JOSE DE LEON, CECILIO DE LEON, in their individual capacity, and JOSE DE LEON and

CECILIO DE LEON , as administrators of the intestate estate of Felix de Leon, petitioner, vs.
ASUNCION SORIANO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-2724
August 24, 1950
Description: This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming a judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

 J o s e d e L e o n, C e c i l i o d e L e o n a n d Albina de Leon, petitioners herein were

naturalc h i l d r e n o f F e l i x d e L e o n , d e c e a s e d , w h i l e A s u nc i on So r i a no,
r e s p on de n t he r e i n i s hi s widow.
 In the administration and settlement of the decedent's estate then pending in the Court of
First Instance, Asuncion and the natural c h i l d r e n r e a c h e d o n M a r c h 2 3 ,
1 9 4 3 a n a gr e e m e n t , a p pr o v e d b y t h e p r o b a t e c o u r t , w h e r e b y t h e n a t u r a l
c h i l d r e n o b l i g a t e d themselves at the end of each of agricultural year (the month
of March of every year), to giveto Asuncion the total amount of 5,700 cavanes of palay.
 Delivery of the palay shall be made in thewarehouse required by the government, or
ifther e be none such, at the wa re house to be selected by Asuncion, in San Miguel,
Bulacan,free from the cost of hauling, transportation, and from any all taxes or charges.
It is expresslystipulated that this annual payment of palay shall cease upon the death of
Asuncion and shall not be transmissi ble to her heirs or to any othe r person.
 The defendants made deliveries to thepl a i nt i f f a t ot a l of 2, 3 00 c a va n e s wh i c h wa s
3,400 cavanes short of the 5,700 cavanes. It was to recover this shortage or its value that
this action was commenced.
Contentions: The defendants averred that their failure to pay the exact quantities of palay promised
for 1944,1945 and 1946 was due to "the Huk troubles in Central Luzon which rendered
impossible fullcompliance with the terms of the agreement;" a n d i t w a s c o nt e nde d t ha t
"i na s m uc h a s t he obligations of the defendants to deliver the full a m o u n t o f t h e p a l a y i s
d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e produce as this is in the nature of an annuity, . . .the obligations of the
defendants have been fully fulfilled by delivering in good faith all that could be possible under the
circumstances.
 The CFI gave judgment in favor of plaintiff for 3,400 cavanes of palay, or its equivalent in cash,
which was found to be 24,900, and legal interest.
 The CA affirmed the judgment of CFI.
Issue: Whether or not the obligation of the defendants to deliver is extinguished
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of CA.
Article 1182 of the Civil Code which was in force at the time agreement in question was entered into,
provide that "Any obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing shall be extinguished if
such thing should be lost or destroyed without fault on the part of the debtor and before he is in default.
Inversely, the obligation is not extinguished if the thing that perishes is indeterminate.
Manresa explains the distinction between determinate and generic thing in his comment on article 1096 of
the Civil Code of Spain, saying that the first is a concrete, particularized object, indicated by its own
individuality, while a generic thing is one of whose determination is confined to that of its nature, to the
genus (genero) to which it pertains, such as a horse, a chair. These definitions are in accord with the
popular meaning of the terms defined.

Except as to quality and quantity, the first of which is itself generic, the contract sets no bounds or limits
to the palay to be paid, nor was there even any stipulation that the cereal was to be the produce of any
particular land. Any palay of the quality stipulated regardless of origin on however acquired (lawfully)
would be obligatory on the part of the obligee to receive and would discharge the obligation. It seems
therefore plain that the alleged failure of crops through alleged fortuitous cause did not excuse
performance.
The general rule on performance of contracts is graphically set forth in American treatises, which is also
the rule, in our opinion, obtaining under the Civil Code.

Where a person by a contract charges himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must
perform it, unless its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, by the law, or by the other
party, it being the rule that in case the party desires to be excused from performance in the event of
contingencies arising, it is his duty to provide therefor in his contract. Hence, performance is not excused
by subsequent" inability to perform, by unforseen difficulties, by unusual or unexpected expenses, by
danger, by inevitable accident, by the breaking of machinery, by strikes, by sickness, by failure of a party
to avail himself of the benefits to be had under the contract, by weather conditions, by financial
stringency, or by stagnation of business. Neither is performance excused by the fact that the contract turns
out to be hard and improvident, unprofitable or impracticable, ill advised, or even foolish, or less
profitable, or unexpectedly burdensome.