Kilosbayan VS Morato explain that because the five members of the Court who dissented
in the first case (Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.) and
Facts:
POLITICAL LAW; JUSTICIABLE QUESTION; MORALITY OF
GAMBLING NOT A JUSTICIABLE ISSUE. — By authorizing the
holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined
that consistently with these policies and principles of the
Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why
we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees Bt." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1 994]).
Case:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They
insist that the decision in the first case has already settled (1 )
whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2)
whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1 1 69, as amended) the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes O8ce can enter into any form of
association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line
lottery.
Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer
be reopened. Because two members of the Court did not consider
themselves bound by the decision in the first case, petitioners
suggest that the two, in joining the dissenters in the first case in
reexamining the questions in the present case, acted otherwise
than according to law. They cite the following statement in the
opinion of the Court:
The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a
narrow one, seven (7) members sustaining petitioners' standing
and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority
was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any
subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been charges in the
membership of the Court, with the retirement of Justice Cruz and
Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice
Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the
maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.
Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle
suggestion, perhaps a Freudian slip, that the two new appointees,
regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first Kilosbayan case
against the lotto (Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 1 1 0 [1
994]) must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos
appointees who were dissenters in the first case and constitute
the new majority in the second lotto case." And petitioners ask,
"why should it be so?" Petitioners ask a question to which they
have made up an answer. Their attempt at psychoanalysis,
detecting a Freudian slip where none exists, may be more
revealing of their own unexpressed wish to find motives where
there are none which they can impute to some members of the
Court.
For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to
explain — rather than to justify — the majority's decision to
overrule the ruling in the previous case. It is simply meant to
the two new members (Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.) thought the
previous ruling to be erroneous and its reexamination not to be
barred by stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of
judgment, or law of the case, it was hardly tenable for petitioners
to insist on the first ruling.
Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds
them together," implying some ulterior motives on the part of the
new majority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is:
None, except a conviction on the part of the five, who had been
members of the Court at the time they dissented in the first case,
and the two new members that the previous ruling was
erroneous. The eighth Justice (Padilla, J.) on the other hand agrees
with the seven Justices that the ELA is in a real sense a lease
agreement and therefore does not violate R.A. No. 1 1 69.
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the
retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the
dissenters (Bidin, J.), it was not surprising that the first decision in
the first case was later reversed.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two
question is barred because the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation made a '"formal commitment not to
ask for a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case
and instead submit a new agreement that would be in
conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1 1 69, as amended)
and with the Decision of the Supreme Court in the first
Kilosbayan case against on-line, hi-tech lotto."
To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of
the Court finds has been purged of the features which made the
first contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO said in its
manifestation in the first case was the following:
1 . They are no longer Bling a motion for reconsideration of the
Decision of this Honorable Court dated May 5, 1 994, a copy of
which was received on May 6, 1 994.
2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new
lease agreement consistent with the authority of PCSO under its
charter (R.A. No. 1 1 69, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) and
conformable with the pronouncements of this Honorable Court in
its Decision of May 5, 1 995.
The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the
PCSO.
There was thus no "formal commitment" — but only a
manifestation — that the parties were not Bling a motion for
reconsideration. Even if the parties made a "formal commitment,"
the six (6) dissenting Justices certainly could not be bound thereby
not to insist on their contrary view on the question of standing.
Much less were the two new members bound by any "formal
commitment" made by the parties.
They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous. Since
in their view reexamination was not barred by the doctrine of
stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment or law of
the case, they voted the way they did with the remaining five (5)
dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight.
Petitioners ask, "Why should this be so?" Because, as explained in
the decision, the first decision was erroneous and no legal
doctrine stood in the way of its reexamination. It can, therefore,
be asked "with equal candor": "Why should this not be so?"
Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not
reversed, in subsequent case because of change in the
membership of a court. In 1 957, this Court, voting 6-5, held in
Feliciano v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-1 0201 , Sept. 23, 1 957 that the
phrase "at the time of the election" in 21 74 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1 91 7 meant that a candidate for
municipal elective position must be at least 23 years of age on the
date of the election. On the other hand, the dissenters argued
that it was enough if he attained that age on the day he assumed
office.
Issue:
WON the constitutional policies and principles invoked by
petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief
from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down
laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them.
RULING:
We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of
constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real party-in-
interest, applicable to private litigation rather than the more
liberal rule on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are
made against that ruling:
1. that the constitutional policies and principles invoked
by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for
affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be
resorted to for striking down laws or official actions
which are inconsistent with them; and
2. That the Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent
people's organizations "effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political and
economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, § 1 6), grants
them standing to sue on constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by
petitioner read:
ARTICLE II, § 5. The maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Id., § 1 2. The natural primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
Id., § 1 3. The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
Id., §1 7. The State shall give priority to education,
science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
As already stated, however, these provision are not self-
executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the
courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive
action. By authorizing the holding the lottery for charity, Congress
has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and
principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this
authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the
PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling
is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left
to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees Bt." (Magtajas v.
Pryce Properties Corp.,) It is noteworthy that petitioners do not
question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract
entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing.
This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but
only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the
agreement, cannot raise.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of
petitioners is DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato, 21 the principles and
state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII22 are not "self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise
to a cause of action in the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but guidelines for legislation."