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Formalism or Pluralism PDF
Formalism or Pluralism PDF
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and is particularly at pains to emphasize that counterfac- were capable of inductive causal inference long before
tual dependence may be sufficient for causation even if it is the POA, or indeed science in general, were conceived.
not necessary, part of (i), and that there is an important • We accept (iii) for the sake of the current discussion, i.e.
difference between causal identification and quantitative to be able to explore its consequences.
estimation, as stated in point (iii). Hernán has emphasized • We accept (iv) provided that ‘well-defined contrasts’ are
(iv) in particular, as well as point (v) below.6 understood in a suitably liberal way, and provided that it
Perhaps because of the POA’s resonance with the theor- is not confused with the incorrect claim that well-defined
etical basis of randomized controlled trials, some have contrasts are sufficient for causal estimation;
taken it implicitly to involve interventions. This is not a • We reject (v) as a mistake. ‘Intervention’ is a misleading
logically essential element of PO theory (as we pointed out term, suggesting human feasibility when this is appar-
in our original paper), and it is certainly not inherent in the ently not intended, and still without a precise definition
counterfactual approach (as Pearl and others make clear7). in the present discussion. Moreover, there is no good
very different assertions (between POA, RPOA, humanly tribute counterfactual dependencies, and by (i) evidence
feasible RPOA). Thus what has been said in recent letters for a counterfactual dependency is likewise evidence for
and commentaries is not equivalent to what was said be- causation. We suppose that the route must be from evi-
fore we published our original paper. We believe that per- dence via counterfactual dependence to causation, and not
ceiving these differences is important for the conceptual directly from evidence to causation, because it is character-
development of the science. istic of the POA that it does not concern inferential routes
In Section B2 we argue that science is a process and we from evidence to causation that do not specify anything
reiterate our general view that the POA does not fit easily about counterfactual dependence (although it need not
into the view of the nature of science that we favour, and deny the existence of such routes, as some of the commen-
from which we believe epidemiology as a whole has bene- taries have stressed, notably VanderWeele’s15). We take
fited and will continue to benefit. this to be accepted on all sides.
The view represented by (ii) is expressed clearly by
designers have to make (meaning that more than one non- method for causal inference is indeed highly desirable. But
equivalent set of these decisions is compatible with the this does not mean that it is possible: we cannot have one
data).19 These decisions include choice of participants, just because we decide we need one. Causal conclusions do
measurement instruments (such as questionnaires), time not follow deductively from data without a strong set of
periods and many other factors. Less transparently, scien- auxiliary assumptions, and (as just discussed) these as-
tists make multiple humdrum decisions on a daily basis sumptions are themselves not deductive consequences of
about what techniques to employ, what ‘leads’ to follow, the data. A formal method may indeed be extremely help-
when to look harder and when to stop; and these, too, can ful, provided that its significance is not misunderstood and
influence the outcome.20 So the trial might yield a causal its dependence on supporting assumptions not forgotten.
conclusion, via a deductive inference, given a raft of as- We are also concerned about policy makers who may
sumptions; but no matter how huge and sophisticated the misunderstand what scientists say. If it is claimed that
trial, the security of its conclusion is no better than the se- causal inference has been formalized and it is not explained
developments. Probably what POA advocates would sequences (consequences for what we can know).
want to say in response is that POA represents a devel- Meaningless claims cannot be true (or false), and thus can-
opment or an advance in our abilities to make causal in- not be known; nor can they be the conclusions of any infer-
ference. We tend to agree and we made a similar claim ence (since an inference ‘to a claim’ is to the truth of that
in our original paper, arguing that the POA represented claim). Thus (iv) implies that putative causal inferences are
a set of extremely useful conceptual and methodological mistaken if they attempt to estimate causal effects without
tools that may help causal inference in particular cir- adequately specifying counterfactual contrasts. We regard
cumstances. However, this simply is not equivalent to (iv) as a useful and important point, and a real contribu-
the stronger (logical) sense of sufficiency, and we suspect tion to epidemiological thinking. Perhaps it ought to be ob-
that the stronger sense is often in the background of dis- vious, but if one is going to specify how much of a
cussions of the POA and supplies some of the associated difference something makes, one needs to be clear about
glamour and excitement, as well as a false sense of the baseline against which the difference is being
has addressed our remaining criticisms of the notion of many causes, such as genetic factors, diet, exercise habits,
intervention in general as it appears in the RPOA, focusing sleep patterns, etc; may have effects on mortality; and may
instead on our criticisms of humanly feasible interventions. respond to different potential interventions which may
We take this opportunity to seek to further clarify why we have different effects on mortality, both through their dif-
think that interventions (human or otherwise) should not fering effects on obesity and their different direct effects on
have an essential or privileged place in the POA. mortality. None of this means that obesity is a ‘composite
In our original paper we identified three difficulties with exposure’ as VanderWeele suggests.4 Rather it is a single
the role assigned to interventions by the RPOA: (a) merely cause of mortality which can be caused by multiple factors
specifying an intervention is not sufficient for adequately and can be reduced by multiple interventions. Of course, it
specifying a causal contrast; (b) one may not always be able could be argued that different types of obesity carry differ-
to determine in advance whether an intervention is suffi- ent mortality risks, and that we should study more specific
ciently well-specified; and (c) specifying an intervention is subtypes of obesity, but this applies to most exposures. We
In fact, for all estimations about factors that we believe an inaccurate caricature of the RPOA approach, and then
to be causal, it is a truism that it might be unforeseeable criticized this caricature. We address this point reluctantly,
how a real life intervention might play out. Some drug because it is hard to do so without sounding argumenta-
interventions for obesity have led to suicidal ideations and tive, but we feel we must address it. We are left with the
suicide. The original interventions on hypercholesterol- feeling that every time we attempt to address some of the
aemia using diet had very little effect—if any—but more extreme views of the RPOA, we are told that remarks
epidemiologists continued to believe that hypercholesterol- have been taken out of context or misunderstood (by us).
aemia was a cause, worthwhile to intervene upon; for that One of the critical commentaries is structured largely
same reason, the pharmaceutical industry sought for means around our ‘misconceptions’, as if the whole thing were an
to influence it, which led to the advent of statins. Thus, unfortunate misunderstanding.2 In fact, the quotes that we
what type of causal assessment is needed will depend on have taken from Hernán, VanderWeele and others are not
the state of the question: in the beginning it is the likely ef- cherry picked or taken out of context, but have counterparts
the paper as a whole) makes no mention of the idea that an sider the subgroup of causes for which interventions can be
intervention might be humanly impossible. Moreover, it is defined, if one so wishes. VanderWeele concedes this point
not possible to make sense of this passage if ‘intervention’ in his commentary, albeit with different terminology from
is not supposed to imply human feasibility. This is because ours, writing: ‘The potential outcomes approach . . . is con-
the human impossibility of intervening on race is used as cerned with a subset of causal questions that can be defined
the motivation for the paper’s project of finding mediating as a contrast of hypothetical interventions.’4 This is the
variables for the effects of race. Drop that implication, and first time, to our knowledge, that this point has been expli-
the entire paper loses its stated motivation. (Others might citly conceded in the various discussions of this topic.
be supplied post hoc, but the one that was actually sup- We have also encountered the sentiment that there are
plied falls away.) The analytical solutions of the paper are no substantial disagreements between our views and those
imaginative; what we are concerned with is the rationale of R/POA adherents, once things are clarified: that it is all
for proposing them. Elsewhere, humanly feasible interven- a ‘storm in a teacup’. We believe that it is now even clearer
Nonetheless we have reiterated in the present paper that Furthermore, we would note that generalizability
causal knowledge without specified interventions can be should also be considered as a matter of scientific rather
useful: we provide several examples in our original paper,9 than statistical inference,16,17,29 and that estimates from a
and we reiterate this position in A5 above. particular population may not apply to other populations
So we disagree that we have set up a straw man, and we because of different distributions of effect modifiers (and
also disagree that we agree with our interlocutors on all main there will almost always be effect modification of the rela-
points, as these are expressed in previous writings. To our tive risk of risk difference or both,30 or the presence or ab-
knowledge, the commentary by VanderWeele4 and the letter sence of co-factors. Furthermore, the ‘effect estimates’
by VanderWeele et al.24 are the first occasions on which it generated in epidemiological studies do not even provide
has been explicitly conceded that the R/POA approach does estimates of the probability of causation in the populations
not address all causes of disease, and does not constitute a under study,31 let alone in other populations. So the most
general and complete theory of causal inference. We agree one can say is that if an exposure causes an increased risk
is a science with a particular subject matter to which we ality for any of these types of causes, just as there is no single
can apply a variety of methods. In the R/POA, we perceive study design (not even an RCT) which can establish causal-
a view of epidemiology as a set of methods which are then ity in itself.
applied to those scientific questions which can be answered Thus we hold that epidemiology, like other sciences,
with these particular methods. starts with its subject matter (distribution and determin-
Epidemiology identifies potential causes of disease in ants of the health of populations), and that introductory
populations. It is part of a larger undertaking, together with epidemiology courses should likewise start with this sub-
other medical and social sciences ranging from biochemical ject matter. As other sciences do, epidemiology should use
laboratory sciences to anthropology, that (unlike many a variety of study designs and types of data to attempt to
RCTs) attempts to understand and explain the observed as- identify causes.22 Although some approaches may be more
sociations rather than simply estimate them. Explaining as- valid in specific circumstances, such as randomization in
sociations means obtaining understanding as to why the the presence of strong confounding by indication, there are
accompanying caveats about its limitations. We hope that 15. VanderWeele TJ, Robinson WR. On the causal interpretation of
this exchange of views has helped to clarify the strengths of race in regressions adjusting for confounding and mediating vari-
these new methods as major contributions to causal infer- ables. Epidemiology 2014;25:473–84.
16. Cartwright N. Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in
ence, although emphasizing that they constitute just part,
Philosophy and Economics. New York, NY: Cambridge
not the totality, of this field.
University Press, 2007.
17. Cartwright N, Hardie J. Evidence Based Policy: A Practical Guide
to Doing It Better. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Funding
18. Resnik D. The Price of Truth: How Money Affects the Norms of
The Centre for Global NCDs is supported by the Wellcome Trust
Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Institutional Strategic Support Fund, 097834/Z/11/B. Part of this re-
19. Ladyman J. Understanding Philosophy of Science. London:
search was supported by the National Research Foundation of
Routledge, 2002.
South Africa (Incentive Funding for Rated Researchers).
20. Douglas H. Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. Pittsburgh,