated as was done on two previous occasions. Zia hoped that’ the judiciary will
extend wholehearted cooperation to me'. The Judiciary, as in 1958 held that martial law
was an extra-constitutional step, which was valid for a short time on the touchstone of
doctrine of necessity, including amendment of the constitution, subject to the judicial
review of all these actions by the Supreme Court. Due to this judicial protection, General
Zia-ul-Haq, changed the constitutional flow when he introduced “8th Amendment to the
1973 Constitution, made the presidency in to a powerful authority with the discretion to
dismiss the Prime Minister at will and dissolve the National Assembly and appoint the
Armed Forces chiefs. {27} Safdar Mahmood says about the Eight Amendments that it
was made to provide for " a blanket and legal and constitutional protection to all orders,
actions, decisions and policy measures adopted by the martial law authorities, including
the judgments of the military courts, at any levels”. {28}When Zia died in a plane crash
on! 7 August 1988, it was assumed that another Marshal Law was imminent and an
opportunity was available for General Beg to assume control of the country. Beg could
not take over, as there were differences of opinion amongst the generals about military
takeover. It is true that the democracy was the first choice for political survival but also
polarised between pro- Bhutto and pro-Zia factions. Although several civilian
governments are being formed, with alliances and counter- alliances may be taken to
develop politicisation in the minds of masses, but could not solve the governance crisis
and failed to establish an acceptable, enduring political order. The political instability, the
biased attitude of the politicians and, constitutional reshuffles erected the boundaries of
newly established marshal law, the new regime wanted to achieve good government.
However, the dilemma of nation- building has not been solved and the constitution is
waiting for new orders. These tendencies are deep rooted and it ensured also that there
was a hidden hand of army on civil affairs after the 1985 election and the crash of 17
August 1988. As Barrister Makhdoom Ali Khan opines that: ”... the army has such a
large monetary stake in the country that it will never allow a populist civilian government
to interfere with the status Quo. A civilian government may be permitted to continue only
so far as it does not interfere with the financial interests of the army. Only a revolution
may bring about a change in this state of affairs. Any civilian government brought into
office by normal sedate democratic channels will neither have the strength nor will it be
permitted to peruse a political or economic policy which the military does not regard as
conductive to its interests." {29}
The painful story of power is started from the powers of governor-general. The
constitution is not the powerful document in our country, being a secondary document it
was neglected. Pakistanis have for all these five decades lived under alternating spells
of civilian and military rule.

A democratic system is only tried for a few years and then people are told that the
system under which they were governed is not compatible with their needs and
aspirations and would require to be changed. 'The changed system has barely struck
root when there has been yet another upset at the top, leading to another round of
changes and inevitably to a period of uncertainty and confusion. 1 Indeed, due to
ignorance, constitutional democracy came to be regarded, in some circles, as utopia. It
is, due to some constitutional provisions that gave the power to those who were power
hungry to suspend or amend the document. One can start it from the Government of
India Act, 1935, as adopted by Pakistan on 14 August 1947, in which the Governor
General was the most powerful authority, and thereafter the authority adopted as
particular constitutional necessity in the Pakistan's constitutions of 1956 and 1962 and
of the interim constitution of 1972, till 1973 which has been suspended twice and
amended, at least, 'several time’.
The national legislature for this nation, the Constituent assembly of Pakistan,..."
was born without the formal blessing of law Its conception lay in the British cabinet
Mission Plan 1946 and the Viceroy’s statement of June 3, 1947, which announced the
agreement to partition the subcontinent. The 1946 Plan envisioned a single Constituent
assembly for undivided India. This was to be an assembly of representatives chosen by
the elected members of the princely Legislature assemblies with addition of delegates
from the princely states." {30} These kind of extra-constitutional, confusions which
started from country’s First Constituent Assembly developed not only contradictions but
also conflicts between the provinces and the centre. The highly centalised structure of
the country was soon attacked and subjected to severe criticism and strain. The
centrifugal forces seemed to be getting much stronger than the centripetal ones.
Different regional- political movements started, which also complicated the political and
constitutional governance in the country. The centre- provinces have many deep-rooted
dimensions. The tensions between the centre and the provinces not only depended on
political instability, but also related to administrative, economic and constitutional set up
of the state. The founders of Pakistan conceived the state as a federal democratic state.
The constitutional documents of pre -independence India, and Quaid-e- Azam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah's statements and other relevant sources can attest this view.
The federal system having merits and demerits is the system, which creates and
integrates the political relations between the centre and federating units. It is a device to
unite diverse ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups under one general government and
several regional governments for the purpose of accommodating their conflicting
pressures of unity and diversity in such a way that matters of common good necessity
and progress and prosperity of the entire nation may be looked after and power in
respect of such matters may be vested in Federal Government. In Pakistan, the
constitution-engineers could not draft a pure federal constitution. Although, for historical,
ethnic and linguistic reasons, a federal structure best suited Pakistan but a federal
political structure was never fully realised in Pakistan. The Constitutions, which were
introduced in the country, were not the federal in spirits, not the federal constitutions.
The plural society of Pakistan has regional differences and contradictions, which
are becoming sharper with the passage of time. One can not deny the fact, that
regionalism in Pakistan is more dominant than the force of nationalism. It is a political
dilemma of Pakistan, that the regional and nationalities' movements working for
provincial autonomy do so like the pressure groups, causing intermittent imposition of
martial laws. The despots used them for their own greedy purposes. It was true that the
constitution of 1956 and 1962 were based upon the principle of parity to create a
balance of power and sharing arrangements at the central level but their makers didn't
solve the problem or not command to use ’ device by which a system of double
government is made to*separate in one and the same time'. Most of the regionalist
criticized this scheme, especially in East Pakistan who was critical of parity system
because they saw in it an effort to deprive them of their due share in the political
institutions of Pakistan.
They had long been demanding an end to the parity and introduction of democratic
principle of representation on the population basis. The troika of Pakistan took decisions
to redress the long-standing grievance, which end its civil war. This civil war and the
intervention of India caused the dismemberment of the country and East Pakistan was
converted into an independent and sovereign state of Bangladesh. Like East Pakistan,
the other provinces of Pakistan was raised their regional slogans and the political pun-
dits are ignoring the unfortunate voices of provincial autonomy. The spirit of federalism
and the rules of co-existence were sacrificed at the altar of ambitions of 'Great Leaders'.
As Pakistan-based Tahir Amin of the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad wrote about
the fear of that ’fragile syndrome' which developed in the minds of intellectuals, not
political pundits. He worried: The Bangladesh syndrome continues to haunt the
Pakistani decision-makers, the North- West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sind and
Baluchistan may also follow the precedent set by the Bangladesh movement." {31}
Though the constitutional history of Pakistan reflects the tortuous and chequered
course of the country yet different constitutional experiments were introduced. The
purpose of these schemes was to dominate the regional conflicts and to provide a
formal federal structure. "These schemes failed* in general, due to two basic reasons.
First, the contradictions of the plural society of Pakistan were sought to be resolved
through constitutional devise in isolation from the socioeconomic and the political
realities, and, secondly, they could not even satisfy the legal notions of federalism.
Moreover, these constitutional schemes, though different in form, were similar in their
basic content."{32}Frankly speaking, the system, constitutionally visualised as federal,
was deliberately allowed the tendencies into a highly centralised and non-federal
system. In the three basic constitutions of 1956, 1962, 1973, we can find federal articles
for the bond of Pakistan's national identity, but sacrificed for the strong centre by the
strong leaders, ’thus making a farce of provincial autonomy.’
The Constitutional perches, is to develop a system of choosing and authorizing
’undespotic’ governments, that is, sets of legislators and law-enforcers who secure the
kinds of law which maximize happiness. But in Pakistan's constitutional history is the
development of despotism - 'the thirst for arbitrary power', which could be checked, as
had happened already in the civilised countries, but the absence of the " rules of the
game” in Pakistan's political and constitutional scenario has been the failure to evolve a
democratic political culture and there recurrence of military intervention in Pakistan's
political life span. The absence of a constitutional democratic culture has tragically
manifested itself on several occasions in Pakistan's politics when the political parties
have revolved around personalities rather than policies, and the politicians, preferring
army intervention than to solve petty rivalries and accommodation with their political
opponent.
We can find different examples of accommodated politicians with army generals
as in 1969, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto preferred to extend support to the army officers on
the question of federal parliamentary structure. Bhutto himself faced this political issue
in 1977, when the religious and other political parties preferred the option of military rule
rather than the continuance of a weakened political civil government. Due to this
ambitious Zia-ul-Haq was able to order the hanging of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Pakistanis are
used to seeing their political leaders go after their opponents.-Military ruler Gen. Zia-ul-
Haq arrested the then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was hanged in
controversial murder conviction. When Sharif came to power, he attacked Benazir, and
his husband on corruption charges. Both were convicted. She is in self-exile, and her
husband is in jail on a murder charge. Most Pakistanis were relieved when Musharraf
toppled Sharif, whose government was ripe with corruption. Having majority in the
parliament, he has lost public support.

People thought he is a corrupt and power hungry politician who was more
interested in strengthening his family rule than promoting parliamentary democracy.
'The army had tested the blood of politics' and it’s wounded political animals. Though
the take over based on very personal rivalry, but reminded to state that the Prime
Minister and his bureaucracy betrayed the people and the dignity of the state. 'The
country became the mess of total collapse, as stated army spokesman, when Musharraf
has wasted no time in consolidating his power. Nothing destroyed Sharifs prestige and
credibility more than corruption, which used by the army as the ultimate symbol of
distortion. The parliament remains suspended since the coup. Musharrafs opponents
worry that he may be inching towards martial law. "There is a gradual tightening of the
grip," says Afrasiab Khattak, chairman of the human rights commission of Pakistan. He
is finding a civilian wardrobe where the general’s uniform is keep hanging it.
The government of Nawaz Sharif was admittedly corrupt and incompetent, but the
country was no more on the brink of disaster in October 1999 that it is today. But the
Supreme Court is currently pleased for having legitimised the regime and his uniform.
The court had almost legitimised two other coups on the basis of a ' doctrine of
necessity' and waxed by the usurper to the legitimate the capacity of courts. 'Their
judgments have often supported the government of the day, presumably to retain a
degree of future institutional autonomy. 'This was their chosen path through the 1950s
when there was no constitution;' during the 1958-1960, when Ayub engineered a coup
and the constitution was a moving target; and in 1977 when general Zia-ul- Haq struck
on July 5, the superior courts introduced constitutional ground for the coup. In their
'doctrine of necessity.' what kind of necessity did it have in mind? Necessity is the
argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves, said British Prime Minister William Pitt.
Going by this aphorism, a survey of
Pakistan's judicial history, from 1950 to the year 2001, renders its rulers as tyrants, its
judiciary as their toothless minions, and its citizens as slaves. One after the other,
judgments have been passed validating the rule of dictatorial rulers like Liaqaut Ali,
Ghulam Muhammad, Iskandar Mirza, Ayub Khan, Bhutto, Zia, Sharif and Musharraf.
The Great Leaders, who became the burden and super ordinate powers. All claimed
that they had intervened to ensure country's continued existence and good order. Paula
R. Newberg rightly stated that 'the story Pakistan's politics has been told in many ways
for many different purposes. Each narrative chooses new victors and victims, internal
and external.'{32} This statement, however, is the theory of Pakistan’s perturbed political
system that the dependent judiciary, the weak and corrupt politicians, and the political
parties, without their program and policies, invite the blunt force of military rule and
martial law in the damaging features of Pakistan's political system in which ’the
constitutionalist could not provided the stable draft for the citizens and the state.’
The very transparent example of dependent judiciary started in 1956 with famous
Maulvi Tamizuddin case, which challenged Governor-general Ghulam Mohammad’s
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. In an appeal against the Sindh High Courts
judgment, justice Munir, the then chief justice, validated Ghulam Muhammad’s action.
Two years later, the same judge performed a similar service for President Iskander
Mirza when the latter abrogated the Constitution of 1956, imposing martial law on
October 7, 1958 and appointing General Ayub Khan as chief martial law administrator.
In what came to be known as the dosso Case, the Supreme Court accorded recognition
to the martial law regime even though this was not an issue that was raised before the
court. "Victorious revolution or a successful coup d’état is an internationally recognised
method of changing a constitution," pronounced Justice Munir, thus legalising President
Iskander Mirza’s move. Ironically^ even before their with which judgment was written
could dry, Iskander Mirza was thrown out by Ayah Khan.''{Idrees Bakhtir, the Herald,
June 2000}. And the judges were taking the same words of oath “That I will preserve,
protect and defend the constitution of the Republic of Pakistan".
T
he trails are set in motion by insecure successors seeking to consolidate power by
eliminating rivals from the political scene For this kind of treason, the rulers hired
judges. Each act of elimination has opened a new Pandora's box that further
complicated the impoverished country’s future out-look. In a democratic society, the
judiciary is the comer- stone of law and justice and plays important roles in determining
country's fate but in the failed state like Pakistan it worked for the ruler’s necessity. The
court, as an independent branch of government, had no power or jurisdiction to allow
anyone to tamper with the constitution and the state. This balance of power has been
lost in Pakistan. The result has been repeated political collapses and constitutional vac -
uum.
It is true that in Pakistan several constitutional alterations introduced to solve the
problem. Most of the constitutionalists of the country depended mostly on the interim act
or to made readjustments, rather to understand the independent country's political
structures and made arrangements for the constitutional survival. The Act of 1935 is the
constitutional mirror in which almost all-constitutional faces of Pakistan reflect. The
political and constitutional shallow thinkers adopted it as the divine massage. Retired
Justice Durab Patel, was described this constitutional dependence on the pre-
independence draft in the interview in Weekly, viewpoint on 15 august 1985 as 'legal
fundamentalism' and Dr. Jaffar Ahmad , in his book Federalism in Pakistan: A
Constitutional Study argued that it was the main reason of country's constitutional
backwardness. He further stated " As a matter of fact, no other part of the Government
of India Act 1935 needed to done away with urgently after 1947 than the quantum of
provincial autonomy contained in its legislative lists, because it was Muslim League's
persistent demand that since the autonomy provided therein was insufficient, its area
should be widened."
The Act of 1935 was the complex Act, having three legislative lists i.e., federal,
provincial and the concurrent. The powers, which distributed in these lists, were not
simple and understandable. The coercive powers of governor-general for the
federal subjects like Defense, External Affairs, Ecclesiastical Affairs and the
Administration of Tribal Areas were more than the federating list. The provincial
legislature powers were deprived, and there right for autonomy. The federal
supremacy, the powerful governor-general and the complex and unusual division
of powers between the centre and provinces were the inherited legacy for the
independent constitutional experts, which can easily perceive by a layman. The
constitutions of 1956, 1962, and the constitution of 1973 and their alterations,
readjustments and changes are the reflection and extension of that inherited
constitutional dilemma which came from the Viceroy's Act. The constitutions like
1962 and 1973 contained with one and two lists respectively and the constitution-
makers made the same subjects in the legislative lists. They enlarged, reduced or
came across the lists in the matter of subjects so the number of subjects has
 varied in all constitutions of the country. The constitution of 1956 was the only
constitution which provided federal and provincial lists whereas the constitution of
1973, having the consensus of all national and provincial leaders, did not
introduced a provincial list .The constitution-makers drafted different constitutions,
engineered different schemes regarding the number of lists but the relation
between centre-province did not develop. The whole constitutional development
worked for centralisation. The centralization in Pakistan is the main cause for the
fractured political system. The political advocates of provincial rights exploited the
situation. The provincial leafs, who were committed to their personal vendetta and
greed than to any commitment to the provincial rights and the point is why other
groups not agitate when the whole constitutional system created by the 1973
constitution and its political governance was turned upside down. It was grossly
violated in 1977, 1985, 1997 and 1999 that did violence to the constitutional sprit
and basic scheme. There is virtually non-stop talkative violence of amending the
organic constitution by the current military rulers for the sake of prolongs life span
with the like- minded groups of politicians. This is the marriage of convenience
between the Strong Centre Lovers.

To the military minds the country is invariably takes priority over the constitution.
The constitution is important but the country is vital. To them any threat to the
integrity of the country is unacceptable and it deserves to be firmly handled. The
military act went unchecked because the pillars of the state were too weak to
question the role of the gun". {33} nothing is in the kitty," bemoans I. A. Rehman,
director of Pakistan's Human Rights Commission." We have had a military
dictatorship, we have had democracy, and we have had socialism. We have reached
the stage where no political theory will satisfy the people. We are a bankrupt state"
Imran Khan, the Pakistani cricketer who has thus far been unsuccessful as a
politician, describes the system as a “status quo of thieves safeguarding the interest
of thieves from the other divide." He recommended a two-year military regime to
cleanse the country. Even more worrying is the Supreme Court defending the
military take over and their supremacy over the constitution. This type of' state of
emergency' can be seen in the entire political span of the country. The country was
indulged in intrigues and power struggle, and it was staged in both the central and
provincial assemblies where the antics of the players made a mockery of
responsible decision making. The formation of a constitution for a state was one of
the urgent matters to be tackled, however the first Constituent Assembly was
created for this purpose and for the good, welfare state but the urgent task turned to
another path and the whole responsible knights started palace intrigues and power
struggle. The assembly was staged to draft a new and independent constitution. It
was indeed an optimistic notion to have expected this Assembly to perform the task
with requisite efficiency but the personal preoccupation, the level of competence and
the mode of operation of the landed barons in the assemble were for from suited to
an urgent formulation of a code of regulations to govern the country. The first
constitution was implemented in 1956 which short- was lived as discussed before.

Some concluding thoughts Pakistan inherited a colonial system of governance. The

foundations of which were rooted in the feudal-imperial system largely influenced by
the British Raj. The economy of the subcontinent remained agricultural and the
system of governance was designed to seek just the twin ends of collection of land
revenue and raising troops to fight an adversary. Government thus existed for the
sovereign and the governance paradigm was that the 'interest of the Crown must
never be sacrificed' The people will or welfare were non-issues and even their
existence was justified merely in relation to the twin objectives of the sovereign. All
 this needed to go through a radical change on independence. The entire governance
paradigm to be reversed to read, ' never should the interest of the people be
sacrificed'. Since doing so entailed fundamental change, Pakistan’s early leadership
could not find the stable environment necessary for effecting such profound change.
Soon, however, the ruling elite took over and finding themselves wearing ’crown' and
decided to maintain the status quo and only rewarded the governance paradigm to
read 'never should the interest of the ruling class be sacrificed'.

Lacking the advantage of neutrality that the coloniser enjoyed, the Pakistani ruling
class handled power without ethical restraints that led to political and constitutional
corruption. A gradual decline in the professional standards because of quality of the
intake led to deterioration in the provision of public service. The same phenomenon
overtook the corporate sector because of the nationalization of private banks and
industry in the early seventies. The consequent combination of corruption and
incompetence coupled with the emergence of unscrupulous political leaders, led to
the collapse of governance. ” The political process in the first decade of Pakistan's
existence was a diffused and unstable amalgam of feudal intrigues, under hand
maneuvers, changing loyalties and interminable regroupings and realignments of the
landed classes represented in National Assembly.

The economic organisation of the landed class, their historical background, their
parochial outlook and their self-sufficiency stood in the way of their acquiring a
national vision. The nation-state for them was more an abstraction; with local power
struggle a concrete reality" {34}

• The other confusion started over the question of Islam in the national polity. 'Two
different stands defined what an abiding debate is: the extent of Islamization of the
state structure as opposed to a loose delineation of the role of religion visa-a-vis the
constitutional and political structure prevailing in the country’. {Pakistan: Problems of
Governance, P.26.} The father of the Nation, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah,
explained constitutional norms for a new state, Pakistan, where religion would have
a role in individual and social life but not in the functioning of the state institutions.
When Liaquat Ali Khan, introduced the basic principles for the future constitution
{Objective Resolution}, the debates started and the religionists were started to
disturb the smooth running of the national polity and governance.
‘The opponents of the League were dubbed as the enemies of Islam and Muslims
were told that Pakistan would be an Islamic state drawing its inspiration and
guidance from the principles of the Quran and the Traditions of the Holy Prophet'{35}
I
• After the birth of Pakistan, The religionist demanded that Islam should govern in the
political structure of the new state. Not only the religionists talked about the Islamic
state but the ordinary man felt that the sacrifices he had made in 1947 were in the
Islamic faith and the promise of an Islamic state must now be fulfilled and enshrined
in the web of the new constitution. They were talking about the ideology, which were
never defined. Islam was employed to reject claim of ethnicity, and autonomy. Thus
it was suggested that the Muslim nationhood is neither based on geographical
boundaries nor social or linguistic similarities but religion, i.e. Islam. "The real factor
which sustains the state of Pakistan is the existence of a consciousness among the
people of belonging to each other because a large majority of them adheres to
common spiritual aspirations, i.e., faith of Islam."{36}

• Although the contact of Islam and the Western Civilisation began in the seventeenth
century, it entered a crucial stage only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
These diametrically opposed reactions between two schools of thoughts emerged in
Pakistan like a river of two parallel banks. The Islamists with undiluted conservatism
sought refuge in the asylum of old tradition and the modernists, on the other hand,
thought that the good political system could be achieved only adopting Western
political norms and constitutionalism. These two trends became more clear and
pronounced in the first decade of independence of Pakistan. This gave birth to an
ideological schism. And no one, after the death of Jinnah, was more capable in the
constitutional and political history of Pakistan, to make bridge the gulf between two
extremes.

• The question why Muslims want an Islamic state is a little bit a strange questions.
For Muslims should not and, as a matter of fact, could not as Muslims but want an
Islamic state. One reason why the managers of the state have relied on Islam is to
foster a sense of unity among the country's diverse provinces and peoples. Islam
and Jinnah have been superbly effective in keeping different Muslim provincial
factions, observers and those totally educated in the Western traditions and
education often criticised and also fails to understand the phenomenon. The slogans
for the introduction of Islamic Law and the establishment of the Islamic State are a
part and parcel of that overall movement for which the country established. It was
true that the between several objectives, Islam also the crescendo behind the
creation of Pakistan. And on the plea of this objective that" Pakistan not only means
freedom and independence but the Muslim Ideology which has to be preserved,
which has come to us as a precious gift and treasure and which we hope others will
share with us". {37}People who were waiting for the effective steps to overhaul in the
light of Islamic principles and to make a beginning in this direction. They were under
their inspiration that” in the case of Pakistan the whole raison d’être of the state is
Islam: it is Islam, alone which holds it together” {38} and sloganeering about the
constitution- making should have been expedited and earnestly carried on Islamic
lines. But, unfortunately, none of these steps was taken and protests and demands
began to pour in. It also caused in delaying the constitution making. Because one
can find the enormous problems which is lack of consensus about what kind of state
it should be.

• One can stated that Pakistan's history could be defined by uneasy relationships
between the state institutions and the masses. The people who were staging protest
and demands, but the ruler, on the other hand, instead of responding to their call,
started dilly-dallying tactics. The conflict which shaken to its roots, superficially,
treated to its political nature. But it was essentially an ideological and a cultural
conflict and can be understood only in a wider perspective. It is also true that
Pakistan came into existing inspire of the oppositions of the Ulema. But once it came
into existence the'ulema thought they had an opportunity to playa role in changing
its direction. The modem Muslims leaders, educated in the British universities, did
not, however, agree.

• It created an awkward situation and its Islamisation developed an awkward

expression-that seeks to analyse and the main focus of this research is on the
causation of political starvation in general and of unsmoothness of constitution in
particular.

The basic problems and their approach, which involved analysing constitutional
system, should be seen in subsidiary questions:

1. Why did we fail to frame a constitution in the early days of Pakistan's

independence?
2. What are the constraints behind the development of constitution in the
countries of colonial supremacy?
3. In what way does Islamic ideology contribute to the uniqueness of Pakistan's
constitutional system?
4. What role did the western and religious environment play in making of the
constitution?
5. What kind of rifts developed between the executive and legislature in the
making of the constitution?
6. What are the issues of distribution of power between the federal government
and the provinces?
7. What role can a critical study play to promote rational understanding of the
constitution?
8. What are the deep-rooted of constitutional development and the causation of
the intermittent imposition of martial law during almost two-thirds of the
country's life span?

These questions have been badly neglected both in recent social researches and
in the high- qualified, breath-less world of history, print and electronic journalism.
Political historians and Philosophers argue abstractly about the meaning of
concepts such as constitution and their constraints, Islamic Ideology and
independence, martial law and democracy, federal government and provincial
government, judicial and elitist relations, convinced that these questions are either
irrelevant to their concerns, ineffectual, trivializing or only to be enjoyed or talked
about outside working hours. The perfect observations for the answers of these
alarming questions can be conceived by the reactions of the audience, western
books but without knowing cultural environment, leaders but sugar -quoted
slogans.
This reassert will engage and criticise such questions and try to focus their origins
in the early independence days for liberty of nation’ against colonial despotism. It
will also trace the deep-seated despotism in the decades after the struggle. It
shows how the struggle for freedom of Pakistan is spoiled by its fetish of
authoritarian whims and 'the no constitution can be absolutely safe from the
political reflections of dirty coup d' etat' which always produced political and con-
stitutional censorship.
The research also throws fresh light on the profoundly disturbing growth of
unaccountable 'governments by moonlight* in all the political history of Pakistan
because "all of those problems are dramatically illustrated in Pakistan, where
incomplete constitution-making has placed the burdens of constitutional
interpretation on state instruments ranging from the bureaucracy to the military to.
The judiciary." {39} The bureaucracy, the military and judiciary, which ranged with
each other identified the authority in Pakistan and plagued the entire constitution
-making norms and habits in the country. "It is easy to see that given its non-
representative, elitist and ethnically discretionary composition, forces in authority
have always tried to seek legitimacy by skirting around the prerequisites of a
national, representative consensus." {40}
And in this complexes scenario the judiciary didn't played the role of mediator
between the state and judiciary, it only determined the fate of governments and
wounded Pakistan's democratic prospects in which the nation and the leaders
could not attain the good and sound political system by the stable
constitutionalism.
Chapter—-2

THE TESTAMENT OF THE

INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

‘The beginning of a Thing is a mirror of its end’

— Ghalib

The creation of Pakistan in 1947 was an almost unique experiment in nation building:
one of the very few occasions in the twentieth century when a country was created on the
basis of’ constitutional Islamic Ideology’. But making the state work for all its citizens has
not proved easily. After more than fifty years of existence, Pakistan has still not developed a
lasting, improved democracy, nor found an agreed basis for translating the idea of a Muslim
homeland into practice.
It remains a divided and unruly society. The religion, which was the pillar of freedom
struggle, turned into the violent political slogans, with a widening gap between the modernist
and the religionist. The ideology of religion, which has provided the bond for the different
sections of religious, ethnic, economic, political and linguistic problems before independence,
created the most obvious and most serious example of internecine strife. The growth of
sectarian violence, the ideological war of Sunni and Shia intelligentsia and their
assassinations by the name of Allah, the supervised silence of the judiciary, all raise questions
about the ability of the state and governments. The ' increasing ineffective' governments
could not handle even in the most important and essential fields of activity: 'collecting the
taxes and maintaining the peace’.
The failure of the state as an administrative instrument caused for the army to intervene
in the political system of Pakistan. The decline of law and order has diverted attention away
from other long-term problems," One enormous problem has been a lack of consensus about
what kind of state it should be. Fifty years after the death of the father of the state, politicians
with widely differing programs lay claim to Mr. Jinnah’s posthumous approval- in favor of
democracy and secularism as well as in favor of an Islamic state. He is the one icon of
Pakistan whom no one can afford to ignore; though much of the deference is purely ritual in
character. The historical evidence points to a secular figure, imbued with British legal
traditions, a constitutionalist who was more at home than on political platform. Mr. Jinnah
was certainly not a populist. His emphasis was on Muslim Culture and civilisation rather than
the Muslim religion. In fact, he discouraged talk of an - Islamic state, as the Raja of
Mahmudabad testified. {1)
It is true that Quaid-i-Azam, embraces the qualities of an ideal 'secular state’. The state
in which every citizen is granted the right of religious freedom. In the constitutional mind of
Jinnah, Pakistan was never meant to be a theocratic Islamic state. However, the debates
started for an Islamic constitutional state in the early years of its existence and it perturbed the
smoothness of its development. And on the other hand the “successive governments have felt
it necessary to steal the Islamist’s clothes for fear of facing their wratlfon the streets {2}

The politicians of the country gave the cause of foster of Islamic Ideology in the newly born state
was to develop the sense of unity among the country's diverse provinces and people. The people
of Pakistan also agreed to fulfill the promise of Islamic State. Indeed, "the ordinary man felt that
the sacrifices he had made in 1947 were for the faith, and consequently that his efforts would
have been in vain if Islam were not enshrined in the fabric of the new constitution" {3}
Basically, there was confusion between the leaders and the masses. The ordinary Muslim
masses could not understand the real meaning of ideological struggle of the Muslim leaders of
the subcontinent.
 Quaid-i-Azam knew that Islam could transcend all petty sectarian imbalances. For this
reason he used the Islamic slogan for the political gatherings of the Muslims against the Indian
nationhood. The pundits of Indian Nationhood were talking about the freedom of United India
and Jinnah, worked for the Two Nation Theory raped in Islamic ideology and reconciling the
differences, he declared the Muslims to be a nation with its own ‘distinctive culture and
civilisation, language and literature, art and architecture, name and nomenclature, sense of values
and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and tradition, aptitude
and ambitions’ {4}
The founding father, fearing Hindu domination, had struggled the separateness of the
Muslims from the Hindus of the subcontinent of India- Two Nations'- mainly in cultural and
social terms for the constitutional fight. The later bonded in Islamic stock was the need of
survival and the aspiration of the Muslims. It was not only his survival but for the survival of
Muslim, the opportunity which he chose 'by the 1937 election to call upon his brethren to support
the Muslim League.’. The Muslims were depressed in their economic, political, educational and
cultural matters, Jinnah adopted a separatist formula in guiding these destinies." and in this task
the services of ulama were used as were those of the pirs, the sajjadanashins, the Zamindars, and
other categories commanding influence and authority with the people. It was Jinnah himself who
requested the ulema to help the League in the referendum campaign in Sylhet and N. W. F. P.”
{5} Perhaps Jinnah understood that Indian Muslims could compete with the Congress Party only
when they showed their differences. For this reason he rejected his earlier efforts of Hindu-
Muslim unity and hard worked to show the differences with the majority.
The purpose of using the influential in the freedom movement was for the collection of
believers who worked for socio-political slogans. All the efforts were directed at achieving
Pakistan. But after the use of Islamic-political slogans, Jinnah spoke against the landlords, pirs
and capitalists and talked about the welfare of the state: "There are millions and millions of our
people who hardly get one meal a day. Is this civilisation? Is this the aim of Pakistan? If is the
idea of Pakistan I would not have it.” If Jinnah was talking about the Islamic civilisation and
Islamic State, it meant the civilisation and welfare state with out disparities and economic
imbalances. The people were not quite sure what the Islamic State, Islamic Government, and the
Islamic Constitution meant. Before independence no one was ready to explain these terms. All of
the masses and the leaders were directed to achieve Pakistan. Jinnah, laid down the first principle
of ideology of Pakistan that for the people, Islam is the basis of their ’Nationalism' as well as
'Patriotism'. The simple doctrine that he preached that Islamic ideology could gather the scattered
Muslim of the subcontinent for their economic and political progress. It is true and argued by the
different historians that the British threw the Muslims into a situation where they were no option
but to demand a separate homeland for them.
Basically, the Pakistan Movement and its raison d’être is being so insolently misrepresent-
ed and maligned to mislead the younger generation. This calculated plot to mislead and 'murder
of the history'. There is some historian who talked that the country was created on the basis of
particular ideology, which is Islamic Ideology. There are others who stated that the country's
freedom based on particular ideology is the deliberated distortion of historical truth. They talked
like this in every sharper way." The Quaid-i-Azam never made even a passing reference to any
"ideology" for Pakistan. His only references to religion, rare as they were related to his avowed
commitment to social justice- as envisioned in the fundamentals of Islamic governance and state-
craft." {6}The confusion attached with the age and it is our duty to protect and explain the con-
fused indoctrination. The ideology, which was nexus of Pakistan movement and in the constitu-
tional mind of Jinnah, was not the ideology of theocracy or theocratic state. To understand the
motivation for the creation of Pakistan, it is necessary to examine the demands leading up to its
establishment and the constitutional fight of the Muslims, which bonded in the ideology of two
nations.
 The following brief discussion creates three purpose: to provide a historical background for
those not know the genesis of Pakistan and insist that the rise of nationalist movement, in which a
people are bound to together by ideology for the creation of political boundaries, has altered the
course of history, to indicate some of the main political developments for the better lead of new
generation, and to touch upon the constitutional demands and its relations with the present
situation. Besides these, the discussion concentrates on the developments of the emergence of
political schism and the Sunni Muslims, which led to the creation of India and Pakistan.
The motivating factors in human achievement have been either ideological or materialistic.
The struggle, when it started was basically not a Hindu-Muslim conflict; rather it was a fight
between the local people and colonial masters, the common enemy of the two sets of depressed
classes for the attainment of some materialistic revolution. But slowly and deeply the straggle of
the subcontinent changed its flow. It became into two dimensions, into two ways and into two
different adventures and finally, developed itself ideological for the political destiny. The
demand of a separate homeland on the basis of religious ideology, was a separatist formula in
guiding the minority's destiny, commonly named as "Two Nation Theory", was the demands of
rights against the majority. It was an exclusive arrangement, which highlighted Muslim
differences with the Hindus. The majority who was more educated and politically cultured than
the Muslims created the natural sense of xenophobia in the disparate community of believers.
They wanted to involve themselves in the struggle of power, which had snatched by the clever
masters from the weakened rulers. So for the struggle of identity they coined the slogan of
Islamic ideology and the freedom had been done. Dr. Safdar Mahmood in his book 'Pakistan:
Political Roots & Development 1947- 1999' also argued that it was purely a conflict between the
Hindus and the Muslims which had started after the slowly demise of the Mughals. The demise
of the Mughals caused the conflict of interests and they began to apart. "A time came when the
leadership of the two groups were able to put on a political mantle and operate from the platform
of their respective political parties— the Indian National Congress, formed in 1885, and the All
India Muslim League, formed in 1906." (7}The conflict of interests between the two sets of the
society was the cause of the ideological explanations. We can understand 'the conflict of
interests' by the following saying, given by the Father of Nation, Quiad-i-Azam.
"Ideologically, all the Hindus... were united in the feeling that an independent sovereign
India should mean a Hindu country. This feeling had deep roots in the emotions of the people...
any effort by other communities, and particularly the Muslim, to safeguard their peculiar interests
and preserve their culture and traditions were condemned as sheer obscurantism... Nationalism
and democracy meant the rule of the majority, and anybody who tried in any way to curb the
power of the majority was an enemy of the country... {8}

The Ideology based movement for the interests of the Muslims was not a sudden phenom-
enon but the logical outcome of the forces operating in the politics of India. The Two Nation
Theory', therefore, was a well conceived formula, for the attitude of the colonial masters and the
foundation of Indian National Congress and their extremist policies for the spread of Hindu cul-
ture, left no other choice for the Muslims than to strive for an Independent Sovereign State of
their awn. It was not the first time that Quaid-i-Azam was talked about the power of majority and
the interest of minority. The Idea groomed in the veins of the history. And the history beards it to
save the 'truth.' It was Sir Syed Ahmad Khan(1817-1898) who had realised the concept of Two
Nation Theory' in a true sense. . In spite of all large-heartedness, and sincerity, displayed towards
the Hindus, Sir Syed came to the conclusion that the Hindu-Muslim Unity was impossibility.
Although, he was the staunch believer of Indian Nationalism . But after the establishment of the
Congress, Sir Syed came to adopt a firm view of nation. It so happened that the Congress
followed such policies, which were suited only to the genius and particular outlook of the
Hindus. Though all the Muslims were not attracted by the separate political struggle but the some
Muslims were realise and think that actually the Hindus constituted a separate nation having
nothing common with the Muslims and they could not live together any more with them as Sir
Syed had already predicted in 1867. This was the political solution for the Muslim's future.
 "Sir Syed had realised that in the end of the 19th century, there were actually two forces,
namely, the ruling party and the Hindu majority. The Deo-Bandis sought the help of the Hindu
majority oust the colonial masters and Sir Syed sided with the ruling party, which meant no
opposition of the Hindu majority but to enable the Muslims with the help of co-operation of the
English to stand upon their own feet to face all ups and downs in their life lest they should be
crushed or dominated by the Hindu majority which was advanced in every field and had started
showing antipathy, opposition and dislike for the Muslim" {9}
Nevertheless, the Indian National Congress drew support from some important Muslim
groups, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the founder of the Aligarh Muslim University, declaring the aim
to oppose to the Congress, 1 the association proved to be the forerunner for subsequent Muslim
efforts aimed at defining a protected place within a British India that was more responsive to
indigenous aspirations.' {10} Basically, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and his like-minded leaders knew
their weaknesses after the 1857 uprising.
The Indian National Congress was founded by A.O. Hume (1828-1912) a retired I. C. S.
officer. Originally, Congress was founded for the discussion of social matters of the country with
the leading Indian public representatives."The Congress orgnisation only one outcome of the
labors of a body of cultured men, mostly Indians who bound themselves together to labor silently
for the good of India.” {11}. It means that the Orgnisation of the Congress was not for the polit-
ical activities as it claimed by the Indians latter. It was the fusion of different sections that formu-
late the population of India and the gradual regeneration to progress the spiritual, moral, social
and political values. In its first steps the congress was also treated as secretly pre-arranged
organisation by the Viceroy to safeguard British rule against the rising forces of unrest and anti-
British feelings. Basically, it was the social bond for the consolidation of the Union between
England and India by the fusion of different sections. The idea of unity promptly appealed to the
Hindus because it was their religious convection. Later on this political unity and cultural
nationalism became the manifesto of the Congress and after sometime the spokesmen of the
organisation started to construct the idea of unified nation and later on, the political construction
appeared as the slogan of freedom movement of united India. On the other hand, the Muslims
split them politically into two very distinct groups. "One group; mostly Deo-Bandis and their
sympathisers along with many high intellectuals joined the congress or they showed their
sympathies and moral affections for it” {12}. Other group was with the ideology of Sir Syed or
they were criticising the Congress was a handiwork of Englishmen, 'an orgnisation which
claimed to represent all Indians, but whose initial agenda could not conceal an anti Muslim bias.'
The slogan of one Indian nation hood from the platform of the Congress and the revivalist
activities frightened the Muslims. They feared, due to their educational and political weaknesses
that the internal agenda could not benefited to them. The fear had many plights of history. They
had the memory when they 'lagged behind their Hindu counter parts in the decades following the
events associated with the Mutiny’. Now the Hindus, who were quick to take advantage of the
opportunities, were preaching the doctrine of one nation that all those who were inhabited this
country made one nation. It was not inpsirable for Muslim Leadership, who acknowledged that
the political and economic dependence on the majority means, the exploitation of the rights of
minority. Hindus were more educated and politically conscious than the Muslims so they easily
adopted the changing political path of the subcontinent after the war of independence. “In the
atmosphere of religious rivalries, any orgnisation with any purpose, dominated by the Hindus,
could not have won the sympathies of the Muslim, because they, in spite of all types of
differences among themselves, were always one to defend their religious faith and practice."
{13} Muslims were always ready to defend their religion and faith. Although, some Muslim
Leaders like Amir Ali, Badruddin Tyebji and Rehmatullah M. Sayani were attracted by the
Congress nationalism yet ’a large number of Muslim Leaders hesitated in identifying themselves
with an orgnisation that they perceived to be threatening to Muslim Causes.’ There were other
causes for which they wanted to struggle. So when the Congress passed resolution to introduce
representative self Government in India, Sir Ahmad Khan and other were came forward and
opposed that move. They contended that Congress anticipated plans for self-governing India did
not include adequate protection for the subcontinent’s Muslim population. It was clearly stated
 that representative institutions were not suited for the Indians who fundamentally differed in
their religious, social and political outlooks from each other. Sir Syed bluntly argued on Local
Self-government Bill on January 12th, 1883, in the Indian Legislative Council.
"Vast population of different races and different creeds inhabits India, a continent in
itself, the rigor of religious institutions has kept even neighbors apart: the system of caste is still
dominant and powerful. He further explained his fears about the introduction of representative
institutions in India “Under these circumstances it is hardly possible to deny that the introduction
of representative institutions in India will be attended with considerable difficulty and socio-
political risks. In a country like England, where the distinctions of race no longer exist, where
the difference of sectarianism in religious matters has been mitigated by the advice of toleration,
the matter does not present such difficulties. The community of race and creed makes the
English people one and the same nation and the advance of education have rendered smaller
differences wholly insignificant in matters connected with the welfare of the country at large. ...
It is obvious, of course, that the same cannot be said f India. The system of representation by
election means the representation of the views and the interests of the majority of the population,
and, in countries where the population is composed of one race and one creed it is no doubt the
best system that can be adopted. But, my Lord, in a country like India, where there is no fusion
of the various races, where religious distinctions are still violent, where education in its modem
sense has not made an equal or proportionate progress among all the sections of the population, I
am convinced that the introduction of the principle of election, pure and simple for
representation of various interests on the local boards and the district councils, would be
attended with the evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations. {14}
._
Even Sir Side was against the progressive political movement and he also prohibited for
Muslims to join that kind of political struggle but he knew the constitutional struggle by which
the Muslim could develop political entity. He even 'insisted on a different constitutional arrange-
ment, one would guarantee the minority community a special place in any future self-governing
experience.1 Sir Syed gave a prediction of a separate Muslim State with a cordial support to the
separate electorate rather to depend on the system of representation by election. It was Sir Syed
who pillared the idea of Two-nation theory by constitutional, economic and political interests.
Otherwise the faith and ideology was not new for the Muslim population.
Akhtar Hameed Khan described, " Sir Syed Ahmad Khan aspired to combine Islamic
Puritanism with the strict self-discipline of Victorian public schools. 'Shurfa' who followed this
pattern were pious, diligent, frugal, modest, and charitable. They faithfully discharged their
duties to God, their community, their family, and their self'. He further explained. “It was the
fruit of Sir Syed's reforms that the intellectual and moral texture of these (Shurfa) Homes was
quite different from the old Shurfa homes: there were no Co-wives, no concubines, and no nautch
girls; there were new aspirations, new ideas, new manners, and new routines. {14} Sir Ahmad
Khan changed the entire scenario of the subcontinent by his religio-socio-educational
philosophy. Firstly, he devoted himself to bring about the political rapprochement between the
rulers and the ruled. He was a political reactionary and diverted the Muslim outlook to their
socio-educational advancement. It is true that sometime he used the famous national style that the
Hindus and the Muslims could co exit in harmony, as they did in the reign of Akbar Badsha. But
more often he was ambivalent and fearful of the growing political and educational power of the
Hindus. So he advised the Muslims to maintain a separate identity, to demand special protection
and quotas.
The religious ideology wasn’t only the single flavor of the separate identification of the
Muslims, though it was great idea which effected the subcontinent civilisation, yet there were so
many others lacking and were in dire need of reforms and because no historical events have
resulted from a single cause. In the days of Sir Syed Muslim were the products of the three
hundred- year-old Mughal culture, Known as 'Indo-Muslim synthesis'. And that old, developed
culture was absorbing Western influences and on the other hands fearful of the growing,
captivating and enlightened ideas of Westernised progress of 18th century 7. The Indo-Muslim
synthesis, which developed after the long living set-ups, scattered by the trauma of what Sir
Syed, called ’ghaddar' and most of the Pakistani historians called the 'War of Liberation’.
 The War of Independence was the turning point of the bridge of relationship between the
two major communities. Though, they fought against the colonial supremacy, "but when they
(Hindus) laid all blame on the Muslims for the 'Revolt 1 of 1857 their ulterior motives became
very clear" {16}Even after 1857, Sir Syed talked about the nationalist idea of Hindus and The
Muslims. But the Congress anticipated plans for the self-governing India, which didn't include
adequate constitutional protection, and their movement to replace Urdu by Hindi as the official
language, only because Urdu was one of the legacies of the Muslim rule, awoke Sir Syed from
the dream of Hindu-Muslim unity. So he convinced at this occasion "That the two communities
would never be able to join hands in anything wholeheartedly" and " hostility between them
appeared to be imperceptible but as time passed it would increase on account of those who were
called educated" {17}
"History bears testimony to the fact that, despite their mutually contributive co-existence,
the Muslims and the Hindus could not repose trust in each other or develop kinship and cohesion.
The Hinds had always labored under the notion that the Muslims were intruders in India and
there could be no reconciliation with them” {18} however they lived together under the complete
supremacy of Muslim reign, having important manners and routines. The masses (Hindu) were
also pleased because the Hindu elite enjoyed the luxurious facilities in the Mughal Empire. It is
the matter of fact that the Mughal Empire was not the religious empire or Islamic State as defined
the Pakistani writers and their syllabus {19}
This kind of introduction was not attracted to the reputed mullahs and pirs of Islam pro-
claimed the 'padishah' as heretic, Satan and led a number of local jihad's against the emperor
"who boldly tried to reconcile Hinduism and Islam in a state of enduring friendly coexistence"
for the smoothness of his Mughal empire. Ahmad Sirhandi (1624) a Muslim Saint and scholar
was the spearhead of the jihad that challenged the wisdom of Akbar to revive and establish the
nucleus of Islam. Ahmad Sirhandi firmly believed that the act of Akber to introduce new
religious policy for the political betterment of the subcontinent was the sole purpose to distort
Islam and the emperor 'lured from the path of Islam by Satan'. He was, however, not the Muslim
scholar who shaped the Two Nation theory, he 'wielded the sword of Islam' against the Akbar's
policies. This concept of separation on the ideological ground started after the advent of Islam.
And Sir Syed deposited the political, educational, and economic considerations in the search of
religious identity.
"During Muslim rule in India, the Hindus tolerated the Muslim governments with mental
reservations. It was only Akbar who won the confidence of the Hindus by showering honors
upon them and entering into matrimonial relations with them. But, in spite of his popularity
combined with political and military domination, the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims
could not be narrowed down. Akbar’s attempts to bridge this gulf only created suspicion and
distrust" {20}. It was the unpopularity of Akbar's Divine Faith (Din~i~Ilahi) that "none of
Akbar's successors sought to follow his path, reverting instead with increasing care and caution
to accepted Shariat Law. By the reign of Akbar’s great grandson Alamgir (1658-1707), the jizya
was re-imposed, wine and music were banished from court, and 'Inspectors of Muslim Morals'
were sent throughout the land to check on provincial governors and judges to be sure they were
enforcing the Islamic Code. Popular rebellion erupted north and south, Sikhs and Jats, Marathas
and Rajputs rising in desperation against the harshness of Alamgir’s administration. The more
the Hindus revolted, however, the clearer it seemed to the emperors Ulema that his orthodoxy
was, bestowed upon him, the only Wish of South Asian monarch ever to be proclaimed 'deputy
of God.1" {21}
Perhaps the redeeming feature of Aurangzeb's era was the starting point of ideological dif-
ferences in more transparent way. Aurangzeb's harshness could not maintain the harmony, which
Akbar wanted to construct. He widened the gulf, which started to observe during the Ghaznawi
and Toughlaq periods. Alberuni and Ibn Battuta when wrote there memoirs about the visit in
India, also talked about the two distinct nations, Juxtaposed against each other. After the death of
Alamgir, the Mughal Empire, which power at its peak was starting to down wards. The Mughals
who wanted to reunite India and ruled, it was ready to disintegrate politically by the death of
Alamgir and 'his provincial fringes now started to break free of the center's crumbling authority.'
With the downfall of the Mughal Empire the authority of the Central Government was
weakened. The harsh policies of Alamgir created So many revolts of Martha's, Rajputs and the
more the Hindus. And when the great empire proves receptive, this was a signal for the Hindus
to embark upon a systematic and sinister plan to oust the Muslims who were depressed, and
divided people because their more militant instincts had been disappeared.
It was the inner situation of Mughal India, and on other hand, the outer surface of the sub-
continent was not safe. ’’The British were securing their first major territorial base in Mughal
India in its eastern province on the Bay of Bengal. The tottering emperor in Delhi and Agra was
so preoccupied with attacks from the northwest and southwest that he was unable to confront the
British with once-mighty imperial legions until it was tocTlate. {22}The whole country was
indulged in the political disintegration, economic decay, and social and cultural downfall, and
moral and religious corruption. Shah Walyullah( 1703-62) realised these threats and he, credited
with leading the Muslim modernist revival in South Asia, released that without Afghan military
support, weakened Mughal power would destroyed by the growing might of a Hindu Marathas
pentarchy. Marathas power was the sharp dagger of Hindu revival aimed at the soft underbelly
of a flaccid and debauched Mughal court, but the Afghan army of Ahmad Shah Abdali poured
over the passes in 1759, recapturing Lahore and moving its Muslim sword and shield into
position at Panipat for what was to be a Hindu-Muslim war of mutual destruction in South Asia
in 1759" {23}. After the 'war of destruction’, Ahmad Shah Abdali entered into central capital in
the aftermath of his 'victory' of Islam. Though initially defeated outside Delhi by a Mughal army
and several times to the capital and was "finally 'invited' back in 1759 to help defend Delhi and
Muslim rule in India by Shah Walayullah."
Though he ’invited' the Afghan King to attacked India for the sake of Muslim glory but the
political solution was not attained after the 'victory' of Panipat. It was also observed that Durrani
and his Mughal brothers started fighting among themselves soon after having disposed of their
common Hindu enemy But, the battle, which widened more gulfs between the Muslims and the
Hindus also, actually gave a last opportunity to the Mughal Empire for to attain their lost glory
but the incompetent rulers could not rise to the occasion. "Ahmad Shah Abdali would have been
startled to leam he had saved India for a Christian, British company he had never heard of rather
than for a Mughal or Afghan Muslim dynasty"{24}
The weaknesses were more sharp than the victory, "that the combined armies of the Mughal
emperor and the nawabs of Oudh and Bengal were beaten by a small but disciplined force of
British soldiers and sepoys on the south bank of the river Ganga at Buxar in 1764" The British
Company was the third political force of India, which ultimately equally dominated Muslims and
non-Muslims in the subcontinent. "For the "Great Company” had its ears every where and paid
well for early warnings of discontent or treason." The movement which was started by Shah
Walayulah, aimed at the glorification of Islam, was working for the said cause and "it was only
for the achievement of this mission that his grandson Shah Ismail and his colleagues laid down
their lives at Balakot in 1831. The Mujahideen associated with this movement continued to work
for the supremacy of Islam and the Muslims in India, and lit the spark that ignited the War of
Independence of .1857." {25} But it led to an emotional fight, which fell in the victim of defeat.
Hindus could visualise the advantages of British Raj. "To the Hindu majority of India's
population, moreover, the "New Raj" was in many ways preferable to the old, and many of the
brightest lads of Bengal flocked to its service, civil and military." and "Hindus found themselves
overnight out from under the sword of Muslim tyranny, no longer obliged to pay any jizya, and
even able to earn better wage than they had ever dreamed of, if they only worked hard and loyal-
ly served these odd, new, pink-cheeked "gods” {26} The Hindu, W W Hunter (1872) noted, were
quick to take advantage of the opportunities offered them by the British. After the "Revolt" of
1857, Hindus initially welcomed their liberation under the Company Raj and having adapting
themselves to the ways and manners of their overlords, whereas "Muslims reacted with cold,
aloof withdrawal, if not openly violent opposition." The movements which were working for the
cause of Muslim supremacy, developed continued arrogant revolt against official authority
damned these 'deluded Feringhis' and Muslims Mullahs across North India were shout, calling
upon congregation in a thousand mosques to wage jihad in defense of religion.
The New Raj of British was not new for the Hindus. They had faced the foreign adminis-
trative supremacy and lived in a 'mutually contributive co-existence' with 'great' Muslim rulers
like Akber and Jahangir. Though they were changed after the reverting path of Alamgir who
imposed ’the Inspectors of Muslim Morals’ yet it was due to that cultural-faced mutually
contribute co-existence of two nations that they fought like national brothers against the
Company. After the great Mutiny-rebellion, the Hindus developed opportune for their socio-
politico-economic growth, offered them by the British. Because the trauma of 1857, was the last
year of yester-rulers and the ’British crown decided to put an end to the company’s by now well-
advertised mismanagement of Indians affairs and extended its direct sway over the conquered
territories.' {27} And It was the quick decision to take advantages from the new rulers as from
the yester rulers that the Hindus ’filled almost all the positions reserved for indigenous peoples in
the expanding colonial government.’ {28} And the new supervisors were naturally suspicious of
those from whom they had captured power. W.W. Hunter remarked about the feelings of the
British in 1871 that" the Mussalmans of India are, and have been for many years, a source of
chronic danger to the British power in India. "{29} So they (British) kept a vigilant eye on the
Muslims who could offer resistance and they wanted to crush them who were calling them
’Feringi Kafir' and proclaiming British India a Land of War (Dar-ul- Harab).
"Deposed princes, disgruntled aristocrats, and impoverished peasants all longed with nos-
talgia for the glorious golden past that may have existed in their dreams, but was made poignant -
ly beautiful by the freedom from foreign rule it invariably embodied. {30}
The Muslims of India became desperate and frustrate due to the repressive attitude of the
British and the local mullahs and alims advised the Muslims to boycott the Anglo-Indian schools
and the new education system of Christian missionaries. They did not disbelieve the faith of their
Islamic Ideology and "all this plunged the Muslim community into an abyss of despair" {31} So
it was the ripe time when Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, impressed with the vitality of Oxford and
Cambridge institutions and environment came forward and abolished post-1857 British prejudice
against their Muslim subjects, when in 1860 published his important Essay on the Causes of
Indian Revolt and argued constitutionally, that the most important cause was the non-admission
of Indians into the legislative council. It is true if the British knew the fact of political catharsis
the trauma was not happened. For the admission of the Indian he found the Anglo-Muhammadan
Oriental College at Aligarh which was soon the cradle of Muslim modernism and the Pakistan
movement. {32}. The freedom struggle, which culminated in the emergence of Pakistan, can be
traced to the reformist trend in Muslim thought formulated by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. The
thought which tearing down the sense of apathy, frustration, resignation and desolation in the
disastrous aftermath of 1857. This Muslim nationalism awoke the Muslims from their political
and educational lethargy, giving birth to the Muslim League (in 1906). The Muslim League was
just one of a number of politico-intellectual movements which emerged in India from the late
eighteenth century onwards in response to the decline of the Mughal empire. Though, the
xenophobic like insecurities gained momentum when the Hind-Urdu controversy threatened the
opportunities for government service and its cultural distinctiveness but the campaign against the
Partition of Bengal in 1905 formed the final desire for the establishment of separate Muslim
political platform. "The Muslim League's origin in Dhaka was a consequence, not so much of the
formation of the Indian National] Congress, but rather of the creation of a Muslim -dominant
province in eastern Bengal." {33}. But it is also true that the Congress provided a convenient
starting point for the new comers with a penchant for political and constitutional demands.
The Partition of Bengal was the 'parting gift' of Lord Curzon’s administration. Though it
was the provincial administrative affair yet it created a great conflict of ideas among all and had
far-reaching effect on the political course of history in the subcontinent. Muslims were happy,
the partition was the result of their loyalist and the could get some political, economic, and
material benefits from this partition of Bengal but the Hindus and their dominated orgnisation
objected the partition. The Hindus wanted to evolve a common Indian nationhood, naturally the
partition was disturbing their ideology and their myths of old time. "’A cruel wrong' Congers
president Gopal Ghokhle (1866-1915) called the partition. {34}Stanley A. wolpert, Tilak and
Gokhale (Berkly and Los Angeles: University of California Press, Library Reprint Series, 1979)
196. Gokhle was a true liberal believer so he called the partition in a very fair way.
 But, Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920), ’Gokhle's Poona colleague, who was the founding
father of more revolutionary ! New Party’ emerged with Congress, argued." The remedy is not
petitioning but boycott. We say prepare your forces, organise your power, and then go to work
go to work so that they cannot refuse you." {34} After the more tougher, harsher and more
revolutionary man like Tilak, Lajpat lal, and Motilal Ghosh who took pride in their orthodoxy,
the new revivalist Hindu sprit entered and was the main motive behind the agitation against the
partition. And this sprit caused more ideological conflict between the two major communities.
After the eve of partition and annulment of Bengal, once again proved the fact that the
fundamental interests of both the Hindus and the Muslims were poles apart and as such they
could not unite on any platform and forum for any purpose.

During the life-time of Sir Syed, the need of political party of the Muslims was not fully
realised, but the party was the result of that political and constitutional struggle of Sir Syed for
the Muslims which sought to reconcile the Muslim elite to make their way in the new political
entity by the colonial state. It was Nawab Mohsinul Mulk who talked about the need for a
separate political party in a meeting of Urdu Defense Association, held in 1900, The first step
towards orgnisation was ” Mohammadan Provincial Union” in Bengal in October 1905. The
successors of Sir Syed, wanted to gather unorganised Muslim Community against the organised
Hindus and their Congress. The Muslim league, like congress started his political career, with
primary interest was in securing more jobs in government services and councils. The Muslims
were relatively backward and neglected community than Hindus and a moderate, upper class
Muslims successors of Sir Syed's idea, wanted to cash the opportunity from the British. The
Muslims upper-class intelligentsia had known that the British Viceroy Lord Minto with the
discussions of Morlay agreed to award some political reforms. It was the representation of
Indians in the political flow of the government to give more happiness and prosperity. On the
sound basis of Muslim population and their political background in India, the deputation to Simla
argued. "We therefore, desire to submit that under any system of representation, extended or
limited, a community in it self more numerous than the entire population of any first class
European power except Russia may justly lay claim to adequate recognition as an important
factor in the state.” They were requesting more. "We, therefore, desire to submit that under any
system of representation.... Commensurate, not merely with their numerical strength, but also
with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they make to the defense
of the empire." Finally, they appealed to the viceroy. "The Mohammadan of India have always
placed implicit reliance on the sense of Justice and love of fair dealing that have characterised
their rulers, and have in consequence abstained from press- ing.their claims by methods that
might prove at all embarrassing." {35}
The Simla Daputation, as it is known, demanded Separate Electorate on the basis of their
different way of life, religion and their political background in India and the viceroy assured the
Muslims that" their political rights and interests as a community will be safeguard by any admin-
istrative reorganisation." Basically, "the demand for Separate Electorates was an unavoidable
necessity because the members elected by Joint Electorate could not be the true representatives
of the Muslims. Once they were recognised as a separate political entity, they needed a political
orgnisation for the protection of their rights.” {36} It is also the fact that Muslims leadership
never accepted the Joint electorate system, which was the command slogan of Indian National
Congress for the progress of one nation hood. The Muslims never accepted the demand of the
Congress of joint electorate either when they were in the minority in the subcontinent or when
they are in majority in an independent state. It was their ideological and political nexus of
survival. And when Minto ensured the Muslim leaders for the introduction of a separate Muslim
electorate formula within the Indian Councils act of 1909, 1919, and 1935. Separate electorate
irrevocably tied political office and power to Muslim religious identity in the minds of all
Muslims enfranchised for next four decades under the British Raj. Where as the " leaders of
Congress saw this formula as further blatant proof of 'perfidious' Albion’s "devide and rule"
technique of retaining power, denouncing the Muslim Deputation and its political offspring as
nothing but 'an official cat's paw" {37} or created 'to strengthen the British rule in India.’
 It was not a sudden phenomenon or a planned political affair with the ruler, 'but the main
concern of the Muslim League was how to achieve effective political representation when the
Hindus outnumbered the Muslims by three to one.' {38} It is true that the Muslims of India were
repressive in their social, cultural, economical, and constitutional matter, but they also lacked the
political orgnisation and guidance to settle such useful benefits. It was also the result of that
’English colonial policy of representative and constitutional ' democracy by installments' which
has transformed for the political outlook of the people of subcontinent. The British started their
constitutional grip over the Indians by various Acts, i.e., the Government of India Act of 1858,
the Council Acts, 1861 and 1892, etc. The reforms introduced by these Acts were not adequate to
fulfil local boy's aspirations. The separate electorates were demanded when the Council Act of
1892 came with the Joint indirect electorate and failed to provide adequate representation for the
Muslims in the provincial and Central Legislative Councils. At last the proposal of separate
electorates, which introduced by Syed Amir Ali for the representation benefit, was accepted and
incorporated in the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909. The viceroy's acceptance of separate
electorate was hailed by the Muslim community because the "separate electorates irrevocably
tied political office and power to Muslim religious identity in the minds of all Muslims
enfranchised for the next four decades under the British Raj." And the formation of All Indian
Muslim League "set the seal upon the Muslim belief that their interests must be regarded as
completely separate from those of the Hindus and that no fusion of the two communities was
possible"(39}

Constitutional Imperative of Pakistani Movement

In the history of the subcontinent, the issue of the system of election had assumed impo-
tence well in the beginning of the 20th century. With the question of the people's representation
in the government bodies, it was quite natural to ask as to whom would represent whom? And
what would be the foundation for this? While the Congress and the British were talking of a
single system of

elections for all those who lived in India, Muslims were asserting that their was a distinct
national, identity and the single system of election or Joint Electorate on the basis of so-called
neutrality, in excursion of religion, culture, civilisation and separate national interests, would
practically amount to their disanchisement since Hindu population was three times larger than
them. This demand for separate electorates was a natural outcome.
It was said that religion was a private matter, having nothing to do with politics, state, and
the electoral process. Whereas the Muslim Umma claimed that their religion (Deen) was not
restricted to individual's beliefs and worship; it is also the basis of their nationhood and shaped

their collective character. The Qur’an emphasises this fact: " So fear God and pursue Islah (i.e.
happiness, peace and order) among yourselves. "(8: 1). Since the advent of Islam and the
establishment of the Madinah State it was the bounded duty and responsibility of all Muslims to
maintain internal peace, security and order and ward off foreign aggression. Prophet
Muhammad’s ( S. A. I W.) convenient with non-Muslims and his character clearly bear
testimony to all these and the Qur’an also puts great emphasis on such ways of life, " And if
Allah had not repelled some men by others, the earth would be filled with disorder. But Allah is
gracious to the people of the world.”(2: 251).
According to modem western political theories, Politics and religion belong to different
shapes of life. Politics is the matter of reason while religion depends on its faith. After a long ideo
logical conflict between the church and the state, they developed a doctrine of 'two swords' and |
separated politics and religion. Muslim theologian differed the West's liberal political idea for
their I political existence. As Allama Syed Suleman Nadvi in his classic work 'Seerat' and made
the following remarks about the 'doctrine of two swords' and explain the relationship between
state and religion in modem western countries and in Islam: "There are two types of states in the
world.
 Those in which the state and religion are utterly separated and it has been stated, 'Give unto
the king hat belongs to him and give unto God what is His.'" {40}. G W Choudhry defined it
as “In this formula, God and King (state) have been regarded as two distinct separate entities.
The commands of one are not applicable to the other. The states in Europe are all founded on
this principle. And on this basis, spiritual and temporal matters have been
compartmentalised.'(41}

It is true that Islam and its historical role as described by Allama Iqbal and Allama Nadvi, I
requires that the state system be based on Islamic identity and ideological unity of the Muslim,
and I other nations and groups are guaranteed their rights to live, progress and play their
collective role in the system. This kind of state had been constructed in Madinah. And in that
state of Madinah,
neither the identity of the Muslims neither was weakened nor was other people deprived of their
identity in the name of ’Islamic collectivism'. Prof. Khurshid Ahmad argues in his essay,
Electorate system: joint or separate? "In the subcontinent, the same .objective was achieved
through the system of separate electorate. And to realise these very objectives and aims after
attaining independence”. {42} He further argued that" This system does not base on any
discrimination, rather it is a healthy and judicious effort to allow the real social plurality to
flourish in the political sphere and play its due role" and for this he quoted the Quaid’s statement'
We (the Hindus and Muslims) are different in everything. We differ in our religion, our
civilisation and culture, our history, language, our architecture, music, jurisprudence and our
society, our dress— in every way we are different. We cannot get together only in the ballot box
(Speech in November, 1945)
The Muslims demand for a separate identity and electorate were ripe to satisfy the Islamic
State or Constitutional State. It was not theocratic, others are guaranteed to live and progress and
profess their religion. The demand was the political and constitutional necessity of the deprived
Muslims for their struggle of welfare state. The year of 1909 was the encouraging year for the
Muslims because the fundamental demand was secured under the Indian Council Act of 1909.
Although, the Indian Council acts, 1892 had recognised the principle of election and
representation. However, in view of growing discontent among the Indians, the British authority
accepted the Muslim Demand to win over a 'sizeable segment of the people.’ Having so many
repressive laws, 'the act did not fulfill all the aspiration of the Indians, the Muslims were pleased
because, in addition to the partition of Bengal in 1905, the reforms bestowed upon them the rare
political privilege of separate electorate, the two main and visible concessions of the Muslim-
British rapprochement.’

{43}The acceptance of demand consolidated the two-nation thesis propounded by the Sir
SyedAhmad Khan foreshadowing the emergence of Pakistan in 1947.
But the rapprochement, which settled after the constitutional and administrative concessions,
collapsed when the Muslim faced a dilemma. When the annulment of Partition of Bengal in 1911,
and Balkan war in 1912 'came as a shock to the Muslims faith in government and was rightly looked
upon as a gross betrayal. " Nawab Viqarul Mulk pointed out, ' it is now manifest like the midday sun,
that after seeing what happened lately, it is futile to ask the Muslims to place their reliance on
Governments' {44}
The disillusionment with British promises, the Muslims leadership thought to change its style
and loyalty and adopted its refined objectives as “the attaining under the aegis of British Crown of
the system of self-government ’suitable' to India." This reflected the emergence of a new leadership,
which questioned the value of its traditional ’loyalist' following the reunification of Bengal and
outbreak of Balkan war. It was constitutional understandable formula for both of the communities
because the leaders wanted to create a United Front of two Communities and knew that 'the
government was accepted to introduce important reforms after the world war, aiming at broadening
the base of democracy. Basically, it was an attraction to gather 'more than a million men, soldiers,
coolies, non-combatant support of every variety from India to every front on which World War 1 was
fought’. The lengthy process of constitutional evolution under the British colonial authority proved
instrumental in generating the demands for the Congress-Muslim League leaderships. Though the
British also gained popularity in the days of war, yet it was better for the joint leadership to avowed
objectives and to present the Indian case for future constitutional legislative reforms.
For Jinnah, 1916 was a year of national fame and good fortune. In which Jinnah won the title of
the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity and the due to the initiative and energy of Jinnah, Congress
and League agreed upon a single scheme of nationalist constitutional demands to pres ent to the
government of India in the famous 'Lucknow Pact’. Jinnah was the real architect of the joint session
of Lucknow. He was the president of the League session at Lucknow in December 1916. Jinnah who
joined the Muslim League in 1913, developed ascendancy over the liberal stock of the Muslim
League. Jinnah stated on this event: “Towards the Hindus our attitude should be of good-will and
brotherly feelings. Co-operation in the cause of our motherland should be our guiding principle. A
true understanding and harmonious relations between the two great sister communities can only
achieve India’s real progress. With regard to our own affairs, we can depend upon nobody but
ourselves.” {45}. In the session Jinnah also stated that he had always been ' a staunch Congressman'
and had no inspiration for ’sectarian cries'. In the session Jinnah also described about the reason of
the League,1 this great communal orgnisation[was] rapidly growing into a powerful factor for the
birth of United India’ {46} Jinnah, who was became the final destiny of the Muslims and the Muslim
League and fronded influence on the creation of a country, was not sensitive to the political and
constitutional context in which he used the terminology of 'two nation.’ The primary focus of Jinnah
to develop pressure on the government.
„ It was the years of 1917-1920, when many of the development in Indian politics occurred and
changed Jinnah's political vision. The first event was the Government of India Act of 1919, in which
the government did not reflect the aspirations of the Congress and the League and the Mahatma
Ghandi’s capture of the Congress in 1920 with the sound help of pro-Khilafat Muslims. Ghandhi who
was securing the impressive support of Muslim ulema for his policy of ’non-violent non-
cooperation’. Jinnah criticised the fusion of politics and the religion and stated about the Gandhi
program a ’complete disorganisation and chaos'. About Gandhi religious frenzy, he feared; ■ that
Gandhi wanted to enter the population in schism and split ' not only amongst Hindus and Muslims
but between Hindus and the Hindus and Muslims and Muslims and even between fathers and sons...
[Indeed] in almost every institution' that the Mahatma had anything to do with."{47 this was a
political conflict, which developed parting of the ways between the two ideological giants of the
subcontinent. Gandhi method of antipathy created religious militancy rather to constitutional fight
with the ruler. The ’opportunistic alliance' between the Mahatma and the Khilafat Movement,
"threatened the stability of the existing political structures and orderly I progress along moderate and
nationalist lines". In the period of nineteen-twenties Jinnah spent his I days in political isolation. The
Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity wounded, when the Khilafat I Muslims overwhelmed the
League Muslims, and the dream of Hindu-Muslim unity fractured by I the fusion of religion and
politics. This fusion also ’broke the fragile constitutional understanding I between Congress and
League which Jinnah had so painstakingly helped to construct’. He thought {that the Khilafat
Movement, in the cunning hands of Ghandhi, drained away the political and constitutional energy of
Muslim population.
Mahatma Gandhi was in forefront of the Khalafat Movement. The Gandhian Hindu-
Muslimunity was not based on firm foundations. This myth of cooperation between the Hindu-
Muslim soon exploded when the extremist Hindus started their Shuddhi movement 1 which aimed at
converting the relatively poor Muslims to Hinduism. Clashes started between the two political
groups and the flavor of the unity shattered and the Khilafat Movement " which Gandhi had
embracedas the ’first plank" of his own Satyagraha campaign, also quickly led to the violence and
their bittar disillusionment" {48} The 'Gandhian Satyagraha and Pan-Islamic Khilafistism' which
seemed a united national front; shattered, when the Gandhi's follower criticised on him to adopt the
Pan-Islamicism and on the other hand the orthodox stock of Muslim adherents deprived their Islamic

cause under the supervision of a sadhu. It also soon to sour when the 'Gray wolf Kama! Ata Turk f
himself proclaimed an end to the Caliphate in 1924. The Muslims, who were disillusioned with Pan-
Islamic movement and Gandhi's tactics, they chart a separate nationalist path under the vital | role of
 Jinnah’s leadership for themselves. The loyal subjects of British government turned into the | rebel
subjects and they could not recaptures the allegiance and confidence of Muslims who frus trated,
exhausted and bitter due to their faithless promises, j The Imperial managers, who were arguing that
they would never leave also, knew that they could not stay and the nationalist slogans crush them 'if
they didn't step aside'. And the Liberal j and labor Cabinets of British Parliament also sympathetic to
Indian nationalist aspirations and demands. Though the Indian councils act, 1909 ushered in a new
era in the history of the Muslims, 'it fell short of the expectations of the local people.' The famous
constitutional document, 'Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms’ was published. It made new
proposals for the reconstruction of the whole constitutional structure and known as the Indian Act of
1919. ' The} Act had been burdened by the principle of diarchy, which meant the Viceroy continued
to reign supreme over all legislative and executive functions,’ {49}. Jinnah assessed that 'the
principle of diarchy aimed to limit the Indians say in provincial self-government to less important
subjects, and, the franchise was tilted the Raj's friend, not to its critics.’ Aysha Jalal, The sole
spokesman ( Lahore Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1997) 8. Congress and Muslim League rejected the
Act, 'finally convinced the British that they had be more forthcoming with their Indian subjects' and
demanding revision of the constitutional Reforms and future enactment's favorable to the Indian
interests.
| The Act 1919, meaning dual government proved to be unworkable and less than
satisfactory for the ever-growing Indian constitutional demands/The constitutional reforms were
disappointing
and due to the provincialised political activities, the sharp rise in communal tensions began to riddle
the constitutional understanding between the two parties, and started to talk divergent perspective
It was due to this that in 1927, The British government sends a Commission to India. The
Commission wanted to consider the political situation, to report on the functioning of the 1919 Act,
and proposed to construct a constitution for India. The British constitutionalists argued that they
wanted to give political and constitutional training and 'giving the new boys time to learn I under the
seasoned supervisory eyes of the wiser old boys'. But the new boys of political wisdom knew the
tactics of Imperial managers of the Raj, stated that it is more inspiring in theory rather to accept its
practical shape. So when the Simon Commission Came in India without any representation of the
Indians, the wounded Indians, in protest, staged to boycott the commission. It was I Congress who
decided to structure the committee headed by Moti Lai Nehru. The committee gave f and published its
brainstorm called the Nehru Report. It was the start of’ the parting of the con-situational and political
ways between two communities. 'While Jinnah was busy reconciling the | divergent Congress-League
constitutional perspective on centre-province powers and the issue of | provincial autonomy', the
report rejected the Muslim League proposals and other constitutional concessions in the future
political set-up of India, which had earlier been agreed. Though the Delhi | Muslim Proposals, which
introduced by Jinnah was a moderate political and constitutional path I and it was accepted by the
then united Muslim League and 'substantially accepted' by the Congress 1 minds. The proposals were
shaped in a conditional concession and like the Lucknow Pact, Brian j child of Jinnah’s constitutional
lawyer's mind.
| The Report was an arrogant draft and completely ignored the Muslim demands of separate
electorates and their political background. Having the democratic principles, the Nehru Report j
repudiated the Lucknow Pact and offered no compensatory benefits to the Muslim community,
which further widened the ideological gap between the Hindus and the Muslim. Jinnah expressed his
political fear about the Nehru report he said, " Majorities are apt to be oppressive and tyrannical and
minorities always dread and fear that their interests and rights, unless clearly safeguarded by
statutory provisions would suffer and be prejudiced" {50} And appealed to the Muslims " not to be
alarmed. I see no reason for consternation and stampede. Muslims should organise themselves, stand
united and should press every reasonable point for the protection of their community.” {51 }He also
refused the Motilal’s invitation to attend its forthcoming Delhi session of the committee. And stated
on the behalf of League that" as the president of the Muslim League.... It would | not do for me to
anticipate their decisions. After the rejection of Nehru report, Jinnah started his new techniques and
struggled to gather the Muslims and the League, which was split into two political groups in 1927.
Even Raja Sahib of Mahmoodabad, Chagla who were liked the Report | but Jinnah remained set
against the Nehru 'constitution', viewing it only as a 'Hindu' document, j Against the 'Hindu
document' which was not acceptable to the Muslims, Jinnah put forward
| his own scheme in his famous " Fourteen points” which was the document of the Muslims. There j
were many demerits of the Nehru report for the Muslims but one important result of the Nehru
report was the foundation of Muslim constitution. Though all Muslims were not with the charter and
Jinnah was again isolated but he firmed on his constitutional answer with a minority of his own
party as M. R. Kayak- stated it. “I have also know Mr. Jinnah for the last sixteen years in close
association as a colleague in nationalist life and I can assure you he comes before us today neither as
a naughty boy nor as a spoiled child . . . One important fact to remember . . . is that well-known j
Muslims like the esteemed patriots Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Ansari, Sir Ali Imam, Raja
Sahib of Mahmoodabad and Dr. Kitchlew have given their full assent to the compromise embodied
in the j Nehru Committee Report. It is further to be borne in mind that even in the Muslim League a
large
_ _
body of the members has given their assent to the Nehru Committee Report. Mr. Jinnah, therefore,
represents, if I may say so without offense, a small minority of Muslims." {52} Jinnah was firmed in his
political ideology and in favor of rejection of the Nehru Report. He wanted to work with his con -
stitutional mind and wanted to introduce the three important amendments in the constitutional pro-
motion of India. One was the separate electorate; second that there should be reservation of one-third
of the seats in the Central legislature, and the third, residuary powers should be vested in the
Provinces. When the Congress brainchild report ignored these fundamental political rights of the
Muslims, he chartered his own constitutional method and said in a clear way “let us part as friends".
This was the complete turning point of the departure in Jinnah's political life and from the Indian
nationalism. The Indian nationalism, which nurtured in him by his different politically and constitu -
tionally, inspired masters like Moreley, Pherozeshah, Ghokele and Montague.
The Formula which was completely against his ' Honorable friend's pet child', came to known
as the Fourteen points of Jinnah, was completely 'opposed by Dr. Ansari, Tassaduq Ahmad Khan
shirwani, Dr. Mohammad Khan, and Dr. Syed Mohammad’ but pleased by Maulana Mohammad Ali,
who had been wounded by the tactics of Mahatma. Johar supported him 'paying glowing tributes' to
his " unique feat of statesmanship" and described him the 'arc composer.'!53} it is true that Jinnah's
Fourteen Points were rejected when he wanted to introduce it at the Rowshan Theatre in Old Delhi.
'Except for a few friends’ of his own. “Other was e reluctant to work with the Quad. His strict
attachment to principles and independent approach to problems were the main reasons which kept the
others away from him.” {54} Jinnah could not attain the identity against the Congress leadership and
turned to his British friends. It was constitutional deadlock and Jinnah wanted to resolve the Pandora
box of constitutional deadlock as he wrote to Ramsay MacDonald, his old friend and the new prime
minister," The present position is a very serious deadlock and if allowed to continue it will, in my
judgment, prove disastrous both to the interest of India and Great Britain. "(On June 19, 1929) {55}
When Jinnah was sheltering under the feathers of British government, Gandhi and Subhash Bose
were ready to call the slogan of ' complete independence' of India. Subhash Bose cried for the
inspiration of countrymen for complete salvation from the 'slave mentality’ of India. Jinnah knew the
political development and warned his British friends, there is a section in India that has already
declared in favor of complete independence' and ’the movement of independence is gaining ground
as it is supported by Indian National Congress'. Jinnah was suspicious by the political domination of
Congress and this domination could not explain of his role and the survival of minorities. For the
solution of constitutional deadlock he advised his friend to “invite representative of India, who would
be in position to deliver goods (because completely unanimous opinion in India is not possible at
present)". {56}
The British Government announced to hold a Round Table Conference of the Indian leaders.
Jinnah was not only the friend of Prime Minister and also the adviser to initiating that process. The
conferences were called for the constitutional solution on 1930, 1931, and 1932, all failed and met
the fate of political failure but 'the most outstanding and substantial outcome of the London Round
Table Conference was the agreement between Indian representatives on the formation of 'a federal
constitution’ with responsible government, operating fully (though subject to specific safeguard) in
the provinces and partially at the centre. 1 {57} On behalf of that agreement, the British introduced its
recommendation in White Paper. It was the start of the final constitution of British India which
known as the Government of India Act, 1935.
The Simon Commission reports led to the drafting the Government of India Act 1935 abol ished
Diarchy, which was introduced in 1919. The eleven provinces of British India were granted
cabinet governments but the governors supervised them like viceroy did in the center. The Act
provided for bicameral federal legislature and a responsible Government in the provinces. The Act was
classified by three lists of subjects: Federal, Provincial, and Concurrent and ' widened the franchise to
nearly thirty-five millions' with the grant of large measures of self-government. 'But complete
responsibility at the center was still something for the future; the executive was not responsible to the
legislature and many of the central subjects were ’reserved". {58} By giving large measures of
provincial authority, the British managers wanted to stay in India. The sugar- coated constitutional
reforms were for their friends and collaborators to strengthen their political power in India. The Act
was without the mention of Dominion Status, which created fears in the minds of Hindu- Muslim
nationalists. In the opinion of constitutionalists of India, was the vast disjunction between provincial
autonomy and the creation of an all-India federation, which created constitutional gulf between the
nationalists. Although aloof the Indians were not happy but the Act laid down the con stitutional
foundation in India and advanced step over the last constitutional arrangement. The Act could not
achieve acceptance and expectations of the people. The leader of the displeased people, Jinnah
described the Act" thoroughly rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unaccented"(Speeches and
Writing of Mr. Jinnah, Jamaludin Ahmad, 20) Jawahar lal Nehru was against the Act by those official
powers and stated the Act as a 1 charter of slavery’. So the Act was criticising by the different leaders
and the parties, yet they decided to contest the provincial elections under the 'rotten and bad' British
constitution. The leaders, Nehru and Gandhi agreed to give the new constitution a try. Basically, the
nature of politics, in the subcontinent was about to change in three fundamental ways after the
introduction Indian Act of 1935.
The balance of decision-making power in the provinces would no longer be with the British,
but with the elected representatives, and the day was approaching when the British would relin quish
power at the centre, and for the first time, many ordinary people, not just the elite, would allowed to
vote. Jinnah, Iqbal and Moulana Shoukat Ali among others also concluded that Muslims of the sub-
continent must now learned together. Condemned to permanent minority status at the center, the
Muslims must make sure that their one-third of the votes would always be as strong as possible, if
there was to be any hope of safeguarding the rights and the interests of the Muslim community.
Jinnah was in England when the Indian act sounded in the subcontinent to hold elections.
When Jinnah returned from England in 1934-35, the Muslim League was almost dead and Muslims
of India had been scattered as a community. They lacked cohesion, direction, objective, leadership
and platform. 'The Muslims of British India in the 1930s were, infect, and divided into a wide range
of competing and often hostile camps. Some were localised orgnisation, while other claimed
representation throughout the subcontinent.'{59} But in the subsequent years, the league pampered it
self with the leadership Jinnah who took up the cause of the Muslim League, 'which had wallowed in
its own despair in the aftermath of the failed Khilafat Movement.' The Congress, on the other hand,
was a better-organized party with influential propaganda machinery and sound financial backing. By
1937, when elections were finally held, Congress received victory in seven provinces. “The Muslim
League did not win control of a single province at this time, since many other local Muslim parties
competed with it for the Muslim minority vote.”{60} And it is also true that amongst the Muslims,
beside the Muslim League, there were splinter groups projecting their own cause but nearly all were
supported by the Indian National Congress that claimed to be a secular national body representing
everyone in India; it was also the oldest one on the Indian political scene. These Muslim groups, by
and large, supported the claim of the Congress, including its advocacy for a united India. Jinnah, for
this reason, appealed to Pandit Jawahur lal Nehru to form
Coalition governments in Congress provinces that had substantial Muslim minorities, such as the
United Provinces. The Congress and specially Nehru ignored the idea of Jinnah who was hoping and
finding for a possible single Indian nation Nehru was flagging the idea that there were only | two
parties left in India: Congress and the British. It was Jinnah who soon proved him that the I Muslim
League was, in fact, a third party in India. He cried and feared that" the present leadership of the
Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Mussalmans of
India more and more by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu" and I Mussalmans cannot
accept any justice or fair-play at their hands. ’’ {61}
It was 1937, and for the next decade, Jinnah started to work against the atrocities of |
Congress and their plead that Congress was the sole spokes party of the Indians. He set himself for |
the anti-Congress tone of criticism for the next decade. He stated that the Hindu Congress would I
mean Hindu Raj, which bring injustice to Muslims. Jinnah was on toured Muslim districts of | British
India to gather the people for his and his Muslim League. It was his political dream to wake | up the
Muslim community by joining the League because Jinnah had been wounded by the British f and
Hindu Congress. Jinnah had been awaked from the dream of Hindu-Muslim honeymoon in 1926.
After 1926
Hindu and Muslims were never to agree, and in 1937, they never to trust each other. Their bitter ness,
mutual hostility and suspicion were increasing day by day and reshaped for the final break. The
Hindu reaction was also so sharp to the strength of Muslim demands. The Muslims of India struggled
for their separate identity, which always been there, though never consciously realised I by the
Hindus and even the Muslims. Muslims demanded to be a separate nation in the idea of I Indian
nation. The Congress asserted that there could only be one nation in India and that various | religious
and linguistic sections in the country where communities or 'minorities' and having no importance of
Congers were treated minorities as a section of Indian Society and they could safe- | guard their
political, religious, and economic rights. They were not reedy to accept the minority j as a separate
nation. Jinnah was the main articulator to make Muslim League a big challenge to |; the Congress and
the slogan of Indian nation. He summed up the political position of the Muslim [ League when he
pronounced that" the Ideology of the Muslim League is based on the fundamental principle that
Muslims of India are an independent nationality and any attempt to get them to merge their national
and political identity and unity will only be resisted, but, in my opinion, it will b futile for any one to
attempt it. We are determined, and let there be no mistake about it, to establish the status of an
independent nation and an independent State in this subcontinent."
The politics in India has been dominated by personalities. As Gandhi sweeped the population in 1919
when he fed the idea of Hindu nationalism and the period from 1926 to 1936 onward, was the period
of Jinnah. Jinnah took thirty years to dominate the politics of the Muslims and became the symbol of
Muslim nationalism. And it was due to the struggle of Jinnah that Muslim League, 'grew from
strength to strength’. Muslim League, who lost victory in the first by-election | in the United
Provinces ’towards the end of 1937, but the three subsequent by-election were won by the League'.
Muslim League, now the political construction of Jinnah. Jinnah not only constructs the League
throughout India but also developed correspondence with several Indian leaders like Jawahur. Lai
Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose, Gandhi, and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, " but the Correspondence between
Nehru and Jinnah was, perhaps, the most illuminating so far as the basic Hindu-Muslim differences
were concerned. "{62} That Congress should admit that the Muslim League is authoritative and sole
representative orgnisation of the Muslim of India. But the Nehru ! could not admit it because it would
damage the cause of Congress mission as he had claimed that there were about 100,000 Muslims on
the Congers~rolls. {63 }It was also cleared that Jinnah was ll0t hurry to make final honeymoon with
the Congress because he wanted to groom the League to such a level that the Congress and Nehru
could not ignore the political reality.

Throughout the correspondence, Jinnah insisted importance of Muslim League. He said, " we shall
have to wait and depend upon our inherent strength which will determine the measure of I importance
or distinction that it possesses" {64} The importance of League was the prime talk I before any
negotiations with the Congress, He faced the bitter experience of Congress rule (1937- 1 1939).
"Until then Jinnah and many other Muslim leaders had been thinking in terms of 'Coalition', I
Safeguards, 'Concessions’, and 'Special Responsibilities'. But now they were convinced that soil
called steel frame of 'weightless', and 'safeguards' was no better than house of cards. With the passage
of time, they came to realise that ’appeals to patriotism of fairly and topics of virtues of moderation
and humanity which are so familiar to the eloquence of the weak, always excite rather than change the
dark designs or check the aggression of the stronger." {65} basically, during the rule of I Congress
they cared little for Muslims. They not even rejected their political importance but also exclude the
League from the governments of the Hindu majority provinces. The indication of how far the Muslim
position had now hardened came in the form of an article Jinnh wrote for an English journal. "After
recounting the constitutional maladies from I which India suffered, pointing out the Congress high-
headdress and the dismal record of British {Governors in dealing with the minority problem, Jinnah
announced that western democracy was | totally unsuited to India and " a constitution must be evolved
that recognised that there are in India two nations, who both must share the governance of their
common motherland” {66} Now Mr. Jinnah was exposing the designs of Hindu Congress. In his
speech, which he delivered at Patna j session of Muslim League, held in December 1938. He said,
"They talk of National Government but they mean only Hindu Government.... Muslim children must
accept 'Bande Matram' as their national song, no matter whether their religious beliefs permit them to
do so or not. It is idolatrous and worse - a hymn of hatred for Muslims. "(67}
One can see the bitter differences increased in the year 1938, that there was no hope of
reconciliation. Allama Iqbal explained the political situation between the Hindu and Muslims of
India |in his letter dated 28 May 1937 to Jinnah. In the letter Iqbal, described the political situation of
the I Muslims and advised Jinnah, to change Muslim League into a mass party, Allama Iqbal
explained I in a letter to Jinnah that "the of bread is become more and more acute. The Muslim has
begun to feel that he has been going down and down during the last 200 years. Ordinarily he believes
that his poverty is due to Hindu money-lending or capitalism. The perception that it is equally due to
[; foreign rule has not yet fully come to him. But it is bound to come... The question therefore is: how
is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? And the whole future of the League depends
on the League's ability to solve this question. Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the
Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modem ideas.... But the enforcement and
development of Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states.
This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve
the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India, j .... Also the insertion of
Jawahurlal's socialism into the body politic of Hinduism is likely to cause much bloodshed among
the Hindus themselvesFor Islam the acceptance of social democracy in some suitable form and
consistent with the legal principles of Islam is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of
Islam . . . . But as I have said above in order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve the
Problems it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one j or more Muslim states with
absolute majorities. Don't you think that the time for such a demand! has already arrived?" {68}
Allama Iqbal's letter to Jinnah changed the political path of the League. The political change I came
into existence when Muslim League held its twenty-fifths session at Lucknow from 15 to 18
[October 1937. In the session the leaguers reoriented the Muslim politics and a new formula was
adopted which demanded ’’the establishment of full independence, in the form of federation, or free
democratic States, in which full safeguards for Muslims and other minorities will be secured” {In
this session most of the Muslim community attracted and league became a freedom-loving party and
the organiser of the protection of Muslim' rights. The outbreak of World War 11 further accelerated
Congress’ fall from power as well as from National Trust. Congress' central committee criticised the
viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, who proclaimed India at war without consulting Gandhi, Nehru, or any
other political leaders of India. On i this issue Congress’ central committee was so outraged and
against the autocratic act of the viceroy, they resigned from all provincial ministries within the
month. The resign from the ministries was mark of protest against the non-acceptance of their
fundamental demand to establish representative legislative body to decide the future of India and to
construct the Indian constitution. On this occasion Jinnah stated that it was political blunder and to
the league it was political advantage, calling Muslim's to draw a 'prayerful' 'Day of Deliverance’ on
Friday, December 22, 1939, in all Congress- ruled provinces, thinking God for delivering them from
the shackles of the ’Hindu Raj'and their autocratic rule.

The year 1939 gave a clear picture that the Hindu-Muslim unity cannot obtain in India.
And the gulf of their different political and ideological theories was wider than ever. "It was
necessary | that one of them should conquer the other. To hope both could remain equal was to desire
the | impossible and inconceivable" {69} This was the ripe time for the Muslims that they carved out
their political and ideological destiny was to demand an independent, separate, sovereign state in
which they could live according to their own ideology and civilisation. They were a sep arate nation
by all canons of law and international standard as Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared the
truth of the century that "We the Muslims of Indian sub-continent are a separate nation with our
distinctive culture and civilisation, language and literature, art and architecture, name and
nomenclature, sense of values and calendar, history and tradition, aptitude and ambitions, in short,
we have our own distinctive out look on life and of life" and were different from those of Hindus.
The theory of nationality which was imbued by the Muslims means” a union of hearts once made,
never unmade and “Nationality is the sense of community, which under the historical condition of a
particular social epoch, has possessed or still seeks expression through unity of the State" {70}
The instinct of nationality springs up by means of unity. The unity of language, religion,
economic interests and common sufferings of political sovereignty with popular will. The nationality'
is a social conscious of the people with a sentiment of oneness which serves them from those who
are not of their kind. There are instances, when a people lost their nationality after being subjugated
to a foreign rule but after some time, under peculiar circumstances, and the yoke of common
suffering, they again acquired it and on that basis sought their freedom from the foreign rule. We see
in the case of the Muslims of the sub-continent, who struggled to achieve nationality and the right of
self-determination from the shackles of 'British Raj’ and the majority of the population. The struggle
for separate homeland was the dynamic political and constitutional expression | of the desire of
Muslims to live together as a free people in future, and then nationality was a prior j condition for
such political desire. The Muslims were a distinct nation and the advantage of their [ common
language; common traditions, common religion, common teachers and common political status
enabled them to develop as a nation.
The separate idea, which
THEgroomed in the
TESTAMENT OF cradle of history now,
THE INDEPENDENCE wanted to come in reality, jinnah,
MOVEMENT 2-37 the
heart throbbing leader of Muslims agreed to think that " the English Parliamentary form of
Government, with its emphasis on the majority rule would permanently subject the Muslims to
the Congress rule and, therefore, was not suitable to India." and ’’ For the first time Hindus and
Muslims were described by the League two distinct nations" so the idea of Pakistan was inevitable. For
the inevitable idea, the city of Lahore, 'a teeming center of Muslim power in South Asia since the
eleventh century, capital of Punjab, and cultural heartland of Mughal India was about to give birth to
the League’s ’Pakistan’ Resolution', selected for the next session of League in March 1940. The Lahore
Resolution was moved by Fazlul Haq, the Chief Minister of Bengal and seconded by Choudhary
Khalquzzaman, which runs as follows:

"Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of All-India Muslim League that no
constitutional plan would be worked in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed
on the following basic principles, viz., That geographically contiguous units are demarcated into
regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that
the area in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-West and Eastern Zones of
India should be grouped to constitute " Independent states" in which the constituent units shall be
autonomous and sovereign{71}
Indeed, the Lahore resolution brought about great changes in the Indian politics; particularly it
was landmark in the history of the Muslims of the sub-continent. They concentrated their efforts on the
struggle to devote for a separate homeland and “this Lahore resolution (later known as the Pakistan
resolution) signified the irrevocable shift in favor of an independent Pakistan to which Jinnah now
devoted himself."{72]But it is interesting to note that word "Pakistan was not explicitly mentioned; nor
was it clear from the language of the resolution whether a single Muslim state of both "zones" had been
envisioned or two separate " autonomous" independent states, on one in the North-west, the other in
the eastern (Bangladesh) zone. Sheri-I-Bengal ("Lion of Bengal ) Fazlul Haq at least appears to have
had the latter in mind when he drafted the resolution and read it aloud. But Jinnah was the leader; and
when asked by reporters if this resolution meant one, or more than one, Muslim nation, his unequivocal
answer sealed the fate of Bengal's Muslim majority. India's newspaper headlines next day pronounced
the Lahore resolution, a single ’Pakistan Resolution’ and so it remained." {73}. Congress called the
resolution ' wild cat proposal of British imperial duplicity’ and Gandhi stated about the resolution "I
admit that the step taken by the Muslim League at Lahore creates a baffling situation. But I do not
regard it so baffling as to make disobedience impossibility... The Muslims must have the same right of
self-determination that the rest of India has. We are at present a joint family. Any member may claim a
division." {74}The Resolution was a ’diseased mentality 1 of Jinnah as described by different leaders of
Congress but the time came when Nehru had to admit the reality and stated that ’League might take its
Pakistan but not those parts of India which were unwilling to join Pakistan' Chouldhry Khaliquzzaman
wrote about the resolution that "It should be noted that the idea contained in the resolution of 1940 was
not a new idea, but coming as it did from the Muslim League platform which had by now the backing
of the bulk of the Muslim population of India, it was an avalanche which up-rooted all the old
..fossilised structure of the political shibboleths which had kept the minds of the Indians Muslims
engaged for about century, and paved the way for a direct march towards a definite goal." {75} On the
other hand Binder criticised the resolution in this way as he observed:
"The Lahore resolution contemplated neither a unified Indian Muslim nation nor the Nationalist
ideology which accrued to the Muslim League program in the years following. The resolution was,
infect neither nationalist nor Islamic. It was in the tradition of the contractual limitation
0f Indian nationalism" THE
{76}. The harsh criticism
TESTAMENT of Binder is based
OF THE INDEPENDENCE upon a basic political misconception
MOVEMENT 2-38
Perhaps Binder could not understand the reality that the Muslim League was the representative of The
Muslims of sub-continent Though it was true that Muslims were scattered in the Congress and Muslim
League but the resolution was the voice of that part that completely believed in their separate
nationality and had the league not contemplated the whole of the Muslims as a unified nation. The
Resolution repudiated the unity of India and recommended the creation of independent Muslim states
consisting of the Punjab, the North-West Frontier, Sind and Baluchistan in the northwest and Bengal
and Assam in the north-east. The Resolution and the Quaid-i-Azam decided upon the partition of the
sub-continent as it described, in fact, 'one state under one central government.' And the next seven
years cashed by the Muslim struggle for their state.
Early in 1942, ’when the Japanese forces were knocking at the doors of India’, the British
Prime Minister with the consultation of Cabinet sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India to discuss with
leading nationalists of all parties on a new constitutional offer the British government was ready to
make. " A post-dated cheaque on a bank that is failing" as Gandhi called cripps offer of full dominion
status, was criticised by the Jinnah also because the plan did not clearly explain the outline of a
separate homeland " which was a matter of life and death for Muslim India." The plan was rejected by
the Congress as well as the League, 'but not for identical reasons'. Congress rejected it because it was
the against the conception of Indian Unity and it was not accepted by the League because the plan gave
the vague idea of the Pakistan scheme. When Sir Stafford flew home Jinnah gave the idea that if
Pakistan scheme was accepted to the parties of India, the League was agreed to reach a compromise but
in Wardha resolution Congress rejected the scheme and laid down that the "communal problem would
not be settled until the British leave India in the hands of Indians who would settle the issue by mutual
agreements."{77} Gandhi launched his 'Satyagrahas' and sloganeer "British withdrawal first,
communal settlement afterwards". It was, however, the last and final phase of 'British Raj’, and though
Gandhi had coined the slogan of "Quit India". Jinnah harshly criticised the movements and coined a
new phrase ’ divide and quit’ in the Delhi session of the Muslim League. And the government also
reacted sharply and arrested the Congress leaders.
In 1944, Gandhi-Jinnah talks started, though it also failed but added to Jinnah's prestige. Gandhi
said that he could not accept the Two-Nation theory because most of the Muslims of the sub-continent
were descendants of Hindus. He claimed that the sub-continent had been one nation before the coming
of Islam and insisted that it must remain one nation. On the other hand Jinnah pointed out that the sub-
continent had never been united until the completion of the British conquest, and that even now, with
princely states covering one-third of its area, the sub-continent didn't enjoy uniform administration. He
explained that a nation was something which developed ever time and asked Gandhi to examine his
own role in creating two separate nations, by injecting the Hindu religion into the sub-continent’s
politics. Jinnah was right that Gandhi poisoned the politics with the religious injection. Though, he also
recites of the Holy Quran and the Bible along with the Bhagwat Geeta in his Prathna Sabhas. But his
every-day life pattern portrayed his being a staunch believer of Hindu myth dogmas to the extent of
fanaticism. {78}
Tjie Simla Conference held on 25 June 1945 is'another significant chapter in the history of Indian
constitutional development. It gave political future to the Indian Muslims. The Conference was an
invitation for the Congress and the League to participate in the formation of an Interim Government at
the Center. The political and constitutional importance of the Indian Muslims created by the
Conference because it came into existence as a third political party. Congress also vision that without
the consent of Muslim League,~the Indian deadlock could not be resolved. So

Simla Conference marks a breakwater in Indian political history' which realised to the Congress that the
Muslim League was the sole, authoritative representative of the Muslim nation, though, not each and
every Muslims. {79)
 India was in
THEtheTESTAMENT
grip of chaos
OF and
THE 'civil disobedience
INDEPENDENCE became a full-fledged uprising
MOVEMENT 2-39in the
countryside of eastern UP and Bihar, under peasants and student local leadership. Rails, roads and
telegraph lines were cut' when the second general elections under the government of India Act
were announced. These were to be held 1945-46. For Jinnah and Muslim League election cam-
paigning was urgent and also extraordinary hectic and brisk. Jinnah suffered bouts of serious ill-
ness at this time; his end was only three years away. However, he “addressed thousands and had
talks with hundreds", as he himself stated in a parting message in the frontier at the end of
November 1945. Unlike the Congress leadership, Jinnah and his followers had not made British
rule the main target of their attack in their election complaint: that rule was nearing its end any-
way. They had complained about official interference in the conduct of elections to the detriment
of the League candidates, especially in Punjab and the Frontier where administrations hostile to
League had been in place; and had also asked the British government to accept in clear terms their
principal demand of division and Pakistan. Jinnah explained the cause of the election on 26-27
November 1945:
"We are not fighting elections to form Ministries; we are fighting to get a verdict on the
Pakistan issue.... Support the official League candidate even though he may be a lamppost;
support and a vote for him does not mean approval of some or disapproval of others . . . we want
to secure a thumping verdict at this moment and prove to the world that Mussalmans have
definitely decided to achieve Pakistan" The election of 1945-46 opened a new chapter of the
political development. The elections were important event for the Muslim community to
determine the cause of struggle for Pakistan. It established the authority of the Muslim League to
speak on the behalf of the Indian Muslims. The "League contested these elections on the basis of
the demand of Pakistan, and returned victorious against all opposition. In the central Assembly,
the Muslim League, won all the thirty Muslim seats, while in Provincial Legislatures it got 446
seats out of 495 seats allocated to the Muslim community, and thus polled about 88 per cent of the
Muslim votes." {80} For Jinnah it was a moment of glory and provided Jinnah a real springboard
to his Pakistan and the solidarity of the Muslims. He stated about the victory "as a day of
"celebration" and passed a resolution demanding a Sovereign Independent State "where the safety
and security, and the salvation and destiny of the Muslim Nation, inhabiting the subcontinent of
India lies". {81}
The election's success established firmly the authority of the Muslim League to speak on
behalf of the Indian Muslims. This reflected in Jinnah's assertion in favor of Pakistan reproduced
in the recently published, The Nations Voices, Vol. IV. It was perhaps for the first time in his
political career that he used phrases like "bloodshed" and "civil war" in his public utterances. The
results strengthened his negotiating position enormously vis-a-vis the viceroy, the Congress and
the two British visiting teams in 1946, the parliamentary delegation and the Cabinet Mission. The
Viceroy had already refrained from reforming his Council without the Muslim League in it and
had 'conceded1 in his 'Breakdown Plan' which he had sent to the Secretary' of State on 27
December 1945 'self determination in genuinely Muslim areas.' The final business was to be
settled by the Cabinet Mission with which the Viceroy had also to calibrate. The British
Parliamentary Delegation called on Jinnah at his Delhi residence on 10 January 1946. A leading
member of the Delegation. Reginald Sorensen, with his known sympathies with Congress,
recorded later his impression of this meeting in his unpublished memoirs entitled A
Backbencher’s Pilgrimage' as follows:

"I confess I had under-estimated the emotional intensity of the Muslim League demand for
"Pakistan’s a term invented by a Muslim Cambridge undergraduate acquaintance who united the initials
of themes of predominantly Muslim Indian states. I came to realise the implacable resolve 0f Mr.-
Jinnah to achieve partition and Pakistan, and I vividly remember the long conversation I with him
ending as he rose to bid me farewell, his sister, Fatima, standing sternly motionless few feet away,
"well, Mr. Sorensen, it's
THEup to you,” said
TESTAMENT OF he,
THEby which I fully MOVEMENT
INDEPENDENCE understood he meant I must change
2-40 my
judgment on the undesirability of Pakistan."

"In the wake of the allied victory, Churchill's coalition government was voted out in 1945', and
Clement Attlee's Labor Cabinet came into existence in London. Attlee favored to give inde pendence to
India from Britain's cage of state as quickly as possible. So the Lord Petheic Lawrence, Secretary of
State for India, concluded that the Government wanted to decide constitutional issue between the two
communities and sent a Cabinet mission of "Three Wise Men" to India, headed by Lord Pethic-
Lawrence and consisted of Stafford Cripps, who was the author of its constitutional proposals, and A.
V. Alexander The Mission came without any concrete proposals. They hoped that agreement could
avail from mutual meetings with the Congress and the League but" after a series of Interviews,
conferences and Lengthy correspondence, the Mission realised that the Hindus and Muslims led by the
Congress and The League respectively spoke not only in divergent but irreconcilable term."{82}The
Congress wanted absolute majority in India and the unity and on the other hand League demanded its
partition for a separate homeland. Though, it was 'Great Britain's parting gift of statesmanship to India’
and "the Mission Plan might well have saved South Asia's subcontinent decades of tragic conflict, still
unresolved. "{83} And could not capture the political and constitutional unity of two very important
nationalists Of India. The Cabinet Mission held two meetings with Jinnah on 4 and 16 April 1946
before proceeding to Simla for further sessions beginning on 5 April 1946 with all parties and interests.
The intricacies of discussions of the Cabinet Mission, its plan, the acceptance and then rejection of the
Plan by the Congress and the League. The Cabinet Mission didn't give a formula for a compromise
between the Congress demand for majority rule at the center and the more extreme forms of the
League's demand for Pakistan. {84}The Congress and the League could not gain any extraordi nary
solution of their demand. The 'three-tiered Federal Union government' was not acceptable to the
League and the Congress. Pethic-Lawrence wrote Attlee about the hurdles created by the League and
Congress that:
"What is going to happen I don't know. Gandhi is provoking enigmatic and blows hot and cold.
Azad, Nehru and Jinnah I think all want a settlement. But already we are up against the sec ond
hurdle... Azad and Nehru and the congress generally are willing to waive any formal or legal change in
the interim constitution, but they want almost absolute power in reality and they want something to be
able to say about it to their people. Jinnah not only does not want the Viceroy to relinquish his
authority but he positively wants him to retain it. The Viceroy is now I think con vinced that he must go
to the limits of what is possible in satisfying the Congress ... I have not.... 'hope that we may surmount
this difficulty and that the Congress and Muslim League may both expire a grudging acquiescence in
our plan sufficient to enable us to go ahead with summoning the Constituent Assembly ... on or before
June 15th. There are many people who would welcome our positively getting on with the job." {85}
It was the reflection that the Cabinet mission understood that they were failing to introduce
compromise formula. It was obvious that the two political groups wanted to draw the constitution al
painting from their own points of view. Jinnah wanted to reconstruct it on the basis of Pakistan and the
Congress pandits were developing the hurdles to abandon the just claims of the Muslim
League. Getting now here, the Cabinet Mission turned towards its own scheme, announced on 16
1946, proposed to embrace the modem nation-states of Pakistan, India, and the Bangladesh, 'each of
which would have been a ”Group" under the central" Union” umbrella.’ and the 'compromise formula’
would be constructed as follows:

"1. The All-India Union Government and Legislature would deal with Foreign Affairs, Defense,
Communications, Fundamental rights and would have the necessary power of taxation to
raise the finances required for these subjects.
2. In the Government and the Legislature of the Union equal representation would be given to
the Muslims majority Provinces or their group and to the Hindu majority Provinces or their
group. In addition to these, there would be representatives from the States.
 3. The residuary
THEpowers wouldOFvest
TESTAMENT THEinINDEPENDENCE
the Provinces. MOVEMENT
Provinces could form groups and 2-41 such
groups would determine what Provincial subjects they should deal with in common.
4. There would be a provision both in the constitutions of the Union and the groups whereby
any Provinces, if a Majority in its Legislature Assembly so desired, could call for a
reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten
yearly intervals thereafter/'{86}

The provinces were to form groups in accordance with the compromising scheme created by the
Mission. The groups were: (A) Consisting of Hindu majority provinces, Madras, Bombay, United
Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces, and Orissa which would have 167 general seats and twenty
Muslim seats, making up a total of 187 seats. (B) Consisting of Punjab, the North-West Frontier
Provinces and Sindh would have nine general seats, twenty-two Muslim, four for Sikh, making a total
of thirty five seats. (C) Section 'C consisting of Bengal, and Assam were to have thirty-four general
seats, and thirty-six Muslim seats making a total of seventy seats. The Cabinet Mission Plan gave each
group the paraphernalia of its constitution, government, executive, legislature and the Judiciary. The
scheme was, divided in to two parts, a long-term scheme and a short one. The Mission also
emphasised, was inter-dependent and was to be accepted or rejected as a whole. After the
implementation of the 'compromise formula' League and the Congress expressed its agreement with the
plan. The members of the plan were sure that the League would not appreciate it. But, the League
accepted it, because the grouping of provinces with the constituent assemblies gave the ultimate idea of
the emergence of Pakistan, although, the scheme rejected the partition of India. On the other hand
Congress rejected the idea of interim government but accepted the long-term plan. " The Mission was
thus committed to set up the proposed interim government with out the representative of the Congress,
but its members tried to quibble out of their undertaking and postponed the establishment of a new
government." {87}Jinnah was disappointed and rightly interpreted this as a ’breach of faith’, and
decided to organise to direct action to achieve Pakistan.
The fact behind the ’Hartal’ was evident when Congress rejected the Plan, The Viceroy refused to
form a government and when League decided to refuse the government the Lord Wavell not only
invited Nehru "to submit to me proposals for the formation of an Interim Government' and also
'authorised him to nominate non-Muslims to the council.' Lord Wavell also wrote to Nehru that 'it will be
for you to consider whether you should first discuss them to Mr. Jinnah.' Lord Wavell after the
Pathetic-Lawrence’s approval argued that the coalition government could solve the destinies of India at
this critical time. Nehru wrote Jinn all for the formation of a coalition provincial government. It may be
noted that the 'Direct Action’, which passed by the Muslim League Council against" illegal to
unconstitutional'’ formula and for the establishment of Pakistan for the Muslim ’Nation’, was to
develop pressure on the Congress and British. The Muslim Leaguers feared that the British government
was thinking about the establishment of an Interim government without the consent of Muslim League.
The 'Direct Action’ marked the end of diplomatic negotiations on the transfer of power and the start of
bloody year of civil war of succession for the sub-continent. "Calcutta's Great Killing" on the August
16 alone claimed over 5000 lives, leaving another 100,000 homeless as rampaging mobs of looters,
killers, and rapists roamed that "City of Dreadful Nights." { 88} It may also be noted that the Viceroy
did not fear the League as he feared the Congress and the invitation to Nehru to form the Interim
Government was the image about Congress importance in the political course of the sub-continent. The
most important initiative by the Viceroy to the Congress to authorise them to nominate non- League
Muslims candidates to the Council was the indication that the Congress was the party of Hindu-
Muslim honeymoon. Jinnah was between the two wars, if he conceded this situation it mean that the
League was not the sole spokes party of the Muslims in India and if the proposals was rejected it would
be poisonous for the League. Jinnah could not vacant the political path for the Congress because the
Hindu-dominated Congress was flagging their complete independence of United India. So when Nehru
invited Jinnah to cooperate him, in the formation of coalition provincial government Jinnah refused it "
I know nothing as to what between the Viceroy and you, nor have I any idea what agreement has been
arrived at between youTHE two ... If this means
TESTAMENT the
OF THE Viceroy has commissioned
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT you to form an Executive
2-42
Council.. . and has already agreed to accept and act your advice ... it is not possible or me to accept
such a position . . . However, if you care to meet me, on behalf of Congress, to settle the Hindu-
Muslim question and resolve the serious deadlock, I shall be glad to see you to-day at 6 p.m. {89}
Nehru offered Jinnah five Muslim Leagues seats on a Cabinet of fourteen and Jinnah object ed the
offer and also refused to participate in the interim government at that time but after some time Muslim
League entered in the Interim government. It was Lord Wavell who invited the Muslim League to join
Interim government because Jinnah was in strong position and the 'Killing’s city’ was on the brink of a
civil war. It was also stated that the invitation was the political blunder of the Viceroy because "if he
had waited a little longer, the Muslim League would have itself begged to be invited in."{90} Although
the League had joined the interim government, but not prepared to enter the Constituent Assembly till a
decision was taken on the ' grouping clauses' of the Cabinet Mission Plan. And when the Constituent
Assembly met on 9 December, the League representatives kept away from it. The two parties hostile to
each other and the concept of joint responsibility could not work smoothly. They could not materialize
the issue and started quarreled over the issue of leader of the Cabinet. The 'compromise formula’ turned
into a deadlock by the end 1946. The leaguers were not attending the sessions of Constituent Assembly
and demanding the division of grouping provisions. And the Congress demanded the resignation of the
League representation from the Interim government. They had grounds of the demand that Firstly,
League had rejected the Cabinet Mission, secondly, and they were not attending the Constituent
Assembly, and threatened by their Direct Action Plan. "The Viceroy was in sympathy with the Muslim
League contention and was himself of the view that the Congress had not in fact accepted the Cabinet
Mission Plan" {91} In the meantime serious communal riots broke out at several places not only them
selves but the civil and military services of the Hindus and Muslims were turned into hostile block."
Orgies of communal violence were trigged across the subcontinent, from Bengal To the Frontiers, from
Cashmere to Hyderabad. Wherever Hindus lived in a close proximity to Muslims, passions flared
beyond the boiling points. Centuries of neighborly coexistence ended overnight. Hatred and distrust ran
wild. "{92} It was the complete failure of the government machinery to tackle the worsening situation,
which had became daily feature of the Indian scene.
Attlee and the British managers convinced that the situation had been out of order and it was
better for the British imperialists to withdraw from India. They wanted to prevent the situation and
forced the Indian leaders to arrive on agreement. Attlee, the British Prime Minister, announced on 20
February 1947 that " His Majesty's Government will have to consider to whom the powers of the
Central Government in British India should be handed over, on the due date; whether as a whole to
some areas to the existing provincial governments, or in such other way as may seem most reasonable
in the best interests of the Indian people". The due date for the 'effective' transfer of power was June
1948 at the least. For effecting the actual transfer of power Lord Mountbatten (1900- 79) was appointed
nineteenth and the last Viceroy in place of Wavell, who flew into New Delhi in March 22 1947.
'Mountbatton's royal birth and 'fatal charm' gave him unique powers in effecting Britain's final transfer
of power in India.' Though he had parliamentary permission to take until June 1948 to complete his
mission of final transfer of power. But soon he observed after the survey of India that the neighborly
coexistence of India deteriorating day by day. He changed his permitted timetable to August 1947,
fearing an India volcanic violence if he waited any longer. After meeting several times with Gandhi,
Nehru, and Jinnah, Mountbatten reached to decide that India’s Partition was inevitable. He who was
the clear supporter of Congress ideology, rushed back to London and after consultations with the
British government, drafted an important declaration which known as Mountbatten plan of 3 June
1947. In a conference held on 3rd June 1947, he placed the plan before the leaders of different political
parties and the procedure for the transfer of power to Indians. He emphasised on the partition of the
country and stated that it was the only solution of Indian political and constitutional deadlock. Unlike
the Cabinet mission delegates, he did not wait for the Indian parties to reach “agreement" and
implement for the safety of Indian political structure and the people.
 'The Plan provided the area of subcontinent
THE TESTAMENT not presented
OF THE INDEPENDENCE in the Constituent Assembly2-43
MOVEMENT were to
decide weather their constitution was to be framed by the existing Constituent Assembly or by a new
one" and "the Legislatures of the Punjab and Bengal were each to meet in two parts representing
Muslim majority and the rest of the provinces. Each part was to decide by a simple majority whether
the province was to be partitioned or not. If either of the two favored partition, it was to be effected
accordingly. The Legislature of Sind was likewise given to choose to join the existing Constituent
Assembly or the new one. In the North-West Frontier Province and the district of Sylhet in Assam the
wishes of the people were to be known by referendum." {93} The Congress and the League accepted
the Plan. Sir Cyril Radcliff was the chairman of two-boundary commission, who demarcate the
boundaries between the new states of Pakistan and India. This demarcation became an Indian
Independence Act on 18 July 1947. The important provisions of the act were as follow:
.- 1. It provided for the creation of two independent Dominion, Pakistan and India.
2 British influence came to an end, with the implementation of the independence Act. The
Legislatures of the two Countries ware to have full power of legislation.
3. Pakistan and Indian governments were to be governed in accordance with the Act of 1935
with necessary modifications.
4. Cessation of the title of Viceroy, henceforth he was to be called only Governor- General.

□D
5. The army, stores and other assets as well as liabilities of the India was to be divided
between the two dominions.
6. The Act of independence, 1947, provided for the complete cessation of British control
over Indian affair.
7. The British imperialism came to an end, the dominions were free to leave the common
wealth, if they so.

On 15 August 1947, Jinnah became the governor-general of Pakistan with the eastern and
western wings. And when he was inaugurating Pakistan's Constituent Assembly in Karachi that day,
declared that "It will be our constant endeavor to work for the welfare and well-being of all the
communities in Pakistan." The governor-general could not live long and died. And Pakistan early
orphaned, was left to rear leaders who were less wise, less tolerant leaders could not solve two basic
problem: the constitutional development and its political identity. The leaders, who formed the
vanguard of the freedom struggle, lost interests in their professional politics. Corruption, nepotism,
regionalism and parochial and tribal localities were the inevitable results of less wise and less
tolerant leaders. Once the identity of the authority established in Pakistan, its non-representative
elite's used authoritarian methods to satisfy their ill ego. Faiz Ahmad Faiz in his poem,' To A
Political Leaders’ portrays such politicians of the newborn country:

Long years those hands, unfriended and unfree,

Have clawed into night's dark unyielding breast As straws
might dash themselves against a sea,
Or butterflies assail a mountain-crest:

Till now that dark and flint-hard breast of night Has felt so
many gashes that all around Look where you will, is woven a
web of light,
And from far off the morning's heartbeats sound.
 THE hands
The people's TESTAMENT
have OF THEyour
been INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
coat of mail, 2-44

Your wealth: what else has lent you strength, but they?
You do not wish this darkness to prevail,
Yet wish those hands lopped off, and the new day,
* Now throbbing in its eastern ambush, doomed
Under night’s iron corpse to lie entombed.
 Ch
INCIPIENT CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i}a p t e r —3 3-1

INCIPIENT
CONSTITUTIONALISM!

® “Over and above the law of the Constitution, is invariably to be found a set
of rules which are habitually obeyed by those who are concerned in the
administration of public affairs, and these are called conventions of the
Constitution or, what comes to the some thing, the political
understandings- and they form the hard core of the ethics of constitutional
behavior or constitutional morality.”
(Brohi, Fundamental Laws of Pakistan, p. 3.)

® “The constables took Ustad Mangu to the police station. On the way and at
the police station, he kept’yelling, "The new constitution . . . the new
constitution." But no one understood what he was referring to. "What are
you shouting about. . . what new laws and rights are you shouting
a bo u t . . . the laws are the same old ones ..
And Ustad Mangu was locked up in a cell.”
(Sadaat Hasan Manto, "New Constitution. ”)

The path that accepted by Pakistan's leadership at independence was a consequence of ill
planning and virtually no sound conseptualisation. Jinnah devoted all his constitutionalist capabil ities
and spends his health in struggling for a sovereign Muslim State where they would live in their
political, constitutional, religious and economic benefits. ’ But neither Jinnah nor any of his immediate
circle was moved to lay out on paper the blueprint for the state they intended to create.' The start of the
state, its operation, nature and structure was defined in words and slogans not in reali ty. Pakistan, in
fact, was created without political scholars who defined its political experience or record the eloquence
of the struggle for independence as it was happening. Though there was theoretical foundation, known
as Two Nation theory, and it defined as a separatist formula in guiding the Muslim destiny yet it was
little confusing? The movers and shakers of the leaders who later adopted an ’official theory’, had been
aimed at constructing Hindu-Muslim castle. The Congress and the Leaguers were the same in many of
time of the Pakistan Movement. Pakistan could be classified with the weaker constitutionalist struggle
because the Founding leaders accepted the British designed ’ failed state' and opted for the more
familiar colonial constitution. The Government of
_
India Act, 1935 which inherited under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, stated that until a con-
stitution was framed, the interim arrangement for the country would be as set out in the Act, 1935.
Pakistan has since been governed by a series of similarly of this act which was better for the colonial
'iron-cage' bureaucracy than to the parliamentarians. The constitution, was framed in more than seven
years, was based largely on the India Act, 1935, and on the provisions for different rights in the Indian
Constitution, with some additions and changes.
Although, Pakistan was fitted into a design of parliamentary experience,’ but the dream of
constitutional parliamentary never came in reality due this bureaucratic-ridden act that introduced, if
not benign, authoritarianism. It isINCIPIENT
true that colonial-trained bureaucrats,
CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} the basic pillars of 3-2
Jinnah for
administration, were more disciplined and laborer that the country's politicians. These trained,
disciplined bureaucrats overwhelmed Pakistan's official parlance of parliamentary entity and designed
an administrative state.
The administrative state was reality because the country came in to existence without receiving
its fair share of assets as one of the two successor States that emerged from British India. The newly
born state lacked the ready-made national government and had to face the influx of refugees, and the
question of survival itself, that created by its neighbor like other ‘multidirectional dilemmas'. It was
thus understandable that the task of constitutional state was not its first romance. The lacking of
constitutional -process created another premature, feeble political stability by the ’symbiotic
relationship ties to each other.’ No constitutional set up means any national elections, and this
underpinning was to prove disastrous political system for a new State. It was not really an
administrative problem, but the failure of this is the tragedy of the administrative state.
In the Fifty-three years of Pakistan’s history, the dream of constitutional government could not
become in reality. Though, Pakistan struggled for it but could not gain the substance of the
constitution. Constitutions are just like bridges between the historical past and the futurist destination
of the governments. Constitutions are the limits for the authoritative methods and if the authority more
bold than the constitution, it created conflict, chaos, and arbitrary decision-making in the society and
create deep-seated governing problems in the country. Constitution is the mirror image of the society
and if the society is weak, divided by centripetal and centrifugal forces, the society can not overcome
its deep-rooted political problems even through constitution making. So the constitutions are the
reflection and extension of the society.
In Pakistan as stated before, the constitutions are treated like paper-document and for trial and
error rather that the outline of governmental intentions which describes structural arrangements and
identifies essential components. “Pakistanis have treated constitutions as though they were experi -
mental devices. If dissatisfied with the original, try another. If something goes wrong, the documents
are at fault. Discard it and attempt something else." {2} Constitutions are not the matter of ignorance,
they are the mirrors of confidence and political environment and can be, if required, change by the
consent of public opinion and for the betterment of governmental purpose. In the constitutional lab -
oratory of Pakistan, the constitutions made by the ready-made valve of visceral colonial features. With
out understudying, they carved, declared and implanted and without the public consent they discard,
holed in abeyance, and violated. The founding father, who has power of his own ability and
personality, Mohammad Ali Jinnah dreamed about federal, parliamentary, and democratic Constitution
in which social justice, equality, and fairly would sparking provisions but it was not outlived in his
administrative tenure. Almost eight constitutions came to screen, censored by heads of the state and
mutilated the creation of their own constitutional struggle. The crises of 'constitution als in Pakistan
have not yet ended'. Various contradictions, the religious and secular conflicts, the theocratic-
administrative set-ups and the democratic outlooks fractured it. The regulatory interface between the
masses and governmental elite disappeared in the entire constitutional history of Pakistan and
"Undeniably, the overwhelming majority of those entrusted with the prestigious task of constitution-
making were neither competent craftsmen nor visionary and futurist leaders."{3} And unfortunately,
the wiser, more tolerant leader than others, died only 13 months after the birth of Pakistan. When he was
died everything was still unsettled except the fact that Pakistan had come to stay. The constitution had
yet to draft, the pattern of government had to be determined, nonalignment in domestic as well as
foreign affairs had to be worked out and the kind of society to be constructed was not known either.
The suffering of migrating Muslims from India had undoubtedly influenced the course of
political and constitutional promotion in Pakistan and when the founder died the path of political and
constitutional developments were more difficult to improve. When Jinnah was alive, he was the
persona of Pakistan. His powers, which were delegated by the Indian Act of 1935, exercised for
beyond those normally associated with that office of viceroy. He was the arbitrator between the Center
and the provinces and mostly relied on the civil
INCIPIENT servant." Particularly {i}
CONSTITUTIONALISiM in the provinces, where3-3most of
the ministers had assumed office for the first time, the Governors and civil servants were extremely
powerful. Governors of three of the four provinces (North-West Frontier Provinces, West Punjab, and
East Bengal) were British and members of the former Indian Civil Service."{4} This wrong
introduction of civil servants haunted the smoothness of political and constitutional development.
They never represented the spirit and growth of nation. They never introduced national integration but
to develop compromises with their personal, parochial, and group interests. The constitution-makers
with the help these compromisers always constitutionals the provisions of their own position and.
immediate*requirements of personal interests.
Pakistan has passed through several 'late constitutions.' Each constitution was the reflection of
personal and group interests rather to the mirror of nation's aspirations with out constitutions proclaim.
In the constitution-breaking history of Pakistan, no constitution appreciated and understood by the
nation as well as military institution. Whenever the constitution of the state discarded by the
successive protectors, there was no public resentment, and less desire to talk to them. The constitution
making and breaking was a game of the rulers and "the population were mere spectators who seldom
followed the activity on the field, let alone grasped the rulers of the contest." {5}
The incipient constitutionalism of the country delayed by conflicted ideological extrapolations
but also the clash between the powerful civil servants and politicians. Though, the civil servants of
Jinnah wanted to overcome the maladministration and eliminate corruption, but they used authoritarian
methods rather to understand the political process and the prime task of making constitution. Jinnah,
who dictated the norms and imperatives of constitution-— based on social justice, equality and fairly,
not any theocracy, but the British-trained bureaucratic powers, though introduced by Jinnah, disturbed
the smoothness of constitution-making. The country which dominated by the British-trained
bureaucracy and vice-regal act and underdeveloped with low industrialisation, and the sudden death of
the founding father could not draft the first constitution.
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan did try to build bridge between the vice-regal system and the
political institutions, which he had inherited from Jinnah and worked hard for the constitution. The
major constitutional conflicts that faced by the Prime Minister was the question of representation of
regional groups in the central legislature of Pakistan though federalism was acceptable to all and
secondly, the Islamic controversy wounded the relation between the state and religion. The Constituent
Assembly of Pakistan, which should be work for the transparent constitution, it sounded the cries of
conflicts. The assembly members indulged in heated debates than to develop constitutional
compromises. The three big institutions, which the British handed down, were the civil services, Army,
and the constituent assembly, inherited Pakistan. The increasing power and influences of the two
institutions created such kind of political circumstances that the third inherited institution could not
able to frame a constitution. The western educated secularist and the Ulema and the regional and
central forces were the causation of delaying constitution.
It could estimate that the leaders, before partition and in the struggle of independence could not
understand the increasing power of regional and linguistic truths. Perhaps they were busy to draft a
country where they could live without the Hindus and the British domination because after domination
of alien power, the Muslim thought" their prestige gone, their laws replaced, their language shelved
and their education shorn of its monetary value." { 6} They were only thinking about the survival of
their political, cultural, religious, legal, and linguistic identities. They were feared that these identities of
their survival could submerge in a Hindu dominated united India. They could not afford to think about
the parochial or provincial loyalties. These loyalties could fracture the slogan of Islamic bond. But
after the establishment of the state of Pakistan, it was the redeeming feature of early years of Pakistan
that the sense of national consciousness was disappeared when an Bengali Leader cried to haunt the
government in the first constituent assembly of Pakistan which sounded in a debate on January 16,
1956 that" It is a country which in reality is not one country. We are going to form One State out of
two countries. We are going to form one nation out of two peoples”. The sense of authority, which was
introduced by the founding father and inherited by the colonial masters, widened the issue of political
disappointments. INCIPIENT CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} 3-4
Any kind of government in Pakistan was worked under the sense of authority. The authoritarian
institutions like the army, the civil service and the constituent assembly could-not worked for the
smoothness of the government but to complicate the religious and regional issues with their muddle-
heads. There were other forces which introduced by the colonial system who were had been worked
like political touts of imperial managers, they were the Mafia, pressure groups and especially the
landowning classes." But their impact was not always decisive; above all, they were often represented
by the three major groups that we have mentioned."{7} One can not estimate that which problem was
the factor behind the delaying of constitutional government. However both the religious and regional
echoes in the assembly emerged in such harsh debates which militated against constitutional
supremacy. Though we had glued the regional cries by the bond of Islamic nationalism but this Islamic
bond which was the election campaign of pre-independence days and the promised that we would
carved the Islamic state, sounded more in the walls of constituent assembly. It was also mentioned in
the draft of Objective Resolution that Muslims would be enable to mold their lives in accordance with
the teachings and requirements of Islam and it was Jinnah himself who requested the ulema to help in
the referendum campaign and to command their influence and authority with the people. {8} Though,
Jinnah wanted to preach very simple doctrine of Islam which was free of all theological and doctrinal
contradiction but it was misunderstood by the masses and as well as their supreme Ulema. They not
only lighted the cause of the establishment of Islamic state but also the Pure Islamic constitution. They
also rejected the westernized politicians and civil servants because according to the religious groups,
were not good practicing Muslims. The idea which carved to transcend all regional and sectarian
differences, after partition failed to protect national integrity but also paused ‘the delay of complete,
clear and independent constitution.
It was the task of Liaquat Ali Khan that in the path of constitutional struggle he introduced the
Objective Resolution to outline the fundamental features of the new state in which the ideology,
character, and form of the republic. It was also not easily implemented due to those regional rep -
resentational issues and ideological debates such like the nature of Islamic state, the nature of fed -
eralism, the form of government, the problem of electorate and the question of language. {9}.
The genesis of provincial autonomy which also obstructed the smooth promotion of gov -
ernmental intentions and divided the political situation of Pakistan into central and provincial fac tions
and impeded the incipient constitutionalism can be finding in the pre-independence federalism of
united India, imbued by the colonial managers. It was Congress and Muslim League who under the
British rule demanded provincial autonomy. Though the Minto-Morley Reforms 1909 had introduced
non-official majorities in the then Provincial Councils but it failed to satisfy the expectation of the
local people and their leaders. It was the Montague-Chelmsford Report, the famous constitutional
document, which published in 1918 for the Indian Constitutional Reforms in which " established a
measure of provincial autonomy by developing authority in provincial matters on to the provincial
governments and freeing them to a large extent from central control." { 10}.
The Act disappointed the Muslims and their political interests because in the provinces of
Bengal and Punjab, where their majority turned into a minority. Though, both the major parties were
disappointing by the constitutional reforms but they were ignorant on different type of issues. In
1920s, the communal tensions began to frustrate the constitutional understanding between them. Both
were talking about the different constitutional perspectives, as Moulana Hasrat Mohani (1878-1951),
demanded ' a loose federation of fully autonomous provinces.'! 11} In such clear and transparent
demand, Muslim League in its special session of 1924 in Lahore, invited government to revise the
constitutional provision of 1919 Act Reforms in which the government should introduce the provision
to satisfy the Muslim Interests. In the Resolution of 1924 they highlighted the demand of a federation
of India in which the full autonomy of the provinces provided, power in Legislature to small
minorities, maintenance of the demand of separate electorates, and the representation of Muslim
majorities in Punjab, Bengal, and the NWFP should be preserved.
 In the whole struggle of Centre-Province power in the subcontinent,
INCIPIENT CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} Congress demanded
3-5 and
favored the strong unitary Centre, While the Muslim League advocated the constitutional power to the
provinces because due to their political and constitutional survival Though, Jinnah wanted to reconcile
the divergent Congress- League constitutional attitudes on centre-province distribution of power and
the issue of provincial importance, the Nehru Report was rejected all constitutional concessions to the
Muslims both in the centre and provincial set-ups. He ignored 'dynamic minority' by his ’pious fraud'
of Hindu document, which turned Muslim intellectualism into callous attitude and Jinnah drafted his
14 points in which he rejected his ’honorable friend's pet document’, In which he demanded federal
constitution, provincial autonomy to all provinces, and the residuary powers in the constitution to be
vested in the provinces. { 12} Jinnah also talked about to form an independent province of Sindh and
became the acumen of the Muslim political rights.
Though the term ’ Provincial Autonomy' that had not name in the Act of 1919, but after the
seven years (1927-34) inquiry of the Indian system of government, the Government of India Act,
1935, a Large measure of provincial autonomy and self government was delegated to the provinces.
Though it was the declaration of importance for the minority but headed by the central supervision
when it provided governors with the right to protected matters of minorities and the law and order
situation. The governors who were the central touts complicated the provincial autonomy. No doubt
■ that the Act also could not draft a simple and more common distribution of powers between the
centre and federating units, "rather, it made it complex and unusual by providing three legislative lists
i.e., federal and provincial and the concurrent." and "moreover, in the exercise of residuary powers, the
Governor general was given an unusual prerogative of deciding in which of the three legislative lists, a
specific residuary subject was to be placed. "{13} The issue of provincial autonomy was a direct
product of centralisation of power in the hands of the federation and the powerful impact of governor-
general. Though the self-government was given at the provincial level, and in accordance with the
British Parliamentary system. But the governor-general remained in powerful control of the Federal
Government and the basic characteristic of Governor- General was to established adminis trative
Central control on the Provinces.
The political position of the provinces was similar to that at the centre. The Governor was as
powerful in the provinces as the governor-general was in the center, "for which the poet-philosopher,
Allama Iqbal, expressed his views (even prior to the formal announcement of the Act of 1935) that the
British appeared to create in the persons of the Provincial Governors ’ white Rajas in addition to the
Brown Rajas'.” {14} And this was the subject who could not create the clear division of powers
between the federal governments and provincial autonomy in the provinces. The seat of governor-
general became more influential in provincial matters when the independence Act of 1947 passed, with
its quasi-federal parliamentary system, by which the British government transferred its crown over
India to the new dominions of India and Pakistan. The Independence Act in its section 8 laid down
that, until a constitution was farmed, the interim arrangement for the country would be set out in the
Government of India Act, 1935. And section 9, provided more power to the governor-general to
adoptions and alterations in the objects of Government of Indian Act.
In Pakistan, this burden of "legal fundamentalism" of federal system inherited and adopted by
those leaders who were the oppose of the federal part of the Act of 1935 in order to avoid expansionist
’ Hitlerism' against the provincial matters and called it 'fundamentally bad' and 'unac ceptable' for its
injurious calculations. The Leaguers who accepted the provincial autonomy and the Communal Award
and completely rejected its federal part, implemented central part and con demned the provincial
arguments of new born state. And because the head could change or alter the Act, the authoritarian got
major change made in the federal system of government to control over "the indispensable quality" of
the system which "is the first instruction in any federal engineering manual, and the first check point
for any inspector of federal constitution." Federal system contains two-dimensional governments, the
national government and the federating units and for the promotion and political development of any
country, the division of power is the pulse of the government. "The powers are so divided that each set
of government coordinates with and remains independent
INCIPIENT of the other {i}
CONSTITUTIONALISiM set of the government."3-6
The two
faced structure of the government should operate at two different levels and on some 'precise method'.
{15}. In the constitutional history of Pakistan it was treated by personal liking and dis-liking. The
inspectors of federal constitutions of Pakistan made changes for their personal vendetta. According to
the Memoirs of Mr. Hamidul Haq Choudhry that "Mr. Liaqaut AM Khan, had Act of 1935 amended
giving the Prime Minister power to appoint and dismiss provincial cabinets. The dependence of the
provincial cabinet on the support of the provincial assembly was removed. The amendment was made
through an Executive Order of the Governor -General without the aid of the Constituent assembly. The
change completely destroyed provincial autonomy and made the province a branch of the central
government. Under it no Chief Minister could afford to disagree with the central govern ment, refuse to
implement its orders or stand up to it in the interests of the province.
Mr. Hamidul Haq in his Memoirs explains the reality as " I came to learn of these changes when
the question of appointing the chief minister for East Bengal arose after Khawaja Nazimmuddin was
appointed to the Post of governor-general on the death of Jinnah. According to the 1935 Act (before
amendment) the leader of the majority party in the Assembly was to be called upon to form the
Cabinet. I had succeeded Nazimuddin as leader of the Muslim League party in the Assembly. I called a
meeting of the party to formally appoint a leader with a view to forming the government. It was taken
for granted that I would be elected without any contest. However, Sir Frederick Bourne, the Governor
of East Bengal at that time, showed me a letter from Liaquat
 Ali Khan directing him to appoint Nurul Amin as the chief ministers of the cabinet. The amend ment to
the Act of 1935, which Liaquat Ali had surreptitiously made, was then shown to me.”{ 16} Pakistan’s
governance crises are closely linked with that identity of authority. The country, which was achieved
by political and constitutional struggle, deceived by those who fought the constitutional fight with the
federal part of the inherited constitution and their bullterrier methods constitutionally appreciated by
the virus of Section 9 of the Independence Act. The male-practices of the constitutionalist fathers
followed by almost every subsequent leader. In the initial stages of the baby country, its opposition
leaders faced very difficult time under je safety laws," which could not be challenged under the
Government Act, 1935." The vote against je Muslim League declared the vote against Pakistan and
this repudiation of democratic norms could not challenge in the silent courts before the promulgation
of the 1956 Constitution. {17}. j Though, Liaquat Ali introduced habit of amendments in the acts by
the order of the governor- general and gave the country in the hands of non- representative, elitist and
ethnically discretionary supervisors but also drafted some principles of Objective Resolution. This was
the foundation of the institution, which were laid in the Resolution. The occasion was described as a
mile stone for the formation of constitution and declared by the Prime Minister when it adopted by the
CAP on March, 1949 that 'Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of the subcontinent wanted to
build their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam.' It was not describe in the
Resolution that Pakistan was to be an Islamic State, nor was any authority vested in the Ulema but
there was a clause of enabling in which the two nation theory enriched in the future constitution. The
Resolution was not accepted because it failed to guarantee political, social, and economic justice but
adopted after much heated debates. Not clearly but the Resolution tried to combine federalism,
democracy with popular sovereignty." The Resolution's generality could not hide profound
disagreements about |e character of the future constitution or state— for example, its characterisation
of the role of Islam |as made simultaneously prominent, obscure and legally undefined. Its grounding
power for constitution writing has been emotional rather practical, inertial more than assertive." {18}.
The Constituent Assembly constituted an Islamic advisory committee to review the basic
principles of Federalism, franchise and judicial powers on which a storm of resentment aroused from
the opposition, the members mainly from East Bengal's Hindus. They were (scussing for the
maintenance of a secular state as expressed by the founder. The reports, which drafted by the CAP
Committees' in 1950 and 1952 faced rejection by constituencies on the principles of representation,
provincial autonomy, language and secularism. The constitutional crises also diverted Liaquat
constitution -making eagerness and he started to build an Islamic castle for Pakistani-Muslims.
Though, it was not mentioned in the foundations of the Resolution. The Islamic advisory councils
created to 'make the Muslim population of the country truly Muslim.’ although, being a Muslim
majority country, it was clear that Islam would not be on the agenda ;)r struggle. The founders of
Pakistan very rightly considered Islam and Pakistan to be mutually independent and supportive rather
than antagonistic so there was no need for slogans like klam is in danger' once the country had come in
to existence. Rather than working for a system responsive to the needs of all the regional, provincial,
and ethnic components of 'Pakistan, it turned to self-assertion. It is also a matter of fact that the
controversies had been start between the eastern and western Pakistan in the days of Liaquat who was
the strongest man of jinnah in pre-independence days. Instead of doing for the constitution legacy,
Liaquat started to create political and constitutional conflicts with the provincial matters and the central
administration. With in the first week of independence, Liaquat Ali Khan had dismissed the
government of (Khan Sahib, the leader of Indian National Congress. Liaqtiat Ali also used this power
under the
__
Order of 1948 to dismiss Muslim League governments in other provinces. Who created differ ences
with the capital, was dismissed by the Prime Minister as Mr. Khurro, the Chief Minister of Sindh and
Nawab of Mamdot of Punjab. {19}.
In the constitutional vacuum, which established for the mall-administration of the country, gave
opportunity to the elite turned to a game of hide-and-seek among them selves while jockey-The
power. INCIPIENT CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} 3-8

That situation of instability in young-nation state essential for every one to carry on the legacy.
The centralised autocracy of Liaquat Ali in the early years of state was accompanied by regional,
ethnic separatism. Pakistani political parlance of provincialism started in which Bengalis, Pushtuns,
and Balochis felt that Muhajireen and Punjabis were shacked with each other to deny their due
provincial. It made national integrity complicated and controversial. The regionalism, which started in
the early years of the country, dented national integration in many ways. Firstly it has fractured the
mass-based political culture for which this country came into existence, and secondly, it has blocked the
constitutional road and its political emotionalism which is most essential for constitutional instruments
like citizens, the judiciary, and the government functionaries. Thirdly, it has allowed the state to fill the
vacuum with more emphasis on administration than on governance. And if the kind of government led
by a bureaucratic, military, and feudal axis, it can not solve the Pandora box of political corruption, it
would be added oligarchic tendencies and the disenchantment of centrifugal forces.
While the powerful elite manipulated the state and the governance, the clergy created seri ous
deadlock in the national outlook by confronting the very concept of Pakistani nationalism. Many of
established 'mulla1 questioned such institutions as elections, political parties, parliaments, a consensus-
based constitution, an adult franchise, and women’s rights modem education, science, research in
humanities and the co-educational system. "Such a dismissive attitude on the part of established
ulema, who otherwise could not agree on the definition of a Muslim, provided an ide ological
justification to successive non-representative elitist oligarchies in Pakistan" {20}. All the successive
representative and non-representative have used Islam to legitimize their authority and to avoid
electorate politics. Though the religio-political parties, could not get more than a handful of seats in
the assemblies but their leaders always disturbed the national political integrity. Due to the lack of
education, rural-urban masses always caught many voluntary and willing supporters amongst the
ulema and increasing in numbers.
Although, the Quaid, nothing could divert him, believed that the state would never be a 1
theocracy or a any thing likes it' and in Pakistan, religion, creed, and caste would have 1 nothing to do
with the business of the state'. But after his death the young state started working against the vision of
Jinnah and developed relation with the religious elite to craft and adopt Objective Resolution. 'In this it
made specific mention of Islam.' The 1949 Objective Resolution provided, inter alia:
Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority
which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits
prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;
Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as
enunciated by Islam, shall be folly observed;
)^herein*the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective
spheres in accord with the teaching of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah (Traditions
of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)....’ {21).
The specific portion of Resolution was incorporated with minor modifications in the successive
constitutions of 1956, 1962, 1973, and General Zia ul-Haq's modification of 1985 and 1997. The Islam
which was used only to gather Muslim’s rapport against the Hindus mythology,

-eased in very a speedy and dominated style not in elections but in the shape of pressure groups 3I1(j
each mosque has become the religio-political pumps who are fueling orthodoxy, narrow- mindedness
and sectarian violence among the masses of after-independence. The personality ideological
differences leading to violent outbursts in the country and decreased foreign importance. It is also
amazing to know that these religious based political parties and their leaders gain not only alliances
with progressive parties but also ministries
INCIPIENTinCONSTITUTIONALISiM
the different periods of {i}
successive governments.3-9 In the
era of Zia, which came for 90 days and became 11 years, army raised the slogan of Nizam-i- Mustafa in
which political, judicial and educational systems destroyed and fragmented in the name of
Islamisation. For this Zia used ulema, pirs and landed aristocracy for his political purpose that was
ready to preach that democracy and political parties were unnecessary and irreligious.
The sense of authority and ideology with the silent behavior of judiciary ‘has always tried to
seek legitimacy by skirting around the prerequisites of a national, representative consensus. Indeed,
legitimacy has been sought by non-representative regimes through a politics of cooperation with
intermediaries and dependence on an ideological rationale 1 as General Ayub Khan and his young team
used the term of modernization and development by destroying the political and constitutional process.
And Zia for his legitimacy coined the process of Islamisation, which fragmented already weak political
culture.
The political and constitutional culture of Pakistan has been a troubled one. Having colonial
ready-made structure ” no other new nation which gained independence after 1947 has expe rienced the
variety of the intensity of traumas that Pakistan has suffered."{22}. And whenever some one wanted to
solve the trauma of Pakistan’s politics he often faced conflicts of ideology, lust of power, clash of
interests, and sometimes linguistic and ethnic hurdles. These inherited, numerous, diverse and most
complex difficulties created the causation of delaying constitution. Though, the Objective Resolution
was achieved and described by the Prime Minister of the state as ’ the most important occasion in the
life of this country, next in importance only to the achievement of independence'. But it was not the
entire constitution; it was the ideological plinth for the making of constitution, which only drafted for
the making of constitution. Its first Interim Report only created the sense of rejection in the different
sections of the society and " In view of an all-round criticism and public demand, Liaquat Ali Khan
moved the House to postpone its consideration and asked the Committee to review the report in the
light of the criticism and suggestions made by the members and others." {23}. While the Committee
was reviewing the report, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated at Rawalpindi on 16 October 1951, which
was the reflection of the provincial and parochial power tussles which started after the independence.
Liaquat Ali Khan was the second man for the great sacrifices to achieve Pakistan. By adopting
an Islamic emphasis, he believed that he could move the process of constitution making to suc cessful
conclusion. But ! during his rule of four and a half years, he even failed to prepare the basic framework
of the future constitution.' He was in the administrative preoccupation rather to draft the constitution
and the task of constitution making was taken up by the Khawaja Nazimuddin on his assumption of the
office of Prime Minister, who was the governor-general since the death of Jinnah three years earlier. "
Nazimmudin did not seem to be anyone's mind as Prime Minister and without minerals in solution.
When he became governor-general he had removed himself from politics, and his mild manner and
non-assertive nature made him appear ideally suited for that office, although not for the office of Prime
Minister. Ghulam Mohammad becoming governor-general was also a surprise because of his health
problems." {24}. The process of hide-and-seek started after the death of Liaquat Ali again. The three
men, Ghulam Mohammad , Nazimuddin, and Gurmani captured the situation and they worked for the
composition of the new government of decorated ideas. This was the starting point, in which wrong
governmental intentions manipulated the task of constitution making. In the Rawalpindi meeting,
Nazimmuddin vacated the post of governor-general, and Ghulam Mohammad, a trainee of autocratic
bureaucracy of British India and Ambassador to Washington, DC, became the new governor general. It
was like mid-night operation 'to give the country a new government as early as pos sible' and 'the new
appointment are likely to be accepted by the people with general satisfaction.!(Pakistan Time 19
October 1951). But it introduced the way of ’emergency’ to reshaped power of persons rather to
constitution or law. For years they bored the listeners (public) with aimless theorizing and power
seeking, demanding and working for good government, and interrupting it as soon as the struggle
grew.
The Constituent Assembly, which was inherited by colonial managers, was to operate in
accordance with the GovernmentINCIPIENT
of India Act, 1935, as amended {i}
CONSTITUTIONALISiM by the Independence3-10Act. The
constituent Assembly was empowered to write an official constitution for the country. "In the interim,
the Constituent Assembly also substituted for the national legislature and passed laws and issued
enactment necessary to the governance of the nation. "{25}, Though having parliamentary powers the
assembly could alter the legislation as it saw fit, in order to meet the needs of the new nation. But the
discretionary role of governor-general, as granted by the Act 1935, was the main rock against the
activities of Constituent Assembly. The authoritarian Governor- General could be used his powers
against the constitution-making body and the ’national legislature’. This was the cause and the
authority used several times in the political life of Pakistan. The constituent assembly could find the
lines of sovereign constitution but the authority delayed it. Not only delayed the constitution but also
fractured the assembly as in April 1954, the government was dissolved. The governor-general, in
justification of his decision, pointed out that the Cabinet of Khawaja Nazimuddin had failed to achieve
the political stability as well as maintaining law and order situation. The governments in Pakistan were
stricken by this common ailment. The successor governments follow in the footsteps of their
predecessors. They describe the causes of the failure of the previous governments in more or less the
same terms. They abused of political and administrative systems, horse-trading, cronyism, corruption
and politicisation of the bureaucracy. Though it was practically started in early years of the country but
one can observe these negative aspects, just as the present government contends. All the incoming
governments seem to believe that there has not been a ruling elite better than theirs to hold the reins of
office has. Every government, which established in Pakistan, has refrained from taking any radical
socio-economic measures to improve the economy or democratize the polity and the judicial system in
order to smooth their personal authority. The collective decision-making leadership of the civil and
military officers, higher judiciary, the intelligence services and their collaborators in the upper classes
(landed and industrial aristocracy) weakened the political and administrative set-up year after year and
the governance of the state has been getting bad to worse. Their actions and decisions are based on
mysterious rationale of an immense faith on themselves that somehow they will muddle through. Every
authoritarian iron-grip, by the few over the many, loosened the power of constitution by their mys -
terious rational© and their elephantic expenditure. In the couplet of Ghalib:

‘. Yoon hi gar rota raha Ghalib tou aey ahle-i-jahan Dekhna un

bastioun ko turn jo veeran ho ga feem ’

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, Pakistan's political life suffered great lose.
The political vacuum 'created a legal, political, constitutional, and administrative crises'. “Pakistan
began choosing its leadership on a geographical basis. No longer did the nation have Jinnah or Liquate,
associated with neither the west and nor the east wing of the country, Nazimuddin was a Bengali and
Ghulam Mohammad a Punjabi." Having striking differences in their background and the personalities,
they were working as heads of the state. Khawaja Nazimuddin was a member of distinguished family.
’He had accompanied Jinnah to the 1946 Simla conference, serving in the legislature and defeating
Suharwardy for the office of Chief | Minister at independence. He was the best man in the opinion of
Sir Frederick Bourne, who j worked with him as Governor of East Bengal after independence. While
Karl Newman, who was [the Head of the Department of Political Science at Dhaka University,
considered his ' ... a man temperamentally incapable of exercising his powers.’ {26} 'His appointment
was a stop-gap measure, made necessary by the circumstances surrounding Liaquat's death and the
desperate need for j a quick and decisive transition
INCIPIENT from the one government
CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} to the other’{27}
3-11
Khawaja Nazimuddin who submitted the Basic Principles Committee Report to the
Constituent assembly, three and a half years after the Objective Resolution also wanted to strengthen
the Islamic Cause of the independence but the bureaucracy, ’which in the past had looked to Liaquat
to protect their interests, now had a leader in Ghulam Mohammad disliked both Islam and
Parliamentary democracy. Though the controversy happened on a geographical basis but the Punjab
leadership accepted Nazimuddin due to his non-aggressive political leadership, while the Bengalis
concluded that Ghulam Mohammed’s physical condition would limit him to a figurehead.' But he
proved to surprise when disfigured the assembly and the Bengali leader. He was 'absolutely fearless'
as Ayub Khan coined a term for him, used his mental strength and political inclinations in 1954. This
was the first practical step towards ultimate bureaucratization and militarisation in state’s political
system. Basically this was the alliance of Bureaucracy and Military and for this Ghulam Mohammad
entered two Generals in the political Cabinet of Pakistan. General Iskandar Mirza and General Ayub
Khan assumed the office of Home Minister and Defense Minister. In the case of Martial Law in
Lahore to stabilise the administrative system also gave opportunity to the military-bureaucratic
alliance to enter in the political system. The dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin was obviously a
decision by the central legislative. It was one - man order by the pressure of the civil service and the
Army Generals." Both the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the dismissal of the Prime
Minister were challenged in the courts of law. The dominant political party of the country, the
Muslim League; suffered a serious setback from with in and outside the party. The precarious
relations between the central government and the provincial government particularly that of East
Pakistan, were undermined, creating a fissures between the Bengalis and West Pakistanis. Pakistan,
with bureaucratic leadership, was given a new direction insofar as the merger of the provinces of
West Pakistan was initiated in order to transform a federation originally based on five units into a
bipolar federal system. This would ultimately imply perpetual confrontation between East and West
Pakistan, and led, in 1971 to the secession of East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, from the
federation."{28}.
4 Frankly speaking, the era of Khawaja Nazimuddin were not a sound and calm period of
constitution making. He was politically and administratively disturbed by the anti- Ahmadis slo gans
by the religious circles. They also demanded that the Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan, and other
civil and military officers belonging to the Ahmadis sect should b dismissed. Being a religious
grooming Nazimmuddin wanted to sympathies the slogans but he was hesitating because such
actions of fanatic type not only against the vision of Jinnah but also "such an action would

for the prestige of Pakistan in international circles, particularly in the United States when the Pakistan
expected help to tide over its existing food crises" {29}. For these administrative reasons f he took
some months to establish himself in personal control of question of constitution- making, but the
administrative crises which he faced and the unlimited powers of Governor -General failed to achieve
any constitutional intentions. For constitutional legacy he presented the consolidated report of the Basic
Principles Committee on 22 December 1952. He recommended in
and revised report that:
| 'The Head of the State shall be a Muslim. He shall be elected by the Joint session of both the
Houses of the central legislature but will not be a member of the legislature and hence not respon sible
to it. His term of office shall be for five years and during this term no action shall taken against him
in any court of law. The central legislature shall consist of two houses: the House of Units and the
House of People, the former shall consist of 120 members, and the latter 400 members, both giving
equal representation to the two wings of the country. The share of West Pakistan was to be j further
divided amongst its provinces according to population. The term of each House shall be fixed at five
 years. Both shall have equal powers but Money
INCIPIENT Bills shall originate{i}only in the Lower House.
CONSTITUTIONALISiM 3-12 The
ministry shall be responsible to the Lower House but could address both the Houses. The
constitution shall be amended with the agreement of both the central and provincial legisla tures,
subjects, however, to certain conditions, at the time of its adoption. Three lists of subjects were
drawn up for the division of powers between the Federation and the Units. The Centre was to be
strong with residuary powers given to it. Adult franchise was to be introduced.' {30}.
The Committee also recommended the boards of Ulema, ’both by the Head of the State and
the Provincial Governors, consisting of persons well-versed in Islamic law.' It would be necessary
for all proposed legislation, censored by the Boards of Ulema to ensure that nothing against the
teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah was enacted. The Ulema who were delaying the constitution
making on the question of Islamic state got virtual veto power on the working of the legisla ture.
Though Khawaja Nazimuddin coined the term ' maximum agreement’ for it and described it as" the
first golden ray of the sun which illumines the sky" {31} but like the first report, this report faced
rejection from many political circles. The most redeeming effect of the report that it gave rise to a
bitter controversy between East and the West Wing, which ended in 1971. The report introduced
'Parity Proposals' which was important that it became the final draft of the constitution.
The ’Parity Proposals', which incorporated in the Report, was rejected by the leaders of East
Pakistan. " They thought injustice was being done to them by ignoring their numerical majority and
giving them equal representation." {32} Though the parity between East Pakistan and West Pakistan
was introduced but as regards seats in the central legislature, the Report disregard not only the
federal principles but 'social, linguistic, cultural, economic, and climatic divergence: dis- esteem in
population; and lack of geographical contiguity between the two wings.' The federal part in which
the parity introduced created conflicts in the Punjabi and Bengali wings. " The Punjabi group feared
that East Pakistan had been given a position of complete domination over the west, which was
already divided into nine units, against one unified unit of East Pakistan". {33} The differences
which created by the Basic Principles Committee Report between Punjabi and Bengali groups turned
to known as the ' Bengali-Punjabi Crises Report'.
The Report not only created the crises between the provinces of east and West into the new
State of Pakistan but also widened ideological gulf in the orthodox and liberals groups. The
appointment of the Boards of Ulema to review the central and provincial legislation invited harsh
criticism by the secular and bureaucratic groups who were totally against this Qur'anic monopoli -
sations in the country. It was the alliance of Nazimuddin with the orthodox Ulema, which created

□D
other problems but the veto powers of the ’Board of Ulema' against the legislature, was the attack 0n
the constitutional smoothness and development.
Pakistan is a federal state of government as the successive leaders inherited by the Jinnah and
stamped by its historical, ethnic and linguistic reasons. "The idea of a federal System appears to
suggest a form of government in which general and regional governments work in coordinate rela -
tionship maintaining their respective autonomies and they do so to give to the cultural pluralism of the
society a viable political expression.” {34}. The tragedy of Pakistan lies in the fact that although it best
suits Pakistan's political structure, nevertheless for the last 52 years Pakistan has been called federal in
name only. In practice, it has quasi-unitary State. In the constitutional history of Pakistan, federal
system and its spirit of co-existence were sacrificed at the altar of ambition. The diversities of the
socio-political inheritance of the country could work with the sound federal constitution and the
system ' but a genuine federal constitution was never formed in Pakistan, and hence, though a number of
constitutions were promulgated in the post-independence period.' The failure of constitutions in the
’experimental laboratory's Pakistan, owing other differences, the problem of federalism and the
division of powers among the federating units were the critical factors. In the name of strong Centre
the powers of federating units were weakened to the point of being extinguished. This has been
contributed to the delay of constitution making. The controversial issue started from Objective
Resolution in March 1949. It was laid down
INCIPIENT by the constitution-makers
CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} that Pakistan should
3-13 be a
federation. " This decision has been regarded as the 'Dictate of Geography'. The Basic Principles
Committee Report also recommended the federal structure of the state but 'did not distribute of powers,
among bodies with limited and co-ordinate authority.' The recommendations polarised the political
society into two groups: One advocating a strong Centre and the other crying for maximum provincial
autonomy. Though, Liaquat Ali Khan hoped that the constituent assembly would " make every effort
to integrate the units closer and forge such ties as would make well-integrated nation". And advocated
the ’’ suppression of provincial feeling". But on the country, the whole history of Pakistan faced
conflict of division of power between the federal authority and the units of the federation. The spirit of
federalism requires that the division is made in such a way that "neither general nor regional
government is subordinate to the other" {35}. The constitutional product of the constitution-makers did
not fail to represent the spirit and growth of the nation, nor could they be called symbols of national
integration of diverse ethno-linguistic and regional aspiration. With the lapse of years, the principle of
division of powers has remained a central issue in the constitutional development in Pakistan.
It is also a matter of realisation that federal arrangement is difficult to adopt and operate even in
the most favorable circumstances. As Felix Frankfurter describes it , 1 Of all the laws ordering the
political life of a nation the federal system is the most complicated and subtle. It demands most
flexible and imaginative adjustment for harmonizing national and local interest’. In Pakistan, where
there is most unfavorable circumstances inherited, adopted and appreciated in the manner of
geography, authority and ideology- the task of adopting a suitable federal structure proved beyond the
imagination of the politicians and constitution-engineers. {36}. Every time the centre and The provinces
like Punjab and East Pakistan acted like the chief protagonists. The state could
not gain the purpose of well-integrated nation. The failure of most of the constitutional- process
!
products was mainly the outcome of excessive faults in division of powers, and 'number game' to
balance the two wings, mainly through a process of 'parity' which could not inspired premature, feeble
offspring political development.
The Report of 'maximum agreement' could not gain any popularity and especially it was ignored by the
Punjabi leadership, 'including Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Doultana, then

Chief Minister of Punjab: M. A. Gurmani, then Central Minister of the interior; and Choudhry
Ahmad; disassociated themselves from the Report and did not put their signature to it.' It created
constitutional deadlock in the country, which relaxed by another kind of wrong adminis trative
decision. The decision also imbued political conflict in a harsh way between the Bengali and the
Punjabi friction. The ambiguity, which introduced by the Indian Act of 1935 also, surfaced in the
political and constitutional crises in the years of 1951-1954. When Governor-general Ghulam
Mohammad used his ambiguous powers against the constituent assembly. The constituent assembly
having sovereign power could not face the individual power of the governor-general. The governor-
general insisted that constituent assembly could not work without his assent and this was the
constitutional right of the governor-general to judge the activities of the Assembly. If the Constituent
Assembly were not working with his assent, it would be violation. Moreover, if the Assembly was
failed to achieve a sound constitution, the governor-general had the right to dis band it. The central
legislature or the consent of the people did not take the action of the dismissal of Nazimuddin and the
Constituent Assembly. Though Nazimuddin’s government failed to carve the principles of coming
constitution which satisfy everyone yet it was clear that the Prime Minister enjoyed the confidence of
the legislature because of budget of his government had been recently approved by the body. It is also
admitted that the Muslim League Parliamentary Party headed by the Bengali group than the Punjabi
group but the Bengali group could not stop the arbitrary action of governor-general. Basically, the
smaller group of the Parliamentary party had the support of Army and the civil service which had been
gained power and the governor-general was the symbol of their powerful alliance.
The Constituent Assembly had been inherited and indirectly elected in 1947 by the mem bers of
the various provincial assemblies.INCIPIENT
It is asserted that in the year of 1953,
CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} the large numbers3-14 of the
members had lost grass roots support. They were trying to draft a constitution, but the regional,
linguistic and geographical differences were the speed-breakers that no solution had emerged. "
Governor-general Ghulam Muhammad, a former member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Services,
was probably confident that his autocratic action would not revoke a storm of protest through out the
country. "{37}. So he claimed that the Constituent Assembly had lost the confidence of the people and
could not longer function1. The proclamation was one man desire in which he dissolved the functions
of the Constituent Assembly. "No provision or section of the Independence Act or the Government of
India Act 1935, was indicated under which the Proclamation was issued." {38}. This was his surprise
to those unaware of his political inclination. He assumed himself as Jinnah's successor, had gained
'unlimited power’ within Liaquat1 s Cabinet, and had acquired many followers. Liaquat was aware of
his active and politically ambitious intrigues had intended to send him to Washington, DC, as
Ambassador and thus remove him from the political scene. "Mohammad Munir, at that time the Chief
Justice of the Punjab High Court, wrote that Ghulam Muhammad assumed the office of governor-
general ' a stricken man, but with the mental grooves of a seasoned bureaucrat and the eyes and the
nose of a mountain hawk."{39}& {40}. He was not sound in his politically wizens but administratively
he was 'as quick „and sharp as a rapier' {41} which resulted in the first major politico-constitutional
battle before the Federal- Court in the Tamizuddin Khan Case.
Ghulam Muhammad had only one rival in the bureaucratic set-up of Pakistan, Choudhry
Mohammad Ali. He was intended to expand the powerful role of bureaucracy in the matters of
governance with out any personal political ambitions. On the other hand, Ghulam Mohammad was
gaining unlimited favor of the two pillars of the state and due to this he successfully built a coali tion of
senior civil servants and military officers. The Sandhurst trainees like Iskandar Mirza and

Ayub Khan were the example of his ambitions to enter the coalition of Army-bureaucratic alliance
And the political institutions.
'Ghulam Muhammad appeared to stay out of politics during his two years as governor-general-' He
seemed to play the symbolic role of the constitutional head of the state.' Some officials worked with
Ghulam Muhammad were alarmed that he was psychotic obsessed with gaining power’ and ’feared
that Nazimuddin would remove him as governor-general' so he called a meeting of the Cabinet, and
when it was assembled he demanded the resignation of Prime Minister and other Cabinet members.
Nazimmuddin was a weakened leader not only in Punjab but also in his own province, Bengal.
Though the governor-general on account of food emergency dismissed him. The governor-general
proclaimed, ' I have been driven to the conclusion that the Cabinet of Khawaja Nazimuddin has proven
entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country'. 142} Yet there were some other
problems, inherited from the Liaquat administration like the delay of constitution-making, the failure
to win the bureaucratic support of Punjabis Language controversy, and specially, lacking of political
confidence in the League provincial members of Bengal. Nazimuddin who was 'temperamentally
incapable of exercising his power' could not capture the minds of power-seekers. On the .other hand
the governor-general, ill as he was physically, he developed administrative relationship with the civil
service and the army and had tempered the silent support of Suharwardhy and other members of the
Awami opposition in East Bengal. The Nazimuddin's dismissal was an experiment' to feel the pulse of
the nation'. The experiment of dismissal achieved political and constitutional victory because ' Not a
voice was heard in protest to Nazimuddin's dismissal, an event that the American Ambassador
describes to Washington as ' one of the most popular coups in history.' In the Cabinet, Ghulam
Muhammad readopted six of the nine members.' The members who were permanently dismissed along
with Nazimuddin were the most influential Muslim League members and potentially the most difficult
for Ghulam Muhammad to control,1 were Sardar Abdul Rab Nishter, and Fazlur Rehman. With the
Nishter's dismissal, the last face ofINCIPIENT
Jinnah's administration vanished. {i}
CONSTITUTIONALISiM 3-15
Ghulam Muhammad not only dismissed the Cabinet but also eliminated the sole power of
Muslim League in the central government. For this act "he was now exercising power similar to
Jinnah, also politically active Governor-General who appointed a Prime Minister independent of the
Constituent Assembly" {43} & {44}
A. K. Brohi, the Law Minister, criticized the Nazimuddin's dismissal. He was inspired and
thoroughly read the British and Commonwealth conventions. He argued that if the governor-general
could not remove the Prime Minister like Nazimuddin, who had the confidence of the legis lature.
"While this constitutional practice was well-recognised in the Commonwealth, it was a matter of
confession rather than a rule of law which could be enforced in a court of law." Brohi argued that the
Prime Minister and his Cabinet was the creature of convention. The conventions, which had grown, up
around government practice of Great Britain and have serviceable role in the constitutional mechanics
in the country. In Pakistan such conventions were not grew due to the arbitrary actions, were not
applicable in Pakistan. " He maintained that ministers in Pakistan were not the same as ministers of the
British Cabinet, who had no statutory recognition, while in con- ; *
trast Pakistani ministers were specifically provided for in the Government Act of 1935 and served at
the pleasure of the governor-general." {45}&{ 46}
The western media appreciated the dismissal. The Times of London congratulated Ghulam
Muhammad for short-circuiting the political intrigues. The Nazimuddin's dismissal was hardly noticed
in Washington, Pakistan itself being at the time little interest in the American capital. The spokesmen
hailed it the ’ Courageous, timely and dramatic' and 'a realistic appraisal of the situation and by acting
with at least some semblance of constitutional legality, has prevented a possible coup d’état.' Though
the western media did not appreciate it yet it was attack on the parliamentary democracy which was
adopted at the time of the inception of the country not out of a delib erate choice but as a historical
legacy. Frankly speaking, the Governor-Generals did not restrict themselves to their constitutional
roles in a parliamentary system. Ghulam Mohammed, who came '''■from ready-made Volvo of
colonial bureaucracy, became the governor-general and through political administrative intrigues
without going through the inconveniences of political process. He expanded and abused his powers and
opened the doors for successive Governor-Generals and presidents to dismiss the Cabinets and
weakening the fledging parliamentary system.
Despite the defects inherent in a report, it was the brainchild for the constitution making.
Nazimuddin stated that the Report would take the country towards the destined goal. It was the statement
by the Prime Minister but it came to know later that only sixteen of the original twen ty-nine members of
the Committee had sigh the Report. There was prominent Punjabi leadership who disassociated them
from the Report. (47). This was political deadlock between the Punjabi leadership and Bengali
leadership and the conflict turned into constitutional deadlock. Most of the Punjabi leadership was not
friendly with the Bengali Premier so they rejected the Report. The political deadlock resolved after the
dismissal; of Nazimuddin's Cabinet on 16 April 1953 and with the appointment of Muhammad Ali
Bogra as the new Prime Minister because it was accepted by the ruling party, i. e., the Muslim League.
Muhammad Ali Bogra who was till then the Ambassador of Pakistan in the United States of America,
gave his constitutional formula in the Constituent Assembly on October 1953, which, according to him,
was acceptable to the representatives of both the wings. The proposals embodied his formula were as
follows:
’The central legislature was to have two houses, Upper and Lower. In the former, the total
membership was fifty, distributed equally among the five units of Pakistan of which East Pakistan was
one. That meant that the four West Pakistani units were to have forty members (ten each) and East
Pakistan was given ten. The second House would comprise 300 seats, divided among these five units
on the basis of population. East Pakistan was allocated 165 seats and the four units of West Pakistan
were given 135 seats. When the two house met together, both the wings had equal representatives: East
Pakistan 10+ 165 = ; West Pakistan 40+135= 175. In this way, despite acceptance of the population
principle for the Lower House, the principle of parity applied to the legislature was to be as follows:
 Units Upper House Lower House
INCIPIENT CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i}
Total 3-16
1. East Pakistan 10 165 175

2. The Punjab 10 75 85

3. NWFP and Tribal Areas 10 24 34

4* Sindh and Khaiipur 10 19 29

■5. Baluchistan, Baluchistan Union,

Bahawalpur and Karachi 10 17 27

300 350

□□
The powers of the two Houses were to be equal and a Ministry was to be responsible to both the
Houses. In case of a conflict between the two chambers, there was a provision for a joint ses sion. But in
case of serious disagreement on matters of exceptional importance, the Head of the State was
competent to dissolve them and order fresh elections. A provision was also made that if the Head of the
State was West Pakistan; the Prime Minister shall be from East Pakistan and vice versa. In this new
arrangement, any Wing expressed hope that there would be no permanent domination. {48}
The suggestions which were introduced by the Nazimuddin's successor, Muhammad Ali Bogra,
popularly known as the Prime Minister formula or Muhammad Ali Bogra formula. These suggestions
were finally adopted by the Constituent Assembly with slight modifications along with the BPC report
on September 21, 1954, by 29 to 11 votes. About this federal formula, it was thought that these would
make bridge between the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies of the two wings. Though it was an
improvement of BPC report yet hailed by almost all sections of public opinion. ''According to it
Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic, the Parliament was to be sovereign and the governor-general's
overriding powers were considerably toned down". {49}. Another important change made in the
formula that in place of Board of Ulema which had the power to change the legislature, the function
was assigned to the Supreme Court. The step, which also hailed by the society also, maintained the
power of legislature*-The final step structured and the constitution seemed finally completed. A
drafting committee was appointed to write down the provisions as approved by the Assembly. Sir
Jennings, was also secured who was the constitutional expert. The Prime Minister expressed his hope
to promulgate it on December 25, 1954 when the governor-general dissolved the Constituent
Assembly in October 1954.
As already stated, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was assigned with two basic functions,
namely, to draft the Constitution, and to act as the. Federal Legislative Assembly or Parliament until
the constitution was enacted. It was an open story that the legislative face of the Assembly could not
work in a satisfied performance. The constitution-makers could not draft the definite constitution. The
constitutional engineering could not tackle in a smooth way but in a hasty enactment. The entire
progress of constitution making from 1947 to the assassin's bullet of 1951 was confined to the
Objective Resolution. After the creation of Objective Resolution, Liaquat Ali Khan and his successors
only refrained from making further effort in the framing of the constitution. The reports and the
formula only engineered the principles of the future constitution but not the real constitution. The
constitution, which is interface between the people and their government, locked in seven years of
deliberations and heated debates for constitution making. Strictly speaking, though without 'regulatory
interface', democracy prevailed for less than five years, after which it was strangulated by the
governor-general Ghulam Muhammad when he dismissed the first Constituent Assembly just before it
 completed its task of framing theINCIPIENT
constitution of Pakistan. "For Pakistani
CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} nation, a constitutionally-
3-17
limited government seems to be a ’luxury' that could only be afforded under a certain fortunate
political milieu." {50}. Because its autocratic ruler like Ghulam Muhammad who sowed the seed and
subvert those political norms and to .reassert unassumingly its ignominious rule in the country. He
ignored the people's demands for constitutional km, political propriety, and democracy.
The reason behind the dissolution of constituent assembly was its go-slow mood in constitution
making but there were other reasons for this abortive action. The crises, which were started after the
ugly Punjabi-Bengali tussle and political ascendancy, particularly after the 1954 provincial elections in
East Pakistan, had deadlock the constitution-making process. The Prime Minister formula came to
draft for the solution of this political and constitutional deadlock and adopted with slight modifications
along with the BPC report by the Assembly. After the adaptation, the Constituent Assembly made two
hasty enactment in the sitting, which eventually resulted in its dissolution. " The Assembly repealed the :•
pgODA (Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act) and voted the Fifth Amendment Act
on September 20 and 21 respectively. Then the assembly took the vital step of curtailing the powers of
governor-general by amending Section 9-10, 10-A and 10-B of Provisional Constitution". (51}.The
governor-general was the main target of this amendment, bounded him to follow the advice of ministers
and empowered the Prime Minister to choose and dismiss his Cabinet colleagues. These hasty schemes
precipitated crises. These schemes were threats, which reduced the powers of governor-gen eral to give
him to the position of merely a constitutional head. The provisions were:

— The governor-general would appoint as Prime Minister a member of the Federal

Legislature who enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the members.
— ' ^^Knisters would be appointed from amongst the Legislative members.
— The Cabinet would be collectively responsible to the Assembly.
— The governor-general would be bound by the advice of the Ministers.

\ Such constitutional development was wholly unacceptable for the governor-general who
was well-versed in the. Machiavellian art of statecraft, could not ignore such constitutional
progress ’having his discretionary powers curtailed, making him dependent on the Federation and the
Constituent Assembly.’ He issued a proclamation of Emergency on the pretext that the Constituent
Assembly could no longer function. He hit back when he was curtailed by his discretionary powers of
the governor-general. He claimed in a Proclamation that the Constituent Assembly had ' lost the
confidence of the people and could no longer function’. " Interestingly enough, the Proclamation
nowhere stated specifically that the Constituent Assembly " could no longer function". {52} He also
reasoned that the constitution-making machinery had failed in the I realisation of its original objective,
necessitating new elections to the Assembly. Thus, he dissolved the first Constituent Assembly by his
inherited governor-generals power. He knew full j well that the draft of the formula ready to bound
him to follow the advice of the ministers and I ^.empowered the Prime Minister to choose and dismiss
his Cabinet members. This was the second I coup in Pakistan’s political history of seven years. He
proclaimed:
"The Governor General, having considered the political crises with which the country is
faced, has with deep regret to come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery has bro- I ken
down. He therefore has decided to declare a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. The | Constituent
Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function.
The ultimate authority vests in the people who will decide all issues including constitutional issues
through their representatives who are to be elected; fresh elections will held
as early as possible." {53}
Mohammad Ali Bogra, who was the head of Constituent Assembly had described it 'open
treachery against the country’, {54} followed Ghulam Muhammad and stated to the public , "The
destiny of the country could no longer be left to the caprices of an Assembly which instead of
safeguarding the interests of Pakistan, was becoming increasingly subject to internal Affair and
 bickering. Constitution makingINCIPIENT
by the present Constituent Assembly
CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} has resulted in developments,
3-18
which threatened to imperil our national unity. It has provoked personal, sectional, | and provincial
rivalries and suspicions." {55}. Even if it could be said that Ghulam was acting with the advice of his
Prime Minister his act would still have to be authorized by the GIA or the TTA- See chap. 8, n. 70,
infra. {56}.
The strangulation of the Constituent Assembly by the uncompromising attitude opened the new
chapter in the history of Pakistan and develops adverse implications for the political and con stitutional
future of Pakistan. Such an act of autocracy introduced the new -born country into polit ical tension,
social strife and constitutional and legal deadlock. The action gave the society into the hands of several
despots who chequered, abrogated, hold in abeyance and violated the democ racy and the constitutions. "
Had the validity of the unconstitutional action of the governor-general arbitrarily dismissing Prime
Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin in 1953 been challenged in the high Courts, the Governor General would
have refrained from taking this far more drastic step of dissolving the first Constituent Assembly" {57}.
But the politicians, high Courts' Judges and the people were remain silent, deaf and dumb, the arrogant
behavior of existing institution gave free hands to governor-general to hit" and this act set in motion a
series of judicial proceedings which was to test the two opposed interpretations” {58}. {59}.

The Judiciary and constitutional politics in Pakistan

The Institution of Judiciary is vital for the development and functioning of a democratic political
system particularly in a third world country. In the absence of strong external political checks on the
executive and the lack of well -organised public opinion in such a country, the role of judiciary
becomes important for guarding democracy. An independent judiciary can exert pressure on the rulers
(the executive) to work within the framework of the established constitutional order and restrain them
from using their executive powers arbitrarily which they otherwise are prone to do. By upholding the
rue of law and protecting the rights of the individual and the minorities it can deepen the roots of
democracy in a country.
The capacity of a judiciary to perform such a role, however, is limited by several factors. First,
paradoxically a judiciary can perform its democratic role only in a democratic polity and society. The
normative and constitutional framework in which the judiciary operates grows out of the political
dynamics of a society. In an authoritarian system the independence of judiciary is often limited subject
to whim of the executive.
Second, a judiciary is a state institution and a part of the state machinery. It shares the polit ical
culture of the other state institutions its material interests are linked to the continuity of the state and
society. This often inclines it towards assuming the role of a guardian of the interests of the state and
the strata dominating it becoming insensitive to the violation of the rights of the citizens by the state.
Only when this cultural and material nexus between the strata controlling the state institutions and the
judiciary breaks down, the judiciary can assert its independence and play a democratic role.
Third, a judiciary does not have the coercive power at is judgments. For implementation of its
judgments it is dependent on the on the executive, whose conduct in state affairs it is supposed to
regulate. The executive often does not feel constrained to implement those judgments of the judiciary
which go against its interests unless it has internalised the culture of constitutionalism and strong and
articulate public opinion and organised political groups compel it to do so.
Finally, the executive in all political systems appoints judges, promotes and transfers them and
determines their privileges and remuneration together with legislative institutions. An authoritarian
executive can use this power to create a pliant judiciary serving its interests.
In the Pakistan’s judicial history the four factors discussed above have limited the independence
of judiciary to play a forceful role to foster democracy in the country. During the colonial period a
close cultural and political nexus developed between the executive and the judiciary. Both were concerned
with preserving the colonial ready-made Volvo. Consequently, the colonial rulers $d not feel the need
to directly interfere with the functioning of the Judiciary. The judiciary also did not provide an
occasion for it. The nexus continued during the
INCIPIENT first decade of the existence
CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} of Pakistan. The3-19
executive
and the Judiciary both were committed to creating and strengthening and centralized state in Pakistan
and to retain the colonial political and judicial legacy. Consequently, the executive did not make any
visible interference in the functioning of the judiciary. When a crack appeared in this nexus after the
Sindh Chief Court’s judgment in Tamizuddin Khan’s case in 1954, the then Federal Court soon
repaired it and the nexus continued, though in impaired form, during the entire years of Pakistan's
executive and the military rule in which the rulers in Pakistan have occasionally used their power to
control the judiciary tempering with the established rules and practices in appointment and transfer of
judges, giving undeserved promo tions to certain judges and penalising others who gave judgments they
did not like. {60} The Founding Father, Jinnah did not realise that one day Judges would be appointed
not because of their ability and sterling character but their loyalty to their Executive and their political
affiliations. The Executive packed the courts and their judges. They have known that the worst man
became the Executive by filling of inexperienced, ill-trained, ill-qualified judges.
Pakistan could not develop civil society in the 50 years since its independence. It was looked
after in the cradle of dictatorship and democracy. The democracy, which came in the country in a
meteoric way also, used authoritarian’s whims. The inherited legacy of ideology, sovereignty and
authority that were present at independence still trouble Pakistan and Pakistanis today. " Viewed in
broad schematic outlines, its politics reflects unresolved tensions between two competing models of
government. The vice-regal traditions of colonial India were embedded in Plans for Pakistan’s own
governance. It was absorbed by the state's founders, who used it to establish the outline for its
constitutions and agendas for its post-colonial rulers, who in turn perpetuated the tradition in the new
state By contrast, the liberals, representative tradition characterised the rhetoric of political opposition
in India and anti-colonial activities that helped to establish its suc cessor states; it has permeated the
language and program of anti-government politics in Pakistan" {61}. And in this condition the judicial
role could not worked in a vital way. The capacity of a judiciary in a Third World’s country to perform
such a free role, however, is limited by these authoritarian traditions. The executive rule in Pakistan
always used the card of central power, with the support of civil and military bureaucracy, have
strangulated the parliaments, courts, judges, press and political parties. The political parties which also
developed into these conflicts of centri-fugal and centri-petal conflicts, however, could not create their
dignity and commitment and several times have been abolished, banned or restricted by executives.
The superior judiciary could able to settle such discord, but their judicial judgments opened the
door of commitments with the executive rather to the public opinions. One can understand the political
and constitutional crises by examining judicial executive-dominated decisions. The courts are a crucial
vehicle in Pakistan. They 'have literally judged the state, ruling on constitutional issues directly
affecting national sovereignty, political participation and government orgnisation'. Though "they have
decided conflicts between heads of state and government resulting in the dissolution of legislatures
(1954, 1988, 1990, 1993), the validation of coups d’état (1958, 1977), efforts to restructure transitions
between civil and military governance (1972, 1986-88), and continuing attempts to define
substantively and procedurally the meaning of politics, of constitutional governance and occasionally,
of democracy. With the state in almost continuous transition, Pakistan's courts become sui generis,
both the subjects and objects of political change. {62}. Yet the situation of governance could not
improve. The judicial independence which is very

Important ^or structuring the state, it was not happened in judicial history. Even before a con stitution
was drafted for the new state, the paid judges explained the idea of a constitution as a handbook of
rules for politics. In Pakistan the central whims and vendetta and the process of give and take have
trapped the Courts. The courts always bargained with the state." From the country's fist decade,
Pakistan’s judges have tried to match their Constitutional ideas and legal language to the exigencies of
current politics. Their judgments have often supported the Government of the day, presumably to
retain a degree of future institutional autonomy. This was their chosen path through the 1950s when
their was no Constitution; duringINCIPIENT
the MartialCONSTITUTIONALISiM
Law period of the 1960s, {i} when the Constitution
3-20 was a
moving targets; and under the mixed Constitutional rule of Zulifkar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, when
hopes for democracy outweighed its reality. To remain open for business, courts accepted limits on
their practice that were not always consonant with the conceptual foundations of their rulings-— a
disjunction that operates to day". {63}. The judiciary in Pakistan has shack hand with the authority and
has made it to be used easily against the citizens and the judicial values.
As stated above that during the colonial masters there was close cultural and political nexus
developed between the executive and the judiciary. Both were concerned with preserving the colo nial
rule. The nexus continued during the first decade of the existence of Pakistan. They were committed to
creating and strengthening a strong and centralized state in Pakistan and to retain the colonial political
and judicial legacy. The relation was cracked by the Sindh Chief Court's Judgment in Tamizuddin
Khan's case in 1954; the then Federal Court soon repaired the crack. The President of the dissolved
Assembly, Moulvi Tamizuddin called the Proclamation of dissolution as 'unconstitutional, illegal, ultra
virus, without jurisdiction, inoperative, and void'. Moulvi Tamizuddin was the first person who
challenged the authoritarian convention of the governor-general and asked him to appoint a new
cabinet, "and petitioned of the Sindh Chief Court to issue writs of mandamus and Que.- Warranto
against the ministers of the central government under section 223-A of the Government of India Act
1935, as amended by the Government of India (amendment) Act 1954." {64} "The constitutional
petitions was contested by all the respondents who raised various pleas, the main plea being that the
Chief Court of Sindh had no jurisdiction in the writs prayed for. According to this plea, the
Government of India (amendment) Act, 1954 by which section 223-A was inserted in the Government
of India Act, 1935, and under which such writs could be issued, had not received the assent of the
governor-general. It was therefore, not a valid law. While setting aside the plea of the Government, the
Chief Court of Sindh held that the Acts of the Constituent Assembly, when it was not functioning as
the Federal Legislature, did not require the assent of the governor-general; that section 223-A of the
Government of India Act, 1935, was a valid law; and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was
ultra virus and void." {65}, The Sindh Court upheld Tamizuddin's contention and on February 4, 1955,
ruled that the five members of the central government, who were not members of the Assembly, were
not to exercise ministerial powers.
The case, in which Sindh Court upheld the challenge of Tamizuddin’s contention, the ruling by
the Sindh Court that the governor-general did not have the power to dissolve the Constituent Assembly
was ^rejected by the Federal Government, and appealed to the Federal Court. The Federal Court
ignored the challenge that the dissolution of Constituent Assembly was 'unconstitutional' and 'invalid'.
The Chief Court verdict was set aside by the Supreme Court on a technical ground. In the opinion of the
Court that the Act, by virtue of which the Court issued the verdict 'was not yet law’, because it had not
received the assent of the governor-general. As a matter °f fact the Federal Court accepted that the
governor-general was the head of the Constituent
Assembly and any law which drafted without the assent of the head supposed null and wide. Rejecting
the verdict Chief Court of Sindh, it may be stated:
"Many constitutional Bills passed by the Constituent Assembly under this rule since 1948 were
authenticated without the assent of the governor-general and neither the first nor the second n0r the
third governor-general, Ghulam Muhammad himself, raised the question that the Acts of the
Constituent Assembly were invalid for want of assent. The Sindh Court referred to an order of the
governor-general only four days before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly under an Act
passed without his assent. It was stated before the Court that even the superior courts in Pakistan in a
number of cases had accepted the proposition that enactment of the Constituent Assembly required no
assent" {65 }& {66}.
The Supreme Court rendered the ruling on 26 March 1955, and it upheld the constitution ality of
the governor-general action, terminating the Constituent Assembly. The court considered that in the
declared state of Emergency, ’the law considered invalid was held to be in force'. This verdict
 provided the power to implementINCIPIENT
state of emergency for making invalid
CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} to valid in a very3-21
uncertain
period. The successive civil and military bureaucratic despots, from Ghulam Muhammad to Pervaiz
Musharraf, have accepted the verdict for their personal political moorings. The same state of
Emergency was intended to grant the governor-general the right to constitute the One Unit of West
Pakistan by decree. Moreover, the governor-general assumed all constitution-making and breaking
authority.
” The governor-general shall by order make such provisions as appears to him be necessary or
expedient for the purpose of making provision as to the constitution of Pakistan and for pur pose
connected therewith, and very such order may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as
the governor-general may deem necessary or expedient." {67}.
Although, the Supreme Court had delegated the power to the governor-general to dissolve the
Assembly, yet it refused to sanction the governor-general’s will to concentrate all power in his
person. One can say that "it had functioned at the behest of the authority and has been used to fur ther
the interests of the state against its citizens." ( 68}Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) 12. But it was also the only institution standing between Pakistan
and its autocratic struggle of an absolute dictatorship. In a subsequent ruling, the Court warned the
governor-general that he had no power to make constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court ordered
that the only possible solution of political and constitutional deadlock was the establishment of
another Constituent Assembly. The Pakistan Government accepted the ruling. Though the governor-
general warned not to use arbitrary powers yet he became the real victor in the encounter. If the
Constituent Assembly was not treated to be a sovereign body than for the creation of the new one,
governor-general could used his personal whims and no one ignored the role of the Governor—
General in the making of the law. He was filled by the special power in the times of emergency and
also crowned " quasi-acceptance to the government argument that the governor- general was a
representative of the King. Or as Head of State, had certain powers that were outside the written
constitution. This was done in order to permit the validation of the impugned laws until
such time as the new assembly could formally pass them". {69}. Chief Justice Muhammad Munir
who sided with’ governor-general and ignored the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly, was
aware the multidimensional shadows of the problem. He had a mind that the country was surround ed
by an impasse situation and any legal blunder would have intensified the conflict, ' and quite possibly
destroyed any possible return to parliamentary government’. In the political deadlock between the
governor-general and the Constituent Assembly, the Supreme Court sided with the governor-general
and ’’preserved the only chance for the resurrection of representative government

~~68~1
in the country". {70) The era after the preservation of the national legal framework, the country's years
of 1953-5 witnessed the domestic political difference such as strong centralised leaderships the struggle
for parliamentary system. The Supreme Court was responsible for the reinforcement of vice-regal
tradition. A man who was clearly not the constitutional head but the Supreme Court made governor-
general, the figurehead who could make and break the Constituent Assembly and the constitution. The
Supreme Court charged the governor-general’s authority. Risking the criticism, "there would be no
more challenges of the governor-general's authority and the scene were set for the transition to
presidential, not centralised government.” {71}. The judicial lacunae, including the rift between the
parliamentary and autocratic way of rule detached Pakistani Government to work hard for the
constitution making. The judiciary confessed the administrative monopoly and behaved like the part
and parcel of the governor-general.
The decision of the Federal Court, announced on March 26, 1955 had created constitutional crises
of supreme magnitude. Midst such grave constitutional complexity, the governor-general filed a
reference in the Federal Court and sought to validate certain Constitutional Acts of the Constituent
Assembly, by giving his assent with retrospective effect. The Federal Court validated the governor-
general’s Act and applied the principle of State necessity. Chief Justice Muhammad Minus described
the Principle of state necessity, explained
INCIPIENTthat:CONSTITUTIONALISiM {i} 3-22
’’ Subject to the condition of absoluteness, extremeness, and imminence, an act which would
otherwise be illegal becomes legal if it is done bona- fid under tress of necessity, the necessity being
referable to an intention to preserve the Constitution, and affirms... that necessity knows no law...
necessity makes lawful which otherwise is not lawful.,, refers to the right of a private per son to act in
necessity, in case of the Head of State's justification to act must ’a fortiori be clearer and more
imperative. "(PLD 1955 FC 435) {72}. It was clear that the Federal Court permitted, that the governor-
general, had the legal authority ' to dissolve the assembly, to Simon a new assembly, and validate laws
retrospect fully during the interim period, but that he could not nominate the members of the
Constituent Assembly which must be a representative body'. However, in another leading constitutional
case in which the powers of the governor-general, 'Us if Patel v. the Crown' the Federal Court, abandon
his powers of formulating a constitution. The verdict was the inspiration of section 42 of the
Government of India Act 1935. Due to this section 42 the governor-general had no power to initiate
any constitutional legislation ’ or validate such legislation with retrospective effect, and accordingly the
Ordinance was invalid.' {73}. And thus ordered the election of a new Constituent Assembly on 28 May
1955. The verdict by the Court came as a 'great relief and put an end to the constitutional crises and the
'Cabinet of Talents' of the governor-general. The Court verdict was very motivating for the
constitutional process in the country and it also closed the chapter that had open on October 24, 1954.
But by insisting on the State necessity Justice Munir threw the nation into chaos. Most of the major
legislation in effect in Pakistan became invalid for lack of the now-required assent.
Chief Justice Munir introduced a crucial drama in Pakistan's political and judicial stage. He
dominated the court and verdict, which would decide who would exercise the sovereign power of the
state, the Constituent Assembly or the governor-general. In the dominating conflict of sovereign power
of the state, he threw the nation and the Constituent Assembly into the hands of governor-general and
gave the introductory contents of autocracy in the political and constitutional history of Pakistan. 'The
order of the Sindh Court, allowing the writs nullifying the Assembly's dissolution, was vacated. No
mention was made by the Federal Court of the governor-general's right to dissolve the Assembly.
Instead Munir avoided the issue by resting the opinion of the Court solely on the lack of jurisdiction of
the Sindh Court to issue the writ, premising his conclusion on the single point that the stature amending
the constitution and creating jurisdiction in the court to issue the writ had not received the assent of the
governor-general.’ For him the assent was ' as necessary to the validity of legislation as the law which
requires a document to be under seal or registered. It is a formality, which cannot be dispensed with
except by proper amendment of the Constitution.' {74}. By the implementation of the 'formality' Munir
handed over the politics and nation into chaos. Munir was the man who seized the power of the state
for Ghulam Muhammad and because the Constituent Assembly failed to gain the judicial 'remedy', the
governor -general became confirmed and ultimate head of the state. The verdict also gifted the virtual
veto power over all of its legislation. The governor-general was the Sovereign body and he could be
dissolved the Assembly for political purposes.
After the election of a new Constituent Assembly on 28 May 1955. The second Cap elected on
21 June 1955 consisted of eighty members, each wing represented by forty members. The new
Assembly was elected indirectly by the members of the Provincial Legislatures. The Muslim League,
which was the sole representative in the first CAP, suffered a defeat and had gained only twenty-five
members in the second Assembly. Most of the members who won seats in the first CAP were defeated
and only fourteen of them captured the seats in the second CAP.
No Marginal Majority was structured for any party and for the solution a coalition of the Muslim
League and the United Front was sought under the Choudhry Rahmat Ali, the former Finance Minister,
as the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the purpose of drafting a constitution. Although the second
indirect elected Assembly by the Provincial Legislature was against the Indian Act of 1935, and
therefore the new Assembly could not validly carry out the constitution-
•making tasks now being entrusted to it by the governor-general yet Dawn saw this latest order of the
governor-general as getting the country ' back on the rails', (16 April 1955) on the other hand Pakistan
Times discovered it that the governor-general authority to dismiss {i}
INCIPIENT CONSTITUTIONALISiM the Assembly, harm 3-23the future
situation of stability because now the governor-general could dismiss the Assembly at any time. The
argument that the members who came after the election of Provincial Legislature had been created
after the Indian Act was appreciated by the Munir's predecessor, Chief Justice Abdul Rashid who
considered the new Assembly unconstitutional because it had no similarity with the Independence Act
and for this reason the Constituent Assembly was legally defective. The Assembly, which was
empowered by the Indian Independence Act, could create the new Constitution. It was hailed by the
'Pakistan Observer' which argued that a constitutional convention would not be in accord with the
Indian Independence Act and the proposed membership was unconstitutional. The matter which was
opposed by the Munir's predecessor and the press could not stop the governor-general who was now
free from the constitutional restriction of acting only on the advice of his ministers and the new
Assembly had little power and would be spectator. Basically "an excessively tormented judiciary,
practically operating under a highly centralised system can in no way fulfill the function which it owes
by virtue of being an essential functional component of a federal system." For this chequered judicial
development in Pakistan "an independent judiciary was never allowed to function in the country" {75}.
- The second Constituent Assembly did not experienced the delay for which the first
Constituent Assembly fractured. "The substance of the new constitution was agreed on in private

meeting held among Ayub, Mirza, Gurmani, Khan Sahib, Suharwardhy, and Choudhry Muhammad
Ali" but before the final draft was accomplished the next highly controversial legislation came to
evolve. It was the first step by the Second Constituent assembly towards framing a constitution. The
bill of the unification of West Pakistan was agreed by the governor-general and his Ministers and
adopted by the Assembly. "The considerations for the integration of West Pakistan had gained impetus
after the victory of the United Front in the East Bengal elections of 1954”. {76}. The One Unit Plan
was not the new political phenomenon, it had groomed in the minds of the Punjabi leadership of the first
Constituent assembly that the parity scheme might exploited their political rights. When the United
Front gained votes in the East Bengal elections of 1954, the fear got fire. It has been aptly observed
"that one of the Causes of the break down of constitutional government j 0 Pakistan was the holding of
pistols to enforce the One Unit Plan" {77}.
The London-Based Economist described the unification of West Pakistan Provinces as ’ A good
many eggs were broken in the making of the 'One Unit' omelet but they were mostly addled onset's One
Unit which came for the unification of the state and provide a constitution in for the entire country,
proved to be administrative encumbrance and wholly against the spirit of federal ism. "To borrow its
characterisation from Professor Wheeler, it was 'a painful process of grudging concession’ by the
smaller units I the western wing, who were coerced into making such an unpalatable omelette" {78& 79}.
The One Unit was the brainchild of the West Pakistan leaders in general and of the Punjab in particular.
It was coined for an equal degree of autonomy and an equal say in all national affairs. The desire of
equal degree was the mirror of 'parity formula' between the two wings of the country, which had
announced by Muhammad Ali Bogra and was followed by the govemor-general’s order-establishing
the single province of West Pakistan under an Emergency Ordinance, which was subsequently rejected
by the Federal Court's ruling the Usif Patel v. the Crown case. It was also witnessed that "during the
emergency when there was no Constituent Assembly, the governor-general tried unsuccessfully to
resolve the question by allocating representation on the basis of two Federal Units through an
Executive Order consolidating all provinces of West Pakistan, and remaining East Bengal as East
Pakistan. Within a few weeks, approval to the scheme had been secured from the Provincial
Legislatures including that the Punjab which agreed to a representation of 40 per cent in the West
Pakistan legislature for the period of 10 years, although it was entitled to 56 per cent of the seats"
(Pakistan News Digest, December 15, 1954.) At that stage the Federal Court held that the governor-
general's power did not include the authority to amalgamate the provinces. The Scheme therefore had
to await the approval of the second Constituent Assembly, which finally came about in October 1955.
 When the second ConstituentINCIPIENT
Assembly CONSTITUTIONALISiM
came in to existence, the{i}
much-cherished scheme3-24 for the
Punjabi leadership decided to get it through the legislative process. "With little regard for the political
aspirations of the people of the merging provinces and princely states and without even seeking their
free consent," {80} the Provincial Legislature were decided into agreeing to the establishment of One
Unit. "Thus, on 30 September 1955, the Assembly passed a bill merging the former provinces of sindh,
Punjab, and the NWFP, the federally administered territory of Karachi, the former states of
Balochistan, Bahawalpur, and Khairpur, the former Frontier states, and the Chief Commissioner's
province of Balochistan into a single province, West Pakistan." {81} It was true that the advocates of
One Unit argued that the merger of the provinces would bring some benefits and advantages {82} and
the High Court of Punjab, the Chief Court of Sindh and the Judicial Commissioner's Court in the North
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan were amalgamated into a single court with jurisdiction over the
entire province. Who argued for the unification of West Pakistan did the military leaders and
bureaucratic administrators (The Ministry of all talents) back. The governor-general himself had been a
civil servant and General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in Chief of the Army, Iskander Mirza, an Army
trained administrator were the pillars of the governor-general's assent. If one wants to find the conflict
in the early years of the country, he can suggested that in Pakistan there was a basic conflict between
the interests of bureaucratic-Army alliance and those of the politicians. It is the alliance who has
largely controlled the state while politicians have either played a secondary role or simply merged to
cooperate ’with the question of who runs the country'.
The Pakistani bureaucrat, as the successor of the British masters, always dreamed the era of
Colonial civil servants who had exercised supervisory over the Indian leadership to enjoyed polit ical
fascination without political interlinings. After the independence 'in Pakistan, particularly in East
Bengal and in the some areas of West Pakistan, a new group of politicians' with their new provincial
autonomy raised voices for the betterment of their respective provinces as quickly as possible. This was
the starting point for the conflict between them and in government of Ghulam Muhammad, a new
jawans of defense entered to side with the British trained administration as stem for too powerful state
and a weak democratic political culture. Pakistan’s Civil service and Army institution had deep-seated
relations with the Punjabi and Sindhi landlord 'because they came from the same social background,
had gone to the same school, and belonged to the same social clubs’ (83). So the governor-general and
his bullies desired the integration of West Pakistan as one Unit. " It has been reported that General
Ayub had already prepared a plan for the integration of West Pakistan." Ayub had a mind ’that
strategically and economically West Pakistan should be welded into one Unit.' He was arguing that
such unification of West Pakistan is better for Western Wing and specially, for Punjabis who were in
majority. Therefore, Ayub suggested that being a biggest constituent of Punjab; the Punjabis could
cash the representation on the basis of population {84).
The document for the integrating west Pakistan was designed by the Punjab’s Former Minister,
Doultana who drafted the Plan on Mackiavelli’s techniques and forecasted that' Punjab will have to
take the lead. At that time I hope an effective intelligent Punjab leadership will have been put in place
both at the Centre and at Lahore' {85} like a corrupt tree uprooted from the earth, having no stability.
The advocates of the unification of West Pakistan were numbering the benefits and advantages but on
the other hand the formula was resisted from the smaller provinces of Sindh and Frontiers. It was
eliminated by the open use of force, which apprehended that the formation of One Unit would establish
’Punjabi sway' in the economic and administrative sphere of West Pakistan. The advocates argued that
it would simplify the federal structure of the proposed new Constitution; constitution- making would
be made easier by getting rid of the complexities and intricacies of bicameral legislation and it would
be fractured the problem of provincialism, kill the practices for 'Pakhtunistan', and introduce
democratic rights and values to the people of princely states. The protagonists also agreed that it would
provide scope for administrative reforms, economic readjustments, and political reorientation, to the
benefits of the whole population, national unity, and integrity.
The antagonists of the Constituent Assembly defined one Unit in a different way: They defined it
as a 'Punjabi sway’ against the smaller provinces of West Pakistan. Suharwardhy propounded that the
unification idea lay in ’the fear ofINCIPIENT
dominationCONSTITUTIONALISiM
by East Pakistan over the{i} Western wing and 3-25
to capture
power at the centre. {86}. The NWFP's leadership maintained that it was ’ the out come of an intrigue
to split the country (The former Chief Minister of NWFP Mian Jaffar's speech, quoted in Dawn
(Karachi) 25 August 1955). Sindh described it as 'ill-conceived and short -sighted', 'un-historical,
unfair and anti-Pakistan, 'an attempt to destroy the very foundation upon which Pakistan was
conceived', ’ an unpatriotic move to liquidate the three smaller provinces' and a 'hostile act Against
Sindh'. {87} The apprehensions of the antagonists flamed due to the way in which the Bill was passed by
the Second Constituent Assembly: (i) ' Support for the plan had been obtained through coercion and
intimidation; ministries were dismissed, people were threatened, interned or extemed for opposing the
merger plan', {88} (ii) ’ officers were transferred, fake charges were framed against inconvenient
persons, elections were interfered with and solemn pledges were broken’. {89} Although, the
founders of the Plan were insisting that it would save millions of rupees, minimize corruption, and
promote efficiency by bringing merit to the top, 'constitution-making would be made easier by getting
rid of the complexities and intricacies of bicameral legislation’s' yet it cre ated hydra-headed provincial
rivalries and jealousies. It imbued the centrifugal tendencies among ; the federating units and destroys
the honor of Centralism. The Plan did not kill the monster of regionalism, it take speed to disturb the
political and constitutional future of Pakistan. ’Far from achieving any national objective’, the scheme
was not appreciated throughout the country. The deep-seated values of Quasi-racial and lunatic
identities of the distinct units in the Western wing were artificially liquidated for the ruling elite’s
electoral and administrative convenience’. {90}.
It is true that its founders conceived Pakistan as a federal democratic state. Federal and
regional loyalties are the pillars of any stable federation. After the implementation of One Unit
scheme, the regional loyalties, upon which rested the very foundation of Pakistan, were
destroyed,
: and provincialism of intensity penetrated in the process. It removed the possibility of relations
between the Centre and the regions; it also removed the "possibility of parity and equity that East f
Pakistanis required for its version of provincial autonomy" and the beginning of a conflict between
I Eastern and Western wings came to an end when they ’found new sovereignties and
constitutions.’{91 }This was the mirror of centralisation, which introduced by the army generals,
bureaucrats and feudal politicians of Punjab against the other provinces. "The Punjabi dominated
bureaucracy fashioned the province of West Pakistan along administrative lines similar to the
central government, ruling the province as it had the centre. "{92} The plan was sell by the Prime
Minister Mohammad Ali who castigated the "artificial boundaries" of "provincialism" claiming that
smaller provinces were not justified politically or administratively, he related the plan with the
Jinnah's dream of non-Sectarianism in the first Constituent Assembly, saying " Within a Short time
people will cease to think of themselves as Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis or Pathans. Instead they will
begin to think of themselves as Pakistanis." {93} The other groups as stated before did not inspire
the idea. Baluch leaders organised a new political party, stoman Gal, especially to reject one Unit
and renewed the demands for a unified Baluchistan that had simmered since independence'. An
anti- | One Unit Front was organised by -Chaffar Khan in the Frontier after his release in July.
Parties ) upholding provincial autonomy backed the movement. In sindh, prominent political
personalities voiced their dissent. ’ In National Assembly, Fazlur Rehman and Iftikharuddin
condemned the bill.’ and govemor-general’s friend 'Suharwardhy who had at the outset supported
the bill, changed his | mind on grounds of the volume of opposition outside.' {94} He had doubted
the feasibility of One ; Unit. The Khan of Kalat who was also rejected the idea, organised
widespread autonomy movement against it 'that helped to spur the military's intervention in politics
in 1958' and ’real trigger for the coup.' Though, one can easily observe that it was One Unit, which
caused greater resentment after fifteen years, 'culminating in the end of One Unit but also the civil
war that led to the separation of East Pakistan from the West'. {95} Yet the One Unit also silenced
West Pakistanis for the time being and paved the way for a speedy settlement of the constitutional
problems.
 Basically, One Unit was crafted CONSTITUTIONALISiM
INCIPIENT to gift the governor-general
{i} extensive power in3-26
the new .
constitution that he planned to promulgate by ordinance and for the reason he imposed it
'imperially, disposed ©f Chief Ministers who objected to its promulgation, imprisoned
politicians who spoke against it."{96} Getting green light from Moulvi Tamizuddin’s case, the
governor-general could exercise unchecked power. He had already had his staff draft a
constitution, which provided for a head of state that would be assisted by ministers to be
appointed by him. His ministers would have broad powers and would not be responsible to the
legislature. A weak after the victory* Ghulam Muhammad imposed the Emergency Power
Ordinance which Jennings had draft for

him, in which he 'declared a 'grave' emergency in order to augment the emergency he had declared
when he dissolved the assembly, and which was still in effect.' {97}. The action was expressed by
pawn, 28 March 1955 as ' romantic reading because it fulfils the romance of unity where diversi ty
has been the canker in the rose. Like mist before the sunshine let that diversity now melt, dis perse
and vanishes’ and 'the result was predictable confusion’. For the political and constitutional
solution, 'and hoping to impose order upon unruly politicians,' Ghulam Muhammad requested an
advisory opinion from the Federal Court on his plans. {98}&{99}.
The country had seemingly opted for strong centralised leadership. It was implemented;
despite the long and long struggle for construction of a parliamentary system. When the Federal Court
reserved its hearing for the Governor -General, it was not without the cost" no matter how constrained
the governor-general was said to be, he was clearly not the figurehead that had been envisaged in
drafting the constitution. ” {100}It was Pakistan's Supreme Court, which reinforced | the vice-regal
tradition, and set the chief executive off from the rest of the political plane and the shadow of this act
could neither wash out nor forgive in the entire history of Pakistan. It is interesting to note that without
having constitution, the strong ground of centralised government had been prepared. The constitution-
makers who were the members of executive wing followed the guidelines already engineered by the
governor-general. Now "there would be no challenges of the govemor-general's authority and the scene
was set for the transition to presidential, not decentralised government.” {101} „
The colonial trained administrative structure was completely biased in favor of a strong
executive. It was inherited structure by Pakistan by their imperial predecessors. The Indian Act of
1935 or the assemblies who, by virtue of clauses like section 93, could simply dissolve the elect ed
assemblies and promulgate governor's rule on the province solidified the transition of centralised
wing. Long after independence, the same act, aided by the Independence Act of 1947, operated as
the de facto Constitution for Pakistan. In the nine years of inception the vice-regal system and its
mechanical members (Bureaucracy) have constantly overstepped, bypassed, dismissed and
denigrated the mass verdict by simply opting for authoritarianism. And the judiciary did it. The
judiciary, military, and the vice-regal bureaucracy underrated its own citizens and their acumen.
Without understanding the dilemma of politicians and the political parties in a young country like
Pakistan, they acted as king-makers, missing n 6 opportunity to malign them among the people. It
was started when the premier Liaquat Ali Khan appointed governors {102} The first dissolution
was set on provincial level when "the West Punjab Legislative Assembly was dissolved ; in January
1949 with the government citing Section 93 (a) of the India Act of 1935." {103} The ' | servants of
Pakistan' as Jinnah acknowledged the urgency of an official servants in the state and I advised them
to adopt a nationalistic and patriotic role for the development of democracy, not realised that the
bureaucracy which came under him were the trainees who in the Braibanti words ‘steeped in the
ethos of British colonial administration’ and it has ’maintained all along that it knows what is good
for the nation’. {104} Bluntly speaking, they were not the servants they were trained masters in the
 'manufacturing laboratory'. TheINCIPIENT
laboratoryCONSTITUTIONALISiM
created officials who held
{i}political- leaders in3-27
contempt.
It was interesting to note that Jinnah maintained state future on the shoulders of anglicised
bureaucracy. In the entire wounded history of Pakistan the political faces replaced, but the officials
clung on the administrative wall of machinery or imperious to change.
The civilian bureaucracy of Pakistan acted as masters and kingmakers, missing no opportuni ty
to create their own political pickets in the society. "In fact, bureaucracy has been playing concur -
rently executive, judicial, legislative, political and technical roles (such as economic planning and
implementation) in the state structure at the same time regimenting the status quo." {105}. Though
It was deep roots in the era of Jinnah, but it was practically started in the days of Liaquat Ali Khan the
bluntest attitude of bureaucracy towards political institutions and parties was Nazi-mu-din’s dismissal,
by Ghulam Muhammad in 1953. They were at the parting of the ways. Although in 1951, the
bureaucratic crowd gathered around the assassinated body of Liaquat Ali Khan and pres sured Nazi-um-
din to form their dream government. In the new government Ghulam Muhammad, an anglocised
official, was selected as the governor-general and the later was Prime Minister.
The country rushed with severe crises, when Iskander Mirza, a part of colonial civil service
machine with 28 years experience, and General Ayub Khan having dreamed closer relations with
Western powers in order to attain his establishment, started assistance with the mentally sick gov ernor-
general. In the trio, the Prime Minister, Bogra, was only a titular and as weak as water, resigned or was
made to resign from the premiership. It was Mirza who declared the government’s policy as
"controlled democracy" 'with politics to be kept out of administration' as he stated about them that
“politicians could make policy but they must not interfere in the administration". {106} The dissolution
of 1954 was the administrative reflection of this autocratic statement. Ghulam Mohammad who gave
himself the title of Mohafiz-e-Millat (guardian of nation), with his ' half-dumb, half-paralysed1 (As in
the words of Air Marshal Asghar Khan) and insane activities was a ’munim who rose to be a vazir had
turned himself into a sultan' {107} by exploiting the assassination of Quaid-e-Millat. It was a fantastic
grows for him that he became the real centre of power and authority in the new government along with
his favorite coadjutors. After the dissolution he also attacked and culminated the CAR As stated before
the undemocratic and unconstitutional arbitrary actions, were introduced by him and naturally,
exploited by his civilian coadjutor, Iskandar Mirza who captured the high office which was vacated
after the severe heart attacks of governor-general on 6 October 1955. {108}Mirza started his high job
as Pakistan’s third governor-general with the backing of bureaucracy and military.
The military's indirect and direct role in the decision-making, not only in regional and foreign
policies as well as the ever-escalating defense expenditure has been justified frequently as a means of
eradicating corruption of inept politician, guaranteeing national security and improving law and order.
The political and constitutional inability of the state automatically invited the men on horseback.
Perhaps in 1953, while the army served as custodians of the law for a brief period during the anti-
Ahmadi riots in the Punjab. The plot of entry of army into a domestic politics was structured by the
powerful civil servants like Ghulam Muhammad, Iskandar Mirza, Ikramullah and Choudhry
Muhammad Ali with the help of an ambitious army chief. From rehabilitation of refugees to formal
take-over in 1958, army played very cunning role and in this ’power-broker’ role army generals
eventually dominated over the bureaucrats. After the political and administrative domination " it
assumed the role of moderniser; in the 1970s it battled with the alienated political forces in the former
East Pakistan and Baluchistan; and in the 1980s it adopted an additional role as the defender of
ideology. In the 1990s it withdrew to a less visible yet crucial role of being the most powerful members
of a 'troika' with the president and Prime Minister as the other members axe. It played a crucial role in
brooking deals among the feuding politicians." {109} In 1998, the Military leadership became the sole
proprietor of the country and attacked on representatives as well as the civilian bureaucrats. The
country is still under military-led establishment of GHQ.
The country's governments, which don't much care about the political and constitutional
development, could not found the stable way. "It took nine years (1947-56) for two constituent
assemblies to frame a constitution for Pakistan." {110}. In that era the prime ministers were in and out
of office and the mirth-bureaucratic allianceCONSTITUTIONALISiM
INCIPIENT were still scrambling and{i} intriguing for power.
3-28On the
other hand India was fortunate to produce a stable political order under which it framed a

institution under the guidance of Jawahar Lal Nehru and Indian National Congress. Pakistan was
unfortunate because after the deaths of Jinnah and Liaquat, and the sad state of affairs of Muslim
League, which had been completely rooted in the general election in East Pakistan, could not able t0
construct stable political structure in which it framed a constitution without any inordinate delay- "
Constitution-making became a tool in the hands of unscrupulous politicians who were engaged in
'palace intrigues' making and un-making the cabinets". The task of constitution making was
fragmented at the 'alter of power politics', Which ultimately led to military-bureaucratic alliance in
political structure. {111}.
'It is, however, true that apart from' political unevenness and the involvement of two strongest
institutions in Pakistan's politics, there were other fundamental hurdles facing the constitution-
engineers. {112} Apart from authoritarian methods and unrepresentative heads, {113} Islamic-
modern ideological confusions, federal complications and regional slogans were the fundamental
issues facing the framers of the constitution in Pakistan. It was decided by the 'dictate of geography’
and the dictate of Allah that Pakistan should form an Islamic federation. Though these decisions were
accepted without any controversy yet serious differences were raised over the ideology, structure and
shape. Three issues are still facing the country and the people. Under the shadow of these problems,
the cultural and linguistic were also important or the destruction of smooth democracy .The country
which described as geographically unique. Consisted of two parts, commonly known as east and
West, created differences between them on the basis of regional representation and linguist’s
domination. This was the dispute between two parts of the country, separated by a thousand miles of
Indian territory and the people of western part also separated to each part where racial complexion,
language, habits of life, and culture also fractured that dictate of the geography The economic rights
of the citizens also very important to note on this dispute, not in the two parts but also in the different
provincial sections of western parts which encouraged provincialism and enter considerable harm to
feeling of national unity. These problems with the group of disgruntled politicians and with out
constitution, it is easy to disturb the state.
With the adhoc ’handling of the problems of representation and language, and the distribution of
powers between the federal and the provincial governments, the framers of the constitution proceeded
faster towards adopting a constitution’. Perhaps the first net result was Mohammad Ali Bogra’s
formula of language and representation, which delay the controversy for some years. The first
Assembly was not allowed or permitted to, complete its constitution-making mission because it was
dissolved by the governor-general in a most arbitrary when the assembly ready to introduce its final
draft of constitution. After the dissolution of the assembly, the country was indulged on a series of
legal and constitutional crises which was solved by the supreme judiciary of Pakistan and ’cleared the
way for summoning the second constituent assembly in 1955.’{114}. Thus the first Constituent
Assembly died its judicial death for the want of assent and 'Munir’s opinion became the law’ that the
governor-general was legally empowered to dissolve it and ’put the country back on the road to
democracy’. {115} Following the judgment of the Federal Court, The governor-general issued order
to holds elections of the second constituent assembly which members {116} were , elected by the
Provincial Legislatures of East Pakistan, Sindh, the Punjab and N.W. F. P. by the method ^of single
transferable vote. " From Karachi the electorate was the municipal Corporation and from Balochistan
it was Shahi Jirga and the no-official members of the Quota Municipality" and where as "the members
from Bahai war Pur and Frontier States were nominated by their respective rulers". The elections of
these members organised after the dissolution of the eight months. The second Constituent assembly
elected and ” in its composition were to be founded lawyers, landlords, industrialists, businessmen,
newspaper proprietors, journalists, ulema, servicemen, teachers, unionists, tribal chiefs and the rulers
of princely states. Among them were men of great wealth and affluence as well as those belonging to
 the humblest strata of society, men with high
INCIPIENT education, qualifications{i}as well as semi-literate
CONSTITUTIONALISiM 3-29 whose
political experience dated back to the days of the noncooperation movement of 1920 as raw recruits to
public life”. {117} So the second Assembly of Pakistan was the tool- box of subordinates having no
powers of expressions and arguments, Just like dead woods they under the premier ship of Choudhry
Muhammad Ali, took up and completed the task of constitution- engineering. There was only one
merit of this second constituent assembly that it produced quicker results than its predecessors and
presented its fourth draft constitution to the country which certain changes and amendments was
finally adopted on 29 February 1956. This was Pakistan's first constitution. According to Kieth
Callard:

'The constitution of 1956 forms a logical constitution of the scheme of government, under the
government of India Act. Many of its terms and even whole clauses have been transferred from one
document to the other. Both in politics and in law it must be expected that the established practice of
constitution will continue except where the new document requires a change to be made. The
relation of the President to the Cabinet and birth to Parliament has to be understood, not merely by
looking at the words of the constitution, but also by scrutinizing the relationship of the pre cursors of
those authorities before March 1956”. {118}.
The constitution opened the new era for constitutional leadership (1956-1958) in Pakistan and
it ended the political 'watershed’, which was marked in the year 1954. Though it was not
appreciated by the different sections of the society yet the country was little proud for having con-
stitution because 'it was not only for the country's stability but for its prestige abroad as well’. The
constitution was not only the work of present assembly but also accomplished by the predecessor
who had submitted their various drafts and reports. For this reason ’most of the articles in the draft
Constitution of the second Constituent Assembly reflected little change from those rejected in |
October 1954.' {119}.
The second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan having certain advantages like the predecessors
and their reports and discussions, necessity of the constitution, agreed governor-general with its
'Ministry of Talents', but also faced certain disadvantages. Muslim League which had monopoly in
the first constituent assembly had lost its comfortable majority, because of its failure in the East
Pakistan Provincial Assembly election in 1954, and still there was no one man big enough to |
control. For this reason, in the second constituent assembly there was a coalition government of | the
United Front and the Muslim League. {120}.
About the existence of Muslim League one could rightly stated that there was a Party j which had made
the country with its political and constitutional struggle of Muslims, but that | Party unnoticed and
unwanted, led by different minds and hands (groups). These groups were | explaining their own diverse
views on fundamental issues of the constitution like the role of religion in the state, strong or weak
centre, federation or con-federation, joint or separate electorates, the national languages of the country,
and One Unit. {121 }Though, despite these heated debates the constitution of 1956 was adopted by the
assembly yet it was never fully implemented, nor could it have been without national elections which
became signals of its early collapse Ayub's domination over political and constitutional values was the
fruit of deep-seated military intrigues' and relations with Iskandar Mirza and muddled-headed
politicians. The observation of the country like Pakistan can made to use King Lear's graphic
description when he told the blind Gloucester, that ’ a man may see how this world goes with no eyes'.
{122}. This was indeed transparent statement to identify the poor and undiagnosed political system and
for the establishment of this situation they also serve who only stand and wait.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-1

Chapter —4

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
(1956 — 1958 )

“....do not ask me where you are going. The road goes no where..,.
no pray for the narrow brain of a cow, and its thick leather hide.... where am I
going Prometheus?”

— LOWELL

» “The Constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed by the Pakistan

Constituent Assembly, I do not know what the ultimate shape of this
Constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be a democratic type,
embodying the essential principle of Islam”

— Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, (In

February 1948, in a broadcast to the people of the U.S.A.,)

After the emergence of new country, as result of decolonisation and the change of old bound aries
of subcontinent, contradictorily appeared between the colonial and centrifugal forces. A study of the
historiography of Pakistan reflects the political vicissitude and change in its political process. With
each change of political set-up, the situation of Pakistan's government also change. The basic reason of
this anti-constitutionalism in the country was the national legislature for this new nation, the
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan “was born without the formal blessing of law. Its conception lay in
the British Cabinet Mission Plan of May 1946 and the Viceroy's statement of June 3, 1947, which
announced the agreement of partition the sub-continent. The 1946 Plan envisioned a single Constituent
Assembly for undivided India. This was to be an assembly of representatives chosen by the elected
members of the provincial Legislative Assemblies with the addition of delegates from the princely
states.”! 1) There were several forces; Pakistan faced which arrayed against the development of a
constitutionally democratic based political system. {2} The inability of the Muslim League to develop
it self as a unified, coherent political party and finally, the Jinnah’s death so early in the formation of
Pakistan, and the leadership which ready to fill a administrative vacuum, could not agree on a
constitutional framework until 1956. life lacking unleashed the amputated forces and flowed to built
devil house of civil-military administrators. Ghulam Muhammad was the member of that devil-house
legacy who dissolved the Nazimudin government and changed the character of the 'debate*. It also
changed forever the Pakistan phenomenon.’{3}
Pakistan came into being due to two basic factors; the Muslim League and the leadership of
jinnah. Unfortunately two factors disappeared so early in the formation of Pakistan. It was Jinnah’s
departure which left the league without its chief spokesman, or the league trapped by the more con -
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-2
troversial personalities after the establishment of its organised purpose, or it ignored the normal process
of political life of a country. The disintegration of the party and its leader’s death led to coer cive
attitude towards other dissenters. The factors have given a way for the politics of bureaucratic
oligarchy. These bureaucrats not only brought end to the Muslim League, they also initiated a new
beginning, based not only on imported ideas but also experiences that were all to familiar to Pakistan's
diverse population. The Final decline of Muslim League witnessed in 1954 provincial elections in East
Pakistan when it was overall defeated. By the time the league tried to revive its popular appeal in 1958,
it was too late. It had became the party of the enemies 'who flying at each other's throats'( 4}The
historian argued that the main reason that Pakistan has not been able to steer its way to a stable,
constitutional-based political culture was the absence of national party.
Pakistan’s new leadership attributed the political, constitutional and sectarian conflicts to the
politicians and the masses. Asserting that the country had enough of demagogic displace, Ghulam
Mohammad stripped from the cabinet the more controversial personalities who were yes-man and not
only changed the Jinnah-inspired course of political though but to deep authoritarian represen tation of
bureaucrats. It is a fact that Ghulam Mohammed's dismissal of Nizamudin’s cabinet in 1953 was
improper, though in line with the legal requirement of the 1935 government of India Act " under which
Pakistan was being run till a constitution was framed". {5 }Similarly, the dissolution of the constituent-
assembly, by amending sections 9,10,10 A, 10B of the government of India act can be characterised as
a traumatic decisions in Pakistan's constitutional history, particularly at a time when it had almost
completed the draft of the first constitution. The worst impact of this controversial action being the
induction of bureaucracy and Army in mainstream politics, paving the way for Army general and civil
servants to give legitimacy to governor-general’s actions. It was a clear violation of the principle of
supremacy of the political over military-bureaucracy authority.
In spite of the disorder in several administrative issues, the use of extraordinary powers by the
Governor-Generals, delegated by the Indian Act, 1935, had spearheaded other political, constitutionals
depressions in the country and it was that ’constitutions’ under which Pakistan organised its
governmental life during the long period of constitution-making. It was for those bureaucrats, army,
and politicians who had so much inspired by the vice-regal traditions and
Perturbing democratic projections. Jinnah also accepted the act as interim constitution, in which it
was permitted that Governor General, in acknowledge circumstances, to dismiss a sitting prime
minister without the advice or consent of the council of ministers. The power of Viceroy was
automatically delegated to the successor, and "the relation ship between the head of the state and the
head of government remained much as it was before the transfer of power. "{6} there was no change in
the traditional politics administrative system, inherited by vice-regal masters. However^ there were dim
glimpses of clash between the advocates of democracy on the one side and autocracy on the other, only
delay the issue of constitutional destination. Basically, the constitutional destination delayed after the ’
Liaquat's mysterious assassination’ which create a huge void and filled by an ambitious bureaucracy.
Ghulam Mohammed who had never held electoral office and came from railways administration, was
the member of that ’Naukarshahi’, without any real reason dismissed the prime minister, who still
enjoyed a majority in the constituent assembly.
The action which came from governor-general extraordinary powers confused the members of
the constituent assembly. It was not illegal decision; the members of the assembly were on the razor’s
edge. They were finding for their political, sovereign survival which was rooted out by the bouts of
vice-regal, legal, extraordinary power. They had a very perplexing questions that' if the governor-
general could used his special prerogatives to pre-emptive and suppressed the powers conferred on the
central and provincial government, how could the constituent assembly pro tect itself against the
arbitrary use of those powers? They amended the government of India act 1935 by inserting new
sections, 223 a, that conferred upon the high court the power to issue pre rogative writ. The step for their
constitutional sovereignty was the repeal of PRODA and a bill was introduced in the Assembly to
amend the section 10 of the Government of India Act 1935. It was direct attack on the emergency
powers of governor-general, notably his right to dismiss a sitting Prime Minister, but in vain because
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-3
the Assembly and the Prime Minister had being transformed into a relic of history and the new
constituent assembly, comprised of a verity of political order, came into existence for the drafting of
delayed constitutional.
Once the identity of the authority in Pakistan has been established, it is easy to see that given its
non-representatives, elitist forces which always tried to seek legitimacy by using their constitutional
powers, gifting by the vice-regal interim constitution. Though the country evaluated from interim
constitution to own constitution in 1956, yet the legitimised consciousness and the total disregard for
constitutionalism have often dented the country's paralyzed political culture.
Ghulam Mohammed's unlimited and unpalatable rule of high authority groomed the sense of
high-headedness in the mind of his coadjutor, Major-General Iskandar Mirza who' had brought to his
job of Pakistan's third governor-general.' The experienced official, who entered in the of Ghulam
Mohammed’s Cabinet as Interior Minister, with 'the full bag of tricks he had learnt as the British
Political Agent on the North-West Frontier." (7}Though after the entrance of Iskander Mirza, it was the
end of Ghulam Mohammed's constitutionally legal, unpalatable 'job', yet it was the start of new era in
the nation saw a romance between the civil-military establishment which surpassed country's
descendent in every respect. The fallen Muhafiz-I-Millat gave nothing to the Millat, except stridden
centralisation and having suffered severe heart attack, he had to vacate his office for Iskander Mirza on
6 October 1955.And he had, via the 1956 constitution, coined for himself an official designation, viz.,
President of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The single object was to make secure and make the
people believe that he wanted to develop a new system for better establishment, which dented by the
wrong mechanical skills. Perhaps it was the destiny of the nation that every time, a man dressed with
power, crossed the borders of political and constitutional values and dented the democratic norms and
the irony is that the leadership of Pakistan during this time period felt that it was not in the best
interests of the new nation to democratise. To many observers and commentators in Pakistan states that
the lack of emotions for democracy and cooperative political ,culture in the country since its birth has
been the main hurdles in the quest for real constitutional destiny. The crises of democratic governance
in Pakistan beginning with the dismissal of prime-Minister in 1953, which laid down the foundation of
immaturity of Pakistan's democracy.
For analysing the constitutional development and the authoritarian state system in general and the
crises of constitutional governance in Pakistan in particular, it is imperative to carry out a historical and
political analysis of some basic constitutional set-ups and their set-backs. The purpose is to understand
those steps which badly influence the potential and order of Pakistan's weaker constitutional and
democratic entity. It is a fact that 'A Constitution contains those primly rules of law and those binding
conventions which regulate the structure of the governmental organs’ and the civilised government
consider the 'Constitution as the supreme law of the land’. This kind of agreement amongst them
created stable political methodology. It is sacred commitment for the government to the constitution
that 'to preserve it with all its commas, semi-colons, and full stops.’ {8 ] It is, thus, a politico-legal
document, which deals with the fundamental rights and the fundamental duties of the citizens of the
state and which should understand in the light of cooperation, scraped as mere piece of paper. The
ruling elite, silent judiciary, low literacy rate, uncompromising religious pressure groups, the seeds of
regionalism created by narrow centralisation, socio-political condition inherited by the colonial
masters, not only became the hurdles in the task of constitutionalism but also helped to wreck the
politico-constitutions conditions in the country. It was due to that colonial constitutional heritage that
the early constitutional experiments "attempted to provide a written constitution that would use the
language of British constitutionalism to define sovereignty and yet separate the new state from Empire"
and was loaded 'with an executive-dominated state already created by imperial instruments of
governance.’!9}
As started earlier chapter, the second constituent assembly again elected indirectly through the
provincial assemblies, saw a new draft constitution, which was hurriedly passed and came into effect on
23 March 1956. The constitution was based essentially on the existing arrangements and the 1950
Indian constitution1. {10} The general structure was the same as of Indian Act, 1935. The 1956
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-4
constitution complicated condition because it did not adequately address the prevailing circumstances
in the different regions compromised Pakistan. The matter of representation by- Bengali penchant
which was the hot cake in the first decade of Pakistan's independence, gained momentum after the draft
which could not mention mutually shared representative culture between the centre-province relations.
Although, when Bogra was existed it also disturbed them. After Bogra's foisted, Choudhry Mohd Ali
was became as Prime Minister by Iskander Mirza, who the head of Muslim League- United Front
coalition ministry, cheered by the CAP on the issue of the scheme of One Unit. The History of
constitution - making suggested that the ” non-contiguity of the two wings of Pakistan and the division
West Pakistan into different administrative Units" {11} were the major hurdles for providing
satisfactory representation to the provinces in the central legislature. For the administrative and
representative solution the West Pakistan's part were integrated. Though via compromise, he hammered
out the Constitution which coined for his governor-general ’an official designation, viz., President of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.’ {12}The God-gifted President with a titular Prime Minister declared
’traitors’ i.e., Fazlul Haq as Governor of East Pakistan and Dr Khan Sahib( Brother of Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan, and Chief Minister of West Pakistan in 1956) who was a non-Leaguer, after the
integration of West Pakistan headed the Republican Party which won the support of the majority
formed its government. The party "was not in the position to contest against Muslim League in a
general election but through political maneuvers and extension of patronage, it won over many
legislatures who were elected on the League ticket" {13} foisted as the Chief Minister on West
Pakistan. Though, the Mirza’s nominees were the prominent leaders of their lands but they were
’widely resented with in the ranks of the public and the Muslim League.' Out of the 310 Provincial
Assemblies members, 245 belonged to the league, which had not only passed a resolution against Dr
Khan Sahib's nomination but had selected Sardar Bahadur Khan as its parliamentary leader. In spite of
these pangs of motions he continued his ' constitutional prerogative' post because he was backed by the
connivance between the Prime Minister and the governor-general {14} and to remain in office, like a
sponge that absorbs water, till troubled and ousted by a no-confidence motion. {15}
Mirza, who became the President after using constitution, had expertise of ’intrigue-ridden game
of formation and dismissal of ministries', crawled and dismissed as many as four ministries which fell
like pins. This was the mirror of those seven years that lapsed since the Objectives were defined were
years of stormy unrest. The unrest decade started when the first prime minister assassinated to a bullet;
the second was captured by an anglicized bureaucrat, the third gave the formula of representation was
made to resign and "repudiated by his own party. The fourth, a sea soned bureaucrat turned politician,
Choudhry Mohammed Ali, gave the country its first constitu tion"! 16} who could work for 13 months
{17} of constitutional unrest. After the natural death of Choudhry Mohammed Ali's 13 months stint as
Prime Minister due to the betrayal of his supporters came the government of Hussein Shaheed
Suhrawardy, who (as a member of the CAP) refused to sign the 1956 Constitution. {18} "It is important
to note that H. S. Surawardy led his Awami Leaguers out of the Assembly while the vote on the
constitution was being taken" {19} and before participated in the Islamic republic President’s power-
ridden politics as prime minister he never gave his approval to the constitution.
Mr. Suhrawardy, after leaving the government and remaining the opposition leader in the new
constituent assembly, and all this within a short period of two years, became the prime min ister of
Pakistan in September 1956. It was very surprising for the people that Suhrawardy who was the tallest
poppy in the land, accepted the offer and started working under the overlord ship of Iskandar Mirza."
Suhrawardy’s only asset was his indomitable personality, made up of his intellectual attainments,
matchless legal acumen, talent and training in the management of men and the art of government. "{20}
These qualities were destroyed when he came as a first pawn on Mirza’s chess board and "defended
policies and perspectives which he had detested in the past.” {21}He was like a democratic bird who
compelled to sing in the golden cage of prime minister-ship who made compromises under Republican
pressure, particularly on One- Unit and in of foreign policy as well. When he was the Leader of
opposition, he expressed open doubts about the integrity of the constitution and the feasibility and
desirability of One-Unit which was structured to give the governor-general extensive powers in the new
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-5
constitution that he planned to promulgate by ordinance. Surprisingly enough, he turned to preserve and
defend the same document and scheme (One- Unit) which was imposed imperials, as the prime minister
of Pakistan.
It was a tragic irony of Pakistan that feudal class was the dominating factor ' first in the guise of
the Muslim League and later in the Republican garb.' Perhaps the greatest misfortune of the country
that it has had to suffer prolonged bouts of mis-governance at the hands of either corrupt , incompetent
feudal politicians, over-ambitious suharwardy, was also trapped by intrigue- ridden game of the unholy
trio of autocracy which clung in the early years and manipulated not only the democratic or
constitutional norms but to try every politicians of some public significance, called upon to uphold the
government, get them labeled as ineffective and corrupt, and than kick them out as disposable tins.
The people of Pakistan, who witnessed the destruction of democracy, were not cried over
Suhrawardy’s dismissal. Mirza who was the real man behind the destruction disdained the Pakistan's
citizen as a political incompetent who needed a controlled government until he could be given proper
training in the affairs of government. {22} As Lawrence Ziring explained it that the people was largely
ill-educated, due to this lack of education would lead 'to an unreal estimate of the consequence of
political action1 {23} It is a fact that Pakistan is today and at the time of independence an
underdeveloped, ’moth-eaten and truncated state' and the people suddenly found them selves in a new
social, political and constitutional responsibilities. But these were not the only consequences which
'made them unready for democracy 1. They were ready for democratic constitutionalism in Pakistan for
which they struggled under the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah.
_
The Father of the Nation had most cherished ideal of federal, parliamentary, and democratic
constitution. They were politically silent but not fools, as Mirza would have them remembered.
While shabby politicians and British- trained bureaucratic and military clique were involved in the
destruction and abrogated the system. "It was not the people who put Ghulam Mohammed in
power. Nor was it the people who wrote the court decisions which legitimised democracy's
destruction."{24}It was not the people who "create the situation under which as many as four
ministries fell like pins’ which indicates the weaknesses in the constitutional environment. They
were politicians and their parties which were 'more concerned with personal retribution that pre-
serving constitutional principle.' They were quarreling with each other and manipulated by
bureaucratic-military alliance. Mirza was expert in changing parties because the political parties
became an anachronism. Mirza swiftly made and unite coalitions and after a brief Republican
NAP alliance, he suddenly shifted his support back to the Muslim League and Suhrawardy, was
replaced by 1.1. Chundrigar, a leader of the opposition in the National Assembly only for 59 days.
He was replaced by Malik Firoz Khan Noon, an important landlord from Punjab, who was the last
victim of Mirza's unconstitutional fire. Finally, there were "politicians who destroyed their options
and left the field to the civil-military elite which quickly filled the political vacuum." {25} In this
political vacuum not only ill-minded politicians, but the leader like Suhrawardy was also trap to
satisfy his personal retribution and missed every opportunity to sustain the 1956 constitution.
Mirza-politicians companionship did not last long and after trying four candidates, decided to use
old whim which he conceived by his ancestors.
In October 1958, he victimised the 1956 constitution and promulgated martial law in the *
country. The 'good guy' was also ousted after a month when his best companion, Commander-in-
Chief, General Ayub Khan replaced him. They wrecked the Constitution by using the
Constitution. Both were jealous about the constitution and constitutionalism. Having no emotion
for the integrity of the constitution both finalised authoritarian art of statecraft under their genius
and their bureaucratic clique. {26} Although both corrupted and disrupted the politicians, Ayub
Khan selected 'Mirza as a crooked politician incapable of giving Pakistan the kind of leadership
that the time called for’ {27} In his book, Friends Not Masters, Ayub Khan who entered in power
since 1954, always hated the constitution and muddle-minded politicians of the state. For the
improvement of his power thrust he used legally-elected President, the man who had taken oath _
on the Koran to protect and defend the Constitution, Iskandar Mirza to destroy the Constitution'
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-6
disclosed that" I said the President: ’ Are you going to act or are you not going to act ? It is your
responsibility to bring about change and if you do not, which heaven forbid, we shall force a
change’—and then he perceived his final destination. Sayeed stated that" Ayub could take action
against what he considered the enemies of the country and tackle some of his basic problems.. He
thought he should first get rid of his friend, Iskandar Mirza. "{28}

It was constitutional and developing process of General election, scheduled for February
1959 ’While blaming every body except himself, President Iskandar Mirza, on the evening of 7
October 1958, issued a proclamation to abrogate the Constitution of 1956 and the National
Parliament and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved and until alternative arrangements were
made, Pakistan would come under Martial Law, general Ayub Khan being the Chief Martial
Administrator, with all the armed forces placed under him. ' During the seven year period follow -
ing the assassination of the first prime minister on 16 October 1951 till martial law, the country
had six prime ministers and three governor-general.'{29}The action which, came with Martial
Law also introduced a new system. The country completed the administrative travel from Viceroy
to governor-general and finally, the President. The Constitution which was adopted after long
discussions
and deliberations threatened by the ruthlessness of political Adventists like Iskandar and Ayub but they
blamed that the traitors of the political body were responsible for this act and marked the ascendancy of
military and bureaucratic influence in Pakistan's politics. There were three basic rea sons behind the
action: the created political instability, the ambitions of the civil-army romance, and the constitution,
mainly engineered for personal position and power. The period prior to the 1956 Constitution, and
thereafter, only witnessed the drama of political instability.
The shameful exploitation of constitutional democracy was not only occurred in the central
system but it was also introduced in the provincial assemblies by their centralised masters. In Sindh
Mr. Ayub Khuhro, the Chief Minister, who was dismissed in 1948 by the Sindh governor on charges of
corruption? Judiciary backed the action and he was disqualified from holding public office. 'However,
Mr. Khuro was able to get his disqualification set aside and a few months later were back in
office.'{30} In December 1951, he was again removed and barred again from holding public office and
again became, in 1955, the chief minister for the third time. Sindh was more politically and
administratively hurt by the centre. One Unit which was schemed for the domination of representation
of Western part over to the Eastern part, provided 'traitors' and 'heroes' to the history of Sindh. Sindh
suffered more under the political rule of Punjab who were dominating Western province. During this
period, fertile land was allotted to army officers and high bureaucrats and peasants of their rights. Due
to this, Sindh found it self in the same situation as when if was part of the Bombay Presidency during
the colonial period. "Instead of Bombay it was now dominated by Lahore” {31} Though, this situation
helped the Sindhis become more mature yet they realised that neither the status of Sindh as 'Babul
Islam’ nor their contribution to the freedom movement helped them to get their rights.
The Provincial Assembly of the Punjab also faced shortage of stable administrative as well as
political situation. In its short life till 1955 had three ministries, which were disqualified and dismissed.
The Mamdot Ministry was dismissed in 1949, Doultana was disqualified in 1953, finally the Feroze
Khan Noon regime lasted till 1955, when the one unit scheme was cheered up to unify all the provinces
of Pakistan. In British India, Punjab was an agro-based transformative province, had importance for its
roots with the colonial managers. It was 1940 when observers thought that the Pakistan Movement had
been able to dent the hegemonic symbiosis between the landed classes and the services gifted by the
colonial’s masters when in 1897 the British Punjab was the province to receive most of the seats and
services were allotted to the representative of landed aristocracy- the intermediaries. 'Such dynasties' of
Punjab "maintained their hold on Punjabi politics through strong political parts like the Punjab National
Unionist Party which ruled the province until 1947. Over the years, the East Pakistan and other smaller
provinces used the slogan of 'Punjabi domination' due to its role in national politics.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-7
The short period of ten years after Independence made the political arena a stage of tempes tuous
drama: the plot was dense with intrigue and the exits and entrances of the players was at times so
frequent that the spectators would often lose track of the underlying theme and instead remained
entranced by the pageantry of scenes, action-packed with heroes and villains. Coupled with political
instability and chaos was the collapsed of national economy. In the ten years the governments at the
centre as well as provinces were changed overnight. These uncertain political events of Pakistan's
history produced economic crises, social fluidity and ideological infirmities but the dazzle of events
have one very important progress in constitutionalism which was brought into operation on 23 March
1956. This experiment, however, was also short-lived and was never fully implemented, nor could it
have been without national elections but it was clear signal of constitution- making, which change the
name of the Dominion (^Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan).

Though the squabbling among the politicians was hindered the situation yet the constitution 0f
1956 was the product of consensus that develop by the political parties. The document agreed upon by
East and West Pakistan leaders. One had then hoped for party based politics and regular elections but
this dream was not fulfilled. However, the army did not accept the constitutional arrangements and two
years later General Ayub Khan decided to abrogate the constitution and finally took control of the
country directly in its own hands in 1958. This is a reality that whenever the politicians developed the
consensus it fractured by the army and their follies. From the early years of Pakistan, the army began to
play a cooperative role along with civilian bureaucrats like Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Mirza
derided the politicians and virtually ran the country after the death of Jinnah. " The army chief even
carried out defense agreements with foreign countries without the prior knowledge of the contemporary
prime ministers.” {32 } The history of Pakistan is replete with a series of hopes and disappointments and
'is witness to element of vendetta webbed around palace intrigues.'{3 3 } In the words of one of Ghalib's
most poignant verses, 'our fate has been a constant longing for a better future and regret over the
unfulfilled with-es of the past.'
The entire history of Pakistan’s constitutionalism had been dominated by the executive,
bureaucracy and army. The constitution-denied tradition in the Pakistan ’was that of a strong exec utive,
first under the oriental rulers, then under the British'. This vice-regal inherited system of Pakistan ’was
not in tune with democratic ones' because the high executive, the members of the bureaucracy in
British India got key position in the governmental machinery in Pakistan. (Governor-general Ghulam
Muhammad, President Iskandar Mirza, and Choudhry Mohammad Ali) “It was hardly expected that
this powerful group should have any regard for democratic traditions" {34} and constitutional
practices. Golam W Choudhry 'feels that the real threats and challenges to democracy in Pakistan came
from an all-powerful and irresponsible executive in Pakistan which was aided and supported by the
powerful bureaucracy’ They openly criticised the ability of Pakistani people and advocated ’controlled
democracy’{35} for Pakistan in 1954. Although the era of Suhrawardy was brief interval of thirteen
months when he became the prime minister. ” But even during this interval Mr. Suhrawardy had to rely
on the all- powerful President Mirza and his party for his existence, and such the grip of the group was
not seriously undermined."{36}
In 1960, Muhammad Shabuddin, examined the causes of the failure of constitutional democracy
in Pakistan. According to him, the main reasons for the destruction of constitutional- parliamentary
democracy were: (i) lack of proper elections, (ii) undue interference by the heads of the state with the
ministers and political parties and by the central government with the functioning of the government of
the provinces, (iii) lack of leadership resulting in the absence of well- organised and disciplined parties,
lack of character in the politicians and their undue interference in the administration. {37} In the
absence of a sound party system, proper elections, bureaucratic heads influence, and lack of descent
leadership could not introduce the constitutional tendencies in the country. Where the leaders were
without parties. Where the representatives were traitors and unrepresentative clowns backed by
authoritarian were God-gifted 'good guys' how one can imagine for good, sound constitutional-
accepted society. It is due to this "that the constitutional provisions, both under the interim constitution
as well as under the 1956 constitution, contained many loep-holes which enabled the powerful
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-8
executive to control the powerful executive to maintain and strengthen its grip on the country’s
administration and government.”{38}
The story of loop-holes in the constitutional machinery which enabled the powerful executive to
control the entire democratic situation started in the time of Lord Cornwallis (1786) when consti -
tutional expert in British India provided emergency provisions to control some governmental crises.
These emergency provisions were also provided after independence to carve out bureaucratic control.
^ Pakistan, 'ruthless exercise
CONSTITUTIONAL was made of
DEVELOPMENT section
AND 92A of CONSEQUENCES
POLITICAL the interim constitution and article 193
(19564958) 4-9of
the 1956 constitution' which dented democratic institutions and supervised them by bureaucratic
influence. This exercise became a favorite phenomenon of Pakistani's bureaucratic-military
alliance. Not only in the era of executive but" even while the popular governments were in
operation, its leaders were constantly under the threat of emergency rule or disqualification from
political life under the PRODA (Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act). "{39}

Pakistan's political system was described as a ' modernising oligarchy' {40} and 'could be termed
as an oligarchy under the democratic constitution' because 'the various government changes that
took place in the country could be traced to the inordinate desire of the ruling oli garchy to
perpetuate its power and position’ and it was very easy for oligarchy to hold the consti tutional
democracy 'because of the lack of cohesion and integrity among the political parties and their
leaders’{41} The oligarchy acted like executive to crush the democracy as well as political parties
when ever 'any of them constituted a threat to its hold and dominance,' The oligarchic tendencies
griped the entire political situation and constitution. It should be destroyed for the prospects of
democracy. The only political machinery was the 'well-organised and widely based political
parties' which could eliminate of the control of the undemocratic elements in Pakistan. This is
impossible in country like Pakistan. Where the leaders and members can change their party and
commitment, not for the sake of principles or country but for the sake of base self inter est. It is
known as lotacracy' in Pakistan and which constitute the greatest challenge to the well- organised
and widely-based political party system and the entire constitutional emotions. This is the reason
that whenever 'nasty, brutish martial law backed by executives has been introduced, it has been
cheered by the people. "Our history can be summed up in one sentence. It is ' the sound of heavy
boots coming up the stairs and the rustle of satin slippers coming down". {42}

The inherited oligarchic loops, the early death of the founding father, the mysterious death
of Liaquat Ali Khan, the removal of second Prime Minister, the collapse of the League and the
regional-central tussle are very important for which the Students, teachers and researcher are
prone to complain about the system. They argued that" events in Pakistan are getting less and less
transparent; it is coming more and more difficult to discern any kind of pattern of political and
constitutional process". {43} It is true because in Pakistan, introduced different type of political
experiments by the executive, politicians and military. But all these play no role in determining
policy decisions and have become irrelevant. As Maleeha Lodhi has observed, ' How meaning -
full is our democratic order, replete with Parliaments, Cabinets, and political parties when real
decisions are made elsewhere?' It plagued the political and constitutional legacy and lacking con-
fidence its future. What is the meaning of constitution in the mind of Pakistan's elite? A little draft
of no importance on the political surface of an unimportant country, living in a second-rate
Society? An accidental or launched of economically depressed masses which have came together
by an odd chance? That is what some political writers are thinking and explaining. Looking out
into the depth of political movement which created Pakistan, in which we discovered a society of
unthinkable people, chained in slave- based feudal thinking or the re-awakening of the people is
one of these enormous movements that can only be properly understood when viewed in a wide I ,
historical perception. It was true that country was achieved by the constitutional struggle but the
masses did not understand the constitutional emotion of the leader, they were only finding
charisma for the satisfaction of their political, economic and social desires and for that lock the
key was made by the Islamic bond. It is also true that no one understand the meaning of Islamic
state and Islamic Constitution. All the effort was for the partition. And for this purpose the serv-
ices of Ulema and mash'ikh was also used. They worked and helped during the elections in 1945.
Sortie of the Ulema like Shabbir Ahmad Usmani defended the Quaid-e- Azam against
the attacks 0f other Ulema. It is also an irony that those ulema who were working with
Quai-e-Azam, working for establishment of an Islamic state rather than an constitutional
 state.
Although, in the nineteenth century, the Muslim masses followed the political path of Sir Seyed
CONSTITUTIONAL
Ahmad and rejectedDEVELOPMENT
the Ulema. ButAND POLITICAL
in religion they CONSEQUENCES
followed the Ulema(1956-1958)
and rejected Sir4-10
Seyed Ahmad.
For the interpretation of their political dream they did not accept the lead of the Ulema and returned to
a modem liberal educated man who was well known for his contemporary constitutional political
understanding in which he was pitted both against the Hindu Congress and British Indian Government.
The Muslim Ulema inspired the people for very short time. They impacted on them during the Khilafat
Movement but could not develop the vanguard in shaping the political arena for Muslim community.
This political development came under the leadership of Jinnah who had no pretension to leadership in
the sphere of religion. His slogan of freedom, an independent homeland for the Indian Muslim, where he
could live according to his own genius, the Muslim community into a formidable force.
After the independence the political idea was confused by quoting different statement of Jinnah
and delayed the constitutional smoothness in the country. The secularist stated that Jinnah spoke
against the exploitation of the common man by landlords and capitalist and the purpose of the making
of a new country to solve the political and economic disparities as Jinnah stated: ' There are millions
and millions of our people who hardly get one meal a day. Is this civilisation ? Is this aim of
Pakistan?... If this is the idea of Pakistan I would not have it'. The ulema that were with Jinnah exerted
the cause of Pakistan into an Islamic state and used the statement of Jinnah for an Islamic state and
Islamic constitution: “Pakistan started the moment the first non-Muslim was converted to Islam in India
long before the Muslims established their rule. As soon as a Hindu embraced Islam he was outcast not
only religiously but also socially, culturally and economically. As for the Muslim it was a duty imposed
on him by Islam not to merge his identity and individuality in any alien society "{44}
The people of Pakistan who witnessed the heated debates in the assemblies and their destruction
were not the political animals. But the educated class of a country talked about the issues involved in
drafting a new constitution which described briefly in the chapters.
On the other hand the other class, who could understand the constitutional responsibility, only
used the argument of necessity for their personal whims. The survey of Pakistan's judicial, from 1954
to the year 2000, renders its rulers as tyrants, its judiciary as their toothless minions, and its citizens as
slaves. The judiciary which should be the guardian of constitutional importance in a country, validating
the rule of dictatorial rulers like Ghulam Muhammad, Ayub Khan, Ziaul Haq and General Musharraf
In this connection the historical roots of bureaucratic-hierarchical structure of the subcontinent
cannot be so easily ignored. Because the history of the subcontinent witnessed the deep-root- ed
traditions of monarchic-despotic government, 'just as where the surrounding areas of the Middle East,
South Asia and the Far East, South East Asia and the Far East'. {45}The introduction of highly
authorised centralisation of the constitution of 1956 was the reflection of those influences.
The constitution was the second model {46} in which the writer calculated the four era of
Pakistan's constitutional evolution.( He stated that 1 it is necessary to distinguish the four different
stages which the constitution making process in Pakistan went.’ For this he made four system of
constitutionalism, i.e. From 1919 and 1935 constitutional era and ’these British acts constitute the basic
frame work in Pakistan even today', the pure Whitehall system of Parliamentary

. | 87 |
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-11
Government and which ' found expression in the first Constitution of Pakistan in 1956', the era of
Constitution of 1962 and which 'was not decided by the Constituent Assembly,' but decided by
president Ayub Khan, but ’with out the separation of power' and the Introduction of 1973 consti-
tution which was nearer to the Basic Law of the German federal Republic, in its most character-
istic aspects’.) of constitutional system of parliamentary Government. This was that constitution- ;
al system for which the Muslim League and other political parties struggled in the time between
1947 and 1958. It was true that the Constitution was the revised edition of the Government of
Indian Act 1935 and " Many of its terms and even whole clauses have been transferred from one
document to the other." (47} With having a preamble with 234 Articles and six schedules.
The Constitution was a game for the maintained bureaucratic-military structure, because it
has the provisions for repeating the game of making and unmaking cabinets. "The constitution
partly demolished the dualism of British legislation for India by making the President a figure -
head, vesting all power in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, while maintain largely the safety
valve of emergency provisions" { 48} which clung with the entire constitutional body and suck
the emotional blood of this sacred document. The Supreme Court did nothing which the country's
mighty civil and military establishment did not want it to do. {49}Though the era from 1956 to
1958 can be called the era of constitutional importance because the government crowned the draft
yet it is also true that the Pakistan visulised the state of crises and the instability of the Executive
in those years. The politicians, the third secondary pillar of governance worked like the rolling
stone for the receiving of jobs in the Cabinet ’or because they hoped to receive a post from oppo-
sition if they crossed the floor.'(50} "So it be said that the main drawback of the constitution of
1956 was instability of Cabinets, selfishness of party leaders, and intolerance towards opposition
groups". (51}
After the implementation of Constitution by the presiding governor-general, 'Pakistan was
declared a federal republic, but its parliamentary system had allowed roles for President and Vice-
President'. 'Provincial autonomy was included in the document' but fractured by the strong cen-
tralisation in the country, especially to meet anticipated emergencies and to safe guard the state's
territorial integrity.’ One can visualised that the Constitution was riddled by the complexities of
centralisation and Islamisation. In spite of this implementation, 'a strong centre did not sit well
with those pressing for a different version of Pakistan than that engineered by Pakistan's civil-mil -
itary elite'. Mujib and Bhashani, the strong dissidents of the constitution, called it the document of
Americans and 'demanded immediate recognition of East Pakistan's distinctive character.' (52}
The constitution was failed in its conventional politics and faced strong opposition from the East
wing who were generating the idea of two countries, which led to the parting of the ways. (53} As
stated before the constitution also satisfied the social conservatives of the society that is the
introductions of Islamic provisions of the state. It is intrusting to note that the country could not
gain the status of Islamic state, while it was declared an Islamic Republic. (54}
So the Constitution was riddled by two basic drawbacks : the ideology(Islamisation) and
authority (Centralisation), which plagued the whole process of Constitution-making. It is also true
that these complexities were historically and instinctively, clung with the nation's constitutional
fortunes. Moreover, too many battle lines had been drawn through the course of these events, and
those once established, they could not be erased. The leaders and their mad rush for power and
acquisition of wealth and their wrong perception of Islamic Republic state, had allowed the coun-
try 'to turn into a laughing stock'. The history of Islamic ideology used for authority and has often
been used to legitimate democracy and dictatorship. Kieth Callard writes that ' Islam has not
encourage systematic opposition, the vision of good government possessed by many Muslims
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-12

[was] that of a people united under a strong leader and confident in the possession of certain
truth.'{55} If Iskandar Mirza had made an honest effort to ensure the fair and impartial working of
the constitution, the constitution would not have been reduced to farce which marked the death knell
of democracy in Pakistan. He was solely based ruler, the state, constitution and religion were not
closer to his genius than to its worn-out clichés and inanities. His centralised mind thought that
politics means comings and goings of government. Which described by the commission Report that
"after the Constitution was passed , one would have expected the Prime Minister, who was successful
in piloting it, to be able to continue in office of sometime, but hardly six months passed when he
resigned. The next Prime Minister hardly remained in office for about a year. None of them went out
as result of an adverse vote in the legislature".!56}
Let us see the Islamic and authoritarian provisions of the constitution by which Pakistan was
declared a federal republic, "but its parliamentary system had allowed roles for a President and the
Vice President. Although the power of decisions was vested in the parliament and the Prime Minister
and his cabinet, The President was provided expanded powers and the central government was
strengthened to meet anticipated emergency. "{57}
The portion of the chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with Islamic Constitutional
development under the process which started since inception of the state.
Part II concentrate on the how and why the power of Presidential centripetal scheme intro-
duced in the Constitution of1956. The constitution provided federal structure, West minister style,
but vertical, in which state power flowed from mighty president down to the Prime Minister.

THE ISLAMIC PROVISIONS:

As stated before at the time of independence the government of India act was modified and the
Pakistan Provincial Constitution Order promulgated. In view of the 'ideological nature 1 of the new
state, how ever, the first step in the 'right direction 1 should have been to frame a constitution
according to Islamic injunctions; even six months after the creation of Pakistan no session of the leg-
islature was called. At this point Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam, the religious party which had supported the
Muslim League in its struggle for the Independence and Jamat-I-Islami declared their desires to press
upon the government to initiate an Islamic constitution (58) or at least, to declare that the constitu tion
would be made in accordance with Islamic injunctions. It was pressure of these ideological
movements that the government decided to introduce its 'Magna Carta’, usually known as the
"Objective Resolution". Though in the 'Resolution' there was no clear indication of laws of Islamic
face and that Shariah would be the basis of all future legislation in Pakistan. The Resolution was pre-
pared for Islamic guideline and a committee was formed in the Constituent Assembly to supervise
the provisions for the future constitutional development. With the chairmanship of Maulana Suleman
Nadvi, the Board of Talimat-ITslamia was also prepared but it was failed because their suggestion
was rejected by the Ulema and the political leadership of East Pakistan.
Seven years after the adoption of the Objective Resolution, Pakistan was acquired its first
Constitution on 23 March 1956. It changed the nomenclature of the state which made the state of
Pakistan an Islamic Republic. It was also declared in the Constitution that" Pakistan would be a
democratic state, based on Islamic principles........where in the Principles of democracy, freedom,
equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam would be fully observed".{59} to
appease the orthodox elements. The seven years before the constitution wasted by the religious-
political debates. The debates were between the Muslim secularists who wish to separate religion
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-13
from politics and Islamists who have interpreted that Islamic state must be based on the Quranic
principles. They also stressed that Shariah is as complete as a legal and moral system that no further
legislation is possible as Shaykh Eadlallah Nuri (1905-11) believed that " Islam does not have any
shortcomings that require completion." Perhaps this is the reason that in Muslim politics, Islam has
often been used to legitimate democracy and dictatorship, republicanism and monarchy." {60}
The Constitution of the country was the blend of spiritual and secular ideas and expression was
the echo of those heated debates which has been sparked in the constituent assembly, with
appropriate ingredients of traditional and Western looks. " "The Constitution had an Islamic facade
but the hard core was missing" {61} The draft started in the name of Allah and declared that ' the
sovereignty by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by him' was the most sacred trust.
It was followed by the saying of the founder of Pakistan as he asserted the country " would be a
democratic State based on Islamic principles of social justice". It was the part of Objective
Resolution, {62} Most of the clauses of the Objective Resolution have been successively repro duced
in the following constitutions: 'Draft Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan of 1954; The
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1956); The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1962 (as modified up to the 12th October, 1964) where God is declared to be sovereign and
law giver. After the recognition of God and his sacred trust and Islamic democratic principles, the
Constitution -declared the frame work of the Constituent Assembly wherein “the principles of
democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social Justice as enunciated by Islam, should be fully
observed". It was also mentioned in the preamble that the government ensure for the Muslims of
Pakistan in which they could secure and "order their lives in accordance with the teachings and
requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah". {63}
Though the Constitution and laws shall be enacted which would be brought into conform ity
with such Islamic injunctions yet there was no provision to make Islam the state religion in Pakistan.
It was stated that "adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice
their religions and develop their culture".{64}Secondly, the Islamic provisions were not enforceable
in the Law Courts as they were just like moral values to satisfy the cause of the creation of Pakistan.
Only the Directive Principles of State Policy {65} It was provided the foreign policy with the
Muslim world and steps, ” taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively to
order their lives in accordance to Holy Quran and Sunnah”, to promote unity and observance of
Islamic moral standard and to secure the proper orgnisation of Zakat and Awkaf {66} were
responsible to reaffirm the Islamic laws for the betterment of the society not the state. Thirdly, the
President was to be Muslim and the Speaker could be a non-Muslim. It was mentioned in the
Constitution that if the President vacate his office on his inability or any other cause, the Speaker of
the National Assembly was to act as President till a new President was elected "so on that occasions
the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan could be a non-Muslim". {67} Fourthly, the leaders
had neither the respect nor the importance for the adaptation of Islamic pro vision. The constitution
makers had secular presentation and they were uncomfortable when engineering the religious
experience in the document. Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza, members of autocratic
bureaucracy of British India, 'disliked both democracy and the influence of Islam in politics'. For this
they created 'quiet revolution' to delay the Islamic provisions. The President stated that “we cannot run
wild on Islam". {68} They delayed the Article 197 {69} as long as possible and "during the two years
that the constitution was in force hardly any steps were taken to enforce the Islamic provisions."{70}
G. W. Choudhry portrays the relations between the Islamic provisions and the Head of the State
in the following words:
“The country had a federal constitution but in practice it was ruled by a mighty centralised
government .Then there was fine and broad principles of Islam embodied in the Constitution but the
Head of the State had not the least regard for those principles. He seemed to have as little regard for
Islamic principles or ideology as for any kind of representative institutions the net result was
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-14
complete confusion and disillusionment among the people. The country's prestige abroad was at its
lowest and economic development was greatly hampered. Political bickering went on so far even to
the extent of riots inside a Provincial legislature resulting in the death of its Deputy Leader and
assault on the Speaker. It is with the background of all these unhappy development that the great
political changes of October 1958 took place.” (71}
Pakistan is an ideological state. It was complete result of struggle of its leaders and the fol-
lowers who grasped the phenomenon of history and nurtured the movement that the Muslim Ummah
as a separate cultural entity was confronted with grave danger. Though the economic and political
symbols were there but the Islamic symbols were more prominent which made people politically
potent. So the slogans of Islam were the necessity of bond the people who saw them selves in danger
in the United India. But it is also true that Islam has been used by several rulers to sustain legitimacy
or, to mobilise masses in support of particular options. For this option some of the rulers of Pakistan
usually result an alliance with religious establishments for their political sovereignty. This political
sovereignty (the political relations between God and man) came from the Objective Resolution and
then used it in the First constitution That "Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belong s to
God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its
people for being exercised within the limit prescribed by Him is a sacred trust” The inspiration came
from the Quranic verses ’ Blessed is He in Whose hand is Sovereignty, and He is Able to do all
things' (72} The sovereignty of the state of Pakistan thus become a derivative concept based on the
idea of delegation of authority from God to people. This 'fictitious concept has been used as a
legitimacy device by defecto rulers.' Though they were not inspired by the religious provisions in the
constitution yet they used it for their political supervisory. The single objective was to make the
people believe that the God-gifted President was a ’Good guy"'.(73}
The Islamic provisions which nurtured in the Constitution were mostly inspired by the 22
points issued by 31 Ulema. “These points are very apt and ideal representations of the dogmatic
theology” (74}
These points were firstly adopted by Objective Resolution and imposed on the future con -
stitutionalism. The body of Islam which was used for the unification of the people of the sub-con-
tinent was accepted only in the West ( Pakistan), but the Muslim League's section of East Pakistan
critcised that1 the repugnancy clause not to be enforceable in the Law Courts’. Mr. Suhrawardy, the
leader of the opposition called it an embarrassment by saying: "You are deluding the people here
calling this an Islamic State". (75}The country which tuned by Islamic slogans started to deny on the
implementation of that Islam and its ideology. Since the emergence of Pakistan, the whole country
engaged in deliberations and discussions for the Islamic role in the country. However, the dilemma
of Islamic modem state has not been resolved and even the first constitution did nothing to settle this
ideological issue. And if there were some Islamic provisions they were not accepted by the difference
section of the society. The people, who were confused about the settlement of the issue before the
Constitution-making, remained confused after the proclamation of the Constitution. Fatal Irbil in his
book Islamisation of Pakistan’ in a chapter ’Islamic Republic of Pakistan' quotes the lines of Justice
Munir about the ideological situation of helpless- ness in Pakistan:” The Musalman finds himself in a
state of helpl essness, waiting for some one to come and help him out of this morass of uncertainty
and confusion. Nothing but a bold reorientation of
Islam to separate the vital from the lifeless can preserve it as a World Idea and convert the man into a
citizen of the present and the future world from the archaic incongruity he is today It is this lack of
bold and clear thinking.........which has brought about in Pakistan a confusion which will persist
..............until our leaders have clear conception of the goal and of the means
to reach it”. {76}
Islam, which is the raison d’être for the creation of Pakistan, failed to construct a bridge to
fulfill the dichotomy between the temporal and spiritual sections. And for this reason the State have
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-15
not to play a positive part in this effort. The desire to see Islam bloom into a full fruition as a
religion, culture, social order and polity, untrammeled by the influence of that elite which groomed
and nurtured by the mixed predominance of Hinduism and British. Allama Iqbal stat ed that " Islam
has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and
groups and finally transform them into a well-defined people" {77}But it was failed in Pakistan not
by its own fault, it is fault of those leaders who had no clear thinking about the implementation of
Islam.
The Constitution which failed to construct ideal Islamic-democratic state was abrogated and
faced commission which precedes the promulgation of the Constitution of 1962. The Commission
attacked on the system of Parliamentary government which was far from satisfacto ry with out a
single general election in the country, that the parliamentarian without any sound responsibility
could not work in a free parliamentary system 'nor did they effectively settle the issue of the
separation of state and religion.’ Lawrance Ziring discuss the issue in this manner: ” While the
country was declared an Islamic republic and not an Islamic state, the Constitution’s blend of
spiritual and secular ideas and expression was sufficient to win the favor of the orthodox members of
the Muslim League, and no less significant, the chief religious parties, i.e., the Nizam-i-Islami and
Jamaat-i-Islami. In fact, the loudest voices of opposition came from the more secular Awami League
of East Pakistan and the smaller Hindu and leftist organisation in the both provinces." {78}
The Commission also analysed the apprehensions of the minorities and pointed out that "Islam
permeates the life of a Muslim and does not allow politics to be kept apart from ethics as is the case
in countries with secular conditions. The non-Muslims in Pakistan need have no fear on this account
as Islam gives them a guarantee of equality, freedom and justice, which is far more effective being a
matter of ideology, than mere declaration of secularity." {79} The Commission was doubted about
these principles which were the part of every modem state, but in the fifth para graph of the
Constitution the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance etc. coined for the Islamic
society by the words ”as enunciated by Islam". The Commission was pressured by the successive
take-over and could not understand the necessity of Islamic -quoted principles which were only to
satisfy the social conservatives. It was the blend or the 'soothing syrup of compromise' of spiritual
and secular ideas and expression which could win the favor of the more ortho dox members of the
Muslim League as well as the other chief religious parties. On the other side Liaqaut Ali Khan, when
he was introducing the Objective Resolution, described that "when we used the word democracy in
the Islamic sense, it pervades all aspects of life; it relates to our system of Government and to our
society with equal validity, because one of the greatest contributions of Islam has been the idea of
equality of all men". Although the society of the subcontinent
didn't experienced the democratic contribution of Islam yet they were united under the Caliphate,
empire and sultanates which were far from the democratic idea. The idea of a Muslim state, much
like the idea of nationalism, is an import from the West. The inclusion of the concept of the terri -
torial state into Muslim politics and the actual boundaries of Muslim states are both products of
colonialism. (Especially the White man's burden) {80}
It is also interesting to note that the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Pakistan are illit-
erate. At the time of independence, no one was quite sure 'what is the Islamic state, Islamic
Government, and the Islamic Constitution meant.' Their knowledge of Islam was what the Imam of
their mosque provided them in the village. They were not capable of explaining the principles of
democracy with the principles of Islam and Islamic history and "an average preacher carries on
following the line of least resistance by keeping on the good side of the powerful section". {81)
Being a tool of landed and industrial autocracy, the imam, failed to grapple with the relationship of
the present and future to the past. Now it is a critical question that how Muslim Ummah create
relationship of faith and tradition to change in a rapidly changing and pluralistic world? For the
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-16

Islamisation in Pakistan we need "some firsts-class minds who can interpret the old in terms of the
new as regards substance and turn the new into the service of the old as regards ideals " {82} with
the development of the intellectual level of the majority of minds who captured by the boun ty-based
Imam and personality-based.
• Though, in Pakistan the secularists who wish to separate religion from politics and Islamists
who implement the divine law reinterpreted their views yet" it is not surpris ing that the
Constitution Commission appointed by the President Ayub found that 96.6 per cent of the
people whose opinions it consulted through questionnaires or interviews were in favor of
adopting a preamble with Islamic provisions to the Constitution." {83} It means that the
great majority of influential people consisting of both the modernist and ulema were in
favor of such blend of spiritual and temporal preamble and the difference between the
ideological wings were with regard to the interpretation and enforcement of the preamble.
{84}On of the group, the ’absolutist' or 'doctrinal purist’ (like Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdidi
(1903-1979), founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami, who concluded that Islam is " the very
antithesis of secular Western democracy" and for this he used the term "Theo.-democracy.")
preached Theo.-democracy and silenced the popular sovereignty or restricted and directed
by God’s law. The modernists, inspired by the ’writings of Ameer Ali and Iqbal’ rejected
that idea that ’does not have any short comings that require completion' and argued about
the importance and necessity of Ijma (consensus) and Ijtihad (exercise of judgment) for the
legislation in an holy community. If the modernist were in favor of implementation of
Sunnah and Quran, but with the ’ijma’ and ’ijtihad’, they were finding better solution to
escape from the theocratic-state which is not the idea of their constitutionalist leader,
Jinnah. A. K. Brohi Stated that the Islamic provisions which used in the constitution seem
encouraging but a careful analysis reveals that they did not have that prominent place in this
constitution which they had in the second BPC report.

PRESIDENT
*
If some one talked about the state of Pakistan. It is a failed state. After its emergence in 1947,
most of the representatives of the Constituent assembly were busy in heated debates like Islam, state
and secularism. They were busy to find the meaning of their leaders sayings. "There was hardly any
debate over the system of government" {85} perhaps the biggest fault was with our leader’s
perception of democratic, and government. The system, as has been enriched in the

constitution, essentially aimed to govern the collective wisdom of the people of United India. It was
not designed to split into independent state. We worked under the Indian Act 1935 until a new
Constitution was framed. The act provided for a parliamentary form of government both at the centre
and in the provinces, recommended in the constitutional drafts of 1951, 1952, 1953 and it was
introduced in the country's first constitution of 1956. (86). Though we adopted the British
parliamentary system but made it unsatisfactory by the introduction of centralised President’s
powers.
The constitution replaced the governor-general by an indirectly elected President who secured
the governor-general’s Emergency Powers, was the most powerful figure in which the pure White
hall system of Parliamentarians (87}.
Under the 1956 Constitution, the President was the authoritative executive of the federa tion,
therefore all executive actions of the Federal Government were to be taken and expressed in the
name of the President and elected by the members of both the National Assembly and provincial
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-17
legislatures with majority votes. (88} The person who wanted to become the President of Pakistan
should be a Muslim citizen of not less than forty years of age, and qualified to be a member of the
National Assembly, having the tenure of 5 years and like American President could not right to be a
President for more than two years. Under the practice and tradition of the parlia mentary government,
the President was supposed to be a mere superior man, the representative of the centre, was vested
with substantial discretionary powers which allowed him to involve in political activities. The extra-
ordinary power of the President was the ready-made valve for the emergency order, and instrumental
in the making and unmaking of ministries and would often influence the prime ministers to induct or
drop particular individuals to an from their cabinets. Such as abominable practice was the prevalent
in all the era of Iskandar Mirza. and his followers. Although, the relation of the President to the
Cabinet and both to Parliament has to be understood, not merely by looking at the words of the
Constitution, but also by scrutinizing the relationship of the precursors of those authorities before
March 1956." {89}
Though there was a check of President that he also could be removed through impeachment for
gross misconduct or violation of the Constitution yet it was not happened due to 'the intrigue- ridden
game of formation and dismissal of ministries, manipulated party position, tried every permutation
and combination to create situation under which'(90} no one can gathered the signatures one third
members of the National Assembly with in the 14 days. If the office of the President fell vacant, the
Speaker of the National Assembly was to act as President till a new President was elected by the
constitutional provisions.
The President’s most important function was to appoint Prime Minister who commanded the
support of majority in the National Assembly. Not only the Prime Minister, but in his discretion he
can appoint the Governors of the Provinces. (91 }Judges of the Supreme Court, Auditor- General,
and the Advocate-General. He was the Supreme Commander of the three forces and being this power
he can appoint Commander-in-Chief of the forces and was to raise and maintain the Military, Naval
and Air Forces of Pakistan and grant commission in such forces. (92}
The President could summon, prorogue, and dissolve the National Assembly. (93} When a bill
was passed by a National Assembly, the President within 90 days was to either (a) Oassent to that
bill (b) with hold his assent or to return the bill to the National Assembly with the request that the bill
may be reconsidered, (94} but if the Assembly again passed the bill with or without amendment by
two thirds of the members of the Assembly present and voting, the President was required to assent
the bill. (95} It is the matter of truth that the President ship is a specialist area, requiring the services
of well-read and well-bred gentile man, schooled in the art of integrity and wisdom, and not
comprehended by the player of intrigue-ridden game, who solve the problems of political
-constitutional development but in the period of 1956-1958 presented in Pakistan was a picture of
growing political instability. The governments at the centre as well as in the provinces were changed
overnight. The people had lost their faith in the political leadership as well as the constitution of the
country. However it was not the fault of the document, but the powers which provided to the
President was wrongly cashed by the man. The President was busy in fighting his palatial battles had
no time to give attention to the constitutional emotions and economic problems which included slow
industrial production, lack of development in agriculture, inflation, unemployment and political
uncertainties.
The most powerful section which gifted by the Constitution that the President could issue a
proclamation of emergency if he was sure that the country's integrity was at stake ' due to an inter nal,
economic, or external threats' {96} The proclamation of emergency plagued the entire histo ry of
Pakistan. The position gained momentum under the constitutions from 1935 to 1973 with its
amendments to Article. 46. The history personal necessity like the aphorism of British prime min ister
William Pitt, 'that necessity is the argument of tyrants, it is creed of slaves.'
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (1956-1958) 4-18
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-1

Chapter —5

AYUB KHAN POLITICAL

CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-
1969
(The story of constitutional megalomania)

• The tyrannical ruler is well-versed in power

Builds about him a fortress made up of edicts;
While falcon, sharp of claw and swift to seize,
He takes for his counselor the silly sparrow
Giving to tyranny its constitution and law,
A sightless man giving collyrium to the blind.
What results from the laws and constitution of kings?
Fat lords of the manor, peasants lean as spindles!
( Mohammed Iqbal, " Divine Government" The Sphere of Mercury, Javaid-Nama)

• He would wreck the Constitution by using the Constitution. He would

use the legally elected President, the man who had taken oath on the
Koran to protect and defend the Constitution, Iskandar Mirza, to
destroy the Constitution— and then he would destroy Iskandar
Mirza...
(Venkataramani, American Role, p. 297.)

We have already seen that the Muslim political leadership of 1947 with the ’exception' of
Jinnah was largely composed of loyalist men who were essentially British toadies. The Muslim
League in addition had no socio-economic program and thus soon disintegrated. Men, who ruled
Pakistan from 1951 onwards had limited politico-constitutional perceptions, thought that
Pakistan could survive politically if it toed the US line in foreign policy. It is an unfortunate fact
of the bandaged history of Pakistan that a country's political leaders have no ideology except
opportunism i.e. no program which identifies them with the popular will, they look out-ward
and seek unnatural protection in the cradle of foreign masters. This is the Pakistan's tragedy that
before partition the Muslim leaders whose life's prime aim was to please the British Viceroy or
Deputy Commissioner, they became the Presidents and the generals after the partition. After
independence, in the same vein these men thought that now they must please the US in the most
disgraceful manner and secure themselves.
We have already seen that the Pakistani politics of 1947-58 revolve largely around the
destruction of democracy, political institutions and the constitution by the civil-military elite,
partly in political romance with some collaborated politicians. In one respect, the Pakistani
politics of this destroyed period represent a transformation from emphasis on ideological themes
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-2

to class and ethnic themes which tuned in due the un-elected men succeeded in sidelining
elected men from the political marathon. {1}Considering the chequered history of the system of
constitutional governance in Pakistan, the self-elevation of the heads to the pedestal of President
came as no surprise.
The chequered history, however, created parliamentary institutions and the constitution of
1956, also transformed the ideological bond to class and ethnic themes. It was manipulated of
the assembly members of the West wing hierarchy. The Constitutional abrogation was installed
with so- called parliamentary institutions under 'which as many as four ministries ’tried in vain
to reassert political domination over the increasingly martial policy, 1 under 'the pawns on
Mirza’s chess board’. The era of president under the 1956 was the era of conceit and inertia
replaced humility and dynamism. The vice regal or authoritarian traditions provided a
centralised, hierarchical apparatus to ensure presidential authority as it helped viceroy, and then
governor-general. The new era started on 7 October 1958, when President Mirza wrote to his
last pawn of his chessboard:
"After very careful searching of my heart I have come to the conclusion that the country
cannot be sound unless I take full responsibility" and " By the time you get this letter Martial
Law will come into operation and General Ayub, whom I have appointed as the Chief Martial
Law Administration, will be in position."{2}"The 1956 Constitution was thus unceremoniously
added to Pakistan's growing constitutional scrap heap". {3}.
The so-called Parliamentary institutions, 'or more accurately the parody of them’, were
brought to 2end on October 1958 when both Iskandar Mirza and Ayub Khan eulogized 'right
law' in the country by abrogating the 1956 constitution. The assemblies, cabinets and the
fundamental rights of the citizens were suspended. The country began to be booked by a 'tight
rule' under martial law cliques and regulations. Mira, having no respect for the constitution and
constitutionalism, ’blaming everybody except himself, issued a proclamation to the following
effect:
• “The constitution of 23 March 1956 was abrogated;
• The National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved;
• All the political parties were abolished;
• Federal and provincial governments were dismissed forthwith;
• Until alternative arrangements were made, Pakistan would come under Martial Law,
General Ayub Khan being the Chief Martial Law Administrator, with all the armed forces
placed under him.
• The Constitution (abrogated) was seriously threatened, claimed Mirza, ’ by the
ruthlessness of traitors and political adventurers. The Constitution is so full of dangerous
compromises that Pakistan will disintegrate internally if the inherent malaise is not
removed ... my intention [is] to devise a Constitution more suitable to the genius of the
Muslim people. When it is ready, and at the appropriate time, it will be submitted to a
referendum’;
• Finally, in Mirza’s ’appraisal’, the vast majority of Pakistani people 1 no longer has any
confidence in the present system of government'."{4}.

Ayub Khan, the most important man of the 'two-man regime' and an expert in power and
intrigues, also hated the politicians, believed that necessity had forced him to retreat from a 1951
admonition to his troops that they should stay out of politics. He was a dictator, but his method
was neither vindictive nor bitter. Unlike other Army officers in so many other countries, he was
neither vengeful nor mean-spirited."{5} He 'allying himself with President Mirza and his charges
against politicians' broadcasted to say:
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-3

” There has been no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation.
Having nothing constructive to offer they use provincial feelings and sectarian, religious, and
racial differences to set Pakistani against Pakistani. The Country and people could go to the dogs
as far as they were concerned". {6}
Ayub Khan was not a new7 man in Pakistani politics. He was the old member of that
military- bureaucratic oligarchy which inherited by the colonial structure and fixed as a ready-
made valve in a newly born country. " The coup d’état had been preceded by the phase of
military-bureaucratic dominance that can be traced to as early as 1951 when the first prime
minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated." {7} The fact can also be traced by the
weaknesses of internal political structure, which was weak as water to assume the dominance of
the civil bureaucracy and the army. Even since January 1951, when Ayub took over as the first
Commander in Chief of the Pakistani army, he had closely associated with the political situation
of the country. Though the 'ultimate aim' of the martial law to restore democracy' yet this 'two-
man regime' was the destination of that bureaucratic -military dominance, which had dominated
Pakistan since the death of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder, and of Liaquat
Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister. The land lords, the businessmen, the industrialists and the
other elitist classes were the right hand of this political romance. They were all belonging from
the provinces which later to become West Pakistan. Hamza Alavi defines the manipulated
situation in his blunt way:
" The bureaucratic- military oligarchy ... has been in effective control of state power not,
as is commonly believed, after the coup d’état of October 1958 but, in fact, from the inception of
the new state. In the first phase, politicians and political parties, who provided a facade of
parliamentary government, were manipulated by them and were installed and expelled from
office as it suited the bureaucratic-military oligarchy. When in 1958 the prospects of the
impending general elections appeared to pose a challenge to the supremacy of the oligarchy,
those who already held the reins 'seized power' by abolishing the institution of parliamentary
government through which the challenge was being mounted."!8}The lesson was achieved by
the decade (1954-1958) of independence in which the unstable coalition politics staged in
muddle way and brought about the military coup d’état. As an active partner of Martial Law, the
General, later to be named the CMLA enlisted the support of the civil bureaucracy when he
dismissed Iskandar Mirza. The civil elite, which had not relinquish power since the death of
Jinnah and captured the country by its power-ridden politics, felt the power pressure of the army
who occupied first position as CMLA. " This act marked the transformation of the bureaucratic
state system into a military regime in which the bureaucrats came to play a subservient rather
than a dominant role."{9).
Though, in Pakistan, many declarations of principles were delivered for high purposes yet
it was power that generated the political actions of Pakistan's politicians, which conceived by the
steel cage of colonial administration. In the matters of transfer of powers, Muslim League was
the sole administrative shoulder that put the responsibility and even after partition it was Muslim
League that took responsibility of the Pakistan government. But with the passage of time some
internally sick differences between the leaders, it collapsed and its power 'gravitated to the
country's higher civil- military leaders took what they believed was the necessary initiative.' and
gave the obvious weaknesses in the political process.
The loss of the country’s most important leaders and the party, the power trapped to others
less informed about national purpose. "Provincialism, not nationalism galvanised these political
successors, and the more they narrowed the range of their opportunities, the more they exposed
themselves
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-J 969 5-4

to competitive expressions that were even more limiting and hence more divisive." (10}
The political weaknesses has been politicised and emasculated by civil-military supervision,
"believing that their professional calling imposed on them emergency responsibilities, and
observing the changed and threatening character of the political experience, concluded that their
only option was the seizure 0f the government" {11} The politicians which should be the
backbone of the country have never really wielded sufficient power to address the country's will;
they have always had to compromise with the army. However, while the country's career
oligarchy sensed that they could repair the political, constitutional, racial and economic damages
for the better relations with modem world? Although they could not make a bridge the ’nation’s
different regions and expressions’ yet to work for its own healthy economy to secure its own
position and expressions. They "concluded that the future of the republic was bound up in their
capacity to reconcile, if not satisfy, the demands of the different publics." {12}.
A new administrative change created when he career bureaucrat gave up the republic to
the career general who nurtured caged environment, jalousie with political institutions and
constitutional growth for his personal his authority. He ignored people forces and built his power
castle on the walls of Big business, Bureaucracy and the Basic Democrats, all anti-people forces.
The role which can seen after more than 50 years after independence, "the only new dimension
in Pakistan's politics is the military expended presence. The country remained divided along
provincial lines. A cynic would conclude that the nation had at least survived the formative
years."{13}
Basically, 'an infant nation whose cognition was rebirth, 11 inheritantly burdened by the
regimes who t2ook the country into custody. The menu of their administrative dishes, prisoned
by their liking and dis-liking which fired up by the articulate successors in the shape of generals,
bureaucrats, judiciary and politicians. The lament of these Four Comers was that politicians did
not realise the catasthropic of the situation and continued to play in the hands of establishment
for their regional antagonism that failed them to take back the charge and eroded their credibility
in the eyes of people.
Over-dependence on the military and regional little political desires signaled the effect that
they could not produce any national leader after the demise of Jinnah and sooner resulted the
military take over, and change in the form of governance with out a constitution, even before she
had reached her teenage. Ghulam Mohammed and Iskandar Mirza introduced morbid element in
the society. Politicians became a commodity; parliaments had no discussion on the social and
political context. Thus, the army argued that it was their responsibility to manage the nation, and
general Ayub Khan led the military government with an aim of discovering 'modernised'
political and economical horizons.
October 7, 1958 was a day of jubilation for many Pakistanis and a day of mourning for
many others because ’resistance to usurpers is neither of our culture nor in accordance with the
best traditions of our society'. However, by and large, martial law was hailed by the general
public and General Ayub was acclaimed as a savior who had come to liberate the people from
the incompetent and corrupt politicians who grew power by the hidden hands of intrigues-ridden
politics. A massive propaganda campaign was unleashed against politicians, and to be called a
politician became something of a dirty word. Beside politics, democracy also became something
that was thoroughly discredited and all the ills and abuses of the previous 11 years were blamed
on democracy, of course, with out taking into account that there had never been any general
elections and consequently no democracy. Ayub Khan and his colleagues wanted to reshape this
situation 'in order to ensure much needed political stability' and there ’second objective must be
the security and stability of Pakistan'. {14}.
Ayub was eulogized as an" Asian or Muslim De Gaulle", {15} that is, a military leader
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-5

who could also be a statesman with vision.’ By this jubilation of puppets and the hero-worshiped
masses he also

felt that 'he has all the solutions and he is in a position to tell what is right for the
'illiterate masses'. For intense, he had prepared a working paper on the outlines of his
'solution' to Pakistan's problems as far back as October 1954 before he launched his coup
in October 1958. His right man, Altaf Ghouhar, explained his solution for which he started
calling his coup a "Revolution". Altaf recalled:

Ayub introduced a range of reforms in the hope that the benefits flowing from these
reforms would reach the people and they would come to recognise the merits of the system of
his government. Some of the reforms never got off the ground; others like the land reforms, lost
their purpose in the course of implementation. Still...' f 16}.

1. The decade of 1958-1969 has been the most event full period of Pakistan's history. The
impact of military rule during these years has been deep, decisive and long lasting and the
outstanding feature of this period has been military hegemony, political decay and
economic development. The military hegemony has emerged as the most dominant and
durable characteristic of Pakistan’s political system. {17}.

General Ayub convinced himself and tried to convince the people that democracy was not
suited to the 'genius' of the people of Pakistan. His solution to that was the 'Basic Democracies',
which ostensibly sought to introduce democracy at the grass root level but was actually another
name for the local bodies system which is prevalent in all the democratic countries. The only
difference was that these so-called Basic Democrats, who were the local councilors, were
considered to be the representatives of the people and only they were considered competent to
vote for the members of the national and provincial assemblies as well as for the President. Thus
Ayub Khan successfully disfranchised the people and gave the voting power in the hands of only
80,000 Basic Democrats. Ayub stated that "this type of democracy will not be forced upon the
people from above. Instead, it will work from below, gradually going to the top and that the
council so formed will be free from the curse of party intrigues, political pressures and the sub-
thumping politicians that characterised the assemblies in our country in the past." and " It was
basic in so far as the whole structure was to be built from the ground upwards," Ayub wrote, and
it was democratic in the sense that the affairs of the country were to be entrusted to the people
within a constitutional framework."! 18}. The first task given to the Basic Democrats after their
election in 1960 was to vote in a majority in his favor and thus he became the first 'elected'
President of Pakistan.
The country's political elite can maintain.”! 19} But the failure of the 1956 constitution,
which failed to run the State under Constitutional supervision, provided him a way to strengthen
his grip over the country and that it was based on compromises which generated political
instability. The constitution was based on political compromises due to the realities of
geopolitical condition of the country. {20} But in Pakistan the compromises were not for the
constitutional supremacy, it was for self-aggrandisement, and above all, the frequent
intervention by the presidential dissentions 'to save the nation from within', have given birth to
constitutional adhocism and ascendancy of military- bureaucracy romance to power. "Although
the constitution was publicised as Islamic in character, Ayub questioned that assertion, and saw
even greater problems when the political system is legitimised and failed to live up to the
expectations of the more fundamentalist among the Muslims. The new political system, in his
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-6

judgment, was a shadow-image of the one that preceded it. The parent system had failed
repeatedly, and nothing had changed to even hint a constitutionally endowed parliamentary
order would be any more successful than the one put into operation with independence." {21 }Khalid
Bin Sayeed has different opinion when he remarked:' Now that Pakistan had produced a
constitution, one could see that the basic weaknesses of its political system was not the lack

of a constitution but the absence of national political parties without which no democratic system
could function.' One can identify that the ineffectiveness of the constitution, political pickets like
parties, corrupt politicians were the factors, which generated 'total administrative, economic,
political and moral chaos in the country' and gave a lush pavement for civil-military hegemony to
engineer the country's 'constitutional democracy.'
This was that politico-constitutional gaps and chaos for which the masses were clapping.
Although, the despotism of this kind was a ’joint responsibility’ of Iskandar Mirza and Ayub
Khan hut it take a dramatic turn when Mirza was forced at 'gun-point to step aside and hand over
all powers' to General Ayub Khan who was the Prime Minister of his announced new Cabinet of
24 October 1958. This thirst of arbitrary power could be checked, as had happened in the
civilised nations, by political mechanisms but it was believed by the nation that the despot was
the man of destiny and they rejected the politicians, parties and parliamentary government for all
times to come. And their political destiny was calling them "distruptioners, political opportunists,
smugglers, black marketers, and other such social vermin, sharks and leeches." {22} The image,
which was created by the despot, inspired the masses that were betrayed by their Prime ministers
governor-generals and the president. In order to inspire the people, "it was relatively easy for the
general to pick the targets one by one and with the complete power that he had, he could shoot
them with deadly accuracy." {23}
The friends of old days of dine and wine overcome the country with ’joint responsibility'
but it was easy to understand by Mirza 'that the division of power and responsibility between two
different persons was an obvious paradox and that he could not enjoy the monopoly of power
while the responsibility for the administration lay with the army’. {24}. Mirza’s bureaucratic
domination was also collapsed when the Supreme Court's verdict in Dosso's case on 27 October
1958, legitimising ' successful revolution' and Ayub and his military coterie seizure of power to
get of' the semblance of dual-control' by defusing Mirza. {25} 'It was Ayub's second 'revolution'
in three weeks.' Ayub was superior than Mirza because he "commanded the army, after all;
Mirza was only a lame duck president, with no government, not even a nominal cabinet, to turn
to any longer moral support." and he "proved more much durable than his partner ’in the
revolution.’ {26}
The political and constitutional scenario of Pakistan was riddled by the rules of game,
which were long in place when Pakistan became a free nation. The political movement that
created the independence of the country only 'marginally absorbed' the different nationalities but
after the independence the order was plagued by those who only commit themselves to a
temporary understanding. This political understanding largely based on personal rather than the
collective aspirations. The personal whims rather than collective, were the cause of "opportunism
that was so embedded in Pakistani political culture was a feature of a history that predated the
state" {27} and the ruling elite informally developed a doctrine: personally first, collectively
later. After long years of ’survival', Pakistan comes out as a delinquent state, which separated
from its neighbor only to end up destroying the constitutional tradition, developed during the
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-7

previous century under the British rule. The military and its corporate interests are considered to
be the motivating force behind all efforts to take Pakistan away from political, constitutional
democracy. 'One tries to correct the impression by arguing that apart from army, there is a
sizable middle class section of population- including the bureaucracy, professionals and business
men- which similarly dislikes the politicians and their dirty politics'. It is true that 'the politicians
were not politically honest with the people, and the constitution was beyond the capacity of the
nation to successfully manage.' At the centre and in the West Pakistan, a political party, Republic
Party, was in power and manipulated the then constitution (1956). In East Pakistan, two political
parties, the Awamy League and Krishak sramik party {28} were not the parties of national level
but to involve bickering and squabbling. The economic and financial conditions were alarming
and flourishing. Ayub, while declaring martial law and thought that he could be replaced the
constitution and substitute the politicians who lacked to cover the responsibility of survival of the
nation.
Ayub who was against the parliamentary politics and convinced that this type of politics
have not suited with the political set-up and the nature of the country, and ’showing confidence
only in the Pakistan Armed Forces’, {29} issued a proclamation, worded as follow:
"Major General Iskandar Mirza, lately President of Pakistan, has relinquished his office of
President and has handed over all powers to me, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Chief Martial
Law Administrator and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan. Therefore, I
have this night assumed the office of Pakistan and have taken upon myself the exercise of the
said powers and all other powers pertaining thereto. "{30}.
Despite the tussle between two opposite poles, the politicians and the civil-military
romance, the slave nation has enormous advantages. Being so politically and economically
backward, "it can do more with less; and its weaknesses became the master's strength who
wanted to become the mid-get and superman, with his self-deceptive attitude. {31} Therefore,
the military intervention was a solution against the crises of parliamentary democracy and it
opened the way of right of army to intervene the process. Though the Ayub era was widely
heralded by his military coterie and the masses, but the impact on the domestic regional order
and the centre was not right. A power tussle at the Centre between the authoritarian general/
president and regional politicians weakened the national bond.
Having achieved his long-cherished ambition of becoming the sole arbitrator of national
affairs, Ayub Khan introduced two disqualification order, PRODA (Public and Representative
Offices (Disqualification) Act), PODO (Disqualification Order) and EBDO (Elective Bodies
(Disqualification) Order. {32} The politicians, and who belong to the Civil Service of Pakistan
’tamed' by the 'term misconduct widely enough to include subversive activities, jobbery and
corruption.' It was relatively easy for him to target one by one and day by day by the weapons
like PRODA, PODO, and EBDO. Ayub was the first ruler of Pakistan who ’reaffirmed the
policy that the strong may do whatever they wish, regardless of the will of others.' Conceived
with high authority, belted by the power of EBDO, manipulated the masses for authoritarian
motives, Ayub portrayed himself an economic reformist with his managers rather than
administrative activist. But the entire nation was slave by the single operating, independent
dictator ship. He has never done anything 'useful.' No discovery of political and economic
reforms has made, or was likely to make, directly or indirectly, for good political process. He
judged the nation's destiny by all his personal standards. Although Ayub began his martial law
regime with wide support in the country, even in East Pakistan. The frustrated people with the
working of country's parliamentarians celebrated him with clapping and 'was regarded as the last
hope for a united Pakistan'. His innovative idea of Basic Democracy was cheered by many,
"including the historian Arnold Toynbee, as a 'plausible alternative between democratic and
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-8

communist system'."{33}But he lost this opportunity because he was not a man of people and
with heavy- handed approach to problems, he bore an intense prejudice against East Pakistan. In
his time the political, constitutional, linguistic, and ethnic links between East and West Pakistan
were critically weakened. On the surface it was stable and quite, but a deep and dangerous
decomposition was taking place and the latter part of this period that quite militant Bengali
nationalism began to show its blunt face. The political and constitutional dead lock that has been
occurred in the early days of Pakistan between East and West Pakistan, Ayub era widened the
gap. Economically, it widened due his economic policy and politically and 'more importantly', it
occurred due to his political system under his self-decep- tive constitution which deprived the Bengalis
in all constitutional, political opportunities by which they could participate in the "decision making
process on vital socio-economic as well as political matters." {34} The total exclusion of Bengalis
from defense, foreign affairs or economic policy which were 'decided at the Presidential House
with the help of inner cabinet composed of the civil and military officials, all from West
Pakistan’, reacted them,
Ayub era was collapsed due to the different political and constitutional flaws. When he
came to power in October 1958 the condition was totally intolerable and when Ayub had to quit,
the condition was no less tolerable. The 52% population was living in East Pakistan, which was
used to tackle as third grade people by the leaders and bureaucracy of inner cabinet of West
Pakistan. These economic, political, and constitutional differences were cashed by the nationalist
leaders of East Pakistan who were sloganeering to liberate the wing in the last days of Sandhurst
general. The movement against Ayub was the restoration of democracy, which was rejected by
him, and this political awakening was against its 'one man’s' constitution, which provided
indirect method of election and all- powerful presidential system. As already stated, a country’s
constitution is fundamentally a regulatory interface between the people and their governments,
ensuring good and stable political system. If the constitution was failed to provide good political
system, the country may indulge in a social or political tension and civil war within the state. On
the other hand a good political system is expected to perform a constitutional government. But in
Pakistan, the political system and the constitutional government have always been ruled by self-
interests; such is the ' nature of men clothed with power'. In the policies of Ayub regime, many
'men clothed in power' had made a substantial and critical contribution towards Pakistan's
political integration and due to this political disintegration, the constitutional politics represented
a coercive, ethnic-based confrontation with the power bloc. Though, there were economical
imbalances in the East wing but the 'Bengali struggle was essentially political’ against the
centralised constitution in which ’their share in the central government, the citadel of power, was
negligible.'{35} And on the other hand Ayub's political structure, "far from rec tifying ethnic
imbalances, and maintained the supremacy of the Punjabi-mahajjir elite, to be described as an
inferior breed was not the kind of privilege Bengalis had in mind when they had opted for
Pakistan in 1947." {36} The unstable political system of the early days of Pakistan cleared the
way for army to draft to centralise constitution and the vice versa.
The mater was not happened only in East Pakistan, it caused also in West Pakistan where
resentment was occurred against the one unit and forced centralisation. It was happened in rural
Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan {37} and even in the ’army's heartland’, Punjab. Mr. Z. A.
Bhutto, a man behind the Ayub's constitutional autocratic structure, gained support against the
exploitation and domination of Ayub's centralised constitutional politics and demanding
provincial autonomy from the government which considered as ’ a treasonous act' and that its
callers ’ would be identified, hunted, crushed and destroyed.’{38} It was the reaction against 'the
cold-blooded exploitation of the people' which made the country like a patient whom is ’in the
last stages of tuberculosis'. {39} Bhutto started his career with Iskandar Mirza and 'stood by
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-9

President Mirza throughout his long exile’. After Mirza, as he characterised him as " a
gentleman who knew nothing about politics. He thought that by small gestures, pranks and tricks
he could run the ship of State" {40} started his career on very cordial terms with Ayub and ’ the
eight -year political apprenticeship under Ayub Khan gave him his first taste of power and
experience in handling public affairs.’ and also he ’helped Ayub in many ways’ like 'prepare the
ground for writing a national constitution, and holding elections of some sort to muster at least
some pretext of popular support for the " Revolution.'

Constitutional Politics
Field Martial Mohammad Ayub Khan was a politically ambitious man. Even while he was
C- in-C of the Pakistan Army, he was the most powerful man in the governments of both
Ghulam
Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza. When he thought that he had come, he clamped martial law and
with in 20 days deposed Iskandar Mirza and became the president.
Ayub was the first Pakistani ruler to introduce "elected" dictatorship in the country and for
the protection of that ’elected’ dictatorship he rushed to crown the constitution, after his " Basic
fascism", (41} Bhutto denounces Basic Democracies as "Basic Fascism".) It was his effort to
"how best to manage Pakistan’s transition from autocratic military rule to democratic
government with at least some patina of popular political support. "{42} Ayub denounced it as "
it was basic in so for a the whole structure was to be built from the ground upwards" and " it was
democratic in the sense that the affairs of the country were to entrusted to the people with in a
constitutional frame work. "{43} Hereafter cited as Ayub's Autobiography. "Basic Democracies
was a political and administrative experiment, but it also was a foray into grassroots economic
reform and social change" {44} Which started at the village level in the rural areas and at the
Mohalla level in towns, using the deep-rooted political ladder. One can denounced that Basic
Democracies should be more remembered for its constructive or destructive impact because it
was progressive for its administrative structure and in some ways it represented to primitive or
'throwback to the colonial period.’
The 1962 Constitution used for the end of martial law and broadcast for the period of revi -
talised political activity. Although, in the modem era, a Constitution is required to set limits on
the arbitrary powers of levers of the state, to ensure the fundamental rights of the governed, yet,
in Pakistan, it was used only for 'moral' and legal justification and described as general’s
dictatorial and self-deceptive behavior. The constitution could-not changed Ayubian's self-
serving, ever-soaring, un-satiated penchant to grab all power within his own hands, which prove
extremely disastrous to the regime, the functioning of the political institutions and political
system, the relations between the two wings at almost all levels, and, above all, to the country
itself. There were politicians, all close to generals, who were also called the like-minded group of
their respective party, who allowed general to implement t his plethora of ideas.
Chapter— 6
BANGLADESH: CLASH OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
POLITICAL DISPARITY (1947-1971)
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-10

• 'Once we had a Country. Do you remember? And we have lost it.’

— 'Jorge Luis Borges'

• ‘Whether through Bengali ineffectiveness or the Machiavellian wiles

of their opponents, Bengali influence had never been decisive.
Nazimuddin had been governor-general, but the real power lay with
Liaquat AH Khan, Nazimuddin became Prime Minister, but lacked
force of will, and was ultimately dismissed by the [Punjabi]
Governor- General. Mohammed Ali [Bogra] was brought in as
Prime Minister but, though a Bengali, he remained the captive of the
West Pakistan group that provided the main strength of his
government. The Bengali members attempted to use their majority to
diminish the powers of the governor-general, but as a result they
found themselves out of their own jobs. The electorate of East
Bengal had repudiated the Muslim League, but the outcome was the
rule for more than a year by West Pakistan bureaucrats. The armed
forces were West Pakistani, the national civil service was
predominantly West Pakistani, and trade and industry were largely
in the hands of non-Bengalis...’
Kieth B. Ka.lla.rd, Pakistan: A Political Study, 172

David Hume, a Scottish Philosopher considered the first principles of Government, he

found that" to see the easiness with which the many are governed by few, and to implicit
submission with which men resigns their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers.
When we inquire by what means this wonder is brought about, we shall find, that as Force is
always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. 'Tis
therefore, on opinion only the government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most
despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular." {1} In
Pakistan 'the many are governed by few' is the starting phenomenon where several governments
with their different experiments came to exist

and injected new, complicated problems which burdened its history. The evolution of the
country has been due to the struggle of political and constitutional means against the well-
entrenched forces of the colonial state. Jinnah, the father of the nation, had given to his nation a
country. 'Though achieved strictly on the basis of the constitutional and democratic process of
the transfer of power, Pakistan, within a few years of its emergence, was placed completely in
the hands of a 'be-all and end-all’ bureaucratic clique which readily dispensed with constitutional
democracy altogether' {2} which created political paralised situation. The crises of governance
of united Pakistan beginning with the dismissal of Bengali Nazim-ud-Din as Prime Minister in
1953 and ended by the creation of Bangladesh.
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-11

The use of strong executive orders, long phases of martial law, authoritarianism and
frequent conflict between the centre and regional groups gave a way to the further partition of the
country which were' not yet nations in being but only nations in hope’. {3}
When Pakistan was created, from the very beginning, there have been many different
interpretations of major aspects of the country's political history, even of the reasons for its
creation. It was initially divided into two large chunks which were separated by a thousands
miles of Indian territory and no one was ready to solve this historical aberration or the result of a
unjust boundary commission. A wing came into being by its geographical proximity with its
country and cultural affinity with its enemy. Quaid-e-Azam was aware of the geographical
separation of the two wings, and he diagnosed it by the description of unity based on Islam. In
February, 1948 he stated about the problem "... How can there be unity of Government between
areas so widely separated. I can answer this question in one word. It is faith.... Faith in Almighty
God, in ourselves, and in our destiny". {4} The geographical factor of which ’the territory
separating them belonged to a hostile neighbor, India ’could pose a grave threat to the integrity
of the country.’ "Realizing this danger and knowing ’geographical absurdity’, Jinnah had
demanded a ’corridor1 across India, but it was not considered feasible by the British.” {5} After
post-independence it was prone to complain that ’the body politics of United Pakistan was
contaminated with many political ills.1 Some of the parasites were inherited in the very structure
of the state, which generally related to its geographical mandate. Some were waiting for their
turn. The parasite-ridden society is not the syrup of health for "the Sick Man of Asia.” {6}.
Pakistan’s political history has been chequered one and ’has experienced to an intense
degree of all the” crises of political development" that were identified as the crises of identity,
legitimacy, integration, penetration, participation and distribution.’{7}’The crises are Woven
into the texture of its history, its concepts of itself and its sense of political possibility' {8}
Although the old-timers argued that it is remarkable resilient and it some how manages to
survive, despite the crises. It is also true that in Pakistan several ideological reshuffled
experiments were used in the name of Allah and federal democracy. However, the dilemma of
nation -building and united castle has not been resolved and the country saw its second partition
in 1971. The reasons for this failure to live with weaknesses are to be found mainly in the
country's inherited internal administrative system and it is also an irony that having strong
’viceregal system' 'all the crises that have afflicted Pakistan's politics, that of legitimacy is the
most inclusive and far-reaching.” Although the country's elitist always tried to develop legitima-
cy. 'Indeed, it has been sought by non-representative regimes through a politics of co-option with
inter mediates and dependence on an ideological rationale’
We can also reconsidered the Professor Ralph Braibanti’s judgment that " no other new
nation which gained independence after 1947 has experienced the variety or the intensity of trau -
mas that Pakistan has suffered'' and "No other state has rearranged the crucial relationship of
space, power, and culture four times—-from five provinces to two.... Then again to five
provinces and, with the secession of East Pakistan, to four provinces."{9} It is also stated that
the country 1

retains the unenviable distinction of being the only country in the post-colonial world to have
experienced a successful secessionist movement.'{10}Pakistan has been a classic example of
Third World political instability and chaos, so much so that leading scholars have chosen to
name their books on the country as The Enigma of Political Development (Ziring), From Crises
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-12

to Crises (Feldmen) or the destruction of Pakistan's Democracy. Fifty Years into its existence,
Pakistan has been captured by the three groups that run the country- the three-faced dilemma of
a country have been slaved the political and constitutional role of the people.
As a Viceregal system', Pakistan, has had a very bureaucratic past. Even when the areas
now constituting the country were governed as part of local empires, the rulers were very distant
from their subjects and the only channel bringing these together were the 'royal servants'. After
the emergence the country, the country not only became executive-dominated state, the army in
particular have played unusually important role in determining the country's political fate. From
the country’s First decade, Pakistan's power-ridden institutions have tried to impose their
legitimized ideals and authoritative, legal language to the secondary players of the country. The
bureaucracy/ military political marriage has overstepped, bypassed, dismissed and denigrated the
mass verdict by simply opting for authoritarianism. They worked as masters or kingmakers,
missing no opportunity to underrate the citizens and the state. As Laporte says about Pakistan's
administrative structure, 'The political leaders are episodically replaced, but the power of the
administrative and the authority of the bulk of its officers is impervious to change.'! 11} The
power-ridden society of Pakistan was not became accidentally It was overburdened with an
imbalance relationship among the civil/military bureaucrats and the feudal politicians. Once the
identity of authority has been established, it is easy for the toughens that they developed their
own legitimacy rather than constitutional or representative. The political and constitutional
instability that characterised the early life of the country, between 1947 and October 1958
Pakistan experienced many faces of bureaucrats, because they belonged the only cohesive and
'capable' institution of the country, They determined, interpreted and safe-guarded the policy of
the state. In this way they also imbued a fragile and vociferous political culture. Political
anomalies, in the apparatus of The external factor was also worked because ’ Pakistan's frontiers
are for the most part crises prone, its neighbors largely bellicose, and fear persists that foreign
machinations aim at exploiting the country’s inherent weakness'. {12}
It is also to note that the ruling elite, the bureaucrat-feudal nexus, in the young country was
mainly related to the areas constituting West Pakistan. East Pakistan, excluding a few landed
classes, was the main loser in the new state structure. {13}Khalid Bin Sayeed wrote about first
decade 'One should also note that the President and his civil service advisors, most of who are
from West Pakistan, are also in position to control West Pakistan's political forces.' It is easy to
say that 'East Pakistan's regional demands were resisted not only by West Pakistan's Bureaucrats,
but also by its political forces." {14} The evolution of this politico-bureaucratic oligarchy shifted
balance in favor of West Pakistan. And especially 'Punjabis from the middle and upper economic
strata were the main recruits to the civil bureaucracy and, especially, the military-thus
exacerbating the problem of constructing a state structure capable of accommodating diverse
linguistic and socio-economic groups.' {15} After geographical absurdity, It was administrative
internal disparity that underlined so many linguistic, political, administrative, economic,
representative imbalances. 'Naturally, this accentuated the ethnic divide of the country as the
Bengalis especially resented the civil/ military domination of the country. In the new state,
although, 'so severe was the lack of managerial talent, and so great the problem of creating a
nation from two separate parts of the subcontinent that it is wonder that Pakistan was able to
exit', {16} tensions soon appeared on the basis of different cleavages. Within two years of
Independence serious discontent prevailed in East Pakistan. It was against the small cadre of
civil
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-13

administration, all rolled into one cause of constitutionally uncontrolled and unbridled
authoritarian, and housed in West Pakistan. Although, Suhrawardhy, while addressing a
mammoth public meeting at Pal tan Maidan in Dhaka on 26 March 1957, declared that 'there is
no differences between the east and West Pakistan. We are Pakistanis first and Pakistanis last. It
is wrong to say that West Pakistan has been oppressing East Pakistan. The same set of people
who have oppressed you oppressed West Pakistan. We are one. Our prestige is founded on the
sense of unity. My one success has been mutual hatred from Pakistan.’ Perhaps he was
optimistic and explaining the cause of his premiership but the realities was different when the
Bengali observed in the course of the Constituent Assembly debates:” A feeling is growing
among East Pakistanis that East Pakistan is being neglected and treated as a colony of West
Pakistan.” {17} The sense of inconvenience started soon after the death of Jinnah, the Bengali
leaders advocated regional cause and emphasised on regional autonomy for East Bengal on the
basis of Lahore resolution, leaving defense, foreign affairs, currency and coinage with the
Federal Government and recognition of Bengali as one of the state language of Pakistan. It was
the start of a civil war, which resulted in partition and the formation of Bangladesh.
East Pakistan was the largest province of the federation. The people are culturally cohesive
and deeply conscious of belonging to a distinct cultural group, ” They are neither Aryans nor
Arabs. Their body and their mind have been formed by the soft soil of East Pakistan, by its wide
blue sky, its murmuring rivers, its warm benevolent sun, its pleasant breezes and its splendid
seasons: Nature has given their mind and body a distinctive stamp,” {18} Due to these distinct
cultural features between the two wings, the Bengali {19} leaders started to highlight the sense
of separation and alienation. They dissatisfied with the government of West Pakistan. They
believed that they made up more than half the population of Pakistan, but west Pakistanis
controlled the government, economy and civil, armed forces. Attuar Rahman Khan, then chief
minister of East Pakistan summed up the feelings of most Bengali politicians in his own way:
As a matter of fact I may tell you, it may be a great weakness with me that I feel a peculiar
sensation when I come from Dacca to Karachi. I feel physically, apart from mental feeling, that I
am living here in a foreign country, I did not fell as much as when I went to Zurich, to Geneva
or Switzerland, or London as much as I feel here in my own country that I am in a foreign land.
{20} These were true sentiments because ’excepting two things, namely that they have a
common religion,
barring a section of the people in East Pakistan, and the common struggle. .With the exception of
these things, all other factors, viz. the language, the traditions, the culture, the costume, custom,
the deity, the calendar, the stranded time, practically everything is different.'{21} In the scenario
of these particular differences, the bureaucratic colossus helped make the nation into a more
unbridgeable gulf of misunderstanding. The religious form and struggle pride was collapsed due
to regional, political, economic and cultural differences because those are 'the sine qua non to
form a nation.' As a Bengali News Paper pointed out 'that although Islam was the main source of
inspiration that unified East and West Pakistani Muslim in the forties, in the sixties this
integrating force had been replaced by the utilitarian or economic forces.’{22}
After independence the religious bond was loose and it eroded by other utilitarian denial
and cultural realities. Though the Muslim leadership created an Islamic castle of unification but
the two provinces also differed from each other as far as the observance of religious and cultural
rites was concerned. As A. Tayyeb observes: 'The East Pakistani type of Islam is mixed with
Hindus, Bhuddist, and animistic practice and is therefore, far more lukewarm and
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-14

accommodating than the rigid dogma of the Punjabi Muslim, or the religious fanaticism of the
Muslim Pathan. In Bengali 2villages, Hindus and Muslims have long participated in each other's
shrines; this is not true of West Pakistan, which has almost a tradition of religious orthodoxy and
conflict apparent in most of its history.'{23} Islam,

which has been, regarded a reason d’etre of the unification, a common idealism has not only
effected their outlook on life, could not sustain its validity after independence.
The fashion was changed in its every aspects of life. The process of de~religionisation
started very clearly because Bengalis are cultural identity, Dravido-Mongolised, in their very
deep-seated nature and also by its geographical and cultural affinity with West Bengal. The East
Pakistani Muslim was closer to an East Pakistani Hindu in matters of language, dress, religious
rites and political etiquette’s than he was to West Pakistani. They countered the Islamic ideology
by their ’linguistic regionalism.' ’The famous Bengali poet, Rabindamath Tagore, is widely read
throughout East Pakistan, and Hindus ideas and concepts in Bengali literature have had a
profound effect on the minds of Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan.’ Wherein West Pakistan
most of the political and religious writers were much inspired by the Allama Iqbal and his
Arabic Islam. The difference of politico-religious philosophy can be finding even during the
time of partition in 1947, when a few influential Bengali Muslim leaders like Suharwardhy
demanded the establishment of a united and separate Bengal state. Mountbaton, however,
refused even to consider it. {24} This proposal, at a time when Hindu-Muslim hostility had
degenerated into mass killing and carnage, was seriously discussed by both Hindu and Muslim
leaders as an alternative to the partition of Bengal into West Bengal and East Bengal, With West
Bengal joining the Indian union and East Bengal becoming a part of Pakistan. Later, in 1954,
Fazlul Haq, the Chief Minister of East Bengal, said he "would not take notice of the fact that
there was a political division of the Province of Bengal into East and West Bengal." The
statesman (Culcutta), May 10, 1954 for this he was denounced by the Prime Minister of Pakistan
as "a self-confessed traitor to Pakistan. {25} Though, the central government has known about
the centrifugal force of Bengali regionalism and for this purpose they developed three bonds.
They stressed on the bonds of Islam, Urdu and Federal system. These were the state
systems for future unification of the state. Islam was replaced by the sense of cultural
domination and federalism was overstepped by non-federal or quasi-federal structure where the
centripetal forces imbued provincial autonomous weaknesses. And when the Urdu was imposed
as a sole official language to 'unifying link that can be achieved by a common language.' {26}
The state was starting to disintegrate the Bengalis’ opposition to it developed into a sort of
linguistic nationalism {27} and took a violent turn. 'Even Jinnah, the much venerated champion
of minority rights,' declared in early 1948 that Urdu was to be the only national language in
Pakistan. Jinnah argued that ”... a language that has been nurtured by the hundred million
Muslims of this Subcontinent, a language understood throughout the length and breadth of
Pakistan, and above all language which more than any other provincial language embodies the
best that is Islamic culture and Muslim tradition, and is nearest to used in other Islamic
countries." The argument could not assuage the injured sentiments of the Bengalis. They not
only promulgated the Bengali issue in its cultural identity, ’ but also expressed a fear that lack of
fluency in a 'foreign' tongue would inhibit the entry of Bengalis into the administrative
services.'{28} One can say that after the problem of representation on 'parity' basis the language
controversy was the important federal issue. It was crucial towards the beginning of 1952 when
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-15

the Bengali origin Prime Minister declared once again that Urdu would be the Lingua franca of
the nation, the result was bloodshed. {29}The Language formula was finally adopted on May 7,
1954 and the 1956, Article 214 of the Constitution of 1956 stipulated 'that the State Languages
of Pakistan shall be Urdu and Bengali
and....English shall continue to be used for official purposes for the period of twenty years.' Now
the
federation had two languages, two parts and 'two nations.'
If the language controversy had introduced feelings to Bengali nationalism the issue of
economic disparity ignited and flamed the movement of separation. It was advocating that
'political independence we have achieved no doubt but economic independence is yet to be
achieved.'! 30} Indeed

economic injustice once again began to agitate the Bengali minds. If we start examining the
economical condition of the East Pakistan, 'with 55 percent of total population, is enjoying at least
60 percent less real income per head than West Pakistan', commenting Mahboob-ul Haq, the
chief planning advisor to Pakistan Government, during Ayub Khan's regime. West Pakistan was
better off economically and had a somewhat more diversified economic base than East Pakistan.
The initial political condition was also influenced by these economic imbalances. Bengalis
accounted for just over half of the country's total population but were living in a less developed
society. In a political system dominated by two institutions 'rose to a position of dominance' has
cultivated the seed of separation that it became a burning topic in the streets of Eastern Wing. It
was complained that 'the responsibility for this interprovincial disparity should be borne by the
central government, who have handled the development of industries since 1948.
The Center has shown preferential treatment to West Pakistani industries by generating
them foreign exchange, by issuing licenses and permits for the establishment of new industries,
and making bigger allocations, loans and grants, both from the United States made available to
East Pakistan by the central government between 1959-65 amount to $ 100. 3 million; whereas
those made available to West Pakistan during the same period amount to $ 2826. 8 million.'!31}

TABLE-I
FOREIGN AJD AND LOANS 1947-48 TO JUNE 3,1960
(Rs in Crore)
East % of the total West % of the total Centre %of the total Total
Foreign
Development 93.39 17 335.22 62 113.03 21 542.14
Aid

U. S. Commodity 129.00 30 262.00 64 18.00 6 409.00 Aid.____________________

Source: Government of East Pakistan, Economic Disparities Between East and West Pakistan (Dacca: Planning
Department, l963), p. 21.

The matter of allocation of resources by the 'Pakistan’s culturally diverse and economically
highly differentiated western’ central government was not agreed with the Eastern province. The
resource allocation were seen as favoring defense and West Pakistan, were being increasingly
questioned by the East Pakistani Economists and the politicians of Awami League well before
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-16

Ayub Khan's take over in 1958. It is true to note that the military take over also widened Eco-
regional disparities. 'East Pakistan with its lower per capita income became a handy dumping
ground for overpriced and generally poor quality West Pakistani manufactures.' {32} In order to
show how former economic policies of the Central Government have had an adverse impact on
the economy of East Pakistan economist have produced an impressive array of figure. These are
to be found in Tables 2,
3, and 4.
 AYUB KHAN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 1958-1969 5-17

TABLE 2
Per Capita Incomes (GNP at factor 1962-63 1963-64*
Cost of 1959/60)
1959-60 1960-61 1961-62
E Pakistan 269 278 287 280 305

W Pakistan 355 359 368 382 388

Pakistan 318 325 334 336 353
Extant of Disparity 28% 26% 25% 31% 24%
(Pakistan= 100)+

* Provisional
+ The Pakistan figures cover 97 % of the GNP. The remaining unallocated 3% has been
excluded.
Source: Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan 1965-70 (Karachi:
May, 1965), p. 127.

(Rs in crores)

TABLE 3
CONTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTS
(IN 1949-53 PRICES)
East Pakistan West Pakistan Index for West Pakistan with
East Pakistan = Years 100

1949-50 59 60 102

1954-55 78 114 147

1959-60 109 169 155

TABLE 4
Source: Planning Department, Government of East Pakistan, Economic Disparities Between East and
PER
West Pakistan (Dacca: East Pakistan CAPITA Press,
Government ELECTRICITY
1963), p. 8. GENERATING CAPACITY
Power Generating Capacity (in K.W.)
Years East Pakistan West Pakistan
1947-48 0.2 4.0
1954-55 1.6 7.3
1959-60 3.5 17.4
1961-62 5.6 19.2
Source: Planning Department, Government of East Pakistan, Economic Disparities
Between East and West Pakistan (Dacca: East Pakistan Government Press, 1963), p. 9
Cited in Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, 200^”
 They not only rejected the guise of development, but the highly trained economists in East Pakistan
BANGLADESH: CLASH OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL D1SPAR11Y 1 947-1971 6-8
suggested positive and concrete remedies for the removal of inter-provincial disparities as they
suggested that 'there must clearly be accelerated growth in East Pakistan as compared with West; in
other words, West Pakistan's economy, although it will undoubtedly still continue to grow, will grow at a
slower pace than that of East Pakistan.'{33). The Political intelligent of Bengali Nationalism needs
political and economic structures capable of accommodating them. The desire moved to their separation
when the centre denied to work under the federal phenomena. The relations started to collapse leaving the
two extremist tendencies arrayed against each other in a dangerous, insatiable stagecraft. The sense of
political deprivation was intensified with economic deprivation. It observed that the area comprising
East Pakistan were economically undeveloped, overpopulated and lacking industries. However, the
policies pursued by the successive Pakistani governments ’seemed directed to ensure that the province
remained in their state1 and the economic disparity between the two wings would further increase.
Jinnah, the father of the nation, had given to his nation the idea of federation, {34} a political
device which suited the requirement of the multi-lingual and multi-cultural structure. It was a univer sal
appeal for the Muslim nationhood. Federation is the ’method of dividing power so that the general(i.e.,
the Central and regional (i.e., provincial) governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and
independent.’{35}. Federal System of government differs from unitary system. In a unitary system all
power legally derives from the Central governments. States or provinces have only those powers that the
central government gives them. Having little similarity for the unitary system, the gov ernments and their
constitution founded upon the pragmatic federal principle have turned out to be, in many cases, highly
centralised and unitary in practice.
Pakistan’s constitutional political history could be matched with federal principles, ’was delib-
erately allowed to degenerate into a highly centralised and non-federal one in practice.’ That is the basic
problem of Pakistan's constitutional legitimacy where we used highly centralised behavior and
demonstrated the chequered history. It is the tragic irony of Central freedom that in the name of fed eral
structure, ’which best suits Pakistan,’ imbued the flux of indiscriminate authoritarian moods. ’All the
constitutional restrains and reverence for federalism in the three constitutions of 1956, 1962, and 1973,
were sacrificed by every regime, to the patent slogan, ’The Centre should be strong', {36} thus
introducing a slogan of provincial autonomy. The federal dilemma could not be solved and this is the
reason that the relation between East with West Pakistan overshadowed all other problems of consti -
tution making. It is because if other parts of Pakistan wanted for equal degree of autonomy and rep -
resentation in the federal legislature, 'East Pakistan insisted on greater degree of autonomy on the basis
of population that entitled it to have a majority voice in national affairs.'{37}.
Bengalis were more in population but they were woefully underrepresented in the civil service and
the military. The slogan of greater autonomy was extremely important for their representation in a
country since these institutions rose to a position of dominance within the state structure federal for mula
was not working well. In September 1950, the Interim Report of the Basic Principle Committee
designed the formula of federation of equal units, which was strongly rejected.' Strong objection was
taken to the provision of equality of powers for both Houses and the vast financial powers vested in the
Centre.1 {38} The regionalist flames were started, advocated and emphasises that it was " strongly of the
opinion" that although a federal constitution was necessary for Pakistan," in setting up the actual federal
structure the geographical position of East Pakistan, its detachment and distance from other units and
also from the federal capital itself has to be seriously considered and provisions made in the Constitution
to accord maximum autonomy to East Pakistan and to that effect it is essential that a sep arate list of
subjects to be administered by East Pakistan be incorporated in the Constitution and the residuary
powers should rest in the units." The Working Committee of the East Bengal Muslim
League was further argued " that since the railways and navigation system of the eastern wing were
separate from those of the west,” communications” cannot and should not be a central subject." The
committee declared “that as so far as the export and import trade of East Pakistan is concerned ade quate
provision should be made subject to the least possible control of the center for the administration of this
BANGLADESH: CLASH OF CONSTITUTIONAL .AND POLITICAL DISPARITY 1947-1971 6-14
subject by the Government of East Pakistan.” It was proposed for regional autonomy on the basis of
Lahore Resolution in which it is stated that' it is considered of the All India Muslim League that no
constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslim League unless it is
designed on basic principles', with two regional governments; and central parliament elected on the
population, retaining foreign affairs, currency and defense only. (39) Here it would be pertinent to say
that none of the proposal for Pakistan or a separate Muslim State that were floated in the 19th century
and the early 20th century mentioned Bengal as forming part of one country. ‘Neither was Bengal
mentioned by Allama Iqbal in his historic 1930 address, nor did it form part of the Pakistan proposal
given by Choudhry Rehmat Ali. So much so that the original Pakistan Resolution of 1940 clearly
mentioned the word "states", showing that more than one Muslim state was envisaged at that time. So the
glaring differences and contradictions can be found in the development of ideological process, which
were highlighted basically of four types-cultural, economic. Political and constitutional-issues,
overshadowed the first political decade of country's independence.
There were two basic reasons, which led to West Pakistan's domination and the birth of sever al
problems in national affair. Firstly, the capital was situated in Karachi and then Islamabad and East
Pakistan was cut away from the mainstream. Furthermost, from the beginning, attention was focused on
the Punjab refugee and the Kashmir issue, which was primarily, matters concerning West Pakistan.
As stated before, though the country was supposed to be federal and parliamentary in charac ter for
a complex mosaic of cultural, political, administrative and provincial diversities, which is basically the
only arbiter of inter-provincial disputes and preserver of a central power, but in Pakistan it could not
work smoothly due the absence of its 'indispensable quality' {40} the division of power 'which is the
first instruction in any federal engineering manual, and first check point for any federal
constitution.'{41} The 'quality' has been stemmed by the power-seeker and turned into the central issue
in the debate between the 'proponents of strong centre and adherents of provincial autonomy.'
The purpose of this hot debate should develop the balance between general and regional gov-
ernments and to strengthen the federal authority. But the system was concentrated in the hands of a
narrow ruling elite of the feudal class, aided and supported by the powerful bureaucracy and the army,
contributed its highly centralized state policies. With the exception of the 1973 constitution which made
some tentative attempts to reflect the aspirations of the provinces, neither the 1956 nor the 1962
documents showed much appetite for federal principle' {42} Countering the Bengali majority 'the fed -
eral composition of the country changed first from four provinces (East Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, and
NWFP) to two in 1955 (East Pakistan and West Pakistan - following the establishment of one unit), then
from two to five in 1970 (after the one unit was annulled and Baluchistan was accredited provin cial
status for the first time) and finally following the dismemberment of the country and separation of East
Pakistan there were left only four provinces.’{43}.
Jinnah, who had been the pivotal force in the drive towards Pakistan, died in 1948. With the
assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, Strong political leadership disappeared from
the political and administrative scene. Those who became Prime Minister between 1951 and 1958 had
weak public mandates. The first constitution of the country was not approved till March 1956. It was
preceded by the creation of One Unit in October 1955. The imposition of One Unit was an adminis -
trative attempt to ensure that the majority province of East Pakistan could not dominate the political life,
'proved to capture power at the centre’ and flamed the dignity of federalism. The federal face was
__
damaged when the East Pakistan was deprived of the benefits of its numerical electorate strength and
introduced more Punjabi domination in the economic and administrative sphere of the West Pakistan and
to an 'unpatriotic move to liquidate the three smaller provinces.’{44} It caused the increasing polit ical
and administrative divisiveness between the two wings and worsening overall political situation.
Unfortunately, the experiments that were followed to deal with the situation — increasing intensified
provincialism in the country. For example by clubbing the three minority provinces in the western into
forming the artificial nexus of One Unit and then making a Federation of two provinces, the constitu tion
BANGLADESH: CLASH OF CONSTITUTIONAL .AND POLITICAL DISPARITY 1947-1971 6-14
(1956) thwarted the politico-cultural aspirations of these units and reduced the due share of East Pakistan
in the federal power. {45}.
In the year 1950, the Bengalis were openly advocating the demands for provincial autonomy of
East Pakistan and a whole sole political exploitation by the ruling elite based in West Pakistan. Their
reaction came in 1954 when the Muslim League was collapsed in elections. It was clear and sharp
public opinion against the socio-political, geo-economic exploitation by the ruling elite dominated by
the West Pakistanis. It was the mater to stop the old fashion of centralisation and to divide power into
the hands of provinces but from Bogra to Noon the ruling elite ignoring all political, democratic and
personal incites, manipulated to make the centre all-powerful, reducing the federating units to mere
extensions rather than autonomous and co-ordinate partner. The situation was so worse and damaging
when the new drama was witnessed in 1958 and that was the imposition of Martial- law, which laid the
foundation of separation of East Pakistan. The take over occurred at the invitation of the President
Mirza, just before the general elections under the 1956 Constitution, who declared that "the Constitution
which was brought in to being on March 23,1956, after so many tribulations, is unworkable. It is so full
of dangerous compromises that Pakistan will soon degenerate internally if the inherent malaise is not
removed. To rectify them, the country must first be taken to sanity by a peaceful revolution." and stating
that " the vast majority of the people no longer have any confidence in the present system of the
government” {46} Before action against what he considered the constitutional and administrative
changes. Ayub entered with his 'quite revolution' and get rid of Mirza who was the man of political
intrigues. It was October 27, 1958 'when the mantle of presidency descended on Ayub's shoulders.’
Although, Ayub had advised to his army to stay out of the politics was appropriate but ’he did not abide
by it himself.1 He was asked by the governor- General, Ghulam Mohammad, to be a member of the new
cabinet' but he ignored because he did not see himself to act as a 'buffer between the politicians and the
armed forces, but there was more to it than that'. {47}.
The parliamentary era of Pakistan was deserted mound without political and constitutional sta-
bility. The newly born country faced provincial, administrative, cultural, linguistic barriers, which paved
the way for the plantation of martial law (1958-62). The weak, chequered parliamentary sys tem
’constantly interfered’ by the internal enemies. Ayesha rightly observed that "some seven years before
the first military takeover, the political process had slipped of the rails. "{48hessassinations and
dissuasions was political fashion of the early history of Pakistan. Ayub came with the ’ultimate' aim of
greater national integration. Before Ayub’s martial law the constitution of 1956 ’ ushered in a short
period of constitutional rule but the constitution's root were also shortcomings,' {21} which in turn
compounded political instabilities across the country. {49}.
The bureaucratic-military supervised constitution was abrogated and the general ignited new plane
of his own constitutional autocracy. The day was jubilated and hailed by the general public of West
Pakistan. It is argued that General Ayub was a savior who had come to liberate the people from
politicians who had’ no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degrada tion’.
However, in East Pakistan the general-led government was not welcomed. For them the cor rupt
parliament was more beneficial for them. They could ensure a fair deal in coming elections.
gut the new tutelage of rule shattered their dream of representation .The policies of the Ayub regime were
based on unrestrained growth and rapid development in which none of the policies of growth belonged
to East Pakistan. Akber Zaidi rightly describes that" critics of Ayub khan's model of development point
out that these two regions (industrial and agricultural sector in Central Punjab and industry in Karachi)
were permitted to grow at the expense of the rest of the country, and the feeling on the part of East
Pakistan of utters neglected and betrayal." {50} The Ayub rule was characterised by the constitutional
autocracy (1962), basic democracy, revolutions-both in industry and agriculture, 'paradoxical
combination of the biggest growth in Pakistani history and large increase in income inequality, inter-
regional differences, and the concentration of economic power'. {51}. As time passed, though the
general-cum- ’president pick the targets one by one with the complete power that he had’, the inter-
regional complications paved the way that were built up frustrations and exacerbated to Ayub's down
BANGLADESH: CLASH OF CONSTITUTIONAL .AND POLITICAL DISPARITY 1947-1971 6-14
fall. Ayub ruled the country for nearly eleven years, and gave the country a quasi-unitary constitution.
Ayub pillared his constitutional-military castle by the basic democracy and the new constitu tion as
he wrote ’the immediate objective was to rehabilitate the civil and constitutional organs of the state.
They had become ineffective and oppressive through misuse and exploitation and needed the protection
of martial law to recover their original sense of purpose se as to be able to operate within a constitutional
framework.’ {52} He has no desire to compromise with 1956 parliamentary constitution, which,
according to him, was 1 no better than a bundle of unworkable compromises'. {53} Before articulating
his document, he took steps to harness the courts to his cause- describing that' the courts are the final
arbiters of what is legal and illegal', {54} imposed most illegal, autocratic, and ’his’ document,
supported by the judges, army-civil nexus and like-minded political stock, as Choudhry Mohammed Ali
has described it, 'as a government of the President, by the President and for the President.Thus the
general-cum president laid the foundation of all-weather autocracy and sowed the seed of regional fight
of national-regional respect. {55}

The following powers were conferred on the office of the President:

• All executive of the Republic was vested in the President.
• He could summon, prorogue and dissolve the National Assembly.
• The President could be impeached but the method was cumbersome, bordering on impos-
sibility.
• In the event of the conflict between the President and the National Assembly on any mat ter,
the President might refer it to referendum, seeking a 'yes' or 'no' answer from the Electoral
College.
Such a presidential, having the deep disease of prejudiced centralisation under the 1962 con -
stitution, paved the way for election on 28 April 1962, on the basis of Basic Democracy. After the
indirectly elected National Assembly held its first session the Martial Law was lifted, the general
crowned so-called civilian facade with the bulk of like-minded and like-hearted politicians, washed out
by the PODO and EBDO, gathered around the president for their personal interests. That was the cold-
blooded exploitation of the people in which East Pakistan has borne the main brunt. Ayub Khan's
policies not only 'controlled' the progress and prosperity of Bengalis’ but he called their inhabitation
'from down-trodden races' and believed that they ' have not yet found it possible to adjust psycholo gy to
the requirements of the newborn freedom. {56was his intense prejudice against the Eastern part than the
Western people for which he stated that’ is probably the greatest mixture of races found every where in
the world'. {57} On the surface the situation was stable but the policies, language, the sense 'that only
the West Pakistan had been protected during the 1965 war,’ {58} imposition of quasi-unitary
system and short-sighted president developed a deep and dangerous decomposition which turned into the
militant Bengali nationalism. The New York Times rightly analysed that" enthusiasm for autonomy
has grown tremendously since early this year (1965)... The pressure stems from the feeling of
complete isolation from and utter dependence on West Pakistan that gripped East Pakistan during the
war with India. {69}.
Shiekh Mujibur Rehman, prisoner of the Agartala Conspiracy case, {60} was politician who
'raised the banner of revolt that broke the country in twin, perhaps never reunited again’. {61 }He was,
however, young East Pakistan's first populist leader. His Bengali address brought his popularity of
Bengali nationalism to millions of Bengalis never reached by any of the more moderate leaders of
Bengali cause, like Molvi Fazle Haq, Khawaja Nazimuddin, and even his political guru Suhrawardhy. In
1965, he articulated a Six-point program that echoed long-held Bengali claims for presentation and
soon became the heart-throbbing politico-constitutional slogan for Awami League and the 'signal of
storm in East Pakistan,' for 'renewed Bengali nationalism, political autonomy and finally,
independence.'{62}.

Mujib's 6- Point Formula:

BANGLADESH: CLASH OF CONSTITUTIONAL .AND POLITICAL DISPARITY 1947-1971 6-14
1: The Constitution should provide for Federal of Pakistan in the true sense on the basis of the
Lahore Resolution and for a parliamentary form of government based on the supremacy of
a directly elected legislature on the basis of universal adult franchise. The representation in
the federal legislature shall be on the basis of population.
2: The federal government shall be responsible only for defense and foreign affairs, and cur -
rency subject to the conditions provided in Point no. 3.
3: There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely convertible in each region, or in
the alternative, a single currency, subject to the establishment of a federal reserve system
in which there will be regional Federal Reserve banks which shall devise measures to
prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region to another.
4: Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units. The federal government shall
be provided with requisite revenue resources for meeting the requirements of defense and
foreign affairs, which revenue resources would be automatically appropriable by the feder -
al government in the manner provided and on the basis of the ratio to be determined by the
procedure laid down in the Constitution. Such constitutional provisions would ensure that
the federal government's revenue requirements are met consistently with the objective of
ensuring control over the fiscal policy by the governments of the federating units.
5: Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate accounts to be maintained of the
foreign exchange earnings of each of the federating units, under the control of the respec -
tive governments shall be met by the governments of the federating units on the basis of
the a ratio to be determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in the
Constitution. The regional governments shall have the power under the constitution to
negotiate foreign trade and aid within the framework of the foreign policy of the country,
which shall be the responsibility of the federal government.
6: The government of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain a militia or para -
military force in order to contribute effectively towards national security. {63}.

Bhutto recognised it as 'Although the first point of the Six Point Formula provided for a fed -
eration ' in its true sense', nevertheless the formula taken as a whole was a veiled charter for a con -
federation which contained the genesis of constitutional secession.'64The Six point Formula was
transparent and final symbol of Bengali Nationalism which had started before the birth of Pakistan.
"It is a growth" quoted by the author and "is spontaneous because these demands are no new points
invented afresh by one or any individual but are in reality long-standing demands of the people and
pledges of their leaders awaiting fulfillment for decades." {65).
The formula was the culmination against the economic and constitutional disparity, which can
be witnessed in the pages of the history. From the Objective Resolution 1949 to the Constitution of
1962 one may find the federal principles that 'Pakistan shall be a federal state' (1956, Article 1) and
the 'included units will be autonomous' (Government of Pakistan, Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan, Debates) 'for the 'unity and interest of Pakistan as a whole.’(1962. Safdar Mahmood,
p.503) but in Pakistan’s constitutional legacy, the constitutions symbolized as federal, was
deliberately allowed to degenerate into a highly centralised and non-federal one in practice. Sayeed
rightly observes that "it would be difficult to describe Pakistani federalism as even quasi-federal
because one can see that the Central Government is not only strong in its own right but can lay
down policy even in matters which have been plotted in the provinces."{66}The Six Point Formula
based on universally acclaimed right of the people. One can not grudge the Bengalis if they were
fighting for autonomy from a centralised regime which they opined as centripetal legitimacy and
unjust where 'the provinces are accepted to function as mere administrative agencies very much like
local governments in a unitary state.' {67}.
Ayub's political and constitutional changes produced all-weather autocracy and half-baked
democracy and 'proved less successful'. By his Basic democrats Ayub wanted to ignore the real
BANGLADESH: CLASH OF CONSTITUTIONAL .AND POLITICAL DISPARITY 1947-1971 6-14
young leadership, but contrary' to his hope this system failed to safe him. His constitution did-not
cipher the disparity between the rulers and the rules and ’did nothing to remove its main defect in
the eyes of the most thinking Pakistanis, namely the very limited extent to which it enabled the
people at large to modify decisions arbitrarily taken by Ayub and his associates.'{68} The element
of disaffection against the regime had dissolved in the political blood of West and East Pakistanis.
Bhutto, the ex-member of Ayub's regime {69} and Mujib with his six dimensions of separatist
tendency orchestrated the political opposition to Ayub's regime. The joint sentiments of the two
chunks and their leaders were more connected with the removal of the President and the
Presidential system, restoration of parliamentary governments, fundamental rights, One -Unit,
regional autonomy and the foreign policy. It was a 'sea-change' against ’monolithic regime' in its
natural pace ’as Emerson pointed out, every hero becomes a bore at last.' {70}
Ayub Khan was accused for 'destroying institution wedded to the public weal [sic], and of
victimising individuals who could not be easily browbeaten or purchased.' {71}His shortsightedness j
deepened the roots of tensions between East and West Pakistan. Although both leaders were stood
against Ayub’s vulnerable representation, constitutional autocracy and the suspension of political rights
yet it did not disguise fundamental conflicts between the two wings. Both leaders were not all- Pakistan
personalities to solve internal irritants. No one had any interest in other's politics. One had its past 'to
manage Pakistan’s transition from autocratic military rule to democratic government.’ One had 'to
seethe with antipathy to West Pakistani ’imperial' domination.’{72} One came from the 'prospered' west
and other 'from wrung dry.1 But both had turned their minds against Ayub's inadequate presidential
system and centralised. 'Pakistan thus simmered' with political and social unrest and” threnody of
violence which reverberated like a dark symphony across the whole of West Pakistan."{73}The
situation suppressed the president. The RTC and DAC were failed. He was powerless, sick and confused
when the response of the army Commander-in Chief, General Yahya Khan, j was dismissive: ’ I cannot
worry about the niceties of law when the country is burning'; if Martial law |
was not imposed immediately,' the integrity of the armed forces will severely undermined 1,
allowing’ some madcap in the army to intervene'. {74}
Ayub Khan was left with little option. He could not shelter in his own constitutional castle
which provided formal procedures for a President to leave office, acted extra constitutional and
"stepped aside," asking General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan to undertake his " legal and constitu-
tional responsibility to defend the country not only external aggression but also to save it from inter-
nal disorder and chaos.” Who crowned power, abrogated the 1962 constitution effectively, declared ;
martial law, and assumed the role of CMLA and president. 'The military takeover now put into
operation by Yahya Khan was by no means merely a carbon copy of Ayub's own takeover ten-and-
half years earlier. For one thing, Yahya altogether lacked Ayub's larger aims.’{75}When Ayub
started his ’decade of progress’ in 1958, the parliamentary system was decaying; the people of the
two wings had neglected when Yahya entered in politic of Pakistan, the presidential system. Yahya
have a clear purpose in his mind: to restore order, dissolve One Unit, arrange free election and a
'smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the people elected freely and impartially on the
basis of adult franchise,1 whose task would be ’to give the country a workable constitution.'
The promise of political and representative freedom articulated by Legal FrameWork Order
(LFO). {76} This said that among the fundamental principles of the new constitution should be
following: ' All power, including legislature, administrative and financial, shall be so distributed
between the Federal Government and the provinces that the provinces shall have maximum auton-
omy.... But the Federal Government shall also have adequate powers to discharge its responsibilities
in relation to external and internal affairs and to preserve the independence and the territori al
integrity of the country.'
Legal Framework Order also lay down 'that in the new National Assembly there would be 313
seats, of which thirteen (13) would be reserved for women.' The total was composed as follows:
BANGLADESH: CLASH OF CONSTITUTIONAL .AND POLITICAL DISPARITY 1947-1971 6-14
TABLE 5
Provinces and Areas General Seats Seat reserved
for women
East Pakistan 162 7
Balochistan 4 1
The Punjab 82 3
Sindh 27 1
NWFP 18 1
'Centrally Administered Tribal Areas' 7 0
300 13

Yahya khan got opportunity for his presidency. Yahya khan himself, like most of his
colleagues, was barely ' primus inter pares' in the general staff, and his interest and capabilities were
not those of "a master crises" but did two credits for his bag: the allocation of seats and conducted
first, open, fair, free and without violence election on the basis of universal adult franchise. Sir Morie
James rightly observed that 'Yahya thus conceded Mujib's demand for representation in the
Assembly by Pakistan's two Wings in proportion to their respective population.' {77}.
The daring step had been ignored in both of the late constitutions of 1956, 1962 in which the
equal division of seats provided for the two Wings and caused one of the conspicuous hurdles of co -
ordination between them. What was in the mind of Yahya? When he had gave superior
representation to the eastern wing. It was a greatest fault or best solution of those perplexing
questions of eastern intellectuals for their representative importance on the behalf of their superiority
in numbers. {78} The
LFO described as an imposed {79} and immune 'dead letter' (Bhutto) and most of its provisions were
'shrouded in obscurity and vagueness.'(feldman) The most important flaw in the Order was its silence
about the question of autonomy but somehow it was like a bridge between the late constitutions and the
coming constitution. Although the new martial-law has observed like “a conspiracy between the men in
power and the army to frustrate the democratic aspiration of the people." {80}.
On December 7,1970, a general election to the new National Assembly were held through out the
country for some settlement, 'however, the political situation remained unsettled' because the result of
free elections opened a new constitutional Pandora box. The Awami League and the Shiekh Mujibur
Rehman, with their six-point program, won the election, voted for in East Pakistan. In the West Wing,
Bhutto was the winner. Thus Mujib and Bhutto were the real actors in the election the atre. The result
was composed as follow: -
BANGLADESH: CLASH OF CONSTITUTIONAL .AND POLITICAL DISPARITY 1947-1971 6-14
TABLE 6
RESULT OF THE PAKISTANI NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 7 DECEMBER 1970
No. Of seats won (%)
Awami Pakistan Other People's Independents Total
League Party Parties
East Pakistan 160 (75%) 0 (0%) 1(22%) 1(3%) 162

West Pakistan
Punjab 0 (0%) 62(42%.) 15(%) 5(%) 82
Sind 0 (0%) 18(%) 6(44%) 3(11%) 27
NWEP 0 (0%) 1 (14%) 17 (80%) 0 (7%) 25
Baluchistan 0 (0%) 0 (2%) 4(91%) 0 (7%) 4
Total West Pakistan 0 81 42 15 138
TOTAL (% vote Nationwide) 160 (38%) 81 (35%) 43(35%) 16 (7%) 300

Source: Craig Baxter, ” Pakistan Votes—1970”, Asian Survey (March 1971): 197218; and G. W. Choudhry,
The Last Days of United Pakistan (Blooington University Press, 1974), p. 129; and Richard Sisson and Leo E.
Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, 32

Note: Total percentage greater than 100 are because of rounding.

It was the matter of truth that Awami League should control the central government, but nei ther
the People's Party not the military was willing to concede without a fight.’ {81} 'Bhutto claimed that if
a durable constitution was to be framed, there must be a broad consensus between the different regions
of the country. Mujib declared that the constitution should be based on the Six Point and the Six Point
alone.’{82} Between the constitutional confrontation, the army was expected to act like a facilitator.
But unfortunately the triangle, 'who could not see beyond its feet,'{83} did not come up to solve the
way. The war was started and the second partition was happened.

We may end with S. M. Burke’s observation:

"In truth if West Pakistanis really wished their union with East Pakistan to endure, they should
have woken up to realities much earlier and pursued utterly different political and economic policies
from the very inception of Pakistan." {84}
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY C h 7-1
apter — 7

BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF

‘UNCONTROLLED’
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

® He would wreck the Constitution by using the Constitution. He would

use the legally elected President, the man who had taken oath on the
Koran to protect and defend the Constitution, Iskandar Mirza, to destroy
the Constitution- and then he would destroy Iskandar Mirza...
(Venkataramani, American Role, p. 297.)

• “We are facing the worst crises in our country's life, a deadly crisis. We
have to pick up the pieces, very small pieces, but we will make a new
Pakistan, a prosperous and progressive Pakistan, and a Pakistan free of
exploitation, a Pakistan envisaged by the Quaid-i-Azam.... [T]hat
Pakistan will come, it is bound to come. This is my faith... but... I need
your co-operation. I am no magician... without your co-operation I
simply cannot succeed. But with your co-optation... I am taller than the
Himalayas . . . You must give me a time, my dear countrymen, and I
will do my b e st . . . I have been working round the clock.”
“Z A. Bhutto, Address to the Nation," 20 December 1971, in Z. A: Bhutt&r Speeches and
Statement, vol. 1, December 20, 1971-March 31, 1972 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan,
1972), pp. 1-16, quotation at p. 1.

Introduction:
Friedrich Hegal, in Philosophy of History (1832), writes that peoples and governments have
never learnt anything from history. The hypothesis can be wrong because those who cannot remember
the past are condemned to repeat it and perhaps Hegal observed the history as a cycle of repeated events.
But it is also true that the statement is fully fitted on our nation (peoples & government) that j they have
certainly not learnt any thing from their darkest history. The debacle of 1971 to Hamoodur j Rehman
Report, we not only shut our eyes but conveniently chose to ignore the syndrome. Ignorance j is not bliss
in Pakistan because after the call of separation in Bengal, the country resurfaced the elements of reactive
nationalism in Baluchistan (1970) and Sindh (1980). 'DEJA VU' as the French
 would say we have all been there before. The familiar story of the military ruler’s quest for legitima cy.
BHUTTO:
The THE DILEMMA
country has itsOF ‘UNCONTROLLED’
own history without aCONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
stable political, constitutional 1-1institutional
and basement. The
so-called democracy and military- founded autocracy failed to crystal its dream of institutional
governance. The country's controversial leadership damaged its identity of welfare for its people and
their unification. On one hand it was also an absurdity that without stable constitutionalism, the leaders
were founding the roots of good governance and on the other hand the start of a plane has loaded with
linguistic, regional, cultural and fake devices, which opened a Pandora box for its crew. We have lived
through the abrogation of the ’56 and '62 Constitutions, by Presidents, now no longer remembered, by
Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Several ’planted' presidents and Prime ministers bordered and alighted but
the politico-constitutional state could not gain momentum of speed. The uncertainty of governmental
structure in the Pakistan's history invited armed forces to play their role. Several examples of the invited
intervention of the army taking power have been shown in the history of Pakistan. The gap between the
state and system has been marked in the country. It is argued that constitutions and democracy has been
crushed because Pakistan's armed forces intervened the system.’The military’s frequent and arbitrary
interventions prevented the development of institutions that could have routines political
uncertainty.'{1}
The leaders were remote from the reality when they talked about constitutional democracy,
institutional governance and ideological identifications. Although, the Jinnah-inspired activities, Islam,
and symbolic federalism used as saviors yet plagued by myopic diseases, ’the old Pakistan had died
years before, but its burial was marked on 16 December 1971.' (2} After the murdered of the two
constitutions, LFO has installed to project the fresh light of constitutionalism. The 1956 Constitution,
which was perhaps our best constitution, was jettisoned. The abrogation was based for new, 'military-
fashioned changes', knowing 'the ultimate aim of Pakistan must be to become a sound, solid, cohesive
nation’. {3}
The 'visionary11962 Constitution was actually collapsed within a few weeks of its inauguration by
the legislators. It was an entirely different experience under the restrictions of martial- law admin -
istration. Ayub's revolution had the immediate objective that was to ’rehabilitate the civil and consti -
tutional organs of the State. They had become ineffective and oppressive through misuse and exploita -
tion and needed the protection of Martial Law to recover their original sense of purpose so as to be able
to operate within a constitutional framework.’ |4}But one by one all the properties of the 'grand vision’
fell apart till Ayub Khan handed over power to the army chief on March 25, 1969 in the violation of his
’own' Constitution. The basic fault behind the Ayub's political system was its consider able opportune
for the West Pakistanis, but it had little benefited for the East wing. He failed to set balanced political,
constitutional and economic principles: constitution and the unification. The bleeding heart of the
Bengalis’, who couldn't comprehend the political, constitutional, and economic favors, thought that
there is no alternative than to separate.
Mushtaq Ahmad rightly said that' Ayub bequeathed a legacy overburdened with liabilities.’ {5}
First of all he was overburdened of the idea that Pakistan is not one, but two lands of two basic nations.
The geographical, ethnic and cultural groups. That gave their attractions to familiar regional leaders.
Ayub was not a political genius who has tact, patience and wisdom to found the moderate way of this
day by day most complicated issue. He acted like a colonial administrator would have classified his
subjects.
The new part-time President Yahya Khan had no’ grand vision' but the situation which he inher-
ited was much worse than on the eve of the first Martial Law which directly or indirectly invited him to
play a role for the suitable, stable and constitutional survival of the country. {6} In his first months,
Yahya khan ordered to structure the rules and regulations. The subsequent actions ’indicated that he
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-3
. understood some of the sources of conflicts in the state.’ {7} He had known that the people of the
country had been overboard by the presidential system and the remedy of their boredom could find in
their political catharsis. One by one he removed the prints of old legacy. Yahya's Legal Framework
Order was not a flaw-less document but it designed to organise elections and steer the new
constitution. Though the LFO did not frame a constitution yet it did spell out the fundamental
principles of the pro- [posed constitution and the structure and composition of the national and
provincial assemblies. The document also caused for the break-up of One-Unit and abolishes Parity
between East and West Pakistan, which thwart the old Punjabi domination of the country. The Yahya
Khan and his military colleagues were so effective for the carving up' the document, it was designed
by the variety of political circles, including those in West Pakistan. The more regionalist or reactive
nationalists from West Pakistan saw an opportunity to survive like federating units in the country.
While the constitutional theory captured the scene, it was also noted that it was silent on the question
of autonomy. One Unit which was the administrative jargon and scheme to shut the real issue of a
country. Though, the document removed it but it’s centralised scenario and properties were throbbing
in the body-politics. The matter of autonomy was constitutional and representative catharsis of those
provinces, which were struggling against the Punjabi-dominated centalisation in the country.
Difficult and conflictive forces of regionalism, together with unfavorable political and econom -
ic realities, may largely wrote account of alienation for Pakistan’s failure in establishing common
political relations between centre and the regions. It was not a new phenomenon for the rulers. The
LFO could be rejected due to the lack of understanding about the question of autonomy but one pro -
vision attracted the provincially inclined leaders and that was ' one man, one vote 1. Though, imposed,
yet it 'announced to the surprise of the nation, whose task it would be to resolve their differences in
assembling a new political order in the nation.’ {8 }The elections were held on the basis of universal
adult franchise but could not settle the deep-seated political differences between the two regions. One
can find two reasons: firstly; 'the results of the first and the last general elections in 1970 were simply
disastrous from the standpoint of national unity and demonstrated the failure of national integration
in Pakistan' {9} and secondly, and perhaps most important, the army intelligence further cultivated
the seed of confrontation between the leaders of two regions because 'the outcome of the elections
came as a shock to the Yahya regime, which had expected to remain as arbiter of a fragmented
parliament. The Awami League’s absolute majority in the assembly, which they had failed to
anticipate, confounded the military. With the emergence of Shiekh Mujibur Rehman and ZAB as the
elected leaders of each Wing, the regime lost political control.'{10)It was the first and perhaps the
last time when the most powerful institution of Pakistan seems to decrease in its episode of power.
Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report examined the fact that:
“In our examination of the events during and after the election campaign we have seen that
General Yahya Khan didn't support any particular party but rather that he was expecting an election
result in which no single party would emerge as a force strong enough to dictate its own terms and
that a number of comparatively small parties would be thrown up...After the election again the effort
of General Yahya was to nullify the election results by playing of the parties against on another."
{11} It was the thinking of the military-bureaucracy- nexus that no political party should emerge
strong and victorious in the polls as well as in the minds of the people. The military rulers always
believed on pressure groups rather than national political parties. They always called politicians as
traitors and 'political adventurers’. Ayub had following the say about the politicians that ’there has
been no limits to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation.' In the dynamics of
hubris, each military ruler, with the help of like-minded serfs, has wished to identify, victimise,
destroy, hang or purchase the individual politicians and stamp the period with his own vision and
simultaneously to
civilise his regime- usually under US pressure. It is at this stage that fault lines develop, and the clefts, in
due course, became yawning cleavages. The problem that arises is that the politicians that the ruler
inducts in the quasi-political phase do not share the ruler's political philosophy. Ayub’s presidential
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-4
philosophy had a problem. The bicameral legislature was replaced by a single legislative body to be
called National Assembly which unless dissolved before due time was to continue for five years. Ayub's
constitution was federal only in name. It was otherwise a unitary constitution with a system that was
highly presidential. In the presidential system power is held by the directly elected president and
exercised through his personal appointees. No one could asked or advise anything. The loss of the
majority in the assembly or a defeat of a bill does not bring down the government. This simply was not
understood by the elected to the '62 assembly. Besides the National Assembly was given no power
through a committee system as in the US. Ayub's castle envisaged the legislature, 'which was no more
than a talking show.'
From 1954 to 1968, the politicians ’have either played a secondary role or simply succumbed to
interline squabbles.’! 12} The constitutions and politicians used like tissue papers by the military
generals and bureaucrats and when ever the political authority of constitutionalism came to dominate the
political seat of the country, the two pillar, army and bureaucracy carved the situation that these political
authorities ’are diametrically opposed on all issues in Pakistan, and the result of the election will,
apparently, carve up the country into two separate political kingdoms.'! 13) It led to a nine-month civil
war in the country, and ultimately, to the third Indo-Pakistan war, culminating in the dismember ment of
Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971. Although the dismemberment of Pakistan
in 1971 was linked with the conflict of frontiers between India and Pakistan, ’which India took well-
planned and calculated moves to cause the disintegration of Pakistan', yet the country's fracture would
be based on the Ayub's Khan's introduction of 'economic and political development', inor dinate delay in
framing the constitution and involvement of military-bureaucratic role with the PPP majority to eclipse
of representation of majority were largely responsible for the break -up of the country in 1971. The
matter also related the failure of negotiation between the tripartite, which began in January-March 1971.
Fortunately, there was a solution. Unfortunately, there was no willing to find out a solution of united
government. The two regional, representative leaders-Mujib and Bhutto-and the ruling military intrigues
played a hovec role that the country slipped away from the hands of the people. ’A patient in the last
stages of tuberculosis' f 14} died by the wrong surgery by its rounded political surgeons. Golam W.
Choudhry described rightly the political psychology of the two that ’ the regional leaders, were
inordinately ambitious and unscrupulous politicians. Mujib was more interested in creating a separate
state for Bengalis, Bangladesh.’ Poisoned by the ruling elite of West Pakistan he had decided to separate
from the colonial like administrator. 'On the other hand, Bhutto was more interested in getting power, no
matter whether in a united or divided Pakistan.’! 15} He was more interested in getting a 21-gun salute
as the head of the state than in the maintenance of the unity of Pakistan.’! 16}.
The political and constitutional unity of Pakistan is ’a dream that in subsequent years was trans -
formed into a nightmare by men of personal ambitions and petty pursuits.’! 17} It is useful to remem ber
that what kind of Political happenings that we could not attain it in Pakistan's five-decade history. It was
wrong political decisions to tuberculosis which were ' difficult to detect in the beginning but easy to
cure, with the passage of time, easy to detect but difficult to cure.'! 18} 'Apart from complicat ed political
and constitutional issues, the country was beset with gargantuan problems in the socioeconomic sphere'
which weren't conducive to the military or civilian regime performing any signifi cant role. The early
1947 to 1958 were a tense and difficult period as the three forces of military, bureaucracy and feudal
political elite jockeyed for power. It is irony for the nation that the 'major architects were either dead or
isolated within the five years of the State's formation.'! 19} The military regimes of Ayub Khan and
Yahya Khan could not provide the freedom and opportunity that the country took benefits for the
development of its democratic governments and people. Their intrusive rule promoted the nation's
darkest hour, they abrogated the constitutions, and they dented the national integrity and country's
humiliating dismemberment, and developed the sentimental Kashmir issue to tense the region.
If Bhutto was ambitious to be a jockey of a country, divided or united, it was inherited phenom-
enon. He has groomed in the cradle of feudal-bureaucrats - military nexus. Not permanently political
experience but administrative one. 'As an alumnus of Berkeley and Oxford, and as a London-trained
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-5
barrister, he was a rare bird among the bucolic notables of Sindh.' He inherited the bandaged region and
politics, which had plagued by the power-seekers, abrogators, and imposers. The politics, which was
'eternal romance' for his flexible persona, not an easy job for slow learner and he was not a slow learner.
He learned and ’possessed the qualities of leadership, which his country now suddenly and desperately
needed: courage, drive, energy, imagination, and eloquence, long experience of men and affairs, and
sense of history. And as the PPP’s leader he was beyond question the legitimate civilian heir to Yahya's
fallen power.’{20)
- Lawrence Ziring laced that: ’Pakistan’s survival demanded a new generation of political leaders'
and Zulifkar Ali Bhutto was the sole representative of new generation of leaders in a ’new Pakistan’.
{21)It is useful to remember that army handed over the crown of authority to Bhutto, an authority which
was demoralize and surrounded by the magnitude problems of political, constitutional and regional
handicaps. Bhutto laid the foundations of his government on conspiracies with army. It was a political
marriage of the old legacy of the country. The two political parties and the military struggled to find out
the thread of solution for months. 'By the rules of normal politics, the winning party should have
controlled the central government, but neither the People’s Party nor the military was willing to concede
with out a fight.'{22) Rafi Raza wrote the unconstitutional story of handed over the authority when the
army generals and Bhutto ’laid the ground for 'conspiracy' against Mujibur Rehman’ and it’s Awami
League {23) which made solution of that perplexing situation that who would be the author of
constitution and the structure of the government. Though the authority conceived by some illegal tact of
hypocrisy yet it was the duty of responsibility, the authority means the making of new constitution for
stable political, economic structure for a 'new Pakistan.'
Dieter Conrad opines: 'one distinguishing feature of Pakistan's unhappy constitutional history is
the persistence of legalistic effort accompanying the most abrupt political changes and break- off.’{24}
The quest for power is the strongest trait of Pakistan's unhappy constitutional-political culture. It had
created political chaos, ethnic extremism, constitutional confusion, civil war and the separation of the
country. It was the highest quest of power and the ’crest of the wave of unprecedented popularity’ when
Bhutto 'claimed that the PPP would not" permit any one to ’chisel us out' of power" and in the March
1971 proposed that the power be transferred to both parties separately, leading many politicians to
believe that the separation was a foregone conclusion of the military establishment. 1 {25}Bhutto's use of
this authoritarian’s statement and refusal to attend the National assembly was the example of his
growing 'enigmatic' association with the army but army was also playing card with Mujibur Rehman in
the name of constitutional dialogue. The role of army was a player in the totter ing political system. They
adopted a two-sword strategy: ’ to appease Mujibur through negotiation and to deter him by reinforcing
military means in the eastern wings.' On the one hand army generals were negotiating to find out some
constitutional solution for the making of national government and on the other hand were ready to
crackdown the dissident Bengalis. In the deserted negotiations Bhutto also joined it and the tripartite
dissolved impossible constitutional shades which have nothing to develop

one- party government. Besides all other unpalatable constitutional, administrative conclusions the
generals of GHQ and their comrades in the Civil Secretariat had ordered that' the green of East Pakistan
will have to be painted red' and crushed all 'anti-state elements.'{26} Maluka stated that the real culprits
were army generals,' while Mujib and Bhutto remained mere pawns in the whole politico-military drama
leading to the secession of East Pakistan.’{27} In Hamoodur Rehman Report it is stated that by Mujibur
Rehman, complained inter-alia that Maj. Gen Rao Farman Ali had written in his own hand on the
stationary of the government. It is a wrong perception, though the military is the strongest institution of
the country but from 1968 to 1971 it has demoralized, while Bhutto and Mujib were on the crest of their
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-6
popularity which they used it in their own disastrous way. They were both politically sound than Yahya
Khan which personal life had many ’colorful' aspects. He was unable to deal with the highly explosive
situation in Pakistan. Pressurised by the internal political leaders and ' foreign-linked factionalism' he
plunged Pakistan into a bloody civil war

• The Constitutional Federalism Before 1973

Jinnah, the father of the nation, had given to his successors the pure concept of federalism, which
definitely based on three basic pillars: ’interdependence', ’cooperation', and the 'sharing of power'
between the centre and its units, as provided for in the written constitution. Due to two chunks, it was
regarded as the 'dictate of geography’. It is also true that the federalism also used to ’achieve national
unity and integration by offering federal solutions to a geographically unique country’ {28} which was
failed constitutional idea and was not able to prevent the ultimate separation of the two wings of the
country. Pakistan's federal constitutionalism from 1947-1971 was sacrificed by every regime with in the
constitution or without the constitution. The non-constitutional and military interference with the like-
minded stuff has been the real nonsuccesses for the country's federalism. Literally, federalism means
two- way government works according to Constitutional rights of its units. But it did not happened in
Pakistan. The Constitution in Pakistan couldn't limit the powers of the government and thus not to
operate as a sacred document for protection of 'private rights.’ Such an example could be conceived
from Pakistan’s constitutional history in which the system visualised on the constitutional supremacy
was deliberately allowed to degenerate into highly centralised governments. Federalism was a vision of
Jinnah, which buried with his dead body in a splendid, palatial 'graveyard'. From that period the federal
constitutional processes commanded the discussions, 'yet in actual operation it may well be non-federal
or quasi-federal structure.'{29}.
When Pakistan came into born in 1947, it was the nation of five distinctive nationalities’. They
have five different provinces, five different nationalities, five different culture, language, and script.
Federalism, Urdu and Islam gifted to the nation 'through which differing nationalities may unite and
while retaining their distinct sub-national existence create a new sense of common nationality' {30} but
regional feelings and tensions grew more than the feelings of unification, culminating in the dis-
integration of the country in 1971. The dismemberment tom the federal structure of the country, inject -
ing the parasite of disintegration in the statue of national integration. Dr Jaffar Ahmad states that"
Thereafter, the contradiction of the body-politic and the peculiar political configuration of the coun try
were not enervated by the separation of Pakistan." {31} And the fragile syndrome also continues to
haunt the Pakistani-makers. As we discussed before that the constitutionalist always worked hard for
federal constitution but they couldn't implement it in the governmental structure. It has become the
gallery of abstracted constitutional paintings: From Provisional Constitution: 1947-1956 (modified and
amended version of the Government of India Act, 1935); the 1956 Constitution: 1956-1958; Interim
Constitution under Ayub Khan's martial law: 1958-62; the 1962 Constitution: 1962-9, were all had
federal provisions - in reality their governments were highly centralised. There was nothing
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-7
| difficult in the constitution- making process, giving priority to political rights, especially the rights of
the provinces and the fact those proposals and the father of the nation carved structure.
The father of Pakistan, and to some extent his closest colleagues, strive to define the ideal of
Pakistan with so much clarity as circumstances permitted them. It was defined that Pakistan was to be
a modem democratic, a federation of autonomous provinces, where sovereignty was vested in the peo ple
and their representatives had full authority to draw up a compact between the state and its citizens. 1
However, a less practical, controversial efforts being adopted to establish Pakistan on federal, demo -
cratic structure through inability, self -deception and palatial intrigues. Perhaps, Pakistan's founding
fathers were unaware of the coming breed whose introductions of Interim constitution (1947) Objective
Resolution (1949), parity formula (1948-1954), and constitutions (1956-1962), were all measures
adopted by the custodians of power to perpetuate themselves or to legitimate their rule through extra-
federate means. Constitutions are influenced by what rulers think of them, by their legitimate attitude to
them. Our chequered constitutional history makes it abundantly clear that Pakistan is one of those
undeveloped countries where the legitimacy is treated with more respect and fear than the constitution. It
is a mater of remember that dictatorship in any form or guise was inconsistent with the country and its
constitutions and it is happened in the country that having federal structure, the legitimised-sucker tilted
the government to the centralisation and non-federation.
Pakistan is a failed federal state and the 'problem can be studied particularly with reference to
two aspects, constitutional and political.'{32} If constitutionally and culturally the federal structure
best suits Pakistan, politically, the regional, linguistic, tribal entities were the disturbances for the
smoothness of federalism. Though the mosaic of different groups, having different socio-cultural
pressures, multiplicity of languages only can be tightened by the federal constitutionalism but they
were also caused the political configuration in the country. The federal structure and 'exert direct
impact over center-province or inter-provincial relations and on the process of nation building, at
large' did not bind them. {33}The growing regional problems posed a threat to political instability of
the provinces and pushed the center towards further open or veiled dictatorship which falsifying
federal procedures.
In the early pages we have already pointed out that Pakistan when it came into being as an
independent state had no constitution of its own. The country started its constitutional morality with
the interim constitution of Government of India Act 1935. Although the Act had a method of
distribution of legislative powers between the central and the provincial governments 'which, as it
was admitted by the joint parliamentary committee in its report, was without precedent. The seventh
schedule to the act contained three legislative lists— the federal, the provincial and concurrent. The
first two belonged exclusively to the competence of the federal and provincial
legislature.'{34}Though structure of federation were based on the relation between the central and the
provincial government yet a slight but very important disparity gave in the balance of the relations.
The provinces, having separate legal entity, entitled by the scope of regional autonomy; the central
weight was more equipped with administrative authority.
Government of India Act 1935 with certain amendments to suit its requirements was adopted as
the working constitution of the country as envisaged in section 8 of the Independence Act of 1947. It
was necessary to work constitutionally but the constitution established of highly centralised system
which reflected in the mirror of coming constitutions. Though certain adaptations were there but the
central supremacy was not settled. It was a constitutional supervision on the political government or
vice-versa that Pakistan's coming constitutions also indulges in the plague of power seeking. And the
trend not only created conflict between the centripetal forces and centrifugal forces but also dented
the basic, distinctive characteristics of federal constitutions i.e., the distribution of power between the
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-8
two sets, 'the existence of a common umpire to determine and interpret the distribution of
powers' and most important the supremacy of the constitution were the features which manipulated
by the dracolian managers of the state. Goal W. Choudhry re-cited Professor Where’s opinion about
the growth 3nd increase of centarlisation of the government in the federal constitution.' The chief
forces which have caused central governments to increase in strength at the expense of the region-
whether by fuller ; exploitation of their existing powers or occasionally by acquisition of new powers-
seem to have been four-fold. They are war, economic depression, the growth of social service, and
the mechanical revolution in transport and industry. War and economic depression demand unitary
control if these problems are to be effectively treated, and they impose a financial strain which only
central government has been able to bear.’{35} In Pakistan the problem is related to its political -
regional settlements, feudal -locked and root-less political parties, lack of political consciousness in
the masses and military- bureaucracy nexus and its supervision on all issues of political,
constitutional, national and international like.
We can assess from our above discussion that Pakistan inherited federal constitutional structure
but laced with unitary components of the non-federalism. In Pakistan, the inherited phenomenon
adopted with knowing the political, regional differences. In the country the constitution was never
regarded as the 'supreme law of the land 1 and secondly it was ignored that the country does not fulfill
the essential conditions for a unitary system of Constitution. It is found that 'the trained
administrators of the old civil and Provincial bureaucracy with the Army behind them, had served as
the ’remedy’ for the centralisation of the government rather to the ’supreme of law of the land’ by the
'unidentified constitutional lawyers’. {36}It was also ’asserted that what existed in Pakistan instead
of a constitution were the ’patched-up remnants of the Government of India Act.'{37}The power of
the governor-general, having strong centralisation, has unchanged in 1956, 1962 constitutions, which
caused major constitutional conflicts in Pakistan. Under the 1956, 1962 constitutions, Pakistan
became a republic, and the head of the state became known as President. The borrowed inheritance
clung and arose largely over the question of representation between the regional and central
legislature. Zarina Salamat also talks about another fact that 'in the Constituent assembly, the
question of relations between East with West Pakistan overshadowed all other problems of
constitution making.'{38} It is the matter of fact that the early days of independence, the issue of
constitutional process was hurdled by (1) the question of provisional autonomy and representation
between the centre and the units and (2) the matter of relation between the two wings. The second
factor caused the unity of all 'Bengalis in their bitterness against the Center and West Pakistan'.
It is the matter of fact that the constitutions have produced in Pakistan but the political mileage
was not achieved. There are three basic reasons: Firstly, the constitutions were the reflec tion of some
like-minded constitutionalist not for the establishment of the stable government. Secondly, The
constitution was working but the politicians were falling foul of everything that crossed their path.
Thirdly, the weakened political system 'was not the lack of the constitution but the absence of
national political parties without which no democratic system could function' {39} was also the cause
of collapsed of politico-constitutional destination. Without a constitution, honest politicians and
national political party, the country can be considering a politically -starved region. The role of
politicians and political parties is essential to every state. The positive intercourse of the constitution
and the national political parties give birth to a complete political system. In Pakistan, the Muslim
League played its role from 1940 to 1947, gathered people for cause and 'carving up ! a homeland for
a nation. But it failed to transform itself into a political party with grassroots support after
independence. The party became a 'coterie of office seekers’. They used it like a ready-made cheaque
for their personal interests and coined splinter groups with new names. In the
_
political history of Pakistan the political parties are used like 'pawns' of the chessboard of the
authoritarian who benefited the Centralist State. Due to the office seekers, those who handicapped
the party dented its legality, and popularity. From 1947 to 'until 1954, Pakistan was virtually a sin gle
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-9
party state. Thereafter new political parties appeared but none had a nation-wide basis or a def inite
program to fulfill the role of an opposition party' but when the democratic movement was started
against the Ayub's era, the two political parties came into the scene and charged the political battery
of the masses of Pakistan. And fourthly and very importantly, Pakistan started constitutional
experiments. The Constituent Assembly had therefore to frame a constitution keeping in view all
religious, social and political aspects. It was a hard talk. But each time, the hard talk was over, the
military establishment stepped in to the corridors of the parliament and 'have indulge the most
malevolent acts of abrogating, holding in abeyance, and violating various Constitutions of the land.'
dismiss constitutions before they could develop their impact on running political system. {40}
Although the constitution of a country is its most fundamental legal as well as political document. It
sets the basic structure of various institution of the state. Being a normative document it is an
expression of the aspirations of the people. But in Pakistan, the tendency to identify the consti -
tutional importance, no political party based its structure on constitutional aspirations; 'they were
often modified or amended to suit the party leaders'. {41}.

• THE COMING OF BHUTTO

Bhutto started his carrier in the confines of military-bureaucratic castle. The established
corrupt politico-constitutional scenario. It was natural because the 'established' governments for
nearly two decades plagued the entire political and constitutional history. Before iris introduction to
some administrative services the country was not only collapse^#! its politico-constitutional
awakening but also amputated. He has observed the status of constitutionalism as well as the
parliamentarianism in the 'democracy of dictators'. From Iskandar Mirza to Ayub Khan, the
advocates of strong presidential form of government, Bhutto cashed his capabilities of brilliant
eloquence. He was ' one of Ayub's closest advisers on the Constitution and how best to manage
Pakistan's transition from autocratic military rule to '’democratic’’ government with at least some
patina of popular political support’. {42} He bluntly criticised ’ pre -ayub politicians like
surawardhy 11 who played hovac and ran amuck with the destinies of the people," and therefore
deserved to " debarred from polluting the social and economic life of the nation". {43} Bhutto knew
the political strength of army in the country, which has such a large monetary stake in the country
that it will never allow a populist civilian government to interfere with the status quo. 'To avoid
regular military intervention, its role in the decision-making process must be concretised, was in his
inner political desire. Because' there was no question of any political motive in his selection, or for
that matter, of any other minister in the cabinet. Bhutto's six years in the Ayub regime were,
therefore, hot years of apprenticeship in politics. It was a period of experience in the
administration.'{44} But there was a 'nimble political dancer' in his charismatic speeches and when
he entered the gateway of politics against his master, a new era of constitutional democracy was
started and ended after a doubtful judicial propriety. The Ayub -Bhutto confrontation was really one
democracy versus authoritarianism.
Bhutto came into power after the fall of Dacca, General Yahoo Khan was forced to step down
and Mr. Bhutto assumed political control of the country on 21st December, 1971 as the first elected
civilian President of Pakistan. It is also true that he was certainly not carried into power by full of
democratic means. Perhaps the situation sandwiched Bhutto between the majority (149 seats) of
Awami League in 1970 elections and the Army. He had only 87 seats in a house of 250 but the
country's opportune came to select him. His Presidency, which followed the secession of Bangladesh
and the

resulting war with India, is credited with restoring stability. The country would be a democracy was
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-10
never in doubt before December 1971 or immediately thereafter. It is the tragedy of the leader and the
country that' democracy begins with the As, Bs and Cs but always ends up with the GHQ.' Bhutto
convened the newly established National assembly of a new divided Pakistan (composed of 139 mem -
bers) which murdered by a coup and 'began the longest tenure in office of a ruler in Pakistan's
history.'{45} Bhutto was a ray of hope for those who advocate that Pakistan's political system should
and can be democratically based.' Despite his inability' to establish strong constitutional surroundings
and federal structure, Bhutto awakened the political consciousness of the masses. Mushahid Hussian
described his governance as a ' combination of some of the cultural attributes of populism, liberal
democracy and feudal despotism.'{46}.
To attain the sense of his charisma and capabilities, Bhutto chose a new path of popularity, which
changed him from the state making to constitution making.. It was not an accidental conversion to
reshape his political ideology, 'His eight year political apprenticeship under Ayub Khan gave him the
real taste of power and experience in handling public affairs.'{47}It was the reflection of his experience
of power and instinctive manner, ’that if he had to assume the leadership of the country, the country had
to be given a new direction and dimension away from the beaten track of the dictatorship of the army
and the dominance of private enterprise in the determination of its economic policy.'{48} The people of
Pakistan who witnessed the destruction of constitutions and democracy did not only clap him but also’
even some of the Opposition parties assured their support to him.' {49}. The opposition parties also
supported him when he instituted the formal structure of constitutionalism, which indicated his
modernist and liberal democratic dimension. He expressed his complete commitment to constitutional
democracy in these words:
" I say this not because it is a fashion to uphold democracy. I say this because it is a fashion to
uphold democracy; I say this because there is irrefutable evidence to show it. The first Constituent
assembly of Pakistan took seven years. They dabbled over the constitution for seven years and at the end
of seven years they were not able to frame a constitution. Within one and a half years the People’s
government and it is the People’s Government no matter how mockingly some people want to deride it.
What else it is if not the People’s Government; the people have given confidence and voted for the party
which is in control of the government. It can not be described by any other name. In this period of time
in these 18 months with all the internal and external problems we faced, the people’s Government lifted
Martial Law in April 1972 and gave the Interim Constitution, {50} and arrived at two fundamental
agreements by the process of negotiation and discussion. And members of the House would remember
that on the 2oth of October 1972 we made strenuous and tireless efforts for the consensus on the
Constitution. We did not take plea that we are the majority party and so we have right to give a
constitution to the country, as we taken soon after the election in 1970 by the majority party at that time
and supported by the parties on this side sitting in the House at the moment."

* Bhutto and the making of the Constitution 1973

Bhutto attempted to democratisation for Pakistan's people (1971-1977) but failed to penetrate it
completely. That is why Zia, handled the politicians and Bhutto’s people’ for coming eleven years. It
was challenging problem confronting Pakistan's political system from its beginning. The development of
a political system based on constitutional democratic institutions and governance has been confronted in
Pakistan with the all-coercive levers of state. 'In fact, from the beginning, several forces were arrayed
against the development of a democratically based political system.' Those 'notorious brakes’ was the
principle dilemma of Pakistan’s constitutional democracy For more than half a century, there seemed to
have no concerted effort to establish real constitutional base gover nance. Even Bhutto struggled hard to
rise to the pinnacle. He used every method and weapon to achieve that position— for this he refused to
accept the greater success of the Awami League in the }970 elections and playing a major role to get rid
of East Pakistan. Bhutto was with the Army than to give opportune to the more winning man like Mujib
to form Pakistan's first elected civilian gov ernment. Bhutto inherited the accumulated fears, ambitions
and contradictions of Pakistanis political and constitutional life, which he used for his ’political
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-11
success.’ The internal political/regional situation which has been plagued after the politico-military
drama leading to the secession of a new country. The Bangladesh syndrome readies to continue to re-
charge the sentiments of provinciality, 'IWFP, Baluchistan and Sindh may also follow the precedent set
by the Bangladesh movement'. {51} 'Bhutto faced the most difficult task of picking the pieces of
Pakistan, lest the example of Bangladesh infect the remaining federating units in the western
wing.’{52}.
Finally, Bhutto also inherited constitutional controversies where the document was not the vehicle
of a nation's life but a laboratory for experiments in tackling constitutional problems, either existing,
created or clung. Though the country’s 'qualified' constitutionalist introduced constitutional experiments
yet the issues of concern like federation and the quantum of provincial autonomy, the question of reli -
gion and the state, franchise issue, the division of powers between the executive and legislature and a
presidential or parliamentary form of government overshadowed all other problems of political system.
Bhutto started his political career with a civilian martial law The country was governed first under
martial law and then under a temporary constitution. The state of dream, which had so many nightmares
of destruction, abrogation, suppression which mitigated against constitution and democracy, now
starting a new plane of constitutional democracy. He lifted the ban from the political par ties and
annulled the results of inconclusive by-elections conducted by the military regime after March 1971.'
Besides introducing a number of changes in the socio-economic structure of the state, Bhutto focused
upon the most important work to structure a Constitution, a frame of political society of democratic
order. He did not want to run the affairs of the country without a constitution as many of his
predecessors-in-office had done. Constitution gain sanctity only with time and the constitution of 1973
when seen in the backdrop of Pakistan's experience of frequent abrogation is a lasting achievement of
Bhutto. General Zia did make a mark on it but only in the shape of amendments which some feel
required.
It was also very first time that the government held consultation with major political parties, (a) It
was also believed that the seat of CMLA could not continue for a long time and had to be replaced by
the constitutional rule, (b) The consultation with the political parties was the step to secure the further
consensus on a constitution, so it was the first settlement for the interim arrangement And (c) it was also
believed that without any necessary consultation, the ruling party could not enforce a consti tution on the
NWFP and Baluchistan. Here, the majority was represented by the NAP-JUI political alliance. There
were two comer meetings. The National Awami Party (NAP) and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i- Islam(JUI) and
PPP were the winning parties of four provinces of 'new Pakistan', whose positive efforts came to agree
upon the following rapprochement to the formulation of the third Constitution:

* TRIPARTITE ACCORD
1. Martial law would be lifted on 14 August 1972.
2. The 1972 interim Constitution returned Pakistan briefly to a constitutive document on the
model of the 1935, with consequential amendments. The two type of government was
installed, i.e., the Presidential type of government in the centre and a parliamentary system in
the provinces.

3. A committee was appointed to draft the permanent Constitution and ’after 14 August 1972,
it would act as both a constitution making and legislative body.'
4. ' It was accepted that in the NWFP and the Province of Baluchistan, the majority parties are
NAP and JUI and they will be entitled to form the Governments.' Moreover,' by way of
compromise', during the interim period, Governors in these two Provinces would be
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-12
appointed in consultation with the NAP-JUL
5. After 14 August 1972, the National Assembly would act both as the constitution making
and the legislative organ of the state, until a permanent Constitution was passed and
adopted. {53}.

The accord was described as 'Golden Bridge'. It was accepted by the bulk of politicians who
had condemned the presidential form of government conducted in 1962. The first step was the inter-
im constitution, introduced on 21 April 1972, 'which did the Federal Government unilaterally
prepare. It was never discussed, debated, or deliberated upon, or decided by voting in the National
Assembly' {54} The document was based on Objective Resolution, federated and huge presidential
relating to the executive, judiciary, and legislature. When a new constitution was structuring, 'Bhutto
had pressed for creation of a presidential political system, but the PPP leaders were more inclined to
revive the parliamentary experiment terminated by martial law in 1958.' {55}. Bhutto accepted the
revival of parliamentary system in the constitution of 1973 when he assured to tilt all significant
powers to the office of the prime minister rather to the president. He didn't abolish the parliamentary
system by any formal amendments to the constitution. It was the start of ’civilian democracy' in
which all the powers were delegated to the office of the Prime Minister and the president became
powerless. Lawrence Ziring rightly writes that 'the parliamentary system was crafted to buttress
Bhutto's executive powers, and the Assembly was literally prevented from questioning the Prime
Minister's behavior or actions. The assignment of virtually absolute power to the head of
government, however, caused the resignation of the Law Minister and provoked an opposition
boycott of the closing proceedings.'{56} It was like marry go round where the power came again
and again in the presidential or parliamentary or any other form of government. The President who
had become the sign of constitutional power was bound to act upon the advice of the Prime Minister.
These provisions made him a mere showpiece.

• SOME NOTES ON PARLIAMENTARY VS PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM IN

PAKISTAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY.
The question of a pre Presidential or parliamentary executive also overshadowed all other
problems of constitution making in Pakistan, and was further complicated by the wishes of the
dictators. As a political scientist, L.F Rushbrook Williams rightly observed that" In view of the
lively controversy, which was being conducted throughout the whole country about the kind of
constitution Pakistan really needed, delay was popularly attributed by interest groups to report that
Drafting Committee was divided whether the future Constitution should be of Presidential or of
Parliamentary type.” {57} Pakistan inherited its political life from the structure of British
parliamentary system when it came into existence in 1947 Government of Indian Act with some
amendments to suits its requirements was adopted, which provided for parliamentary form of
government both at the centre and in the provinces, the system was recommended in the various
constitutional documents of 1951, 1952, 1953 and finally adopted in the country's first constitution
in 1956. It should also be noted that the Assembly had taken action to amend those sections 9, 10,
10B, 17 of the Act, which related to the development of presidential system. These were curtailed
which disturbed the discretionary powers of the Governor-General.
To many observers and political commentators on Pakistan's parliamentarians, the lack of
mutually 'share political culture', the permanent 'palace intrigues' and the series of martial law in the
country since its birth has been the main dominating hurdles for the establishment of parliamentary
system. 'The working of the said system in Pakistan was however, far from satisfactory.' With out a
single election and with the seven Prime ministers, it was impossible to find out the way for the
maturity of country's parliamentary democracy. The crises of democratic parliamentarianism in
Pakistan beginning with the dismissal of Nizam-ud-Din as prime minister in 1953 and followed by
the use of strong executive orders, long phase of martial law, bureaucratic authority,
 BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-13
dismemberment of the country and frequent attempts against the constitutions were endemic. The
unfortunate and retaliatory actions plunged the country in confusion and chaos and the country
never recovered. On the other hand, there were some who didn't believe on parliamentary system for
Pakistan and especially, ulema who wanted to struck the castle of Islamic state considered the
presidential system nearer to Islam. Due to these breakers and 'favorable realities' led the army to
enter in the political scenario, abrogated the constitution of 1956, manhandled the politicians and
introduced the presidential type in Pakistan in 1962. Ayub stated to explain his presidential attempt
like this way:
“We have adopted the presidential system as it is simpler to work, more akin to our genius and
history and less liable to lead to instability- a luxury that a developing country like (Pakistan) cannot
afford." {58}It is also the matter of fact that he ’rejected all the recommendations made by the
Constitutional Commission, accepted only one namely that the constitution should be Presidential in
form.' {59} What he was adopted in his 1962 constitution was not a genuine presidential system
which should be based on checks and balances as it exist in the United States. The constitution was
the act of his government. It was the handiwork of his like-minded generals and politicians. The
President, under the Article 226 of the new Constitution, was selected and overriding authority in
provincial matters. The legislature was weak and powerless. It is also true that through the
'controlled democracy' Ayub was diagnosing the ills of the political economy. He believed that for '
development, progress and awakening, the' strong, stable and efficient administration' is the basic
need of the day. {60} And for the implementation of 'sound’ administrative system, the 'Asian de
Gaulle’ attempted to save the government by his constitutional supervision. Though he worked with
his military uniform for forty- four months, argued that the purpose of his rule during that period
was not retribution, but education and development. {61 }The constitution reflected Ayub's own
concepts of political satiability ('Yes, I dictated it myself, the whole of it. I wanted to do it a bit plain
speaking.') - Indirectly elected chief executive with wide administrative and fiscal power, an
indirectly elected assembly, and asset of guiding principles of the legislature instead of the
fundamental rights.
Though the strong and stable executive, backed by the constitutional wall, has made good
progress in economic development yet it faced strong revolt in the eastern as well as the western
chunk of the country. It is true to some extent that the Martial Law and the centralisation of power
which denied due share of the people of East Pakistan in the administration of the country expedited
their separation from the west, but it can be conveniently stated that the factors other than centralisa -
tion did also play an important role, a role more damaging than that of centralisation. Bhutto and
Mujib justified their extraordinary powers by citing the country's instability in the wake of martial
law
! and its presidential trap. Both called for the stability of parliamentary system, 'as it was the only form
I
I of government under which the people could expect to have some share in the decision-making j
process on vital issues; the cabinet, the real executive authority under the parliamentary system.' In new
Pakistan' which reshaped by Bhutto’s political authority dealt with strong prime minister rather to strong
parliamentary system.
• THE MAKING
The Constitution committee of 24 members, with Abdul Hafiz Pirzada as a Chairman, met in
Islamabad on October 9, 1972, was particularly conscious of the unfortunate political and constitutional
history of country and past failure. It identified the causes, which led, on more than one occasion, to the
breakdown of the constitutional and judicial machinery. It was the opinion of the committee that the past
constitutions were dictated and abrogated by the usurpers and dictators. Their basic j purpose was to
assume powers at the cost of the oppressed people and country. It was hoped that the j draft of the
constitution would do away with the dichotomy between the fiction and reality of executive authority.
To save the constitution, it was declared that any attempt at a military coup or to abro- | gate or subvert
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-14
was deemed treason, punishable by death. (Article 6). The clause was crafted for the preservation of
democratic order and protection of the Constitution from power-hungry adventurers.
It was the 'first ever framed by directly elected representatives of the people, the 1973 constitution
put 1 the country back on the rails of democracy after fifteen years of political frustration.' {62}
Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, who piloted the Constitution bill, stated that "Mr. President, Sir, first time in
the history of Pakistan of 25 years, tragic history of Pakistan, tragic constitutional history of
Pakistan, for the first time we are not only on the threshold of giving a Constitution through the most
recognized and cherished democratic process but we are almost over that threshold..."
Zulafkar Ali Bhutto the architect of the Constitution characterised it and said:" I hope that after
a long and tortuous road we have reached a stage in our life which can be regarded as a culmination.
For a long time we have not been able to find basic solution too many problems that affect the coun-
try. Again and again, the issues have been opened and re-opened with greater anger and with greater
bitterness. Among these problems of Pakistan the answer to the constitutional problems of Pakistan
can be regarded as the most important. After 25 years we have, after many disputes and quarrels,
come! to point where we can say that we have a fundamental law; we have a constitution and
nobody can deny that this Constitution does represent the will of the people; no body can deny that
this Constitution is a democratic Constitution by any definition of a Constitution; nobody can deny
that it is a Federal Constitution; nobody can deny that there is settlement over the quantum of
autonomy and thanks God for that; no body can deny that it is an Islamic provisions than any of the
past constitutions of Pakistan as well as any of the other constitutions of Muslim countries other than
monarchist countries..."
Bhutto was proud of his brainchild and ensured 'that our people will not again be subjected to
the arbitrariness, the exploitation and the suppression which had turned the cherished Muslim dream
of an independent homeland into a long nightmare.’{63} His constitutionalism, progressive labor !
laws, autonomous Industrial Corporation were the indication of his modernist and liberal democratic
dimension. Yet, at the same time, a despotic streak was manifested in his feudal hostility when his
authority was questioned. The 1973 Constitution was not without controversy and it had opportuni-
ties to question the empowerment of the prime minister. Where according to the Article 90 of the
Constitution, the Prime Minister is considered to be the fountainhead of the executive authority,
which was giving indications of his future course. Nonetheless, a 1973 constitution was written and
approved by a directly elected Assembly for the first time since independence. The constitution of
1973 though it is an improvement over all those approved earlier is not in form, character and sub -
stance from others excepting of course the one passed in 1962. Although, the document laid the
answer of political frustration which spread by the arbitrators in the name of constitutionalism of
1962. Mirza and Ayub Khan were the earliest and most obvious representatives who disturbed the
laxative conditions of constitutions and created instability in the relationship between the various
institutions of the state. 'Having failed to manage the state, the military rulers temporarily assumed a
low-key profile by allowing Z. A. Bhutto to run the country’, {64} without knowing his interior
decorative and experienced capabilities of Bhutto who rearranged powers, and took certain decisions
to bring the armed forces under his complete command. Bhutto wanted to take this opportune for a
long time and for this purpose he backed his constitution by the Article 6 to protect the constitution
from the familiar military coups d’état. He planted parliamentary system for his executive powers
where the no order of the President was valid unless the Prime Minister countersigned it. Crafted the
provisions which suited his delegated powers, he became the most powerful prime minister in the
history of Pakistan and the treatment of absolute power was opposed in the parliament It was criti-
cised that 'the 1973 document, like Ayub Constitution of 1962, reflected the interests of the maxi -
mum ruler, and from Bhutto’s point of view, it was challenge proof.' {65} The president who was
one of the powerful calibraty of Pakistan's constitutional functions was bound, by the advice of the
Prime Minister in the performance of his duties. Under Article 232, he was empowered to issue a
proclamation of emergency in the country but supervised by the approval of joint session of
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-15
Parliament. It was easy to say that the conflict between the president and Prime Minister's adventures
for power was one of the major problems, which bedeviled Pakistan’s constitution and its impact on
governance. Bhutto, of course, was averse to 'presidential martial law 1, which could disturb him, and
he wanted to hold an honored place in the government so he (Prime Minister) ’reduced the status of
the president and incorporated provisions presumed to deter the army from interfering in
politics.'{66}

■ FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM UNDER BHUTTO

j; The most alarming problem which faced Bhutto was 'to pick up the pieces, very small pieces. 1
in the federative unification. Pakistan disturbed by its interior political monologues, which made it the
complex mosaic of regional and anti-national movements. The country has seen the dismemberment
of one of his province, which also opened the political, economic, regional pendorabox for the other
parts of 'new Pakistan.' The truncated country has no political consensus and constitutional legitima -
cy for the remaining federating units. In the absence of constitutional rule it was very difficult to
operate federal system in a political foundation which always groomed to accept the impact of
tyrannical governments. It was Bhutto's work that he struggled to change the entire laughing stock
to the constitutional and political legitimacy. He permitted to abolish ban on the functioning of the
political parties, and allowing the JUI-NAP to run the provincial administrations in the NWFP and
Baluchistan. Maya Chudda writes well that' the six years under Bhutto had provided Pakistan a taste
of popularity. They were heady days in Pakistan, where politicians of every hue and ideological
orientation flourished.’{67}But he could not gear the process of this flourishing political culture.
His civilian government was failed to check the armed forces and their internal intrigues to develop
ethnic challenges for the central government. Like last experiences, the army didn't give time to
'bridge the gap between the promise and the reality.'{68}
The country has its third constitution, 'a body of rules governing the affairs of an organised
group" {69} and ’the Federal provisions of this Constitution and the existence of a bicameral
Federal Legislature are meant to allow the various regions of Pakistan to play their full part in the
nation's social, political and economic life.'{70}This is why the Jinnah’s 14 points (1929) and
Pakistan Resolution (1940) had spoken of 'independent Muslim State' in which the Constituent units
would be 'autonomous and sovereign'. The aim of federalism in a society is to unify the mul-
tilingual, multi-ethnic and diverse cultural entities. When the aim didn't work for the unification of
'double governments’, it creates political chaos, double standards between the state authority and
regional sentiments. We can find these failures in the Pakistan's constitutional history of in which
the system, constitutionally presented as federal, was deliberately allowed to degenerate into a highly
centralised and non- federal in practice.
It should be the matter of research that Pakistan is a society, which fulfilled the essential con -
ditions of federal system, but the system was only visualized on papers and debates and failed to gen -
erate highly federal principles in the country. It resulted not only the separation of the country in 1971,
also making a farce provincial autonomy in the 'new Pakistan.' Inspired by the federal principle and all
the political idealism associated with it, Bhutto (71} and his colleagues opined that 'it is a special merit
of the federal system that it harmonise differences, dissimilarities and divergence's, enabling dis parate
groups, to live side by side in a symbiosis of mutual benefit' {72}The federal system is a desire for
unification among the units of a country. By this desire, the federalist enables both governments to draw
their authority and legitimacy from the Constitution of that society. Bhutto knew the merit and demerits
of federal and centralised unitary system. He was the involved observer of the former constitutionalism
pillared on the federal system have turned out to be, centralised quasi-federal in practice. He knew that
if the unitary or quasi-federal system imposed under the federal circumstances, it developed centralised
dictatorship, destroyed the happening of civil society. This what happened under the 'late 1
Constitutionalism. Having positive thinking about federalism and essential components for better
federal principles, our society could not conceive the system satisfactorily and smoothly? Perhaps the
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-16
federal structure was difficult to generate in the federating units of Pakistan which are ' the most
difficult provinces in the subcontinent. Always historically they have been a free people... [they] have
fought always for individuality, personality, freedom... they have that tradition; they have that
history.’{73} But it is not only the limitation, which suffered the federal structure even in 1973
Constitution.
The Constitution inherited number of unitary feature, which make it quasi-federal system. Yet it
was stated that the document was Pakistan's first to depart from the Westminister model to evolve “a
genuinely Federal Constitution". {74} The Federal structure was tilted towards central isation. It was
mainly based on the constitutive provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 which provided
adequate provisions and process to ensure full predominance of the central authority and 'solidified
authority over the assemblies who, by virtue of clauses like 93, could simply dissolve the elected
assemblies and promulgate governor’s rule in the provinces. The dilemma also clogged and congested
the positive political relationship between general and regional governments to rewording of section 93
of the India Act of 1935 which provided a chance 'to the military oligarchy stepped in to dismiss elected
governments officials before they could complete their full terms in office.'{75} The frequent martial
law and unilateral amendments have persistently dented and created instability in the relationship
between various constitutions of the state and blocked the federal process. It is not surprising then that
after almost six decades the country still awaits basic federal guidelines and has yet to decide between
federal and unitary system. The 1973 Constitution came into being, then, as a result of the exclusive
attention given to the constitutional consensus between the central and provincial leaders. The purpose
is to incorporated provisions presumed to deter the army from interfering in politics and federal
principles. It is also correct to say that the 1973 Constitution provides federal characteristics, which
drives towards provincial importance in the general government. For example, their own legislature
directly elected by the people (Article 106)., their power to make law on the residuary subjects (Article-
142(c))., their equal representation in the Senate (Article- 59), their division of power amongst the
executive, the legislature and the judiciary were the provisions of sound federal structure. Due to these
provisions, other provinces lent support to the government in the hope of negotiating a constitutional
practice based on strong provinces and weak center. This is about all. Virtually all the other provisions
and

Processes were fully utilised for the dominance of centre over the governments in the provinces which
created some constitutional conflicts between the two basic polls of the federative set-ups. penetrated in
the provincial's financial, administrative and political matters, the country's governmental structure
could hardly be described as truly federal.
Pakistan is described as a 'Federal Republic' (Article-1). Its provisions were similar to its con -
stitutional background as in the interim constitution (1947) and the 1956 constitution. The Constitution
provided provisions not only relating to the distribution of legislative powers but provisions relating to
the financial and administrative relations between the federation and provinces.
The distribution of legislative powers are conceived from the Government of India Act 1935, but
instead of three lists-federal, provincial and concurrent- there are two lists: the federal and concurrent
list having 59 and 47 items respectively, ’and the federal legislature shall have exclusive power to make
law in respect of any matters in the federal legislative list.'{76}The Constitution appeared to give power
to federal and provincial legislature for the making of laws with respect to any matters in the concurrent
legislative list. The residuary subjects belonged to the federating units. The Council of Common
Interests (CCI) and the National Finance Commission (NFC) were the striking features of federalism in
The Constitution.
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-17
FEDERAL LIST-1
List of Subjects 1935 Act 1956 Constitution 1962 Constitution 1973 Cons:
Federal 61 30 94 Part 1-59 Partn-8
(Only 1 list)

Provincial 55 94

Concurrent 19 47

Residuary With Provinces ■ (But With

Powers
Provinces with Provinces

Overriding Provision Regarding National interest)

Source: Rafi Raza, ZulajkarAli Bhutto And Pakistan: 1967-1977 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997)181.

It is true that the centralising tendency of the governments, captured by representatives and
unrepresentative regimes had made federalism unworkable as a smooth system. It is also expounded
that without centralising tendency, the system couldn’t gain momentum in a modem complex society.
In Pakistan, federalism is a working machine, which has been mishandled by the inherited colonial
nexus, provisions and tendencies of centralisation. But it is also true that Pakistan government had to
provide maximum constitutional autonomy to the provinces, which have slogans of their regional
rights. It tilted towards decentralised governments to grow autonomous provinces.

It is also noted that federalism look impressive and a tool of good relations between the
centre and the provinces when 'one confines oneself to the distribution of legislative powers', but
one can not find these good authoritative relationships between the centre and provinces in the
administrative and financial sphere. Pakistan’s constitutionalise federalism is also disturbed by its
administrative and financial matters. The provinces always cried about their almost free
authorities and finances in their own hands.The centre, being habitual, always confronted with
these matters. The 1973 Constitution provided some provisions as discuss earlier to satisfy their
regional demands and aspiration, but like other constitutions and as adopted by the 1935 Act it
also showed its dominance of federal government over the provincial government in the
administrative as well as financial spheres. Lawrence Ziring used it correctly that’ Bhutto wanted
a constitution, but more than that, he wanted a political system that acknowledged his
paramouncy. Operating on the basis of viceregalism, supposedly protected by the trappings of
constitutional legitimacy, politically unchallenged at the national level, and surrounded by layers
of security, Bhutto anticipated governing Pakistan almost indefinitely.’ {77} it’s not a new
phenomenon in Pakistan. From 1947 to 1973, the entire constitutionalise federalism was not
similar with the governmental intentions. It is necessary that the observers and commentators
should differentiate between the constitutional writings and governmental intentions in Pakistan
to know about the true story.
Bhutto's legacy of Federalism was 'tempered with executive privilege and government
centralisation, which displeased the strong assertions of provincial autonomy voiced in NAP.' The
issue of provincial autonomy was the burning feature of NAP politics ’which its leaders figured
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-18
repeatedly in the constitution-drafting debates’ where Wali Khan had trumpeted: ’ When we
wanted our rights in the past we were dubbed as traitors, but now the situation had changed. Now
we shall take our rights and not beg for them. And if any one tries to oust us from Pakistan then
he should remember that we are not Bengalis who separated/ {78}From the very beginning,
Bhutto's government faced politico-constitutional tension with the NAP-JUI governments in the
provinces of the NWFP and Baluchistan because both of the parties were not fully satisfied by the
governmental structure conceived by the constitution of 1973. Although the constitution received
entire approval from the elected National - Assembly yet the differences were highly flammable
and waiting for any immediate cause to bum. Bhutto’s government received these differences as
threats to his intention to rule Pakistan. The provincial and tribal unrest can be settled by the
negotiating tools or to approve more autonomy in the administrative as well as financial benefits
but the centralised intention to rule Pakistan changed provincial leadership through central
interventions and settled the issue 'on the battlefield, not in the provincial legislature.’{79}.
The Provisional Government are patterned on the organisational set up of the centre have
almost identical powers confined to their own jurisdiction dealing with provincial subjects. There
is no accepted principle of distribution of powers between the federation and the units of the
federation. The one rule that decides this distribution relates primarily to the character of the
subjects. Pakistan's central governments didn't develop an integrated national and provincial
cohesion. The guarantee of its cohesion always perturbed by the interference of centre to its units.
The policies of Zulafkar Ali Bhutto promising constitutional settlements, federal, and radical
reforms turned out to be very surprising when he tried to threat and harassed not only the non-PPP
provincial governments but also its own members who disagreed with the prime-minister by the
unconstitutional and illegal means. The dissolution's of the ministries, and the use of troops to
suppress the ’quantum of provincial autonomy', the rigging, in the 1977 elections were the all
manners of wrong impulses of Bhutto's ' uncontrolled federalism'. The PPP government came into
power and headed the central authority by an electoral victory but 'it didn't entitle it to bludgeon
its opponents' {80} Bhutto’s excessive interference in the local affairs not only plagued the
concept of federalism in the constitution but also developed enemies of post-election
confrontations, who invited army to erode the process of 'democracy'. The military *s frequent
and arbitrary interventions has been were not new subject in the discussions of Pakistani politics.
Between 1947 to 1971, the bureaucratic and then military penetration in the politics arbitrarily
dismissed several national and provincial government. Conflicts among the central and the
provincial government gave the armed forces moral justification to intervene, and these
interventions prevented the establishment of democracy. The staunch believer of federalism
insured that they ’had signed the Constitution in the legitimate expectation that, with time, better
working arrangements between the centre and the provinces would emerged. The power of the
Federation would dilute. The process of politics would evolve mechanisation, which would
augment the role of the provinces in the affairs of the state. This dream was not realised 1 (81 }The
real purpose of Bhutto was to impose ardent authority through a negotiated constitution. To
achieve the 'objective validity in the form of 1973 constitution, he compromised with the leaders,
parties and other institutions of the country. Once he attain the constitutionalise powerful prime
ministership he became pugnacious to supervise institutions, parties, and personalities 'to suit his
style and purpose.' {82}The actions meddled the constitutional machinery in the provinces. A
Constitutional democracy ridden with multidimensional central authority that it may fit in the
class which Where describe as ’quasi-federal’.
It is strange, however, that in spite of all the inkling of federal provisions such as Article 106
of the Constitution, Article 142(c), Article 59, Article 28, 59, 70(4) and the Fourth Schedule to the
constitution, the political system which Bhutto imposed was characterised as self-centeredness and
lack of federative insight into the provincial affairs displayed, in and after, the 1973 Constitution,
have lost its credibility and opportunity for the development of constitutional democracy. Ziring
BHUTTO: THE DILEMMA OF ‘UNCONTROLLED’ CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-19
opines that 'the coup in Afghanistan that was perpetrated by Sardar Daud ! was the main cause
behind Bhutto's strong action against NWFP and Baluchistan's leadership because the new change
in Afghanistan gave positive response, which was a ’boost for Bhutto’s morale.' Addressing the
nation, he called 'for peace and co-operation, for national solidarity, and the development of
democratic practices. But he had also signed an order that directed the Baluchistan Governor to
arrest the leaders of the provincial opposition.'{83 }These unconstitutional practices disturbed the
accord of NAP-JUI with PPP, which died in less than a year. Both Frontiers provinces were placed
under Tikka Khan's military search. ' Wali Khan, however, called him " Adolf Bhutto" and told his
Frontiers followers that it would be impossible for them to enjoy " undiluted democracy" until
Bhutto was "removed" from the office.’{84) And for this purpose, the champions of provincial
rights invited army to 'stable' the democratic norms, reversing the demand of higher provincial
autonomy to an adequate amount of provincial autonomy. Paula defined the situation in these
words:' The army decided that intervention in politics was a better route to stability than the
cacophony of indecisive politics, particularly since the civilian government had set a pattern of
using the army extensively, if not effectively, to impose civil order. Military action against civil
government thought only a few years earlier to have been prohibited in the constitution, was a
simple and direct as it had been before. By misinterpreting history, the Prime Minister helped to
renew the praetorian state.' {85}
 'CONSTITUTIONAL MARTIAL IAW”: AN RELIC lO-POLITICAL STUDY 8-1
Chapter — 8

“CONSTITUTIONAL MARTIAL LAW”: A

RELIGIO-POLITICAL STUDY

“The Bhutto period therefore underscore the persistence of the executive-

legislative divide that has plagued Pakistan since the 1950s. That
democracy was again thwarted, this time under a Populist Party, invites
retrospection about the separation between state and society, and the dif-
fidence that characterised government’s relationship to its constituents,
even under a self-proclaimed populist party. Conflicts between the
establishment and the PPP led to the bureaucracy's protecting its own
interest; this in turn led to Bhutto's determination to seize the state
regardless of the incursions on the same liberties that his constitution was
to have protected. He misread the army’s loyalties and its ambivalence to
his own mixed messages; ultimately, he was overtaken by forces he
thought he had neutralised and had in fact re-empowered.”

Paula. R Newberg, Jugding the State, 169

As noticed earlier, Bhutto over-estimated his prevalence and constitution as 'supreme law of the
country’. He incorporated provisions to stop the army from interfering in politics, especially, from his
own constitutional arena. Being an experienced politician, he knew that if the country were again
plunged in a political chaos like the one that was rampant in 1958, the armed forces would not hesi tate to
intervene and dislodge the civilian government. For this purpose, he introduced constitutional and
institutional changes. Being a leader, he had ability to communicate democratic dream to the peo ple but
as Prime Minister he 'helped to renew the praetorian state.' His ’effort to assert the authority of the prime
minister was a lost cause in a situation where the street agitation was swinging the pendulum of power
once again towards the military.'! 1 }His government is alleged to have manipulated all democratic
norms and institutions which collapsed the hopes of energetic constitution whose provi sions could stop
the army to get away with plunder of the 'basic and fundamental law of governance.' The federal
experience, as he introduced, was marred by quasi-federal system, as in the early years of Pakistan's
regime, and against the provincial rights, he used military to quench 'lawlessness' in the provinces which
also raised questions with regard to the ability of the 'federal' government, to maintain law and order in
the federating units. It provided for an immediate cause for the army to enter into the politics. 'The Prime
Minister, they concluded, would sacrifice the country, much he has sacrificed
East Pakistan.’{2} It is, however, an altogether different domain that the role of the Armed forced in the
bifurcation of the country in the wake of the 1971 tragedy can hardly be overlooked. The matter remains
complicated why the duly elected leader could not help save democracy. The army officials created
conflicts among civilian leaders, fueled agitation against elected government, to sabotage the elected and
constitutional structure of the State. "The man who was called upon to bind up the nation's wounds after
a terrible civil war could very well to be the same who would destroy what remained in Pakistan" {3}
'and it is the job of the army, in fact its national duty to act if somebody is looting or destroying public
property or is trying to disrupt the MARTIAL
“CONSTITUTIONAL pattern ofLAW”:
national
ANlife ... All
RELIC of us stressed
IO-POLITICAL upon the Government,
STUDY 8-2 in
the name of God, to solve the problem politically.'{4} The disintegration of the first Pakistani parliament
was backed by the Supreme Court as' constitutional' while Zia's martial law was belatedly earned under
the ' law of necessity'. In Pakistan, the Superior courts in particular have utilized for the support of
utilitarianism of the state. Similarly Zia's Martial Law produced a grave impotence in the judicial
system.
In case of Pakistan, military regimes have developed means of relinquishing the form but retaining
much of the substance of military rule. Pakistani military leaders have embarked on a policy of 'two
steps forward; one step backward' whenever they decide to give up direct rule. This methodology
enables the army brass to avoid massive repressive steps and at the same time give them the leverage to
engineer a system in which they do not lose complete control. This exercise has invariably involved
them in a domestic political arena. Military regimes in an effort to 'civilians' the military rule and up
'militarising' the politics. The instrument available to a military government is coercion, selective
patronage and repression and cultivation of new civil groups who would accept military hegemony.
The new Martial Law, which came due to the pressures of the juniors to the general, PNA’s sup -
port to the army, centralised, unconstitutional behavior of the prime minister, organised rigging in
election, popular uprising against Bhutto's constitutional dictatorship and other loopholes in the political
system, which was neither strong nor integrated, but it got strength by the external changes which
accurse in Iran and restructuring in Afghanistan. Bhutto's civilian government, whose internal and
external policies were the cause of unhappy interlude with America, reinforced Zia's Islamist tone that
started his eleven year's rule on positive relationship with US government. It was Zia's tenure that ' the
Pakistan had now been welcomed into the club of non-aligned nations, and they valued their
membership highly. For its part, Washington's declared policy was 'to promote the independence, non-
alignment and territorial integrity of the nations and the people of South Asia'.* {5}.
The Coming of Zia was the extremity of constitution-making in Pakistan. Unlike his two pred -
ecessors, Ayub ( 1958-1962) and Yahya, (1969-1971) Zia (1977-1985) did not abrogate the existing
constitution of the country (the 1973 constitution). He suspended it in abeyance and acquainted a
number of specific martial-law codes and presidential ordinances which handed out concise verdicts
varying from ritualized beating to imprisonment by the help of the 'tame judges of the superior courts.’
Under Chief Martial Law Administrator order no.l of 1977, it was granted that (I)' notwithstanding the
abeyance of the provisions of the 1973 constitution, Pakistan shall subject to this order and any order
made by the president and any martial law regulation or martial law made by the Chief Martial Law
Administrator (CMLA), be governed' as almost as it may be mentioned in the (1973) constitu tion^) It
was also ordered that before the initial of this order, all courts' shall continue to function and exercise
their respective powers and jurisdictions'.
The new legal as establish by the laws order no. 5 July 1977, any law might at any time be
changed by the President and therefore there was no such thing as fundamental rights. The fundamen tal
rifts c conferred under part 1, chapter 1 of the 1973 constitution and all proceedings pending in any
court, in so far as they were for the enforcement of any of these rights ' shall stand suspended'. {6}.
The new legal order was more facilitated and elected under the Provisional Constitution Order
1981 ( CMLA order no. 1 of 1981). Under the Order, it was settled that the CMLA 'has already
announced that endeavors will be made and are being made to restore as soon as possible democracy
and representative institutions in accordance with the principle of Islam wherein the state of
Pakistan exercise its power and authority through chosen representatives of the people and until
then, interim measures are necessary'! 7} Under article 15 of the Provisional Constitution Order
1981, the judicial powers were simplified that ’ all presidential orders of the CMLA, including other
orders amending the (1973) constitution made by the president or by the CMLA, martial law
regulations, martial law orders and all other orders made on or after the fifth day of July 1977 are
hereby declared, notwithstanding any judgment of any court, to have been validly made by
competent authority and shall not be called in question in any court on any ground whatsoever.‘{8}
 With “CONSTITUTIONAL
regard to politicalMARTIAL
parties and their
LAW”: ANactivity it was declared
RELIC IO-POLITICAL that if the president
STUDY 8-3 was
pleased that 'a political party has been formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the Islamic
ideology or the sovereignty or integrity or security of Pakistan', the president strength melt the
political party in consultation with the chief election commissioner. (9} It was not a new
phenomenon in Pakistan to impose restrictions on political parties. It has been done in 1962, passed
by the national assembly of Pakistan under the 1962 constitution on July 1962. It was known as the
Political Parties Act 1962 which more legitimated by the Zia’s martial law regime in 1979.By then
the de institutionalisation of the judiciary, political parties was complete.
The ’fully-fledged martial law' coerced the will of the people who wanted to live together
under the political umbrella of 1973 Constitution and made it what Professor Lslie Wolf-Philips
calls, 'merely the expression of the will of the military Generals.’ {10} With Zia’s Islamic military
maneuver, emission of martial law, and imposing down of Bhutto’s constitutional government, the
ugly incident of ’constitutional morality’ was reintroduced. {11}
Zia breached the Article 6 of the Constitution to acquaint his authority by using Islam as a
straitjacket to legitimate his rule and satisfy the religious orchestra of the country. He said that
'Pakistan will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. The introduction of the Islamic system
[is] an essential pre-requisite for this country.'{12}It has been discussed in earlier pages where the
country's constitutional process stipulated by authority, it also plagued by the ideology. The
authoritarian traditions and ideological reshuffles, during almost two-thirds of the country's life
span, not only overshadowed its every concept but caused of delaying in the positive constitutional
and political development. General Zia-ul-Haque was the first soldier-turned politician who used
these two traditional whims to pillarise his long tenure of martial law which has been supposed to be
the shortest one. Before him the two generals avoided referring to Pakistan as an Islamic
establishment. Ayub simply believed on authority which basically inspired by western leadership. In
other words, Ayub's 'authoritarian paternalism’ was combined with an idea of secular, progressive
Pakistan. Zia's emphasis on Islam, as an effective political plank, 'helped him to create constituency
based on support of the Islamic ethos among Pakistan’s clergy, sections of the middle-class and
other conservative segments of the society.' The society which became secular after the role of
Ayub, Yahya and Bhutto was replaced by one of strict Islamic character. Zia ’skillfully used Islam
to create the ideological basis for his regime and divide his opposition.' He spoke of the 'need for an
Islamic system of politics and government, a Nizam-i-Mustafa, as more suited to the genius of the
Pakistani nation’{13} ’as a master manipulator of collective psychology.' Agitation against Bhutto's
secular and anti-Islamic thoughts helped Zia to plunder the 'elected' constitutional government. In
spite of the prologue of Islamic tenet,
| Chadda noted in Building Democracy In South Asia (2000). "Zia had brought in three key changes in |
the legal and political framework before martial law was lifted: the presidential referendum of
December 1984, the February 1985 party less elections, and the Restoration of Constitutional
0rder(ROC) in March 1985. {14} In order to retreat constitutional retribution, he managed an indemnity
for all the dry measures undertaken during the martial law years by aggregating the Eighth Amendment
in the constitution. By then the de- institutionalisation of every subject was complete.

ISALIMIC REVIVALISM: ITS HISTORICAL & CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Islam has remained an issue of political philosophy in Islamic history. It is a known ideology in
the constitutional and political decision-making in Islamic government undertakings. After half a century
of existence of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as an independent country, there is no consensus over
what role Islam is expected to play in the state. The need to address the question has acquired a new
dimension in view of Islamisational intentions by Zia-ul-Haque in the third martial law of 5 July 1977
which was the invitation of the civilian political parties, those agitating against the secular mindedness
of Bhutto regime. Air Marshal (retired)Asghar Khan said on BBC: 'General Zia-ul-Haq had done well to
take a timely step to intervene. He had saved the country from impending disaster.' Roeded Khan noted
in Pakistan A Dream gone Sour - MARTIAL
“CONSTITUTIONAL (2000).” There
LAW”:had been military
AN RELIC coup before,
IO-POLITICAL STUDY but now, for 8-4 the first
time, a moulvi, a deeply religious person, was the head of the state, was the head of the government, and
the military chief- a frightening combination- and he seemed determined to recreate the Islamic legal &
social order which had orgnised in Tribal Arabia more than a thousands years ago." {15}
Yet, in Pakistan, it was not a new idea to celebrate religion in the hideout of the state. The free dom
movement that was an ideological urge to preserve and foster Islamic values. 'It is maintained that
implicit in the demand for Pakistan was the demand for an Islamic state.'{16}But one of the true facts in
the Pakistan movement was that religious leaders were never a part of the core leadership at the top in
the Muslim League. Pakistan was the needlework of a very determined, but highly Westernised elite,
and scions of traditional Muslim aristocracy who had received modem education.. These leaders
attracted the people in the name of Islamic identification. Because most of the Muslims were living in
villages, for whom religion was a genuine fact of life no matter how unclear it was as a pragmatic code
of life. The cleavage of political understanding between the leaders and the masses was too visible to be
overlooked. However, the perceived Islamic State appear to be the only similarity between them.
Viewed in this perspective, the politics of constitution-making of the early decades of Pakistan's
existence was mired by the intense debates of Islamisation between strict textual and liberal
constructionalists. But ’the pattern of Government which the Quaid-e-Azam had in mind was a secular
democratic government.'{17}But this constitutional decoration was tried to be disturbed by the religious-
political parties, 'each of which, except the Muslim League, was opposed to the establishment of
Pakistan and given it indescribably vulgar names came to Pakistan, leaving 4 crores of Muslims in India
to their fate.’ {18) It was first ideological polarisation by which several other problems would later come
to birth.
The orthodox legal school insists on a literal interpretation and application of the scriptures- the
Quran representing the immutable word of God according to Muslim belief, and the Sunna explaining
the message, and sometimes offering textual references to augment exclusionary and intolerant
theological orientation.
The liberal school, on the other hand, struggles to comprehend the underlying moral philoso phy of
Islam - those fundamental principles that transcend time and place. They aim at contextualising the
sacred texts, and refuse to adhere to and apply literal dictates in a sociological and historical context.
Zia-ul-Haque was the strict textual construG&Qnalist who believed that the constitution of a State needs to be
guided by the supremacy of the Shariah that is Quran and the Sunnah. With this intent
 he introduced rapid changes to modify the composition of the Pakistani state, society and the
'CONSTITUTIONAL MARTIAL IAW”: AN RELIC lO-POLITICAL STUDY
constitution. The changes consist of government accountability, economic and political8-5policies,
personal and religious behavior. Although, it is sustained that a constitution is a necessary creation of a
secular state and secularism is an essential feature of a constitution. As it is noted that 'A Constitution is
the basic and fundamental law and it can not be governed by any other law, order or authority'. Pakistan’s
constitution is a significant deviation from this principle, for the reason that the country was created in
the name of Islam {19} and its leadership famed it for their personal legitimacy and was to make the
people believe that they were a good guys. Zia wanted to gadget his character as a good guy and he
imbibed it by the Islamised constitution, controlled by his incomparable command. It is blamed that the
political exploitation of Islam by those who made no contribution to Jinnah’s Pakistan started long
before Zia-ul-Haque but not with the kind of cynical finesse for which he and the army high command
should be held accountable. What Zia enforced was not only against Islam, it was contrary to the
aspirations of the subcontinental Muslim renaissance. On the other hand he 'called upon to handle an
extremely difficult political and ideological situation.’{20} "Although Zia is accused of having
perpetrated a military dictatorship, the truth of the matter is that, but for the dangerous mess Bhutto had
made of democracy, which threatened the integrity of the country, the obedient and disci plined soldier
would never have dreamed of overstepping the bounds of duty." But soldier's duty of resistance to stable
the state’s politics was limited to symbolic measures of peripheral importance which have only
refurbished Pakistan's politics by his own concept of Nizam-i-Mustafa and have had no impact
whatsoever on the society as Craig Baxter noted about his concept of Islamic authority in Zia’s Pakistan
(1985) to be ’led by an Amir to be chosen by some form of election from those who are faithful to Islam
and would be advised by Majlis-i-Shura of faithful persons but would not be bound by its advice.’{21}
Before going into theoretical debate with regard to the utility of the Zia era, it is important and
essential to decipher in detail as what are the basic principles on which the foundation of Islamic polit -
ical system is based. This will provide as a reference point in analysing as to what extent the Zia’s
authoritarian rule was in line with the accepted Islamic norms. Furthermore, it will help provide a
measuring yard from which the deviation to satisfy personal ambitions could be fathomed. For being
very shrewd and deep in constitutional maneuvering, Zia interpretation of Islam has seldom achieved
universal acceptance. We, hereby provide a glimpse of the concept of Islamic political system and the
congruence in those patterns as developed over a period of time.
• Sovereignty: The concept of human sovereignty is completely absent in Islamic governance and
polity. ’Authority belongs to Allah alone’ (12:40). And, “Do you not know that to Allah belong the
kingdom of heavens and the earth” (2: 107)." He does not share His Command with any person
whatsoever." (XVIII: 26) As a vicegerent of Allah, man has to conduct the affairs of the state as under:-
* Status of Government Authority:
1) That all are equal before law. 2) That the exercise of power is a trust. 3) That power has to be
exercised in accordance with the commandments of Allah and His name.4) that everyone vested with
power is accountable for his actions.5) As vicegerent of God, his natural function is to live for God, to
carry out divine commands and to surrender his ego completely too divine pleasure. 6) He should rule
the state in consultation with the people. According to the Holy Quran, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon
him) was commanded by God, in spite of his unique position as God’s Messenger, to administer the state
in consultation with the people, who were his followers. The commands reads: ’.
.. And consult with them upon the conduct of affairs.’ (111:59)
• Liberty : In Islam there is no room for kingship or dictatorship. There is close relation between
the ruler and the ruled. Every one is free within the limits of Divine Law. Freedom of expres sion and
liberty of conscience are the cornerstones of an Islamic polity and an ordinary citizens differ from the
opinion of those who are at the helm of affairs.
• Justice : Islam stands for a just society and the Quran has laid the greatest emphasis on injus tice,
equity and fair dealing. In Sura Nisa (1:35) it is clearly stated:" stands out firmly for justice, as witnesses
to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parent, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor:
For Allah can best protect both. Follow
“CONSTITUTIONAL MARTIALnotLAW”:
the lusts of your
AN RELIC hearts, lest STUDY
IO-POLITICAL ye swerve, and if8-6
ye distort
(justice) or decline to do justice, varily Allah is well acquainted all that ye do." (IV: 135)
• Fraternity : In Surah Hujurat Quran lays great stress that" the believers are surely brothers; so
restore friendship among you brothers" (49:10). The principle of egalitarianism is the foundation of
Islamic body-politic and its greatest strength.
• Accountability : In the Islamic concept the authority or power to rule is vested as trust ("
amanat") of the community and not the birth right of anybody. The Quran says: " Those who, if We give
them power in the land, establish worship and pay the poor due and enjoin kindness and forbid
inequity.” The concept of trust brings in automatically the authority because a trustee appointed by the
people has to render account to those by whom he is appointed.
It may further be argued that many contemporary Muslims governments have accepted the notions
of Islam in the system of their democracy, constitution and the other way of governance. The
politicisation of Islam, by fueling the fundamental principles in the constitution has been treated as a
self-defender of their unconstitutional governments. ” Although they have different opinions about its
precise meaning. Muslim interpretations of democracy generally build on the well-established Quranic
concept of consultation, but these interpretations vary in the degree to which " the people" are able to
exercise this duty. Some argue that Islam is inherently democratic, not only because of the consultation
but also because of the concepts of independent reasoning (ijtihad) and consensus (ijma). The attempt to
generate Islamic forms of democracy is based on a reinterpretation of traditional concepts and
institutions. Consultations and political deliberations and community consensus have been reinterpreted
to support parliamentary democracy, representative elections, and political parties. Thus, for example,
the consultative assembly or group (majlis ai-shura) that selected or elected a new caliph has been
transformed and equated with a parliament or national assembly." {22}Theoretically, the Muslim
Scholars like Dr. Muhammad Iqbal (The Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam), Dr fazlur-
Rehman Ansari ( Quranic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society), Dr Asad ( The Principles of
State and Government in Islam) and ulema like Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi (Islamic way of life, edited
by Khurshid Ahmad and Khurram Murad, 1986(2) Islamic Perspectives- studies in Honour of Sayyid
Abul Ala Mawdudi, edited by Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, London, 1979.) acclaimed the
view that the Quran provides a number of principles regarding the Islamic democracy and the
constitutional structure of Islamic State and it is the prime function of the Head of the Islamic State
(Amiral-Mo'minin) that he implement Quranic constitution (Shariah) to encourage the expansion of
Islamic democratic state by the consultation with the people ( Majlis-e-Shoora).
However, the influence of Islam in the constitution making of the country has remained limit ed
not only to Zia-ul- Haque. A cursory look at the constitutional documents brings to sharp focus the fact
that the underlying current for Isamisation of the State were quite pressing. So much so that the
Sovereignty had already been granted to the Almighty and some of the decisions taken by Mr. Bhutto at
the fag end of his career were quite uncharacteristic for a secular and liberal leanings of the earlier part
of the rule. It is therefore customary to have a look at the constitution history that led to the brisk
Islamisation of State in Zia rule.
 * The emerging influence of Islam in constitution making:
‘CONSTITUTIONAL iMAKTIAL LAW": AN RELIGIO-POLITICAL STUDY 8-7
Pakistan was not just meant to be a new country on the map of the world but a struggle of the
Muslims of British India. The obvious reason for the struggle was the survival of the minority, 'as a
political and not a religious issue which needed to be addressed and resolved' from the majority of
Hindus. It was Jinnah’s leadership of constitutional secularism which ’ even after he put forward the
Muslim claim to nationhood there was no waning of his secular beliefs.’{23} The main objective of
Pakistan movement in India was to establish a state where its citizens could attain their political, con -
stitutional, economic and religious rights. Izzad-ud-Paul noted in Pakistan : Islam and Economics
(1999)" The main focus of Mr. Jinnah was to protect the national interests of Muslims in any future
constitutional arrangement for British India from the thick shadow of Hindu dominance. That is what
attracted the Muslim mind and became a mass movement." {24}The political leadership who gathered
the Muslims for their interests were westerenised. They believed that if in an area an extensive majori ty
of the populace were Muslims it automatically became a ’Muslim state’. {25} So far as politics, law and
constitution were concerned, they derived their inspiration directly from the Western liberal democracy.
But after the demise of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and other westernised companions, ’the state has drafted
into the hands of an orthodox elements which claim that they will make Pakistan a totally Islamic State,
as it was in the days of Nizam-i-Mustafa.’ { 26}
Soon after partition, the new country riddled by the styles of two powerful political elite. Both
were wanted to see 'their Pakistan’ in the light of their way of governance. The differences which were
submerged against the British imperialism and Hindu nationalism arose and resettled the approach of
political and economic realities. Marshal Hodgson has described the difficulties which effect the process
from the state-building to nation -building in the following words: "But perhaps even more important, in
the long run it had to face the fact that the emotional response it had evoked among the Muslims was no
political maneuver but a true religious passion which would not readily be waged by the conventional
arrangements of politicians." {27}.
Though the idea of Muslim khilafat got speed in the 1940 Resolution, later known as the Pakistan
resolution yet Jinnah and his other companions ’scrupulously avoided any association with such an
idea.’{28} But after the death of Jinnah, the liberal western thoughts could not survived. Pakistan which
came into being, then, for the secular Muslim state, kidnapped by the weak succes sors and religious
ulema who, now, thinking ’ that the sovereignty of Pakistan belongs to God Almighty and that the
government of Pakistan shall administer the country as His agent* and ’that the basic law of the land is
the Islamic Shariah which has come to us through our Prophet Muhammad 1 and ’that all those existing
laws which may be in conflict with Shriah shall in due course be replaced or brought into conformity
with the basic law and no law which may be in any way repugnant to the Shariah shall be created in. the
future’ and finally, 'that the state in exercising its power, shall not be competent to transgress the limits
laid down by Islam.' {29} And these demands of fundamental changes in the coming constitution were
applause by the populace whose intellectual life was not really prospered. So it is believed that idea of
Islamic state from Muslim state germinated through the Objective Resolution of 1949, reinforced by the
1973 Constitution under Zulifkar Ali Bhutto and made popular, especially during and since the period of
General Ziaul Haq, is a later innovation.'
• It was in this sarcastic humidity of debates of the nature of the Islamic state, that the
Constituent assembly started the enormous task of making the constitution for the new state.
The structure of the new country began with the welfare realities of a secular organisation
started to riddle with religious demands. Liaquat Ali Khan encountered Islamised pressure and
failed to damper it because he ’ did not possess any of Jinnah's qualities, nor did he command
to obedience that had been reserved for Jinnah alone. 1 {30} But to show his primiership's
importance he and his Constituent Assembly approved the Objectives Resolution to be a step in
the direction to control religio-constitutional situation. Having characterisation of some secular
and western visions, it is important to note that the resolution begins with a purely Islamic
reference, citing that 'sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone,
and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being
exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust.’ It is also asked that' this
Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for
the sovereign independent State of Pakistan. ‘The Resolution also talked about the principles of
chosen representation, democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice but with the
supplementation of Islam. More specifically, it stated 'that Pakistan was created as a home land
where Muslims would be able to order their lives in accordance with their Islamic traditions,
but that minorities would be amply protected and given complete freedom to pursue their
different ways of life.’{31 }Fundamental rights, independence of Judiciary and Federation was
supposed to introduced in the future constitutionalisation in the country, Paul defined Objective
 Resolution in Pakistan, Islam,
“CONSTITUTIONAL And LAW”:
MARTIAL Economics that"IO-POLITICAL
AN RELIC The Objectives Resolution, in 8-8
STUDY fact was to
provide constitutional legitimacy to the phenomenon-the myth of the Islamic state *- that was
to emerge in the form of a dichotomy between the secular state and Islamic Law and it has
continued with all its attendant problems to haunt the politics of the country since 1947." {32}
Paul also noted that the resolution was a complete departure from Jinnah's speech of August
1947.'( Paul 1999: Chap, 1) We can also examine a passage from the speech of Prime Minister
to understand the basic smell of the constitutional milestone which made to incorporate in the
future and very important for further legitimacy. He said:
• "All authority is a sacred trust, entrusted to us by God for the purpose of being exercised in the
service of man, so that it does not become an agency for tyranny or selfishness. I would
however, point out that this is not a resuscitation of the dead theory of Divine Right of Kings or
rulers, because, in accordance with the spirit of Islam, the Preamble fully recognised the truth
that authority has been delegated to the people, and to none else, and that it is for the people to
decide who will exercise that authority.
• For this reason it has been made clear in the Resolution that the State shall exercise all its
powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people. This is the very essence
of democracy, because the people have been recognised as the recipients of all authority and it
is in them that the power to wield it has been vested." ( The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
5, No. 1, p.2.)

The constitutional system inherited from British constitutionalist managers seems to have brought
with it an Islamic nation-hood. The speech of Liaquat Ali Khan also seems to inspire from the two
streams of colonial constitutional democracy and Islamic generalisation. The structure of the new
country began with the colonial constitutional democracy of its government, but religion played a role in
the making of country's first preamble. Resolution also faced these two different impacts which make
skeptical everyone. Some established their opinion that by simple declaration of the cho sen
representation of the people, and the people recognisd as the recipients of all authority, Pakistan could
not be Westernised. Some discern the simple notification of God's sovereignty over the universe, and its
delegation as sacred trust to the people, Pakistan could not be Islamised. Lawrence Ziring says," While
this section of the Resolution addresses itself to the belief of Muslims, the remain der of the document
elaborates a doctrine which is essentially liberal democratic, not dogmatically theocratic. Equality,
social justice, fundamental freedom, and the safeguarding of cultural and religious preferences were
intrinsic parts of the documents." {33} So it is not true that Objective Resolution was the departure from
the western constitutional democracy but a combination of both inherited philosophies and also
brainchild and accepted by the both groups. Wrapped up to each other, the Resolution gave instructions
to the constitution makers that 'the state should be guided by the principles of the Objective Resolution
and ' Only a person possessing ability, character and piety and fit to conduct the affairs of the State in
accordance with the Objective Resolution should be elected as Head of State. ‘Under the terms of
Objective Resolution of 1949, the State and God or both sovereign and so perhaps was the Constituent
Assembly which was to 'frame a constitution’.

Though, head of state should a Muslim in the existing state yet the concept of Islamic sovereignty
was perverted. 'To frame a Constitution’ denied the ulema's claim that the divine law is already
there; it has only to be elaborated and activated, not "framed" as the Resolution suggested. {34}
The problem of constitutionalism in Pakistan started due to the unavailability of right thinking. The
founder was constitutionalist but the process of constitution making did not start in his life, j
although his 'first concern was the melding of a balanced community of different believers. The only
J test Jinnah believed necessary was the citizen’s loyalty to Pakistan'{35 }but heard the demand for j
Islamic Constitution, which, certainly mouthed by the section of the population, hypnatised by the
fanatics. In there fanatic mind they were matching Islamic Constitution with Shariat Law which had
been structured for every Islamic government. There was some smell of confusion when referring to
it Quaid-e-Azam. He said at the end of January 1948,
“I cannot understand why this feeling of nervousness that the future constitution of Pakistan is
going to be in conflict with Shariat Law? There is one section of the people who keep on
impressing) every body that the future constitution of Pakistan should based on the Shariat. The
other section deliberately wants to create to mischief and agitate that the Shariat law must be
scrapped." {36}
Jinnah was rightly stated the 'feeling of nervousness' which plague the coming constitutional-
ism in Pakistan. The history of constitution-making in Pakistan shows that the tension between
 Ulema / and“CONSTITUTIONAL
other slight liberal schoolsLAW”:
MARTIAL of thought did pay
AN RELIC much wastage
IO-POLITICAL STUDYin their debates
8-9 than to
obtain recommendations. If some recommendations were made, rejected by the other and the both
groups had created a climate in the country in which acceptance of the constitution by the people did
not seem feasible. The people were sandwiched in the situation where the leaders after the death of
Jinnah, demanding theirs establishment of castle. John Esposito has explained Pakistan's first
dilemma of constitution-making which played very instrumental role for the establishment of the
country and as well as its structure to run." The crux of the problem was that unless one was
prepared to simply opt for revivalism that called for a classical Islamic state or to advocate his
adoption of a modem secular state, Pakistani Muslims faced a formidable task. Theirs would not be
the path of simple adaptation of one model but adaptation, not a mere following or limitation of a
past Islamic ideal of a present secular reality but a breaking of new ground - creative construction of
a blueprint for a modem state and society which incorporated and realized the Islamic sentiments,
ideals and values upon which mass support or Pakistan's independence was based from." {37}
It is a matter of fact that in the struggle for Pakistan, the leaders adopted a western' constitu -
tional' approach to the demand for establishing an Islamic state, hoping to disperse the urgency from
the ulema of classical Islamic state. Paul stated that 'they did not seem inclined to accept the views
of ulama, but they made solemn declarations that they envisaged a country in which Muslims would
be free to build their lives in accordance with Islam. Perhaps they had considerable confidence in
their ability to exercise an ambidextrous strategy and each of them hoped that this strategy would
see him through the term of his office. Or, perhaps they expected that somehow some kind of
Islamic modernism would evolve in the long run and resolve this conflict for them.'{38} Jinnah
could dress up this authority. Others were not leaders like him or had vision and courage like him.
They could not develop that 'constitutional' sample for this objective to light the country in its
modem niche. In every
constitutional settlements, had its Islamic paragraphs which were tipping extensive opportunity
towards the civil bureaucracy, military and the politicians to turn the perfervid articulation about
Islamicization to their ’legitimacy’. The exploitation provided opportunity to Zia to use the misuse a
few step further in order to islamise the country.
Zia pointed and criticised those predecessors who gave him the opportunity to rule. He noticed that
his predecessors had failed to adopt a cooperative policy towards the ideological dimension of the
state, and all their statements and even the constitutional accouterments they made in the three con -
stitutions were mostly declarative in property and needed legal machinery for their performance.
Following are some of the important provisions of the two constitutions.
1. Recognition of the sovereignty of God Almighty over the entire universe which had been
delegated to the people of Pakistan as a sacred trust.
2. Implementation of the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice
within the framework of the laws of Shariah.
3. Muslims must be ’enabled' to formulate their individual and collective lives, strictly according
to the precepts as enunciated in the Quran.
4. There should be facilities for Muslims to -understand the meaning of Islam according to the
laws of Shariah.
5. Teaching of Islam in school and colleges must be made compulsory.
6. People should be encouraged to follow the high Islamic moral standards.
7. Zakat (poor tax) Awkaf (religious endowments) and mosques must be orgnised properly.
8. Prostitution, gambling and drugs should be banned.
9. Consumption of alcoholic drinks must be stopped.
10. Interest or usury should be eliminated.
11. Elimination of all laws which were repugnant to Islam.

The provisions were general guidelines for policy-makers, and not statutory laws that could be
used in the country for competent authorities. Ayesha Jalal notes in Democracy and Authoritarianism in
Pakistan that 'the 1973 did make some efforts to win the support of the religious lobby in order to create
a semblance of consensus after Pakistan's military defeat of 1971.' Following is the abstract of the effort
which were giving a way to enforce like statutory laws. But had no legal or institutional framework by
which these further steps could be operationalised. The Prime Minister used these 'Islamised'
amendments to elevate his powers and approaching the maintenance of Islamic look of the country.

1. It was declared in Article 2 of the Constitution (1973) that" Islam shall be the state religion of
Pakistan."
 2. It was“CONSTITUTIONAL
resolved in the principles
MARTIAL of LAW”:
policy AN
(Article
RELIC31(2) of the Constitution)
IO-POLITICAL STUDY that" The
8-10State
shall endeavor, as respects the Muslims of Pakistan:
a) To make the teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat compulsory, to encourage and
facilitate the learning of the Arabic language and to secure correct and exact printing and
publishing of the Holy Quran;
b) To promote unity and the observance of the Islamic moral standards; and
c) To secure the proper organisation of Zakat, auqaf and mosque."
3. It was also resolved in the Principles of Policy ( Article 38, clause F) that the state shall"
eliminate riba as early as possible.”
4. Article 227of the Constitution provided that ' All existing laws shall be brought in conformity
with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in this part referred
to as the Injunctions."
5. It is provided in the Constitution that a person shall not be qualified for election as President
of Pakistan or as Prime Minister unless he or she is a Muslim. Their oath of office prescribed
in the third schedule of the Constitution includes the following words:

“I do solemnly swear that I am a Muslim and believe in the Unity and Oneness of Almighty Allah,
the Holy Quran being the last of them, the Prophet hood of Muhammad (peace be upon him) as the last
of the Prophet and that there can be no prophet after him, the Day of Judgment, and all the requirements
and teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah:... That I will strive to preserve the Islamic Ideology which
is the basis for the creation of Pakistan."
In the Constitution, the Islamic Council also incorporated to work for the betterment of the soci ety
and provisions. But 'it was not empowered to interfere with the secular performance. In fact, neither the
National Assembly nor the provincial legislatures were obligated to accept the advice of the Islamic
Council, and nothing prevented the legislative bodies from taking actions with or without its
sanction.'{39} Although, the constitution paved the way that ' Islam shall be the state religion of
Pakistan' but the Islamic provisions of the constitution were really not put to test, except the weekly
holidays changed from Sunday to Friday and sale of liquor to Muslims was banned. Kemal Farruki has
also summed up some of confusions and even variations between the constitutional processes:
"There were variations of foregoing elements in each of these three constitutions. For instance,
with regards to alcoholic, one constitution refers to “discouraging” its consumption, anoth er to its
“prevention’s”, whereas the third refers to its "prohibition". Variation also exists with regards to Muslim
rules: At times the emphasis is on "providing facilities," at other times on 11 enabling” and at still other
times on "compulsion" {40}
The Bhutto's era was the promise of constitutional politics. He did for the fulfillment of political
and constitutional developments in his period. Mahrunnisa Ali noted that 'He made the masses conscious
of their exploitation so much so that when they arose against his own regime, he was unable to suppress
them even with force.’{41} but the Islamic provisions of the constitution were not deal with its basic
pace as it was introduced in the constitution. Although, there was an oath of office in Pakistan for
elected officials. It was more different from previous constitutions and stated," that I will strive to
preserve the Islamic ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan.” From the time of the
Objective Resolution as passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949 to the 1973 Constitution, the
religious notification had been used for two reasons firstly, to satisfy the section of ulema and secondly
and largely used as personal legitimacy. Paul noted that' the exploitation of Islam for political purposes
from Liaquat Ah Khan to Zulafkar Ah Bhutto provided an opportunity to Ziaul Haq to use religion for
his legitimacy with some well -designed changes in the 1973 Constitution, while some parts of it were
held in abeyance' on account of state necessity." {42} Firstly, 'the aim of military intervention was to
save the country from impending civil war and to hold free and impartial elections to further the cause of
democracy in Pakistan' but it changed for 'to 'cleanse' the nation's politics by putting off elections until '
the process of accountability' was completed.'{43}Basically, his agenda was not to hold elections or to
cleanse the scenario or to strengthen constitutional democracy with Islamic bond but to control the
objective 'Islamic' with help from the ulema dreaming of their Shariat utopia internally and externally, to
pleased America for the role in 'Jihad' of Afghanistan. He used them and allowed them to shine in his
reflected glory.
Islam has never been in danger but politicisation of religion has endangered Pakistan's very
existence as a civil society and a viable state. In Pakistan, where, the reparation of Islamisation was
 “CONSTITUTIONAL MARTIAL LAW”: AN RELIC IO-POLITICAL STUDY 8-11
"However, I have very intention of transferring power from the military to the civilian elected
representatives. At the moment, we are in the process of finding what should be the parameters of the
structure of government for running an Islamic state in conformity with the Holy Quran and the tra-
ditions of the Holy Prophet (peace is upon him). That is not what is causing the delay I must add that
Islam in not in conflict with elections; nor does it prescribe a parliamentary or presidential form of
government. Islam only lays down certain basis principles of polity and it is those principles I am trying
to adopt in the country. We have our Constitution of 1973 which we do not abrogate. With prop er
modification in it, and through a peaceful process of transfer of power from military to the civil, the way
will eventually be paved for the establishment of an Islamic democracy in Pakistan." {44}
It is believed and discussed earlier that the "non-state actors used Islamic slogan to legitimise their
special identification. President’s Zia's commitment to Islamisation was also the commitment to his deep
power-concentration which he also notarized it by ' The Referendum Order 1984'. Dr Safdar Mahmood
noted in his book that ’the most important link in the chain of power transfer was President Zia's own
continuance and survival for which he did not intend to depend on newly elected assemblies. He was
determined to keep his grip tight on power politics like a powerful political commander. After all, what
he had conceded after ruling the country for about eight years was not transfer of power but sharing of
power with the elected representatives.'{45} Zia rose to power with the support of two constituencies
( army and Ulema) which though very strong and penetrating chunks of the country, yet because of their
small sizes and having no contact to give legitimacy, could not represent the political and democratic
feelings of the entire population. To give stability of these constituencies and to develop emotional
contact with the population, the only option left for him was to make Islam as the sole representative of
his rule to which all Muslims regardless of their educational and social background subscribed. The
policy was criticised by the western commentators as the Daniel Pipes noted in his book In the Path of
God; Islam and political power that" Islamisation made cultural life increasingly bland and whittled
away personal freedoms without bringing commensurate gains. The central Zakat Fund, supposed to
eradicate poverty, had negligible effect; corruption at high places remained a plaque and Zia was
perceived as manipulating Islam for his own benefit He claimed to be building an 'Islamic Democracy 1
but Shariah knows no such concept and that left him free hand to claim Islamic legitimisation for any
steps that he took. After thirty years of waffling between Western ideologies fundamental issues from
1947 to 1977, the government finally made a wholehearted move to resolve the question of Pakistan’s
identity and ideology. Zia-ul-Haq chose Islam; but historical experience suggests that his decision will
not stick and that the Pakistan soon again face the old dilemma of identity, only next time with less
innocence." {46}
General Zia's dream to make Pakistan Islamised was not fulfilled as other constitutional and political
dreams failed to practice in the country. Zia's Islamisation opened a widespread sectarianism in the
country. Different sects of Islam in the society provide different opinion and interpretations which
caused instability in the ideological concepts. For instance Zakat which is one of the pillars of Islam, and
very pungent aspect of its ideational frame of reference, is rationalized and scanned very Differently by
the Shias and the Sunnies, the two very predominant sects in Islam. The tragedy of Pakistan is that the
zealotry of the 'political' ulema has been patently irrelevant to the solution of the differences facing their
ideological sect. Devoid of settlement, and unwilling to change the differences seem to be so critical
when President Zia passed his famous Zakat Ordinance, the Shias of Pakistan protested so vehemently
that he had to exempt them from the operational implications of this ordinance. Lawrence Ziring
wrongly cited these differences as the permanent feature of Islam when | he stated' Islam is like that' no
less than other monotheistic religions. (47}Basically, it was the inheritance ideological insecurity of
Pakistan where the system provides gentle opportunity for wide discretionary powers to the ambitious
generals and feudal politicians.
 “CONSTITUTIONAL MARTIAL LAW”: AN RELIC IO-POLITICAL STUDY 8-12

MAJOR CHANGES IN THE 1973 CONSTITUTION: THE SECOND

PHASE:
Maluka noted in his book ' The Myth of Constitutionalism' that 'in absolute breach of article 6
of the 1973 Constitution, open violation of the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s judgment in the Miss
Asma Jilani case (PLD 1972 SC 139), and lacking any legal sanction whatsoever, Zia and his
’accessories and associates’ indulged in their breach of duty to the state, allegiance to the society,
and its constitution'. The Court gave its prediction that the new regime was only for limited purpose
and it represented ’a phase of constitutional deviation dictated by necessity' but the purpose changed
dictated by the military CMLA. A jurist wrote the condition in this way’ this was constitutional
rewriting of the worst end. The Court had no power or authority or any convincing reason to
authorise any single person to change the Basic Law of the country in a manner which violated not
only the spirit but also the letter of the constitution. The Court no doubt retained with itself the
power to review the legality of all the actions of the military regimes on the touchstone of necessity.
It was naive to expect that once the Court handed over a loaded gun to a military dictator, he would
seek the leave of the judges every time he wanted to use it.’{48} The political and social observers
expressed their apprehension that if the military act to abrogate or suspended the Constitution it
would have ' disastrous consequences for the country' because 'the 1973 Constitution was prepared
with great difficulty and was endorsed by the elected representatives of the four provinces including
the Opposition. It [would] not be possible to obtain their agreement in future.’{49} Though, the
Constitution was not abrogated, but suspended and amended 'to pave the way for the establishment
of an Islamic society.' Yet it caused the constitutional-political chaos and threat for its eleven years
instability.
Besides developing his personality like 'lawgiver' in the actual indent of the 1973 Constitution,
Zia introduced wrong messages so as to save him from the pointed public criticism. He found faults
with the 1973 Constitution for not containing enough Islamic provisions to joined hand with
religious politic which was agitating against Bhutto’s 'un-Islamic' government and his character. His
imposed politics was a confusing mix of religious rhetoric and worldly content to use Islam by the
state. The politically active religious parties were moribund and wished to impose Islam without a
socio-economic back-up, shake slogans and ranks for the sake of their worldly gratification. It
caused the continuation of his services as the sole representative of constitutional, political, and
administrative powers.' Though he tried to keep up the facade of consultative process by holding
conventions of different sections of a society, the need for an advisory forum having a semblance of
a parliament was felt In 1982.'{50} A Majlis-e~Shoora (Federal Council) was set for three years. 11
was the body of legislative members, workable till the general election.
The military regime was not so mounted by any political pressure from the political parties to
restore democracy. The strongest institution of the country knew the validity and political grounds of
these weak ’groups' in the masses. Having hanged Bhutto, the military junta has been understood
that
’ ninety per cent of the people in the country did not care who ruled them as long as their basic needs
were fulfilled.' {51} The decision that the power be transferred to an elected government was an
assurance of army canniest and tried to be clever by half. They thought they could beat the odd and
arrange the deck to suit their convenience by holding non-party election, without campaigning and
'all candidates would have to be strictly vetted.’{52}
In order to device the power sharing plan, unspecified key changes were proposed in the 73
constitution. 'Whether the calculated alteration changes the basic character of the constitution or not,
it was the minimum price that the nation had to pay for the transfer of power from the army to the
civil.' Against this background, the President placed the following proposals before the people for
handing over power. These were:
 “CONSTITUTIONAL MARTIAL LAW”: AN RELIC IO-POLITICAL STUDY 8-13

1. There will be no new role for the armed forces in the Constitution.
2. The 1973 Constitution will be restored after incorporating certain amendments.
3. General elections will be held on adult franchise basis in two phases; first, local bodies, then
the national and provincial assemblies and the Senate. The entire process will be completed
by 23 March 1985, and thereafter Martial Law will be lifted.
4. The President will be Supreme Commander of the armed forces, empowered to appoint the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and three services chiefs.
5. The President will appoint the Prime Minister who will seek a vote of confidence within sixty
days.
6. The President will have the power to dissolve the National assembly if in his opinion the
Prime Minister had ceased to enjoy the support of the majority in the National assembly and
order fresh elections within seventy-five days;
7. The President will have the power to send back a bill to the National Assembly for recon-
sideration.
8. The President will not declare emergency in the country without consulting the National
Security Council whose composition and number of members will be announced later.
9. The President will appoint Provincial Governors and the Chief Election Commissioner. {53}

Dr Safdar Mahmood wrote in his book that ’ the most important link in the chain of transfer of
power was President Zia's own continuance and survival for which he did not intend to depend on the
newly elected assemblies. He was determined to keep his grip tight on power politics like a powerful
political commander. After all, what he had conceded after the ruling the country for about eight years
was not transfer of power but sharing of power with the elected representatives."{54}.
Conclusion: Amid Hopes and Challenges- 1
Looking back over the past 65 years of Pakistan’s turbulent history one is apt to be left intrigued by a
whole plethora of contradictions it would bring to the fore. First thing first, it was conceived as a
progressive, democratic welfare state for the tormented Muslim masses of the subcontinent, with not the
slightest touch of theocracy. But by a queer combination of events and circumstances, it has remained
deprived all these long decades of its objectively conceived: fundamentals. Democracy, in the real sense
of a system built on the concept of rule of the people, for the people, was not allowed to take roots in
this country. As for its progressive nature, it lost 1 its meaning in the absence of democracy. The same
applies to the vision of welfare. Both of these attributes have to be nurtured by the unwavering will and
unshakable determination of the representatives of the people - the people being the real rulers in
democracy in all its forms and \ manifestations. What we found in its place was unbroken chain of
governments, not formed by: the will of the people, but quietly and secretly fashioned by the
Establishment - comprising the civil and military bureaucracy.

That clearly meant usurpation of the powers of the legislature, which is considered to be the supreme
ruling authority on behalf of the people, that is, its electors. This was how the people, the real creators
of the State of Pakistan stood reduced to mere vassals, as under kings and their { viceroys in a colonial
system in vogue during the British period. This should leave little to doubt with the plight of the people,
which have often been left wondering in various periods of military rule if they, or their forefathers had
struggled and sacrificed for Pakistan only to see them being lashed and tortured at the whims of the
generals’ junta. As for the aims and objectives of the Pakistan movement and the mode adopted for the
earth-shaking revolution, that is the spellbinding carving of a Muslim state out of the heart of history of
the subcontinent, these were all thrown to the winds. Similarly, its goal remained obscured rather too
long in the aftermath of the untimely death of the Father of the Nation in the very next year of its
establishment. For his j successors, overly engrossed in settling scores between aspirants of loaves and
fishes of office, j were left with little time to attend to the very basics of the new State as envisioned by
the great leader. This, obviously, has reference to procrastination about framing a constitution,
conducive to the aims and aspirations of the people around whose practical wisdom Quaid-e-Azam
Jinnah had built the concept of Pakistan. It is this unpardonable delay to which can be attributed the
misfortune that began befalling this young state in its very infancy, as leading to its breakup in the 24 th
year after its birth in the atrocious vacuum caused by the frustrating absence of a constitution to live by.

j Like the proverbial empty mind, which is alluded to the devil’s workshop, Pakistan devoid of its 1
basic law, opened widening avenues to the bureaucracy and other vested interests to fish in the j troubled
waters for their own selfish gain, unmindful of what might happen to its fragile unity, j To this diverse
combination also belonged the convincingly defeated religio-political elements j who had put their
entire weight behind the anti-Pakistan forces during the democratic struggle for a separate, independent
state. Some idea of the depth of their aversion to that urge may be had from their declaration of the very
concept as being un-Islamic and outrageous to the spirit and teachings of Islam. As against this, the
rejection of their nominees in the decisive 1945
election by the religiously devout Muslim masses, would point to the latter’s sense of devotion to
democracy, which, as the Quaid had unhesitatingly asserted, was in their blood. This should; explain
the somersault of the defeated elements in their bid for counterrevolution, once again, in the name of
Islam!

As for the role of bureaucracy, both civil and military, in the early period of crisis of leadership it i
played safe by looking the other way, evidently to strengthen his or her own hold. This is not to j say
that the mischief was embedded in the very system it was left to be governed by. For it was the same
system that both Pakistan and India inherited with freedom from the British rulers. I However, while
conditions in the immediate post-partition period in India meant continuity of j the old administrative
system it inherited, in Pakistan it had to be virtually rebuilt from the I scratch, thereby, allowing
bureaucracy much greater say in its restructuring as also in decision- j making on this count as well.
This essentially added to the power and reach of the bureaucrats, Little wonder, the more resourceful
and crafty among them made their way into the government j as ministers, holding key portfolios. One
can find some of them rise to the high status of Prime Minister, Governor-General and President in
different periods in the turbulent history of the country. This much for civil bureaucracy. In so far as the
military bureaucracy, its increasing J involvement in the affairs of the state can be seen linked to its
growing importance from its pivotal role in the defense of the country, which remained constantly
threatened ever since its j occupation of vast territories of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The arms race initiated in its aftermath continuing unabated during the long stretch of sham
democracies deriving their support largely from both civil and military bureaucracy. This should
explain their increasing involvement in the scheme of things of running the government, hence
encouraging them to take over the government, a harbinger of which was the imposition of Martial Law
to curb violence during the Qadiani movement of the 1950s. Serving as the meeting j ground between
the two vital arms of administration, it proved instrumental in strengthening the I nexus between them.
And as the system of sham democracy kept losing its weight, the intrusion of military started taking
shape with the backdoor induction of General Iskander Mirza with the strong backing of the Army
chief General Ayub Khan. Waiting in the wings and watching the I deteriorating political situation in a
constitutional vacuum he deemed it opportune to strike right when a democratic movement looked like
leading the way back to democracy. Dismissing the I then Prime Minister, he stepped in as the Prime
Minter under President Mirza and then ousting 1 him too and becoming the sole ruler as the Chief
Martial Law Administer and subsequently the President of the country, with the promise of restoring
true democracy. The democracy he introduced was an ingenious contraption of a system resting on
widespread corruption down to j the grassroots level, thereby, setting a pattern for the future
adventurers from his ilk. Laying j great emphasis on reforms and economic development, his rule led to
disenchantment of the country’s eastern wing, which acquired ghastlier dimensions in the aftermath of
the 1965 war with India. With the political situation turning grim with the passage of time, the country
witnessed an outburst of movement for his ouster and restoration of democracy. He could not | stand it
much longer and quit the scene transferring power to General Yahya Khan, the then | army chief Failing
to stem the tide he ordered the first general election in Pakistan’s history. Held in 1970 in the thick of
distrust between the two wings, from the launch of a separatist movement in former East Pakistan. The
election led to the emergence of two different majority parties, Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League in the
east and Z.A. Bhutto’s People’s Party in the West. Numerically, Awami League was the majority party
with all its deputies belonging to the eastern wing. Again, as the movement for full autonomy for the
eastern part was in full swing the transfer of power was delayed, ostensibly to avert a disaster in the
event of the entire government falling to the MNAs from that wing by dint of its numerical strength.
However, while efforts for reconciliation were still on General Yahya moved in the Army, cancelled
the election result and called re- election, evidently with the vain hope of Jamaat-e-Islami turning the
table. It flared more violence, leading to Indian intervention and Pakistani army eventually
surrendering, thereby, facilitating creation of Bangladesh as a separate independent state.

With East Pakistan gone, what was left of it, in the West, that is was handed over to PPP chairman Z.A.
Bhutto as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President. Learning the right lessons from that
disaster the new National Assembly gave the country its first genuinely framed constitution, with a
built-in guarantee against its abrogation. However, it proved of little avail in preserving democracy and
the constitution, with General Zia striking in 1977 and dismissing the Bhutto government and
suspending the Constitution and succeeded in getting away with it. He got rid of Bhutto who had turned
into his nightmare, thus making himself indispensable. As for his whims and fancies, he opted for the
bogey of Islamisation. Luckily, he got an opportunity of fulfilling his agenda during the Afghan war of
liberation, which he wholly supported at the beck and call of the United States, thereby winning its
favour in a number of ways. As for the country it witnessed the beginning of unabated influx of arms
and drugs. This led to widespread reign of terror all over, particularly targeting Karachi, which went
through unimaginable bloodbath. During that process, lost his life in a mysterious plane crash. Although
the then CO AS did not take over power and allowed civilian governments to function through election,
political and stability remained a far cry for a number of reasons, including the involvement of the
Establishment.
 This resulted in yet another military takeover, which though followed by an election and revival of
democracy through an amended constitution that still sees General Pervez Musharraf still as President
but in the uniform and resisting all pressures to come out of it. Needless to point out, the nexus between
civil and military bureaucracy remained unbroken too long, leaving virtually no chance for democratic
culture to flourish. All efforts of the democratic forces to revive democracy in its true form continue to
be frustrated, though calmed at times by planting sham democracy, like the one now put in place. Where
it is going to lead the country is simply beyond average comprehension.

Amid Hopes and Challenges-2

The Pakistan People’s Party, PPP, and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, PML-N, managed to
form a coalition government after the election in the backdrop of the political situation that
emerged after former President Pervez Musharraf imposed emergency on 3 November 2007.
Musharraf had imposed emergency in order to dislodge the ‘defiant’ and increasingly proactive
judiciary in the country. Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry led the deposed judges,
who posed the biggest challenge to the rule of former President Musharraf since he took over
in a bloodless coup in 1999. The movement for the restoration of judiciary got momentum on its
way leading to the election as the civil society enthusiastically supported the agenda of
restoring judiciary in the country. The elections, which revolved around the agenda of restoring
the judiciary, brought arch rivals – the PPP and PML-N – closer enough to form a coalition
government. The agenda held the biggest promise and posed the compelling challenge to the
future of the coalition government. The promise emerged from the hope that the coalition
government between the PML-N and the PPP will end political bickering and bring in a
conducive political system to carry forward the agenda of change in the country. The
differences that emerged right from the onset of the system proved the political honeymoon
very short lived as the two parties parted ways on 15 March 2008.

The breakup of the PPP and the PML-N pushed politics back to the nineties, when both parties
struggled to dislodge each other through intrigues and accusations with the result that the third
force benefitted from the power struggle between the two parties. The government buckled to
the pressure of the opposition parties and the civil society and subsequently restored the
judiciary, but the issue had already caused irreparable damage to the relations between the
PPP and the PML-N. The economy of Pakistan was in extremely bad shape and speculations
were rife that the PPP will not be able to manage the economy even if it establishes workable
relations with the judiciary. The ailing economy – marred by burgeoning trade deficit and high
debt servicing obligations forced the then Finance Minister Ishaq Dar to ring the alarm bell,
which ultimately lead to the speculation that Pakistan may not meet its debt obligations in the
near future.

The government of former Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani faced challenges of disturbed
relations between the government and judiciary and the freefall of economy. The opposition
parties that adhered to the agenda of restoring judiciary enjoyed moral superiority, which
helped them launch aggressive campaign against the government. Political parties and
independent analysts accused the government of being vulnerable that would not be able to
complete its term if it fails to restore the judiciary. The opposition parties launched the
campaign to keep the government on tenterhooks. They knew the military was not interested in
getting into any adventurism and that office of the president was occupied by none else but the
 co-chairman of the ruling party, Asif Ali Zardari. Being a leader of the ruling party, it was totally
out of question that he would take any action against the government. President Zardari
initiated political and constitutional reforms after strengthening his position in the government.
It will perhaps be generally admitted that President Zardari launched the most aggressive
reforms in the 1973 Constitution. He agreed to forego his powers to dissolve assemblies and
appoint services chiefs and introduced a new formula for the distribution of divisible pool among
the federating units. The government also introduced Balochistan Package in order to woo the
Baloch nationalist leaders and mitigate the uprising in Balochistan. These measures were
revolutionary on paper, but they failed to bring about political and administrative harmony in the
country. The insurgency in Balochistan continued with the government accusing the foreign
powers of being involved in the instability in Balochistan. Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad
Chaudhry took suo motto notice in the missing persons case in Balochistan, which started a
cold war between judiciary and intelligence agencies on the issue. The efforts of the Chief
Justice Chaudhry to recover the missing persons proved successful to a great extent. However,
it raised several questions regarding the role of the Frontier Constabulary in Balochistan.

The US operation against the Al-Qa’ida leader Usama Bin Ladin in Abbottabad raised serious
questions about the sovereignty of the country. The political and military leadership reacted and
subsequently suspended the NATO supply through Pakistan. This resulted in straining the
relations between Pakistan and the United States. The ups and downs in the relations between
Pakistan and the United States have been a consistent feature of the present rule of the PPP.
That the government continued tight rope walking regarding relations with the United States is
quite understandable. The newly independent media sensitized people regarding the
sovereignty of the country, which seemed eroding in the face of consistent drone attacks and
intrusions from Afghanistan. The people continued raising their voice for regaining the
sovereignty and establishing the writ and authority of the government in every part of the
country. Meanwhile, the government remained conscious of its economic and geostrategic
compulsions, which did not allow it to cross the red line. The military and political leadership
faced pressure from both sides, but it goes to the credit of President Asif Ali Zardari and Army
Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani that they succeeded in making the United States realize
that Pakistan has its limits when it comes to protecting the national interests. Though, Pakistan
failed in bringing about any change in the policies of the United States, yet it succeeded in
impressing upon the United States to be mindful of the overall sentiment of the people in
Pakistan. The government subsequently restored the NATO supply despite opposition of the
people in general and the religious parties in particular.

The lack of clear policy toward the United States provided political support to the parties, which
tilted toward the right. The religious parties have never been an electoral choice for the people
in Pakistan. It is for this reason that there has always been political space for a moderate right-
wing political party in the country. This led to the emergence of the PML-N as a real political
entity in nineties. It remains a dominating political force even today. However, its character has
changed considerably after the coup in 1999, which forced former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
to go in exile in Saudi Arabia. Sharif’s arrest and his subsequent exile to Saudi Arabia pushed
Sharif to a unique political position in the country. Though, Sharif still remains a moderate right-
wing politician in the country, he is not liked by powers that be in the country. The situation
provided a conducive setting for Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, PTI, to emerge as a political force in
the country. Will PTI be able to make its presence felt in the coming elections remains a
million dollar question. The emergence of the PTI as a political force has introduced an element
of speculation to the possible political setup in the country. There are two entirely different
viewpoints about the real strength of the PTI. A section of the opinion-makers considers the PTI
to have its roots in the masses and the party is a real contender of power in the country.
However, there is no dearth of critics, who believe the PTI enjoys the support of the
establishment, which wants to cut the PML-N to the desired size. As the elections are around
the corner, it is not appropriate to comment on the possible influence of the PTI in the new
election.
The PTI has further fragmented the political scenario in the country, which may not augur well for
establishing a powerful government in the country -- the need of the hour. The PPP formed a
coalition government with the help of the MQM and the ANP, which survived for almost the
entire tenure. However, the government postponed several tough decisions due to fragility of
the political system, and, as such, failed in restoring law and order situation in the country,
particularly in Karachi and Balochistan. The Supreme Court issued directives to the federal and
provincial governments to restore law and order situation in Balochistan and Karachi, but its
total dependence on the coalition partners clipped the powers of the government to take
appropriate steps in this regard. It is generally believed that no single party will emerge
victorious in the next election. As such, two, three or more political parties will have to join
hands to form the federal government. Even the provincial governments will need support of
the coalition partners in order to form stable governments. How many political parties will be
needed to form a coalition will solely depend on the ability of the PTI to cause dent in the vote
bank of the PPP and the PML-N. All parties are making tall claims with regard to their ability to
form the new government, the veracity of which will be judged only after the election results are
announced.

The electoral process in the country is not without its challenges. The Constitution demands
formation of the caretaker governments at the federal and provincial levels, in addition to
forming a neutral Election Commission in the country. The appointment of Fakhruddin G
Ebrahim as the chief election commissioner on the advice of the former Leader of Opposition
Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan is a huge unprecedented step in the history of Pakistan. He enjoys the
support of almost all political party. He is a man of integrity and is well-respected across the
entire political spectrum in the country. The independent Election Commission and proactive
judiciary raise hopes for organizing a noncontroversial election in the country. The caretaker
government has taken over with the primary responsibility of holding free and fair elections in
the country. However, the biggest challenge for the government is maintaining the law and
order situation in the country. The Election Commission is holding survey to prepare a list of the
sensitive polling stations in the country. The Pakistan Army has accepted to provide the
security cover during the elections. Before the fragile security situation poses any challenge to
the electoral process, the process of scrutiny of papers has already raised several questions
about the next elections. The Election Commission has rejected papers of several potential
candidates belonging to all political parties on the basis that they do not fulfill the demands of
articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. Tahreek-e-Minhaj-ul Quran Chairman Tashirul Qadri who
is a Canadian national stressed the need of carrying out scrutiny of papers under articles 62
and 63 of the Constitution. Political parties have generally criticized the scrutiny process in the
country, which is viewed as “witch-hinting” of the politicians in the country. The return of the
former President General Pervez Musharraf and his announcement to take part in the election
have further complicated the situation. Will Musharraf be able to pass the strict scrutiny test
under articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution is the biggest question. His opponents have
already filed objections against his nomination papers, accusing him of imposing emergency in
the country, which was not ratified by the Parliament, putting judges of the superior courts
under house arrest, carrying out Red Mosque operation and for the killing of Baloch nationalist
leader Nawab Akbar Bugti. The Supreme Court has already initiated a case of treason against
Musharraf. If Musharraf qualifies the stage of scrutiny of papers, it will definitely raise relevant
questions about the role of the returning officers who disqualified several prominent politicians
on the basis of articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The rejection of the
nomination papers of Ayaz Amir, a prominent columnist and a leader of the PML-N, on the
basis that he wrote an article against ideology of Pakistan, has ignited a new debate in the
country. It is a fact that Pakistan has failed to develop an ideology acceptable to all segments of
the population in the country. The interpretation of the ideology of Pakistan differs from being a
modern secular and democratic country to an Islamic state government by laws of the Shariah.
Different governments and ideologues have been explaining the ideology of Pakistan on the
basis of their personal likes and dislikes. However, the situation has reached a situation where
there is need for the Election Commission and Supreme Court to intervene and define the
 ideology of Pakistan. The Lahore High Court has already asked the returning officers to avoid
asking unnecessary questions with the candidates. The returning officers have been asking
candidates questions, which can be termed as offending and ridiculous to say the least. The
whole exercise of the scrutiny of papers is a matter of debate in the entire country. It is
questionable why coverage of the scrutiny exercise was relayed on national media. Since the
path to democratic process has always been bumpy in Pakistan, such an exercise is bound to
raise apprehensions regarding the entire electoral process. W e hope and wish the
apprehensions in this regard prove wrong and that the scrutiny process is not used to
marginalize the genuine political leadership in the country.

As we mentioned earlier the emergence of the PTI as a political force has raised countless
permutations and combinations about the possible political alliances in the country. The United
States is all set to withdraw troops from Afghanistan in 2014, which is likely to pose several
geostrategic and security challenges to the country. It is feared that the Taliban, which still
controls a predominant area in Afghanistan might stage a come back in Kabul after the United
States leaves from Afghanistan. The United States has pledged to maintain its limited presence
in Afghanistan in order to avert the possibility of the Taliban extending their influence further in
Afghanistan. The resistance to the Taliban in Kabul will not make the situation easier for
Pakistan. The cross-border infiltrations are already taking place inside Pakistan and the United
States is mounting its pressure on the government to carry out operation against Haqqani
Network in Afghanistan. These are difficult political challenges, which demands Pakistan to
have a very strong government in Islamabad. The challenges on the external front are no less
demanding either. The political parties view threat of extremism and terrorism through their own
prisms. As such, any future coalition government may not have the unanimity of views on the
strategy to counter extremism and terrorism in the country, which is a pre-requisite to deal with
this menace. The ongoing wave of terrorism has already claimed several thousand lives in the
country. It cannot be overemphasized that bringing an end to this mindless and merciless
killings and getting the society rid of increasing extremism and terrorism is by far the biggest
challenge to the country. The coalition government in Islamabad will hardly be able to forge
consensus and tackle the challenge in this regard. There have been efforts on the part of the
Awami National Party and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal to develop political consensus about
holding talks with the Taliban. It will be recalled that the Taliban had expressed their willingness
to hold talks with Pakistani government before the appointment of the caretaker government.
The political parties have diametrically opposed views about holding talks with the Taliban.
Those who support holding talks with the Taliban develop their argument on the basis that the
United States is itself negotiating with the Taliban. However, we should not forget that
Afghanistan has caused more scars to Pakistan that to the United States. Tens of thousands of
people have been killed in Pakistan since 9/11, which makes reconciliation with the Taliban a
highly questionable issue. However, analysts who believe in pragmatism in geostrategic issues
believe that the talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan are the only option for both parties.
The sooner the process is set in motion the better. However, a strong and stable political
government in Islamabad is a pre-requisite for undertaking any such task.

A strong government is also required to deal with the challenges of economy, which is marked by
dwindling foreign exchange reserves, plummeting rupee value and consistent stagflation.
Though, the PPP government succeeded in bringing down inflation to considerable extent in
the last year of its government, it stood at around 20% in the initial part of its tenure. The tax-to-
GDP ration has become a political issue, as the wealthiest and the mightiest are not willing to
share in the national kitty. As they enjoy decisive majority in the Parliament, it is not easy for
any coalition government to bring them into the tax net. It is true that the aversion to paying
taxes is an issue that transcends party-divide as almost all political parties have influential
feudal and industrialists in their ranks. They enjoy leverage in policy-making process within the
party and, as such, they never allow political parties to take a clear stand on issues like
agriculture tax and other pressing tax reforms.
Viewed in this perspective, Pakistani nation keeps its fingers crossed regarding the future political
setup in the country. The hopes are high, but the challenges are also stiff. However, holding
free and fair elections, which are acceptable to all political parties, is the first step toward a
thousand miles journey.
 NOTES
1

1. Rafi Raza, Pakistan in Perspective:1947-1997 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 1.

2. Keith B. Callard, Political Forces in Pakistan ( New York: Institute of Pacific Relation, 1959)77.
3. Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism, (Karachi: Oxford University press, 1995) 25.
4. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan : The Formative Phase, p. 235.
5. Zulafkar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan (Karachi, Oxford University
Press, 1995) 2.
6. George Buechner, Danton’s Death, translated by Victor Price ( Oxford: Oxford university Press,
1971) 7.

7. Jeremy Bentham, On the Liberty of the Press and Public Discussion (London, 1820-1).
8. Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan ( Oxford: St Anthony’s College, 1997)3.

9. John Esposito, Pakistan : Quest for Islamic identity in Islam and Development ( Syracuse University
Press, 1980) 143.
10. Izzud-Din-Pal, Islam and Economics ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 5.
11.Ibid.,
12.Ibid.,5
13.Aziz Ahmad, The Religion and Society in Pakistan ( Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971)
3.
14.Ibid.,
15.Saleem Qureshi, “Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan” in ibid., 39.

16. cf. D.E. Smith (ed.), Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World: A Source Book (New
York: Free Press, 1971) 38.
17. Dr Manzooruddin Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan ( Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982)1.
18.Ibid., 1.
19. Pakistan Affairs (Washington; The Embassy of Pakistan), Vol. 12, No.8[1959], P.l.
20. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Dowson: Westview, 1980)
251.
21. Dr. Manzooruddin Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society ( Karachi:
Royal Book Company, 1982 )10.
22. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political system in Pakistan ( Karachi: Civil and Military Press, 1987)
v.
23. Roedad Khan, Pakistan A Dream Gone Sour (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000) 55.
24. Idid.,p. 11.
25. Ibid., P.13.
26. Mushahid Hussain, “Pakistan’s Judiciary; A Political Profile”. The Frontier Post, 5 October
1990.
27. Dr. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots & Development 1947- 1999( Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1999) 7.
28. Cited in Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1995) 8-9. See Makhdoom Ali Khan, ‘ 1973 Constitution— The Founding of the Federation’, an
unpublished paper read at a seminar: ‘The Heritage of Prime Minister Bhutto’, in Karachi, 3-5 April
 1989; f.n. 22, 10.
29. Keith Callard, Pakistan: a Political Study ( London: Goerge Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1957) 77.

30. Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movement of Pakistan: Democratic and International Factors, 1988.
31. Jaffer Ahmed, Federalism in Pakistan: A Constitutional Study ( Pakistan Study Centre:
University Karachi, 1990)10.

32. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional politics in Pakistan, ( Cambridge:
Press, 1995) 6.
33.Dawn, Karachi, 4 May 2000,p.13.
34. Qasir Nadeem, Pakistan Studies: An Investigation into the Political Economy 1948-1988,
( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1991)10.
35. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The political System of Pakistan, (Karachi, Oxford University Press,1967)
33.
36.Ibid.,

37. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore) 366-67.
38.Wilfred C. Smith, Pakistan as an Islamic State (Lahore, 1954) 29.
39. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional politics in Pakistan,
( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 2.
40. Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, ( Oxford: St Antony’s College, 1997) 3.

2
9. Dr. Shafique Ali Khan, Two Nation Theory-as a concept, strategy and ideology (Karachi :Royal
Book Company, 1973)215.
10. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History ( Karachi: Oxford Unversity Press, 1997) 2.
11. Dr Shafique Ahmad Khan, Two Nation Theory (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1973) 216
12.Ibid., P. 237.
13.Ibid.,
14. Quoted in Z. A. Suleri. My Leader (Lahore: A Lion Publication, 1946) 33-
37.
15. Akhtar Hameed Khan, Orangi Pilot Project: Reminiscences and Reflections (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1998) 5-6.
16. Safdar Mahmood, A Political Study of Pakistan (Lahore: Ashraf press, 1973)
35.
17. Quoted in Safdar Mahmood, A political Study of Pakistan (Lahore: Ashraf Pres,1973 ) 35.
18.Ibid,, p. 33.
19. This was done under new educational policies. Students were supplied with targeted
information and only those parts of the history of the subcontinent were selected which easily
proved the Two Nation theory and refuted the existence of a composite Indian culture. As Akbar
does not fit in this framework, and he was conveniently ignored, whereas, Aurangzeb appears in the
various textbooks of social studies and Urdu language as an orthodox and pious Muslim copying the
Holy Qur’an and sewing caps for his livelihood. It caused the ‘dilemma of ideologues’ and created
confusion in the mind of new generation).
20. Safdar Mahmood, A political study of Pakistan (Lahore : Ashraf Press, 1983)
34.
21. Stanley Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asi, ( New York: Oxford University Press) 36-
37.
22. Stanley Wolpert, The Roots of Confrontation in South Asia ( New York: Oxford University
Press 44.
23. Stanley Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia ( New York: Oxford University Press)
45.
24.Ibid,, p. 45.
25. Safdar Mahmood, A Political Study of Pakistan ( Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1983 ) 35.
26.Ibid., p. 46.
27. Sugata Bose and Ayesha JalaL Modem South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy
(Lahore: SANG-E-MEEL, 1998) 97.
 28. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History ( Katrachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 3
29. W.W. Hunter, The Indian Mussalmans (Calcutta: Comrade Publishers) 3.
30. Wolpert, Stanley, The Roots of Confrontation in South Asia ( New York: Oxford University
Press ) 78-79.
31. Safdar Mahmood, A Political Study of Pakistan (Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1983)
3.
32. Stanley Wolpert, The Roots of Confrontation in South Asia ( New York : Oxford University
Press) 84.
33. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 7.
34.Ibid., 197.
35. G. Allana, ed., Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents ( Lahore: Islamic Book Service,
1977) 6-9. And cited in Stanley Wolpert, The Roots of Confrontation in South Asia ( New York:
Oxford University Press).
36. Dr. Safdar Mahmood, A Political Study of Pakistani Lahore : Ashraf Press,
1983) 7.

37. Stanley Wolpert, The Roots of Confrontation in South Asia, P. 87.

38. Rafi Raza, Pakistan in Perspective: 1947-1991 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) xiv.
39. Ibid.,
40. Golam W Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule (London:Scorpion
Publishing LTD, 1988} 78
41. Ibid., pp. 78- 79.
42. Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, ‘ Electorate System: joint or separate’ dawn Friday, July 21, 2000.
43. Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, ( Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1995) 93.
44. Quieted in Khalid Bin Sayeed, -Pakistan: The Formative Phase (karachi: Oxford University
Press, 1968) 35.
45. Mohammad Ali Jinnah: An Ambassador of Unity, op. cit., p. 59. & Cited in Khalid Bin
Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998) 40-41.
46. Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman^ Lahore: Sange-e-Meel Publications, 1995) 7. 47.
Ibid., p. 8.
48. Stanley Wolpert, The Roots of Confrontation in South Asia{ London: Oxford University
Press) 94.
49. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History ( Kararchi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 18.
50. Selected Speeches and statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohd Ali Jinnah, M. Rafique Afzal,
Research Society of Pakistan, Lahore. (1966) p. 289.
51. Saiyid, Jinnah,p. 413 & Quieted in Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan ( Rawalpindi: PAF
Book Club, 1984) 97.
52. Saiyid, Jinnah, pp. 428-429. & Quieted in Ibid., p. 101.
53. Hasan, Collection, p.48. & cited in Ibid., p. 105.
54.Ibid., 105.
55.Saiyed, Jinnah, pp. 450-51.& Ibid., p. 107.
56. Ibid., p. 111.
57. Maluka , The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan ( Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1995) 97.

58. Aysha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan
(Lahore: Sang-e-Meal Publications, 1995) 15.
59. For more information see Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: Political History( Kararchi: Oxford
University Press, 1997) 18-19.
60. Stanley Wolpert, The Roots of Confrontation in South Asia( London : Oxford University
Press) 105.
61. Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan ( Karachi: National Publishing House,
1970)116.

62. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase: 1857-1947

63. Seyed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., op. cit., p. 124. & Ibid., p. 92.
64. Ibid., p. 132.
 65. Dr. Safdar Mahmood, A Political Study of Pakistan, p. 16. & adopted from A. Aziz, Discovery of
Pakistani Lahore, 1957) 296.
66. Salim M. M. Qureshi, The Politics of Jinnah (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988) 103.
67. Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, Vol.11, op. cit, p. 305.
68. Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, Lahore: 1968) see letter dated 28 May 1937.
69. Richard Symmond, The making of Pakistani London: 1957) 31 & Quieted in Safdar Mahmood, A
Political Study of Pakistani Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1984) 20.
70. Maclver, R. C., Op. Cit. p. 124.
71. Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistani Lahore: Longman, 1961) 236.
72. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan : The Enigma of Political Development London: West view Press, 1980) 69.
73. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Rawalpindi: PAF Book Club, 1999) 185.
74. Ibid., p. 185.
75. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Path --way to Pakistan(L'dhoxt: Brother Publishers, 1993), 240.
76. Leonard Binder, Religion and politics of Pakistani Los angels: university of California Press, 1963) 62.
77. Dr. Safdar Mahmood, A Political Study of Pakistan, p. 24.
78. Zahid Hussain, Rationale of Partition ( Karachi: Royal Book Company,
1999) 122.
79. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan : The Formative Phase{ Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 132-
133.
80. Dr. Safdar Mahmood, A Political Study of Pakistan ( Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1984) 27.
81. Ibid., p. 28.
82. I. H. Qureshi, A Short History of Pakistan ( Karachi: University of Karachi, 1984)

83. Stanley Wolpert, The Roots of Confrontation In south Asia, p. 109.

84. Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-e-
Meel Publication, 1995) 176.
85. May 26, 1946, Note by Wyatt, pp. 705-6. & Quieted in Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, p. 271-2.
86. Khalid Bin Syeed, Pakistan: Formative Phase 1857-1948(Karachi: Oxford University Press) 138-9.
87. I. H. Qureshi, A Short History of Pakistani Karachi: University of Karachi,
1984)222.

88. Stanley Wolpert, The Roots of Confrontation in South Asia, p.lll.

89. Nehru to Jinnah, 1946, p. 238. & Quieted in Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, p. 283.
90. Khalid Bin Syeed, Pakistan: The formative Phase, p. 157.
91. Ibid., p. 164.

92. Stanley Wolpert, The Confrontation in South Asia, p. 111.

93.1. H. Qureshi, A short History of Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi) 225.
 1. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development,(Dowson : Westview, 1980)166.
2. Ibid., p. 167.
3. Zulafkar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of constitutionalism in Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1995) 2.
4. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistani Karachi : Civil and Military Press, 1987) 62.
3
5. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, (Dawson: Westview, 1980) 169.
6. H. A. R. Gibbs, Whither Islam, (London: 1932 )190. & quoted in Zarina Salamat, Pakistan: 1947-1958
An Historical Review ( Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1992) 1.

7. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 66.

8. Afzal Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan,(Lahore: Vangaurd Book Ltd, 1986) 30.
9. Dr. Manzooruddin Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society (Karachi: Royal Book
Company, 1982) 7.
10. Zulifkar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1995) 94.

11. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, All India Muslim League Documents (Dhaka: 1969),
vol.l, 558-9. & Quieted in Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, p.95.
12.Ibid., p. 96.
13. Syed Jaffer Ahmad, Federalism in Pakistan : A Constitutional Study (Pakistan Study Centre,
University of Karachi, 1990) 72-73.

14. Maluka, The Constitutionalism in Pakistan, p. 100.

15. Dr. Jaffer Ahmad, Federalism in Pakistan, p. 69.
16. Dorab Patel, Testament of a Liberal ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000) 3 adopted from the
Memoirs of Mr. Hamidul Haq Choudhry, page 151.
17. Ibid., p 5.
18. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and constitutional politics in Pakistan, ( Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) 22.
19. Dorab Patel, Testament of a Liberal, Oxford University Press, P. 5.

20. Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity (Oxford:
Macmillan Press LTD, 1997 ) 51.
21. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report, Volume V, 1949, pp. 1-2.
22. Ralph Braibanti, “ The Research Potential of Pakistan's Development Chapter. 15 in Lawrence Ziring,
Ralph Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins, ed., Pakistan : The Long View. Cited in Norman D. Palmer,
Changing Patterns of Politics in Pakistan: An Overview. In the contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, And
Society , ed., Dr. Manzooruddin Ahmad, Royal Book Company, p. 45.
23. Dr. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots and Development 1947-1999 ( Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2000) 38.
24. Allen MacGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996 )
79.
25. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, Dawson Westview, p. 170.

26. Allan McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy, p. 80-81.

27. ( Some other historians talked about Nazimuddin as G.W. Choudhery credits Nazimuddin with being
a respected leader and one of the few Pakistani politicians who appear to have had a genuine regard for
Parliamentary government, Sayeed states that he was ‘ extremely affable’ but weak, indecisive and
entirely on he council of his shrewd brother, Khawja Shahabuddin.’ Chief Justice Munir observed him ‘
an angel of a man with out guile or smile of a politicians.’ Jalal assess him as $a man whose reputation
for weakness was tempered only by that of religious piety’ and charging him with a ‘ talent for making
wrong decisions at critical moments.’ Choudhry, democracy in Pakistan, p. 10; Sayeed, Formative Phase, p.
231; Munir, Highways and bye-ways, p.
74. ){27} Ibid., p. 251.
28. Dr. Manzooruddin Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan, Royal Book Company, p. 8.
29. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Karachi: Civil and Military Press, 1987 ) 70
30. Dr. Safadar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots and Development 1947- 1999, (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 2000 ) 39.
31. Ibid,, p. 42. Quoted I. H. Fildman, A Constitution for Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1955)
35.
32. Ibid.,. p. 40.
33. Pakistan Times, 12 January 1953. cited in Ibid,, p. 41.
34. Syed Jaffar Ahmad, Federalism in Pakistan: A Constitutional Study, Pakistan Study Center: University of
Karachi, 1990) 39-40.
35. Ibid,, p. 70.
36. Rafi Raza, Pakistan in Perspective: 1947-1977 ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 5 .
37. Ibid,, p. 72.
38. Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-1958: An Historical Review (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical
and Cultural Research, 1992) 56.

39. Munir, life, writing and Judgment, p. 19.

40. Ghulam Muhammad was later describe as 1 a man of immense willpower....unwilling to interpret
his own role as merely ornamental.’ Callard, political study, p. 23. He was also refereed to as ‘ perhaps the
most controversial
figure of Pakistan’s political history......Ghulam Muhammad knew only one
method of dealing with opponents: their ruthless elimination.’ Khalid Bin Sayeed, 4 The political role of the
Pakistan Civil Service31 Pacific Affairs 131, 134 (1958). Allan McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan’s
Democracy ( Karachi: Oxford University Press) 251.
41. Ibid,, p. 82.
42. Ibid., p. 98. Quoted in Callard, Political Study, p. 135.
43. ( While Callard was willing to admit that certain principles of parliamentary government were
breached when Nazimuddin was dismissed, he did not place much emphasis on that fact but instead
stressed the allegation that Nazimuddin was not an efficient administrator. Callard adopted the view that
no one in the Cabinet or the Assembly really cared, the Assembly did not even consider Nazimuddin’s
dismissal as ‘worthy of debate.’ The matter seemed to Callard little more than an inconvenient interruption
in government affairs. ‘ Ghulam
Muhammad was left with an awkward political situation on his hand.’ Callard ignored the possibility
that the dismissal was carried out accompanied by the use of police. He seemed to completely misread
what happened when he concluded that, ‘ The governor-general’s action was not a personal seizure of
power.’ Kieth Callard, Political Study, pp. 135-7.)
44. Ibid,, p. 255.
45. Ibid,, p. 99. (GIA $ 10. ‘ A proposition more destructive of the parliamentary system could not be
advanced as it meant that no administration could service the displeasure of the governor-general
however much it might enjoy the confidence of the Parliament or the people. It made the governor-
general an arbiter of the fate of government, which he could dismiss or appoint at his will or whim/
Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics, p. 13.).
46. Ibid,, p. 255.
47. (the members were Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Doultana, then Chief Minister of
 Punjab; M. A. Gurmani, then Central Minister of the Interior: and Choudhry Nazir Ahmad; who did
not put their signature to the Report).
48. Dr. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots and Development, (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1999 43-44.
49. Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58 : An Historical Review, (Islamabd •.National Institute of Historical
and Cultural Research, 1992) 55.
50. Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997)7
51. Ibid., p. 55
52. ibid., p. 56.
53. Dawn, 25 October 1954. Reprinted in Allan McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy ,
Oxford University Press, p. 132.
54. Ibid., 23 October 1954. Ibid., p. 132.
55. Reprinted in Ziring, Failure of Democracy, p. 203.
56. Ibid., p. 132.

57. Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, p. 139. Reproduced Justice (Retired) Ahmad, Pakistan: A
study of its Constitutional History, 42.
58. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan : The Enigma of Political Development, Dowsen Westview, 1980, p. 170.
59. The decision was challenged by the President of the dissolved Assembly, Moulvi Tamizuddin and
observed it as “ unconstitutional, illegal, ultra virus, without jurisdiction, inoperative and void.
60. Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan, London, 1957,p. 160. Zairina Salamat, Pakistan
1947-58: An Historical Review, p. 56. (In the first decade of Pakistan’s existence govemor-
genera>@hulam Muhammad appointed justice M. Munir from Punjab, then Chief Justice of Lahore
High Court. Munir superseded the Bengali justice A. S. M. Akram who was then Acting Chief Justice,
Justice Munir later headed the benches that delivered several controversial judgments in favor of the
then governor-general supported by the then C-in-C Ayub Khan. He also headed a bench that
legitimised Mirza-Ayub imposed martial law in the well known Dosso case).
61. Paula R. Newberg , Judging the State: Courts and constitutional politics in Pakistani Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996 ) 10.
62. Ibid., p. 12.
63. Ibid., p. 5.

64. Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review, P. 56.

65. Maiuka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, Oxford, p. 139.
66. ( For a summary and anatomy of Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan's case, see Choudhry, Constitutional
Development, 87.)
67. Ibid., p 140-141 & 336.
68. Quieted in Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan : The Enigma of Political Development (London: Dowson
Ltd., 1980)
69. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (London : Dowson Ltd, 1980)
172.
70. Ibid., p. 172.
71. Ibid., p. 173.
72. Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, Oxford, p. 141.
73. Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review, p. 57
74. ( Tamizuddin ( Jen), p. 149. The governor-general*s assent was considered a formality because by
convention his assent was given to legislation as a matter of routine and without any reference to his
opinion on the legislation. If he were to withhold his assent he could be removed from the office by the
Queen acting on the advice of the dominion’s Prime Minister. Later, at p. 9 of his Islamic Constitution,
Munir Wrote the principle of statutory constitution which was
applicable in a situation such as the one presented by Tamizuddin,......... [ A]
constitutional enactment should be interpreted liberally and not in a narrow and
pedantic sense..........’) Allan McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy,
p.185-186. and p. 251.
75. Jaffar Ahmad, Federalism in Pakistan : A Constitutional Study, p. 112.
76. Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review, p. 58.
77. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 79. Although, “He made it clear that in
issuing the ordinance his objective was nor merely to create the Province of West Pakistan, but to arm
 himself with the power to provide a constitution for the entire country’’ (The Emergency Power
Ordinance, 1955. Ordinance No. IX of 1955. See Section 6(3) and 10. A Collection of the Central Acts
and Ordinances for the Year 1955 (Karachi: The Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan,
1956), pp. 3-5){77} Ibid., 79.
78. The Economist(London), 8 October 1955, 138, quoted in Aziz, Party Politics.) {78} requited in
Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan , p. 143.
79. ( Wheeler, Quest, 110){79}Ibid., 143.
80. Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, p. 143.
81. Ibid., 143.
82. ( For the advantages of the One Unit and the scheme, see Choudhry, Constitutional Development,
71; Rehman, Public Opinion, 71-2; see also Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, 53-4, 187-8 ; Maluka,
The Myth of Constitutional ismf 143-44.)
83. Khalid bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Queen’s University, 1987, p. 76.
84. ( General Ayub’s Plan embraced the whole of Pakistan. It was entitled “ A Short Appreciation of
Present and Future Problems of Pakistan. ” Colonel Mohammad Ahmad. My Chief ( Lahore:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1960) 86-
93.)
85. Ibid., p. 77 & One Unit Documents. Document B, pare. 7 (biii)
86. (Suharwardhy’s speech, quoted in Dawn( Karachi) 1 October 1955).
87. ( Dawn (Karachi), 28 and 29 July 1954).
88. ( Shiekh Mujibur Rahman’s speech, quoted in Dawn (Karachi), 26 August 1955).
89. ( Suharwardhy’s speech, quoted ibid., 11 and 13 September 1955.)
90. Ibid.,
91. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State,( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) N 23, 25.
92. Ibid., p. 52.
93. ( Broadcasts of 24 November 1954 and 1 December 1954 published in Pakistan Times New Digest
(Karachi)).
94. Zarina, Pakistan, p. 40.
95. Ibid., p. 53.
96. Ibid., 52. ( Sindh Chief Minister Pirzada was dismissed for opposing One Unit and was replaced by
former Chief Minister Khuhru, who was supported the plan).
97. It is also noted that it was Sir Eric Nelson, Law Secretary, who advised Ghulam Muhammad that he
possessed the constitutional right to retroactively validate legislation, Dawn, 23 March 1955). The
Emergency Order granted him power to implement his crafted One Unit Plan, made provisions for a
future constitution and assumed the right to give the nation ‘an annual budget validated on his signature
alone’. By the signature of ‘absolute’ authority ‘it was agreed that West Pakistan was to be integrated
into One Unit, each wing was to have full regional autonomy, parity was to exist between them at the
centre, and election would be joint electorate.^ Suharwardhy, Memoirs, pp. 88-9.)
98. Reference by His Excellency the governor-general, PLD 1955 FC 435, Advisory Jurisdiction).
99. This was another Judicial difficulty which faced by the Court. The court had been faced the
problem which first brought Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan’s case to the bench. Some questions which could
be created by the bench: who should lead the country; on what basis should franchise be organised; how
should the institutions of state function; and what role should the judiciary play in answering these
questions?
100.Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan; The Enigma of Political Development, p. 173.
101.Ibid., p. 173
102. ( many of whom were civil servants ). Their duty was to sent secret reports on the chief ministers
and the cabinet members. See Sayeed, ‘political Role’, p. 131.
103.Iftikhar. H. Malik, State and Civil Society of Pakistan, p. 61.
104.Ibid., p. 60 & 277.
105. Ibid, p. 60 adopted from Charles H. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan , Karachi, 1987, pp. 4-5.
106. ( New York Times, December 15, 1954 which adopted in Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An
Historical Review, p. 40).
107. M.S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan-- 1947-58 (New Delhi, Radiant Publishers,
1982 ) 171, Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism, p. 161.
108.Mirza had already assumed office as acting governor-general on August 7.
109.Iftikhar H. Malik, The State and Civil Society in Pakistan, p. 72.
110. Ghulam W Choudhry, Pakistan : Transition From Military To Civilian Rule ( Victoria House:
Scorpion Publishing LTD, 1988 ) 10.
 111.Ibid., p. 11.
112. For details see GW Choudhry, Constitutional development in Pakistan, second edition, London,
1969 and Dr Manzooruddin, Contemporary Pakistan, p.
7.
113. There were seven prime ministers in Pakistan during the era of parliamentary democracy, multi-
party system and coalition politics (1947-58), With the exception of the first prime minister, Liaquat Ali,
none of the remaining six prime ministers were elected as a result of election or even as a result of the
vote of confidence.
114.Ibid., p. 18.
115. Dorab Patel, Testament of a Liberal ( Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2000) 13. ( Though the way was not good for the long political future of the country yet it was good for
that adhoc solution of political and constitutional dead lock. It opened the way for highly centralised
federal structure and the departure from the parity).
116. (80) and (The following table gives the details of seats allocation in the second Constituent
Assembly: East Pakistan-40 seats (nine for non-Muslims), Punjab- 21 seats (one for non-Muslims),
NWFP- 4 seats, Sindh- 5 seats (one for non-Muslims), Other Areas-10 seats. Safdar Mahmood,
Pakistan: Political Roots and Development 1947-1999 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000 ) 47.
117. Mushtaq Ahmad, Governments and Politics in Pakistan ( Karachi: Space Publishers, 1970 ) 105.
'
118. Kieth Callard, Pakistan: a Political Study (Karachi: Oxford university Press, 1968) 148.
119.Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review .... pp. 58-59.
120. The Party position in the 1955 Constituent Assembly elections was: Muslim League-25, United
Front-16, Awami League-12, Noon Group-3, Independent Muslim-1, Pakistan Congress-4, Scheduled
Caste federation-3, United Progressive Party-2, Others-6.) Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots
and Development 1947-1999 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000 ) 48.
121. Which was passed on 30 September 1955 and implemented on 15 October 1955, to simplified the
issue of representation in the central legislature, because Pakistan now had two provinces— East and
West Pakistan. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan; Political Roots and Development 1947-1999, p. 48.
122. Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines (Karachi: Oxford University Press,1999) vii.

4
1. Kieth Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study{London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957) 77.
2. For more analysis of this period see: Robert Laporte, Jr, Another Try at Democracy in
Contemporary Problems of Pakistan , ed. j Henry Korson (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993) 171-173.
3. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 148.
4. Ziring, A Political History, 148.
5. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political Study , 148-149.
6. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan : A political History, 161-162.
7. Zulafkar Khalid Maluka, , The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 1995) 163. Wolf-Philips, ‘ The 1973 constitution—A Heritage for the Future’. Kalim Siddiqui,
Conflicts, Crises & War in Pakistan, ( London: MacMillan, 1972)96-7.
8. Maluka , The Myth of Constitutionalism , p. 4-5.
9. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State : Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan, (Cambrige:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) 3-4.
10. Rafi Raza, Pakistan in Perspective: 1947-1977(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 9.
11. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999, Oxford, p. 48.
12.Maluka.The Myth, p. 163.
13. Safdar, Pakistan, 53.
14.See for more information, Rehman, Public Opinion, 180.
15.1bid., 164.
16. Afzal Mahmood, Islamization of Pakistan, ( Karachi: Vanguard Book Ltd, 1986) 65.
17.i.e., August 1955-September 1956.
18.Maluka, The Myth.
19.Ziring, Pakistan, 173.
20. Mushtaq Ahmad, Jinnah And After: A Profile of Leadership ( Karachi: Royal Book Company) 87.
21. Maluka , The Myth of Constitutionalism , 165.
22. Allan, McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan's democracy ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985
 ) 232.
23. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: the Enigma of Political Development (1980) 58.
24. Allan, McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan’s democracy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985 )
232.
25. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: the Enigma of Political Development (1980) 175.
26. Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism ,171.
27. Maluka , The Myth of Constitutionalism ,171.
28. Khalid bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Queen’s University, 1987,93.
29. Rafi Raza, Pakistan in Perspective: 1947-1977{Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 10.
30. Rafi Raza, Pakistan in Perspective: /947-i977(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 10.
31. Dr. Mubarik AH, Understanding Pakistan, Progressive Publication, 36.
32. For details, see Aysha jalal, 4 State-Building in the Post war World: Britain’s Colonial Legacy,
American Future and Pakistan’, in Sugata Bose (ed), South Asia and world Capitalism, New Delhi,
1999, 271-72.
33. Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistani London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997) 102.
34. Golam w Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, 20.
35. Iskander Mirza openly talked about it He was a great believer in the British administrative system in
India and much more concerned to preserve and foster that the system rather than maintain a democratic
constitution to which he was sworn in as President of the republic. The elected representatives were the ‘
mess of things’ for his controlled ideology.
36. Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, 20.
37. See report of the constitution, 1961, Lahore, 1961.
38. Golam w Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, 2L
39. Golam w Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, 2.
40. Almond and Colman, The Politics of the Developing areas (Princeton, 1960) 572.
41. Golam w Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule,22.
42. Roedad Khan, Pakistan: A Dream Gone Sour (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000 ) 203-204.
43. See Karl j. Newman: The Constitutional Problems of Pakistan, Dr. Manzooruddin Ahmad,
Contemporary Pakistan : Politics, Economy Society, ( Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1983 )84.
44. The modem oligarchy.
45. It is also interesting to note that in Muslim states army has always played, and still does play, a very
important part with the political traditions of the state.
46. See Karl j. Newman: The Constitutional Problems of Pakistan, Dr. Manzooruddin Ahmad,
Contemporaty Pakistan : Politics, Economy Society, ( Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1983 ) 54-56..
47. Kieth Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study(London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957) 148.
48. See Karl j. Newman: The Constitutional Problems of Pakistan, Dr. Manzooruddin Ahmad,
Contemporary Pakistan : Politics, Economy Society, ( Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1983 )
49. It all began in 1956 with the famous Moulvi Tamizuddin case which challenged governor-general
Ghulam Muhammad’s dissolution of the Constituent assembly. In the appeal against the Sindh High
court’s judgment, justice Munir, the then Chief Justice validated Ghulam’s action. Two year later the
same judge performed a similar service for President Iskander Mirza when the leader abrogated the
constitution of 1956, imposing Martial-Law on October
7, 1958 and appointing General Ayub Khan as chief martial law administrator. In what came to be
known as the Doso case, the Supreme court accorded recognition to the martial law regime even though
this was not an issue that was raised before the court.
50. Ibid., 57.
51. Ibid, 57.
52. For more information see Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 18 L
53. Ch. Mohammad Ali in spite of his limitations managed to get a constitution passed in 1956 on the
basis of parity and it was accepted by all the political leaders from East Pakistan because, it was felt that
even under this principle East Pakistan could play an effective role in the governance of the country and
enjoy a fair participation in the making of policy decisions if healthy conventions were established and
important portfolios were equally shared between the two wings. Unfortunately these healthy
conventions never grew up because the new President was no less intrigue then the previous governor-
general.
54. Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1999) 180.
55. Kieth Callard, The Political System of Pakistani New York : Institute of Pacific Relation, 1959)
 125.
56. Report of Constitutional Commission ( Karachi: 1961 ) 9.
57. Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1999) 180.
58. For more information see Abula’la, Islamic law and constitution (Karachi: Islamic Publication Ltd,
1967) 17-26.
59. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956.
60. John Esposito (ed), The Oxford History of Islam ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 677. and
Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Karachi: Civil and Military Press, 1987) 159-164.
61. Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan, 65.
62. Ibid., 65.
63. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956, Article-198.
64. Ibid.,
65. Part-111 of the constitution, from Article-23 to 31 contained provisions about the DPSP.
66. Ibid., Article-198.
67. Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan, 66.
68. Iskandar Mirza, New York time, 7 February 1955.
69. Article 197 provided that the President “ shall set up an orgnisation for Islamic research and
instruction in advanced studies to assist in the reconstruction of the Muslim society on a truly Islamic
basis.
70. Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of pakistan, 68.
71. G.w. Choudhry, Constitutional development in Pakistan (Karachi: The Ideal Book House, 1959)
134.
72. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956.
73. Maluka , The Myth of Constitutionalism ,
74. Manzoor Ahmad- Khalida Ghous, Pakistan: Prospects and perspective (Karachi: Royal Book
Company, 1998 ) 72.
75. Constituent Assembly debates, Vol.l, 31 Jan, 1965. 2248.
76. Munir report: 232.
77. Iqbal. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 155.
78. Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1999) 180.
79. Report of Constitution Commission (Karachi: 1961) 115.
80. John Esposito (ed), The Oxford History of Islam (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999)
81. Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan, 74.
82. Fazlur Rehman, Islam and Modernity, 1982.
83. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Karachi: Civil and Military Press,
1987) 161.
84. A. K. Brohi, Fundamental Law of Pakistan, 784.
85. Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, 153.
86. Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, 153.
87. Karl J. Newman used this style in his essay * the constitutional Problems in Pakistan, in his opinion
this expression was introduced after the long constitutional struggle of the leaders and other parties in
the time between 1947 and 1958 was installed, by this system, the dualism (two-tier) of British
legislation demolished but the British acts of 1919 and 1935 constituted the basic framework in the
constitution.
88. Though the President Iskander Mirza had coined for himself an official President.
89. Kieth Callard, Pakistan: A Political History, 148.
90. Maluka , The Myth of Constitutionalism ,
91. The Governor was supposed to be real figurehead like President in the centre. The Governor, being
the nominee and the representative of the Centre, was vested with substantial discretionary powers
which allowed him to indulge in political activities. In the analyse of rounaq Jahan, the five Governor of
East Pakistan who succeeded the first English Governor there, remained continuously active in
provincial and national politics. Jahan, failure, 24.
92. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956, Article-5.
93. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956, Government of Pakistan, Article 50, 17.
94. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956, Government of Pakistan, Article-57.
95. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots And Development 1947-1999 ( Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2000) 49.
 96. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956, Government of Pakistan, Article-191,
17.

5
1. To understand Pakistan’s disgusting politics for the period of 1947-58 please see Allen Me Grath,
The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996.
2. Firoz Khan Noon , From Memory (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1966) 297.
3. Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993)57.
4. Zulafkar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University
Press) 172.
5. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 246.
6. The Pakistan Times, 9 October 1958.
7. Aysha Jalal & Sugata Bose, Modem South Asia : History, Culture, Political Economy ( Lahore:
Sang-E -Meel Publication, 1998) 214.
8. Hamza Alavi, “ The State in Post-colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh”, in Kathleen Gough
and Hari P. Sharma, eds. Imperial and Revolution in South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1973), pp. 151- 152.
9. Dr. Manzooruddin Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan : Politics, Economy Society, ( Karachi: Royal
Book Company, 1983 ) p. 9
10. Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1997) 228.
11.Ibid., p. 228.
12. Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History, p. 229.
13.Ibid., 223.
14. For further information see Dr Manzooruddin Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy,
and Society, p. 9; Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969, First edition
( Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971); see also G.W.Choudhry, Democracy of Pakistan ( Dacca:
Green Bookhouse, 1963).
15. Due to his foreign policy and diplomatic moves earned him the title when the Economist ( London,
15 August; for details see chapters 2and 3 of The Last Days of United Pakistan.) wrote that ‘Ayub
wanted essentially what his brother soldier [de Gaulle] sought for France.
16. Altaf Gouhar, Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler ( Lahore : Sang-e- Meal Publication,
1994), 488-9.
17.which was achieved through four processes:
1. promotion of what has been termed the “ corporate interests” of the military,
2. political exclusion i.e., exclusion of political leaders, political parties and the urban middle
classes,
3. political control, i.e., control of the press and labor;
political inclusion, i. e., co-optation and consolidation of bureaucratic elite, financial-industrial
groups and the feudal classes.
18. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends, Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London:
Oxford University Press, 1967)207.
19. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History, p. 246.
20. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots and Develolopment 1947- /999(Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 20000) 362.
21. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History , p. 246*247.
22. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, (Karachi: Civil and Military Press, 1987) 93.
23. Sayeed , political system, 93.
24. Zulafkar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 1995 )176.
25. Maluka, The Myth, 176.
26. Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto: His Life and Times of Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1993) 58. Hereafter cited as Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan.
27. Ziring, Pakistan : A Political History, 248.
28. Peasants and workers party.
29. Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History,249.
30. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1958,16459.Maluka, The Myth,116.
 31. Moreover, it was convinced that Ayub Khan did not act alone and his primary support came from
out side Pakistan, that is, from the United States. For further information see Farhat Mahmood, A
History of US-Pakistan Relation ( Karachi: VANGUARD, 1991, chapter 2) 29-78& Ziring, Pakistan,
253-254.
32. for further information please see Maluka, The Myth, 177-179. Sayeed, Political System,94.
Quereshi, ‘ Politics of Parties in the Ayub era ’, 45. Jahan, Failure ,51.
33. Arnold J Toynbe, Commununism and the West Asian Countries’,The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Sciences, July 1961. Cited in Chouhry, Pakistan: Transition from
Military to Civilian Rule, 28.
34. Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, 29.
35. For detail of poor Bengali representation see R. Jahan: Pakistan-Failure in National Integration. M.
Ahmad: Bangladesh- Constitutional Quest of Autonomy, 1950-71. Golam W Choudhry: Pakistan:
Transitional from Military to Civilian Rule. Omar Noman: Pakistan: Political and Economic History
since 1947.
36. Omar Noman, Pakistan: Political & Economic History since 7947(Karachi: 1988)32.
37. For further information see ibid., p. 33.
38. The speech delivered by S. M. Zafar, quoted in Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics
in Pakistan, 1958-69 (New York: Syracuse University Press,
1971)184
39. Zulafikar Ali Bhutto, The Great Tragedy (Karachi: Pakistan People’s Party Publication, 1971) 5-
9.
40. For further information see Stanley Wolpert: Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, p, 60
41. Stanely Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, p. 67.
42. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends, Not Master: A Political Autobiography ( London: Oxford
University Press, 1967 ) p. 207.
43. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) 255.

6 ~
1. Nom Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London:VERSO, 1991) 352.
2. Zulafkar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University
press, 1995) 3 .
3. Pakistan’s Chance’, (editorial) The Financial Times, London, 20 July 1993. Cited in Iftikhar H.
Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997) 13,
4. Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor General, Karachi, 11963, p. 58,
Cited In Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 21947-1958 An Historical Review (Islamabad: '-National Institute
of Historical and Cultural
-Research, 1992) 72.
5. Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides, p. 33. Cited in Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan Divided
(Lahore: Jang Publication, 1993) 2.
6. Damodar P. Singhal, Pakistan ( New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1972) V. Cited in Syed Humayun,
Shiekh Mujib’s 6-Point Formula (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995) 29.
7. See Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), pp. 62-66;
and Leonard Binder, etal; crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1971). Cited in Dr. Manzooruddin (ed), Contemporary Pakistan (Karachi: Royal
Book Company, 1982)46.
8. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the Star<?(Cambridge University Press, 1995) 2.
9. Ralph Braibanti, “The Reassert Potential of Pakistan’s Development,” Chap. 2. Norman D.
Palmer, Changing Pattern of Politics in Pakistan : An Overview. Dr Manzooruddin, (ed).,
Contemporary Pakistan (Karachi: Royal Book Publication, 1982) 45-46.
10. Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia (Lahore: Sang- e-Meel
Publication, 1995)183.
11. Robert LaPorte, Jr, ‘ Administrative Restructuring During the Zia Period’, in
S.J Burki and C. Baxter (eds), Pakistan under the Military. Eleven Years of Ziaul- Haq (Oxford, 1991)
128.
12. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: the Enigma of Political Development (1980) 248.
13. During the Ayub era Bengalis still constituted only percent of the officers corps of the army, 15
percent in the air force and 20 percent in the navy, Bengalis
 continued to be underrepresented in the CSP at a time of growing pressure for entry due to a 162 per
cent increase in college enrollment in the eastern wing. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National
Integration ( Dacca (Second Edition), 1977, pp. 62 and 106. Cited in Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and
Authoritarianism in South Asia, 186.
14. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Karachi: Civil and Military Press, 1987) 196.
15. Ayes Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarian Rule in South Asia, 185.
16. Ralph Braibanti, Research on Bureaucracy of Pakistan, Durham, N.C., 1966, p. VII. Cited in
Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review, 145.
17. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 24 February, 1948, vol.II, No. 1, pp. 6-7. Cited in Syed
Humayun, Shiekh Mujib's 6-Point Formula, 84.
18. Shamsuddin Abul Kalam, Social Questions in Bengali Fiction,” in Sajjad Hussain, ed, Dacca
University Seminars on Contemporary Writings in East Pakistan, (Dacca: 1958), p. 60. Cited in Khalid
Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, 185 .
19. In this chapter the term Bengalis is synonymous with the East Pakistan. The term Bengalis is better
suited for describing the culture and the language of East Pakistan. Slightly over 50 million people, out
of a total population of 50.8 million in East Pakistan, regarded Bengali as their mother tongue. Sayeed,
The Political System of Pakistan, 185.
20. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 1(4), 19 March 1956, p. 216. Cited in Iftikhar H. Malik,
State and Civil Society in Pakistan, 6.
21. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol.i. 16 January 1956, p. 1861. Cited in Richard Sisson
and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1992) 16.
22. The Pakistani Observer, November 10 and 13, 1961. Cited in Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political
System Of Pakistan, ( Karachi: Civil and Military Press of Pakistan, 1966) 188.
23. A. Tayyab, Pakistan: A Political Geography{ London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 16. Cited
in Syed Humayun, Shiekh Mujib’s 6 Point Formula(Kmachi :Royal Book Company, 1995) 35.
24. For more information see Stanley Wolpert, Gandhi’s Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma
Ghandhi (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001)10.
25. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Karachi: Civil and Military Press, 1987)188.
26. CAP Debates, Vol. II, February 25,1948, p. 121.
27. Rounaq Jahan, op. cit., p. 10. Cited in Seyed Humayun, Shiekh Mujib’s Six Point Formula, 36.
28. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession Pakistan, India, and the Creation of
Bangladesh (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992) 10.
29. Four persons were killed by police firing on that day when the Dacca University students sloganeer
against the Lingua franca of the nation and the day become a Martyr’s Day as the Bengalis call it.
30. Muzaffar Ahmad, Why Regional Autonomy, (Dacca), pp. 1-19.
31. Figures obtained from the U.S. AID Office in Washington. It may be noted that West Pakistan
received a dollar development loan of $12.8 million during the fiscal year 1958, whereas East Pakistan
received none. All these figure do not include technical assistance. In addition, development loans were
given on an all- Pakistan basis, which are also not included in these figures. Khalid Bin Sayeed,
The Political System of Pakistan ( Karachi: Civil and Military Press, 1987) 200- 201.
32. Aysha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, (Lahore: Sang- e-Meel, 1995)187.
33. Report of Five Members of the Finance Commission (Dacca: January 18, 1962), p. 11. cited in
Ibid.,
34. In 1929, Quid-e~Azam presented his famous Fourteen Points of which the first dealt with the
subject of federation. It says: The form of the future constitution should be federal with the residuary
power vested in the provinces. Central Government to have control of only such matters of common
interests as may be guaranteed by the constitution Dr Jaffar Ahmad, Federalism in Pakistan: A
Constitutional Study, 25.
35. K.C. Wheare in his Federal Government, says: ‘The test which I apply for federal government
embody predominantly a division of powers between general and regional authorities, each of which, in
its own sphere, is co-ordinate with the others and independent of them? If so, the government is federal’
30. K.C Where, Federal Government (London: Oxford University Press, 4th ed,, 1963), p. 35. Cited in
Zulafkar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of constitutionalism in Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 1995) 29. Federation is like ‘a great factory wherein two sets of machinery are at work, their
revolving wheels apparently intermixed, their bands crossing one another, yet each set doing its own
work without touching or hampering the other’. Lord Bryce’s remarks quoted by Morton Grodzins, ‘The
Federal System’ in Aaron Wildasky (ed.), American Federalism in perspective ( Boston: 1967 ) 261
cited in ibid., 30.
 36. Maluka, The Myth, 31. On Federal issue see Bhutto, The Great Tragedy, 5-7.
37. Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review ( Islamabad: National Institute of
Historical and Cultural Research, 1992) 78.
38. Ibib., 78.
39. Dawn, 1 November 1950; emphasis added. For expended discussion of regional conflict over
representation, c.f Kieth Callard, Pakistan, 77-113, 135- 28; and Binder, religion and Politics, 11634,
200-208. 241-58 and 307-14: G.W.Choudhry, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, 72; Zarina
Salamat, Pakistan, 96; Richard Sisson and Leo E, Rose, War and Seccession in Pakistan, India, And
the creation of Bangladesh ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992) 17&282.
40. C.F Strong, Modem Political Constitutions (London: The English Language Book Society, 1975),p.
88. Cited in Dr . Jaffar Ahmad, Federalism in Pakistan :A Constitutional Study, (Pakistan Study
Centre, 1990) 69.
41. S. Rfus Davis, The Federal Principle: A journey Through Time in Quest of Meaning (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1978),p. 142.
42. Ayesha, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia (Lahore: Sang-e- Meel Publication, 1995)
184.
43. JafferAhmad, Federalism in Pakistan: A Constitutional Study, 71.
44. Suhrawardy’s speech, quoted in Dawn (Karachi) 1 October 1955. For this argument ,see a letter to
the editor, The Pakistan Times, 3 August 1954. Dawn (Karachi), 28 and 29 July. All Cited in Maluka,
The Myth 144-145.
45. Satish Kumar, ‘Problems of Federal Politics’ in Pandav Nayak (ed.), Pakistan: Society and Politics
( New Delhi: 1984) 24. Cited in Maluka, The Myth, 146.
46. Dawn, 7 October 1958. cited in Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan,
India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992) 16. Mrtial law
Proclaimed,” CMG 8 October 1958, p. 1. Paula, Judging the State, 71.
47. Brain Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 40-41.
48. Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, 52.
49. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional politics in Pakistan (Cambridge
University Press, 1999 ) 69.
50. S. Akber. Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan's Economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 5.
51. Ishrat Ali, The Economy of an Elitist State ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 15.
52. Mohammed Ayub Khan, President Of Pakistan, Friends Not Masters: A Political
autobiography{ Punjab Branch: Oxford University Press, 1967)77.
53. Ibid., 207.
54. Paula, Judging the St ate, 82.
55. Dawn, April 2, 1963. Cited in Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, 105.
56. See for more information Ayub, Friend Not Masters, 187.
57. Ibid, 187.
58. Puala, judging the state, 111,
59. The New York Times, 22 April 1966.
60. Paula rightly stated, ‘that Agartala symbolised every thing that government festivities left unspoken:
the power of the state constitutionally to imprison political leaders and to convene a special tribunal to
hear the proceedings; to extend such a trial for partisan purpose; more generally, to ignore the economic
and political demands for majority province while applauding a decade of purported reforms.’ Paula,
Judging the State, 107.
61. Mushtaq Ahmad, Jinnah and After: A Profile of Leadership (Karachi, Royal Book Company,
1994)106.
62. “Mujib’s 6~Point: Platform or diving Board?,” Holiday(Dacca) 20 February 1966; Rehman Subhan,
Autonomy and Social Change: West Pakistan,” Forum 22 November 1969,p. 6. Cited in Paula, Judging
the State, 111. See also The London Times, The New York Herald Tribune, The Economist from 22
April to 21-27 May 1966.
63. Shiekh Mujibur Rehman, Bangladesh, My Bangladesh, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), 129-
48. Cited in Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession Pakistan, India, and the creation of
Bangladesh (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992) 20.
64. Zulafkar Ali Bhutto, The Great Tragedy ( Lahore: CLASSIC, 1971) 11.
65. Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, 6-Point Formula: Our Right to Live ( Dacca: Published by Tajuddin
Ahmad, General Secretary, East Pakistan Awami League, Pioneer Press, 1966) 1. Quoted in Syed
Humayun, Sheikh Mujib’s 6-Point Formula, 202.
66. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, 111.
 67. Ibid., 111.2.
68. Sir Morie James, Pakistan Chronicle ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993) 62.
69. In March 1966 Ayub removed Bhutto from the Secretary Generalship of the Muslim League, and in
June from the Cabinet as foreign minister.
70. Sir Morie James, Pakistan Chronicle, 63.
71. Ayub’s attack on Progressive Papers,” Forum (Dacca) 7 February 1970, pp. 8-9.
72. Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993) 67&80.
73. “The right to an answer,” Holiday 17 November 1968. Cited in Paula, Judging the State, 111.
74. Altaf Gauhar, ‘Pakistan-- Ayub’s Abdication’, in Third World Quarterly 7(1), January 1985, p. 123.
Cited in Rafi Raza, Zulafikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan : 1967-1977 ( Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1997) 15.
75. Sir Morrice James, Pakistan Chronicle (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993).
76. The Legal Framework Order, 1970, President’s Order No. 2 of 1970, The Gazette of Pakistan
Extraordinary, Part II of 30 March 1970.
77. Sir Morie James, Pakistan Chronicle, 173.
78. In 1970 there were approximately 73 million people in East Pakistan, as compared with only 60
million in the West.
19. Yahya Khan announced that if the election victors did not accept the LFO as promulgated, martial-
law would continue.
80. Rehan Subhan, The New Salesman, London, 28 March 1969 yet it open the way of political
catharsis in Pakistan.
81. Paula, judging the Sate, 174.
82. Sir Morrice James,,Pakistan Chronicle, 114.
83. See Mohammed Hasnain Haykal, : The General who was Defeated” in his weakly Frankly
Speaking, articles in Arabic. MENA, Cairo, April 19, 1973. Also quoted in G.W. Choudhry, op. cit., p.
193 .
84. S. M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1973) 401.

7
1. For more information see, Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia (New Delhi:
Vistaar Publications, 2000) 25
2. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in Twentieth Century: A Political History ( Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1977)369.
3. Mohammed Ayub Khan, President Of Pakistan, Friend Not Masters: A Political
Autobiography ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967 186.
4. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, 11.
5. Mushatq Ahmad, The Government and Politics in Pakistan ( Karachi: Royal Book
Company, 1988) 319.
6. Ayub, before his resignation, held round table conferences with the political leaders. He
conceded their demands to abolish the indirect method of election. But the political leaders could not
agree, and such an anarchic and explosive situation was created that there was no alternative to military
intervention for the second time in Pakistan... Golam W. Choudhry, Pakistan, Transition from Military
to Civilization Rule, 29.
7. PaulaR. Newberg, Judging the State{ Cambridge University Press, 1995) 113.
8. Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History, 327.
9. Golam W. Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule (England:
Scorpion Publishing LTD, 1988) 8 .
10. Rafi Raza, Zulafkar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan: 1967-1977 ( Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1997) 43.
11.The excerpt of the Hamoodur Rahman commission Report, published in the issue of weekly
magazine India today. The commission of inquiry was appointed by the President of Pakistan in
December, 1971 to inquire into and find out “ the circumstances in which the Commander, Eastern
command, surrender and the members of the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command laid down
their arms and cease-fire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the cease-
fire line in the State of Jummu and Kashmir.”
12.Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, 3.
 13. Peter Hazelhurst, The Times, London, 9 December 1971.
14. Zulifkar Ali Bhutto, The Great Tragedy ( Lahore: Classic, 1971)9 .
15. Golam W. Choudhry, Pakistan, 9.
16. For details see G. W. Choudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana, 1974).
17. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 1997) 372.
18.Bhutto borrowed Michiavelli’s phrase, The Great Tragedy, 9.
19. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History, 372 .
20. Sir Morrice James, Pakistan Chronicle (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993) 187.
21. the term Borrow by Golam W. Choudhry, Pakistan, 22.
22. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State ( Cambridge University Press, 1995) 116.
23. for more information, see Rafi Raza, Zulifkar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan: 1967- 1977 ( Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 1997) 49-90.
24. Dieter Conrad ‘ In Defense of Continuity of Law: Pakistan’s Courts in Crises of States’, in Zingel
and Lallamant (ed)., Law and Constitution, 123.
25. Bhutto statement reported in Dawn 15 March 1971, reprinted in Bangladesh Papers, p. 234.
Reactions to this proposal were uniformly negative, and Bhutto later disavowed the statement. Cited in
Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State,
116.
26. In Hamoodur Rehman Report it is stated that by Mujibur Rehman, complained inter-alia that Maj
Gen Rao Farman Ali had written in his own hand on the stationary of the government.
27. In Hamoodur Rehman Report it is stated that by Mujibur Rehman, complained inter-alia that Maj
Gen Rao Farman Ali had written in his own hand on the stationary of the government.
28. Golam W. Choudhry, Pakistan’. Transition from Military to Civilian rule, 183. 29.See
for intense, Where, Federal Government, 20.
30. Ibid., 201.
31. Seyed Jaffer Ahmad, Federalism in Pakistan: A Constitutional Study ( Pakistan Study Centre:
University Of Karachi, 1990 ) 36-37.
32. Syed Jaffar Ahmad, Federalsim in Pakistan, 37.
33. Ibid., 42.
34. Golam W. Choudhry, Pakistan, 184.
35. K C Wheare, Federal Government ( London: third edition, 1953) 253-4. Golam W. Choudhry,
Pakistan, 186.
36. Allen McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1996) 222.
37. Callard was among those who so characterised the constitution, Political study, p. 25. See also,
time, B November 1954. ibid., 222 &22B.
38. Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review ( Islamabad: 1992)
78.
39. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan ( Karachi: Civil and Military Press, 1987) 82-
83. .
40. Maluka, The Myth, I
41. Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review ( Islamabad: National Institute of
Historical and Cultural research, 1992) 100-133.
42. Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993 >67.
43. Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, 68.
*44. Mushtaq Ahmad, Jinnah and After: A Profile of Leadership ( Karachi: Royal Book Company,
1994) 135.
45. See Robert Laporte, Jr ‘ Another Try at Democracy’, in J. Henery Korson (ed.) Contemporary
Problems of Pakistan ( Islamabad: American Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1993) 176-177.
46. Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan; Problems of Governance ( New Delhi: Vanguard) 125.
47. Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, 59.
48. Ibid., 59.
49. Mushtaq Ahmad, Jinnah and After: A Profile of Leadership, 137.
50. Bhutto’s Interim Constitution ( i.e., based on the Government of India Act, 1935, and the
Independence Act, 1947): 1972-3; the 1973 Constitution: 1973-7.)
51. Tariq Amin, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors (1988).
Cited in Aitizaz Ahsan, The Indus Saga: And the Making of Pakistan ( Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 1996 )xiv.
 52. Maluka, The myth of constitutionalism , 230.
53. For the salient features, see the text of the tripartite Accord between the PPP on the one hand and
JUI and the NAP on the other hand, photocopy reproduced in Constitution-making in Pakistan
(National Assembly of Pakistan, 1973 )73-5. See also Rafi Raza, Zulifkar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan:
1967-1977,153. Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism, 231. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State,
137.
54. Ibid., 233.
55. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 394
56. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 395.
57. L,F Rushbrook Williams, Pakistan Under Challange ( London: Stacey International 1955) . pp
138-139.
58. See Ayub Khan’s interview with the newspaper Editors on March 1962 in Dawn, Karachi, 1962.
Cited in Golam. W. Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition From Military to Civilian Rule
(Karachi:Scorpion Publication, 1988) 160.
59. A. K. Brohi: Supreme Court Advocate, during an interview on 22-2-1985.
60. Ibid., 160.
61. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History, 270.
62. Maluka, the Myth of Constitutionalism, 242.
63. Dawn, 16 August 1973. Cited in Maluka., the Myth, 242.
64. Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan ( Oxford: 1997)73.
65. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History , 395.
66. Paula Newberg, Judging the State, 138.
67. Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia ( New Delhi: Vistar Publication, 2000) 32.
68. Ibid.,32.
69. Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. 5, 84.
70. Bhutto’s address. Dawn, 16 August 1973.
71. See Bhutto’s The Great Tragedy, 4-6.
72. J. A. Rahim, Outlines Of A Federal Constitution For Pakistan, ( Pakistan People’s Party, Political
Series (4), Lahore: 1969) 41.
73. National Assembly of Pakistan ( Constitution -Making) Debates, 10 April 1973, 2468.
74. Comments of Khurshid Hassan Khan Meer in National Assembly of Pakistan ( Constitution-
making), Debates Report, 10 April 1973, p. 2424. Paula, The State, 137.
75. Maya Chadda, building Democracy in South Asia, 3.
76. Golam W. Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition From Military To Civilian Rule, 194.
77. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History, 396.
78. No denying rights to Phakhtoonistan, Baluchis,” Dawn 20 April 1972. However, Baluchistan
Governor Ghous Bahksh Bizenjo observed that “ the country wanted not only stable Government but
stable democracy.” Autonomy formula accords with NAP stands, says Bizenjo,” PT 23 October 1972.
Cited in Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State, 140.
79. Ziring, Pakistan, 396.
80. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State, 142
81. Makhdoom Ali Khan, 1 1973 Constitution: The Founding of the Federation an unpublished paper
read at seminar, ‘ The Heritage of Prime Minister Bhutto \ 3-5 April at Karachi.
82. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977 ( Macmillan, 1980) 97-98.
83. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History, 397.
84. Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993)213.
85. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State, 143.

8
6. See the text of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977, CMLA order no. I of 1977,
Islamabad, Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1981, pp. 19-23,
7. See the Text of the Provisional Corporation of Pakistan Order 1981, CMLA order no. 1 of 1981,
Islamabad, Printing Corporation of Pakistan, 1981, pp.1-15.
8. Ibid., p. 10.
9. See the text of the political parties Act 1962 in Election Commission of Pakistan: Election Laws as
modified up to 20th January, 1985, Islamabad, Election Commission Office, January 1985, pp.

1 Mushahid Hussain Akmal Hussain, Pakistan: Problems of Governance ( New Delhi: Vangaurd )131.
 365-347
10.Wolf-Philips, ‘ The 1973 Constitution’, 16. Cited in Maluka, The Myth, 255.
11. The expression ‘constitutional morality’ is drawn from Ms Benazir Bhutto’s address to the
members of Sukkur Bar Association on 2 March 1989, See The Pakistan Times, 3 March 1989. Ibid.,
255.
12.Broadcast on July 5,1977.
13. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History, 425.
14. Maya Chada, Building Democracy In SouthAsia (New Delhi: Vistar Publications, 2000)70.
15. Roedad Khan, Pakistan-A Dream Gone Sour ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000) 95.
16. Choudhry, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, 77.
17. Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia,( Lahore: Vangaurd Books LTD, 1980)29.
18.Ibid.,
19. Justice S.A. Rabbani, The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan: an Analysis (Karachi:
Asia Law House, 2002).
20. Salem Azzam, Shaheed-e-Islam: Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq ( Islamabad: Indus Thames Publishers
ltd, 1990) 12. Z. A. Suleri noted in his essay A leader with Faith and Vision (1990).
21. Craig Baxter, Zia's Pakistan ( Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985 ) 2.
22. John L. Esposito (ed) The Oxford History of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)
677.
23. See Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, 234.
24. Izzad-ud-Paul, Pakistan Islam & Economic: ( Karachi:Oxford University Press, 1999) xiii.
25. Aziz Ahmad noted in Religion And Society in Pakistan ‘ Religion was not a program but slogan
during the years of the growth of Pakistan movement between 1940 and 1947. What Jinnah and
Liaquat Ah Khan had in mind, and what they actually did when they achieved power was to fashion
Pakistan, in fact as a secular democracy, but in name in theory an Islamic state. In fact what they
aimed at and what they achieved was a state of the Muslims, not an Islamic State’. Aziz Ahmad,
Religion and Society in Pakistan (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1971).
26. Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah To Zia, 1. For more information also see Richard S. Whealer,
The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest ( Itheca Cornell University Press, 1970) 93- 94.
27. Marshal G.S. Hodson, The Venture of /s/am,Vol.Ill ( Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1977) 355.
28. Paul, Pakistan: Islam and Economics, xiv .
29. Sayyid Abul A’lA Moududi and Khurshid Ahmad (Translated & ed), The Islamic Law and The
Constitution ( Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967).
30. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan:A Political Study, 100.
31. Quated in Callard, 1957 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan,1991. Afzal Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan,
1986. Shoukat Ali Pakistan: A Religio-Polical study. 1997. Paul, Pakistan, Islam and Economics,
1999
32. Paul, Pakistan, Islam, And Economics, 4. P.J. Vatikiotis (1987) explains the phenomenon
and refers to it as a myth of the Islamic state, p. 9. See also, Nazih Ayubi (1991) for a discussion of
the role of utopia in the theory of the Islamic state. Justice Munir in his book ‘From Jinnah to Zia’
argued that ‘when the resolution are examined it is found differ in all the basic points of Quid-e-
Azam’s views.’ (Muhammad Munir 1980:Chap. 5.)
33. Lawrence Ziring, The Enigma Of Pakistan Development ( Dawson Westview, 1980) 35.
34. Afzal Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan ( Karachi: Vanguard, 1996) 46.
35. Ziring, Pakistan, 106.
36. Ibid,. Dawn, January 26, 1948.”
37. John Esposito (ed), Pakistan: Quest for Islamic Identity in Islam and development ( Syracuse
University Press, 1980) 143.
38. Izzud~Din-Paul, Pakistan Islam and Economics, xx.
39. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: A Political History, 394.
40. Kamal A. Faraki, “Pakistan Islamic Government and Sociaty” in John L. Esposito (ed) Islam In
asxa ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1987 ) 56.
41. Mehrunnisa Ali, Pakistan: Aftermath of the March 1977 Elections” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XXX,
No. 3+4,1977,102.
42. Paul, Pakistan, Islam, and Economics, 8.
43. Quoted in Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto in Pakistan (Karaci: Oxford University Press, 1993)
318-320.
44. President of Pakistan General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Interviews to Foreign Media, Vol. VI, p
 43-44.
45. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots And Development 1947-1999 ( Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2000) 93.
46. Darial Pipes, In the Path of God; Islam and Political Power ( New York: Basic Books, 1983)
229-230.
47. Lawrence Ziring, The enigma of Political development Dawsen: Westview, 1982) 196.
48. The Pakistan Times 10 April 1989. Cited in Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism, 260.
49. See editorial, Nawa-i-Waqt, 7 July 1980.
50. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan : Political Roots And Development 1947-1999( Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2000) 93.
51. The Pakistani Times, 28 March 1978.
52. Zingel and Lallemant (ed), Law and Constitution, 76.
53. Rafique Akhtar, ed., Pakistan Year Book 1987-88 ( Karachi: East and West Publishing Company,
1988 ) 237.
54. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots & Development:1947-1999 ( Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
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