Professional Documents
Culture Documents
VITUG,
J.:
FACTS: Complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own
father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed
inside their house armed with a knife and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her. Hence,
complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla Bermas,
filed a complaint against the accused of the crime of Rape before the RTC
of Parañaque. Accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty. The
accused denied the allegation hence he even performed the dual role of a
father and a mother to his children since the time of hisseparation from
his wife and he thinks that the complainant might have been motivated by
ill-will or revenge in view of the numerous scolding’s that she has
received from him on account of her frequent coming home late at night.
The trial court convicted the accused guilty of the offense charged
andsentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.I SSUE: WON the
accused was denied his constitutional right to effective and vigilant
counsel. RULING:YES, SC remanded the case to the trial court. Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his
client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard
renders himadministratively liable.In the instant case, the aforenamed
defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, thefundamental rights
of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as
counsel
de oficio
to the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty
he might have been found to beafter trial. Inevitably, this Court must
advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closelyand
faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future
will be severely sanctioned. The Second Assistant Prosecutor issued
acertification to the effect that the accused had waived his right to a
preliminary investigation. On the dayof his arraignment, the accused was
brought before the trial court without counsel. The court
thereuponassigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C Villamin of the Public Attorney's
Office to be the counsel
de officio
.Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.The
prosecution placed complainantManuela Bermas at the witness stand. The
counsel de oficio testified on direct examination with hardlyany
participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the
cross-examination and thenasked the court to be relieved of her duty as
counsel
de officio
. Furthermore, Atty. Roberto Gomez wasappointed the new counsel
de officio and asked for a ten minute recess
before he began his crossexamination
which is far too inadequate On the day the defense will present their
evidence another lawyer Atty.Lonzame was appointed as counsel de oficio.
Therefore,
the accused has not properly andeffectively been accorded the right to
counsel. So important is the right to counsel that it has beenenshrined in
our fundamental law and its precursor laws.
TINGA,
J.:
FACTS:SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M.
Joaquin were involved ina shooting incident which resulted in the death of
two individuals and the serious injury of another. As aresult,
Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder
and frustrated murder eventually they were convicted. Complainants engaged
the services of herein respondent for the accused.Respondent then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied still
therespondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for
Reconsideration, with theattached Second Motion for Reconsideration and
filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.Thereafter,
complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent
telephone callsthey made to his office. When respondent did not return
their phone inquiries, complainants went torespondent¶s last known address
only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.More
than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to
personally verify the statusof the petition and they were shocked that
their petition was denied due to late filing and non-payment of docket
fees and said resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest had
already been issued againstthem.Complainants filed before the SC an
affidavit-complaint against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal(respondent)
for violation of the Lawyer¶s Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence
for allegedmishandling of the petition which eventually led to its denial
with finality. Respondent contends that hewas not the original counsel of
the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of
theSandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide
and one count of attemptedhomicide. He was merely requested by the
original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision and the petition was filed
within thereglementary period. Respondent sent a letter the PO3 Joaquin
for his formal withdrawal as counsel butthe latter did not reply. Upon the
investigation of the IBP, it ruled respondent guilty of violation of
theCode of Professional Responsibility and recommended the imposition of
penalty ranging from reprimandto suspension of six (6) months.ISSUE:
Whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling
G.R. No. 152621-23,which eventually led to the
ad cautelam
petition¶s dismissal with finality.
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein
private respondentRaul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regalaand Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law
Firm performed legal services for its clients andin the performance of
these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its
clientdocuments which substantiate the client's equity holdings.
y
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law
firm acquire informationrelative to the assets of clients as well as their
personal and business circumstances. As membersof the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assistedin
the organization and acquisition of the companies included in CC No. 0033,
and in keepingwith the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporationsinvolved in sequestration
proceedings.
y
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended
Complaint" w/cexcluded Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as
party-defendant, Roco having promised he¶ll reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder inthe companies
involved in PCGG Case # 33
y
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a
separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him
in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.
y
nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he
acted as nominee-stockholder.
y
ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the
petition for certiorari. Petitioner Hayudini, likewise, filed his own MFR
w/c was also denied thus, he filed aseparate petition for certiorari,
assailing SB¶s resolution on essentially same grounds averred
by petitioners, namely:
o
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of
an attorney: (e) tomaintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril
to himself, to preserve the secrets of hisclient, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except from him
or with his knowledge and approval.
y
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (³A lawyer owes fidelity
to the cause of hisclient and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.´) Canon 15, CPR alsodemands a lawyer's fidelity
to client.
y
Thus, the Court held that this duty may be asserted in refusing to
disclose the name of petitioners'client(s) in the case at bar.
y
The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse
to divulge the name or identity of his client.
y
Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
o
Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig: The subject matter of
therelationship was so closely related to the issue of the client's
identity that the privilege actually attached to both.
o
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged.
Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldn¶t reveal name of his client as this
wouldexpose the latter to civil litigation.
Matter of Shawmut Mining Company: ³We feel sure that under such
conditionsno case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney,
at the instance of ahostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer,
but the nature of the transactionsto w/c it related, when such information
could be made the basis of a suit againsthis client.´
A
Baird vs. Korner: a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of
clientswho employed him to pay sums of money to gov¶t voluntarily in
settlementof undetermined income taxes, unsued on, & w/ no gov¶t audit
or investigation into that client's income tax liability pending
y
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which
could qualify asexceptions to the general rule:
o
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or
legal service sought wasduly established in the case at bar, by no less
than the PCGG itself as can be seen in the 3 specificconditions laid down
by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution
shouldthey accede thereto.
y
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that
the clients indeedconsulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers,
regarding the financial and corporatestructure, framework and set-up of
the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave
their professional advice in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignmentcovering their client's shareholdings.
y
Secondly, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name
would obviously providethe necessary link for the prosecution to build its
case, where none otherwise exists.
y
While the privilege may not be invoked for illegal purposes such as in a
case where a client takeson the services of an attorney, for illicit
purposes, it may be invoked in a case where a clientthinks he might have
previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney.
Whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be
illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to
evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which mightlead to
possible action against him.
The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the
principal policy behindthe privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of
promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors byclients,
apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated.
What is soughtto be avoided then is the exploitation of the general rule
in what may amount to a fishingexpedition by the prosecution.
y
Civil Case No. 97-9865.The latter engaged the legal services of herein
respondent. Respondent as a consequence of saidAttorney-Client
relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire
proceedings of said case.Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said
counsel, hence delicate and confidential mattersinvolving all the personal
circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent.Later on,
respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly
filed a Motion towithdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled
hearing. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdrawas Counsel will
conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A.
Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformityThe grounds alleged by
respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was
that heis a retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena. This is an estafa case
filed by the representatives of PRCitself against spouses Dennis and
Carmen Jalbuena It is worthy to note that from the outset,
respondentalready knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot
A. Jalandoni being married to her eldestdaughter, Carmen J.
Jalbuena.Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing
conflicting interests, breach of attorney-clientconfidentiality and
deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To
effectivelyunravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the
cases involved.Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing
conflicting interests, breach of attorney-clientconfidentiality was
committed by respondent.Issues: 1. Whether there existed a conflict of
interest in the cases represented and handled byrespondent, and2. Whether
respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record of
Jalandoni.Held: Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
highlights the need for
candor, fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their
clients
. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:Rule 15.03 ± A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concernedgiven after a full disclosure of the facts.It is only upon strict
compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer
may appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of
conflicting interests is reprehensible.
a quo
- decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo
de abogado,"taken alone, means that of afull-fledged lawyer, but
that has used in the deed of donationand considering the function
or purpose of theadministrator, it should not be given astrict
interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law
degreeor diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as
erroneous both by the defendant and by theintervenor.
ISSUE:
WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to
the office of administrator. (YES)RATIO: Whether taken alone or
in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not merepossession
of theacademic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the
Bar after dueadmission thereto, qualifying one forthe practice of
law. A Bachelor's degree alone,conferredby a law school upon
completion of certain academicrequirements, does not entitle
itsholderto exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent
of "abogado" islawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed
and general signification, and has reference to that classof
personswho are by license officers of the courts, empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend, anduponwhom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the
practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Rule138 such admission requires passing the Bar
examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a
certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his
license to practice the profession. The academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to
the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements
that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed
all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,
officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not
indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown
in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under
the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not
gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed
to take the Bar examination and to qualify as lawyers. (Section
14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be
incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de
abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelorof Laws
from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio
de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing
testadvisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a
lawyer, the administrator shouldbea doctor or a civil engineer or
a pharmacist, in thatorder; or failing all these, should be
theonewho pays the highest taxes among those otherwise
qualified.A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the
managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "makeregulations for
thegovernment of said institution; shall "prescribe the
conditions subject to which invalidsandincapacitated and
destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to
it thattherules andconditions promulgated for admission are not
in conflict with the provisions of theAct; and shall
administerproperties of considerable value — for all of which
work, it is to bepresumed, a working knowledge of the lawand a
license to practice the profession would beadistinct asset.Under
this particular criterion we hold that theplaintiff is not
entitled, as against thedefendant, to the office of
administrator.As far as moral character isconcerned, the standard
required of one seeking reinstatementtothe office of attorney
cannot be less exactingthan that implied in paragraph 3 of the
deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed
in thiscase. When the defendant wasrestored to the roll of
lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from
hispreviousdisbarment were wiped out.For the claim of intervener
and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also alawyer, grandsonof
Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio
mentioned by them inthedeed of donation. He is further, in the
line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,who is a son
of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.Besides being a
nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma.Cui is older than
he andtherefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise
equal. The intervenorcontends that the intention of the founders
was to confer the administration by line and
successivelytothedescendants of the nephews named in the deed, in
the order they are named. Thus, heargues, since the
lastadministrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the
Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must comefrom the line
of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenorbelongs. This
interpretation, however, is not justified by theterms of the deed
of
donation.--------------------------------------------------------
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#5:
IN THE MATTER OF PREOCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that werecommitted must never be
repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that... a
resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney andcounsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faithand confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyer’s
Certificate of Title.
RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen be, as he ishereby, suspended from the practice of law
until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.-----------------------------------------------------
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#6: IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN January 21, 1974FACTS:
Vicente Floro filed his Answer to the above-mentioned Petition
for relief and he alleged that the decisionof the City Court was
based on an admission made in open court by petitioner Lagrimas
Lapatha on the basis of which the words "Confession of judgment"
were written on the "expediente" of the case and underneath
wereaffixed the signature of said petitioner and that of Atty.
Felizardo deGuzman; that the alleged payments of Lagrimas Lapatha
were made after the rendition of the decision toforestall
immediate execution of the judgment; that when petitioner filed
with the City Court a motion forreconsideration of the decision
alleging fraud, the true circumstances attending the hearing of
November 2,1967, were brought out to the satisfaction of
petitioner's counsel, for which reason the City Court denied
themotion for reconsideration; that during the hearing on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration Atty. de Guzmanagreed not
to press for the execution of the judgment on the assurance of
petitioner that she would vacate thepremises by January 15, 1968,
however, petitioner did not comply with her promise and instead
filed thePetition for Relief.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for relief against the respondent who
committed any deceit or misconduct in CivilCase No. 165187 of the
City Court of Manila be approved.
RULING:
We agree with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the
evidence is wanting" to sustaina finding that respondent
committed any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of
the City Court of Manila. In Go vs. Candoy, 19 this Court said:
"It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the
burdenof proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis
for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the chargeagainst him
must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose
as free from doubt a case whichcompels the exercise by this Court
of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done
as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly
demonstrated."WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint is
dismissed and respondent, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman,
isexonerated of the
charge.----------------------------------------------------------
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#7: In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A.
Diao vs. Severino G. MartinezFacts:
Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was
admitted to the Bar. Two years later, Severino Martinez charged
Diao of falsifying the information in his application for such
BarExamination. Upon further investigation, it was found that
Diao did not finish his high school training, andneither did he
obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College
in 1941.Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he
served the US army, and took the General Classification Test
which, according to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma,
although he failed to submit certificationfor such claim from any
proper school officials. The claim was doubtlful, however, the
second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not obtain his
AAdegree from Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was
erroneously certified, and asserts that he obtainedhis AA from
Arellano University in 1949. This claim was still unacceptable, as
records would have shown that Diao graduated from the University
in April1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948
(second semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not havebeen
permitted to take the Bar, as it is provided in the Rules,
applicants under oath that “
Previous
to the studyof law, he had successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal education (AA) as required bythe
Department of Private Education”
Issue:
Whether Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred.
Ruling:
Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but
did by falsifying information. Admissionunder false pretenses
thus give grounds for revoking his admission in the Bar, as
passing the Bar Exam is notthe only requirement to become an
attorney at law.
individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known
to possess good moral character. “A lawyer isan oath-bound
servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by
inflexible norms of law and ethics,and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has
sworn to be afearless crusader.” By taking the lawyer’s oath, an
attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law,and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration
of justice. Lawyers should act andcomport themselves with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote
the public’sfaith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly
clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was
seriouslytransgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the
blank checks by indicating amounts that had not beenagreed upon
at all and despite respondent’s full knowledge that the loan
supposed to be secured by the checkshad already been paid. His
was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document,
resorted to for hismaterial gain.Deception and other fraudulent
acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful
anddishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of
the legal profession are not satisfied by conductthat merely
enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering
the depravity of the offensecommitted by respondent, we find the
penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from
thepractice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing
deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. Hismisuse of the
filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is
loathsome. Thus, he is sentencedsuspended indefinitely from the
practice of law effective
immediately.-----------------------------------------------------
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#15:
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#16:
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#17:People vs de luna et al GR 10236-48
Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.Pedro B. Ayuda.Alawadin I.
Bandon.Roque J. Briones.Abraham C. Calaguas.Balbino P.
Fajardo.Claro C. Gofredo.Estela R. Gordo.Generoso H. Hubilla.Emilio
P. Jardinico, Jr.Angelo T. Lopez.Eustacio de Luna. Jaime P.
Marco.Santos L. Parina.Florencio P. Sugarol, andMaria Velez y
Estrellas-took an oath as a lawyer even though they did not pass
the bar exams. (sa notary public pa jud)
RULING:
It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo,
Gefredo, and Sugarol,have not passed the examinations, it was
resolved:A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for
investigation and appropriateaction in connection with Section 3
(e), Rule 64;B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney
without authority, he is given 10days from notice thereof, within
which to explain why he should not be dealt withfor contempt of
the Court;C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the
Bar, who has illegallyadministered the oath to the said persons
in disregard of this Court's resolutiondenying them admission to
the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), ishereby given
ten days to show cause why he should not be disbarred or
suspendedfrom the pratice of law;D. The clerk of Court is
directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court
of Appeals and to all courts of first instance, the Court of
Industrial Relations, thePublic Service Commission, and the
Department of Justice;E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol,
proper action will be taken later in theirrespective cases. (pp.
36-37, rec., G.R. No. L-10245.)It is clear, from the foregoing
resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise
itsconcurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt
committed by appelleesherein and that we preferred that the
corresponding action be taken by the CityFiscal of Manila in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had
no jurisdiction over the cases at the
bar.-------------------------------------------------------------
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# 1 8 : L e s l i e U i v s . A t t y . I r i s
B o n i f a c i o A C # 3 3 1 9 J u n e 8 , 2 0 0 0 Facts:
Leslie Ui and Carlos Ui were married on January 1971. On June
1988, Leslieconfronted the respondentAtty. Iris Bonifacio for the
illicit affair . Respondentadmitted the relationship and said
that she will cut off thesaid relationship. OnDecember 1988
Carlos and Iris had a second child. On March 1989
complainantpleaded torespondent to stop their illicit
relationship.On Atty Iris’ side, she asserts that she had no
knowledge of Carlos’previousmarriage. Carlos Ui was the one who
represented himself as single during theircourtship. Shesubmitted
her Certificate of marriage dated Oct. 1985 to court. Uponthe
court’s investigation it was found outthat the marriage was in
fact on Oct 1987.In the case at bar, it is the claim of
respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when shemet Carlos Ui, she knew
andbelieved him to be single. Respondent fell in love withhim and
they got married and as a result of suchmarriage, she gave birth
to two (2)children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status
of Carlos Ui, she lefthim
ISSUE
:Whether or not Atty Iris Bonifacio is guilty of gross immoral
conduct as aground for disbarment
RULING:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED,the Reportand Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
of thisResolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supportedby the evidenceon record and the
applicable laws and rules, the complaint forGross Immorality
against Respondent isDISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty.
IrisBonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfullyattaching
to herAnswer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern
warning thata repetition of the same will merit a moresevere
penalty.---------------------------------------------------------
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#19: Elmer Canoy,
complainant
v. Atty. Jose Max Ortiz,
respondent
A.C. No. 5485 March 16,2005Facts:
This is a case wherein complainant Elmer Canoy accused his
former counsel, Atty. Jose Max Ortiz of misconduct and
malpractice. In 1998, Canoy filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against his former employer,Coca Cola Bottlers
Philippines, and was represented in said case by Atty. Ortiz.
Canoy, explained Ortiz, was oneof his indigent clients, in that
it was the latter’s practice since commencing his practice of law
to cater toindigent and law-income clients. In the labor case
against CCBP filed with the National Labor RelationsCommission,
the labor arbiter ordered the parties to submit their respective
petition papers. Canoy submittedall the necessary documents and
records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper.
Canoy madeseveral follow-ups with the office of his attorney,
said visits were unfruitful until it came to his knowledge
on2000, upon inquiring with the NLRC itself, that his complaint
was already dismissed way back in 1998 for failureto prosecute
because the parties did not submit their position papers. Atty.
Canoy further claimed that Atty.Ortiz never informed him about
the status of his case nor of the fact that he failed to submit
the position paper.In his
Comment
, Atty. Ortiz admitted to not being able to submit the position
paper because the period withinwhich to file it lapsed already,
with arbiter already dismissing the case, but reasoned out that
his election as aCouncilor of Bacolod City made him very
preoccupied with his functions. His duties as a public servant
and alawyer are “beyond physical limitation”, said Atty. Ortiz,
so he had to withdraw from his other cases. He alsoclaimed of not
being able to remember whether he immediately informed Canoy of
the dismissal of the case,but recalled of Canoy conveying that he
already has a lawyer to handle the case. Hence, his office did
not insiston refiling the case. Atty Ortiz also pointed out that
the dismissal of Canoy’s complaint was without prejudice.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ortiz is guilty of misconduct and
malpractice
Ruling:
Upon investigation of the case, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippinesconcluded that clearly “Atty. Ortizfailed to exercise
the degree of competence and diligence required of him in
prosecuting his client” andrecommended that Atty. Ortiz be
reprimanded. The Supreme Court, however, finds the recommended
penaltyof the IBP too lenent and instead suspended Atty. Ortize
from the practice of law for one month, in lieu of theadmonition
or reprimand. According to the Court, Atty Ortiz several canons
and rules in the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.
Specifically, Atty. Ortiz was guilty of violating Rule 18.03 of
the Code, which states, “A lawyershall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render himliable,” on account of his failure to file the
position paper on time, tantamount to neglecting a legal
materentrusted to him. That the case was dismissed without
prejudice does not mitigate his liability. Further, Ortizalso
violated Rule 22.02, which states,“A laywer shall withdraw his
services only for good cause and uponnotice appropriate in the
circumstances.” Therefore, even if Atty. Ortiz was justified in
terminating his servicesdue to his elective position, he should
have coordinated with the new council of Canoy and turned over to
thelatter all papers and property which the Client is entitled
and should have cooperated with his successor in theorderly
transfer of the matter, as per Rule 22.02.
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# 2 0 : L a p u t v s . R e m o t i g u e , 6 S C R A
4 5 ( A . M . N o . 2 1 9 , 2 9 S e p t e m b e r
1 9 6 2 ) L A B R A D O R , J. (En Banc)FACTS:
Petitioner
ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT
charge respondents
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F.REMOTIGUE andATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG
with unprofessional and unethicalconduct in soliciting cases
andintriguing against a brother lawyer. In May 1952,
NievesR i l l a s V d a . d e B a r r e r a
r e t a i n e d p e t i t i o n e r A t t y .
L a p u t t o h a n d l e h e r "Testate Estate
of MacarioBarrera" case in CFI-Cebu. By Jan.
1 9 5 5 , p e t i t i o n e r h a d p r e p a r e d t w o pleadings:
(1)
closing of administration proceedings, and (2) rendering of final
accounting and partition of saide s t a t e . M r s . Barrera
did not countersign both pleadings.
Petitioner found out later t h a t respondentAtty.
Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a written appearance as the
new counsel forMrs.Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955, petitioner
voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as
Mrs.B a r r e r a ’ s c o u n s e l . P e t i t i o n e r a l l e g e d t h a t :
(1)
respondents’ appearances were unethical
and improper;
(2)
theymade Mrs. Barrera sign documents revoking the petitioner’s
“Power of Attorney" purportedly todisauthorize him from further
collectingand receiving dividends of the estate from Mr.
MacarioBarrera’s corporations, and make him appear as adishonest
lawyer and no longer trusted byhis client; and
(3)
Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance withoutnotice to
petitioner. Respondent Atty. Patalinghug answered that when he
entered his appearance on 11 Jan.1955Mrs. Barrera had already
lost confidence in her lawyer, and had already filed a pleading
discharging hiss e r v i c e s . The other respondent
Atty. Remotigue answered that when he
filedhis appearance on 7 Feb. 1955, the
petitioner had already withdrawn as counsel. The SC
referred the case to the SolGen forinvestigation,
report and recommendation. Thelatter recommended
t h e c o m p l e t e e x o n e r a t i o n o f respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of
unprofessional andunethicalconduct in soliciting cases.
RULING: No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of
Atty. Patalinghug as counselfor Mrs.
Barrera; and there was no actual grabbing of a case from
petitioner becauseAtty.Patalinghug's professional services were
contracted by the widow. Besides, the
petitioner'svoluntarywithdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing
almost simultaneously of a motion for thepayment of his
attorney'sfees, amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty.
Patalinghug ascounsel for the widow. T h e S C a l s o
h e l d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t A t t y .
R e m o t i g u e w a s a l s o n o t g u i l t y
o f u n p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n d uct in as much as
he entered his appearance, dated 5 Feb. 1955, only on 7
February 1955,after Mrs. Barrera h a d d i s p e n s e d w i t h
petitioner's professional services, and
after petitionerhad voluntarily
w i t h d r a w n his appearance.As to Atty. Patalinghug’s
preparation of documents revoking the petitioner’s power
of attorney,the SolGen found that the same does not appear to be
prompted by malice or intended tohurtpetitioner's feelings, but
purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix.Case
dismissed and closedfor no sufficient evidence submitted to
sustain the
charges.---------------------------------------------------------
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