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Glorification of War in Japanese Education PDF
Glorification of War in Japanese Education PDF
Education
I
o u r ultimate target
is not so muck children at school, as the adults which those children are to
become. When we correct a schoolbook, we sow seeds which may bear fruit
after a generation. But when we secure publicity for suck correction, we
contribute to this year’s harvest.
-E.H. Dance, History the Betrayer’
The content of Japan’s history textbooks has for several decades been an issue both in
Japan‘s domestic debate and in its international relations.2 In the early 198Os, the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) undertook a campaign seeking revision of
some 100 textbooks, with a “thrust toward greater respect, in effect, for State Shinto,
big business, duties instead of rights, and the military instead of pacifism.” The
minister of education asked that high school textbook writers and publishers “soften
their approach to Japan‘s excesses during World War 11, the horrors of the atom bombs
Saburo lenaga was professor emeritus of education at Tokyo University of Education. Among his books
are The Pacific War 1931-45, trans. Frank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978) (published in Tokyo
as Taiheiyo Senso by lwanami Shoten, 1968); and Senso sekinin (War responsibility) (Tokyo: lwanami
Shoten, 1985).
The editors of International Security thank Frank Baldwin and the Asia Foundation, Tokyo, for
translating this article from Japanese. For help in providing additional notes to English-language
sources, all of which were approved by the author, the editors thank Barton Bernstein, John
Dower, Ted Hopf, Marc Trachtenberg, and Stephen Van Evera.
1. E.H. Dance, History the Betrayer: A Study in Bias (London: Hutchinson, 1960; Westport, Conn:
Greenwood, repr. 1970), p. 146.
2. Nationalism and the glorification of war in school texts and university teaching has been an
issue in many countries. See, for example, Frances Fitzgerald, America Revised (Boston: Atlantic,
Little Brown, 1979; new ed. 1992); Katherine Bishop, “Bill on Internees Raises New Alarm;
Descendants of Japanese Fear Proposal in California on World War I1 Teaching,” New York Times,
August 28, 1990, p. A19; Paul M. Kennedy, “The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West,
1900-1970,” IournaI of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1973), pp. 77-100; and on
Germany, Holger Herwig, ”Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany After the Great
War,” International Security, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall 1987), pp. 5-45; Richard J. Evans, In Hitler’s
Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escapefvom the Nazi Past (New York Pantheon,
1989); Peter Baldwin, ed., Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historian’s Debate
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1990); Judith Miller, One, by One, by One: Facing the Holocaust (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1990).
113
International Security 18:3 114 1
. . . and the pacifist requirements of the Constitution (Article 9). More stress was
suggested on patriotism, [and] the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces.
Japanese critics of these efforts were joined in July 1982 by protests, both public
and diplomatic, from North and South Korea, China, Taiwan, and other countries.
“Blistering attacks were leveled at Japan‘s leaders by [other]Asians for insensitivity
to East Asian memories of Japan’s arrogant and inhumane treatment of its neighbors
before 1945 and for outright dishonesty in the textbook presentation of historical
fact.
The author of this article has played a pivotal role in Japan’s debate over. the
presentation of its history in textbook^.^ Professor lenaga has written numerous
studies of the war and of modern Japan, and many school textbooks, including (as
co-author) one of the first postwar history texts6 By the early 1960s, his history
textbook for high-school students, Shin Nihonshi ( A new history of Japan) was one
of the three most used in Japan. When, in 1962, the third edition was submitted to
3. ”Every detail of the school curriculum . . . is decided centrally by the Ministry of Education.
. . . Textbooks must be approved by the ministry. . . . One of the most reactionary and secretive
bits of the bureaucracy, this ministry has systematically tried to prevent schools teaching the
grisly details of Japan’s modern history. Textbooks have referred to the ‘advance’ into Manchuria,
not its invasion; sometimes no reference at all is made to Japan’s brutal rule of Korea between
1910 and 1945.” “Japan’s Schools: Why Can’t Little Taro Think?” The Economist, April 21, 1990,
pp. 21-24. The process of MOE review and certification is described in detail by Lawrence Ward
Beer, Freedom of Expression in lapun: A Study in Comparative Law,Politics, and Society (New York:
Kodanshai Harper & Row, 19&1), pp. 260-262.
4. Beer, Freedom of Expression in lapun, pp. 270, 271, 272.
5. ”In a 1980 [Ienaga] text, the ministry ordered 240 changes and still rejected it as ’inappropriate’
on 70 other points once revisions were made. The word ’aggression,’ for instance, could not be
used, and Ienaga’s lengthy description of Japanese atrocities in China in the 1930s would have
to go, regardless of protests from Beijing and Seoul.” Patrick L. Smith, “A Textbook Warrior in
Japan,” International Herald Tribune, November 1, 1989, p. 18. See also Ienaga, “Teaching War,”
in Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History (New York: New
Press, 1992), pp. 441-447; and David E. Sanger, “A Stickler for History, Even if It’s Not Very
Pretty,” New York Times, May 27, 1993, p. A4.
6. Beer, Freedom of Expression in lapan, pp. 257, 258, notes that this textbook, “Kuni no Ayami
(The progress of Japan) , . . propounded a new ’open world,’ rationalist, social studies approach
to Japan’s past that has been influential ever since. Professor Ienaga, as one of the four authors,
wrote the section on early Japanese history which ’defined the approached followed throughout
the book and [was] later made explicit’ in the Guiding Principles for Instruction (Gakushu shido
yoryo) of the Ministry of Education. Though adopted under Occupation supervision of textbooks,
’the evidence shows that postwar values sprang not from American but Japanese sources.’ There
is poetic justice in the fact that, of all the politicians, scholars, teachers’ union members, and
social critics who have been alert to prevent educational drift back toward statism, Ienaga Saburo
should be in the eye of the stormy trials over textbook review in during the 1960s and 1970s.”
On the role of the U.S. occupation in revising Japan’s textbooks and its system of education,
see Gordon Daniels, ”The Re-education of Imperial Japan,” chap. 9 in Nicholas Pronay and
Keith Wilson, The Political Education of Germany and her Allies after World War I1 (Totowa, NJ:
Barnes and Noble Books [London: Croom Helm], 1985).
I
Glorification of War in Japanese Education 215
the Japanese Ministry of Education (MOE) for the review that is mandatory for all
textbooks used in Japan’s schools, the MOE requested changes which, in many cases,
sought to tone down Professor lenaga‘s description of Japan’s activities during the
fifteen years of war that began with Japan’s invasion of China in 1931.
In response, Professor lenaga filed an unprecedented lawsuit against the MOE’s
textbook certification system, alleging violations of his constitutional freedom of ex-
pression and academic f r e e d ~ r nThe
. ~ lawsuit continued for nearly three decades, with
final disposition in March 2993 from Japan‘s Supreme Court.s It has been called a
“landmark” constitutional law case, and has served as a focal point for a continuing
debate over Japan‘s role in the war, the conduct of its armed forces and political
leaders during the war, and the willingness of its government and its people to
examine that role and that c o n d ~ c t . ~
-The Editors
In the period before August 1945, Japan was a ”warfare state.”’O Bristling
with armaments and dominated by a professional military caste, the nation
waged war against its neighbors-China twice (1894-95, 1931-45) and Tsarist
Russia (1904-05), and turned the Korean Peninsula into a colony in 1910.
Inculcated with militarism through the school system, the Japanese people
believed that dying for the nation on the battlefield was the supreme virtue.
7. See Beer, Freedom of Expression in lapan, pp. 264-266, and ”Ienaga textbook review case,”
Encyclopediu of Jupun (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983), Vol. 3, p. 261.
8. The court held against Professor Ienaga. See “Textbook screening upheld; historian’s 28-year
suit fails,” ]upan Times, March 19, 1993, p. 18. An editorial in the same paper described the
lawsuit, one of a series brought by Professor Ienaga against the MOE, as having done “invaluable
service in keeping before the public eye a government activity that many view as excessive
interference, which has angered textbook authors and publishers over the years and has led to
international criticism that this country was whitewashing its wartime actions. . . . The point
that critics of the system make is that it too easily allows Japan to deny responsibility for its
past and has led to objections at the highest levels from the governments of nearby countries.
. . . There have been major revisions in the screening method in the last few years which make
it quite different from the one in use when Mr. Ienaga’s suit began. The changes were welcomed
by many authors and publishers as making the entire system more transparent. . . . Japan’s
youth can best be prepared for their global responsibilities by not denying the nation’s past.”
Editorial, “The challenge of the textbook ruling,” lapun Times, March 19, 1993, p. 18. The decision
in the third lawsuit, issued by the Tokyo High Court on October 20, 1993, awarded damages
but dismissed the constitutional claims. Both sides may appeal. See ”Text author wins damages;
But constitutionality of state screening is upheld,” Japan Times, October 21, 1993; and ”Court
awards 300,000 yen in censorship suit,” Mainichi Daily News,October 21, 1993, pp. 1, 12.
9. ”Manv IaDanese observers consider the two resulting” ’Textbook Trials’ (Kuokasho suibun)
.
I , I \.,
among the great constitutional cases of modern Japan.” Beer, Freedom of Expression in lapan,
pp. 254-255.
i0. See Fred J. Cook, ”The Warfare State,” The Nation, October 28, 1961.
International Security 18:3 116 I
11. See Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on japan‘s Role in World
War 11, trans. Frank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978; orig. publ. in Japanese 1968), esp.
chap. 2, “Thought Control and Indoctrination.”
12. Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution states: ”Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. . . . (2) In
order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.”
Glorification of War in Japanese Education 217 I
military bloc and directed Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to start rearming.
The former ruling strata regained control. Ex-members of the Imperial Army
and Navy by the thousands joined the new armed forces. (The National
Police Reserve formed in 1950 was renamed the National Safety Forces in
1952 and became the Self-Defense Forces 1954.)The Occupation’s new prior-
ities were evident throughout Japanese society, including education. It even
seemed for a while that the clock would be turned back to the militaristic
norms taught in prewar Japan.
At the present time, however, the old guard have been unable to revise
the Constitution and delete Article 9.13 The wording of the preface has been
staunchly defended: “Never again shall we be visited with the horrors of
war through the action of government.” Militarism of the prewar stripe will
not be resurrected in Japan. Those committed to the letter and spirit of Article
9 are pitted against those trying to weaken it gradually.
For the past forty years, I have been involved in this debate as an educator
and as a writer of school textbooks. Thus I have observed at first hand how
the Ministry of Education (MOE) shapes what the youth of Japan learn about
their country’s behavior during the militarist period before 1945. I am not
attributing the Pacific War (1931-45) to the influence of textbooks alone.
However, there is no doubt that the emphasis on militarism in the curricu-
lum, combined with the media’s glorification of war and the government’s
suppression of pacifist and liberal views, was a major factor in socializing
the great majority of Japanese to support aggression enth~siastically.’~ The
generation who lived through the war need no scholarly proof of this; they
know it from personal e~perience.’~ This fanku (a 31-syllable poem) by a
housewife appeared in a national newspaper: ”Millions of people / Were
killed by the official textbooks, / Japanese and Asians alike.”16
13. On the debate over changing Article 9, see, e.g., Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara,
”Japan’s National Security Policy: Structures, Norms, and Policies,” International Security, Vol.
17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 101, 103-104, 110. [Eds. note: on this and some subsequent notes, the
editors provided assistance with English-language citations and related notes, all of which were approved
by the author.]
14. See also Ienaga, The Pacific War, chap. 6, ”The War at Home: Democracy Destroyed.”
15. A soldier who participated in Japan’s bacteriological warfare experiments in China was
asked whether he felt pity for the human subjects of the experiment. He replied, ”Well. None
at all. We were like that already . . . we were already implanted with a narrow racism . . . If
we didn’t have a feeling of racial superiority, we couldn’t have done it. People with today‘s
sensibilities don’t grasp this. That’s why I’m afraid of the power of education.” Tamura, ”Unit
731,” Cook and Cook, Japan at War, p. 164.
16. The poet was Chika Mikihara, in Asahi Shimbun, July 26, 1981.
International Security 1 8 3 118 I
Before World War 11, primary school textbooks were written and issued by
the Ministry of Education (MOE); middle school textbooks were prepared by
private publishers in accordance with the MOE’s curriculum and had to be
approved by the ministry. Since the use of official authorized texts in the
nation’s schools was mandatory, the government effectively decided the
entire content of education for these grades. Classroom instruction closely
followed the textbooks; all pupils were taught the same material and beliefs.
Teachers instilled an identical consciousness in all the children under their
sway. Given the prominence accorded militaristic ideas, the schools were a
powerful instrument for maintaining the ”warfare state.”
The curriculum was loaded with militaristic notions even during the mod-
erate period of Taisho democracy (1912-26) after World War I. But when the
Japanese army seized Manchuria in 1931 and hostilities spread across China,
and even more after Japan went to war against the United States and Great
Britain in December 1941, pro-military sentiment became pervasive in the
textbooks. The following examples are drawn from these two periods.I7
THE 19205
Even during the comparatively liberal and peaceful period during which I
attended school (1920-31), when Japan was engaged in no conflicts abroad,
all the textbooks we used were laced with accounts that glorified war and
the military.
17. Reverence for the emperor and statism were the central values of prewar education and the
spiritual underpinnings of militarism. However, space limitations preclude a full discussion of
these issues; in this article I focus specifically on the glorification of war and the whitewash of
history in the curriculum.
Glorification of War in Japanese Education I 119
First, consider the coverage of Japanese history. Most of the section about
the Meiji period (1868-1912) in Elementary School Japanese History, Vol. 11, was
filled with accounts of Japan’s foreign wars.Is Combat was described as a
heroic undertaking in order to make a positive impression on young minds.
The treatment of the bombardment of Port Arthur and the battle of the
Tsushima Strait during the Russo-Japanese War (section six, chapter fifty-
one) is typical: “Our brave, loyal officers and men, resolved to repay His
Majesty’s benevolence with their lives, launched assault after assault and
finally seized Hill 203. From there they sank all the enemy warships that
were still hiding in the harbor. . . . [Admiral Togo’s] flagship Mikasa displayed
this message: ’This battle will decide the fate of our empire. Be more coura-
geous than ever before and do your best.’. . . . Amid fierce winds and raging
waves, our navy fought tenaciously. . . . It was the greatest naval victory of
all time.”
Ethics textbooks, even from the lowest grades, included militaristic con-
tent. A first-grade lesson cited an example from the battlefield: “Kiguchi
Kohei was hit by an enemy bullet and died, but the bugle was still at his
lips.”19 Lesson 16 of the second-grade ethics text was entitled “Loyalty”:
“Commander Hirose Takeo set out on a dark night to block the harbor
entrance at Port Arthur with a steamship. Braving enemy fire, he . . . was
about to leave the ship [when he discovered that] Chief Warrant Officer
Sugino was missing. The commander searched all over the boat three times.
[As he] finally . . . left the larger ship . . . he was hit by enemy fire and died
a glorious hero’s death.”*O
Fourth-graders were taught about Yasukuni Shrine, the Shinto shrine ded-
icated to the nation’s war dead? ”Yasukuni Shrine is on the Kudan Hill in
Tokyo. Men who died for the emperor and country are enshrined there. An
Imperial Messenger is present at the spring and autumn observances. Their
Imperial Majesties the Emperor and Empress attend certain special events.
The Emperor has ordained that those who have died for the sovereign and
the country should be enshrined and rites carefully performed. Mindful of
the Emperor's deep benevolence, we should emulate those who are interred
here and do our utmost for the sovereign and country."22
Textbooks used to teach the Japanese language and singing sought to
implant the military spirit through the emotions. Fourth-graders learned this
song in their Japanese lesson: "The cannons roar, the shells scream/ Standing
on the deck awash with waves/ The commander's call pierces the darkness:/
'Sugino, where are you? Are you there?'/ He searches every corner of the
boat three times;/ He calls but gets no answer, looks but finds no trace;/ The
boat gradually sinks beneath the waves;/ Enemy shells fly thick and fast/ The
commander moves to the small boat/ A flying shell, he is dead./ How tragic
his death outside Port Arthur/ Heroic Hirose's fame lives
In a fifth-grade music lesson entitled "Meeting at Suishiei," children
learned about the surrender of Port Arthur in a song glorifying the victory,
the emperor, and the meeting of the generals.24In the sixth grade students
memorized a song about "The Battle of Tsushima Strait": "Enemy vessels
are sighted/ and draw near/ 'This battle will decide / the fate of our empire./
Be more courageous than ever/ and do your best,'/ the flagship's ensign
signals./ Clear skies but strong winds and/ high waves off Tsushima Island./
Dawn in the eastern sky./ As the fog lifts/ the morning sun rises/ brightly
over the Japan Sea./ No way to escape!/ Russian ships are hit and sink;/ Some
surrender./ The enemy fleet is completely vanquished./ Long live the empire!
Long live the empire!"25
The textbooks for many subjects contained exciting accounts of great vic-
tories and soldiers' valor. Stories about Commander Hirose, the capture of
Port Arthur, and the battle of Tsushima Strait were repeated in different
contexts to pull the children' minds and hearts toward militarism.
China has repeatedly doubted our country's sincerity and many Japanese
residing there have been injured or killed. Some of our special rights in
Manchuria were even threatened. We frequently urged China to reflect on
its actions, but day by day Chinese actions became more violent. Finally, in
September 1931, Chinese troops blew up a section of the South Manchurian
Railroad. Our country had no choice but to dispatch troops and drive Chinese
forces out of Manchuria. These events are called the Manchurian
Incident. . . . 27 When the Manchurian Incident was over, Japan concluded
a truce with China and, through the mutual cooperation between the three
countries-Japan, Manchukuo and China-strove to create eternal peace in
the Orient. However, the Chinese government failed to comprehend our
sincerity and in a provocative act sought help from Europe and the United
States. Determined at all costs to expel the Japanese from the continent, the
Chinese built up their military forces and even tried to hinder the develop-
ment of Manchukuo. In July 1937, Chinese troops bombarded and attacked
Japanese units training at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing.28Japanese
residents, too, were violently attacked. To correct the mistaken views of the
Chinese and establish eternal peace in the Orient, Japan sent its righteous
forces into action. Our forces have continued their brilliant campaign on the
land and sea and in the air, unstintingly supported on the homefront by the
civilian populace. United in purpose, we shall persevere to accomplish this
great mission. We are laying the foundation for eternal peace in East Asia.
27. The explosion was in fact caused by Japan's Kwantung Army, and served as a pretext to
launch Japan's seizure of Manchuria. Fifteen years of death and destruction were sparked that
night by army officers acting illegally. See Ienaga, Pacific War, pp. 38-38, and sources there
cited.
28. Japanese control of Manchuria relied upon railway lines; the two that connected Peking
with Nanking and Hankow converged at the Marco Polo Bridge. Japanese troops on maneuvers
near the bridge on July 7, 1937, engaged Chinese troops in what became a pretext for widened
hostilities; Tienstin and Peking were in Japanese hands by the end of the month, and most
histories date the outbreak of Japan's war from this event.
29. Elementary School Reader, Vol. I (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1938).
30. Elementary School Reader, Vol. I11 (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1938).
lnternational Security 18:3 122 I
does. Sometimes we steal into the enemy’s port and suddenly attack his
warships. When the enemy vessel is weak, we remain on the surface and
sink him with our cannon or torpedoe~.”~’ Fifth-grade students read about
Major Tachibana in the Russo-Japanese War, who ignored danger and led
his troops under a ”hail of enemy bullets,” and who, ”hit in the right hand
. . . held his sword in his left” and led his unit to victory.32
In a sixth-grade Japanese-language class, pupils read a story about “The
Mechanized Unit”:
The tank unit commander hoisted a signal flag high. . . . The squadron
moved into combat formation and struck at the left flank of the enemy
tanks. . . . Ignoring the enemy’s cannon fire, which was exploding all around,
our tanks closed the distance. . . . The squadron sought out and attacked
enemy tanks, one after another. On the right side, one of our brave crews
rammed into an enemy tank. It was a free-for-all battle with some tanks
disabled and burning, others moving ahead. There was hand-to-hand fight-
ing between our infantry and engineer troops and theirs. Our forces suffered
considerable casualties but . . . the triumph brought great honor to the
fighting men of Japan.33
The 1941 Japanese language textbook for third-grade students had a song
entitled ”Brave Soldiers,” which glorified three soldiers, known as ”the hu-
man bombs,” who strapped explosive charges to themselves and charged
into Chinese barbed wire on the Shanghai front, killing themselves but
clearing the way for others.%
In the fourth grade, pupils learned a song about ”The Young Tankers”:
”They’ve come!/ The young tankers/ In their steel chariots/ In their steel
helmets/ Clang, clang, clang, clang/ Rumble, rumble!/ They’ve come!/ The
young tankers/ Lips clenched / Looking ahead/ Clang, clang, clang, clang/
Rumble, rumble!/ They’ve come!/ The young tankers/ Rolling over the enemy
trenches/ Clang, clang, clang, clang/ Rumble, rumble!”35
These examples show how prewar Japanese youth were i n d ~ c t r i n a t e d . ~ ~
31. Elementary School Reader, Vol. I11 (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1935).
32. Elementary School Reader, Vol. V (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1937).
33. Elementary School Render, Vol. VI (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1938). Although the fighting
under way in China was not explicitly mentioned, the Ministry of Education probably had the
spreading conflict in mind when it prepared this text. News from the battlefield was severely
censored; nothing about atrocities was reported. Coverage was slanted to emphasize “friend-
ship’’ betwen Japanese and Chinese with, for example, photographs of Imperial Army soldiers
patting Chinese children on the head.
34. Elementary School Mirsic, Vol. I11 (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1941).
35. Elementary School Music,Vol. IV (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1941).
36. Elemeritary School Mirsic, Vol. IV (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1941). A Japanese historian
Glorification of War in Iapanese Education 123 I
Such militaristic conditioning ended with Japan’s defeat. In 1948 the Occu-
pation abolished the system of official texts and refashioned education along
American lines. Ultra-nationalistic material was banned from textbooks but
otherwise enormous latitude was permitted. New textbooks still had to be
certified, however, because SCAP feared the inclusion of objectionable, un-
democratic passages. The Occupation wanted to end government authori-
zation, and hoped that commercial publishers would bring out varied and
distinctive texts. Initially the Occupation intended to allow local boards of
education, which were then elected, to certify textbooks; the Ministry of
Education was only supposed to approve texts until the paper shortage was
over. However, the authority was never actually transferred to the boards of
education; the Ministry retained the prerogative.
During the period that government-certified textbooks were still subject to
Occupation censorship; especially in the immediate postwar years, the books
and supplementary readers had strong, explicit statements about Japan’s role
in the Pacific War. For example, the Ministry of Education’s 1947 publication
Atarashii kenpo no hanashi (Our new constitution) contained this passage:
Many of your fathers and older brothers went off to serve in the war. Have
they come back safely? Or did they never come back? Many of you probably
lost homes and family members in the air raids. The war is finally over.
Don’t you think that sad and terrifying experience should never be repeated?
What did Japan gain from the war? Nothing. Was not the only result enor-
mous grief and suffering? War destroys human life and culture. The countries
that started World War I1 must bear a grave responsibility.
Citing the need to prepare for war, [the state] enormously expanded military
expenditures and armaments, imposed tight controls on industry and re-
stricted speech and thought. The military trumpeted grandiose strategies of
has said, “When I was a teenager, we had no other books than those with the ’Imperial-nation’
view of history. . . . The goal of our education was only to create men who would fervently
throw away their lives for the sake of the Emperor, men who were full of loyalty. We had no
way of knowing anything other than what we knew. Therefore, we just did what we were told,
and we did it believing in it. . . . We went out without even having a healthy fear of war and
ended u p being slaughtered.” Ota Masahide, “A Quest for Meaning,” Cook and Cook, Japan at
War, p. 429.
International Security 18:3 124I
As the Cold War raged, however, the Occupation modified its policy.
I have been writing high school Japanese history textbooks since 1952 and
have detailed personal knowledge of how the system works. What follows
are some of the more striking examples from my own experiences-the kind
of intervention that makes me apprehensive about the revival of jingoistic
values in Japan. I have not been pressured to include specific phrases that
flagrantly glorify war or praise the military; rather, the government has
sought to exclude as much as possible vivid depictions of the horrors of war,
and of Japan's responsibility for war and war crimes. I consider this a con-
scious tilt toward militarism.
In 1952, 1955, and 1957, I submitted manuscripts for high school history
textbooks to the MOE. Although examiners challenged my wording in places,
the issues were resolved and the manuscripts were approved. In 1963, how-
ever, the MOE rejected my manuscript for the third edition of Shin Nihonshi
(A new history of Japan, first published in 1953). The MOE objected to
numerous passages whose deletion was thus mandatory before the book
37. In 1956 and again in 1957, several hundred issued statements protesting censorship.
Glorification of War in Japanese Education 125 I
38. In the MOE textbook approval system, if an author resubmits a manuscript without revising
the challenged portions, it is automatically rejected.
39. The picture showed maimed veterans begging for money; the caption was: “The war has
ended but many soldiers lost their limbs. Their sad figures most eloquently express the meaning
of the words in the Constitution’s Preface: ’Resolved that never again shall we be visited with
the horrors of war through the action of government’.”
International Security 18:3 126 I
footnote: ”In Germany, the Allied Forces conducted military trials. Subse-
quently, the Germans vigorously pursued the issue of war responsibility by
bringing more Nazis to justice. In Japan, only trials by the Allied forces were
held; Japanese conducted no war crimes proceedings.” This was a rare in-
stance where I was able to turn the tables on an examiner.
In 1981, I submitted another high school history text manuscript to the
MOE for review. I wrote: ”The Chinese . . . resisted Japanese aggression and
desperately tried to regain their sovereignty.” The examiner commented: ”In
writing about your own country, shouldn’t you reconsider, from a pedagog-
ical perspective, the use of value-laden words in a textbook?” Objecting to
the word “invasion,” the examiner said, “Regarding Japan, as well, you have
used the expression ’military advance‘ at least twice. To standardize termi-
nology, couldn’t you repeat it again?“ I refused to make the change and left
the word ”invasion” in the manuscript. In this case, it was approved. Al-
though I could not read the examiner’s mind, I believe that his acquiescence
was related to a 1970 court decision that favored my position in my lawsuit
against the the MOE, described below.
I had also written: ”Immediately after the occupation of Nanjing, Japanese
forces killed a large number of Chinese soldiers and civilians. This is known
as the Nanjing atrocities.” The examiner objected: “How can you tell it was
’immediately after’? Furthermore, this wording could be misinterpreted as
indicating that the army officially sanctioned it. . . . One could say ’During
the confusion of the occupation of Nanjing many Chinese soldiers and civil-
ians were killed.’ Although embarrassing to Japan, it is a fact. If you would
write the sentence this way, it would be within the guidelines. Please recon-
sider your wording. The present construction, particularly the words ’Japa-
nese forces,’ suggests that [the killings] were systematically carried out by
the Japanese army.”40
The approved version reads as follows: ”Japanese forces crushed the
staunch Chinese defense and occupied Nanjing. Enraged by their heavy
casualties, the troops killed a large number of Chinese soldiers and civilians.
40. Japanese soldiers murdered, raped, and brutalized Chinese civilians and prisoners in the
weeks following the capture of Nanking on December 12, 1937. How many were killed is the
subject of dispute, but estimates range as high as 200,000 to 300,000; Japanese sources generally
give lower numbers. The rest of the world learned of the “Rape of Nanking” or “Nanking
Incident” from the accounts of survivors and of foreign residents and visitors to Nanking, but
little news of the atrocities reached Japan at the time. See Cook and Cook, japan at War, p. 39
and sources there cited.
Glorification of War in Japanese Education I 127
41. Published as Shin Nihonshi (New Japanese history) (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1983).
42. On Unit 731, see “Germ War Exhibit Begins Japan Tour,” Boston Globe, July 6, 1993, p. 40;
Tamura Yoshio, “Unit 731,” Cook and Cook, lapan at War, pp. 158-167; Peter Williams and
David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War I1 (New York: Free Press,
1989); Robert Gomer, John W. Powell, Bert V.A. Roling, “Japan’s Biological Weapons: 1930-
1945,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1981; Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945, pp, 188-
189 and sources there cited (p. 288).
43. Tracy Dahlby, “Japan’s Texts Revise WWII: ’Invasion’ becomes ’Advance’; Asians become
Irate,” Washington Post, July 28, 1982, p. Al; the 1982 PRC and ROK protests are detailed in
Beer, Freedom of Expression in lapan, pp. 271-273.
International Security 28:3 228I
Recent Events
In 1989, when the curriculum was completely revised, the Ministry of Edu-
cation, in another move to undermine the pacifist spirit of the Constitution,
suggested forty-two individuals who might be included in the textbooks as
historical figures and explained by teachers. One was Admiral Heihachiro
Togo, whose actions provoked the Sino-Japanese War.46The notion of ele-
mentary school pupils studying Togo drew fire even before the new curric-
ulum was announced. A letter to the editor of the Asahi Shimbun went to the
heart of the matter: ”Togo was a professional soldier and is inappropriate for
discussion in elementary schools where a major objective is [should be] to
explain Japan’s rejection of war and the importance of peace. . . . The
44. Saburo Ienaga, ”The Historical Significance of the Japanese Textbook Lawsuit,” Bulletin of
Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fall 1970); Ronald P. Dore, ”Textbook Censorship in
Japan: The Ienaga Case, Notes and Comment,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Winter 1970-71).
45. “Text author wins damages”; “Court awards 300,000 yen in censorship suit”; ”Textbook
screening upheld; historian’s 28-year suit fails.” For background, see Lawrence W. Beer, “Edu-
cation, Politics and Freedom in Japan: The Ienaga Textbook Review Cases,” Law in Japan, Vol.
8 (1975);Beer, Freedom of Expression in Japan, pp. 264-270.
46. Togo commanded the Japanese squadron that sank Chinese vessels on the open sea prior
to an official declaration of war.
Glorification of War in Japanese Education 129 I
appearance of Togo Heihachiro means not only that a soldier is now offered
as a role model to young children but the distinct possibility that war itself
will be presented as a legitimate a~tivity.”~’
Even the conservative politician serving as education minister at the time,
Gentaro Nakajima, was against the inclusion of Togo in the course of study.
However, he was replaced in a routine cabinet reshuffle in December 1988
by Takeo Nishioka, who approved the proposal.48 On March 9, 1989, Ni-
shioka held an extraordinary briefing for foreign journalists to allay suspi-
cions from abroad that the change heralded a revival of militarism. But as
Beijing radio reported a few days later, at the press conference Minister of
Education Nishioka stated that “through the Sino-Japanese War and the
Russo-Japanese War Japan had built up its national power and enhanced its
international standing.” The Chinese report noted that Admiral Togo was
recommended as a historical figure worthy of inclusion in textbooks and
charged that, “A Japanese cabinet minister is again glorifying aggressive
war.”49
But by 1991, all eight approved elementary school social studies textbooks
contained references to Admiral Togo, the first mentions of him in postwar
texts.50As we have seen, the Battle of Tsushima was prominently featured
in prewar official textbooks and now, after an absence of forty-six years, that
”glorious event” has been resurrected. It is not only the Chinese who are
alarmed at this revival; many Japanese as well feel very uneasy. Here is a
typical letter to the editor:
51. During the same visit, ”Akihito expressed ’deepest regret for the sufferings and pain’ Japan
inflicted on Korea during its colonial rule from 1910 to 1945. Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki
Kaifu extended his ’sincere remorse and honest apologies.’ Kaifu’s apology was Japan’s clearest
statement of regret over its military past. . . . . Roh’s visit [to Japan] sparked far bigger protests
in South Korea. Before he left, radicals and human rights groups demonstrated almost daily,
demanding that he cancel his visit. One man slashed his abdomen with a knife in protest in
front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul.” ”Roh urges Koreans to forgive Japanese,” Boston Globe,
May 27, 1990, p. 15.
52. Yoshiaki Miyakawa (letter to the editor), ”The Gods of War Return,” Asahi Shimbun, June 7,
1991.
53. See “Text Glosses Over Japan’s War Actions,” Washington Post, May 29, 1986, p. A18.
54. On the opinion by Justice Radhabinod Pal of India (the sole dissenter from the Tribunal‘s
opinion), see John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York:
Pantheon, 1986), pp. 37-38. See also Ienaga, “Bias in the Guise of Objectivity,” The japan
Interpreter, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Winter 1977), pp. 271-278.
Glorification of War in Iapanese Education 131 I
Fleet led by Togo Heihachiro fought Russia’s Baltic fleet in the Tsushima
Strait and won one of the greatest victories in naval history.” Japan’s victory
is a fact, of course, but to emphasize it in this way encourages jingoism.
Among the consequences of the Russo-Japanese War, the authors list the
following: ”Japan’s victory had a profound effect on other countries. The
ability of little Japan to halt huge Russia’s southward expansion and maintain
its independence bolstered the confidence of many Asians such as China’s
Sun Yat-sen and India’s Nehru, and inspired independence movements in
Turkey, Egypt, Poland, Finland and elsewhere.” There is no mention that
the war led to Japan’s seizure of Korea.
The book‘s account of the battle for Okinawa at the end of World War I1
celebrates sacrifice for the state: ”In Okinawa, civilian Defense Units, which
included male and female secondary school students . . . fought alongside
the soldiers against U.S. forces for three months, suffering very heavy cas-
ualties. The garrison was completely annihilated.” Particular attention is paid
to the “Okinawan student soldiers”:
Some middle school boys were formed into the Invincible Imperial Corps
and others into a communications unit. Members of the former put impro-
vised explosives on their backs and threw themselves at enemy tanks or
made bayonet charges into enemy positions. The latter braved a hail of bullets
to deliver messages and commands. Girl students were organized into the
Himeyuri [Star Lily] Corps and assigned as nurses in a field hospital where
they treated wounded soldiers within range of enemy artillery fire. About
1,400 boy and 400 girl students gave their lives in the battle for Okinawa.
55. In another book, a survivor of the ”Lily Corps” described how her companions perished,
blowing themselves up with a grenade after fleeing in terror from U.S. soldiers who offered
rescue because, “from the time we’d been children, we’d been educated to hate them.” She
said, ”What we had been taught robbed us of life. I can never forgive what education did to
us! Had we known the truth, all of us would have survived.” Miyagi Kkuko, “Students Nurses
of the ’Lily Corps’,” Cook and Cook, lapan at War, p. 360.
International Security 18:3 132 I
Although the regular review period had ended, the MOE "requested" that
the authors make additional changes. The final published version was greatly
toned down.56
Conclusion
Looking back over the past decade, I see scant possibility of a revival of the
militarism that overwhelmed prewar Japan. Yet we must be mindful of the
constant strengthening of the Self-Defense Forces to the point where they
now rank among the major military organizations in the world and have
been dispatched overseas (minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf after
the U. S.-led war against Iraq; peacekeeping operations in Cambodia). Public
opinion has shifted; for example, the number of Japanese who believe the
existence of the Self-Defense Forces is compatible with the Constitution is
much greater than in the past. The Social Democratic Party of Japan, formerly
the Japan Socialist Party, has softened its position against the Self-Defense
Forces. The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo)-once a fierce
opponent of the Self-Defense Forces and a staunch defender of Article 9-is
now gone. This trend is even stronger since SDF units were dispatched to
Cambodia in 1991 to participate in the UN operation there.
Furthermore, there is an increasing promilitary slant in education that I
have documented above.57It is not surprising therefore that China and other
Asian nations fear a resurgence of militarism in this country. Having paid
the terrible price of imperialistic expansion in the past, many Japanese share
those misgivings.
56. For this episode, see Ienaga testimony in the third textbook lawsuit, August 30, 1988, and
September 27, 1988; Kokumin shiso tosei no tame no kyokasho kentei (Textbook certification: Thought
control in action) (Tokyo: National Council to Support the Lawsuits against Textbook Certifica-
tion, September 1988), pp. 95-97.
57. For more examples, see Colin Nickerson, "In Japan, war and forgetfulness," Boston Globe,
August 15, 1988, p. 6; Urban C. Lehner, "Changed History: More Japanese Deny Nation Was
Aggressor During World War 11: Youths Learn Little of Era; Spread of Revisionist View Irks
Many Other Asians: Was Nanking Really Raped," Wall Street Journal, September 8, 1988, pp. 1,
16; Susan Chira, "For Japanese, A Book Drops A War Lesson," New York Times, October 5, 1988,
p. A5. The latter discusses right-wing pressure on the MOE to drop a previously approved
English-language textbook that contained a lesson called "War." Cf. Michael Richardson, "From
Japanese Schoolchildren, a Lesson for their Elders; Without awareness, Asian officials say, Japan
will never be able to dispel lingering resentment throughout the region," lnternational Herald
Tribune, October 26-27, 1991.
Glorification of War in Japanese Education 133 I
58. Another example is described in David E. Sanger, ”Mayor Who Faulted Hirohito Is Shot,”
New York Times, January 19, 1990, p. A6; David E. Sanger, ”Elements of Japan’s Far Right Praise
Shooting of Mayor Motoshima,” New York Times, January 26, 1990, p. A3.